




13th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON

THAI STUDIES

GLOBALIZED THAILAND? CONNECTIVITY, CONFLICT,
AND CONUNDRUMS OF THAI STUDIES

15-18 JULY 2017 CHIANG MAI, THAILAND

PROCEEDINGS



Volume 2: H-K



March 2018

ICTS 13 Conference Secretariat

Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development (RCSD)

Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand

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VOLUME 2: H-K

Volume 2: Table of Contents

CHANGES IN BUILDING MATERIALS AND HOUSE STYLES AMONG TAI-KHUN OF NORTHERN THAILAND

Hara, Yusuke; Shimizu, Ikuro; Tanskanun, Pranom & Sooksawasdi, Surasawasdi449

BUILDING STUPAS AND CONSTRUCTING CHARISMA IN THE MYANMAR-THAI BORDER REGION

Hayami, Yoko465

THE URBAN AS METHODOLOGY: CRITICAL URBAN PEDAGOGY AROUND CHIANG MAI

Heng, Mark480

THE SILVER GUARDIAN DEMON OF THE JUNGLE: MATERIALITY AND MODERN BUDDHISM IN THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SHAN REBELLION IN THAILAND, 1900S-1920S

Hongsaton, Preedee506

CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND CULTURAL STEREOTYPES IN TOURISM - CHINESE TOURISTS IN THAILAND

Huang, Ming & Qin, Shiyu519

CLIMATE MITIGATION INITIATIVES: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOREST AND GLOBAL WARMING IN TWO KAREN COMMUNITIES

Huete, Alejandro Alfredo528

BEING LEFT BEHIND: TRADITIONAL MEDICINE PRACTICE AND UN-BELONGING

Hunter, Assunta547

THE THAI SENIOR GENERATIONS UNDER TRANSITION: INCREASING URBANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY IN AN INDUSTRIAL PERI-URBAN DISTRICT AND AN EMERGING TOURISTIC TOWN

Hutanuwatr, Khanin; Charoentrakulpeeti, Wanpen & Wungaeo, Surichai562

**POLITICAL POLARIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY RADIO AND THE MEANING OF
DEMOCRACY**

Inthajakra, Phatmai.....577

***ANISONG* MANUSCRIPTS ON THE *BUN PHAWET* FESTIVALS IN LAOS: STUDYING THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANUSCRIPTS AND SERMONS**

Jaengsawang, Silpsupa590

**GERMAN MIGRANTS IN PATTAYA: NEGOTIATING CROSS-CULTURAL MARRIAGE,
FAMILY AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THAILAND**

Jaisuekun, Kwanchanok & Sunanta, Sirijit612

**THE PARADOX OF MORALITY: THE CULTURAL FORCES OF EMOTION IN THAI
POLITICAL CONFLICTS**

Jarernpanit, Thannapat625

**ON THE EFFECT OF COMMUNICATION OF *ROMANCE OF THE THREE KINGDOMS IN
THAILAND*: THE ROLE OF FEEDBACK IN CROSS-CULTURAL LITERATURE
COMMUNICATION**

Jin, Yong.....643

**CONFLICTS, MARGINALIZATION AND THE CREATION OF MODERN NATION-STATE:
THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PATTANI AND OKINAWA**

Jundittawong, Tanapat654

DIGITAL HUMANITIES RESEARCH APPROACH FOR FOLKSONGS STUDIES

Kaewboonma, Nattapong & Tuamsuk, Kulthida.....664

**JAPANESE ROLLING STOCK ON THAI RAILWAYS: FROM STEAM LOCOMOTIVES TO
SHINKANSEN?**

Kakizaki, Ichiro674

CULTURAL POLITICS OF LONG BOAT RACING FESTIVAL IN NAN PROVINCE

Kanatham, Suthira697

**AN ANALYSIS OF FILIPINO'S IDENTITY IN THAI-ASEAN JUVENILE BOOKS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR FILIPINO PSYCHOLOGY**

Kanchina, Yingyot & Petras, Jayson D.....708

QING CHINA'S VIEW OF THE SIPSONGPANNA IN THE 1720S

Kato, Kumiko.....727

**THE PAPERWORK DONE BY THE SIAMESE GOVERNMENT DURING THE REIGN OF KING
RAMA III: A CASE OF THE DOCUMENTS USED IN THE PROCESS OF RECEIVING
TAX-IN-KIND**

Kawaguchi, Hiroshi.....739

DISCOURSES, POWER, AND COMMUNICATION ABOUT THAI THERAVADA BHIKKHUNIS

Keeratiwasin, Phongphan & Kleechaya, Phnom754

**SANDONTA ANCESTOR WORSHIP: FROM FAMILY RITUAL TO PROVINCIAL TRADITION
OF SURIN PROVINCE**

Khowdee, Sarapee768

**OPERATIONAL PROCESS AND NEW EXPERTISE OF A PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
SERVICE FOREST RESTORATION PROJECT, MAE SA WATERSHED, NORTHERN
THAILAND**

King, Eza.....782

**IDENTITY TRANSITION: AN OVERVIEW ON TAI KHAMPTI TRIBE IN ARUNACHAL
PRADESH, INDIA**

Komow, B.....798

**RETRACING THE SHARED CULTURE: TAI AITONS OF ASSAM AND TAI LUANGS OF
MAEHONGSON, THAILAND**

Konwar, Juri Gogoi & Namtham, Wanlaya812

LAND GRABBING AND THE RIGHT TO BORDER LAND TENURE AT SI SA KET PROVINCE

Krisanachuta, Surasom.....823

**CULTURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT OF THE STREET CULTURE: A STUDY OF
PROMOTING AND PRESERVING ON CRAFTS IN THE NIGHT WALKING STREET MARKET
IN CHIANG MAI PROVINCE, THAILAND**

Kuankham, Satiya831

**CONTESTED LEGITIMACY ON LAND ACCESS: DOUBLE MOVEMENT IN SEZS: CASE
STUDY IN TAK, CHIANG RAI AND TRAT PROVINCE**

Kuaycharoen, Pornpana; Chotiwan, Phurinat & Damkaew, Tiwat844

**PEOPLE'S POLITICS IN THAILAND: LESSONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENT
PRACTICES IN COMMUNITY AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY**

Kunphoommarl, Montri & Kunphoommarl, Sirinapa858

**KNOWLEDGE ORGANIZATION OF I-SAN PROVERBS (PHA-YA) FOR SEMANTIC
RETRIEVAL**

Kwiecien, Kanyarat; Kingsawat, Krongkaew & Junlabuddee, Sompetch868

Changes in Building Materials and House Styles Among Tai-Khun of Northern Thailand

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Abstract

In Thailand, various ethnic groups have been building diverging form of the house according to their own culture for a long time. Moreover, the house has been built under the influence of a climate and ecological environment. It allows people to make use of various recourses as building materials and as a result, build various form of house. Commonly, bamboo, wood, grass, and leaf of the palm have been used in many ways as post, beam, floor, wall, and roof.

However, in Thailand, economy has been gradually recovered since after the end of last century's what is called Asian Financial Crisis, and we can see wherever in Thailand, the house form has been impressively changed today. The use of industrial products such as brick, RC, steel, and slate, caused the changes. In the city, it is quite common that new materials are used in the construction today. It can also be seen in the remote village. Stilt, or raised floor form of the house transformed one-storied, ground floor house.

This article aims to show the changing process of the building materials based on the intensive research in Ban Ton Haen Noi, a Tai-Khun village of Chiang Mai. We also show the changes of the material causes, in some, the changes of inhabitant's everyday life. On the contrary, we will analyze what has not been changed in the house even after the installing new materials.

Keywords: Northern Thai, Wooden Stilt House, House Form, Building Materials, Transformation Process

1. Introduction

In Southeast Asia, various ethnic groups have been living in their traditional houses. These houses were built based on the climatic and natural environment of the land. Therefore, different building materials were used by different groups, which gave rise to a wide variety of architectural styles. Roofs, walls, and pillars were built from natural materials such as bamboos, palm leaves, barks, and logs. The house styles and the building materials used varied from one ethnic group to another. However, the houses were mostly made of wood and were stilted.

In Thailand, the economy has been gradually developing since the mid-20th century. The house styles in the cities and villages have greatly changed. However, traditional houses are still seen now in the remote villages. In northern Thailand, traditional and modern houses coexist despite their different architectural styles.

A number of researchers have investigated the space constitution and building styles of Thai houses. However, there are only a limited number of studies on changes in materials and structures, including the changes brought about by modern skills and the tools of carpenters. Therefore, we intend to study Ban Ton Haen Noi, a Tai-Khun village of Chiang Mai in this article. We analyze how architectural styles of houses have been transformed by cultural factors such as the individual lifestyle changes (e.g., the use of electrical appliances) and the changes in social factors (e.g., religion, economy, and politics). Then, we consider the building materials, the skills of carpenters, the tools used, and the structure.

2. Methods

Investigations

We performed a fact-finding survey of the houses, and interviewed the village inhabitants and the village carpenters as part of our investigations. We divided the interview contents for the inhabitants into three items: extension and renovation, family, and lifestyle. The interviews with the carpenters had five items: basic intelligence of the carpenter, the plan and the design of the house, the team and the tool of the carpenter, building materials, and the construction periods and costs. The interviews were conducted over two phases. The investigation locations are shown in Fig. 2-1.

(1) The first phase: We conducted the first set of investigations from September 15 to September 19, 2015. Four houses and two carpenters were targeted.

(2) The second phase: We conducted the second set of investigations from September 25 to September 30, 2016. Our target was six houses (of which one inner house was under construction) and one carpenter.



Figure 2-1: Investigation Locations

Description of Investigation Locations

The Ban Ton Haen Noi village is located about 30 km to the south of the city area of Chiang Mai. It is located along the Khan River, which is a branch of the Ping River. Ban Ton Haen Noi merges with another village located in the neighborhood across the river. The population of the village is 661 people, and

there were 200 houses¹. Though it is located at a distance of only 30 km from the city area, many people continued living in the traditional wooden stilt houses.

3. Survey Results of Houses and Inhabitants

Classification by House Types

We focused on the body structure and the use of building materials, and classified the ten houses that we surveyed. One wooden stilt house used a base of reinforced concrete (RC) (see Fig. 3-1). We call this the "RC base Type." Other than the wooden stilt house, concrete blocks or brick masonry structures were seen for the first floor; a wooden second floor was seen. For this type of house, the part under the floor of the wooden stilt house was extended. Therefore, we called this house type as "House with Extended Room Under a Floor" (Fig. 3-2). In addition, the house of two stories or the one-story houses that used industrial products in the structure body except were seen. We define this type of house as a "Modern House."² (see Fig. 3-3)

Based on this classification, we observed the following styles: five houses were "RC base Type"; three houses were "House with Extended Room Under a Floor"; and two houses were "Modern House." Many of the houses were built from the 1950s through the 1960s. However, the "Modern House" styles were built during the 2000s.



Figure 3-1: base of RC Figure 3-2: "House with Extended Room Under a Floor"



Figure 3-3: "Modern House"

¹ It is the data at the time of the second investigation.

² Modern means the progressing generation. Therefore, I show the house where it could be said the newest type now with "Modern House".

Changes in Building Materials

In this section, we consider the transformation of the house style from that based on the changes in building materials. We targeted the pillar, roof, wall, window, and floor materials. Based on their year of construction, we studied the changes in building materials used (see Table 3-1). We have also noted the building materials used before any repair was done.

Table 3-1: Year of Construction and Building Materials

Year Part	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	Legend
Pillar	○		○○	○○	○		Under construction	⊕ ⊕	○ Wood ⊕ Wood+RC
Roof	△		△△	△	△	?	Under construction	☆ ☆	△ Roof tile ○ Wood ☆ Slate ? Unknown
Wall	○		○○	○○	○		Under construction	□ ■	○ Wood □ Wood+Block ■ Brick
Window	○		○○	○○	○		Under construction	⊕ ?	○ Wood ⊕ Wood+Glass ? Unknown
Floor	○		○○	○○	○		Under construction	⊕ □	○ Wood ⊕ Wood+Tile □ Tile

In all houses, wood was used for pillars. In northern Thailand, a lot of teakwood is used to build traditional houses. A characteristic of teak is that it is very strong, and it has excellent water resistance. In addition, it is easy to saw teak. Therefore, teak has been used traditionally not only for pillars but also for the walls and floors. However, the price of teakwood had been soaring for approximately ten years. Therefore, In Ban Ton Haen Noi, teakwood was hardly being used for construction.

The use of the RC pillars was seen in houses built after the 2010s (see Fig. 3-4). The RC pillar was used together with a pillar of the wood. It is assumed that the RC pillar came to be used from 1990s through 2000s. After this change in the use of building materials, houses were no longer being built using only wood. However, wood is even now commonly used for pillars. Therefore, wood pillars and RC pillars are used now.

Currently, in many houses, slate or zinc-coated steel is used for the roof, but clay roof tiles were common until about the 1970s. The dimensions of the clay roof tiles were approximately 300 mm × 200 mm (see Fig. 3-5). The shapes of these tiles varied marginally because the craftsmen make the tiles in different areas, but clay remained the traditional building material for tiles. However, with the decrease of craftsmen, it is rare to see a house with a tiled roof. The roof materials changed to industrial products, and it is often reroofed using slate or zinc-coated steel (see Fig. 3-6).

In the house under construction, the use of a roof insulator was seen (see Fig. 3-7). According to the carpenter who built the house, roof insulators have become popular in the last ten years. Therefore, in the “Modern House,” new building materials, such as roof insulators, were used as protection against the heat.



Figure 3-4: RC Pillar Fig. Figure 3-5: Clay Roof Tile Fig.



Figure 3-6: Slate Fig. Figure 3-7: Roof Insulator Fig.

Commonly, the wall is comprised of a wooden board, which is similar to a "Modern House." However, in the house built after the 2010s, the use of industrial products, such as the blocks and bricks, are seen (see Fig. 3-8, Fig. 3-9). Concrete block are used mainly. Blocks and bricks started being used from the 1990s through 2000s. After construction styles were changed, houses were no longer built using wooden boards only like traditional houses.

In the house built in 2011, the living room part of the second floor is made of a wooden board, and the kitchen is made of a concrete block masonry structure. The kitchen or bathroom is made of industrial products because they involve water pipes and drainage facilities. Meanwhile, a case to use wood for a living room part is seen. There is still a great demand for wood now. In this house, the walls were double to protect against heat. On the roof, new building materials, such as roof insulators, were used as measures against the heat. The walls were also double walls. In the house under construction, the wall was made of brick masonry structure without using any wood. However, there was still a demand for wood, but the wall materials gradually changed to industrial products, such as bricks and blocks.

Fig. 3-8 Brick Fig. Fig. 3-9 Block Fig.



It is common to attach a wooden door to a window (see Fig. 3-10). In the house built in 2011, a glass window was attached to the sliding door, and a wooden door was also used (see Fig. 3-11). Several houses had frosted glass windows, but sliding doors made of glass were not common.



Figure 3-10: Wooden Door Fig. Figure 3-11: Glass Window Fig.

On the floor, a woodcut and a tile were used. In the wooden stilt house, a wooden board was spread. A tile was used in the first floor in the “House with Extended Room Under a Floor.” In the two-story modern house, tiles were used in the first floor and wooden boards were used in the second floor mainly. The wood board was highly accurate. As the part that is comprised of an RC pillar and a block is all the floors tiling. The house under construction was a one-story house; therefore, tiles were used on the floor.

Extension and Renovation of the House

Most of the roof repairing happened during the extension and renovation of houses. Six of the nine houses, except the house under construction, had repaired their roofs. In many cases, the roof was renewed using slate from the clay roof tile. The reason for the main repair was a leakage. Roofs made of clay tiles easily undergo wear and tear because of the wind and rain; therefore, slate and zinc-coated steel are preferred because they are stronger.

Second, most items is the extension of the room under the floor, three of the nine houses are worth it. In many cases, the wall of the extension consisted of concrete blocks or brick masonry structures between

pillars; therefore, wooden walls were no longer seen. The extended room had various uses, for example, it could be used by a child or could be made a warehouse. In two houses, the rooms were extended because a child had grown up and needed space. The idea of the need for privacy with the growth of the child produced the need for personal space in the house; therefore, the house style was transformed. It is considered that many “House with Extended Room Under a Floor” were changed for this reason.

In three houses, the restrooms were also extended (see Fig. 3-12, Fig. 3-13). The bathroom included a toilet and a shower. This was not the case in the wooden stilt houses; in these houses, mostly the bathroom was located some distance away from the main building. However, people faced several problems as stated by some participants: “In the case of a flood, we cannot go to the bathroom” and “It is hard for my aged father to go up and down the stairs for the restroom.” Old age makes movement difficult; therefore, extending the bathroom was very helpful for the elderly.



Figure 3-12: Restrooms Were Also Extended Figure 3-13: Restrooms Fig (Inside).Fig (Outside).

Houses with extended kitchens were also seen. In Thailand, people like to spend time in cool areas under the common floor space; in many cases, they eat in open spaces such as in detached rooms without walls. The most common reason for extending the kitchen was to accommodate the rice granary.

In a traditional house, the bathroom and the kitchen were located outside the house. However, when these traditional houses were enlarged, these spaces were made part of the house; therefore, the residents could come and go without stepping outside the house. The main reason for extending the kitchen was for convenience in rainy weather.

Ideal House

In the second round of interviews, we asked questions about the people’s understanding of an ideal house. The average age of interviewees was 69 years; therefore, it was assumed that they did not hope to move and rebuild in future.

The inhabitant of the house under construction was living there for a long time; therefore, he had chosen a one-storied house in which he did not have to climb stairs. Also, the inhabitant had been a carpenter; therefore, he knew the troubles of elderly persons who lived in the stilted houses. Meanwhile, he used the roof insulator to improve the air-conditioning. The change of lifestyle because of the use of electrical appliances was also seen.

4. Results of Carpenter Survey

Investigation Contents

The interview with carpenters had five items: the basic intelligence of the carpenter, the plan and the design of the house, the team and the tool of the carpenter, building materials, and the construction periods and cost. We obtained information about the process of becoming a carpenter, the work contents, and the workload. We found that carpentry skills are often learned from family members. We also investigated the work range and the work contents of the carpenter. The carpenters interviewed explained how to decide the layout, how to make the roof inclined, and how to obtain the dimensions. Carpenters needed specific skills to make the roof slanted. To obtain the dimensions, we investigated the present measurement techniques and the times when there were no tapes for measurements. In regards to the team and the tool of the carpenter, we learned about the team members. We examined the tools used by the carpenter and grasped the actual situation of the carpenter and the skills that changed with the changes in tools. With investigated the choice and the procurement methods for building materials. The architectural styles of houses changed with changes in building materials. We also heard about the calculation method of construction periods and wages.

Intelligence of the Carpenter

Mr. D is Tai-Khun, and his age is 60 years. He has been doing the work of a carpenter from the age of 20. He became a carpenter because his father and uncle were carpenters. He first worked on probation, and later learned the technique from his seniors. In the beginning, he learned foundation construction. Currently, he does all the carpentry work regardless of whether it is a wooden construction and or an RC structure. He builds approximately three houses in one year.

Mr. K is Tai-Khun, and he is 78 years old. He has been a carpenter from the age of 26 years old to 70 years. Currently, he is retired. He became a carpenter because his uncle was carpenter. He started by learned planning. In his career, he did the carpentry of houses having wooden construction and RC structure. He has built temples and houses. When he began work, there was enough demand for wooden construction; however, houses of RC structure gradually increased. As his experience enlarged, he was able to build not only wooden structures but also RC structures.

Mr. W is from Ban Tong Haen Noi, and his age is 78 years. He became a carpenter because his senior was a carpenter. His main work was that of plastering; however, he also performed carpentry. He usually built temples, but he had built a house at the time of the interview. He said that it takes 1-2 years for the construction of a temple.

Many people became carpenters by being introduced to a relative or an acquaintance working as a carpenter. In many cases, they were introduced to persons who were carpenters. Most of the carpenters started off by learning foundation construction or planning. This is different for different carpentry teams. When they were on their own as carpenters, they were often in charge of overall carpentering. There were also times when they had a person with a skilled trade, such as a plasterer. The skills required to build a temple and a house are different. A temple is bigger than a house and superior construction technology is required; therefore, often the craftsman is in charge.

Plan and Design of the House

Mr. D does not generally draw the plan, and the layout is decided based on the overall size of house and the number of rooms required by the owner. He goes to look at the house of another person with the owner and sometimes refers to it. The size of the room is decided based on the length between the pillars counted backward from the floor space. In regards to thickness of the pillar, to see the materials that arrived, he decides appropriate size and saw up it. The number of the pillar uses a lucky number. The lucky number is in the book to build house. For example, there is the rule that floor joist and rafter must do in an odd number. The unit of length is based on the metric system. When there were no tapes for measurement, they used the human body dimensions. This was done by selecting one person who became the standard of dimensions. The length to be cut was decided by placing the square lumber on this person.

Mr. K can draw a plan, but in many of his projects, the plan was already drawn. When it is not drawn, he goes to see the house of the owner and other people. Then, he sketches the layouts, the room size, and the roof incline that the owner thought was good; he builds the house based on this. The roof incline was decided as one-third the length between a pillar in contact with rafters and the height of the ridge beam from a beam. If the owner wants to suppress some inclines, he makes it one-fourth the length instead of one-third. The unit of length he used was the metric system. When a tape measure was not available, they used human body dimensions. The distance from the elbow to the fingertip was one sook, and the distance between the thumb and the middle finger was one kheub; the width of the thumb was one ngiu. The house was built at four sooks at the height of the second floor from the ground surface of the stilted house; six sooks was the height of the pole plate from floor of the second floor.

Mr. W himself decided the layout of his house under construction. After deciding most layouts, he adjusted the area of the room. However, he changed the position of the pillar to accommodate his son's demand for a large room. However, he made a calculation mistake, and a gap occurred at the structure body of the roof and the position of the pillar. The unit of length that he used was the metric system. For the roof, he hired a specialized carpenter for construction; he paid the carpenter a salary of 100 baht/m². He chose a one-story house so that he could easily live in it even in his old age.

At the time of house construction, there were many cases in which there were no plans. Therefore, the carpenter decided the layout in consultation with the owner. The carpenter drew a rough layout based on the owner's opinion; it was usually just a sketch. In the case of a house plan, the custom of using a pillar and a floor joist as a lucky charm is still prevalent. For the roof, a traditional method was used to find the length of the beam from the ridge beam. In this way, house styles transform; nevertheless, a traditional plan method is still used. However, traditional methods are disappearing, such as the traditional unit of length; the metric system is now preferred over human body dimensions.

Team and Tools

The carpenter team of Mr. D has about 7-8 people. For big buildings, he gathers the carpenters of acquaintances also and builds a ten-member team. The name of the master carpenter is Salaa-Kao; the common carpenter is Salaa; the probationer is Luuk-Noong in Tai-Khun. Luuk-Noong is called Kama-Kong in Thai. The work is shared among the team members. The tools used include electric drills, electric planes, electric circular saws, desktop circle saws, impact drivers, routers, and levels (see Fig. 4-1, Fig. 4-2, Fig. 4-3). In the times without a level, for horizontal measurements, a tub was filled with water, and

a thread was immersed in it parallel to the surface of the water. Before the advent of electric tools, he used axes, hatchets, chisels, and wood planes.



Figure 4-1: Electric Plane Fig. Figure 4-2: Electric Drills Fig.



Figure 4-3: Router

The carpenter team of Mr. K has about 7-8 people. The name of the master carpenter is Salaa-Kao; the other is called Luuk-Noong. The work is shared. When Mr. K began as a carpenter, he was not only in charge, but he also helped other members. He prepared tools by himself; however, he retired from carpentering and handed over his tools to his son. Therefore, we could not confirm that.

The carpenter team of Mr. W had four people for house constructions and 14-15 people for temple construction. The name of the boss was Chang-Yai, which is also the name of the central part of Thailand. The name means Salaa-Kao. The common carpenter was called Charn, and the probationer did not have any name in particular. The tools used included the electric circular saw, the high-speed cutter, the sanding machine, an electric drill, a tape measure, a saw, a plasterer trowel, an electric plane, a plane, a chisel, a square, and a hammer.

The team of carpenters had approximately 7-8 people and a member; the number of people varied according to the day and the building. This is because many carpenters do other work such as agriculture. In many cases, the work is shared. The main carpenter's tool was an electric tool. They used axes and hatchets before the spread of electric tools. For the careful processing of the wood, a plane and a chisel are used now; these tools were inherited by the son.

Building Materials

Mr. D determines the necessary building materials, and the owner purchases it based on Mr. D's estimate. Sometimes, the owner and the carpenter go together for making the purchases. Therefore, the material cost is not included in the cost of construction. Ten years or more ago, the wood used was mainly teakwood. However, in recent years, the prices of teakwood have soared; therefore, its acquisition has become difficult. Therefore, Mr. D uses various other kinds of wood such as Chinese quince, Mai-Pao, and Mai-Yaang. He used the roof tile as roof material; however, there are hardly any craftsmen who could make roof tiles; therefore, they now use ready-made articles.

Mr. K was paid for all of the building materials by the owner. When the building materials were not available in the market, he fetched the gravel from the river.

Mr. W purchased the building materials on his own. After the arterial roads were inaugurated, it became easy to go to the building materials market nearby; therefore, he purchased the materials mainly from there. Sometimes, he went to the Chiang Mai center. The brick price was 2.6 baht /unit; the slate ridge tile price was 36 baht /unit; the price of slate roof tile was 15 baht /unit; and the cement price was 65 baht/bag. He used the teak that he planted by himself 22 years ago for the pillar. The roof was a steel structure, and only the material cost was more than 100,000 baht. A roof insulator was placed on the roof. Roof insulators had begun to spread almost ten years ago. The price of the roof insulator was 1,000 baht/roll (60 m). His way of construction was to examine the construction methods of other carpenters, and he also learned from the distributor of the roof insulator.

Owners often purchase the building materials. To do this, they often go to a building materials market. When there was no building materials market, they gathered materials from nature, processed, and used them. When building materials markets spread, most building materials came to be prepared in one place.

Construction Periods and Cost

Mr. D considered the construction periods in comparison with the house that he had built the previous time. The cost of construction was 2000–3000 baht/m². The cost of construction was not provided at the time of the completion; it was paid day by day. The number of people did not matter. Building the house of a relative was a little cheaper.

For Mr. K, generally the construction periods were approximately two months. He anticipated that it takes one-and-a half months if the house was small and 3-4 months if the house was bigish. The cost of construction was 4000–5000 baht/m².

Mr. W had not established the calculation method for the construction periods. Therefore, he said that it took approximately three months with 5-6 experienced people. Their salary would be 450 baht/day, and the plasterer who covers the wall with cement is paid 350 baht/day.

Therefore, construction costs were not rigid, and the amount of money earned varies. Construction periods do not have a rule, and the periods are estimated by the experienced team leader. Daily wages are paid, and the amount of money varies according to the type of job.

Skills of K and the Team

In the second phase, we heard about the skills required to be a carpenter and the ways of transmitting

these skills. Mr. J and Mr. T were members of Mr. K's carpenter group. Commonly, carpentry is learned directly from a relative and a senior. Mr. K and others also acquired the skill in the same manner. In the village, there is a custom of referring to the carpenters by their generation; therefore, Mr. K and others were called "the third-generation carpenters." The third-generation carpenters were handed down the skills from the second-generation carpenters. The second generation learned carpentry when they were taught how to build temples by the first generation. Therefore, it is possible that the first generation of carpenters were priests. The villager cooperated with the carpenters and built a house and a temple earlier. It is said that even the villagers acquired the skills of a carpenter with this experience. They learned carpentry by processing the wood, such as planning or making a joint, and they acquire skills so that they could work independently in 1-2 years.

Mr. K has gone to the vocational school of the carpenter in Chiang Mai; he uses a tape measure, and he has learned the metric system. However, earlier he used human body dimensions for measurements. After learning the metric system, he converted one sook into zero.5 m and built it. In this way, many carpenters started leaving the village and acquiring skills. Therefore, in the fourth and fifth generations, the custom of learning skills directly from a relative and or an elder decreased.

The tools of carpenters changed from imported to domestic. They used a steel square before the tape measure spread. This was done because in earlier days, they placed a steel square in the tub filled with water as a substitute for a level. Currently, they use a method called water leveling for measuring horizontality

5. Analysis of Structural Details

From the drawing of the houses that we made from measurement investigations, we analyzed the structural details and grasped the characteristics of the house in the village and the skills of the carpenter. The analysis objects were the junction of the pillar, the beam under the floor, and the roof truss (Fig. 5-1, Fig. 5-2).

The junction of the pillar and the beam had two pattern confirmations. The beam was placed on a pillar that had its top cut out, or the beam was put through a hole in the pillar. In Ban Ton Haen Noi, seven of eight houses seen had beams put through a hole in the pillar. If the beam was placed on the pillar that had its top cut out, then two beams were placed on the pillar and pinch it. If neither of this was the case, the floor joist was placed on the beam, and the floorboard was laid on the floor joist.

The roof was a Dutch gable roof, and the M-type and plural ridges were joined in a cross or a T shape. Three houses were seen with beams built in the center of the gable beam when there were one or two girders. In the case of one girder, the vertical roof strut was erected on the girder. However, in the case of two girders, the vertical roof strut was sandwiched by girders.

The styles of the junction of the pillar, the beam, and the roof truss were not related to the year of construction. In the house under construction, a steel frame was used for the roof truss. However, the shape of the roof truss was similar to a general wooden stilt house. The change of building materials was seen, but there were no major changes in the structure.




Figure 5-1: Junction of the pillar and the beam under the floor




Figure 5-2: Structural details of Dutch gable roof

6. Conclusions

In this article, we studied the architecture of houses in Ban Ton Haen Noi, a Tai-Khun village of Chiang Mai. We examined how and why the style changed from traditional structures to modern structures with changes in the available materials and the skills and tools of carpenters. We have shown the transformation of the house style and the work and skills of the carpenter.

Architectural House Style

The wooden stilt house used base of RC. However, an increasing number of houses had extended the part under the floor of wooden stilt houses. When building new houses, they chose two stories or a one-story house. There is little demand for stilted house now. Meanwhile, the building materials have varied from wood to industrial products. The pillar gradually varied from wood to RC, and the roof tile was reroofed using slate or zinc-coated steel; the wall changed to a concrete block from bricks. Glass windows were seen in some houses, and this is expected to spread in the future.

Houses using industrial products were not limited to “Modern House”; however, the measures against heat were characteristic of the “Modern House.” The measures against heat such as the use of roof insulators and double-walled houses started being used from the 2000s.

All this helped enhance the precision of sawmilling. In the future, airtight houses will need to be built to accommodate air-conditioners.

Work and Skills of the Carpenter

To extend and renovate the house, roof repairing, and the extension of the room under the floor, extension of restroom or kitchen were done. The extension and renovation were carried out for convenience, and industrial products were used. Concrete was used for the room, and it performed certain functions that wood could not. The spread of restroom facilities and the spread of new building materials influenced each other. In the second phase of the investigation, we examined the part under the floor of the wooden stilt house; this became the room surrounded by a glass door. The floor became the tile finish. In this way, extension and renovation were carried out frequently.

The house made only of natural materials is uncommon now. Convenience is a major reason why houses built in the 2000s transformed into modern two- and one-story houses. The transformation process of the house styles seems irreversible now.

The carpenters of Ban Ton Haen Noi not only construct but also prepare the blueprint of the house. If no blueprint has been provided, the carpenter sketches and executes the plan provided by owner. The unit of length used has also changed from the traditional human body dimensions to the metric system. With the spread of tape measures, traditional measurement methods are not used. At the same time, electric tools, such as electric drills, electric planes, and electric circular saws have gained popularity. This change is not only related to the spread of new carpentry tools, but it is also related to the fact that they were able to go to a vocational school in the urban area where they learned carpentry. In addition to the spread of electric tools, work efficiency improves by changing the building materials. For example, because wood processing decreases when pillar materials vary from wood to RC, the workload of the carpenter decreases. Meanwhile, a specialized carpenter of roof construction does the construction of steel roof frames. Therefore, the workload of the carpenter of the village has decreased over the years.

In future, the steel frame roof made by the prefabrication construction method would probably spread, which would reduce the workload even more. In this way, with the change of building materials, the skill and the workload of the carpenter will continue changing.

Owners often purchase the building materials by themselves. Before a building materials markets came about, the wood that was available in the vicinity was used as the main building material. However, currently, concrete and brick are being used widely because they can be purchased easily in the building materials market. These materials can be purchased in bulk, and the trouble of supplying wood has disappeared. This is one of the factors for the spread of modern housing.

The change in structural details with the changes in building materials is uncommon. Even for steel frames used for a roof, the primary structure of the Dutch gable roof does not change. The only thing that changes is the point where the section of the material becomes small.

It is common for owners to prepare building materials. Before the market for building materials spread, the wood from a nearby location was used as the main building material. However, now it is possible to purchase concrete, bricks, and steel from the building materials market. Building materials can be purchased in bulk, and the trouble of supplying wood has disappeared. This is one of the reasons for the spread of modern housing.

It is uncommon for structural details to change with changes in building materials. Even the use of a steel frame for a roof, which is the primary structure of a Dutch gable roof, has not changed. Only the point where the section of the material becomes small has changed.

Future Prospects

The spread of networks with the spread of smartphones and PCs and electrical appliances have influenced the transformation of house architectural styles. A separated bathroom and kitchen are taken in with the main building of the traditional house, and the increase in room, thereby it is considered that the house more modern than a traditional house became gigantic. Thailand is now in the vortex of economic growth, and the transformation of house styles will increase in future.

In this article, we studied the architecture of houses in Ban Ton Haen Noi, northern Thailand, but it is considered that a similar change is seen in other racial houses. The house styles are standardized which one ethnic group to another has as those transform in “modern house”, when the type of the house changes to one-storied house and 2 stories, and building materials change to industrial products. The house styles transforms at remarkably fast speed, therefore it is considered that the time when the situation that a modern house is mixed with a traditional house is seen is short. From such situation, additional studies are required in the documentation of building materials and in investigating how to structure traditional houses and the skills of carpenters.

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**Building Stupas and Constructing Charisma
in the Myanmar-Thai Border Region**

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The Urban as Methodology: Critical Urban Pedagogy around Chiang Mai

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Abstract

In this research about research in Thailand, I posit that urban universities may connect the city and countryside more by working with rural communities and helping them to navigate networks of useful resources in the city through an approach that I term 'critical urban pedagogy', which builds upon the methodological praxes of critical pedagogy, participatory action research, and experiential learning. I theorize that they can learn how to think and/or act in 'urban' ways without necessarily being made more 'urban' through this approach, which seeks to benefit the community as much as, if not more than, the university. I therefore aim to explore the role of critical urban pedagogy beyond the city in framing a practice-based understanding of the urban. My first objective is to understand how urban universities may relay their knowledge of the 'urban' to rural communities, by considering the 'urban' as methodology. My second objective is to understand how the latter may speak back to the former, by considering what urban universities can learn from engaging with rural communities. I explicate my argument through a case study of critical urban pedagogy that is taking place around Chiang Mai, by drawing on the experiences of faculty members, graduate students, and community members, and assessing the impacts of such collaboration on its participants. Doing so highlights the strengths and weaknesses of critical urban pedagogy, and underscores how it fails to decenter the 'urban' as a developmental reference frame. In privileging 'urban' ways of thinking and acting over 'rural' ones, it falls short of undoing the power relations that still allow urban actors to dominate rural ones. University researchers may wish to explore what it means to adopt 'rural' methods to work better with community members, who may not appreciate the point of 'urban' methods, and empower them further.

Keywords: rural-urban relations, university-community relations, critical pedagogy, participatory action research, experiential learning



*This clock tower marks the heart of Chiang Mai University.
Source: Author's Own.*

Into the Field

In the summer of 2014, a group of National University of Singapore (NUS) and Chiang Mai University (CMU) students, including me, travelled to the Mae Chaem district of Chiang Mai province in Northern Thailand. There, we engaged in participatory action research, which revolved around a wide range of topics with interdisciplinary concerns, with one of six village communities for three weeks. We were on a field-based module that a faculty member of the NUS University Scholars Programme helmed and ran in collaboration with the CMU Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development (RCSD), *USE2315: Participatory Social Development in Southeast Asia*. The villages were located in different areas of the district, and isolated in terms of transportation and communication to varying extents, yet cast by certain characteristics as 'rural': these highland settlements were all remote, deep in the countryside, and populated predominantly by indigenous peoples, who had been largely disenfranchised as ethnic minorities. This paralleled how we also came from diverse backgrounds but shared 'urban' positionalities simply by virtue of where we lived, worked, and played as city-dwellers.

During my evaluation of the medium-term impacts of this module on its participants, the local community organizer who had coordinated our activities there shared that because of USE2315, the villagers felt connected to the outside world and that others were interested in their problems. For example, they appreciated the documentary that my group did on Sop Kho village's anti-dam struggle and the website that another did on Mae Sa village's cultural politics, as these projects were useful in representing themselves to, and sharing their ideas with, outsiders. These also served as media for non-Thai audiences to learn more about what was going on in the district from the villagers' perspectives.

When the villagers gathered with other stakeholders, such as the forest conservation network, they used these to explain what was happening to their communities in English. The villagers thus gained a record of their lives and livelihoods and the critical issues that they faced, one that they took part in making and could share with those in or from other places. Therefore, he characterized the students as ‘mediators’ who had helped to present what has been happening locally to the world outside.

The themes of connection and meditation resurfaced when I, as a graduate student in urban studies at University College London (UCL), was reconsidering the role of the university and our understanding of the ‘urban’. While interrogating the ‘urban’ has been in vogue, the ‘practice’ of urban studies is lagging behind urban theory in this regard, as research remains tethered to the city. We can address this disparity by attending to the relations between the urban and its constitutive other, the rural. This paper goes further by incorporating putatively ‘rural’ perspectives – those of people in the countryside – to do so. Southeast Asia is a fitting setting for my endeavor, since the division of its geographies into ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ has long been recognized as problematic. As urbanists are reviewing our key concept, universities are reassessing our interactions with communities. University-community relations have gained renewed interest because universities are increasingly acknowledged as urban actors whose impact on communities is complicated. I am interested in the intersection of these pertinent concerns – the relations between urban universities and rural communities – particularly the research activities taking place between them. Urban universities have been especially active in working with rural communities around Chiang Mai in Northern Thailand, my area of study.

In this paper, I posit that urban universities may connect the city and countryside more by working with rural communities and helping them to navigate networks of useful resources in the city through an approach that I term ‘critical urban pedagogy’, which builds upon the methodological praxes of critical pedagogy, participatory action research, and experiential learning. I theorize that participants can learn how to think and/or act in ‘urban’ ways without necessarily being made more ‘urban’ (or ‘urbanized’) through this approach, which seeks to benefit the community as much as, if not more than, the university. I therefore aim to explore the role of critical urban pedagogy beyond the city in framing a practice-based understanding of the urban. Here, my first objective is to understand how urban universities may relay their knowledge of the ‘urban’ to rural communities, by considering the ‘urban’ as methodology. The second is to understand how the latter may speak back to the former, by considering what urban universities can learn from engaging with rural communities. Bearing these aims and objectives in mind, I assess the impacts of critical urban pedagogy on participating faculty members and graduate students from CMU and community members of two villages that are located in the area around Chiang Mai: Baan Pang Dang Ngok (BPDN) and Ban Mae Jon (BMJ).

This research complements the work that is being done at UCL on university-led urban regeneration (Melhuish, 2017) and situating the new urban university (Addie, 2017), and the Cities Methodologies programme (UCL Urban Laboratory, 2017). It contributes an alternative case study of university-community relations by focusing on graduate students and faculty members and presenting a Southeast Asian perspective through anthropological and cultural geographical lenses. This challenges the dominance of foci on the institution and university administration, Euro-American perspectives, and urban planning and economic geographical lenses in the existing literature on the topic. My paper is a methodological one, through which I hope to pave the way for greater progressive possibilities in terms

of engagement between urban universities and rural communities to take place, in light of how critical urban pedagogy remains driven by an urban reference frame. This advances the agenda of engaged urbanism, or 'work that critically and purposefully responds to the concrete problems and issues that are important to improving quality of life for city dwellers' (Campkin & Duijzings, 2016, p. 3), to involve those who dwell beyond the city. In the next section, I elucidate my understanding of critical urban pedagogy by drawing on my USE2315 experience and relevant literature. In the third section, I introduce why and how CMU researchers are doing critical urban pedagogy and develop a nuanced narrative of their research activities in BPDN and BMJ. I conclude by highlighting key implications of this research, in terms of theoretically reconceptualising the urban as methodology and practical recommendations for rethinking knowledge production.

Critical Urban Pedagogy

Urbanists have been productive in our critical analysis of other actors, but we should shine a sharper self-reflexive spotlight on the university, especially given its neoliberalization and financialization (Belina, Petzold, Schardt, & Schipper, 2013). There is growing recognition that it plays increasingly complicated roles, including cultural ones (Chatterton, 2000), as an urban actor (Perry & Wiewel, 2005, 2008), and is obliged to pursue meaningful relationships with (Hirokawa & Salkin, 2009), and make its academic practice relevant and valuable to, the community (Goddard & Vallance, 2013).³ Greater emphasis is being placed on universities to collaborate with communities (Wiewel & Knaap, 2005), marginalized and disadvantaged ones in particular (Robinson, Zass-Ogilvie, & Hudson, 2012). Case studies hint that making research and teaching useful is key to forging university-community partnerships (Benson, Harkavy, & Puckett, 2000). As this burgeoning university-community relations literature has focused on cities and 'urban' communities at the expense of 'non-urban' actors or 'rural' communities, I step out of this comfort zone to explore how universities may drive a specific kind of urban knowledge production and how this work affects their relationship with 'rural' communities.

In this paper, I analyze how three key approaches come together to be deployed and encountered as what I term 'critical urban pedagogy' through fieldwork, my archetype being USE2315.⁴ Firstly, it is informed by *critical pedagogy*, which advocates education as political praxis for social change and the empowering of marginalized communities (Freire, 1973; Shor, 1992). While critical pedagogy remains primarily targeted at adult learners in marginalized communities (Freire, 1970; Shor & Freire, 1987), its strategy and tactics may be reworked as transformative educational and social praxis by or for university researchers (Kincheloe, 2008; Missingham, 2007). Critical urban pedagogy does so and connects university researchers with marginalized communities, who negotiate a series of unequal power relations as they interact with one another. Secondly, it is dedicated to *participatory action research*, which involves 'researchers and participants working together to examine a problematic situation or action to change it for the better' (Kendon, Pain, & Kesby, 2007, p. 1). With critical urban pedagogy, university researchers and community members work together to address issues of concern, as both take on the role of researchers. However, this means that community members have to invest their

³ I define 'community' as a group of people who live in the same area and/or share issues of concern.

⁴ More information about USE2315 can be found at its University Scholars Programme (2015) website.

resources in participatory action research and hosting university researchers, and these interactions have the potential to disrupt their lives and livelihoods. Thirdly, it is rooted in *experiential learning*, which defines learning as '*the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience*' (Kolb, 1984, p. 38). Critical urban pedagogy takes place in the field, where participants learn by reflecting on doing research, rather than on campus. It has significant fieldwork components, which entails a greater investment of resources by both groups of participants. For these reasons, it is worth assessing the impacts that critical urban pedagogy has on communities that university researchers work in and with.

My USE2315 experience exemplifies how these three strands come together as critical urban pedagogy.⁵ My group stayed in and spent time with the villagers of Ban Sop Kho, where we got to know them personally and learnt about the issues that they faced. Having identified the impending construction of Mae Chaem Dam as the community's primary issue of concern, we set about working with them to create deliverables that would be useful to them. As they expressed their hopes that we could help them to share their stories with a broader audience, we settled on producing a documentary and online resources that captured how the planned development threatened their lives and livelihoods and the natural and cultural landscape in accessible formats. As we worked closely with community members throughout the process, from ideation and storyboarding to filming and editing, the final products were theirs as much as ours, and we ultimately handed these over to them. These served as aids to the villagers in fighting for their cause, and a snapshot of what their community was like, which would be valuable regardless of how the anti-dam movement panned out. Undoubtedly, there were issues with the project, such as how not every member of the community participated, how those who participated tended to defer to our judgment, and how they deployed discourses that could be counterproductive. Nevertheless, it was clear that we learnt, as they did, from collaborating towards changing their circumstances for the better. More crucially, our project bolstered their impetus to take further action and continue working towards positive change.

While the three approaches are not 'urban' in themselves, they are brought together as critical urban pedagogy typically by urbanites to learn from and work with communities, including 'rural' ones. Critical urban pedagogy is generally generative. Participants formulate 'complex questions' rather than seek 'simple answers' (Fraser, 2009, p. 265), and 'reflect on their positionality' (d'Auria, 2015, p. 106), through 'experiential, affective and critical learning' (Golubchikov, 2015, p. 143). However, there are caveats to this. As unequal power relations inevitably characterize critical urban pedagogy, we should consider our 'role in reinforcing or altering hegemonic relations of power' (Sletto, 2013, p. 228). The 'inherent contradiction' that our resources usually come from those who are powerful is another, as this may mean that our work 'desires fundamental social change yet does not engage fully in the political struggle' (Ravensbergen and Vanderplaat, 2010, p. 347). As we embody the status of being knowledge-bearers, our 'presence at the margins defines and normalizes the dominant center, even as we struggle against' it (Kress, 2011, p. 271). The USE2315 students returned to comfortable lives in the metropolis without having really challenged their own positions of privilege, albeit having 'helped' marginalized communities. How truly radical can critical urban pedagogy be?

⁵ My critical reflections about my USE2315 experience can be found at my USE2315 blog (Heng, 2014).

Moreover, critical urban pedagogy messy as a methodology. This may come down to participants' different priorities (Pain, Finn, Bouveng, & Ngobe, 2013) and understandings of 'being useful' (Taylor, 2014). Practitioners 'need to *know how* to do things'; academics 'want to *know why* things are done' (Mason, Brown, & Pickerill, 2013, p. 253). Academics may also be more concerned about their evaluation by metrics that privilege research impact at global and national rather than local scales and count research outputs rather than processes (Pain, Kesby, & Askins, 2011). Therefore, both parties have to build 'common ground', yet may lack the time and resources to do so (Chatterton, 2006, p. 275), particularly if the issues of concern are urgent. University researchers may also face a 'lack of enthusiasm and cooperation from participants', such that it may be tempting for them to 'resort to traditional academic outputs and elite-level ways of influencing policy' (The Autonomous Geographies Collective, 2010, p. 248). Defining and identifying the communities that we seek to work with further complicate matters; inequalities within putative 'communities' may affect how university researchers work with their members, in terms of who participates and how they do so. In Ban Sop Kho, we made compromises during the course of our project to 'get things done'. Participants have to strive to overcome such obstacles to work together well even before change can take place.

'Relocating' critical urban pedagogy to Southeast Asia and Northern Thailand presents another series of challenges, as these approaches are not simple 'how-to methodologies and practices' and are 'made more complex' by their contexts (Lam, 2008, p. 13). Firstly, Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand, are characterized by strong centralized governments where decisions are made in a top-down manner, such that obtaining resources and support for such bottom-up approaches is even more difficult (Tuyen, Armitage, & Marschke, 2010). Secondly, the hierarchical relations that structure Thai society and the veneration of teachers mean that learning may not be as mutual as intended (Castella, Bourgoin, Lestrelin, & Bouahom, 2014), and community members may not speak back to university researchers to change how critical urban pedagogy is being done (Neef, Friederichsen, & Neubert, 2008). 'Privileged' university researchers working with 'underprivileged' community members may even further reinforce the paternalistic attitudes that urbanites already have towards rural communities (Hirsch & Lloyd, 2005). Thirdly, unless the power structures and 'elite ideologies' that marginalize these communities are changed, critical urban pedagogy can ever only offer 'temporary snapshots of change' (Rush, 2014, p. 128). The current period of military rule in Thailand circumscribed how much we could do to overcome these obstacles even more. Therefore, this geographical context is a particularly interesting yet challenging one for assessing critical urban pedagogy.⁶

For this paper, my concerns are not only assessing critical urban pedagogy for practical purposes, but also the theoretical implications of its evaluation for how we understand the 'urban'. My premise is that one can *learn* how to think and act in an 'urban' way, perhaps akin to how one may learn to be urbane. For example, people – not only urbanites – develop their knowledge of urban navigation from their experience of navigating cities that they are familiar with, which they then use to navigate those that they are not familiar with. Moreover, cities are not just spatial environments but also social milieus. We can conceive the urban landscape as featuring 'situated webs of interrelationships' that 'create highly differentiated contexts of urban transformation' (Ong, 2011, p. 23). 'Rural' actors may find networks of

⁶ I have developed a rubric that renders simpler the complexity of assessing the medium-term impacts of critical urban pedagogy modules on its participants qualitatively and evaluating the value of such modules (Heng, 2015).

‘urban’ actors, such as government officials and non-governmental workers, difficult to navigate, as they are largely hindered from accessing the formal, Western knowledge that these circles privilege and that dominate policy and practice. University researchers may help community members to do so by teaching them to think and act in ‘urban’ ways, including conducting research in an academic style, forming connections to foster collaboration, and defending themselves by understanding how these circles work. In learning to play such ‘knowledge games’ (Valverde, 2005), rural communities can be better equipped to draw on resources in the city, such as the knowledge and networks of urban actors. This urban-rural, university-community interface is thus a site for ‘rehearsing interventions elsewhere’ (Simone, 2009, p. 1057); ‘experimentation and exploration’ (Dorstewitz, 2014, p. 433) may lead to progressive outcomes for both groups.

This highlights the central role that knowledge about the urban, or urban knowledge, plays in critical urban pedagogy. Today, we privilege urban knowledge to the extent that the urban has become the normative analytical lens for studying even the rural or non-urban. In our hubris, urbanists rarely question the assumption that the world is urban(izing). Given this ‘intellectual imperialism of the urban’ (Krause, 2013, p. 234), scholars should reflect on how the knowledge that we bring to bear on others affects them (Liu & Lye, 2016). There is ample research about how urban knowledge is ‘produced and circulated on a global scale’ for urban communities, as policy-makers ‘learn the most updated urban theories and “best practices”’ then ‘adopt, convert and adjust these into their local contexts’ (Park, 2016, p. 163), but little for rural ones. Furthermore, there is a growing consensus that the university should ‘provide useful knowledge and contribute to [solving] societal problems’, since it is privileged in ‘the creation, circulation, transmission and adaptation of knowledge’ (Benneworth, 2013, pp. 3-4). Therefore, I examine the value of urban knowledge for rural communities in this research, which contributes to the debate about the value of urban studies (Schafran, 2014), the politics of urban knowledge (Madden, 2015), and the future of the urban academy (Schafran, 2015).

We may find critical urban pedagogy’s urban studies counterpart in critical urbanism, which takes a three-pronged approach to learning that seeks to ‘*evaluate* existing dominant forms of urban knowledge and learning’, ‘*democratize* the groups and knowledges involved in urban learning’, and ‘*propose* alternative knowledges and forms of learning based on that democratization’ (McFarlane, 2011, p. 179). This approach opens up the production of urban knowledge to other communities and ways of conducting research and teaching about the urban (Millstein, 2013), which entails shaking off the shackles of the unproductive assumption that only ‘research undertaken in cities rather than rural areas’ can add to ‘urban scholarship’ (Kamalski & Kirby, 2012, p. S4). Moreover, critical urbanism implicates not only how but also why we do research, and inspires us to work towards ‘bringing about practical improvements’ (Andersen & Atkinson, 2013, p. 4), rather than just theoretical advances, by fostering ‘critical engagement with pressing urban concerns’ (Pendras & Dierwechter, 2012, p. 308). Therefore, I believe that we should aim to realize what I call ‘people’s urban studies’ – *urban studies by the people, of the people, for the people*.⁷ Urban knowledge should be made (more) useful by working together with communities to develop their own ways of addressing their concerns.

⁷ My idea of people’s urban studies is inspired by the *People’s Geography Project* (see Mitchell, 2006).

In the process of doing critical urban pedagogy, university researchers and community members work with each other to produce such 'generative knowledge' (Peake, 2016, p. 835). This involves 'knowledge brokerage' between social groups (Maiello, Battaglia, Daddi, & Frey, 2011, p. 1165), and 'multiple forms of knowledge' (Pfeffer, Martinez, Baud, & Sridharan, 2011, p. 236). Rather than imposing urban knowledge on rural communities, university researchers *ideally* empower and engage community members to draw on their knowledge (Campbell, Svendsen, & Roman, 2016), generate new pathways to address their concerns (Carter, 2013), and learn together (Frantzeskaki & Kabisch, 2016). However, bringing a fundamentally 'urban mode of knowledge production' (Heßler, 2007, p. 145) into rural communities through critical urban pedagogy may reinforce the privilege of 'urban' ways of thinking and acting over others (Muñoz-Erickson, 2014). Do university researchers also learn ways of thinking and acting from community members? Additionally, as there may be contestations and negotiations between them (Spierings, 2010), and they may mask certain details from each other (Saikkonen, 2015), rural communities may not speak back to urban universities, even given the opportunity to do so. Therefore, through this case study, I reflect on the value of the 'urban' in this context.

Around Chiang Mai

This research on research, or 'meta-research' (Ioannidis, Fanelli, Dunne, & Goodman, 2015), found me entering into familiar territory with a series of unusual questions. I adopted a qualitative, interpretative, and grounded methodological approach to addressing these and doing fieldwork for three 'urbanist' reasons. Firstly, as a cultural geographer, I believed that a 'productive combination' of 'iconographic interpretation' and 'embodied experience' would 'enrich work on urban landscapes' (Bunnell, 2013, p. 287). Secondly, I avoided assuming that 'because two places are urban, "the urban" carries the same meaning in both' (Johnson, 2014, p. 3). Thirdly, I did not wish to conflate the 'urban-rural interface' between the university and the community with a 'peri-urban condition' (Arabindoo, 2009, p. 879). My fieldwork saw me shuttling between CMU (Figure 1) in Chiang Mai city and the villages of BPDN (Figure 2) and BMJ (Figure 3) in Chiang Dao sub-district, Chiang Dao district, Chiang Mai province, from mid-June to mid-July in 2016 (Figure 4). I interviewed faculty members, graduate students, and community members who were involved in the critical urban pedagogy research project that was taking place at these villages during this period, as well as faculty members and graduate students who had adopted similar approaches at the RCSD and Center for Ethnic Studies and Development (CESD) at CMU. Participant observation and informal conversations supplement my formal interviews, which I recorded with my interviewees' permission then transcribed.⁸ Since my fieldwork was exploratory, I identified the pertinent leitmotifs that ran through my field notes and interview transcripts, through content and discourse analysis with a focus on critical urban pedagogy. I then developed these themes by threading them to form narratives.

⁸ For confidentiality's sake, I will not include the names/pseudonyms of my respondents in this paper.

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*Figure 1: Chiang Mai University.
Source: Author's Own.*



*Figure 2: Baan Pang Dang Ngok.
Source: Author's Own.*



*Figure 3: Ban Mae Jon.
Source: Author's Own.*

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


Figure 4: Map of Chiang Mai University (blue) and Baan Pang Dang Ngok and Ban Mae Jon (red).

They are approximately 60 kilometres apart.

Source: Google Maps.

As I traced networks of research surrounding Chiang Mai, I found that three factors mediated my access to, and ability to build on, these connections, which already sheds light on how contingent on such factors critical urban pedagogy can be. Firstly, my positionality as a Singaporean from universities that that are considered to be relatively prestigious in local circles opened some doors, thus affording me privilege in accessing certain knowledges, while closing others to me as an outsider. Secondly, my

interpreter helped to personally introduce me to community members and interpret not only their languages but also cultural situations. Thirdly, serendipity gave me greater access to informants and information. My affiliation with the CMU team and their NUS associates allowed me to follow the networks that they had established and interview people who were already familiar with their work. I also arrived in the villages during a religious ceremony (Figure 5) that marked a festival period when people were more compelled to ‘do good’ and perhaps more open to helping me with this fieldwork. These factors reminded me that my empirical material and my ‘reading’ of it are partial and situated. Most crucially, my ‘urban’ positionality inflects these as I seek to incorporate ‘rural’ perspectives yet filter them through my lenses. My informants may not have said some things with regard to sensitive issues. Some of them also sought my opinions on our interview topics, such that my contributions may have informed how they spoke about critical urban pedagogy. Therefore, this section in particular is composed out of inevitably inter-subjective responses.



Figure 5: The communities' religious ceremony.
Source: Author's Own.

While critical urban pedagogy can take place within the city and in Chiang Mai, where urbanites learn how to navigate networks of useful resources and draw on them, I focus on how it takes place beyond the city and around Chiang Mai to highlight the relational themes of connection and meditation. Three points help to set this in context.⁹

Firstly, critical urban pedagogy is the latest phase in the development of relations between urban universities and rural communities in Thailand, which saw academics once play a crucial role in Thai

⁹ I elaborate on these points in my dissertation for the Master of Science in Urban Studies at UCL (Heng, 2016).

society. Its more politically-charged and activism-oriented antecedents linked rural communities with the resources of urban universities, even as efforts shifted from promoting decentralization, democratization, and development in general to tackling specific topical issues, so paving the way for critical urban pedagogy today. University engagement also tends to be more technical and prescriptive and less critical and participatory, and civil society and the non-governmental organization (NGO) now fill in the gap left by the decreasing involvement of the university in the community.

Secondly, critical urban pedagogy characterizes only part of the work of some academics at CMU, mostly social scientists from the RCSD and CESD, who seek to empower minority groups and marginalized peoples through their research and have provided space and support for community members to share their knowledges and experiences. Given that the current military junta has arrested, detained, and exiled activists, it may be their best way of working with community members towards progressive change and navigating uncertain territory (Figure 6). Their goal of progressive change and their collaboration with marginalized groups distinguishes critical urban pedagogy from other types of university engagement, as they build closer relationships with community members that foster greater understanding and mutual learning that better equip community members in negotiating with urban actors.



*Figure 6: The Chiang Mai University team and their National University of Singapore associates film a meeting in Ban Mae Jon.
Source: Author's Own.*

Thirdly, networks are crucial to critical urban pedagogy around Chiang Mai, from the university-community networks that connect community members with useful resources in Chiang Mai and other 'univer-cities' to the university-NGO connections that allow universities and NGOs to share

resources and work closely across extensive networks. Here, the university serves as the mediator between the community and organizations within and beyond the city, helping them to navigate networks of urban resources, which requires researchers to manage the politics of collaboration and handle these resources well (Figure 7). They have to do so by prioritizing community members' participation in discussions and decisions throughout their research process, making their research available and useful to the community in accessible ways, and taking the community's feedback into serious consideration in determining how they conduct their research. The following case study shows how these play out. It consists of a patchwork of stories that university researchers and community members have shared with me and I have woven together. By drawing on their experiences, I explicate my argument regarding critical urban pedagogy and set the stage for considering the urban as methodology.



*Figure 7: University students and non-governmental organization workers interact with community members in Baan Pang Dang Ngok.
Source: Author's Own.*

A CMU team, which consists of faculty members and graduate students from the RCSD and CESD, and their NUS associates helm a research project about the Dara-ang communities around Chiang Mai. They work with twelve villages near Chiang Dao, a town about an hour's drive from/to Chiang Mai, to learn about the lifestyle of these communities and empower them to solve their problems. The Dara-ang, or Palong/Palaung, are refugees from Myanmar (Burma), and the last ethnic minority tribe to come to Thailand, about three decades ago. The CMU researchers are interested in how the Dara-ang have changed over the generations, and have been there to collect data since 2014, but became involved in helping them to negotiate with the government's local, forest, and parks departments over a land

conflict in 2016. The villages are in/near Si Lanna National Park, onto which the state claims they are encroaching; local, parks, and army officers intimidated them and seized their land in mid-May. As they lost their land and face rising poverty levels, the villagers began to work more with CMU and NGOs.

The CMU researchers analyze the data that they collect from the villagers for research on the Dara-ang, about whom most Thais know little and information is scarcely available and rarely found. They organize field-notes about such topics as the Dara-ang's culture and drug problems for researchers to easily access, and support discussions and meetings concerning ethnic minorities at CMU with their knowledge and experiences. While many issues interest the team, its primary concerns are uniting and guiding the villagers in identifying and solving their problems. These include not only their lack of land and citizenship, but also drug issues and internal conflicts, which they have to work together to solve. Although the Dara-ang wish to settle down in Thailand, they find it difficult to fit in with Thai society and live with others because of their different lifestyles and mind-sets, and lack of land and work. The team is also conducting research on and helping these villagers with local savings, farming different crops, land rental, and weaving, which are other pathways to better lives and livelihoods. During my fieldwork period, the team and their associates were producing a video documentary on three topics: drugs, land, and nationality. I explore how this takes place as critical urban pedagogy.

CMU is not the first organization to work with these Dara-ang communities. They have been working with NGOs since 1998, when some members were arrested and imprisoned by the government over land issues. They sought assistance from NGOs, sympathetic lawyers, and eminent individuals, including the RCSD and CESD's director. The NGOs invited CMU into these communities to collect data from the villagers, and work together to support them. The CMU researchers have played the role of a mediator by conveying information between these three parties since then. The CMU researchers found that the best and only sustainable way to solve the communities' problems was by involving the villagers. Those who are involved in critical urban pedagogy tend to be community leaders or members who are keen on learning about themselves and solving their problems. Among other tasks, they may help to document land ownership, manage correspondence, coordinate activities with outsiders, or organize meetings. Leaders also attend gatherings of the Dara-ang network across Northern Thailand.

The team trained elected representatives and volunteers to be local researchers. The team initially asked villagers to elect representatives of various groups, including their elderly, youth, women, Christians, and Buddhists, as bringing different groups to the same table gives them opportunities to bridge gaps between one another. These representatives were elected because they are fluent and literate in Thai, have experience in community networks around the country, and/or are community leaders, and the team finds that they are teachable and great to work with. The team then invited experienced local researchers who had success in conducting local research to teach these representatives and volunteers how to collect and analyze data well, including knowing whom to approach for certain kinds of information. They learn research methods, such as making village timelines (Figure 8) and maps, and how to use one another's strengths, such as literacy and experience, to their advantage. Faculty members also teach them about theory and practice, such as the importance of knowing about their own history. Therefore, these community members are equipped to think and act in 'urban' ways, which appeal to urbanites and serves them in their negotiation with other urban actors.




Figure 8: Village timeline of Ban Mae Jon.
Source: Author's Own.

The local researchers form networks between the villages and work together to tackle problems that the communities share. Here, the CMU researchers serve as facilitators who guide and support the local researchers in conducting research on their own and solving their problems by themselves, which empowers the community members. Local researchers are crucial to the research project as insiders who help to unite the communities and may find it easier to gather trustworthy information from the whole village, unlike university researchers who remain outsiders and can access the knowledge of only a few villagers. Furthermore, as some of the villagers may be illiterate or less fluent in Thai, local researchers help to interpret for university researchers, and conduct meetings among the villagers, where they brainstorm and share knowledge as a community. While the CMU team brings in 'urban' ways of thinking and acting, community members ultimately have to take it upon themselves to employ these.

Besides bringing university researchers into the community and countryside, critical urban pedagogy also brings community members into the university and city. The RCS and CESD have invited villagers to the university to discuss the Dara-ang communities' history and issues, and share their experiences and culture with students, staff, and villagers from other tribes, including the Lahu, Hmong, Karen, and Karenni. Such meetings open CMU up to these communities and serve as platforms for their members to

learn about, and make connections with, one another, while providing its resources for them to tell their stories in more 'legible' formats, which may help others to acknowledge them, such as their book about the Dara-ang communities' history. Moreover, training sessions also take place in, and bring community members to, different cities, where they learn different skills, such as how to conduct and present research, and weaving. Here, they also build networks with other communities and share stories of success and failure that edify them. Such networks are important for building community development within and between villages. They are both urban *and* rural as they connect these 'rural' communities from the countryside through 'urban' resources in the city.

The CMU researchers regard being mediators as their key role in the networks where the communities interact with other organizations. It entails arranging meetings between the villagers and other actors, such as CMU faculty members and NGO workers, supporting the villagers in communicating with government officers, and setting things right with urban actors who seek to capitalize on the villagers' lack of understanding of how they think or act. In BMJ, community members write letters to the government departments to make their case under the guidance of CMU researchers. University researchers and NGO workers also help community members to share their concerns beyond their communities by transforming their histories and stories into documents and documentaries, and encouraging them to express themselves. In BPDN, students from Charles Sturt University and workers from Makhampom Theatre Group staged a play for the community (Figure 9). They created this dialogical theatre piece by workshoping with the community, learning about their issues, and developing the performance to reflect the community's concerns, including the loss of a sense of community.



Figure 9: Charles Sturt University students and Makhampom Theatre Group

*workers stage a play for the community in Baan Pang Dang Ngok.
Source: Author's Own.*

The principal leitmotif throughout my fieldwork was the importance of the villagers being a 'community'. The CMU team views their research there through the lens of 'imagining communities'. For them, these villagers have to work together as a community, and cannot rely on others, to solve their problems. In BMJ and BPDN, villagers affirmed their identity and unity as a 'family' of Dara-ang people when speaking to me, which they reinforced through their spiritual beliefs (Figure 10). Performing their identity as a 'rural' 'community' may appeal to 'urban' sensibilities, and shows their strength in solidarity to others. At a meeting in BMJ (Figure 11), the CMU team explained that the community would have to say the same things to appear united in fighting against the departments that wish to grab their land. However, I later learnt about potential fractures in the 'community' and this critical urban pedagogy. The headman explained to me that he was concerned that CMU may not be on their side one day. Others have questioned the role of the team in these conflicts because they are not Dara-ang. In BPDN, villagers have split between those who believe that the team is there to help them, and those who mistrust the team due to their previous experiences with dishonest outsiders.



*Figure 10: A structure that connects the Dara-ang spiritually.
Source: Author's Own.*



*Figure 11: The village meeting in Ban Mae Jon.
Source: Author's Own.*

Furthermore, participation remains unequal among community members. Men tend to be more involved in the research project as women tend to play a supporting role. Women may wish to be more involved but stay to take care of their households. The villages also have a few families of another tribe, the Lahu, who tend to be richer than the Dara-ang. Unlike the Dara-ang, they have landholdings elsewhere that they do not wish to jeopardize and can leave for. The Lahu believe that these conflicts do not concern them and prefer not to challenge the government officers or work with CMU. This causes problems for critical urban pedagogy in BMJ, because although their headman is Dara-ang, most of their leaders are not Dara-ang.

Government officers exploit such fractures within and between communities to keep them divided and prevent them from working together. These officers act craftily, oscillating between appealing to the villagers to take certain actions and threatening them with violence if they fail to. Forest officers organized a meeting inside BMJ but cancelled it after the villagers invited CMU faculty members, and shifted it to their office after the villagers abandoned those arrangements. They also ordered the villagers to join a meeting about other villages' issues, where the villagers would not be dealing with their own issues but used to show agreement with the officers. Although the team clarified that villagers would not face any repercussions if none of them attended, and there was a consensus that they would not, two who had their own landholdings did. Moreover, government officers order the villagers to sign documents without knowing what these entail or having copies of these to keep. While the villagers have been taught not to do so, the officers declare that all of their land will be seized if they refuse.

Such quandaries leave the CMU team and community members in a difficult position. The villagers have

come to fear such official dealings and want a neutral party, such as CMU, to take responsibility for things if they fall through or backfire, because their history is one of continuous struggle as they fled conflict only to encounter corrupt officers. Parks officers who returned token parcels of land have explicitly told the villagers that if they worked with CMU, then the department would take all of their land. While the villagers desire to fight for their land, they are understandably paranoid and seek reassurance that CMU will remain on their side. At the end of my fieldwork period, their ambivalence about working with the CMU team was growing. The villagers were increasingly divided over how they could keep their land and the presence of the CMU team. Some who have landholdings elsewhere told the others that they should work by themselves because the team was being troublesome. A village leader, who felt that the team had stolen business from his homestay, claimed that they did not deserve to be there, calling them 'tourists' and denying their status as university researchers.

Although organizing and galvanizing the villagers is difficult as such, the team remains committed to developing a process of community development here, which is the only way to solve their problems. Those who work with the CMU team understand that while the team guides them in doing so, they bear the responsibility to help themselves, such as by knowing their rights and speaking up with their voices. For the team, critical urban pedagogy involves making space for the villagers to negotiate with others better and helping them to navigate the networks of resources that this entails, but community members have to participate and take over their own fight. A part of this is also community-building for grassroots action, and the team has decided to work with an ad hoc committee of the most affected families, who will be given the power of attorney to take legal action as representatives of the community. However, they can do so only in the confidence that everyone else in their community will be supporting them. How critical urban pedagogy plays out in BMJ and BPDN remains to be seen.

This case study highlights some of critical urban pedagogy's strengths and weaknesses and underscores how 'success' is not guaranteed. While it empowers community members to solve their problems by themselves, and progress against the odds can be made slowly and steadily, this depends on their participation. The 'urban' methods that critical urban pedagogy brings into rural communities may be an issue. Community members may not appreciate the point of (learning about) 'urban' ways of thinking and acting, such as conducting research and forming networks, especially if their concerns are urgent. Moreover, critical urban pedagogy may be a better way of working with communities, yet it falls short of decentering the 'urban' as the developmental reference frame that researchers relay as the normative one. In the context of Thailand, where prejudice against 'rural' communities is particularly entrenched, appealing to 'urban' sensibilities through such strategic essentialisms as 'community' may be counterproductive. Community members may be equipped to think and act in 'urban' ways, which allows them to negotiate with urban actors better, but on those actors' terms rather than their own. Furthermore, university researchers learn about but are not inclined to adopt 'rural' ways of thinking and acting. What would it mean and take for university researchers to adopt such 'rural' methods to work better with, and further empower, community members?

The Urban as Methodology

The vignettes that constitute my narrative of critical urban pedagogy around Chiang Mai shed light on how we can understand the 'urban' as methodology. From this perspective, the 'urban' as methodology

combines both ways of thinking (theory) and acting (practice), such that one can learn *how to* think and act in an 'urban' way, without necessarily becoming 'urban'. Critical urban pedagogy connects marginalized communities with useful knowledge and networking resources in the university and city, through such events as training courses for local researchers and sessions for community members to share their stories, where they learn how to navigate the 'urban' landscape in both thought and action, such as conducting research to make their concerns known in an academic way and forming networks with other communities to foster collaboration. Urban universities may thus relay their knowledge of the 'urban' to rural communities. Through CMU's critical urban pedagogy beyond the city, its researchers learn how to mediate between different parties, including NGO workers, even as community members learn how to negotiate with urban actors, such as government officials.

Another, perhaps more significant, lesson that urban universities may take away from engaging with rural communities through critical urban pedagogy is to reconsider how we as academics understand the world around us, allowing those whom we work with to speak back to what we seem to treasure the most: theory. In this context, besides rethinking knowledge production and putting it into practice, we should be reconceptualising the 'urban' and 'rural', which are notions that inform how we see the world. Certain perspectives have unsettled and broadened the scope of more conventional understandings of these ideas in relation to each other (Cloeke, 2006a; Woods, 2011), from the continuum model (Dewey, 1960; Pahl, 1965) to planetary urbanization (Brenner and Schmid, 2011; Brenner & Schmid, 2015). Although these disrupt the urban and rural as situated in places, we approach rurality and urbanity as if they are embodied in people. Understanding how people are and become urban or rural (Nguyen, Rigg, Luong, & Dinh, 2012; Wu & Logan, 2016) may help to address how the social and spatial are out of joint and challenge the assumption that 'rural' people can be(come) 'urban' only in the city. As theorizing that the urban extends beyond the city in socio-spatial form and process while assuming that urban activities and practices remain within the city is disingenuous, we should expand our perspective from places and people to practices and attend to temporality.

Scholars of Southeast Asian urbanism have long acknowledged that urbanization takes place within *and* beyond the city (Rimmer & Dick, 2009; McGee, 1991), such that the city and countryside are no longer separate worlds (Rigg, 2001; Rigg, 2003), and people and places can be(come) rural *and* urban (Jones, 1997; Jones & Douglass, 2008). On this note, another lesson that urbanists can take away from this case study of critical urban pedagogy is that we should diversify the (types of) places and people from which, and the ways in which, we theorize and learn about the urban. In this research, I have heeded calls by geographers and urbanists to 'regionalize' urban studies (Roy, 2009) and make it less metrocentric (Bunnell & Maringanti, 2010) by speaking back to the Euro-American academy (Bunnell, 2013) and theorizing about the urban from cities other than the Western metropolises (Robinson, 2006), such as the area around a smaller city in Southeast Asia in this case. This allows the region to once again serve as an urban laboratory (Bishop, Phillips, & Yeo, 2003), and I have taken this further in adopting a more experimental approach to exploring the interstitial yet generative zones between the urban and the rural (Chattaraj, 2010; Le Heron, 2013). To this end, I have incorporated the voices of, and theorized about the urban from the experiences of, people in the countryside instead of the big city (Hinderink & Titus, 1998; London, 1980) and considered the influence of universities on rural communities and areas instead of urban areas (Forbes & Cutler, 2006).

This paper reflects an ambivalence about the categories of the urban and rural as they are reified in the moment of their undoing (Thompson, Bunnell, & Parthasarathy, 2013). Like culture (Mitchell, 1995), heritage (Smith, 2006), and landscape (Wylie, 2011), they are more productively conceived as powerful ideas that are deployed for political purposes. Building upon cultural geographical understandings of landscape as practice (Cresswell, 2003), I have suggested that the 'urban' and 'rural' are practices, or ways or acting, like how urbanity and rurality are enacted or performed. Concomitantly, they are *also* ways of thinking, or theories. Therefore, I have posited that they are best conceived as methodologies, encompassing ways of thinking (theory) *and* acting (practice), in bridging the divide between theory and practice within and beyond the academy (Fuller & Kitchin, 2004). This is why people can think and act in 'urban' ways without necessarily becoming 'urban', and how communities may learn to do so while remaining 'rural', such as through critical urban pedagogy. Understanding the 'urban' and 'rural' as methodologies is a holistic approach that engages with social and spatial aspects along with the temporal dimensions of conceiving them as process (Benet, 1963) and events (Cloke, 2006b), and asks where *and* who the urban and rural are. Building from my case study, I have developed this practice-based, rather than theory-based, understanding of the 'urban'.

Therefore, the 'urban' still has purchase if we conceive it as methodology, which can be productive in practice. As research on research, this paper is founded on methodological reflection and contributes to fostering a methodological turn in urban studies. As a case study of how critical urban pedagogy works, there are lessons to be learnt from CMU's iterations. In BPDN and BMJ, critical urban pedagogy is working as university researchers and community members develop a better understanding of each other's issues, and build connections and trust by working together. It encourages and empowers villagers to learn about themselves, take pride in their identities, collaborate with one another and other communities to solve their problems, and share their stories in ways that different urban actors appreciate. Critical urban pedagogy also makes resources in the university and city more accessible to community members, giving them better opportunities to learn in new ways. Those who have been more involved in this research project expressed senses of appreciation, joy, pride, and well-being.

Critical urban pedagogy benefits university researchers and community members, yet is also revealed to be a fraught approach. The marginalization that the communities face in their lack and loss of resources and their experience with dishonest outsiders mean that they are understandably paranoid about working with the university. Critical urban pedagogy's strength is its weakness, as it privileges 'urban' ways of thinking and acting over 'rural' ones, reinforcing rather than undoing the power relations that allow urban actors to dominate rural communities. Therein lies the conundrum of critical urban pedagogy, which is revealed as a double-edged sword. However, if there are 'urban' methods, then there must also be 'rural' ones that university researchers can learn from by engaging with community members, which in line with urbanists' aim to be more experimental in working with people around the ivory tower (Campkin & Duijzings, 2016). Future research may explore the 'rural' as methodology and how it can help us to conduct our research, allowing rural communities to speak back to urban universities in generative ways, as a pathway to broaden the horizons of urban studies.

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The Silver Guardian Demon of the Jungle: Materiality and Modern Buddhism in the Suppression of the Shan Rebellion in Thailand, 1900s-1920s¹⁰

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Abstract

A few years after the suppression of the Shan Rebellion by the army of Siam in 1902, the kingdom's young crown prince Vajiravudh made an official visit to the Northern Administration, where the rebellion has taken place. The trip took three months, and required a great deal of strength from the prince, who up until then had little experience of governing. He spent his nights in the thick jungle area where the Rebellion had taken place. And it was on one of those nights that one of his entourage dreamt that although there were many different threats to his life, he was protected by *Thao Hirunphanasun* (lit. The Silver Guardian Demon of the Jungle). Soon afterwards the prince ordered that a statue of the guardian demon be erected and the deity has stood ever since in Bangkok's Phayathai Palace. This was an ambiguous episode in the history of Thai Buddhism. The crown prince, who had spent nine years being educated in Britain and had travelled through Europe, acted in something of a contradictory manner to the modern form of Buddhism that he would be championing as the next King of Thailand.

What were the factors that made the crown prince "invent" a deity which had no Buddhist origin? This paper shows that there is a need to reconsider the relationships between Buddhism and the power of the absolute monarchy in the making of the modern Thailand.

Keywords: Thailand, Modern Buddhism, King Vajiravudh, Thai Absolute Monarchy

Modern Buddhism and the Role of the Laity in Thailand

In a compilation of articles on Buddhist Studies by the Dhammakaya Foundation called *Buddhism into the Year 2000*, Professor Heinz Bechert (1994), who had coined the term Buddhist Modernism (*Buddhistischer Modernismus*) a few decades earlier, took the opportunity to stress the importance of the concept for one of the last times in his career. He again emphasized the characteristics of Buddhist Modernism in twelve features.¹¹ The important features among them were the "de-mythologization" of

¹⁰ This working paper is indebted to many. Craig J. Reynolds has provided helpful comments, many which cannot be fully addressed in the present form of this paper. Karin H. Zackari has provided valuable comments on the direction of the argument and helped with editing. Wirawan Naruepiti has provided important research assistance. Thanks to them all.

Buddhism, the view that Buddhism was a philosophy, which made Buddhism compatible with modern science, and the role of the laity.

Many studies have followed since Bechert coined the term. Extending the discussion based on Buddhism in America, McMahan posits that Buddhist Modernism is a reform movement that came out of complex relationships between Buddhism and the discourses of modernity. This process played out differently in Buddhist countries, whether followers of Theravada, Mahayana or others, but contains a few characteristics that all the Buddhist reform movements shared. Firstly, it negotiated with the discourses of scientific rationalism, Christianity (more from Protestantism), and Romanticism. Secondly, it was a manifestation of more liberal forms of Christianity. Thirdly, it was a process that was also critical to the positivism that was a product of rationalization (McMahan, 2008, 86).

For a discussion about Modern Buddhism in Southeast Asia, Hansen (2014) draws examples of movements from the nineteenth century to illustrate three broad developments. The first was the continuing importance of religion in the region, contrary to the well-known claim that modern societies will be “disenchanted”. The second theme involves the increasing transnational level of Theravadin activities, which include the emphasis on textual scholarship and the rising role of meditation in Buddhist practice. The third development of Modern Buddhism in Southeast Asia is an uneasy relationship between nation-state and religion. While Buddhism was an essential component of the oppositional forces towards the state, the latter also patronize and made Buddhism the ideological force bolstering control and suppression. These three broad themes of Modern Buddhism synchronize well with the particular focus of this paper.

Turning to Thai Studies, there have been a number of studies on Buddhism and modernity (notably Swearer, 1973; Jackson, 2003[1987]). One of the latest studies by Tomomi Ito focuses on Buddhādāsa Bhikkhu (1906-1993), the quintessential modern monk who campaigned hard to make Buddhism a scientific form of knowledge. Ito notes that among such modern Buddhists as Colonel Henry Steel Olcott, Anagārika Dharmapāla, Yang Wen-hui, T'ai Hsu, Soen Shaku, D. T. Suzuki, Mahasi Sayasaw, and others, Buddhādāsa Bhikkhu of Thailand was part of the transcendent modern Buddhist movement. However, Ito remarks, while other modern Buddhist modernists travelled across the globe to promote their causes, Buddhādāsa travelled comparatively little and enjoyed reclusive surroundings. Almost his entire corpus was in Thai and he seemed to “contribute much more significantly to Thai Buddhists in Thailand than to Western Buddhists...” and that “...the drive of modernity did not transform Buddhādāsa and contemporary Thai Buddhism on the same scale [as in other Buddhist countries] (Ito, 2012, 2-3).

Ito's remark is a very useful point of departure for a discussion that will follow. Her study looks at a monk for the source of modernity, and she could not find it perhaps because she was looking at the wrong place and time. This paper argues that modern Buddhism in Thailand emerged during the time of the Absolute Monarchy (1892-1932), a period before the rise of Buddhādāsa Bhikkhu.¹² It will look specifically at King Vajiravudh (r.1910-1925) and his invention of *Thao Hirunphanasun* (The Silver

¹² Although the term “The Modern Buddhist” was used already in 1871 by the British consul, Henry Alabaster, basing his work on Chaopraya Thiphakorawong's *Kitchanukit*, it relates to a discussion on whether or not Thai Buddhism was rational or not. My focus on the term rather refers to the relationship between the Sangha and the laity, which manifested itself later on, during the absolute monarchy. (Craig J. Reynolds, personal communication), see also Thongchai Winichakul (2015).

Guardian Demon of the Jungle), a deity that was part of the expansion of the Absolute Monarchy, and argues that in order to understand how Buddhism works in Thailand, it is not possible to separate it from the political power exercised by the state. We need to look at the center, not the periphery, of modern Buddhism.

In order to put the argument to work, there is a need to add one important feature into the discussion of modern Buddhism: the role of the laity. Since Bechert coined the term, there have been attempts to modify and extend it. One of the most important efforts was made by Gananath Obeyesekere (1972) on Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka. He stressed the role of the “Anakarika” as a mediator between the monkhood and the laymen. Later, he developed the concept more fully when he coined the term “Protestant Buddhism”, and one of the most important features of this concept was the role of laymen. “The hallmark of Protestant Buddhism...is its view that the layman should permeate his life with his religion; that he should strive to make Buddhism permeate his whole society; and that he can and should try to reach *nirvana*” (Gombrich and Obeyesekere, 1990[1988], 216). Modern Buddhism, therefore, includes the unprecedented role of laity in Sri Lanka.

The Thai Absolute Monarchy and Modern Buddhism

In the case of Siam¹³ at the turn of the twentieth century, the laity was the king. Kingship and Buddhism have had a direct link throughout Thai history. The role of the *cakravatin*, the wheel-turning monarch, has been part and parcel of the Thai monarchy, up until the present day. Craig J. Reynolds explores the complex relationships between kingship and Buddhism by referring to the life of Gautama, noting that when he was a boy he had to choose between being either a warrior king or a Buddha. This duality, for Reynolds, was “two sides of the same coin”:

If the Buddha represents the absence of power, then he leaves a very large black hole that exerts immense gravitational force on all those in its orbit. This relationship between [Buddhahood and kingship] had implications throughout history in the way secular leaders availed themselves of Buddhism’s idioms of authority and leadership (Reynolds, 2005, 220).

The black hole was the Thai king, Vajiravudh, whose reign indicated that modern Buddhism had emerged in Thailand. He continued the system that his father Chulalongkorn (r.1868-1910) had established, and was an important figure in the history of Thai Buddhism, an aspect that major studies on his reign have overlooked (Vella, 1978; Green, 1999).

Vajiravudh was a devout Buddhist and many of his policies reflected that his views were indeed modern. According to the first characteristic defined by Bechert, the process of reinterpretation of the early canonical texts was part of this movement (Bechert, 1994, 254). In the 1920s, Vajiravudh commissioned the recension of the *Pitaka* under the Supreme Patriarch Prince Vajiranana. It was the second recension after King Rama I’s reign, when the Bangkok Era began. After the recension was finalized in 1925, and called the *Siamrat Pitaka*, one thousand copies were distributed to the temples across the country and sent to Buddhist countries abroad (Vorachart, 2010, 117-119).

With the notion of modern Buddhism in Thailand established in the discussion, let me move on to the concept of absolute monarchy. There have already been extensive discussions about the nature of the

¹³ Siam changed her name to Thailand in 1938.

Thai Absolutist State, especially in the field of political science regarding the concept of state transformation, about which I will not go into great detail (see Kengkij, 2012-2013, for the recent survey). The following scholars have given explanations of Siamese absolutism: Somkiat Wanthana was one of the early scholars who drew the attention of Thai studies to the discussion of the nature of the Thai Absolutist State. He argues that the absolute power of the Thai state was not the status that had been in place for centuries. Instead, it began only in the late nineteenth century, and lasted for merely forty years. Somkiat points out that the Thai absolutist power began in the period during which, for the first time, the elite, led by King Chulalongkorn, gained absolute power in politics, economics, and culture over the Kingdom of Siam. This period began in 1892 with the political reform by King Chulalongkorn and ended in 1932 with the overthrow of absolute monarchy (Somkiat, 1990; Nidhi, 1995). Chaiyan Rajchagool opines that the period of absolute monarchy began a little earlier, in 1873, when royalty began to take control of the Finance Office, and a year later the Privy Council and the Council of State were established. These attempts were one of the series of power struggles of King Chulalongkorn and his allies to rise to the top (Chaiyan, 1994, 85-92). Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead contends that the Siamese absolutist state began as early as 1869, when during the Regency, the young King Chulalongkorn took steps to campaign for the centralization of power, which became more successful towards the last decade of the nineteenth century (Kullada, 2004, 51-58).

For our purposes of our discussion, the cultural side of the absolute monarchy was the centralization of Buddhism. The Supreme Patriarch Prince Vajiranana, Chulalongkorn's younger half-brother and Vajiravudh's uncle, was at the heart of this process. The Sangha Act was enacted in 1902 and led to the creation of the Council of Elders (*mahatherasamakhom*) to supervise the whole of the Thai *Sangha*. That marked the beginning of the alliance between institutional Buddhism and the Thai state. The most important part of this transformation was that it created the structure that put the monarch as the defender of religion, and he/she must extend his/her patronage to all monks (Ishii, 1986, 69-80). The role of the king vis-à-vis the monkhood turned into a form similar to what we call modern Buddhism.

King Vajiravudh and His Time

During the first quarter of the twentieth century, Siam found herself in a world where the contrast between the new and the old seemed starker than ever. From the 1900s to the 1930s the world saw a wave of wars and revolutions, and nations became more intensely interconnected, paving the way for easier flows of capital, commodities, technological innovations and ideas. What was happening in one corner of the world could be heard in the other corners in less time than ever before. This transition was not only felt in the political and economic realms, but also in the cultural and intellectual arena in Siam as well. King Vajiravudh, who acceded to the throne in 1910, found himself in this kind of world, and maintained his position amidst numerous pressures for him to change.

We might be able to understand what happened by taking a brief look at the king's life. The impact of his overseas studies became apparent in Vajiravudh's reign for the first time, as members of the elite with foreign education returned to Siam. The king himself was educated in England, which affected his views towards education and sport, and became the basis for his political maneuverings throughout his reign between 1910 and 1925.

Prince Vajiravudh was born on 1 January 1881, the 29th son of King Chulalongkorn, and the second son

of the king with Queen Saowapha. He began his education, both in Thai and English, at a young age. His English supervisor was Sir Robert Morant,¹⁴ an English educationalist who was also a tutor of other princes (Green, 1999, p.2).¹⁵ In 1893, at the age of twelve, Prince Vajiravudh was sent by his father to England for an education. He left Siam not long after the Franco-Siamese conflict¹⁶ of that year. In England, he was home schooled in Latin, Geometry, and Gymnastics. A year later, in 1894, he heard the news from Siam that his elder brother, Crown Prince Vajirunahis, had passed away suddenly. The title of Crown Prince thus passed to him, and the ceremony took place in March 1894 in the Siamese Embassy in London. At the dinner on the same night, he gave a speech that he would “return to Siam more Siamese than when he left it” (Vorachart, 2010, 18-19).

In 1897, Vajiravudh went to study at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. There he learned riding and other military skills. In 1899, he began civilian training at Christchurch College, Oxford University, and finished without a degree, albeit having written a dissertation titled *The War of the Polish Succession* (Vorachart, 2010, 31). During his time abroad, like other elite of his generation, he spent time travelling on the continent. He went to Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Russia, Egypt, Austria, Hungary, France, and Denmark.¹⁷ In 1902, he left England for good. But instead of travelling east, he headed west to New York, meeting with President Roosevelt (Greene, 1999, 3) and continuing to Canada. Hethen crossed the Pacific to Japan, and met with Emperor Meiji and the Japanese Royal family, and left Japan on 14 January 1903. After a brief stopover in Hong Kong, Crown Prince Vajiravudh arrived in Siam on 29 January 1903 (Greene, 1999, 2-3; Vorachart, 2010, 37-41).

Based on the standards of the time, it is fair to say that Crown Prince Vajiravudh was as cosmopolitan as he could be. He had travelled to most of the modern cities that the world could offer him, gaining first-hand knowledge of the modern world. But unlike his father King Chulalongkorn, Vajiravudh did not have the constituencies that he needed when he ascended the throne in 1910. Back in Siam in 1903, he found himself facing many challenges, ranging from a lack of support within the Siamese bureaucracy to

¹⁴ Robert L. Morant (1863-1920) was Prince Damrong Rajanubhab’s adviser while the latter was the first director of the Education Department between 1880 and 1892. Morant graduated from Oxford, and came to Siam in 1886. The first job to which he was assigned was as a tutor for the young children of Prince Naret and later the children of Prince Phanurangsi. His performance in tutoring was so impressive that in 1888 he was called upon to serve as a tutor to the Crown Prince Vajirunahis. He was recognised by the press at the time as Prince Damrong’s “able assistance”. Moreover, he looked after the English instruction and drafted the English examination standards in 1891. His important contribution to Siam’s modern education system included the *Ladder of Knowledge Series* textbooks teaching English to Thai pupils (Wyatt, 1969, 136-137).

¹⁵ Sir Robert Morant was also an important person in the history of the English education system. He returned to England and worked in education from 1901 (E.J.R. Eaglesham, 1963).

¹⁶ The 1893 Franco-Siamese conflict occurred from the attempt to settle the margin along the Mekong River. The dispute ended with the defeat of Siam, and the humiliation of the Siamese rulers (Battye, 1974, ch.7). Thongchai Winichakul has argued that this 1893 crisis was the utmost agony, the “psychological breakdown” for the Siamese rulers, and they, in turn, had to rethink the world around them in a whole new light. One of their new evaluations was to think about the past in a new way. “The defeat by the French,” Thongchai suggests. “gave birth to a new biography of Siam and Thailand today” (Thongchai, 2011, p.30).

¹⁷ King Vajiravudh’s trips to Europe and Africa were: Italy, 30 March-8 April 1901; The Netherlands, 28 June-5 July 1901; Belgium, 5-16 July 1901; Russia, 9-26 January 1902; Egypt, 3 February-6 March 1902; Austria, 25-29 April 1902; Hungary, 29 April-4 May 1902; France, 8-13 July 1902; and Denmark, 16-18 September 1902 (Vorachart, 2010, 34-35).

the threat to the monarchy resulting from the decline of dynasties around the world, and especially the Xinhai Revolution in China that was the major inspiration of the Revolt in 1912.

The Challenges to King Vajiravudh

Crown Prince Vajiravudh faced at least four levels of challenges upon his return to Siam in 1903, and these challenges became even more serious following his accession to the throne in 1910. The first challenge took place within a circle of the Siamese elite, while the other three can be regarded as the accumulation of structural changes Siam had experienced from the time of Vajiravudh's father, King Chulalongkorn.

The first challenge was on an individual level. Crown Prince Vajiravudh felt isolated from his father's bureaucratic structure. He felt that he lacked support, and his path to the throne was not of his own choice. Prior to the acceptance of the title of crown prince, Vajiravudh's brother, Crown Prince Vajirunahis, had been the first holder of the title, which King Chulalongkorn created in 1886 when Siam adopted the European royal tradition of succession by primogeniture. Prince Vajirunahis was the son of Queen Savang Vadhana, and was the favorite of the Siamese elite circle and foreigners in Bangkok alike.¹⁸ This situation, one historian suggests, caused Prince Vajiravudh to feel that he was only an auxiliary, the second best (Vella, 1978, 12). The crown was to be thrust upon him whether he wanted it or not.

Unlike his father, Prince Vajiravudh did not have support from the higher echelons of the bureaucracy before ascending to the throne in 1910. He lamented this situation, saying:

I feel very isolated, without any supporters. Those who are my supporters happen to be powerless. As for those who are in high positions in the bureaucracy, they have less faith in me than they should. Therefore they will not listen to any of my suggestions, but are proud of the fact that they have been in service longer than I [have], or have more knowledge and better understanding of the people's feelings than [me] (Translated and quoted in Kullada, 2004, 129).

The second challenge for Crown Prince Vajiravudh was due to the political influences from outside Siam. During the 1890s, the memory of Western imperialism was vivid among the Siamese elite. The Franco-Siamese crisis in 1893 was the greatest threat from imperialism that they had experienced. This event subsequently brought a reorientation of ideas among the elite about Siam's relationship with the West as no longer a "friendly" one. It was, in Thongchai's words, "the real first taste of colonial threat and defeat Siam had ever experienced" (Thongchai, 2011, p.26).

But a more urgent issue challenged the Siamese monarchy than Western imperialism from the 1910s, namely the global current of reforms and revolutions. Prince Vajiravudh knew the threat from Western imperialism before he even ascended to the throne, as he had left for England the same year as the

¹⁸After Crown Prince Vajirunahis' Tonsure Ceremony in 1891, King Chulalongkorn organised a grand dinner party reception for foreign guests. It was presumably the biggest of its kind. Participants were "the elite of Bangkok" and the foreign guests included the Rajah of Kedah. About 800-900 guests attended the dinner, from about a thousand invitations sent (*Bangkok Times*, 28, 31, Jan 1891, 2, 3).

Moreover, following Prince Vajirunahis' birthday on 27 June 1891, a celebration and exhibition were organised at King Chulalongkorn's summer palace in Si Chang Island, off the coast of Chonburi (*Bangkok Times*, 24 Jun 1891, 2-3).

Franco-Siamese crisis. The precarious situation for the Siamese elite ended with treaties that France and Great Britain signed in 1907 and 1909 respectively, which determined the borders with the colonial powers, and thus effectively settled the question of what modern Siam would look like on the map.

The global currents of reform and revolution after Vajiravudh became king in 1910 were more acute. The influence came from England, Japan, Turkey, and particularly China, and the new king became alarmed about the repercussions of the revolutionary ideas that were circulating among bureaucrats and educated Siamese (Thamsuk, 1979, 18; Atcharaporn, 1997, 162-163; Kullada, 2003, 155).

To be sure, pressure for reform had already been present before the reign of King Vajiravudh, and members of the Siamese monarchy were well acquainted with this pressure. It is not surprising, therefore, that the royals sought ways to slow down the rate of change in society. As early as 1885, a group of Siamese ambassadors to London and Paris drafted comments for the political and bureaucratic reform to King Chulalongkorn. The comments stressed the need for Siam to reform in order to weather the imperialism storm from the West. Many reform plans were proposed, among them Siam changing from an absolute to an institutional monarchy, and reforms to the salary system for the bureaucracy as well as the recruitment system. Siam, according to the group of ambassadors, needed to walk as close to Europe as possible, just as Japan had successfully done. In reply, King Chulalongkorn agreed that there was a need for political reforms, but he insisted that Siam was not ready (Chai-Anan and Kattiya, 1975, ch.3 and 4).

But the rate of change during the first decade of the twentieth century was too rapid for the absolute monarchy in some countries to cope with. In 1911, the world heard about the Xinhai Revolution, which ended the Qing Dynasty and began the era of the Chinese Republic. This revolution was “the culmination of nearly two decades of extraordinary ferment that left China more radically changed than had any other two decades in many centuries” (Gasster, 2006 [1980], p.464). The Xinhai Revolution was the amalgamation of forces that began from 1905, as the triumph of Japan over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War that year helped fuel the alliances between diverse revolutionary groups in China. The time came in October 1911, when a series of events swept the nation and ripened the conditions for the revolution, ultimately leading to the abdication of the Manchu emperor in February 1912 (Gasster, 2006 [1980], 484-485).

The events in China influenced the young and educated Siamese men enormously, and dissatisfaction towards the old system manifested itself in the 1912 Revolt¹⁹ (*Kabot ror.sor. 130* - ๑๓๑๑.ศ. 130),²⁰ but the plan was exposed and aborted only a few days before it took place (Nuttapoll, 2012, 80). There was a direct link between the Chinese revolutionary currents and the situation in Siam, which can be observed a few years prior to the plan for revolt being revealed. In 1907, a branch of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance was established in Siam (Kasian, 1993, 143). This Chinese Revolutionary Alliance was one of the key players in the Xinhai Revolution (Gasster, 2006 [1980], 484-486). In 1908, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, one of the leaders of the Chinese revolutionary coalitions, visited the overseas Chinese community in Siam for ten days (Kasian, 1993, 144). The first decade of the twentieth century, therefore, saw an acceleration of the need to change that China brought to Siam. One of the members of the 1912 group declared that the

¹⁹For major works on the 1912 Revolt, see Atcharaporn, 1997; Thamsuk, 1979; Varangkana, 2006; Nattapoll, 2011, and 2012.

²⁰*Ror.sor.* is the Thai calendar for Rattanakosin Era, or Bangkok Era (1782-present).

ideas of revolution came from China, and the political models planned after the revolution came from the West (Nattapoll, 2011, 79).

The 1912 revolt began among the group (*khana*- กษณะ) of young army and navy officials and civilians, who recognized that Siam's existing political system was out of date and wanted to change it. The exact number of the members of the group cannot be determined due to its rather loose organization. One study suggests that there were ninety-two members, made up of eighty-eight middle-ranking army and navy officers, and four civilians who belonged to the Department of Justice (Thamsuk, 1979, 27-34). But the numbers of those who were involved are estimated to be higher, ranging from one hundred and nine (Varangkana, 2006, ch.5) to about two hundred (Atcharaporn, 1997, 178). The majority were young army officers in their mid-twenties of low rank, mostly Second Lieutenants (Thamsuk, 1979, 29-31; Varangkana, 2006, ch.5).

Although members of the 1912 revolt were young and subordinate in rank, they had high intentions, if not ambition. The aim was to turn Siam from absolute monarchy to a democracy with a constitution (Rian and Net, 1976 [1960], p.18). The plan of the group was based on the political models that the members of the group had in mind: absolute monarchy, limited monarchy, and republic (Atcharaporn, 1997, 168-172). In the meetings between members to discuss the political model that they thought most suited Siam, some members of the radical wing of the 1912 group preferred the republic model like in the United States, France, and China. After the group gained more members, however, the majority preferred Siam to have limited monarchy as her political system (Nuttapoll, 2011, 79-80).

In March 1912, the plan of the group was exposed, and the members were captured, and so the initiative was called a revolt rather than a revolution. Had the 1912 Revolt become successful, Siam's path in history would have changed course in an unimaginable way.

The third challenge that King Vajiravudh faced when he ascended the throne in 1910 was the declining financial situation of the kingdom. The trade surplus dwindled from the year he became king. Signaling the economic recession was rice exports, Siam's major export commodity, which started becoming very unstable in 1905. The total volume of commodity exports went down from 106.9 to 81 million from that year, with the largest drops occurring between 1911 and 1912. This was due to a global recession and the change from silver to the gold standard in international trade in 1908, which affected the rice price in the world markets (Pornpen, 1974, 50-51). Furthermore, between 1903 and 1911 a scarcity of rainfall significantly affected rice crops in the Chao Phraya Basin, the Northeast and the North, pushing the rice price up (Atcharaporn, 1997, 76-80; Pornpen, 1984, 474). In 1912, the government turned to reliable domestic taxes on gambling, opium, and liquor, which added up to about 66.8 million baht, constituting over 40% of the total income of the government (Pornpen, 1974, 61).

The deficit problem was exacerbated by the dissatisfaction of the private business sector. Groups of Siamese businessmen could see that the reason for the difficulties in achieving successful capital accumulation was the domination of the country's entire business apparatus by colonial and foreign companies. Major export-oriented industries including rice, tin mining, teak and banking were in large part dominated by Chinese and European companies. Chinese entrepreneurs and coolies were heavily involved in rice milling, Europeans in sawmills and mines (Pornpen, 1974, p.52). Akira Suehiro concluded that there were three capitalist groups by the end of the 1920s: 1) European 2) Chinese and 3) Thai, or *sakdina*, group. Overall, the major export-oriented industries were dominated by the first two groups,

the Europeans and Chinese (Suehiro, 1989, 103-105). Siamese businessmen resented this situation because they were unable to gain access to means of production, especially in acquiring new technologies. Moreover, they felt that the government's tax and tariff regime favored the Western companies the most (Pasuk and Baker, 2002, 262-263).

The fourth challenge that King Vajiravudh faced came from the intellectuals and journalists. According to Matthew Copeland, Siam entered the new era of "political journalism" (*nangsuephim kanmueang* - หนังสือพิมพ์การเมือง) during the reign of King Vajiravudh, (Copeland, 1993, ch.4).²¹ That is, the monopoly that the Siamese monarchy claimed on politics was dismantled. A different kind of polity emerged that provided an institution which included the views of the opposition from the critical press to the Siamese monarchy. This Siamese public sphere emerged in a situation which, according to Thanapol Limapichart, "was the first time that every aspect of the Siamese government had been monitored by the newspapers, from economic and social policies and the corruption of high-ranking bureaucrats to gossip about the king's personal life" (Thanapol, 2009, p.387). The absolute monarchy responded to these criticisms in several ways, trying to control the uncontrollable Siamese public sphere. In 1917, King Vajiravudh bought one of the most critical of the political journalism sources, *Bangkok Daily Mail*, and its Thai-language edition, *Krungthep Daily Mail*. In 1922, he enacted the first press act in Siam. But these maneuverings still could not stop criticisms of the government and, particularly, of the king himself (Thanapol, 2009, 388).

The Shan Rebellion in 1902 and the Silver Guardian Demon of the Jungle

Among the numerous pressures on King Vajiravudh I have discussed so far, is one event that barely gets mentioned because it did not happen during his reign: the Shan Rebellion in 1902, eight years before he acceded to the throne and the same year that the Sangha Act was enacted. The event is registered in mainstream Thai history as one of the small unrests that was quelled easily by the authorities (Tej, 1981, 32). But I want to suggest that it had a more profound repercussions than have been seen.

In 1902, when the Crown Prince Vajiravudh arrived back in Siam after spending almost a decade in the West, challenges were waiting for him at many levels, as I have discussed above. His important task was to show that he was ready to become the next king of Siam. Between 1905 and 1906, after he ordained as a monk for a few days to fulfill his role as a Buddhist, he took on the first major task to fulfill his role as the crown prince by launching an official visit to the Northern region (Vorachart, 2010, 48-49). It was a telling choice, as the area that he was visiting was the heartland of the rebellion that took place in 1902 and lasted at least until 1904 (Walker, 2014). To overcome the challenges, the crown prince had to prove that he was an able person to rule Siam. In other words, the trip was a rite of passage for him.

Let me now turn to the Rebellion. The Shan Rebellion erupted in the area around the provinces of Phrae, Lampang, and Nan. On 25 July 1902, Pakamong, the Shan leader, led a group of more than forty rebels to plunder the center of Phrae, attacking the police station and the post office aiming to cut the telegraph

²¹ Copeland also included political cartoons that he discovered during his fieldwork into his thesis. These cartoons are critical of the nobility and King Vajiravudh, in particular. Looking at them, I cannot imagine that such cartoons could escape Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code in present-day Thailand, especially the cartoon on page 122 of the thesis (Copeland, 1993, ch.5).

line. They targeted the Thai officials there and around twenty of them were captured and killed. The Thai officials who went into hiding were tracked down by the locals and handed to the rebels, who decided their fate. After the first successful attack, the rebels split into two. One group advanced northwards to gather support from the Shan community in the area, which consisted of up to 20,000 people (Walker, 2014, 561). Another group went down South to the thick jungle of Uttaradit to slow down the Thai troops expected to march up from the south. This group launched guerrilla attacks on the Thai troops that were marshalled into the area, especially at night time (Royal Chronicle,). According to the official account, the Shan offensive lasted for about two weeks, and was effectively suppressed before the Bangkok troops arrived. Nevertheless, the Shan “problem” was not resolved until at least 1904.

The Silver Guardian Demon of the Jungle (*Thao Hirunphanasun*) emerged in this context. Indeed, if we consider the time that the Rebellion took place, Crown Prince Vajiravudh would have had this in his mind. He arrived in Bangkok only five months after the offensive, and throughout his time in Bangkok he knew that the Shan “problem” was still on-going. His trip to the North lasted three months. The most intense period was when he entered the thick jungle bordering Phrae and Uttaradit, the very area where the Shan rebels targeted the Thai officials. When the crown prince and his royal party entered into the jungle trail, it was reported, they were afraid of the perils and threats that they would face in the jungle. The crown prince was sure that there were supernatural beings that would protect them from harm. The report states that “one member of the royal party” then said that he had a dream that a tall, powerful guardian appeared and said that he would follow the royal party to protect the king throughout his time in the deep jungle. The king heard this and ordered propitiatory gifts to be offered to the guardian every day that the party spent in the jungle of Uttaradit (Vella, 1978, 229-230; Vorachart, 2010, 51-53).

The incident seemed to be vivid in the king’s mind and when he ascended the throne, he ordered a Brahmanistic ritual to condone the making of four statues of the Guardian. The first he kept personally as an amulet; the second one was placed at the Royal Page Department; the third in front of the royal vehicle and the last one as a statue at the Phayathai Palace (Vorachart, 2010, 53).

What are we to make of this deity? It does not seem to fit neatly with Bechert’s modern Buddhism nor Obeyesekere’s Protestant Buddhism. I would like to suggest that we might need to extend the understanding of modern Buddhism also in the dimensions when it encountered other “informal” religions such as spirits and animism, especially in regard to the expansion of the Thai absolute monarchy at the turn of the twentieth century. This process is what Hayashi (2003) called Buddhacization, but Holt (2009) insists that it was not a one-way interaction. There were constant responses by local forces that he described in the Lao religious culture as “inspiring” when Buddhacization from Bangkok arrived there (Holt, 2009, 232-258).

However, I would like to suggest that the process of Buddhacization, in this case the Thai king’s Buddhism towards the informal religions of the northern region needs a different approach than the Saidian self-other opposition. The Buddhacization process under the Thai absolute monarchy, while expanding untiringly, did not have only one dimension of rule, that is, to overcome and turn the local religions into Buddhism. Instead, Thai absolute monarchy under King Vajiravudh incorporated and hierarchized the Silver Guardian Demon of the Jungle into the cosmos of its modern Buddhism, by placing it in the heart of the Bangkok Empire, at the Phayathai Palace where the king resided. As Ann Laura Stoler put it forcefully, this strategy was similar to elsewhere in the colonial East Indies, where

colonial administrations adhered to non-interference in local religious practices, but in fact incorporated it with the colonial hierarchy of rule (Stoler, 2012). Bangkok was no different. During the same period, Bangkok applied plural jurisdictions towards the Malay-Muslim South regarding family law (Loos, 2006). Vajiravudh incorporated informal religious institutions – the supernatural – with absolute monarchy's modern Buddhism by making it compatible with the discourses of scientific rationalism. His position on the supernatural was determined by reasoning. He wrote that Buddhism, like Judeo-Christianity, needed miracles to attract the believers. For him, miracles and supernatural beliefs were not foreign to religion. He gave an example:

For the legend that before the Buddha attained the state of Awakening [*Tratsaru*], there were two occasions that the Great Demon [*mara*] tested him. The first occasion the Great Demon turned to be a female to seduce the Buddha but failed. On the second occasion, the Demon summoned a large army to test him. Both these tests, for those who have wisdom could contemplate that...they were metaphors. They happened inside the Buddha's mind during his contemplation, not outside (Vajiravudh, 1920, 50-51).

By relying on the empirical, King Vajiravudh followed what Bechert called the "de-mythologization" of Buddhism, which he termed "the use of...early sources...combined with modernization of the concepts of cosmology and with a symbolic interpretation of traditional myths which were customarily associated with Buddhism" (Bechert, 1994, 254-256). Here was the indication that Thailand was part of the transcendental movement of modern Buddhism, but throughout this article I have emphasized that modern Buddhism was part of the process of hegemony during the period of absolute monarchy in Thailand.

Conclusion

This article has taken a historical approach to the study of modern Buddhism in Thailand by the early twentieth century by analyzing the relationship between a particular form of rule, the Thai absolute monarchy, and a particular form of religion, Modern Buddhism. I have suggested that the form of modern Buddhism in Thailand has to be reconsidered based on its historical development, and that it could be seen that modern Buddhism was not a neutral concept but was utilized for the expansion of Buddhism from Bangkok to the other parts of the country. Further studies are needed in order to explore the relationship between modern Buddhism of Bangkok and other parts of the modern Thai nation-state.

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15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND

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Cross-cultural Differences and Cultural Stereotypes in Tourism - Chinese Tourists in Thailand

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Abstract

Stereotypes exist everywhere, and there is no exception in tourism. Thailand has been one of the most popular places for Chinese tourists, and thanks to Chinese visitors, tourism in Thailand has become the single biggest source of growth in the Thai economy. The tourism industry in Thailand is also faced with an increasing number of travelers from all over the world, with different cultural backgrounds as well. As a result, greater cross-cultural awareness, understanding and acceptance of cultural differences is needed in tourism industry. This paper mainly explores the cultural differences between Thai people and Chinese tourists in a tourism context, and examines some stereotypes of Chinese tourists held by Thai people. As stereotypes range from highly favorable to highly unfavorable, this paper focuses on some negative perceptions Thai people hold toward Chinese tourists and discusses the negative effects of stereotyping in cultural understanding and some suggestions to reduce stereotypes in cross-cultural communication.

Keywords: cultural differences, stereotypes, tourism

1. Introduction

Tourism is a major economic factor in the Kingdom of Thailand. Estimates of tourism receipts directly contributing to the Thai GDP of 12 trillion baht range from 9 percent (one trillion baht) (2013) to 17.7 percent (2.53 trillion baht) in 2016 (Theparat, Chatrudee, 2017). The Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) officials said their revenue estimates, for foreign and domestic tourists combined, show that tourism revenue for all of 2017 may surpass earlier forecasts of 2.77 trillion baht (US\$78.5 billion) (*Voice of America*, Retrieved 1 February, 2017). According to a report from the United Nations World Tourism Organization, China is now the top source of international tourism expenditure. For decades, Thailand, the Land of Smiles, has always been considered to be one of the most popular tourist destinations for Chinese. In 2014, 4.6 million Chinese visitors travelled to Thailand (*Department of Tourism*, Retrieved 10 March, 2015; *The Nation*, Retrieved 5 July, 2015). In 2015, Chinese tourists numbered 7.9 million or 27 percent of all international tourist arrivals, 29.8 million; 8.75 million Chinese tourists visited Thailand in

2016 (Chinmaneevong, Chadamas, 2016). According to TAT, the number of Chinese tourists rose by 93 percent in the first quarter of 2013, an increase that was attributed to the popularity of the Chinese film *Lost in Thailand* that was filmed in the northern province of Chiang Mai. Currently Chinese visitors account for 30 percent of all foreign travelers to Thailand (*China Daily*, Retrieved 26 May, 2015). "We can see Chinese tour groups all over the country (Thailand), and UnionPay is now widely used anywhere here to cater to Chinese customers" said Yang Chun, a young scholar who studies E-tourism in Thailand for her doctor degree.

The following is the report of the top ten arrivals by nationality in the recent years, which shows Chinese tourists far outpace those from other countries.

Table 1: Top 10 arrivals by nationality

Rank	Country/territory	Jan-Mar2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011
1	China	2,439,076	8,757,466	7,934,791	4,636,298	4,637,335	2,786,860	1,721,247
2	Malaysia	813,865	3,533,826	3,423,397	2,613,418	3,041,097	2,554,397	2,500,280
3	Russia	488,987	1,089,992	884,085	1,606,430	1,746,565	1,316,564	1,054,187
4	South Korea	463,278	1,464,218	1,372,995	1,122,566	1,295,342	1,263,619	1,156,283
5	Japan	408,264	1,439,629	1,381,690	1,267,886	1,586,425	1,373,716	1,277,893
6	Laos	366,376	1,409,456	1,233,138	1,053,983	976,639	975,999	891,950
7	India	304,479	1,193,822	1,069,149	932,603	1,050,889	1,013,308	914,971
8	Germany	283,274	835,506	760,604	715,240	737,658	682,419	619,133
9	United States	283,240	974,632	867,520	763,520	823,486	768,638	681,748
10	United Kingdom	269,995	1,003,386	946,919	907,877	905,024	873,053	844,972

Source: Adapted from "Visitor Statistics, 1998-2016", Department of Tourism Thailand, Retrieved 10 January, 2017.

From the figures in table 1 we can see that the tourism industry in Thailand is now faced with an increasing number of travelers from different countries, with China ranking first. As the number of Chinese tourists (tour groups and self-service travelers) visiting Thailand has been rising, various problems arise as well. Some Chinese tourists fail to obey local laws and regulations, and their behavior violates Thai customs and habits. Their individual behavior was exaggerated and reinforced by certain mass media, newspapers, television, internet in Thailand, which made it easy for ordinary Thai people to conclude that all Chinese people have the same traits. Their perceptions affect their attitude towards Chinese tourists and all Chinese people as a whole. They have actually some unfair misjudgment about Chinese people and therefore show prejudice against them. Psychologists Plotnik and Mollenauer clearly illustrate the damaging effect of prejudice and its link to stereotyping: "Prejudice refers to an unfair, biased, or intolerant attitude towards another group of people" (1986:565). The prejudice is expressed in a variety of ways, sometimes subtle and on other occasions overt. As stereotypes range from highly favorable to highly unfavorable, this paper focuses on some negative perceptions Thai people hold toward Chinese tourists and discusses the negative effects of stereotyping in cultural understanding and some suggestions to reduce stereotypes in cross-cultural communication.

2. Literature Review

Stereotyping is assuming that a person has certain qualities (good or bad) just because the person is a member of a specific group (Jandt, 2001:72). Stereotypes fail to specify individual characteristics. They

assume that all members of a group have exactly the same traits. Stereotyping is often based on faulty information. It often leads to serious misunderstandings. Creating stereotypes is a natural human coping mechanism for making sense of our social environment. The reason for the pervasive nature of stereotypes is that human beings have a psychological need to categorize and classify (Samovar & Porter, 1994:246). Saville-Toikey states that “social ‘typing’ or categorization is probably a necessary part of our procedures for coping with the outside world...; [it] should thereby be seen as a potentially positive and in any case inevitable process” (1993:195). The term stereotype initially referred to a printing stamp which was used to make multiple copies from a single model or mold, but Walter Lippmann (1922) adopted this term to describe the way society set about categorizing people---“stamping” human beings with a set of characteristics. In his work, Lippmann identified four aspects of stereotypes: simple---certainly more simple than reality, but also often capable of being summarized in only two to three sentences; acquired secondhand---people acquire stereotypes from cultural mediators rather than from their own direct experience with the groups being stereotyped; erroneous---stereotypes are attempts to claim that each individual human being in a certain group shares a set of common qualities; resistant to change: old stereotypes stubbornly color our perceptions (Nachbar & Laue, 1992:5).

Often people do not spend the time (or do not have either the need or the opportunity) or the emotional and cognitive energy to learn about variation within cultures we perceive to be different from ours. Rather, we use superficially noticeable events to make judgments, even based on one isolated incident, about the characteristics of an entire social group and to determine otherness (Smith & Mackie, 2000). Our prejudice influences the personal contacts and experiences we have with members of other cultures so that when we observe behavior that contradicts our expectations, we might explain away the reason for the non-correspondence as “the exception that proves the rule” (Smith & Mackie, 2000).

Stereotypes impede cross-cultural communication in various ways. They keep us from being successful as communicators because they are oversimplified, overgeneralized, and exaggerated; they tend to impede cross-cultural communication in that they repeat and reinforce beliefs until they often become taken for “truth”. Stereotyping can also be defined as gross simplification that prevents a more profound understanding of others as individuals and as members of social groups, and it prevents our dealing effectively with members of other groups. Negative effects of stereotypes occur when we use them to interpret behavior. Some people say stereotypes are an extreme example of cross-cultural miscommunication. They are probably the most difficult stumbling block to overcome in cross-cultural communication.

3. Methodology

3.1 Method

This study aims to explore the particular stereotypes that Thai people might hold towards Chinese tourists. We prepared a few questions to investigate how much Thai locals know about Chinese tourists. The questions were as follows: What do you like /dislike about Chinese tourists? What is your impression on Chinese tourists? Write down characteristics of Chinese tourists. Participants were required to answer the questions either in English or Thai. Interestingly, three school employees from Chiang Mai University (CMU) wrote down their answers in Chinese, as they were learning Chinese as a foreign language. The

survey was conducted in Bangkok and Chiang Mai.

3.2 Participants

Twenty-eight Thai locals engaged in this survey, among whom there were undergraduates, postgraduates from National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), cab driver, street vendor, restaurant owner in Bangkok, teachers and staff, postgraduates from CMU, some employees in massage store, travel agency, guesthouse and some other service industry. Their ages range from 23 to 47. Of the twenty-eight participants, most of them have had personal contact with Chinese tourists, and some of them got the impression from mass media or someone else's opinions.

3.3 Procedures

We mailed our colleague, friends and students working or studying in NIDA or CMU, Thailand, asking them to help us interview some Thai locals about their general impression on Chinese tourists. Participants were informed that they could include all descriptors that they associated with Chinese tourists no matter whether they were positive, neutral or negative. We got all feedback within five days from twenty-eight Thai people. Some wrote sentences, some a few words, and some paragraphs. Our friends and students also sent back a few screenshots from their phone for us to read their dialogues on social websites like QQ (the biggest instant message programme in China), WeChat (a mobile text and social message communicative service) and Facebook. Based on their online communication we were happy to know that participants were interested in the topic and willing to express their views. But some participants were apparently reluctant to report bad things for any of the other groups and this reluctance was not surprising, given the extreme negativity of these emotions. "Are you sure you want the truth?" a PhD scholar asked.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 Results

Despite the fact that stereotyping is a natural method of classification and despite the fact that stereotyping has some useful functions under certain circumstances, there are a number of reasons that stereotypes hamper cross-cultural communication. Stereotypes fail to specify individual characteristics. They assume that all members of a group have exactly the same traits. The results of the survey are quite interesting: some traits we did not expect were in the answers, such as speaking good English, great purchasing power (greater than westerners), asking nonsense discount, trouble-making and causing car accidents. Some of their descriptions are true; some are not. Some descriptions are even contradictory—some say Chinese tourists are polite, yet some say rude; some say Chinese are generous, while some others say selfish. Based on this survey it is safe to say that the temptation is so strong to lump an ethnic group together. Yet those who look a little deeper will be puzzled by the seeming contradictions in Chinese tourists. The truth is that they are all right, and they are all wrong in different situations. The following is the results of the interviews of Thai locals' impression on Chinese tourists.

13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THAI STUDIES
GLOBALIZED THAILAND? CONNECTIVITY, CONFLICT AND CONUNDRUMS OF THAI STUDIES
15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND

Table 2: Thai locals' description of Chinese tourists

Positive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They are good and generous and contribute to the local tourism a lot. - good for Thai economy (8) - well-educated, great, Ok - Chinese people take up 70% of all the foreign tourists. The more Chinese tourist come, the more job opportunities we have. - speaking good English (young people); polite (young people); nice (3) - For the new generation they speak good English.
Negative
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - bad behavior (4); not following traffic rules (4); not respecting the Thai customs (2) - always asking discount if we don't have any discount they ask for gift even (when) they buy the product just 50 bath - doing whatever they want; very noisy (9) - speaking very loudly in public (3); not caring about their manners - too boisterous (3) - They speak very loudly like they are quarreling with each other and they are easy to get mad. - hard to please; not satisfied with their tour guides' service - queue-jumping(3), jaywalking - some rude, picking up nose, spitting, eating loudly - disgusting, rude, loud (2), ill-mannered - taking off shoes in public - trouble-making and causing car accidents - selfish (old people) - taking photos everywhere, even where photos are strictly prohibited - littering and spitting (2) - asking nonsense discount - smoking in non-smoking areas (2) - bad temper and cursing - being noisy or messy, ignoring smoking signs, cutting in lines, spitting in public places or disrespecting local customs - not following the rules which cause misunderstanding - Chinese girls wear shorts when visiting Buddhist temples.
Neutral
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - It's easy to recognize Chinese tourists on the street by their dressing, looking and behavior. - Chinese like to visit temples, Sunday Market, night bazaar. - Chinese tourists interested in "shopping" more than other tourism attractions - buying a lot (middle aged and old people) - They like to visit pharmacy. - buying a lot of Tiger Palm, snake oil and other Thai products (3) - buying Thai souvenir - fewer tour groups, more backpackers - Their purchasing power is sorely needed in many countries. - great purchase power, greater than westerners

The numbers in the table refer to the frequency. In addition, for those which did not quite make sense the authors altered a little of the original.

There are some other answers which are a combination of good things and bad things, not belonging to any one category (positive, negative or neutral). "I felt a bit bad about Chinese people at first because they always ride motorbikes and stop on the main road to find the way, but later I worked for some

Chinese as a photographer, it was good experience with me to know the good side of Chinese. They are good and generous and contribute to the local tourism a lot" (a staff member from CMU). "For Chinese tourists, they are here because of Thailand's affordability and its accessibility. But in the view of most Thais Chinese tourists are unkind and lack of communication in English. In spite of the fact they may not understand our culture. Well we should tell them whether (?) what they should do or shouldn't in the polite way to maintain our relation" (a receptionist from a four-star hotel). One Thai wrote, "Chinese tourists are very enthusiasm, but too boisterous. They tend to drive fast on the wrong side of the road, and often go against traffic on one-way streets." He also mentioned that "some hotel and guesthouse operators are turning them away because they say Chinese tourists often rent a room for two, but stay in a group of four or five. They also deplore their tendencies to litter and hang their clothing on the balcony railing." A cab driver from Bangkok said, "I love Chinese tourists and hate them as well." Judging from the above answers, people can easily see some prejudice and bigotry in them.

4.2 Discussion

4.2.1 Stereotypes and Prejudice as Barriers

Thailand is one of those unique places in the world that has been gifted with some of the most amazing tourist attractions and sightseeing adventures we'll ever experience. In addition, this is a location that has a wonderful mix of culture, tradition, and heritage as well as its own collection of historical attractions that will leave a visitor in complete awe. Traveling is not just an economic behavior, but more a cultural one. And cultural communication is often restrained by some basic civilized norms that are recognized throughout the world, such as respecting local laws, regulations and customs. It is true that some Chinese tourists are not very much aware of cultural differences, and even violate rules and regulations when they are travelling in Thailand. The mass media exaggerated and reinforced Chinese tourists' bad behavior which made it easy for most Thai people to assume that all Chinese tourists had the same traits. In recent years we could feel Thai people's subtle change of attitude towards Chinese tourists, ranging from the in-flight cabin crew's service of Thai Airways to shop assistants' cold shoulder in stores like seven eleven. If people always talk about a member of the target group in negative and stereotypic terms, there is prejudice. "Certain people have negative feelings about a given group because they feel that the group is interfering with aspects of their culture with which they have become familiar" (Xu, 2004).

Why is it that contact with persons from other cultures is often frustrating and fraught with misunderstanding? Sometimes rejection occurs just because the group to which a person belongs is different. And people tend to assume that there are sufficient similarities among people all over the world. We sometimes make negative decisions about other people, and prejudice occurs when we hold negative attitudes toward certain group of people, especially racial and religious groups. Prejudices are formed by highly personal and unreasoned generalization about all or most members of the group (Xu, 2004).

Some Thai people harbor negative feelings about all Chinese people just because they dislike some Chinese tourists' behavior and they know very little about Chinese culture. For example, speaking loudly in public is really bothering for most Thai people. It seems, however, that Chinese are more tolerant of loud noise in public places such as airport, bus, restaurant, hotel lobby. Nevertheless, the awareness of

the group's background does not lessen the dislike of loud speaking. People express their dislike in various ways. When prejudice replaces communication, we see overt and covert avoidance and withdrawal when cross-cultural communication is expected. We observe some "arm's-length" prejudice held by flight attendants, shop assistants, hotel receptionists when they become less communicative, impatient and even rude to Chinese tourists. This form of prejudice is hard to detect since people who engage in it seem so tolerant of outgroup members much of this time. Stereotypes and prejudice are a pernicious stumbling block to cross-cultural communication.

4.2.2 Cultural Stereotypes and their Damaging Effects

Often, communication difficulties arise because people think they know all they need to know about people from different cultures and that further communication is unnecessary. Yet images of them tend to be exaggerated, maybe too good, but often too bad. For example, in most Thai people's view, all Chinese are loud and noisy, which is obviously untrue. To reduce or eliminate the bias or stereotypes, we should first understand the damaging effects of stereotyping and then try to find ways to confront and fight them. The term stereotype is the broader term commonly used to refer to negative or positive judgments made about individuals based on any observable or believed group membership, whereas prejudice refers to the irrational suspicion or hatred of a particular group, race, religion, or sexual orientation. The terms are related in that they both refer to making judgments about the individuals based on group membership (Jandt, 2001). Gustavo Lequerica-Calvo (2008) finds that the problem is that "stereotypes are distorted taxonomies: incorrect maps of the sociocultural landscape. Just as a distorted map would cause a traveler to become lost, so do false impressions about people and groups cause individuals and indeed, whole societies to lose their moral compass." Stereotypes are stumbling blocks in cross-cultural communication because they interfere with objective viewing of other people. People tend to evaluate, to approve or disapprove the statements and actions of the other person or group. Instead of trying to comprehend thoughts and feelings from the worldview of the other, we assume our own culture or way of life is the most natural, which prevents the open-mindedness to examine attitudes and behaviors from the other's point of view. They force a simple pattern upon a complex mass and assign a limited number of characteristics to all members of a group, such as the description (All Chinese) "speaking very loudly in public; not caring about their manners; not respecting Thai customs".

Stereotypes are harmful because they impede communication, especially communication between people from different cultures. They cause us to assume that a widely held belief is true when it may not be; Stereotypes also impede communication when they cause us to assume that a widely held belief is true of any one individual; The stereotype can become a "self-fulfilling prophecy" for the person stereotyped; When stereotypes lead us to interpret an individual's behavior from the perceptual screen of the stereotype they impede communication (Jandt, 2001).

4.2.3 Tentative Ways to Reduce Stereotypes

Stereotypes can influence intercultural communication in different ways. According to some studies, people tend to favor hypotheses based on stereotypes even when they have a reason to suspect the validity of the stereotype (Johnston & Macrae, 1994). Stereotypes are often resistant to change in cross-cultural communication. They often become substitutes for thought and experience. When assumptions and stereotypes influence our attitudes, we may find that making a fair judgment about

someone or something is a tough challenge.

In cross-cultural communication we should learn some appropriate ways to address stereotypes and learn how to reduce them. We should first do a mental check to make sure we are not influenced by someone else's prejudice and be very careful of jumping to conclusions based on generalizations or others' opinions. Some ways to reduce or eliminate stereotypes in cross-cultural communication are suggested here:

- Using various ways to search more information about other groups or -cultures;
- Being willing to learn more about different cultures, being more tolerant of the customs different from ours;
- Developing an open and flexible attitude to cope with all the problems when facing the uncertainty during the communication;
- Taking a more humble, tentative attitude about the accuracy of our judgments;
- Always remembering that there are more differences within a group than between groups;
- Recognizing that we are all part of many groups, none of which can totally explain or define who we are;
- Focusing on every person as an individual instead of taking a group of people as a whole;
- Taking opportunities to neutralize stereotypes when we hear them.

Knowing less about people of different cultural backgrounds increases one's chances of making stereotypes. Hence learning as much as we can about each other's culture can help us to develop better relationship, to get rid of misunderstandings, and to eliminate stereotypes or prejudice created by the lack of realistic information about each other. The appropriate attitude towards different cultures should be respect, understanding and tolerance. Although it is easy to fall into the habit of using stereotypes to prejudge people, there are ways to reduce stereotypes and combat prejudice. What we stress most is to check our own thinking, to be careful of jumping to conclusions based on generalizations or others' opinions and to politely challenge stereotypes when we hear them by offering evidence that the stereotype is false.

5. Conclusion

Due to short flight, easy visas, beautiful beaches, Chinese tourists are still crowding into Thailand, which becomes Thailand's largest tourism market, and the number of Chinese tourists is optimistically growing. In such a place as Thailand where people from different cultures like to go for their vacation there are inevitably many differences, including belief systems, values, customs, religion, sexual orientation, physical appearance, skin color and so on. Anyplace where differences are found leaves room for stereotypes. Stereotypes are generalizations about people usually based on inaccurate information or assumptions rather than facts (Samovar & Porter, 2000). Stereotypes do not take into account the great diversity of people within a group of people. Nor do stereotypes consider the present circumstances of the individual. Even worse, stereotypes can lead to prejudicial or discriminatory behavior.

As for us Chinese, we should improve our behavior to keep our image. For years, we've been chanting that "an opening-up China is warming up to embracing the world." However, there is one prerequisite to

such an embrace — the Chinese should first abide by a code of conduct in accordance with international practice and behave in a civilized way. To develop and finally achieve cross-cultural communication competence, we should always be aware of such stumbling blocks as stereotype, prejudice and ethnocentrism. We may learn to suspect, or at least keep in check, the cultural perspective that is unique to our own experiences. We may learn to expect more cultural differences, using an investigative approach rather than stereotypes and preconceptions, gradually exposing ourselves to differences so that they become less threatening. As Roger Harrison, a communication expert, has pointed out:

The communicator cannot stop at knowing that the people he is working with have different customs, goals, and thought patterns from his own. He must be able to feel his way into intimate contact with these alien values, attitudes, and feelings. He must be able to work with them and within them, neither losing his own values in the confrontation nor protecting himself behind a wall of intellectual detachment.

(Adapted from L.M. Barna, “Stumbling Block in Intercultural Communication”, 1992)

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Climate Mitigation Initiatives: Perspectives on the Forest and Global Warming in Two Karen Communities

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Thailand

Abstract

The continued crisis of global warming has led to an increase in solutions regarding how to decrease greenhouse gases and deforestation. One of these solutions is carbon mitigation initiatives (CMI). These initiatives utilize a market-oriented approach which attempts to decrease carbon outputs from deforestation by placing a price-value on sequestered carbon which can then be sold on an international carbon market. Another goal of these initiatives is to enhance the livelihoods of participating communities. It is important to understand the effectiveness of these new solutions in order to solve global warming and deforestation, increase livelihood enhancement as well as better understand the overall effects on participating communities. The goal of this research is to understand how these initiatives have transformed human-environmental relationships within the two Karen communities of Muang Ang and Huay Hin Lad Nai. Although these two communities have distinct agricultural practices and different relationships to the Thai government, they both have used CMI for their own reasons. For them, CMIs are about strengthening networks and visibility, and collecting scientific proof in order to demonstrate to the government and Thai society in general that they live harmoniously with their natural surroundings. In opposition to the carbon trading proposition (which states that people need financial incentives in order to conserve natural resources), these communities do not feel any financial incentive to conserve the forest. Rather, they feel that whether they are able to sell carbon credits or not, their main priorities are to dismantle the image of them as 'forest destroyers', strengthen local and international networks, and collect scientific evidence that they can live sustainably with the forest in order to make their argument to the government that they should be granted land rights on their traditional lands.

Keywords: carbon mitigation, Karen, rotational agriculture, environmentality

Background

Muang Ang is a Karen village located both within Doi Inthanon National Park and a neighboring National Forest Reserve in Chiang Mai Province. The community was established in 1914 and can trace its roots back to Karen migrants that moved into the area from Burma around 200 years ago due to political conflicts in their homeland (Cohen, 1984). The Karen people traditionally practice a dry-cultivation rotational agriculture, in which they clear an area of forest in order to grow rice and other vegetables. They utilize the land for one year and then move on to another area, allowing the previous field to lie fallow for 6-12 years. This long fallow period allows vegetation and soil fertility to regenerate, thus allowing them to return and utilize the area in the future (Yos, 2013). In 1972, the Doi Inthanon National Park was established in the same area that Muang Ang villagers had been inhabiting. Under forestry law, these villages were considered illegal as well as all their traditional practices such as rotational agriculture, hunting and grazing livestock (Tomforde, 2003). Through national development projects and the Royal Project Foundation, these Karen communities have gradually given up rotational agriculture for irrigated terraced paddy fields and organic greenhouse cultivation.

In 2009 Muang Ang took up organic greenhouse cultivation in collaboration with the Royal Project Foundation, which has now become their main source of income. Of 175 households, there are 158 greenhouses. Greenhouse cultivation provides 5,000-15,000 baht/month/greenhouse depending on the season. There is a very communal feeling within greenhouse cultivation practices, with households assisting each other during every step of the process. Villagers seemed to view greenhouse cultivation as very beneficial. It has helped them gain a continuous source of income throughout the year, has been less laborious than rotational agriculture and has allowed them to conserve the surrounding forest by not having to agriculturally expand outward. Cultivation times, types of vegetables and price are all determined by the Royal Project Foundation, who provides the village with all the seeds and handles the crops' distribution throughout Thailand.

Huay Hin Lad Nai is another Karen village but continues to practice their traditional form of rotational agriculture, set within fairly new community rules and regulations. Most, if not all of their food comes from their rotational agriculture fields alongside rice paddy farming. Their main source of income is through selling tea, bamboo shoots and various fruits, which grow naturally around the surrounding forest. Huay Hin Lad Nai, like many highland ethnic groups in Thailand, has a rich history regarding their relationship to the state and the forest. The village is situated in Chiang Rai province in between a National Forest Reserve and Khun Jae National Park. In 1992, Khun Jae National Park was established and 3 years later, the area was declared a watershed protection area and the villagers were ordered to leave the area. This led to them joining the Northern Farmers Network, a network of various indigenous groups around Northern Thailand that have been organizing in order to demand citizenship and land rights. Huay Hin Lad Nai became more internally organized; creating community maps, fire breaks and new rules and regulations regarding natural resource management. From this point forward they participated in a series of protests and marches against the state. In 1999 the community was named as a 'sustainable village' by the Thai government and finally in 2003, the village was officially recognized within the Wieng Pa Pao district, Chiang Rai (International Fund for Agricultural Development [IFAD],

2013). Today the community is considered a model for its low-carbon and environmentally friendly lifestyle.

Methodology

The majority of my research was conducted using the ethnographic fieldwork techniques of in-depth interviews and participant observation. In-depth interviews were conducted with those members who directly participated in the CMI projects, village elders and randomly-selected villagers. Interviews were loosely structured, sometimes going off-topic but then eventually returning to the main themes of my research. However, it was during these times when interviews went off-topic that seemed to provide the most surprising responses that allowed me to better come up with new questions for the next interviews. The main themes of the interviews were their views on rotational agriculture, deforestation, global warming and carbon trading as well as how these relate to their more traditional Karen worldview. A total of 10 participants were interviewed for Muang Ang while the research for Huay Hin Lad Nai is based off 11 interviewees. I spent 2-3 weeks in each village conducting in-depth interviews and living alongside them, helping them with whatever chores and work they may have been doing that day. The participatory nature of the fieldwork allowed me to better understand the relationship between villagers and to get a better sense of who this data is coming from. Working alongside them also allowed me to better build up rapport amongst the community. I believe that working alongside the community was the most fundamental aspect of the fieldwork that allowed me to receive more honest responses by the participants.

Muang Ang REDD+ Pilot Project

The REDD+ Pilot Project was initiated in 2014 by the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP). The DNP went around to various communities located around and within Doi Inthanon National Park with only a few willing to participate. During that time, Muang Ang was approached and, after conducting a village meeting decided to participate. Soon afterwards Muang Ang created their own REDD+ committee, consisting of 6 members, one from each hamlet. The committee would be in charge of going to various workshops and meetings across Southeast Asia in order to learn from other communities participating in CMIs. Every month there is a village meeting in which they discuss various topics, REDD+ being one.

The pilot project consists of 15 plots measuring 1,600m² divided across 3 different forest types depending on the density of the forest. In other words, 5 plots are allocated to low, medium and high density forest areas. These measurements were determined prior to the project and are based on scientific research that is considered legitimate within the international scientific community. Three times a year (summer, winter rainy seasons), the DNP REDD+ team travels to these areas along with members of the Muang Ang REDD+ committee to measure various data such as tree height and diameter, types of tree species and the amount of each one. Data is collected and then sent to the research labs for analysis. Prior to the project, an agreement was made in which villagers could not alter the natural surroundings within the 15 plot sites. This did not seem to affect the practices of the community due to small size of the plots and the numerous other locations in which they could collect

forest products and allow their cows to feed (although against Thai forest law). The pilot project has a 5-year research goal and will continue if the data demonstrates that sufficient carbon has been sequestered.

Huay Hin Lad Nai Carbon Footprint Research Project

In 2013, the local NGO, Northern Development Foundation (NDF) approached the community of Huay Hin Lad Nai requesting that they assist researchers from various Thai Universities to conduct a research project. The project would seek to calculate the carbon footprint of the village and its relationship to rotational agriculture. The goal of the research was to demonstrate that rotational agriculture contributes less to global warming than those living in the city as well as surrounding villages that practice cash-cropping. After having a village meeting, the community agreed and began the project. The community set up a special research team consisting mainly of local youth who would be taught how to collect data from the researchers and would later gather the data themselves in order to send to various university research labs. Data collected consisted of the various types of plants they consumed, the amount of each and the origin (field, forest or city). They also had to measure how much gasoline was required to collect the forest products in the fields or by heading to the city to buy various products. The project lasted 3 years and the research findings have given the village international recognition for practicing sustainable rotational agriculture.

Villagers' Understanding and Experience of Carbon Mitigation Initiatives

In this section I will be discussing the experience villagers had throughout the project. This will include the level of difficulty of learning new knowledge as well as how they explain this knowledge themselves. The section is divided into 4 sections regarding their understanding of each topic: The CMI data-collection and participation, deforestation, climate change and carbon trading. We will see that in both cases, the technical aspects of CMI knowledge is very difficult to understand. However, the level of participation with both communities varied. Regarding the more general aspects of global warming, both communities tended to agree that industry and city-life are the main causes of global warming.

CMI Data Collection and Participation

The REDD+ and Carbon Footprint Research initiatives were both introduced by outsiders (REDD+ by the DNP and the Carbon Footprint Research by various local and international NGOs). In both cases the initiative's research team consisted of professors with degrees in various environmental sciences and connections to people in high positions from either the government or international NGOs. Both organizations approached the community and requested to conduct research regarding deforestation, carbon and global warming. Each initiative utilized similar techniques and language to conduct the project and transmit this new knowledge to the community. Although the actors and various conditions of each community differed greatly, the villagers' reaction to the highly technical and tedious aspects of the initiatives were very similar.

One issue that was brought up was the projects' time-consuming nature. Both communities felt that working on these projects took a lot of time out of their day, time that is needed to perform other more important duties such as taking care of the family and working in the fields.

"I don't know why they chose me, but I just accepted it. I don't have free time at all! Hah. Others refused to participate. I could have refused but I am considerate haha. I feel that there are more men when we meet and less women. Women never go to the meetings. In the past when the headman asked us to go to the meetings, women hardly came, but now there are more women" (Me. Smith, personal communication, February 16, 2017).

"A lot of meetings! Many people come to visit us, very busy. They take a lot of our time. Half a day. Sometimes very boring" (U. Smith, personal communication, February 17, 2017).

"It was complicated! You have to weigh everything, you have to check everything that you put into the pot. It is tedious, very busy. 3 meals per day, every day for 3 weeks" (P. Smith, personal communication, March 25, 2017).

"Yea, it was very difficult. We had to spend a lot of time collecting data" (C. Smith, personal communication, March 24, 2017).

The first two quotes are made by those from Muang Ang while the other two were taken from Huay Hin Lad Nai participants. Although participating in different projects, they all felt that the project took a lot of time out of their day. However, whereas those from Muang Ang felt that the meetings were the main culprit, those in Huay Hin Lad Nai emphasized the great amount of time actually collecting data. We can see here that there may be an issue with emphasizing community participation by outside actors. One Muang Ang REDD+ committee member explained the issue with data collection as follows:

"Sometimes, I go watch but we don't know how to do the measurements. We don't understand. They teach us. Do like this, do like that but we forget. Our memory is not very good hahahaha, we don't write it in the notebook. There are too many things. If we don't take notes we forget." (U. Smith, personal communication, February 17, 2017).

This could be an issue with how much emphasis the DNP has put on community participation. As stated before, the collection of data is done 3 times a year, usually taking one day. There is not much time to fully learn and understand the data-collection procedures and if villagers do understand, they may forget by the time the next data collection is conducted. This is contrasted with how the villagers of Huay Hin Lad Nai were expected to collect data:

"We collected the data 3 months per year. We record how much gasoline we use for the machines. How long it takes per day. We recorded data on rotational agriculture, how much time we spent burning the fields. We checked the tree sizes on the fallow fields. We gathered all this data and sent it back to Professor J. from Chulalongkorn. We checked how much and what we used from the forest. What we eat, how much of everything we eat. How much we buy from outside. If we go to the city, we check how much gasoline is used to drive to the city. Here we just eat from the forest so we have a smaller footprint" (Pr. Smith, personal communication, March 23, 2017).

In this case, a large amount of data was collected consistently throughout a long period of time. Research teams were available for longer periods of time in order to fully transmit the knowledge of data-collection to the villagers. Having to do this every day or every week allowed the community to better understand what data they are collecting and how it is relevant to the overall goal of the project, as well as to their own lives.

With regards to their understanding about the more abstract ideas of the project (deforestation, climate change and carbon trading), both communities also tended to agree on the same points. What was most emphasized was that industrialization, not deforestation, is the main cause of carbon emissions and climate change. It is with carbon trading, the idea of exchanging carbon credits for money that unearthed unique perspectives regarding the community's relationship to the environment.

Deforestation

Deforestation is important to consider when discussing CMIs because not only does the burning of trees emit carbon dioxide, but forests also act as natural carbon sequesters. Deforestation became a hot topic with both communities because of their distinct perspectives on rotational agriculture. The community of Muang Ang had already stopped rotational agriculture since 2002 while Huay Hin Lad Nai is internationally recognized for continuing their traditional practices of rotational agriculture in a sustainable manner.

"Yes (I believe rotational agriculture causes deforestation), there are some families that don't respect special areas, like watersheds. They cut the trees. During my parents' time, some families cut a lot of forest. People from all villages" (C. Smith, personal communication, February 15, 2017)

"It is kind of bad but we have to survive. Maybe burning is bad. But we have no choice. If you don't clear the land there is no way you can grow something" (Me. Smith, personal communication, February 16, 2017)

"Before, when I was a kid. On one hand, I felt sorry to cut down the forest but there was no other way. We didn't have enough rice to eat. When I looked at the mountains, it didn't look beautiful" (U. Smith, personal communication, February 17, 2017)

All three of these participants come from Muang Ang. Most people in the community were not sure if rotational agriculture directly causes deforestation. They decided to stop because of many reasons that included low productivity, intensive labor, income, beauty, government and love of the forest. Every community member I spoke to were happy to have greenhouses because it allowed them to gain income without illegal logging or expanding their paddy fields in order to make a living.

"The land where the greenhouses are used to belong to the community anyway so the DNP let them do that and then the upper parts of the mountains are to be conserved. The village doesn't want to cut up there. Taking care of the greenhouses is sufficient for the villagers so they don't need to cut anymore forest for cultivation" (C. Smith, personal communication, February 15, 2017).

Concerning the community of Huay Hin Lad Nai, everybody wanted to make the point that their rotational agriculture does not cause deforestation. They commonly differentiated rotational agriculture from cash-cropping in the forest and stressed that it is the cash-croppers, not those who practice rotational agriculture that is causing deforestation.

“If you burn a tree but don't destroy the forest, it will not contribute to global warming, but if you cut down the forest it will. Rotational agriculture does not contribute to global warming, but cash-crops like corn and cassava do. If you burn cash-crops it will make damage. There is toxic smoke” (N. Smith, personal communication, March 22, 2017).

“No (rotational agriculture does not cause deforestation)! Because we have always done rotational agriculture, we still have forest” (D. Smith, March 23, 2017).

“The city people think that rotational agriculture destroys the forest but actually rotational agriculture is a cooperation between the forest and people. Rotational agriculture does not destroy the forest because there are limits in the area. The fields switch every year” (PC. Smith, personal communication, March 23, 2017).

Regardless, both communities believe that they do not cause deforestation. Muang Ang has switched from rotational agriculture to greenhouse cultivation, which provides enough income for them to stay in the designated agricultural areas within the National Park and not have to expand agriculturally into the surrounding forest. Huay Hin Lad Nai continues to practice rotational agriculture but is steady in their belief that their practices are set within community rules and regulations that prevent any type of deforestation from occurring.

Climate Change

The specifics on how deforestation, carbon and climate change are linked is a fairly difficult theory that requires some background in the natural sciences to fully understand. However, the general idea is fairly simple, and villagers from both communities seemed to completely understand the basic underpinnings. There seemed to be a unanimous agreement that industrialization and all the luxuries that come with modernization are the main contributors to climate change.

“Uhh well right now, it is not only about rotational agriculture and the forest. Deforestation contributes less to global warming. Everything contributes, but big cities, very hot, no trees, lots of factories, they contribute more” (U. Smith, personal communication, February 17, 2017).

“I think it is because companies, and things in the city. Too much smoke or chemicals, too much pollution. But people in the city, they think people in the jungle, they cut a lot of trees, they burn the forest. I think global warming is mainly about cars and pollution in the city” (S. Smith, personal communication, February 26, 2017).

“No connection. It is different, not the same. Global warming is from the city. 20% from the forest, but 80% from factories, trucks, cars, motorbikes” (PM. Smith, personal

communication, February 26, 2017).

Out of the 20 plus interviewees, only 3 were able to give statistics regarding where the majority of carbon comes from. Two of these people were the headmen from each village and the other was a close associate.

Rotational agriculture requires the burning of past fields that have been left in fallow. After burning the newly-grown forest, they cultivate the land. Many acknowledged that burning may contribute to climate change but has a very minor impact:

“Everything contributes to it. The one who doesn't own the land and starts burning. It is not much but it all contributes a little bit to global warming. Everything adds up” (U. Smith, personal communication, February 17, 2017).

“We burn the waste of the harvest but everybody doesn't burn at the same time. We help each other to burn the waste from the field. We burn from the outside in, in order to control the fire. We burn but I don't think it makes a lot of carbon. We don't burn at the same time. One household at a time. Yes, I know (that carbon is bad). But we don't cause much damage” (T. Smith, personal communication, March 22, 2017).

Moreover, the idea that rotational agriculture actually absorbs more carbon than strict forest conservation was brought forth repeatedly, even in the case of Muang Ang, who no longer practice rotational agriculture.

“Well, rotational agriculture can produce young trees, young trees can absorb more carbon. So, rotational agriculture can help reduce global warming” (PM. Smith, personal communication, February 15, 2017).

“Rotational agriculture does not contribute to global warming. We believe that if we can do rotational agriculture, we can absorb more carbon. When we cut the field for rotational agriculture, the next year we leave it fallow and the young trees will absorb more carbon, more than old trees” (N. Smith, personal communication, March 22, 2017).

“Well, I understand but the way we practice rotational agriculture works is that we burn a little but the fallow fields absorb more. We like to compare this with people. The elders eat less and the young eat a lot. We observed that the trees. We see by ourselves. The older trees don't blossom, don't flower again but the young trees do. So we think that older trees absorb less” (PP. Smith, personal communication, March 23, 2017).

All three of these participants are leaders in their communities. They are directly involved with every project that goes on and seem to make sure that they are constantly updated on new information.

Climate Change: Mepo

Although the leaders of these two communities spoke very eloquently using the scientific language of outside actors, there were also those who believed climate change is happening for different reasons.

Only a few elders spoke of what they called *mepo* which can be translated as “hot air.” *Mepo* is a gas-like substance that you can see when you completely alter the surrounding environment.

“We believe that *mepo* causes global warming. If you cut down the forest, a big area, you will see some type of gas. But small areas like what we do, rotational agriculture, you don't see it. It is hot air. *Mepo* is the main reason we have global warming. Carbon comes from *mepo*” (N. Smith, personal communication, March 22, 2017).

“In the city there is a lot of smog and pollution, it is not clear. You cannot see if there is *mepo*. I believe that there is a lot more *mepo* in the city but you cannot see it because of the pollution. The city is hotter because it has more *mepo*. The elders say that if you change the natural environment too much, you will have *mepo*. But if you keep it the same, there will be no *mepo*” (N. Smith, personal communication, March 22, 2017).

“I think that it is both. Both contribute to global warming. Because if you use leaves to make a roof, there is no *mepo* but if you use a tin roof there will be some. If you have no forest there will be a lot and if you have forest there won't be *mepo*. *Mepo* and carbon are separate” (PC. Smith, personal communication, March 22, 2017).

“I think it comes from other places too. I'm not sure because I haven't been to the city too often but I've seen *mepo* in the city” (L. Smith, personal communication, March 25, 2017).

This could be considered a traditional Karen understanding of why the world is becoming hotter. It was discussed only by those aged over 50. *Mepo* and the scientific research regarding carbon do not seem to contradict each other but are simply different ways of explaining the same phenomenon. In both cases, a transformation of the natural environment (deforestation and industrialization) are the main contributors for global warming.

Carbon Trading

As explained in the introduction, REDD+ is a fairly new program that can be linked to carbon trading in general. The basic premise is that people who prevent deforestation and forest degradation can obtain carbon credits depending on how much carbon the specified forest has sequestered. These carbon credits can then be sold on an international carbon market. Of these two communities, Muang Ang is the only community participating in a type of carbon trading project. Most villagers did not know too much about the specifics and their feelings ranged from neutral to beneficial.

“I have never thought about this (selling carbon credits for money). I don't care about carbon. I only care about preserving the forest and becoming well-known to other government officials. Those people can recognize us. That is what is important to me” (C. Smith, personal communication, February 15, 2017).

“I think if it gains money it is good but if not, good also because we preserve the forest either way. If we can get income from it, then I support it. The committee thinks we

should work for the community first, if we get the money we will distribute it in a communal way. Support agriculture, occupations” (U. Smith, personal communication, February 17, 2017).

Most Muang Ang villagers did not know about carbon trading. If they did, or if I brought the idea up, most stated that they conserve the forest because it is their livelihood, not because there is some financial incentive. If money is presented to them, they would accept it in order to help pay for forest conservation practices such as maintaining fire breaks and paying for food and gas for wildfire guards. The reason they don't know too much about carbon trading could be because of how the DNP presented the project to them. One member of DNP REDD+ team, who is Karen himself from a nearby village explained the situation as follows:

“There is a carbon market. But it is not so developed yet. Maybe one day it will sell, but if we can't sell, who will take responsibility if the community feels angry. If we tell them that they will definitely get the money and it doesn't come” (T. Smith, personal communication, February 15, 2017).

However, he continued by stating that even if there was a developed carbon market, the community should not sell their carbon credits:

“This is my opinion ya? I don't want them to sell the carbon. There will be problems for sure. How to sell it, who will buy it? If they make the money, where will it go?” (T. Smith, personal communication, February 15, 2017).

This seems to be a big obstacle for REDD+ and carbon trading in general in that there has yet to develop a fully functioning carbon market. The biggest emitters of carbon have not felt the need to buy carbon credits in order to continue profitable production levels.

Although Huay Hin Lad Nai has not participated in any carbon trading project, many villagers had strong feelings towards the idea. Their biggest issue was the problem of government and corporation corruption.

“I'm happy if CP (the largest Thai conglomerate) stops polluting. But it is not good if they can buy carbon credits and then pollute more. I've heard that the government sells the carbon credits though. The government cooperates with the companies. This is not good. Corruption” (P. Smith, personal communication, March 23, 2017).

“The Thai government wants to sell carbon credits. The government wants to take credit for preserving the forest, they want to earn money from others. So I don't agree with this” (Td. Smith, personal communication, March 24, 2017).

Others had more philosophical responses concerning humans' relationship with nature:

“I don't want to be a victim of REDD+. If the community does REDD+, the money will not reach the villagers for sure. The money will go to the Forest Department or something

like this. We don't want to sell because the forest belongs to the world. Nobody owns the forest. It is not right if we get the money" (PC. Smith, personal communication, March 22, 2017).

For many villagers of Huay Hin Lad Nai, there is this idea that humans do not own the environment. They may be fighting for their rights to live on the lands they have lived on for generations but they do not believe that it is 'theirs.' This is opposed to the Western way of thinking in which the idea of private property and manipulation of the environment has been grounded in our thought for centuries.

Another important theme that came up is their idea regarding money in general.

"I'm concerned about hidden agendas. So we have to have meetings and discuss about the company. When money is involved, it is dangerous. If a project comes here talking about money, then we have to be careful. Money is dangerous. If we don't have a village fund then it is dangerous, villagers will fight amongst each other. People might become greedy. We have to manage the funds. If one or two people manage it, it is not good" (Pr. Smith, personal communication, March 23, 2017).

The responses regarding carbon trading varied but the general sense I received was that exchanging money for the conservation of the forest was not necessary. Villagers from both communities believed that they should take care of the forest regardless, it is part of their Karen belief system. I believe Muang Ang villagers seemed more willing to accept money due to their closer relationship with the DNP as well as not fully understanding carbon trading (which could be the fault of the DNP not fully explaining it). Huay Hin Lad Nai also, under very specific circumstances stated they would accept money, but in general they seemed more reluctant to participate in any carbon trading project. The current unstable land situation of Huay Hin Lad Nai, along with their history in activism may explain this. I would now like to discuss why members from each community decided to participate in the CMI.

Reasons for Participating in CMI

As mentioned before, both villages had community meetings before deciding to participate in the project. The projects were not forced upon them and, as we will see, both communities exercised their agency, deciding to participate for their own reasons (i.e. non-financial motivations). The two most cited reasons were networking/visibility and scientific proof to demonstrate to the government and lowlanders that they do in fact take care of the forest.

Networking/Visibility

Both communities believed that by participating in the CMI, they would be able to meet important allies, gain knowledge from them and become more visible to society. Visibility is very important for both communities because if nobody can hear their voice, if nobody knows about them, then their chances of facing oppressive state policies greatly increases. Both communities face very vulnerable situations. They do not have legal rights to the land and the Thai government and Thai society in general hold the view that they are 'forest destroyers.' Therefore, by increasing their visibility and building up their networks, they are able to build alliances with other groups (NGOs, government departments, university

professors, activists) that will come to their aid if any oppressive measures are taken. Here are some examples of what both communities believe lowlanders feel about them:

“People in Bangkok, they don’t understand. They say, ‘Karen people, or the hill tribe people, they cut a lot of trees, after that, you have floods’” (S. Smith, personal communication, February 26, 2017).

“The city people think that rotational agriculture destroys the forest but actually rotational agriculture is a cooperation between the forest and people” (PP. Smith, personal communication, March 23, 2017).

“For the government, I think only 10% understand. But this is not because of us, it is because many other forest villages destroy the forest. We have to make the government understand that we are not the same as them. The government has to separate the two different types of villages” (Cp. Smith, personal communication, March 24, 2017).

Flooding, deforestation, polluting streams with chemicals, these are some of many reasons lowlanders believe ‘hill tribes’ should not be able to live in the mountainous forest areas. As the last participant stated, and which may be a generally held belief with the villagers of both communities, lowlanders are correct to an extent. Many hill tribes do cause some of these problems through cash-cropping (Karen and non-Karen). However, these two communities do not and therefore must build up networks and increase their visibility in order to demonstrate to the government and lowlanders that they are able to live sustainably with the forest. One way to do this is by participating in new projects that allow them to strengthen their network connections.

“I joined this group (the Northern Development Foundation) because they are a cooperative. They help us talk with the government. They like us because how we live with the forest” (Cp, personal communication, March 24, 2017).

“Yes! The Royal Project is not enough though, if REDD+, Royal Project and DNP come, it is kind of a network to help. We help them, they help us” (C. Smith, personal communication, February 15, 2017).

“We can communicate better with other sectors. They send us to many other government sectors to learn from them. They send us out to learn, to exchange knowledge, we swap to see each other’s places. Good for networking and knowledge-sharing” (C. Smith, personal communication, February 15, 2017).

As you can see, both communities feel that networks are good for exchanging knowledge, communicating with the government and helping each other in general. By befriending government officials, NGOs and university professors, it also increases their visibility. While conducting field research, I saw that almost every other day, a new group of people (NGO tour, professor teaching students, government officials) were coming to visit the community in order to learn from them. By becoming recognized by these various sectors for the work they do, the community is able to gradually dismantle

the image of them as 'forest destroyers.' Although not having legal rights to the land, both communities felt that through these strong networks, they are not afraid if the government began to increase pressure on them to leave the forest. If this were to occur, a process of resistance would begin to form within the networks and various sectors would come to their aid. They believed that it would be a lot more difficult for the government to enforce their policies if they had to confront resistance from not only the community, but also university professors, government officials and international NGOs. However, the most cited reason for joining the CMI was to collect scientific proof that they could then use to demonstrate to the government and lowlanders that they are able to live sustainably with the forest.

Scientific Proof

"We made sure we didn't cultivate where the watershed is, if we did it there, the water would run out. Up to each individual. We cultivated underneath the watershed. In the past, we worshiped spirits, so we didn't cut there. Near the places where we worshiped the spirits, we wouldn't touch those places" (U. Smith, personal communication, February 17, 2017).

"If we cut trees without permission, if we don't ask or do too much hunting. Then there will be some punishment from the spirits. The spirits punish us if we cut a tree but don't use all the wood. The Zeeko (Village spiritual leader) will then perform some ritual in order to ask for forgiveness and prosperity" (N. Smith, personal communication, March, 22, 2017).

Although the Karen hold many traditional beliefs that regulate their relationship to the environment in a sustainable manner, the government and Thai society in general continue to disregard this knowledge, considering it irrational, primitive and unscientific. Therefore, the need to conduct research in order to provide scientific proof is a top priority for these two communities.

"Why we have to join REDD+? Because before, the people from the city, the government, said 'the Karen cut a lot of trees, they move everywhere.' So we want to show them that we look after the forest, that we take care of the forest. We don't mind the money. If it comes or doesn't come, no problem. We just want people to know that the Karen grow up in the forest so we have to take care of the forest" (Mo. Smith, personal communication, February 26, 2017).

"This study will help the people in the city understand that rotational agriculture does not contribute to global warming and does not destroy nature" (PP. Smith, personal communication, March 23, 2017).

"I think that they have never done it so they don't understand. We use science to prove the results, that we take care of the forest. We've used carbon footprint science, how much we burn and how much the forest absorbs it" (D. Smith, personal communication, March 23, 2017).

“We had many professors who knew what they were doing. I didn't know too much but I remember we were doing the project in order to see how we live with the forest. The main purpose was to see what we take from the forest and to inform the others that we can live sustainably with the forest. So city people know we protect the forest, that we don't destroy it” (Cp. Smith, personal communication, March 24, 2017).

As can be seen, community members fully understood what they were using the research for. Regarding REDD+, they did not care about the financial incentive, which is one of the core tenants of carbon trading, but used the project for their own purposes. They were fully conscious that they were participating in the CMI in order to collect scientific proof to demonstrate to the government and lowlanders that they live sustainably with the forest. One participant from Huay Hin Lad Nai stated this very clearly:

“We use science to support our lifestyle to make others understand. We have our traditional beliefs but we use science to communicate it to others” (PC. Smith, personal communication, March 27, 2017).

Historically, science has been used to justify oppressive measures against small forest communities. Concerning indigenous groups in the mountainous regions of Thailand, science has been used to declare special forest zones such as watershed and biodiversity conservation areas that have forced indigenous communities out of their traditional lands. However, as we can see, these same communities have now been able to use this same scientific discourse to defend themselves and make an argument for legal rights to their lands. They have done this by scientifically proving to the government that they in fact live sustainably within their natural surroundings.

Overall Benefits of CMI

In this last section I would like to discuss the communities' view of the overall benefits from participating in CMIs. As discussed in the last section, the communities decided to participate in order to strengthen their networks and increase visibility, as well as collect scientific data demonstrating their sustainable relationship to the environment. We will see that not only were they able to achieve these initial goals but also gain important knowledge, strengthen the unity of the community and receive various material benefits as well.

Material Benefits

Most of the material benefits between the two communities came to Muang Ang. By participating in the REDD+ project, they were able to gain various material benefits such as 2 small rice mills, the construction of a REDD+ office that is now used for community meetings, 8 garbage/recycling cans and an interest-free loan that they have used to buy 3 greenhouses (around 60,000 baht). Most villagers of Muang Ang do not know about REDD+ except for the fact that they were given these benefits. The greenhouses act as the main income source for the community and seemed to be very well-received. According to some, the rice mills were a nice gift but did not seem to be used very frequently.

“(We use the rice mills) not very often. 6 hamlets with only 2 mills, long distance, it is

better to go to Chom Thong. Once we have an errand to do in Chom Thong, we fill our truck with all the rice and do it there. The rice mill is too small. Takes too much time. We want one rice mill for each village. One village is about 40 households” (U. Smith, personal communication, February 17, 2017).

The garbage/recycling cans seemed to have a more positive impact:

“Before people did not separate. In the beginning, they came only to Mae Bagor (one of six hamlets of Muang Ang), now many people, when they throw things away, they have to separate the trash, recyclable and non-recyclable. They are separate. Before really, around here, there were many plastic bags in the village, in Mae Bagor really, some people would throw the plastic bags in the forest, some people would burn them, you know, burning plastic bags, it is not good. Burning plastic bags is not good right? Before, kids, when they finished eating something, they would just litter. When they finished, just throw it everywhere. Now, like my son, or his son, or Por Luang’s daughter, we say ‘when you finish you have to put it there (the recycling bin).’ Before a lot, you can see plastic bags everywhere in the village. But now people they are learning ya? Everything you have to teach them, they learn ya?” (S. Smith, personal communication, February 26, 2017).

Regarding Huay Hin Lad Nai, there were not much material benefits except for being paid for the collection of data:

“(They paid me) about 5,000 baht. There was a big fund at that time, and then we distributed it amongst each other. I got 5,000 baht” (P. Smith, personal communication, March 25, 2017).

Overall, the communities seemed to view the material acquisitions of the CMI positively. None of the villagers from Muang Ang felt that the 2 rice mills were bad, but as the participant stated above, they don’t seem to be utilized much and it would have been better if they provided the village with a rice mill for each hamlet (6 total). Those who worked on the carbon footprint project in Huay Hin Lad Nai seemed to feel that the amount of money they received was adequate, however, as explained before, none of the community members from either village were participating in the project in order to receive material benefits.

Non-material Benefits

According to both communities, it was the non-material benefits that had the most positive impact for the people. By participating in the projects, the two communities were able to gain new important knowledge, strengthen their networks, become more united as a community and collect and demonstrate to the government their scientific research. Regarding new knowledge:

“(We) learned about the forest, new knowledge. How to utilize the forest sustainably. Learn about the trees, the area, water” (Me. Smith, personal communication, February 16, 2017).

“The study helped me recognize the all the different varieties of vegetables we have in the community” (Cp. Smith, personal communication, March 24, 2017).

It seemed to me that much of the new knowledge they’ve gained had already been known but villagers believed that they were not able to articulate it thoroughly to outsiders. For example, many of the villagers in Huay Hin Lad Nai could point out what plants you can eat and use for medicine but they did not know their specific names in Thai nor how many varieties of usable plants there were total. Regardless, they felt that they gained new knowledge and considered it a benefit of the project. Another non-material benefit was the strengthening of their networks and becoming more visible. As mentioned before, this was one of their main reasons for joining the project. Here we see the final results:

“This village has become well-known internationally because of the Royal Project and REDD+” (C. Smith, personal communication, February 15, 2017).

“Well, after this research, there were many organizations that came here to observe and study this community. Even other Karen communities came here to see how we do rotational agriculture. They wanted to learn from us. They said ‘we used to do rotational agriculture a long time ago but then we stopped, so now we want to learn again’” (P. Smith, personal communication, March 25, 2017).

“Yes, we got an award from Australia for resource management and the carbon footprint research. Protector of the Forest Award” (PC. Smith, personal communication, March 27, 2017).

Here we see that both communities were able to strengthen their networks both within the country and internationally. They have become recognized for their sustainable agricultural practices and have become a role model for other communities.

Another important non-material benefit that came from participating in the CMI was an increased sense of community unity. Good leadership and village unity were recognized as reasons for why the villages were chosen to participate in the projects, but here we see that after having participating, the unity increased more so.

“REDD+ united the hamlets of Muang Ang, more forest, no more rotational agriculture, no more deforestation” (U. Smith, personal communication, February 17, 2017).

“I think REDD+ is good, it helps us to preserve the forest and revitalize nature. There are more green areas. Before we did it (protect the forest) but we didn't take it so serious. Now we pay more attention. In the past, only some people helped but now everybody is helping more, understanding more, taking it more seriously” (Me. Smith, personal communication, February 16, 2017).

I believe unity was stressed more so in Muang Ang because of the size of the village. Whereas Huay Hin Lad Nai consists of no more than 25 households, Muang Ang is a set of 6 hamlets which range from 10 to

30 households each (175 total). In the past, there have been conflicts between the hamlets when the Royal Project introduced greenhouse organic cultivation. Some villagers from other hamlets that had yet to receive the opportunity to participate grew frustrated and conflicts arose. Presently however, it seems that both the greenhouses and the REDD+ project have brought the hamlets together regarding forest conservation.

The main overall benefit that villagers seemed to bring up the most was the collection of scientific data. As mentioned before, villagers are very conscious about how lowlanders and the government think of them. They know that they cannot use their traditional knowledge as evidence that they live sustainably with the forest, therefore they have decided to use the same scientific techniques that in the past were used against them. Here are some results from having used scientific evidence.

“There is more happiness because some departments of the government no longer blame us for destroying the forest. This is due to the study. The research demonstrated that burning the rotational fields does not contribute much to global warming” (N. Smith, personal communication, March 22, 2017).

“We gave the research to the sheriff and some other government department officials. And now they are more interested. Educated people, the university are now a lot more interested in Hin Lad Nai” (P. Smith, personal communication, March 23, 2017).

Even the Karen DNP REDD+ employee believed that this would help them prove themselves to the government:

“If anybody accuses them of deforestation, now they have science to back them up to tell them that they live sustainably. We can live with the forest, we can take care of the forest” (T. Smith, personal communication, February 15, 2017).

This quote I found interesting because the participant identifies as Karen first and DNP staff second, demonstrating that researchers should not consider ‘the state’, ‘the DNP’ or even ‘the Karen’ as monolithic entities which do not have their own contradictions within them. We see here that these two communities were fully conscious that they could use this scientific research in order to prevent further issues with government officials. They now have proof that is in the government’s own language to demonstrate that they are not causing deforestation. We see also that some government staff as well believed this to be the main purpose of the research. By participating in these CMIs, the communities were able to collect scientific proof that they live sustainably within the forest.

Analysis/Conclusion

The main purpose of this study was to determine how Carbon Mitigation Initiatives transform human-environment relationships within two Karen communities. Academically, the Karen are singled out as the most environmentally-conscious indigenous group in Thailand. They have their own traditional rules and regulations that have allowed them to live sustainably with the environment for many generations. However, presently, I believe that this image is a romanticized image used as a political tool in order to assist Karen communities in obtaining land rights to their traditional lands. There are many

Karen communities that have taken up cash-cropping and, in the case of Muang Ang, admitted that in the past they may have caused deforestation through rotational agriculture. Nevertheless, in both communities, whether traditional Buddhist-animist or Christian, they seem to maintain a type of Karen environmental ethic, bringing up their love of the forest, respect for various spirits and the need to maintain certain areas forested. So in what ways do Carbon Mitigation Initiatives transform human-environmental relationships with communities that already have a traditional environmental ethic and are already practicing sustainable agricultural techniques?

In order to answer this question I decided to use a *governmentality* framework proposed by Arun Agrawal. According to him, a *governmentality* approach requires the researcher to understand 3 themes: power/knowledge, institutions and subjectivity (Agrawal, 2005). Power/knowledge refers to how power originates from various forms of knowledge while at the same time reproducing knowledge when policies are put into effect. Power/knowledge creates a hierarchy of knowledge, making various forms of knowledge deemed legitimate while delegitimizing others. The study of institutions is concerned with the various national and local rules and regulations that are put into effect for target populations, while subjectivity focuses on the relationship between individuals and the outside world.

Regarding power/knowledge, we have the emergence of a new discourse, global warming, which is supported by numerous scientific studies and is accepted by the international scientific community. This new knowledge is very technical and as demonstrated previously, only the most general aspects of it could be understood by both communities. However, both communities happily accepted this new discourse because not only did it allow them to state that most carbon emissions come from the city and industrialization but they could also use it as a tool to scientifically prove that they were not causing deforestation and therefore were not contributing to global warming. What we do see however is a clear example of a hierarchy of knowledge. Both communities accepted that their traditional knowledge would not be accepted by the government or Thai society in general and therefore needed CMI scientific research to communicate to outsiders that they could live sustainably with the environment. They did not seem to have any problem with this and believed that learning new knowledge, no matter where the origin, is beneficial.

Thai institutions regarding forested areas have remained relatively the same for the past century. Those living within National Parks or National Forest Reserves are required to desist in expanding agriculturally, and legally, they are not allowed to collect firewood or feed their cattle around the community's borders. However, there seems to be an unofficial agreement that these communities can do these things as long as the wood is used for personal reasons (firewood and house construction) and is not sold to outside markets. The arrival of CMI did not seem to change any of these institutions however, with many local NGOs, REDD+ became a strategy to obtain legal rights to the land. This is due to the REDD+ requirement that participating communities have recognized legal rights to the land. This is necessary for there to be a fully-functioning carbon market.

Now to the last category, subjectivity. How has the communities' relationship to the environment changed due to CMIs? As stated before, these two villages have already been practicing sustainable agriculture and already hold traditional beliefs that require them to conserve the forest. Almost every participant stated that industrialization and city-life were the main contributors of carbon emissions and that burning and deforestation have a minor effect. Does this originate from a new carbon subjectivity? I

believe not because when asked if they believe this due to participating in the CMI, they answered in the negative. Participants stated that before they knew about carbon, they always thought that the world is becoming warmer due to technology, deforestation, industry and cars. Other responses included *mepo* and the failure to respect the spirits. It is my opinion that the responses I was given regarding global warming were due to participants' willingness to 'speak in my language'. They asked what I wanted to know and they gave me the standard answers that they've learned from having participated in the CMI. Moreover, when I asked if they truly believe in carbon, most responded that they do not understand it too much but are rather using it as a tool to scientifically prove to outsiders that they are not at fault for global warming.

Another aspect of CMI is carbon trading, the idea that by conserving a specified area of the forest, they can obtain carbon credits and then sell them on the market. If a full transformation of subjectivity were to take place, participants in carbon trading would conserve the forest solely for the financial benefits they would receive. This too, hardly seemed to influence their thinking or relationship with the environment. Most were neutral about this idea, instead believing that they conserve the forest because it is part of their traditional Karen thinking.

In conclusion, I believe that these two communities have demonstrated an incredible amount of agency by participating in these projects. They have not accepted them blindly but instead have used them as tools to strengthen their case that they can live sustainably with the forest. Throughout this paper we saw that they joined the projects for different reasons; networking/visibility and scientific proof. The closest responses I received regarding money was a simple suggestion that it would be nice if money was provided to them in order to take care of the forest (food and gas for those maintaining the fire break and occupying the forest guard roles), but there was never any suggestion that they were conserving the forest for financial motivations. Eventually, they hope, projects and research such as the carbon footprint study will be accepted by the government and they will be granted legal rights to the land. These communities have shown themselves to not be passive victims to whatever project comes their way but are strategic and intelligent, using every resource they have to enhance their situation.

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Being Left Behind: Traditional Medicine Practice and Un-Belonging

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Abstract

There are moral dimensions to the acquisition and creation of professional expertise in a rapidly modernizing country and this paper explores how notions of expertise are intimately connected to forms of education and to historically situated, cultural understandings of knowledge, legitimacy and value. I draw on ethnographic material from research in Thailand showing how government health policies have re-shaped the practice of Thai traditional medicine through university-based education, the licensing of practitioners and the introduction of a scientific rationale for treatment. University education has transformed the knowledge base of Thai traditional medicine and created tensions within the traditional medicine community about the kind of knowledge and practices which are supported and the status of licensed and unlicensed practitioners.

The recent accreditation of practitioners and a state-supported hierarchy of expertise and support has elevated Thai Traditional Medicine practitioners with degrees and excluded unlicensed Thai traditional medicine practitioners (folk healers). The process of professionalization which has transformed the practice of Thai traditional medicine highlights the contradictions and moral tensions inherent in the emergence of expertise in modernity. I examine the moral dimensions of the selective authorization of modern licensed practitioners and the marginalization of folk healers. Learning through apprenticeship and forms of practice which are entangled with Buddhist rituals and beliefs have been devalued. These local moral worlds exist as a challenge to modernized approaches to knowledge acquisition. The contradictions and moral tensions inherent in professional recognition for modern practitioners reveals the issues associated with medical expertise cultivated through university training. It is imbued with the status, values and meanings associated with the institutions of modern medicine and education but it is not located in local moral worlds.

Keywords: traditional medicine, professionalization, modernization

Mo Morchit

One of my interviews during fieldwork in Northern Thailand was with a folk healer I shall call Mo Morchit. He lived and worked in village outside of Chiang Mai and consulted patients in a bamboo lined room above his house. I was overwhelmed by the range of artifacts it contained. One half of the room was filled with statues of the Buddha and images of Buddhist monks who had taught Mo Morchit and to whom Mo Morchit paid respect. The rest of the room was filled with images of animals (roosters,

elephants, tiger and water buffalo) and with bottles of dark colored liquids; there were hundreds of bundles and bags of dried plants. The entire room had taken on the quality of a shrine. It included an altar where offerings were laid and prayers were offered.

Mo Morchit had trained for some years in the monkhood and one of his most revered herbal medicine teachers was a monk he had been apprenticed to during his time in the temple. Mo Morchit worked in a semi-rural village setting and collected many of his own herbs in the surrounding forests and fields. He treated the day to day ailments of villagers who came to him and when the HIV epidemic was at its height in Northern Thailand in the late 1990s he treated many HIV patients. His style of practice included spells and magic; he advised about foods that should be avoided or included in the diet and suggested why and how patients should make offerings. He was well respected for his work in the local community and within networks of local folk healers. He was shunned by some members of the community because of his work with HIV patients who were highly stigmatized in Thailand. He is characteristic of folk-healers whose learning was based in the master khruu (ครู teacher) and luuk sit (ลูกศิษย์ disciple/student) relationship. He had learnt traditional medicine through an apprenticeship and had spent time as a monk. The master pupil relationship central to apprenticeship, is understood to create a lifelong bond of respect and authority between master and pupil. Apprenticeship locates the pupil and the teacher in a sacred lineage connecting the pupil to Shivaka Komarpaj (ชีวกโกมารภัจจ์), the figure from Buddhist teachings recognized as the founder of the Thai healing tradition. Shivaka Komarpaj is the figure who links traditional medicine practitioners to the mythological roots of their tradition (Salguero, 2016). Mo Morchit collected many of the herbs he made into medicines and tailored prescriptions for individual patients. In our interview he echoed a phrase that I often heard in Thailand; 'traditional medicine is dying out'. He spoke with great feeling about the need to protect and support folk healers and to preserve older-styles of practice.

"They are very advanced in the development of herbal medicine, like talking about *marum* the magic vegetable that everyone talking about. It is the vegetable that has lots of ingredients that are good for health ... so they are making capsules of it ...then it is produced under the name of different companies. It is called *marum* (*Moringa oleifera*). It is a very popular herb. So they support research and many companies are producing *marum* in capsules but they do not support healers. So, in the future healers will be gone.

Herbal medicine has become a 'national wisdom' but it has become a very developed thing for producing herbal medicines, but the healers are keeping on practicing in a self-sufficient way....They recognize the herb but they do not recognize the healers.... they cut the top off the tree and they use the top to develop. They use this herbal medicine and they see this healer who is good at this herbal medicine, but they leave the healer down here without help. And then the healer will die. And the healers have nowhere to grow because they cut the top already (Mo Morchit interview).

As an unlicensed folk healer²² concerned about the lack of support for unlicensed practitioners, Mo Morchit is representative of a large body of folk healers. Folk healers include bone-setters, fortune tellers, herbalists, massage practitioners and many other kinds of popular healers. This wide spectrum of practitioners co-exists with licensed practitioners. Folk practitioners are widely valued and trusted, particularly by older Thai people but also by the wider Thai population. They are consulted by many people both rural and urban for conditions as widely varying as diabetes, cancer, hypertension and musculoskeletal problems (Dusanee Suwanakong, Pranee Liamputtong, & Runbold, 2011; Dusanee Suwankhong, Pranee Liamputtong, & Runbold, 2011; Putipun Puataweepong, Nongnuj Sutheetchet, & Panjachat Ratanamongkol, 2012; Summana Moolasarn et al., 2005). It is not unusual for patients to consult a number of practitioners in what has been described as a 'variegated medical system' (Riley & Santhath Semsri, 1974) and a 'medical marketplace' (Salguero, 2016).

Folk healers whose practice is based on informal education, practical experience and skills acquired by observation and repetition, are often part of local communities and many have acquired their skills working with an older family member (Brun, 1990, 2003). Their decision to practice may be prompted by a profound experience of illness, or taken up as part of a family tradition in which fathers, sons and uncles pass on skills and knowledge to those who seem to have the inclination or aptitude for this kind of work. A period in the monkhood was considered to be part of this training because it instilled in young men Buddhist morality and teachings. It also taught them how to read and write and gave them access to the written knowledge which was a part (but not the primary basis) for practice. The skills and expertise folk healers acquired through apprenticeship were part of an oral tradition encompassing the therapeutic use of local plants and physical skills and techniques, such as bone-setting and massage (Brun & Schumacher, 1994 [1987]; Sasitorn Chaiprasitti, 2006). Folk healing in Thailand, like most of southeast Asia, is locally based and medical knowledge is located in a wider cultural context that includes animism, Buddhism and magic.

The shift from apprenticeship to institutional training, a movement from an oral or semi-oral tradition to a literate tradition and the loss of specific medical skills such as bone-setting (See Sasitorn Chaiprasitti, 2006) and midwifery (Poulsen, 2007) in the last 30 years is considerable. These physical skills were learnt by observation and were often passed on through extended traineeships, not through texts. Midwives and bonesetters have declined in numbers not because of their lack of skills and experience, but rather

²² Throughout this paper I will distinguish practitioners who have been trained in universities by describing them as *phaet phaen thai*, (แพทย์แผนไทย) Thai Traditional Medicine doctors (TTM) and the form of traditional medicine that they have been trained in as *kaanphaet phaen thai* (การแพทย์แผนไทย) Thai Traditional Medicine (TTM), in line with Thai government terminology. I will use the more general terms traditional healer and folk healer *phaet phuen baan* (แพทย์พื้นบ้าน) to refer to practitioners who have trained by apprenticeship or trained in the traditional medicine association schools, most of whom are unlicensed practitioners. TTM practitioners are licensed through a government examination process. Practitioners must sit government examinations in order to obtain licenses to practice legally. Separate licenses are given for Thai Massage, Pharmacy, Thai Traditional Medicine and Midwifery. Folk healers are unlicensed and technically illegal, but are rarely prosecuted and the number of unlicensed practitioners far exceeds licensed practitioners. Folk healers are widely used despite their ambiguous status. Folk healers use a broad range of traditional medicine practices which include massage, bone-setting, ritual and magic. I use the terms modern medicine, western medicine, and biomedicine interchangeably to refer to western origin medicine rooted in the biosciences.

because their skills are no longer recognized as sufficient for the management of conditions such as broken bones and pregnancy. The availability of x-rays and a network of modern hospitals in Thailand has encouraged the use of modern medical practices and facilities. Subtle and not so subtle pressure from the Thai government (a nation state which has embraced modern medicine with gusto) has encouraged the use of biomedicine and modern birthing practices (Sasitorn Chaiprasitti, 2008; Whittaker, 1999, 2000).

In the last 15 years new forms of training have been established as a basis for the practice of modernized styles of Thai traditional medicine. Learning to be a traditional medicine practitioner is now part of a formal education process. Students learn in universities, follow a set curriculum and are learn modernized forms of massage (Anchalee Chuthaputti, 2010) and a university based curriculum. The knowledge and the practices of these students who are called Thai Traditional Medicine (TTM) practitioners (literally Thai-style doctors), *phaet phaen thai* (แพทย์แผนไทย), is very different to that of the *phaet phueun baan* (แพทย์พื้นบ้าน) the folk healers. The new curriculum in Thai traditional medicine and in Thai massage has been shaped and supported by the Thai government.

Modernization and Professionalization

There is a growing body of literature about the congruence of nation-building, modernization and the emergence of professions in the sphere of traditional medicine (Alter, 2005a; Ernst, 2002). When harnessed to national ideologies and political agendas, the processes of modernization and professionalization have shaped new forms of Ayurvedic medicine, Tibetan medicine and traditional Chinese medicine (Adams, 2002; Adams, Schrempf, & Craig, 2010; Craig, 2007a, 2007b; Hardiman, 2009; Hsu, 2008). These re-invented forms of traditional medicine share an alignment with prevailing forms of national identity and in some cases nationalist movements. Modernization has been associated with the 'revitalization' of the literate medical traditions such as Ayurveda and traditional Chinese medicine and their re-invention as standardized and secularized traditions. Emerging modern nation states have frequently popularized their traditional medicine systems and relegated ritual and religiously inflected practices to the realms of superstition and primitive practice by describing them as old-fashioned or superstitious (Connor & Samuel, 2001; Kendall, 2001).

Above all the transformations of modernity have involved changed social relations in the teaching of traditional medicine. The transmission of traditional medicine through formal educational institutions involves a shift away from participatory learning through involvement in a community of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991). Literacy and knowledge based in text create the basis for a formal education. The codification of knowledge and standardization of curriculum, become the mechanisms by which oral practices are translated into written forms of knowledge. The immediacy of hands on learning and the power of the word is transmuted into abstract thought (Ong, 1982; Tambiah, 1968). Eventually these 'revitalized' traditional medicine systems are modernized by recourse to the incorporation of a scientific rationale (Adams, 2002). The translation of traditional medicine by 'science' has superseded the longer less certain process of becoming knowledgeable through learning at the feet of a master. As Hsu points out in her study of the transmission of Chinese medical knowledge, standardized modes of transmission are generally associated with westernization, modernization and professionalization (Hsu, 1999).

Professional Knowledge and Lay Knowledge

The distinction between professional knowledge and lay knowledge underpins notions of the claims to a specialized body of knowledge central to the development of professional expertise and the emergence of a profession (Giddens, 1991; Saks, 1998, 2003). Common themes in the emergence of professions are the development of systematic bodies of knowledge, the emergence of state accredited courses and institutions, and the formation of professional associations. The development of specialized knowledge is one of the key strategies of professionalization. State regulation of expertise ensures homogeneity of practices, or at least some comparability in the provision of treatment and provides the basis for accreditation (Lambert, 2012; Langford, 2002; Last, 1990).

Since independence in India there has been a shift towards medical pluralism as an explicit strategy to provide access to health care which is not only focused on biomedically trained practitioners. The incorporation of local health traditions including indigenous medical systems has involved their reformulation into professionalized and accredited knowledge systems and state regulation (Lambert, 2012 p.1030). Textual codification and the creation of an internally unified system of medicine and a discrete body of knowledge is fundamental to the standardization of a medical system and its potential for regulation. Lambert describes the recognition of traditional medicine systems in the Indian health system. A variety of non- biomedical practices have been regulated through state accreditation of training institutions and official recognition of degrees. Practices such as yoga, Unani-tibb medicine, homeopathy and Ayurvedic medicine have been unified under the banner of AYUSH (meaning long-life in Sanskrit). Un-codified practices such as bone-doctoring have been marked for 'revitalization' but have been marginalized due to their lack of credentials. These unstandardized practices taught through apprenticeship and participation in a 'community of practice' (based on kinship affiliations), have lacked formal training institutions and courses. As a consequence they have been much less likely to be authorized through government regulation due to their lack of formal training. As Lambert points out, one of the unintended consequences of the establishment of a profession, through formal training and state supported accreditation, is the potential for marginalization and exclusion which is implied in the regulation of one group of practitioners and the exclusion of another.

The remainder of this paper explores issues associated the accreditation of Thai Traditional Medicine practitioners and the ambiguity of the status of unlicensed folk healers. My focus is on what happens when formal education and regulation is granted to one group of practitioners.

Medicine and Modernity in Thailand

There was great interest in modern medicine in Thailand from the early 1800s when Dr Dan Bradley (1804-1873) a western-trained doctor practiced in Bangkok. Although his methods and medical practice in Bangkok predated a scientific basis for modern medicine they were adopted by the royal family and the Thai elites (Davisakd Puaksom, 2007). By the end of the 19th century members of the royal family trained in public health in America, and modern medicine began to be taught in Bangkok (Catichai Muksong & Komatra Chuengsatiansup, 2012; Chanet Wallop Khumthong, 2002).

By the 20th century prescriptions for life as a good Thai citizen had entrenched western ideas of hygiene and nutrition which were included in the Cultural Mandates of the Field Marshall Phibulsongkhram. These mandates issued between 1939 and 1942 were guidelines for citizens which emphasized modernization, westernization as part of the development of a Thai national identity (Reynolds, 2002). One aspect of this momentum for development was the development of a modern medical system. Modern medicine developed a strong institutional basis throughout the 20th century in the form of a public health system and a 'medicalized state' linked to the consolidation of state power and the creation of a Thai national identity (Catichai Muksong & Komatra Chuengsatiansup, 2012; Davisakd Puaksom, 2007). Over the course of the 20th century the Thai population absorbed western medical ideas into their Buddhist and pre-Buddhist medical beliefs. The Thai population developed a flexible approach to medical beliefs. The Thai population both educated and uneducated held multiple overlapping medical beliefs. Indigenous understandings of health and the body remain a significant basis for health behaviors today (Liamputtong, Yimyam, Parisunyakul, Baosong, & Sansiriphun, 2005; Siriporn Chirawatkul, 2004; Whittaker, 1996, 1999).

After the World Health Organization conference at Alma Ata in 1978, traditional medicine began to be recommended as having a useful role in primary health care, and the Thai government was swift to begin a long official project to incorporate traditional medicine into the Thai health care system. Public health campaigns began to educate the Thai population about the potential usefulness of massage and herbal medicine. State health and social development policies were directed to the 'revitalization of traditional medicine' from the late 1980s onwards. They included programs such as *The Medicinal Plants and Primary Health Care Project* which supported local village level utilization of medicinal plants for common minor illnesses such as diarrhea and musculo-skeletal pain. From the late 1980s traditional medicine education centres were established and courses were established to teach 'safe' herbal medicine usage. The Thai government began to manufacture herbal remedies for household use and the beginnings of a herbal manufacturing industry were initiated (le Grand, Luechai Sri-ngernnyuang, & Streefland, 1993). Projects like the Massage Restoration Project during the 1990s took modernized form of massage training back to rural villages with mixed results (Iida, 2000, 2005).

Integrating Modernized Thai Traditional Medicine into the Thai Health System

The creation of a modern Thai Traditional Medicine curriculum in the last 30 years has facilitated the integration of Thai Traditional Medicine (TTM) practitioners into the Thai health system. Initially the formalization and standardization of traditional medicine education proceeded through the establishment of Institute of Thai Traditional Medicine (ITTM). This organization was set up by the Ministry of Public Health in 1993 "to revitalize and disseminate modernized traditional medicine practices" (Anchalee Chuthaputti, 2007; Vichai Chokevivat & Anchalee Chuthaputti, 2005a). The mission of the ITTM was to collect collate and standardize traditional medicine knowledge from existing practitioners 'to promote the wisdom of the ancestors'. This process later came to be known in government documents as 'the protection and the promotion of national wisdom'. In order to produce a style of traditional medicine that was suitable for modern Thailand a scientific rationale as a basis for traditional knowledge was included (Chantana Banpasirichote, 1989; Ouay Ketusingh, 1977). The development of new teaching materials has been assisted by a series of economic development policies

from the Fourth National Economic and Social Development Plan 1977-1981 (National Economic and Social Development Board, 1977) through to the Eleventh National Economic and Social Development Plan 2012-2016 (National Economic and Social Development Board, 2012). These policies gave financial support for the teaching of traditional medicine at a regional and local level and strategies to enable practitioners to establish small scale businesses when they had completed training.

The apprenticeship system where teachers lived in local communities and taught their students (predominantly men) through everyday exposure to practice, began to be displaced by formal training in the mid-1980s. Oral transmission of knowledge in Thailand was based on students (often with a familial relationship to the teacher), who lived and worked with their masters. In this tradition 'the word' predominated; lineage and teacher were foremost and learning was based in experience and followed the 'words of the master' (Brun, 1990; Brun & Schumacher, 1994 [1987]).

The ITTM produced a new method of teaching Thai Traditional Medicine (TTM) and developed workshops to train a new generation of practitioners in this modernized style of practice. Learning traditional medicine in formal classrooms not only introduced significant changes to the social conditions under which traditional medicine students learnt their skills but also changed the kind of knowledge they received during their education. Modern education in traditional medicine involved classroom teaching in traditional medicine schools. These courses and the style of teaching were introduced through the work of the ITTM (Brun, 2003; Vichai Chokevivat, Anchalee Chuthaputthi, & Pavan, 2005b). From 1980 to the late 1990s traditional medicine schools were established in cities like Bangkok and the larger regional cities such as Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai. They taught a modern version of traditional medicine which introduced elements of sciences such as botany, chemistry and pharmacology. Magical healing and the Buddhist healing rituals were gradually de-emphasized. Colleges such as the Ayurvedh College set up in Bangkok in 1983 by Professor Ouay Ketsingh, included subjects such as chemistry and pharmacology and anatomy and physiology. They were taught by teachers with a background in biomedical sciences and had the backing of members of the Bangkok elite (Cohen, 1989). The Foundation for the Revival and Promotion of Traditional Medicine promoted the Ayurvedh College which was established to revive knowledge of traditional medicine. This course went on to become a recognized course in Applied Thai Traditional Medicine taught at Siriraj University. (Ayurved Thamrong School, 2009). It was the precursor of a dramatic increase in university based courses teaching modernized forms of Thai traditional medicine which came after the Decade of Thai Traditional Medicine 1992-2001.

The rapid transition of traditional medicine education into the tertiary education sector from 2002 onwards marked a further transformation of the practice of Thai traditional medicine into a profession taught in modern tertiary institutions. It also transformed the teaching of traditional medicine into a scientifically based practice. The establishment of bachelor degree courses in Thai Traditional Medicine in universities saw some 22 universities initiate courses teaching modernized forms of Thai Traditional Medicine in a little over a decade. The practitioners who graduate from these institutions with either a bachelor degree in Thai Traditional Medicine or a bachelor degree in Applied TTM are state licensed practitioners who can be employed in public hospitals and whose services can be reimbursed under the universal health coverage scheme (Sumneang Ratanawilawan, 2007).

Licensed Thai Traditional Medicine (TTM) practitioners are able to work within the Thai health system

and are employed by the Ministry of Public Health. Patients can see TTM practitioners for free and certain kinds of herbal medicines are available under the National Essential Medicines List at subsidized prices. Licensed TTM practitioners are able to treat using therapeutic massage and saunas within public hospitals. Thai health policy documents describe Thai Traditional Medicine (TTM) as being 'integrated' into the Thai health system (Vichai Chockevivat, 2007). Folk healers who are informally educated and whose education and therapeutic skills are very varied, are rarely able to pass the exams to acquire a license.

Professionalization and the Creation of Expertise

The emergence of expertise in modernizing societies is characterized by the legitimation of particular professional groups. There is a progressive limitation in the way that expertise is officially defined. Limiting expertise to those who are literate and have been taught a formal curriculum has led to a decline in many traditional forms of practice, such as the bone doctors of Northern Thailand (Sasitorn Chaiprasitti, 2006). These kinds of practices are being increasingly marginalized. Expertise in modern societies is defined on the basis of a specific curriculum, formal qualifications and accreditation. This creates a hierarchy of practitioners and tends to marginalize groups who do not have specific educational qualifications and who are thus invisible to the official health system (Lambert, 2012). Modern societies as Giddens notes, develop bodies of knowledge which are less dependent on local context and local social relations and rely on expertise with a scientific basis (Giddens, 1991 p.18).

Support for the revitalization of medical traditions such as has occurred in India and in Thailand, has taken the form of acknowledging the expertise which is associated with formal education and the development of a system of credentials such as licensure (Attewell, 2005; Langford, 2002). The support of the state for the licensing or registration of specific professional groups is a further development of the state regulation of expertise. The transfer of authoritative knowledge from the local world to the nation state constitutes an engagement with modernity whereby 'expert knowledge' is recognized and professional boundaries are drawn by state bodies. State recognition and legitimation are closely entwined with adherence to socially acceptable forms of knowledge.

The impact of modernity on who is considered to be an expert is still being explored in the Thai context. In the next section of this paper I examine the impact of this transformation in traditional medicine knowledge and traditional medicine practitioners.

The Invisibility of Folk Healers

"Healing practices that are not based on formal literate knowledge applied by high status (usually male) members of a politically dominant cultural group are less likely to receive any state recognition at all" (Connor & Samuel, 2001 p.9).

In Thailand the medical hierarchy has modern medical practitioners at its peak, followed by TTM practitioners (*phaet phaen thai*), who have a university education and a practice style of traditional medicine that can be said to mimic that of modern medicine. At the bottom of this hierarchy there are a wide variety of unlicensed practitioners, whose skills have been acquired through apprenticeship and a

direct relationship with a master, including folk healers. Folk healers are tolerated but receive little support from government sources and are often described by civil servants as being 'outside the system'. The process of marginalization of folk healers gained momentum in the second half of the twentieth century when the modern nation state of Thailand became less tolerant of what was called 'ritual and superstition' and began to describe traditional medicine and its practices as old-fashioned (Morris, 2000). Most recently the licensing of modern TTM practitioners has rendered folk healers still less visible to official eyes.

In practice the modernization of even folk-healers in Thailand is happening in partial and fragmented ways. The shift from vocation to profession, from master-apprentice teaching to formal teaching in tertiary institutions is uneven. It is not unusual for a folk healer to have acquired some formal training and a very few have been granted licenses on the basis of long years of practice. At one end of the continuum are folk healers working locally and educated through apprenticeship, some barely literate. These practitioners have acquired specific physical skills such as massage and bone-setting and have a knowledge (sometimes wide sometimes quite specific), of herbal treatments and healing rituals. At the other end of the continuum are university trained Thai traditional medicine practitioners. Their understanding of Thai traditional medicine is underpinned by science and research and their approach to patients is modeled on the kinds of therapeutic relationships and practices taught in modern medicine.

In Thailand folk healers have an ambiguous status. Folk medicine is valorized as one of the 'traditional skills' which is particularly Thai. Indeed as Mo Morchit described it traditional medicine is described as 'national wisdom' and considerable effort is made to preserve old manuscripts and formulae. Folk healers are respected, particularly in local communities and their practice is tolerated (although technically illegal). They may be highly skilled but these skills are not recognized by state accreditation systems. Despite this folk healers remain numerous and they continue to be popularly used.²³

Modernization and State Recognition

In Thailand the modernization of traditional medicine practice was an attempt by the Thai government to reduce the cost of modern pharmaceuticals and specifically to decrease the dependence of the Thai population on pain-killing medications (Brun, 2003; Brun & Schumacher, 1994 [1987]; le Grand et al., 1993). The development of a Thai herbal medicine industry was seen by the Thai government as one way of reducing the bill for imported pharmaceutical medicines. There was also a desire to spread medical resources into rural areas which were not so well served by modern medicine and Cohen argues that the movement to revive traditional medicine was strongly supported by non-government organizations opposed to the domination of a drug oriented medical profession (Cohen, 1989). Since the mid-1990s

²³ The most recent estimate of the numbers of unlicensed healers which I heard circulated at a curriculum development meeting at ITTM in Bangkok in 2010 was that there were some 50,000 unlicensed traditional medicine practitioners. These numbers are approximations only as the statistics are based on the cumulative number of licenses given to practitioners, and may include practitioners who are no longer in practice or dead. They include many practitioners who work part-time. They tend to under-estimate the numbers of folk healers, some of whom stay determinedly under the government radars. The number of government registered and licensed TTM practitioners in 2010 was 17,001 (Accessed 01.05.2017. at: http://www.searo.who.int/entity/medicines/topics/traditional_medicines_in_the_kingdom_of_thailand.pdf)

these rationales for the revitalization of traditional medicine have been overlaid by a state narrative which supports self-sufficiency. Most recently traditional medicine practices such as modernized forms of Thai massage have been promoted to support the tourism industry (Anchalee Chuthaputti, 2007; Vichai Chokevivat & Anchalee Chuthaputti, 2005a; Vichai Chokevivat et al., 2005b).

However the consequence of licensing and an increasingly formal educational process in Thailand has been to disenfranchise a very substantial proportion of the traditional healers. The instigation of formal modern training for Thai Traditional Medicine practitioners has created a wide range of practitioners, some licensed and state supported, others working locally with the support of the community but with very little government support. There is limited government recognition given to folk healers, some of whom are consulted by government traditional medicine committees and asked to teach in the formal courses offered to a younger generation of modern practitioners. There is a government system of certification of folk medicine practitioners which has been in existence for the last 10 years (Churnruritai Kanchanachitra et al., 2012). However this certification of folk healers is not linked to any meaningful kinds of support for the folk healers. The ambiguity in the status of folk healers is in some ways disruptive to the state mandated accreditation processes. The attempt to standardize Thai traditional medicine practices, to formalize teaching and to spread the acceptance of a modernized form of practice embodying professional relationships, is contested by the continuing popularity of folk healers.

The impacts of modern education and training processes are deeply felt and widely debated by folk healers and by their licensed counterparts, modernized TTM practitioners. There are conflicting views about what it is to be a traditional medicine practitioner in Thailand today. These views are voiced by a wide spectrum of the Thai traditional medicine community, by both licensed and unlicensed practitioners, and by policy-makers, academics and the wider Thai population. I focus here on the voices of the folk healers.

For folk healers, the ethical and moral values embodied in training as a folk healer include the wider virtues of being a good Buddhist: a person whose virtuous conduct and respect for his (or more recently also her) teachers is evident to the local community. The practice of medicine is still understood as a way of acquiring merit. Historically this was re-enforced by the acquisition of some training within the monkhood. As more women are identifying as folk healers recognition by the *wat* and the community as a good Buddhist person are markers of suitability. Despite the decreasing inclusion of formal religious studies as part of training to be a folk healer, the importance of being a person of good character who is guided by the moral precepts of Buddhism is regarded as significant.

In the folk medicine community the moral and religious dimensions of healing remain central to good practice. The sense of vocation which drew many folk healers to the profession and which is still present in the conventions of folk healer practice adds to the 'khun' (the power of moral virtue) which is attributed to the folk healer (Yongsak Tantidipoke, 2014). This aspect of virtue is still visible in the way folk healers describe themselves not as charging fees but rather as accepting payment as a gift which is described as being a token of respect for their teacher (*khan khruu*). Treatment by a folk healers may include herbal medicines, prayers and offerings to particular Buddhist teachers or at specific religious sites.

Among the folk healers I interviewed practitioners voiced concerns about the commercialization of practice and the potential loss of Buddhist morality among younger practitioners, especially those with a

formal education. They voiced anxiety about the loss of 'respect' in university educated practitioners. These younger practitioners were perceived as having stepped outside of the traditional model of practice which understood the power of the healer (and their medicines) as coming directly from the practitioner's on-going relationship of respect with their *khruu* (master/teacher). These tensions are expressed in recent academic writing about traditional medicine in Thailand. Academic narratives about the world views, values and morality of different kinds of practitioners are becoming increasingly common (Roncarati, 2003; Yingyong Taoprasert, 2005; Yongsak Tantidipoke, 2014).

One of the most profound effects of professionalization is the impact it has had on communication with patients, on the shared moral world of the patient and the practitioner and on the perceived authority and authenticity of the therapeutic knowledge and practice of folk healers. Shared modes of communication and shared moral codes are central to the familiarity and accessibility of healing practices used by folk healers (Kleinman, 2006). In Thailand the sympathy and the intimacy of folk healers' communications with their patients is based on these shared values and on the relationships between folk healers and patients, which mirror kinship relationships. The practice of folk medicine in local communities adds to the familiarity of these connections and communications. Treatment by folk healers and their relationships with patients are characterized by shared social modes of conduct and morality derived from Buddhism which are central to the regard in which healers are held (Sasitorn Chaiprasitti, 2006, 2008). Yongsak further suggests that these shared moral processes form a key component of the effectiveness of local healing (Yongsak Tantidipoke, 2014 p.493).

Building on Yongsak's arguments about the centrality of moral sensibilities to the work of the local healers, I go on to explore some of the unresolved tensions that revolve around the modernization and professionalization of Thai traditional medicine. In particular I query the role of the Thai state in 'leaving behind' folk healers through the accreditation and subsequent legitimation of modern Thai Traditional Medicine (TTM) practitioners.

Folk Healers and Citizenship

Previously I have referred to folk healers being 'delegitimized' and the subsequent marginalization it produces as being a form of disenfranchisement for these practitioners. Erni in his work about citizenship in Hong Kong (Erni, 2015) uses the term being 'included-out' to characterize the work of governmentality in establishing individual's rights to citizenship. In his example Chinese mainlanders and foreign domestic helpers have both been subject to the citizenship laws of Hong Kong and have been categorized as non-citizens on the basis of discriminatory laws which 'include them out'. Erni's example is of people who were once invited in to Hong Kong as migrants and who now are now legally excluded from citizenship; he shows the proximity of 'inclusion' to 'exclusion' as an uncomfortable fact of life in Hong Kong. He also demonstrates how who is included and who is excluded is a historically located phenomenon, often rooted in the economic needs of the nation state. The changing boundaries of law, and historical shifts in ideology and government control can transform a person from citizen, to an immigrant, to an illegal migrant over time. This provides a compelling portrait of the exercise of state power to include some individuals and to exclude others (Erni, 2015 see pp.6-9).

I take up this notion of citizenship through the state production of categories of difference and identity and apply it to the way that the Thai nation state has 'included in' and 'included out' certain kinds of

traditional medicine practitioners and certain practices. In Thailand folk healers were until the beginning of the twentieth century the only kind of medical practitioners available to the overwhelming majority of the population. As recently as 50 years ago traditional medicine was the preferred and trusted form of medicine for all but a small urban minority. Most recently folk healers have been defined as outside the medical mainstream in their own country; 'excluded' rather than left behind. I suggest that the 'including out' of folk healers in Thailand through a combination of economic, cultural and legal means is a form of exclusion guided by the state-based embrace of modernity. Certain kinds of practices, behavior and values have been problematized as antithetical to modern Thai citizenship. Folk healers have been 'included-out' as modern Thai citizens on the basis of their lack of modern education and credentials and by their allegiance to aspects of Buddhism which are considered superstitious and old-fashioned. The tension between Buddhist morality and modernization plays out in many aspects of Thai life, not the least in the commercialization of religion itself (Jackson, 1999) but despite this the effect of uprooting Buddhist morality in the sphere of medicine remains unexamined. By adopting westernized forms of education, mandating the licensing of practitioners and legitimizing one style of practice over others, the Thai government has established an elite form of modernized practice as the preferred form of Thai traditional medicine. I suggest that tensions arise in the implementation of a government policy which seeks to establish a hierarchy of expertise and legitimacy that is at odds with the cultural beliefs of the local moral world inhabited by the folk healers and much of the Thai population. However it is not just the rural communities and the folk healers who feel the fractures created by the decision, but also the newly trained modern TTM practitioners and the bureaucracy which has implemented the new forms of education and accreditation. The increasing marginalization of folk healers is a consequence of a new generation of modern practitioners but also reflects the twentieth century transformation of Thailand in which Thai political culture has mandated forms of 'Thainess' which are not popularly held in high esteem by the wider population of Thailand.

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13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THAI STUDIES
GLOBALIZED THAILAND? CONNECTIVITY, CONFLICT AND CONUNDRUMS OF THAI STUDIES
15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND

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13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THAI STUDIES
GLOBALIZED THAILAND? CONNECTIVITY, CONFLICT AND CONUNDRUMS OF THAI STUDIES
15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND

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**The Thai Senior Generations under Transition:
Increasing Urbanization and Environmental Uncertainty in an Industrial
Peri-urban District and an Emerging Touristic Town**

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Abstract

The vulnerability of senior population discussed in the literature has usually focused on their physical limitations in dealing with extreme events. This paper provides an additional perspective by addressing their livelihood resilience to coupled socio-economic and environmental transitions from the rural to the urban as well as from certainty to uncertainty. Among critical areas indicated in the literature deserved greater attention of such transitions are peri-urban areas and emerging cities.

The paper thus addresses the issue by drawing on two cases, Ladkrabang district--a Bangkok peri-urban area and KhuekKhak municipality --an emerging touristic town in Phang Nga Province. Both cases are exposing to environmental and socio-economic dynamics. Located on a floodplain encountering precipitation uncertainty, Ladkrabang district becomes an area serving industrializing and globalizing infrastructures resulting in changes in both physical and socio-economic environments. KhuekKhak municipality, on the other hand, a coastal town exposing to intensifying coastal hazards, is under dynamic pressures of tourism development with influx of tourists, hotels, tourist-related services and migrant laborers.

From the combined dynamic drivers, the older generations who depend on traditional, semi-subsistence livelihoods in these two identical cases face significant transformations of their living sphere. Although rooted in different contexts, it is likely that they share some common patterns of livelihood challenges. This paper thus comparatively explores their livelihood resilience under complex structural and environmental dynamics during both crisis and non-crisis situations. It discusses their changing livelihood assets (e.g. natural, physical, and human capitals), adaptive capacity, and the issue of dignity. While traditional Thai culture gives significant value to the elderly, the paper demonstrates the extent to which policy and practice prioritizes these groups of senior people.

Keywords: livelihood resilience, urbanization, age, hazards, maladaptation

Introduction

Physical limitation of the elderly can be one of contributions to decreased resilience to socio-economic and environmental changes; however there can be other aspects deserved greater exploration. The paper brings the perspective of 'livelihood resilience' along with other supplemental theoretical lens into the analyses of older people. There are growing discussions on the limitation of resilience concept particularly how well it takes socio-political dimensions into the framework. For examples, O'Brien (2017) pointed out that current adaptive responses do not well embrace the role of politics that is needed for social transformation while Cannon and Muller-Mahn (2010) argued that resilience thinking might not go well with pro-poor views toward development. In this light, Tanner et al. (2015) suggested livelihood resilience as a perspective to strengthen the concept of resilience by adding socio-political dimension to resilience analysis. Tanner et al. (2015, p 23.) defined livelihood resilience as *"...the capacity of all people across generations to sustain and improve their livelihood opportunities and well-being despite environmental, economic, social and political disturbances...is underpinned by human agency and empowerment, by individual and collective actions, and by human rights set within social transformation."* In other words, resilience is shaped by socio-political process and should embrace the perspectives of rights and justice into its framework (Tanner et al. 2015). This paper will contribute to these efforts by adopting the livelihood resilience as one of its key analytical lens to unveil resilience of the elderly.

The paper will also contribute to the argument of Scoones (2009) in advancing livelihood analysis in terms of power-relation in livelihood process and of scalar linkage with the emphasis on urbanization and globalization as they are drivers at macro level which can have impacts on specific micro locale. The new urban agenda and land grab literature calls for greater attention to peri-urban areas and the emergence of new cities as they are among critical areas undergone processes of urbanization and globalization (Zoomers et al. 2016). Their speed of urbanizations are among the fastest and can result in the increase in problems related to poverty, improper infrastructure, and environmental conditions etc. (Zoomers et al. 2016). In response of the identified gap, the paper focuses on the transformation happening in the contexts of Ladkrabang district, a peri-urban area of Bangkok and Khuekhak municipality, the emerging touristic town in Phang Nga Province.

With such influx of changes, people in these areas thus need the capacity to adapt to such transitions. In livelihood perspective, adaptive capacity heavily depends on assets including human, social, natural, physical and financial capitals (Knutsson and Ostwald, 2006). The diversity of these assets help increase the possibility for livelihoods to be flexible to respond to changes (Nelson et al. 2010). However, the importance of each type of assets can be varied by context along urban-rural spectrum (e.g. Stoian, 2005; Meikle, 2001). This paper thus takes livelihood assets perspective to discuss the adaptive capacity of the older generations.

One of characteristics embedded in older people is age. While urbanization and economic shift can result in livelihood change (Scoones, 2009), the paper brings in a perspectives from career studies to inform the possibility for such change to older people. In the literature, age is among the top three factors ranked in discrimination (Ruggs et al. 2013). As age can contribute to interactional barriers, age-related problems (AR) is one of career inventory barrier used in the career barrier study (Lee et al., 2008). When interacting with gender, the issue can be more serious as female aged population tend to get more

discrimination against their appearance and sexuality (Duncan and Loretto, 2004). In the study of career mobility and generation, older generations (the Mature and Baby boomers) tend to be less mobile than the newer generations (the Generation Xers (born in 1994-1979) and the Millennial Generation (born after 1980)) (Lyons et al. 2015). All these may add to the adaptive capacity of the older generations.

While in livelihood resilience Tanner et al. (2015) mentioned dignity in association with rights for basic needs, the paper explores its expansion by applying the dignity concept from healthcare literature into the investigation of livelihood change. In doing so the paper highlights the dimension of dignity of identity (Nordenfelt and Edgar, 2005), in which occupational identity is recognized as one of crucial elements (Burton and Wilson, 2006).

The paper is based on parts of research results from multiple projects. All of them were based on a qualitative fieldwork approach in which key data collection methods comprised qualitative interviews and observation. Ladkrabang field study was carried on 2014. Data on Khuekhak municipality were based on detailed studies on Moo2 during 2012-2015 and Moo4 during 2013-2015. Before getting into details, it should be noted that in this paper terms related to old age such as seniors, the elderly, older people, and older generations are used interchangeably, and loosely refer to people in the Mature generation (born before 1946) and Baby Boomers (born between 1946-1964) (Lyons et al., 2015).

The paper begins with the contrast between new urban functions and the livelihoods of the older generations. It later elaborates the impacts on two key livelihood assets-- natural resources and land. It further addresses the possibility for the elderly to adapt to the new economy based on their human asset, and later analyzes their adaptive capacity to environmental extremes.

Urban Functional Transformation and the Older Generation Livelihoods

Replacing agriculture which contributed to less than 10 percent of the GDP, industries and services, particularly tourism, became major contributors/drivers to the national GDP (CIA, 2017; NESDB, 2017a, b; FPO, n.d.). Reflecting this national trend, Ladkrabang and Khuekhak transformed their urban functions toward the Thai modern economy. Ladkrabang's previous functions were agriculture and freshwater fish farms. It later served the base for industrial manufacture (e.g. an industrial estate), logistic hubs (e.g. inland container depots), and airborne transportation (e.g. a major international airport). These drivers brought in other supporting elements such as residential and commercial areas, resulting in the rapid expansion of urban scape into green space. In addition, it lied on the route of the Eastern Economic Corridor, a new developmental program connecting the national capital, the eastern region and Cambodian borders. More radical changes were expected to come.

Unlike heavy industrial and logistic sites, Khuekhak had been transforming toward touristic spots. While rubber farming and coastal fishing were among key traditional functions of the area, tourism became a key driver of change in Khuekhak. Particularly along its coasts, hotels, resorts, and other tourist services (e.g. restaurants, spas, tour services, and shops) continued to grow despite some interruptions from the 2004-indian-ocean tsunamis. Such development also brought in migrant laborers from other regions similar to Ladkrabang case. This demographic change resulted in growing residential space and other related services for migrant laborers. The growth made Khuekhak eligible for the status of municipality, changing from rural administration toward a more formal form of urban management.

Despite such change toward industries and services, it was found that groups of older generations in the

two cases still made a living on traditional, semi-subsistence livelihoods. In Ladkrabang, a group of seniors who live along the canal surrounding the industrial estate based their livelihoods on canal fishes and floatable vegetables such as mimosa growing along canal fronts. In Khuekhak, a considerable group of older generations worked on coastal fishing and rubber farming or other small-scale, mixed agricultural practices. Coastal fishing included traditional methods such as net for which boats were not needed as well as other methods such as squid trapping which required small-scale fishing boats. These livelihood practices of older generations were contrast to modern economies that took places around their homes.

Transformation of Livelihood Assets

The new economy and urbanization brought in a wide array of changes, among which were those of critical livelihood assets of older generations. Ladkrabang and Khuekkhank shared in common that the transformation impacted (1) natural asset (e.g. canals and marine ecosystems), (2) physical asset (i.e. land), and (3) human asset.

Natural Asset Declined: Pollutions and Environmental Degradation

As cities rapidly grow without effective environmental control and protection, increasing pollutions from new urban functions can threaten the quality of environments (Augilar, 2008; Li et al., 2010; Zoomers et al 2016). The degradation of environments can consequently undermine livelihoods of the older generations who rely on those natural assets.

In both Ladkrabang and Khukhank, natural assets were critical for the livelihoods of older generations. Healthy ecosystems of canals and oceans were fundamental to the production of vegetables, fishes, and other marine lives. These ecosystems were sensitive to pollutions particularly those from wastewater. Issues related to the discharge of wastewater appeared in both cases.

Although there were considerable efforts in regulating and controlling wastewater management from the state, research results suggested that issues of regulatory enforcement and the monitoring mechanism deserved closer considerations. In Ladkrabang, changes in land-use from low-density mainly agricultural use to the increase in density with industrial, commercial and residential uses added to the poorer water quality in canals. Such degraded water quality consequently impacted older generations whose livelihoods depend on canals' ecosystem services.

Debates on whom to blame for polluting canals were found in this case. On the one hand, environmental consultants hired by the industrial estate argued that wastewater discharged from the estate was within the legal "standard," and pointed out that other factories and residential projects outside the estate also discharged wastewater to the canals. On the other hand, people from surrounding communities perceived that the main source of polluted water came from the industrial estate. There was an issue of trust on data that the industrial estate referred to partly because the estate and the environmental management consultant company were financially related. Although it was legal for the estate to deal directly with the company for its services, it was criticized that this relationship was so close that transparency can be an issue. The district environmental officer support community's argument by adding that the industrial estate wastewater quality barely met the standard and that the assessment and management of wastewater from the industrial estate disengaged the district administration and

communities out of the process.

The debates continued, but livelihoods of older generations depending on canals were already disrupted. Water pollution was among key challenges for canal fishers. Uncle Dee,* for example, said the canal was so polluted that he was not able to keep fishes caught but still alive in a canal in front of his house where the opposite lied factories in industrial estates. They would die from the polluted water, he said.

Instead of fishing, Grandma Jai *and Aunt Mee* relied their living from floating vegetables on canals (e.g. morning glories and mimosa). Grandma Jai's husband was not able to make a living, so she was the only person who brought in income to the house. Her main source of income was from mimosa, earning her 500-700 Bath/week. Grandma Jai said that when wastewater came, her mimosa was damaged to the point that they were not able to be sold or the price was dropped in half. This was the significant reduction on her already small amount of income.

Aunt Mee was a former laborer in a factory. She was laid off and consequently came back to rely on floating morning glories, but canals were already degraded. The industrial development does provide jobs, mostly waged laborers, but in this case the job was not secured. The question arises as to how much waged employment in industries is sustainable. This showed that natural resources-based livelihoods were able to be the safety net when waged employment was unstable. However, such safety net were declining due to degraded environments, in which sources of such waged employments contributed.

According to the literature, in urban livelihood, natural assets may not as critical as in rural livelihood (Meikle et al., 2001), but in peri-urban areas it might be different as Stoian (2005) found that in peri-urban context livelihood can benefit from both natural resources and urban types of jobs. The results from this study emphasized that in peri-urban livelihood natural assets remained significant especially for those who carry on traditional mode of semi-subsistence that include the older generations and that they served as fallback for unstable jobs, but can be threatened if environmental management cannot keep up with such rapid change.

In Khuekhak, issues in wastewater discharged from some beachside hotels, restaurants, construction sites, and shrimp farms surfaced during conversations among observed fishers. Even though there were regulations controlling the management of wastewater, the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement systems were at questions as Uncle Shaw*, a senior fisher, asked how many hotels truly had functional wastewater treatment systems. He further added that the monitoring actions should take place without early notification at 10-11 p.m. when they actually discharge wastewater.

Although contributors of wastewater in this case were said to be multiple sectors such as large-scale shrimp farming where substantial chemical substances were used, in conversations among fishers regarding wastewater pollution, tourism sector was often mentioned. When cleaning swimming pools, "all chlorinated water was just drained toward to the sea," Uncle Od (6/17/14) gave an example for sources of water pollution happening in the area. Interviewed local officer also informed that even tourists filed complaints against beachfront restaurants and hotel construction sites that drained their wastewater directly to the sea. During the fieldwork, the first author also observed wastewater discharged to the beach. The sewer exit was found covered in bushes near the road that run along the beach. The area smelled unpleasant. From its appearance, the sewer was likely to run across and underneath the road. When asked where this wastewater came from, a local lady who made a living

near the sewer exit turned her eyes toward resort hotels.

In addition to other factors such as illegal large-scale fishing (e.g. Hutunuwat, 2013a), in older generations' views, these wastewater pollutions contributed to the reduction of marine lives. For example, Uncle Shaw said that such wastewater killed fishes and drove baby fishes away. He said that previously there were lots of fishes here but now there were only a few, even fewer in 2014. The reductions on marine resources were found to be a major challenge for fishers to continue their livelihoods. Most explained that the catches were not matched with their investment. As a result, nearly 90 percent of fishers quit fishing. Previously there were 50-60 fishing boats in one of fishing communities, but it was reduced to five by the time of the study. All most all of the remained fishers found were older generations while younger generations tended to adopt other types of livelihoods such as tour boats or employees in resort hotels. Similar to Ladkrabang, this case demonstrated ironic relations between the old and the new economies. The new economy, when implemented with poor environmental management, can pollute environments and push people who depended on such natural resources out of business. Although it then provides new kinds of jobs, these jobs are not guaranteed to last, but at the same time natural assets serving as a safety net can be already degraded.

Poor control of peri-urbanization and rapid coastal development can result in both freshwater- and saltwater-wetland degradation (Augilar, 2008; Li et al., 2010). Relationships between Intensive industrialization and urbanization and heavy metal pollutions on natural resources were documented (Hu et al., 2013). According to the aforementioned results, we argue that polluting and degrading environmental resources can be another form of dispossession, dispossession by destruction, in addition to its typical sense. As a result, state and private incapacity to maintain the quality of environments could indirectly marginalize people who relied their livelihoods on those natural resources, one of whom were the older generations. Particularly in the context of economic transitions, natural resources can serve as the safety net for sources of livelihood when new, urban employments fail. The reduction on environmental quality also means the reduction on system resilience. Thus it is necessary to reconsider the ongoing developmental pathway that emphasize globalization and industrialization without effective environmental management. While Folk et al. (2002, p. 439.) stated *"Although most people appreciate that development is ultimately dependent on the processes of the biosphere, we have tended to take the support of ecosystems for granted,"* we would like to add that they also take for granted in degrading resources on which the powerless, in this case groups of older generations, depend their livelihoods. Communities' involvement and ownership of natural resource as identified as one of ten key characteristics of resilience systems can be one area to be strengthened in order to increase systems' capacity to control environmental degradation (Bahadur et al. 2010).

Land Asset: Competition for Space

In addition to degraded natural resources, availability and entitlement of space became competitive along intensive urbanization. As land price sky rocked, space for traditional livelihoods became under pressured. In Ladkrabang case, the development of the major international airport resulted in land-use change from agriculture to international transportation infrastructure as well as the displacement of a few farming families. The compensation for the displaced families was insufficient to get the same amount of land in adjacent areas although it was enough to find new adjacent land for residential purpose. For older generations, the losses of agricultural land also meant the losses of livelihood as land

was their significant livelihood asset. Consequently, livelihoods of these displaced people were disrupted. For example, Grandma Joo*, who used to be an orchard owner in the size of 60- Rais, resided in 0.25 Rai after displaced. Due to the reduction of land entitlement, she was unable to continue her agricultural livelihood and turned to a street vender selling Thai traditional sweet for a living.

In land grab literature, if the process of land negotiation, though legally, is unjust or unfair such as improper compensation or poor involvement of local communities, it can be considered 'land grab' (Zoomers et al. 1016). This case showed that the transformation dispossessed older generations of farmland on which their livelihood depended and that the compensations were insufficient to get similar asset resulting in the disruption of livelihood. Although compensation is an economic tool popular to mitigate negative impacts of development projects, the practices of compensations are often not able to capture the complexity of impacts and consequently externalize project costs resulting in vulnerability of others (Cernea, 2003). This suggested that the review of Thai compensation mechanisms and their uses are important to prevent unfair, short-term and incomprehensive solutions.

In Khuekhak case, beaches where fishers conducted livelihood-related activities were under pressure for touristic uses. They became contested space between old use and new urban function. It was found that beaches were used for various fishing-related activities such as preparing fishing gears, maintaining boats yearly, monitoring boats during heavy storms, and trading etc. From field studies, squid traps, for example, were sizable gears that need considerable space. Each fisher used 50-200 traps. While their post-tsunami relocated residential areas were spatially limited, beaches were important space for them to build and place traps ready to move onto boats. Each year, fishers took their boats out of the sea for major maintenance. Changing parts, renewing their structure, recoating and sealing were among their maintenance activities found on beaches. These could take about a couple weeks to months. During heavy storms, from interviews and observations, it was found that fishers needed to stay around their boats checking anchors, removing water out of their boats, and monitoring any incidents that might damage their boats. Sometimes, this took a whole night long. Thus, from fishers' perspective, there was a need for shelters that facilitate them for such overnight missions. Shacks with mosquito nets, mats and pillows were thus found at some spots. On a daily basis, fishers gathered around the beach, waited for tide change deep enough for maneuver their boats, rested for another round of fishing trips, sought for protection from rains, and socialized among themselves. A scatter of small shacks made temporary from local materials found along the beach served such activities. Unlike large-scaling fishing where there are formal piers and trading space, for small-scale squid trapping, beaches were found to be space for trade. Squid wholesalers sent their staffs with pick-up trucks to buy squids from fishers at beaches where fishing boats arrived at. Squid weighting and transactions took place there as well. All these demonstrated that fishers, mainly senior fishers in this case, relied heavily on beach space for their livelihood related activities. At the same time, hotel operators also want beach space for recreational activities such as sun bathing, beach valley balls, pedestrian walkway or even no-visual-obstacle zones for the sake of oceanic views in order to serve their clients.

Competition over beach space grew continuously along with the tension between some hotel operators and fishers. These touristic uses might seem typical for coastal recreation in the eyes of tourism developers. However if these uses are viewed as the only activities supposed to be on beaches, conflicts with local fishers can arise. Uncle Od* added that these hotel operators tried to prevent the locals from

finding fishes, crabs and shrimps near their hotels by arguing that such activities will disturb their clients. The confrontation was intensified when there was an attempt to develop pedestrian walkway along the beach to facilitate the growing number of tourists. The issue was that the design of the walkway, though finally not materialized, allowed only one entrance for fishers to access the beach while originally there were several accesses fishers used in reaching various spots on the beach.

As the results revealed detailed fishing-related activities on beaches, these activities reemphasized that beaches are not only for recreational, touristic related activities, but also important for local livelihoods. Such diversity of uses thus should be fully understood and acknowledged by policy makers and tourism developers. Meaningful multi-stakeholders management of coastal resources can be a promising option to prevent beach and coastal land grabbing. In addition, lessons learned from practices where commonly confronted stakeholders such as local fisher, hotel operators, and tourists were able to live together should be further investigated in details.

Along with urban transformation, pressures on natural assets and space challenged the continuity of traditional semi-subsistence livelihoods. As a result, change in ways of making a living might be inevitable in the end, but would such transition be smooth for these groups of older generations?

Human Asset: Challenges in Adapting toward Industries and Services

While their physical and natural assets for traditional livelihoods were under pressured, some aspects of their human assets were arguably 'devalued' along the economic transformation. In this study, skills, education, age, and the nature of generations may contribute to their capacity to adapt to new economy.

From career mobility literature, changing from traditional livelihoods to wedged laborers in factories or tourist services can be considered a fundamental shift or 'occupational change' (Lyons et al. 2015). Such fundamental change during late in life can be a great challenge especially if earlier skills and experiences do not much benefit the new jobs. These people had local knowledge of the geography, environment, and survival subsistence skills which are excellent for traditional mode of livelihoods; however, they may not what industrial and tourism sectors want. For example, in Ladkrabang case skills in growing floatable vegetables and knowledge of complex canal networks may not well fit with jobs available from surrounding factories. Along such economic change, their human assets were technologically obsolete or devalued.

In Khuekhak case, some skills and experiences from fishing were transferable to tourist services; however language skills remained an obstacle for senior fishers. Tour boats that were among popular adaptations for younger fishers in Khuekhak were an example. They were able to adapt their existing boats, skills in maneuvering vessels and finding fishes, and knowledge of the sea and surrounding areas (physical asset and human asset) to provide recreational services such as sightseeing, snorkeling, and fishing to tourists. But another skill needed for this adaption was communication in foreign language such as English in order to communicate with their new clients. It was found that this was a major challenge to older fishers. For example, Grandpa Nai* said that he could not speak the language so that he did not provide boat tour service but remained working on squid trapping.

In career barrier literature, age is among barriers indicators (Lee et al. 2008). Age limitation appears in the conversations with these older generations particularly for an industrial sector. In Ladkrabang, they said that industries did not prefer aged people. Aunt Mee, for example, was said to be laid off after 55 as

she was too old. They perceived that it was quite challenging for people in their age to get into industries. From a quick search on classified ads, it was found that 40-45 were an age limit to a few jobs available in industries particularly for non-skilled laborers. Thus their concerns on age limitation were legitimate. While in UK there is an Age Discrimination Act, in Thailand there is an Act on the Elderly; however, it barely addresses an issue of discrimination.

In addition to knowledge, skills and age, their generations may make it less likely to change their livelihoods. The literature suggested that older generations (the Mature and Boomers) were less mobile in career than the newer generations (Xers and Millenials) (Lyons et al. 2015). In both Ladkrabang and Khuekhak, senior social groups that relied on traditional livelihoods were the Mature and Boomers. If this tendency is applicable to Thai context, a possibility that they are less mobile than their successor will make them even less likely to adapt to the new economy. Although livelihood diversity was also found in few senior fishers who also had farms in Khuekkhak case, farming and fishing were both traditional livelihoods. For younger generations, there were more options. It is found that some younger generations took very distinctive jobs. While occasionally join fishing trips, some of the younger generations drove taxi, offer boat tour services, and even work with hotel resorts. Due to their limited livelihood choices and generation characteristics, the transition could push these groups of older generations to a tougher position where they might find nowhere to go.

From the mainstream perspective, there might be an argument that these senior groups must work harder to adapt to the new economy with other ways of life. However, Tanner et al. 2015 (p 25.) put

Some forms of adaptation may impoverish people and build very powerful systems of negative resilience. In this way, adaptation, for example, from traditional modes of agriculture to more precarious urban waged employment, is recast as contested transformation. Adaptation of this kind can therefore be seen as a process of triage involving the things society values least, with some adaptive response equated to the relinquishing of certain values, development goals, and possibly even the acceptance of conditions of poverty.

We suggested that there should be a reconsideration on whether the adaption toward industrial sectors or tourism economy in particular should be the choice for these elderly especially from the dignity perspective.

In order to expand the discussion of dignity in livelihood resilience, this paper borrows the concept of dignity from healthcare literature and occupation identity. Dignity can be classified into four categories, one of which is the dignity of identity (Nordenfelt and Edgar, 2005). Identity of self can be constructed from multiple grounds. Occupation is among fundamental pillars for conceptualizing self-identity (Burton and Wilson, 2006). In empirical study of self-identity, occupation is one of major areas in defining self-identity such as in Extended Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status II or in Groningen Identity Development Scale (Kroger, 2007). However, it should be aware that occupational identity is not confined within a single income generation but rather comprise multiple work-related activities in everyday life (Burton and Wilson, 2006) or in other words what a person do for a living. Dignity of identity thus can be related to a person's livelihoods. The loss of livelihood may consequently lead to the loss of the dignity of identity. Due to the older generations' mismatched skills and knowledge, even if

they can get into industries, they may enter them at the very low level of career ladder. Uncle Dee, for example, was introduced to us as the guru of canals in the areas, signifying the sense of integrity of this local fisher. How will the guru of canals feel if he becomes an entry-level industrial worker during late in their life? As part of self-identity can be defined as “*an unconscious striving for continuity of experience*” (Kroger, 2007, 206 p.), the transition in modes of production, as a result, can have profound impacts on a peasant’s self-concept (Burton and Wilson, 2006). Thus disruption on existing livelihoods due to impacts from modern economic development can challenge older generations’ self-identity as well as their dignity. Livelihood thus concerns not only practicality in living but also psychology.

Despite that social support to the elderly was found at a family level, when looking at macro structure, what happened to these groups of elderly seemed to contrast with Thai culture in which the society gives value to and respects senior people. Perhaps this culture may hold true for a selective group of the older people rather than all. We proposed that a development pathway that is built from older generations’ experience and skills, including those from traditional livelihoods, may add to the smoother transition.

These older generations not only met earlier mentioned changes on socio-economic transformations and their impacts, but also changes from predictable to uncertain extreme events. While facing uneven distribution of benefits from economic development, these older generations can encounter uneven ‘redistribution’ of hazards. It is interesting that urbanizations of the two case studies took place on hazard-prone areas. Ladkrabang is located on low-lying areas of eastern Bangkok. Some areas are even below sea-level and thus prone to floods. Despite formal designated floodways, expansion of urban scape and infrastructure (e.g. highways, railways, and airport) narrow or even block the flow. Similarly tourism- driven urbanization in Khuekhak concentrated along the coasts. It was one of areas devastated by the 2004-Indian-ocean tsunamis. Despite such impacts, tourism in Khuekhak returned and continued. Development, wealth, and growth in these cases thus come with risk.

Uneven Hazard Redistribution: GDP Contribution

Incorporating the human rights concept, the livelihood resilience perspective highlights the nation state’s obligation to protect the development of their citizens particularly the minorities (Tanner et al. 2015). In practices of Thai disaster management, it is often argued that the state has limited financial resource and thus it needs to prioritize who to be protected. In many cases, the priority goes to sectors that heavily contribute to the GDP (e.g. Suthidhummajit, 2017). One of the questions arise is whether this is a pro-rich approach.

Giving priority to major GDP contributors in disaster management may benefit the figure of macro economy, protect the majority, and keep the larger systems functional. The possible assumption of such practices is that the consequences will enable the functional society to cure and mitigate negative impacts on those who are chosen to receive hazards. The issue is that if the society fail to materialize this assumption, such practices of management is then able to widen social divisions and contrast the cultural value given to the elderly.

The case of floods in Ladkrabang can well add evidences to the issues of prioritization and hazard redistribution. Compared to the 2004-Indian-ocean tsunami, the slower onset of 2010-2011 floods partly allowed disaster managers to redistribute flood hazards to a certain extent. In contrast, the onset of the

2004-Indian-ocean tsunami was much faster with high magnitude but minimal measures prepared in advance. This gave little warning to its victims as well as opportunities for disaster managers to redistribute them. Although social issues in the managed redistribution of hazards may not be obvious in case of the 2004-Indian-ocean tsunami, the recovery process can be uneven. This is discussed elsewhere (e.g. Hutanuwatr et al. 2012; Hutanuwatr, 2013b; Hutanuwatr, et al., 2013.; Hutanuwatr et al., in progress). To elaborate the issue of hazard redistribution, this paper will thus emphasize the case of Ladkrabang.

From both public and private efforts to 2010-2011 floods, finally the industrial estate in and the major airport near Ladkrabang were successfully safe from floods. It is understandable that critical infrastructures are usually prioritized to prevent macro-impacts. In this study, however, it should be noted that their protection was at the expense of others, among whom were senior citizens who have already been marginalized from the development stream. It was them again who sacrificed involuntarily. Unlike the earlier mentioned assumption, it is found that those who benefited from the redistribution of floods paid little attention to help mitigate negative impacts to social groups that received the 'redistributed' hazards. *"They [staffs from industrial sectors] came to monitor water level...they were just concerned about their properties...they did not care about us"* said one of interviewed flood victims who resided along the canal near the industrial estate. It was not a surprised that conflicts between these facilities and the community was thus deepened. Although these senior citizens may not contribute much to the national GDP, they are also human who in theory also have rights to be protected. Whether it is fair to distribute hazards to the developmentally marginalized groups with little attention to mitigate their impacts from those who benefit from disaster management should receive more attentions and discussions.

It is also interesting that traditional culture and Thai value promotes respect and care toward the elderly. During crisis, support toward the elderly was found at family units, indicating a certain level of social capital these senior people had. However, again at broader systems, the redistribution of hazards toward these groups of older generation seemed contrast to such value. Through the lens of livelihood assets analysis, which is argued to be the basis for adaptive capacity (Nelson et al. 2010), it appeared that these groups of senior citizens have less political and financial assets.

It was found that these elderly did not have much bargaining capacity to negotiate hazard management with the authority. While industrial estate was able, though against the law, to entirely block a public canal that run through their property. Non-absolute obstacles from light structures of small pedestrian bridges connecting homes of these seniors to the broader transportation networks were ordered to be removed in order to increase flow rate of the canal near the industrial estate. The interviewed elderly reported their suffering from labor intensive tasks in removing these bridges that added further obligations on top of other hectic household flood responses. The disconnection of land-based transportation, as a result of bridge removals, added to the intensification of their suffering. Such contrast between industrial estates' political ability to completely block the canal and the seniors' inability to keep their pedestrian bridges can bring in questions of justice and power relation.

In terms of financial asset for adaptive options toward future floods, the industrial estate had such financial asset to build dikes to protect inside facilities. However, on the other side of the dikes lied houses of these elderly. On the one hand, these dikes, responding to surrounding community's need for

road access, also serve transportation function for residents around the estate. On the other hand, they divert floods to other spaces, one of which was where these elderly resided. Thus again in the future they will probably one of those to bare floods from the adaptive response of others. These seniors who had much less financial capacity than the industrial estate already struggled in making a living daily, let alone building walls competing with the industrial estate. Because financial asset is among key factors contributing to the ability to adopt this adaptation measure, the richer will thus have more capacity for this option and in turn more capacity to divert hazards to the poorer.

Adaptions of one group that negatively impact or increase vulnerability of others are considered 'maladaptation' (Barnett and O'Neill, 2010). Infrastructural responses to environmental risks in many cases are largely unclear if they are really solutions or turn into maladaptive measures (Hissen et al., 2017). Differences between the industrial estate and the older generations shown here urge the issue of disparity that presses the need for normative structural intervention. If regulations and policies allow little control in flood wall construction, it is likely that inequality in flood distribution can be rising. This measure thus deserves a more comprehensive view. In livelihood resilience perspective, the modification of normative structure can be one of strategies the nation state can increase its capacity to protect their citizens (Tanner et al 2015). Given that after the 2010-2011 floods a few industrial estates in Thailand took flood walls as one of their primarily adaptive measure, this paper stresses the need for the reconsideration of such practice and urges greater attentions to regulations and policies that will help prevent maladaptation and encourage the more just disaster management.

Conclusion

The paper presented the analyses of the older generations' livelihood resilience to the transformations of urban functions and uncertainties of environmental hazards. While urban space was transformed in according with major GDP contributors--industries and tourism services, it was found that groups of senior people remained relying on traditional, semi-subsistence livelihoods; however, along with such changes, their livelihood assets were declined in terms of (1) degraded natural resources, (2) land dispossession; and (3) devalued human assets. The declination of these three livelihood assets made those with low financial and political capitals even more challenging to cope with the transitions and pressured most people to change from traditional livelihoods to join modern economy; however, for the senior people, it was a challenge to do so at this time in their life. Age limitation and devalued skills and experiences contributed to such challenge. Even if it is possible for them to enter industries, the question on dignity remain to be explored. While all these challenged the daily life of these older generations, during crisis from environmental hazards, they were not better off. In Thai practices of disaster management, priority often went to major GDP contributors. Redistributable hazards such as floods thus were redistributed toward lower GDP contributors, among whom were traditional livelihood sectors in which groups of older generations were situated. Compared to the industrial sector, they had less power in the negotiation of hazard management and limited financial capital to invest on flood protection structure such as dikes or floodwalls. Consequently, they thus again bared hazard impacts in addition to the impacts from developmental transformation. These evidences showed how low adaptive capacity these older generations had and revealed issues of rights and justice to which the concept of livelihood resilience argues to contribute.

In order to increase livelihood resilience of the older generations, we argue that it is necessary to reconsider development trajectories and practices in order to help prevent the reduction of critical livelihood assets on which the older generation depend. We agree that it is critical that development in our generation should not compromise future generations' capacity, but we also argue that it is necessary that the development should not be at the expense of previous generations. To do so, as natural resources are among critical livelihood assets of older generations, the more balanced development with better emphasis on effective environmental management is in need. Communities' involvement and ownership of natural resource, one of identified resilience characteristics, should be emphasized (Bahadur et al., 2010). To prevent unfair expense of older generations, the analyses highlight the need for fairer compensation mechanism and meaningful community involvement in land negotiation process. Instead of the sole focus on modernization, we also argue that development policy should also be sensitive to older generations' strengths and limitations. The creation of economic space that is built from older generations' experience and skills from traditional livelihoods can be appreciated. Bringing in the perspective of justice, the analyses question disaster management thinking that prioritize higher GDP contributors over the lower and press the need for normative structural intervention to prevent maladaptation measures.

Lessons from the analyses of these two case studies hopefully can shed some light on urban transformation and the livelihood resilience of marginal people and are expected to be transferable to other similar cases. In Asian and African countries, the rate of urbanization is among the most rapid around the globe. The pattern on land use change from the use of traditional livelihoods to new urban functions is not unique to these two cases. The new Thai eastern special economic zones, if approved, can make significant land-use changes especially the conversion of green space into industrial and commercial zones and may lead to significant impacts on the reduction of forested areas (Khamnurak, 2017). In China, following the births of other new cities such as Shenzhe, a new megacity project named Xiongan New Area plans to convert agricultural land in Xiongan into mega urban arena connecting to two major cities, Beijing and Tianjin (Fong, 2017; Huang et al., n.d.). Livelihood resilience of older generations, particularly who depend on traditional livelihoods, encountering such powerful transformation in these new urbanized scapes can be at critical conditions and are in need of great attention.

Note

* They are pseudonyms in order to protect informants' privacy.

Acknowledgements

This paper is based on parts of results from three research projects. The first project was financially supported by the Thailand Research Fund (TRF), the Office of Higher Education Commission (OHEC), and King Mongkut's Institute of Technology Ladkrabang (KMUTL) (MRG5680098). The second project was funded by the Faculty of Architecture, KMUTL. The third project received funding from International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) through Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN) co-organized by the Thailand Environment Institute (TEI) and the Institute for Social and Environmental Transitions (ISET).

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Political Polarization of the Community Radio and the Meaning of Democracy

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Abstract

Political polarization has often been seen negatively by Thai state. However, this may only be the state's political agenda aimed to protect status quo. The transformation of community radio for community's rights into a political community radio after the coup in 2006 proves that it is pathway to democracy. This paper analyses the contents and programs of community radio in the context of Thai polarized politics after 2006, and the audience's reception. The group of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 (2008) community radio, FM 92.5 Mhz., used this media to construct the meaning of "Democracy" through the radio programs. This group had emphasized obvious notion about the key principle of Democracy that "the heart of Democracy is the vote of people, therefore, only the party who get majority vote from people has a right of being sovereign." In conclusion, the construction of meaning for Democracy of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 tended to believe in the power of majority vote. Furthermore, the community radio of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 had constructed both symbolic and subjective reality for democracy in two points. Firstly, the construction of symbolic reality consisted of two main concepts and the one hidden concept: 1) the real democracy was "edible- democracy" and the people were powerful, 2) the real democracy should be the real constitutional monarchy; only symbolic, and 3) the hidden concept for the liberation of Siam-Lanna State. Secondly, the construction of subjective reality consisted of two main concepts: 1) the construction of reality for one-dimensional democracy which regard only majority vote but overlook minority right, and 2) the construction of reality for political imagined-community in three issues: loyalty to their political party, people's power of negotiation, and continuously constructed the unity of "RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 Group" in sender (DJs) and receiver (listener) by mutual consent.

Keywords: community radio, political polarization, democracy, political media

Introduction

After the coup in September 2006, many community radio stations have played the role as a kind of "political media" or "political polarization media" in order to provide some political knowledge and news as well as to encourage and arouse people with political consciousness to assemble and expel the coup's government as well as to call for equality and to foster the real democratic ideology. In Chiang Mai, which is the hometown of Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra, there certainly are some community radio stations

that are established to call for fairness to their admirable leader and political party with potential in administrating Thailand to become wealthy and prosperity. In the year of 2008-2012, the community radio station of Chiang Mai's red-shirts people that is outstanding on calling for the righteousness and fighting for democracy is the group of "RAK-CHIANG MAI'51": FM 92.5 MHz. which has started to perform the political movements seriously against the other group, the yellow-shirts or "Suea Lueang", since the political movement and pressure group of People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) has started to overthrow the Thaksin Shinawatra's government in the mid of 2008. This community radio is considered as a main media broadcasting the voices and thoughts of the leaders and constructing the reality on democracy to the listeners who are the red-shirts or the group of "Suea Dang" in Chiang Mai and Lamphun provinces continuously after the coup 2006 under the name of 'RAK-CHIANG MAI'51' since August 2008. If we briefly considered, the communication via community radio seems to have small power compared with others mainstream radio stations on the reaching of coverage area and the quality of sound or the clarity of listening. However, when mentioning on making decision to use an alternative media like "community radio" as a key tool for political-movements in the local or provincial level, it surely represents confidence on providing political knowledge, encouragement, and instruction in order to enable the supporters to understand the principle of "Democracy of People" as claimed by the leader of red-shirts movements in Bangkok from the establishment of "United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) on August 23rd, 2007, as well as fostering the concept of "eatable/edible-Democracy" under the policy and campaign of the Populism Project of Thai Rak Thai Party in the past (2001-2006). This may surely affects to listener of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 to conform and not hesitate to joined this movements and definitely, demand for the leader like "Thaksin Shinnawatra", the ousted-former Prime Minister, to brought him back to govern the country and made economy great again for better living. This paper wrote based on my own personal interested in the area of political polarization, especially local media phenomenon; in the past 10 years of Thailand's political turmoil all over the country, that horribly changed from the medium that have been created for the voiceless in Thai's society, to have the right to voices or to communicated with the others for their demands and could be created the unity & solidarity or would reduce some prejudices or conflicts among villagers in each local in the country. But my dream was swept away when we started hatred and polarized among Thai's people, after the Coup in 2006, so many (local) community radio stations transformed themselves to the "political media"; fully and absolutely runs for each side of politico-driven admiration, in both yellow-shirts and red-shirts. In this article, explain about "local political communication via community radio" in Chiang Mai province, one of the most incidence of local political conflicts happened, and finally, causes many people died and get wounded, Therefore, the effort of the Junta's government, who urged the people of each side to made an reconciliation among us could be vague. This study uses the application of the theory of social construction of reality of Berger & Luckmann, 1966 and the application of the theory for analyses mass media content by Adoni & Mane, 1984 as the guidelines to searched for the meaning of democracy, constructed through the local political media (community radio station in Muang District of Chiang Mai), of this political movement group , Finally, discussing the answers in 3 main points: 1) the finding on the construction of social reality for symbolic reality regarding democracy of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51; 2) construction of social reality for subjective reality on democracy of the listeners; and 3) discussion on concepts hidden with the construction of social reality on democracy of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51.

Findings & Discussions

1. Issue 1: The construction of Social Reality for Symbolic Reality on Democracy of RAK-CHIANG MAI' 51

RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 constructed social reality on democracy through their speeches given in a community radio, RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 (FM 92.5), that was considered the construction of symbolic reality because it was the construction of concept and belief on democracy that was passed on via a community radio. The construction meaning of democracy could be concluded into three main guidelines as follows: 1) the real democracy was "eatable/edible-democracy" and the people were powerful, 2) the real democracy should be the constitutional monarchy; only symbolic, and 3) the hidden concept for the liberation of Siam-Lanna State. The discussion on these guidelines shall be conducted according to the theory of construction of social reality and the concept of democracy that is the objective reality of current Thai society. The main-discussions are as follows:

1.1 Edible-Democracy

"Eatable or Edible-Democracy" is considered as a word that has often heard mostly via the radio programs and personal opinions given by the leader and DJs of FM 92.5 throughout 2 years of my observation (2009-2010). Consequently, it leads to the finding that RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 has strived to build the concept of "edible-democracy" as the objective reality that is accepted by all villagers or listeners under the framework of reality on democracy through those words. The principle of the theory on construction of social reality believes that since all humans have two worlds around them, i.e., physical / sub-world and 'symbolic / social world', each person constructs different realities due to social world with different environment because this social world performs the duty of reading meaning that is the reality of humans. Social world is constructed by interaction between humans and social institutions in their life including family and community radio (in this case) which have the same concept, i.e., supporting the concept on calling for true democracy under the guidelines of red-shirts. Especially, symbolic / social world which listeners who obtain some information from RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 and perceive or be constructed some stories on democracy from this community radio will gradually accumulate some knowledge on democracy under the framework of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51.

I analyzed that 'sub-world' of listeners was fostered in primary level and each red-shirts had some political foundation, i.e., they used to vote for Thai Rak Thai Party to be the government in 2001 and they admired the policy of Thai Rak Thai policies, for example, village fund project, 30 Baht Medical Care Scheme, Ceasing and Reducing *Farmers'* Debt' program, OTOP Project, Agricultural Product Pledge Project, etc. In addition, they were local people of the hometown of the former leader of Thai Rak Thai Party and they highly admired leadership and management of Thaksin Shinawatra who made their trading and economy grew. However, after the coup on September 19th, 2006, Thai Rak Thai Party, the Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2540, and their admirable leader were destroyed by military dictatorship. After establishing RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 community radio to oppose dictatorship and propose their political petition on the real democracy and allowing Thaksin Shinawatra to be the Premiere of Thailand again, the imagined-reality on calling for democracy through this community radio turned to be new 'symbolic / social world'. This was considered as instruction performed by social institutions in secondary level that was consistent with primary instruction that was their physical /sub-world where they have

accumulated and absorbed admiration and preferences on the concept of eatable/edible-Democracy of Thai Rak Thai Party. Accordingly, their symbolic /social world on democracy defines their “perception or make-sense” towards the reality on democracy. After perceiving and making sense, it led to interaction with such thing as perceived and understood under the concept or “construction of reality on the real democracy or edible-Democracy”. The theory on construction of social reality was also combined with the concept on ‘Power’. Accordingly, if any person is able to control construction process of knowledge and understanding or construction of social reality, such person should be able to define this process to the end, i.e., ‘action’ of people (in this case, it was voting for Pheu Thai Party) and this was the great power of the mass media. Currently, mass media is the institution that could creating the perception and make sense with everything towards our thinking (Kanchana Kaewthep, 2007:21) therefore the leader (the backbone) of RAK-CHIANG MAI’51 was considered as the person who equipped the concept of reality on democracy under their own guideline to listeners for constructing perception and making sense whereas they must have the same behavior with the leader and DJs. The theory also specifies that the constructed reality will be maintained and unable to be changed easily because there is the exchange on thinking and there are some political activities and movements among them regularly. Such finding is consistent with the theory of Berger and Luckmann specifying that primary socialization is the most important foundation towards individual who will be instructed in secondary socialization with similar foundation with that of primary instruction because humans have not perceived objective social structure only but they have also perceived objective social world since they were born. Whereas, symbolic or social world help to filter perception on reality of each person through those two types of objective selection (Berger & Luckmann, 1966:131), i.e., RAK-CHIANG MAI’51 community radio station plays the role as a “social-world” cooperating with the institution of the red-shirts to provide secondary instruction for filtering information on democracy that is consistent and similar to existing perception of listeners caused by primary instruction. Each listener has his/her own “physical/sub-world”, i.e., whether he/she has preferences on policies or the abilities or the competencies in country’s administration of Thai Rak Thai’s government.

Thus, construction of social reality on democracy to make it become such objective reality is consisted of integration among three types of reality on democracy including objective reality, subjective reality, and symbolic reality that was consistent with the proposal concept of Adoni and Mane (1984), i.e., it was constructed from the symbolic reality on democracy based on content and speeches obtained from radio programs and special publishing newspapers of RAK-CHIANG MAI’51. In addition, it also had the interaction with subjective reality in the physical/sub-world of listeners incorporated with interaction with objective reality on democracy that was both mainstream and alternatives which had already established in the society. The mainstream democracy concept of Thailand is often the general legislations of most editions of the constitution, for example, Thailand had constitutional monarchy and sovereignty was held by all Thai people. The king exercised his power through the parliament, cabinet, and court. Performances of the parliament, cabinet, and court shall be under the Rule of Law, human’s dignity, rights, freedom, and equality. Thailand must be a unity kingdom without separation or it can be said that this concept on democracy is influenced by a political discourse on Thailand’s democracy under ‘traditional or conventional perspectives’ that take it for granted in “absolute monarchy”. The political discourse of the secondary thoughts is Thailand’s democracy under ‘alternatives perspectives’ that not

reliable in the “constitutional monarchy” system. (Nakarin Mektrairak, 2010: 45-64). The objective reality on democracy of the secondary thought’s has already been established in the society since political revolution of the Council of People’s: Khana Ratsadon in 1932 (B.E. 2475) as shown in Section 1 of The Temporary Charter for Administration of Siam Act B.E. 2475 stated that “The sovereign power derives from the Thai people”. Thaksin used to mention such statement in a video link played in the Red-shirts protest on December 10th, 2009 that was broadcasted throughout Thailand via various kinds of media of Red-shirts including satellite TV, community radio, websites and publication as well as some distributed CDs.

According to the above explanation, understanding on democracy that was the objective reality of RAK-CHIANG MAI’51 was the belief towards the democratic discourse of alternatives perspectives, i.e., selecting the democratic concept that was consistent and beneficial for the campaign on democracy of RAK-CHIANG MAI’51 emphasizing that the sovereignty was truly held by people without constitutional monarchy as well as attaching to the principles of freedom and equality. In addition, they have also strived to make such principles to be true for the mainstream by considering it as the reason for supporting their rightfulness in calling for democracy of western perspectives as the objective reality of Thai society under acceptance of all parties as specified by Berger and Luckmann that the objective reality could be divided into action for legitimation, i.e., objectivation of meaning for institutionalization (cited in Supang Chantavanich, 255: 122). It was surely considered as distorted construction of objective reality by selecting the set of explanation from the concept supporting reasons of Red-shirts only, for example, claiming on majority vote, asking to pay respect to voting result, opposing against the coup or government that was not voted by the consent of people. Finally, I would like to exemplify some empirical examples to show why construction of social reality on democracy under the guideline of this ‘eatable/edible democracy’ was successful (especially for persons who supported red-shirts and Thaksin). As shown in the research of Wattana Sukansil (2012: 23) who found that people in Chiang Mai and Lamphun considered that the principle of democracy written in the constitution was less important than eatable thing and well-being. I noticed that ‘eatable/edible democracy’ may be originated from economic problems of Thailand that lacked of balance between income of rich and poor people. Accordingly, when the populism policies started to change the relation of exchange between citizens and politicians by negotiating on some benefits to each other, it was considered as another factor constructing such framework or political consciousness system emphasizing on election system of “Plutocracy” was constructed and driven more clearly than those policies in the period of Thai Rak Thai Party.


1.2 Democratic Guideline or Constitutional Monarchy with the King as only Symbol

From the proposal of a DJ of RAK-CHIANG MAI’51 to leave the former concepts (e.g., conservatism and philosophy of sufficiency economy) by claiming that such concepts were under bureaucracy/aristocracy. Finally, people will believe and accept such concept as the reality on democracy under capitalism or liberal democracy or new real democracy. Accordingly, in the period of capitalism and globalization opposing against monopoly of the former capitalism (conservatism), such group of people who may be the majority of Thai people lack of intellectual and economic immune. What I’ve mentioned above, because I would like to identify that the leader of RAK-CHIANG MAI’51 was able to promote their campaign continuously via the radio program, especially their intention on calling for legitimacy, fairness,

and equality (specifically on equal before the laws). Moreover, they also called for freedom for giving their opinions towards the real democracy leading to the propagation of the concept stated that they wanted constitutional monarchy but with the exception that the king should be only the symbol of the head of state of Thailand.

However, although Red-shirts claimed that they wanted freedom, they were truly under the framework of eatable/edible-Democracy (as explained in the first guideline) or Red-shirts of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51. Both sender (DJ) and receiver (listener) were also under the cycle of Capitalism and liberal democracy brought by Thaksin to Thailand systematically with more efficient management than that of the former parties who were the leader of the government. Consequently, freedom or equality demanded by Red-shirts became escaping from one system that they thought that it was old-fashioned and made them to be under sufficiency to another one that made them became political, economic, and social slaves. Accordingly, they entered into the cycle of capitalism with no escape, i.e., exercising the right of vote for exchanging with "eatable/edible populism policies and projects" or "vote for populism policy". If red-shirts people failed to vote for Thaksin's political party or "No Vote", it meant that they would no longer edible-populism as concluded in the figure of the eatable/edible-democracy as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Edible-Democracy Vote's Cycle of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51



From Figure 1, it could be seen that red-shirts' listeners who supported and conformed to construction of reality on democracy under the guidelines of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 was finally unable to avoid such cycle which led to the democracy system with benefits exchange though construction of populist economy. In addition, a political dynasty was also constructed to possess the national administration on behalf of the democracy under new capitalism like Shinawatra family which three members of this family could hold the top position of the political field, i.e., Prime Minister, for 10 years from 2001 – 2011 including Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006), Mr. Somchai Wongsawat (2008) and Miss Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) or Shinawatra Dynasty. Finally, although they claimed that "people are currently clever and will not sell their votes", they were finally under the power of any political dynasty that encouraged

them via all types of media, especially approaching to people who still love and pay respect to any leader in such family. Calling for democracy is considered as another tactic & strategy of campaigning by offering benefits to people through various types of populism projects related to four requisites and well-being.

At this point, I will discuss on some important issues about the key success for constructed the reality as exemplified in the first guideline could be led to the second issue, i.e., when the Chiang Mai's red-shirts found that how the good democracy under liberal capitalism was and how it was eatable and approached, it led to the following framework, i.e., how they had to do to have the absolute democracy or administration under democracy with no additional special power; such as Democracy with the monarchy as the Head of state. Most importantly as discussed on this issue, the key of reality on democracy constructed under such constitutional monarchy surely makes all Thai people to be under the control of "Plutocracy" (govern by the rich with liberal capitalism and those people may turn to be addicted with populism policies, increasingly and ever after, i.e., leaving sufficiency-lifestyle and moderate living without any immune in the period that capitalism is superior than politics and they need to depend on benefits from politician's policy forever. However, it does not mean that red-shirts people do not realized. On the other hand, they said that "Although Thaksin was a corruptor, but he shared some benefits he gained to the people while aristocracy, like a Democratic Party (Abhisit Vejjajiva), had never given them anything." This is considered as consent given by listeners to the capitalists making them to work for capitalism throughout their life without any escape from this illusion of capitalism. Any red-shirts who wants to be free from "aristocracy" or claims that he/she needs the real constitutional monarchy, he/she finally becomes a servant of "oligarchy" led by a new capitalist group. Eventually, these people are unable to approach the absolute democracy as they wish but they have to follow the plan of the capitalism. This is accordingly to the finding of Atchara Pantranuwong (2007:23), specified that Thaksin's government must strive to make the grassroots to give their consent and Thai Rak Thai Government was very successful in dominating people's ideology by building their image through semiotic system and strategic & tactics of advertisements conveying that the party firstly constructed "the battle area" for grassroots people, enabling them to have some 'opportunities' to built and succeed in their life that they had never had before. The red-shirts people also perceived this fact but it was necessary for them to reply on the capital of the capitalists to fight with aristocracy as mentioned by one of the DJs of this radio station FM 92.5 stated that

"... the fact of the red-shirt's battle are bitter because we have to be under the power of any party. Red-shirts needs to rely on the power of a person (Thaksin) to fight with aristocracy unavoidably because there are only two choices in Thai society, namely, becoming the free citizen with or without the Angel (the King)..."

1.3 The Hidden Concept for the Liberation of Siam Lanna State

This framework of reality on democracy also revealed the trace of thinking focusing on the pride of Thaksin was a Lanna's citizenry and identity of Lanna people on language, culture, tradition, and religion. They always blamed that Lanna people have been bullied and looked down as stupid, lazy, and cheating for long period. Most of these opinions were given by the leader and listeners who participated with this

community radio station closely. They always had similar opinions and said that “they do not want to destroy the monarchy but they highly pay respect to monarchy”. However, there were some leaders admit with me that, in the early period of 2012, it’s just an idea of imagine to perform liberation of Siam-Lanna State by separating the 8 upper northern provinces as “Siam-Lanna”. However, they did not plan to establish the separatist movement as happened in the three southern border provinces. This idea was occurred because they felt that it was improper that their democratic leader had been bullied by aristocracy regularly and they also felt unfair that persons involving to the coup were free from all offences without any punishment. Accordingly, the concept of liberation movement for Siam-Lanna state was only constructing the imagined kingdom with dissatisfaction against the administration under the government of Democrat Party (during 2009 - 2010). However, I still believe that the leader of RAK-CHIANG MAI’51 was also able to construct some successful imagined reality including construction of administration under the principle of equality and edible-Democracy must be deprived from a majority. In addition, they also constructed the concept on fostering people to admire their race as Lanna people in 8 upper northern provinces for preparing themselves mentally in becoming Siam-Lanna State or Republic in the future. If the red-shirts was able to achieves Thailand’s revolution and campaign against aristocracy leading to the belief on ‘invisible hand’ causing ‘enlightenment’, there would be separation among Lanna’s people leading to the intention of separation as right side and left side (separation between the up-northern-people from the rest of all Thai people) affecting to constitutional monarchy, eventually. With such construction of social reality, all parties in Thai society should have realized that there was a seed of thinking on liberation for Siam-Lanna state has been grown as directly accepted by the leader of RAK-CHIANG MAI’51. They also strived to lead their listener to support their movement with this kind of reality fostered in their mind.

2. Issue 2: Construction of Social Reality for Subjective Reality on Democracy of Listeners and Discussion on the Concepts Hidden with Construction of Reality on Democracy

Based on the findings, it could be concluded that RAK-CHIANG MAI’51 community radio station (FM 92.5) was able to construct the framework of social reality on democracy that leaded to the misconception to political and democratic concepts of listeners into two main issues:

The first issue was the construction of reality for one-dimensional democracy which regard only majority vote but overlook minority right;

The second issue was the construction of reality for political imagined-community in three issues: loyalty to their political party, people’s power of negotiation, and continuously constructed the unity of RAK-CHIANG MAI’51. The discussion was described for two issues, i.e., the construction of reality for one-dimensional democracy and the construction of social reality on democracy of RAK-CHIANG MAI’51 for symbolic reality and subjective reality.

2.1 Discussion on Construction of Reality for One-dimensional Democracy

To propose the democratic concepts via community radio, I found that the leader and DJs of RAK-CHIANG MAI’51 often claimed that the real democracy was respecting to the majority votes for Thai Rak Thai Party and People’s Power Party as the government. In addition, they also thought that this regime should not be destroyed by minority and aristocracy through the coup. In fact, RAK-CHIANG MAI’51 did not accept any opinion of other minority groups, for example, the yellow-shirts in Chiang Mai or even some red-shirts people in the same group or different groups with different opinions on political

activities. They were always aggressive with their political opponents. While RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 was striving to call for the use of the Rule of Law and equality of law enforcement, there may be some contradiction on the construction of reality on democracy via community radio because the majority was often counted tightly without accepting to or paying respecting to other persons' opinions. Although they sometimes accepted that they should listen to some opinions of minority in order to avoid dictatorship, they still retorted that dictatorship was caused by such minority leading to some confusion. Nevertheless, RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 constructed the framework of reality and passed on their democratic concept on the real democracy via community radio until they were able to construct social reality to their listeners continuously by repeating that "the real democracy was *"eatable/edible- democracy"* and *the people were powerful*" and *"The heart of Democracy is the vote of people, therefore, only the party who get majority vote from people has a right of being sovereign"* as emphasized by the leader of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51. Accordingly, it could be said that RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 community radio was able to play a crucial roles in constructing reality on democracy successfully because they constructed tailored political reality to meet with demands of media organizations or sender based on design and construction of the imagined framework on democracy of their group, i.e., emphasizing people to believe in majority and election. On the other hand, they ignored and denied any objection or opinion of the minority and they felt dissatisfied with any criticism. Consequently, it was considered as the construction of reality for one-dimensioned democracy, i.e., the winner overcomes everything. They considered that such successful construction of reality was the key of intellectual battle and important political ideology. They also protected such framework of reality for their leadership.

2.2 Construction of Social Reality for Symbolic Reality and Subjective Reality on Democracy of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 for constructing the "Imagined Political Community in Daily Life"

The community radio station of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 performed its duty in constructing the intellectual community or imagined community for assembling persons with the same thinking or preferences or political taste in the same group for reinforcing one another on their thinking, belief, and political movement openly and confidentially. This could show the power of red-shirts conveying that they were the majority of this country and this imagined political community was constructed from the imagined framework of reality on the following three issues:

First Issue: The imagined community that directly correlated with political parties for supporting political movement of the red-shirts, i.e., Pheu Thai Party. Both leader and listeners supported this party openly.

Second Issue: The construction of imagined community with people's power of negotiation that was considered as constructing political values emphasizing on enabling Thai citizens to alert on politics and enabling Thai citizens to exchange their votes with benefits that they would earn after election, i.e., it was considered as the construction of eatable/edible democracy. This was considered as the beneficial factor for enabling listeners to understand that democracy enabled them to negotiate and sustain themselves for benefits therefore they had to reserve and love democracy. This was consistent with the statement of Nidhi Eoseewong; 2012 specified that *"Democracy is an opportunity or condition in administrative system or anything giving an opportunity to all groups for 'negotiating'."* and

Third Issue: It was the imagined community that was able to contract people to participate in the ideology of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51, especially participating as DJs, as well as to build the strong citizens in order to continue the never-ending cycles of red-shirts. The first cycle was sender or DJ and it could be seen that RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 community radio station always provided new DJs every year. The second cycle was receiver or listener. The construction of reality on democracy of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 enabling citizens to be alert on politics and values of democracy as well as recognize benefits of election. They were changed from persons with no knowledge on politics to become enlightened that was considered as the good effect for politics and helped to construct the dynamic of the imagined political community; in daily life.

As mentioned above, I noticed that the construction of social reality for imagined political community was able to be fostered in the mind of listeners successfully. Briefly, it was not considered as the construction of imagined community of reality on democracy as the political ideology or government or administration. The most important thing was constructing the reality on democracy as the way of life or constructing civic culture on providing the power of negotiation to people in some extent or eatable/edible democracy, namely, constructing culture with acceptance on majority who elected the government for their true benefits although they truly knew that such candidate or politician may be corruptor as long as they still earned some benefits from such candidate or politician. Moreover, they also constructed imagined political community accepting opinions of persons who had the reasons that were consistent with the concept of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 only while ignoring different opinions because they thought that majority supported aristocracy with the concept of conservatism and idealism who not allow the majority to select their own government and be clever and rich. This construction of imagined political community on democracy could be concluded into 4 main issues (that were consistent with the opinions of all DJs at RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 station and considered as the construction of social reality on democracy for subjective reality that was aimed to be objective reality accepted by all people in the society) as follows:

- a. The heart of Democracy was the vote of people.
- b. The real Democracy was "edible democracy" with good economy
- c. Democracy must be constructed by villagers (the people) without aristocracy.
- d. Red-shirts were people who love legitimacy, fairness, and democracy.

Both leader and people of RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 constructed the social reality to attach to the majority votes solely. When considering on social theory, it can be seen that it is unable to define the term of "the real democracy" clearly because it depended on who defined such term. Each group may define or construct the reality on democracy differently for their benefits. When considering on political communication, such construction of reality on democracy was also considered as construction of values on polarized democracy for their benefits (group of people who admired the way of red-shirts) while ignoring the common benefits of the society.

However, the role of community radio towards the construction of imagined political community in daily life that constructed continuity of successful concepts and propagation of democratic and political news and information and it was not always violent (referred to other community radio stations). This was

consistent with the finding of Aranya Siripol (2011) who had the question whether claiming of the society against community radio that it was a tool for creating conflict was true or false. This research showed that all community radio stations were not used as such tools. On the other hand, it was found that some community radio stations did not perform the duty to broadcast news and upgrade situation analysis for red-shirts but they also caused horizontal decentralization and expanded the network horizontally including DJs who came from community and broadcast news to community.

Conclusions & Recommendations

I would like to conclude that there should be the construction of correct political values to Thai's people in all parts of the society in order to make them have democratic consciousness, namely, democracy is consisted of various opinions and conflicts which all parties should be patient and learn to stay together by listening to reasons of all stakeholders as we;; as solving political problems peacefully without utilizing any superior capital on money, mass media, and wisdom. Accordingly, it is the democratic values that should be constructed in Thai society for avoiding any violence that may be occurred in this political transitional period. I has always realized that politician or the politics under representative democracy emphasizing on election of Thailand as happened in today world is getting transformed to utilize some small media (e.g., community radio or some new media) or even national media (e.g., satellite & cable TV) that was the alternative media for the underprivileged people in participating in and utilizing community media beneficially and valuably for such community as much as possible including urban, rural, or semi-urban and semi-rural community. However, such media was transformed from community media to be political media throughout the country, especially the use of community radio as the tool of political communication for motivating, stimulating, campaigning, or encouraging people to support such party's political guidelines or concepts in order to gain some benefits on reputation, donation, gaining people's power, establishing pressure group-movements, building political stronghold for its party (I did not say that all political parties followed this guideline but they may be different upon their areas, belief, and concepts). Finally, political media like community radio made people in both parties lost. In addition, I found that it was not surprising that listeners of each station with political format would admire and conformed to motivation or construction of reality of sender (DJs) because each listener may have bias, pressure, and anger in his/her mind and it was required to be expressed by listening to media that could respond to their demands on news and information or political ideology referring to perception towards political news of current people in both sides.

For recommendations, Firstly, I would like to suggest that although the sender or DJ had a chance to host the program based on his/her political preferences; he/she had to remember that when speaking via the mass media could be broadcasted to people in many fields with various ages, occupations, experiences, and belief, etc. Accordingly, it is necessary to pay attention on avoiding some rude words or hate speech, satire, and those words that are against for good morality of people or the Royal institutions. Sender must always realized that mass media shall perform the duty with consciousness on social responsibility although sender is the polarized media. In the event of any dissatisfaction, listeners could switch to other stations because RAK-CHIANG MAI'51 has already had its fans who are red-shirts. However, it is necessary to remember that the political opponent may listen to the community radio of the other side for obtaining some information or any person with no side may listen to this kind of political radio

program. The important thing is that the media should run by the code of conduct. Nevertheless, from interviewing, it was found that each DJ had never been trained for the host of radio program, studied laws and code of conduct of mass media before. Moreover, the reason of becoming DJ is their preferences and anger feeling, requiring him/her to find the place for expressing such feeling and community radio should be the best way. Consequently, community radio should be controlled in order to make the owner or DJ to pay respect to human-right and freedom to share opinions of other persons besides calling for their benefits and fairness only or even threatening others accidentally.

Secondly, the receivers or listeners often suggested that should be trained to have media literacy. However, I considered that listeners who are red-shirts have already known the objectives of this community radio station. They just want to hear what they want to listen, such as DJ speaking in order to express their stress. Listeners sometimes or often phone-in to the program for giving their opinions and expressing their feeling through some hate speeches hidden with violence, for example, *"Ready to die with car bomb, in order to kill him/her before visiting our area again, etc."*

I suggested that listeners should have freedom in listening to any station freely. However, listeners should aware that they are able to participate in any activity of preferred political group but they shall not have any behavior of threatening, hurting, killing, or attacking any house or office of any person with different opinions. In conclusion, listeners should have knowledge, social responsibility and correct political values, for example, be patient and open to different opinions with toleration without using violence for solving problems. This recommendation may practical among the context of Thai polarized politics since the coup in 2006, by CNS: Council of National Security, until now (2017); by the NCPO: National Council for Peace and Order. Unluckily, Thai people are always divided and the real democracy, we desired, still in the crises.

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15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND

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***Anisong* Manuscripts on the *Bun Phawet* Festivals in Laos: Studying the Relationship between Manuscripts and Sermons**

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Abstract

Anisong sermons describing meritorious rewards derived from attending the annual Bun Phavet chanting festivals (Thai: *Thet Mahachat*) are also performed during the rituals. With regard to religious contents, *anisong* sermons are different from Bun Phavet chanting itself; Bun Phavet chanting recites the story of Prince Vessantara (Thai: *Phra Wetsandòn*), while *anisong* sermons explain meritorious incentives that the participants gain by listening to or joining the chanting rituals. As the texts of *anisong* sermons are not long, less time is spent listening to them than to the Bun Phavet chantings. My corpus comprises ten manuscripts containing texts of *anisong* or meritorious benefits derived from attending Bun Phavet chantings; six manuscripts were found in Luang Prabang, two manuscripts are from Luang Namtha province, and two manuscripts are kept in Paris. My approach to the studies of *anisong* manuscripts focuses on paratexts such as colophons, on the production process, the usage and the storage of manuscripts in order to reveal the relationship between manuscripts and *anisong* sermons in Bun Phavet chanting festivals. In addition to manuscript studies in relation to rituals, textual analysis is also applied to trace these relationships. Different texts were written in different styles which are definitely significant evidences to reveal cultural perspectives. The study consequently analyzes a total of ten *anisong* manuscripts used in Bun Phavet chanting festivals. Manuscript analysis, ritual analysis, and textual analysis are concurrently applied to study the relationships between *anisong* manuscripts and sermons. The study aims at addressing the following research questions: In addition to the special importance of the writing support, what other physical features (*anisong* as objects) in the manuscripts manifest and give *anisong* sermons importance in Bun Phawet chanting festivals? To what extent are wishes expressed in colophons relevant to Bun Phavet chanting festivals or to *anisong* sermons in the festivals? For what reasons are different writing supports used for *anisong* manuscripts and what are the different materials relevant to *anisong* sermons? As for textual analysis, what kinds of texts are different texts associated with *anisong* sermons in the Bun Phawet festival?

Keywords: *Anisong*, Bun Phawet, Thet Mahachat, Manuscript, Sermon

Introduction

Based on the Buddhist belief in the coming Buddha *Maitreya*, the traditional chanting festival *Thet Mahasat* (Thai: *Thet Mahachat*) or *Bun Phawet* has been inherited so far especially in Laos and Thailand where *Theravāda* Buddhism plays a considerable role as a central religious dimension. According to the well-known storytelling about *Phra Malai*²⁴ who obtained the miraculous ability and traveled through the heavens and the hells, the Bodhisatva *Maitreya* has been already destined to incarnate as the next Buddha *Maitreya* after the end of the 5000-year Buddha *Gotama* period, two thousand and five hundred years approximately henceforth left. The Bodhisatva had *Phra Malai* forward his statements of meritorious commitments towards all human beings; namely, everybody is able to reincarnate in the period of the Buddha *Maitreya* provided that he or she follows the Buddhist moral precepts, makes merit, donates (gift-giving), and listens to the story of *Vessantara Jātaka* (Lao: *Phavet*), composed of overall thirteen episodes, in the annual *Thet Mahachat* chanting festival. *Vessantara Jātaka* is considered as the great previous life of the Bodhisatva (before his incarnation as Siddhartha Gotama) or the Great Birth. According to Buddhist belief, before he could attain Buddhahood, the Lord Buddha had to perfect himself with the Ten Virtues or Perfections (Pali: *pārami*). These could not be done in a single lifetime but through the ten stages of virtuous life as depicted in the Buddha's last ten existences (Malalasekera 2002: 419). Thanks to the belief of Buddha *Maitreya* conveyed by *Phra Malai* and the great virtues of Prince Wetsandòn, listening to the *Vessantara Jātaka* is accordingly believed as a considerable way to gain substantial merit. The festival in which the thirteen episodes of the Buddha *Gotama*'s previous life are chanted has been therefore annually held so far.

In accompany with the *Mahachat* thirteen episodes being customarily chanted, *Anisong* or *Salòng* sermons are also given in the festival itself: *Anisong Khao Phan Kòn* and *Anisong Wetsantara*²⁵. *Anisong Khao Phan Kòn* sermon is given to declare meritorious benefits derived from offering rice to the Buddha *Gotama*. The sermon is usually given after a procession of one thousand rice balls attended by the festival's participants has been finished. *Anisong Wetsantara* sermons reveal meritorious incentives gained from listening to the *Vessantara Jātaka*. The sermon is given after the thirteen-episode chanting has been completed.

To give a retrospective glimpse of manuscript cultures, one should realize that texts were inscribed on several kinds of manuscripts. In Laos palm-leaf manuscripts (Lao: *nangsü bailan*) and mulberry paper manuscripts (Lao: *papsa*) contain a wide range of texts: treatises, astrology, the Buddhist canon (*Tipiṭaka*), *anisong*, and etc. *Anisong* or *salòng* texts were written on various kinds of writing supports as manuscripts in response to diverse purposes: dedicating to a monastery, being read as a preaching at occasions, supporting the Buddhist religion to last until the end of five thousand years, and the like. Those who produced these manuscripts expected to gain merit from copying and offering books to

²⁴ *Phra Malai Kham Luang* is a non-canonical story and was composed in A.D. 1737 by Chao Fa Thamma Thibet (A.D. 1715-1755), a king of the Ayutthaya period. He was believed to translate *Malai Sut* into Thai version and to compile it into *Phra Malai Kham Luang*. *Malai Sut* (Pali: *Maleyya Sutta*) was originally composed in Pali around A.D. 1157 by a monk from Lan Na. Then, Phuttha Wilat, a monk from Ching Mai, gave its more explanatory details in *Dika Malai*. (Pluang Na Nakhon 1980: 201 quoted by Sanit Tangthawi 1984: 189)

²⁵ The titles were diversely differentiated as shown in the table below on the next page but the textual contents itself are thematically identical.


temples; the merit could also be dedicated to their deceased relatives or people. The eventual purpose of *anisong* manuscripts, however, is to be read by monks as a sermon or chanting at religious occasions; the manuscripts itself are consequently more or less relevant to *anisong* or *salòng* preaching events. Arranged by years of production, the following ten *anisong* manuscripts were found in several archives. Basically analyzed by the titles, the scripts, and the colophons, these manuscripts are all related to the annual *Bun Phawet* festivals located in Laos.

Title	Material	Year and month	Archive	Sponsor	Scribe
Salòng Wetsantara	Palm-leaf manuscript	1817 November	Wat Mai Suwannaphu-maram, Luang Prabang	Chao Pathummathirat (female high-ranked person) and followers	<i>Not mentioned</i>
Anisong Wetsantara		1826 November	Ban Khònkham, Nalae town, Luang Namtha	Khuna Phikkhu (monk)	
Salòng Khao Phan Kòn		1913 September	The National Museum, Luang Prabang	Bunthan (female layperson)	<i>Not mentioned</i>
Sòng Maha Wetsantara Chadok		1944 September	Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang	Phra Virachitto (Khamchan) (Venerable monk)	
Salòng Khao Phan Kòn		1990		Chinna Thammo Phikkhu (monk)	Phra Wirachitto (Khamchan) (a Venerable monk)
Salòng Maha Wetsantara Chadok	Mulberry-pa per manuscript (<i>papsā</i>)	2004 February	Müang Sing town, Luang Namtha The National Library of France, Paris Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang	<i>Not mentioned</i>	Thit Niao (disrobed male layperson)
Tham Anisong Maha Wetsantara		<i>Not mentioned</i>			<i>Not mentioned</i>
Anisong Wetsantara					
Anisong Wetsantara					
Salòng Khao Phan Kòn	Palm-leaf manuscripts				

The manuscripts listed above contain *anisong* texts used for giving sermons in the annual *Bun Phawet* chanting festivals. Due to being an *anisong* preaching, not to mention their textual contents, the ten *anisong* manuscripts are, based on the studies of manuscript cultures, considerable sources to reveal the significant relationship between the manuscripts and the festivals including preaching rituals.

Anisong Manuscript Production and the *Bun Phavet* Festival in Laos

According to the table above, *anisong* manuscript productions were finished within five months prior to the period of *Bun Phavet* festivals, which were frequently held at the beginning years up to the middle of March²⁶. Veidlinger (2007) defines general scribal works as a seasonal activity. “*The dates found in manuscript colophons demonstrate that the work was carried out mostly during the rainy season. The vast majority of dated manuscripts were completed in months nine, ten, eleven, and twelve.*” (Veidlinger 2007: 123). In addition to the main purpose of copying a manuscript by sponsors for a monastery to be read on *Bun Phavet* festivals, some could possibly produce to pay homage to the great previous life of the present Buddha *Gotama* in response to the upcoming festival; others expected a better rebirth in the period of Buddha *Maitreya*. In the context of Theravada Buddhist beliefs, even though the manuscripts are eventually not used in the festivals, the merit derived from copying manuscripts virtually exists, ensures sponsors or writers’ beneficial returns or better antipant lives, and can be transmitted to the deceased. The belief was evidently manifested in the colophons of the manuscripts.



Salòng Wetsantara, code: 0601140601408, folio 10 (recto)
Wat Mai Suwannaphumaram, Luang Prabang

Transliteration: สงกราด ๑๑๕ ตัวปีเมิงเปลาเดินเจียงขึ้น ๕ วัน ๑


รจนาแล้วยามเที่ยงวันเจ้าปทุมมาราชธิดาสหกนิยาทาสาทาสีมีใจใสศรัทธาเป็นอันยิ่งจึงสร้างโหวนเทศนามหนวสองมหาชาติไว้กับศาสนานพระโคตมเจ้าตบเตา ๕ พันวสา นิพพานปัจจโยโหตุ ทูว์ นิวั

Transcription: จุลศักราช ๑๑๑๕ ตัวปีเมิงเป่า เดือนเจียง ขึ้น ๕ วัน ๑ รจนาแล้วยามเที่ยงวัน เจ้าปทุมมาราชธิดาสหกนิยาทาสาทาสี มีใจใสศรัทธาเป็นอันยิ่งจึงสร้างโหวนเทศนาสองมหาชาติไว้กับศาสนาพระโคตมเจ้า ตราบต่อเท่า ๕ พันวสา นิพพานปัจจโยโหตุ ทูวัง นิจจ

²⁶ In Thailand *The Mahachat* are mostly organized almost the end of each year or after the end of the Buddhist-monk retreat as mentioned by Malalasekera (2002: 420) as “The recitation may be performed during the Sat (Pali: Sarada) or Mid-Year Autumnal Festival in early October or on other special occasions such as the raising of funds for the monastery. The reason why it is usually performed after the Lent is obvious. For during the period October to December, food, especially fish and prawns, is found in abundance, and the people, in particular the countryfolk have a comparative leisure time, in former days the recitation of the *Maha Chat* might be performed at a private residence in special case or in the preaching hall of the village. Nowadays the performances are confined to the preaching hall within the precincts of a *wat*.”

Translation: In [C]S 1179, a *müang pao* year, the fifth waxing day of the first lunar month, the seventh day of the week²⁷, [the manuscript has been] completed at noon [by] the royal princess Chao Pathumma Ratchathida [and her] male and female followers who have the high faith [in Buddhism] thereby producing the didactic Sòng Mahachat for the Teachings of the Buddha Gotama to last until the end of five thousand years. Nibbāna paccayo hotu duvaṃ niccaṃ (May this be a condition [for me] to reach Nibbāna).

The following colophon clearly shows the sponsor's declaration. The intention of Ms. Bunthan to sponsor the manuscript commission was to dedicate the merit to all relevant beings who (Lao: *Phòkao Maelang Phòkam Maewen*), to recover from illness, and to attain the ultimate peace (Pali: *nibbana*).



Salòng Khao Phan Kòn, code: 0601850600706, folio 4 (verso)
The National Museum, Luang Prabang

Transliteration: จุรสงกราตราชาไค ๑๒๗๕ ตัวปีกาเปลาเดิน ๑๑ ออกไหม ๑๕ คำวัน ๓
ยามกองงายหมายมีอินทันทมีใจเลื่อมใสศรัทธาเป็นอันยิ่งจึงได้สร้างหนังสือสองเข้าพันกอนทานไปหาพ่อเก่าแม่หลังพ่อกรรมแม่เวร
ข้าหายพระยาอุปบาตอาคาคติโลกาทั้งมวลรทั้งมวล คำมาถึงนิพพานปร่มสุขขัสาทุก อนุโมทามิ

Transcription: จุลศักราช ๑๒๗๕ ตัวปีกาเป้า เดือน ๑๑ ออกไหม ๑๕ คำวัน ๓ ยามกองงาย หมายมีอินทันท
มีใจเลื่อมใสศรัทธาเป็นอันยิ่งจึงได้สร้างหนังสือสองเข้าพันกอนทานไปหาพ่อเก่าแม่หลังพ่อกรรมแม่เวร
ขอให้ผู้ข้าหายพระยาอุปบาตอาคาคติโรคาทั้งมวล ขอเข้าถึงนิพพานังปะระมังสุขัง สาธุสาธุ อนุโมทามิ

Translation: [The manuscript was finished being written in] C.S.1275, a *ka pao* year, on the fifteenth waxing day of the eleventh lunar month, the third day of the week²⁸, at the time of the morning drum (*kòng ngai*). [The sponsor] Ms. Bunthan was so faithful in Buddhism thereby producing the Sòng Khao Phan Kòn manuscript in order to dedicate the merit to all persons with who she was connected in previous lives. May I recover from any kinds of illness [and finally] reach the *Nirvana*. (Pali ending expression)

Besides, in the red-framed part, there is an expression “rough hands do not touch females’ breasts. (The text) is completed here. (I) will erase the inscribed traces of a stylus at the below corner, my friends. (I) can merely do this,” written in Tham Lao scripts and Lao Buhan scripts next to the colophon. The first sentence mentions somebody who does not touch female’s breasts due to his rough hands. It was written by a totally different hand and is irrelevant to the text *Salòng Khao Phan Kòn*. The manuscript was sponsored by a female layperson but the scribe is unknown. The vagueness of information makes it different to conjecture about the writer. However, the sentence can be basically interpreted as a

²⁷ 1179 Margasisha 20 = Sunday, 28 December 1817. The seventh day of the week (Saturday) was one day earlier.

²⁸ 1275 Asvina 15 = Wednesday, 15 October 1913. The third week of the day, however, was a Tuesday, one day earlier.


restriction to touch female bodies which is directly involved in Buddhist religious rules; namely, monks are not allowed to touch females. The ‘*rough hands*’ in the expression can also be understood as ‘*incapable hands (of monks) to touch females*’ or ‘*touching females with uncomfortable minds caused by religious rules*’; the scribe was likely a monk.

Transliteration: มีกะด้างบ่คุมนมสาว สิดทิกานกัแล้วเท่านี้ก่อนแล ชิม้างเล้กจานไ้หม่มบ่อนได้เพื่อนหากเท่านี้จะได้

Transcription: มือกระด้างไม่จับนมสาว สิดทิกาก็แล้วเท่านี้ก่อนแล จะลบเหล็กจารไ้หม่มด้านได้เพื่อนหากเท่านี้จะได้

Translation: Rough hands do not touch females’ breasts. (The text) is completed here. (I) will erase the inscribed traces of a stylus at the below corner, my friends. (I) can merely do this.

The following colophon was excerpted from an *anisong* manuscript inscribed and sponsored by *Phra (Kham Chan) Virachitto*, a Venerable monk of Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang. In order to celebrate his 24th birthday anniversary, he wrote five different texts²⁹ in one fascicle including *Sòng Maha Wetsantara Chadok* as a multiple-text manuscript (MTM)³⁰. The statement of intention, combined with the place and the date of production, was completely written on the title page. Those five texts were organized in a certain template of covers and paginations throughout the manuscript. However, the table of contents was written only on the cover of the first text.



Sòng Dòkmai Thup Thian, code: BAD-13-1-0157, folio 1 (recto)
Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang

Transliteration: สองดอกไม้ทูปเทียน พรวิริจิตโต (คำฉันท์) วัดแสนสาวิไนพรพุทธศาสนา เมื่อวันพุธขึ้น ๑๐ ค่ำเดือน ๑๑
ปีวอก (กาบสัน) พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๘ เพื่อเป็นทีรลิกในคาวอายุครบ ๒ รอบวันพุธขึ้น ๑๐ ค่ำเดือน ๑๑ ปีวอก (กาบสัน) พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๘

²⁹ *Sòng Dòkmai Thup Thian* (Benefits derived from offering flowers, incense sticks, and candles to monasteries), *Sòng Fang Tham* (Benefits derived from listening to the Buddha’s Teachings), *Sòng Raksa Sin* (Benefits derived from following the Buddhist precepts), *Sòng Phao Phi* (Benefits derived from attending funerals), and *Sòng Maha Wetsantara Chadok* (Benefits derived from listening to the *Vessantara Jātaka*)

³⁰ This term Multiple-Text Manuscript (MTM) was suggested by Professor Harunaga Isaacson during discussions held at Hamburg in the DFG Research Group 963 ‘Manuscript Cultures in Asian and Africa’ (2008-2011). Multiple-text manuscripts (MTMs) designate codicological units ‘worked in a single operation (Gumbert) with two or more texts or a ‘production unit’ resulting from one production delimited in time and space (Andris, Canart, Maniaci) (Friedrich and Schwarke 2016: 15-16). A MTM contains several texts in a single fascicle (Thai: *phuk*) or bundle (Thai: *mat*) which was completely done in one production. Moreover, there is a related term ‘Composite’ which means a codicological unit that is made up of formerly independent units (Friedrich and Schwarke 2016: 16). A composite in northern Thailand and Laos includes several texts, probably with a similar textual theme, inscribed by different scribes on different occasions and later combined into a bundle. In 1939 the German mediavist Edward Schröder (1858-1942) distinguished between ‘*Sammelhandschriften*’ and ‘*Miszellanhandschriften*’ (Friedrich and Schwarke 2016: 3) which were called ‘composite manuscripts’ by Lynn Thorndike (1882-1965). They mean similarly to ‘collecting manuscripts’ or multiple-text manuscripts; the *sammelhandschriften*, however, carries narrative senses of meanings.

Transcription: สองดอกไม้รูปเทียน พระวิระจิตโต (คำจันทร์) วัดแสน สร้างไว้ในพระพุทธศาสนา เมื่อวันพุธขึ้น ๑๐ ค่ำ เดือน ๑๑ ปีวอก (กาบสัน) พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๗ เพื่อเป็นที่ระลึกในคราวอายุครบ ๒ รอบ วันพุธขึ้น ๑๐ ค่ำ เดือน ๑๑ ปีวอก (กาบสัน) พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๗

Translation: Sòng Dòkmai Thup Thian. Phra Wirachitto (Kham Chan) at Wat Saen produced and dedicated it to the Buddhist religion on Wednesday, the tenth waxing day of the eleventh lunar month, a year of the monkey (*kap san*), B.E.2487, to commemorate [the completion of] the second twelve-year anniversary cycle on Wednesday, the tenth waxing day of the eleventh lunar month, a year of monkey (*kap san*), B.E.2487.

Sòng Dòkmai Thup Thian and *Sòng Maha Wetsantara Chadok* were inscribed in the same fascicle because the two texts are sometimes read for preaching on *Bun Phavet* festivals. A *Bun Mahachat* festival, for example, was carried out at Wat Manorom, Luang Prabang during February 17-19, 2017. In the festival, a *Sòng Dòkmai Thup Thian* sermon was given on the second day (February 18) prior to the *Malai Mūn Malai Saen* sermon³¹, the two *anison* texts can no doubt be combined together. The manuscript was inscribed by the Venerable monk and kept in his abode; it can be assumed that he produced and used the manuscript by his own³².

The following mulberry-paper manuscript (*papsa*) can be exemplified as an interesting dimension of manuscript productions. Written in February 2004 by Thit Niao, an ex-monk, the manuscript was made from different pieces of *papsa* connected by adhesives in order to contain multiple texts (in the form of MTM), folded in a hand-sized width similar to the palm-leaf manuscripts. The cover page shows the table of contents and decorations.




*The cover of a multiple-text manuscript made of mulberry paper, code: BAD-13-2-038
Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang*

³¹ The sermon gives a story of a miraculous monk called *Phra Malai*. He taught vicious beings in the hells and humans on earth to be excluded from the horrible hells by avoiding sinful acts. One day he was bestowed a lotus by a poor man and dedicated it to the celestial Chulamani Chedi in Dawadüng heaven. *Phra Malai* discussed with God Indra towards merit-making and. The future Buddha *Maitreya* then joined and asked *Phra Malai* about the human's world. He planned to spread the Buddhist religion after the end of five thousand years of the present Buddha Gotama period. Those people who aim to be reborn in the *Maitreya* period should listen to the whole *Vessantara Jātaka*. After the end of the Buddha Gotama period, *Kaliyuk* or the Dark Age comes. During the Dark Age people live for only 5-10 years and are shameless of immorality. When the Dark Age ends, the Buddha *Maitreya* reincarnates and spread the Buddhist religion. He had *Phra Malai* forward the story of world's future destination towards all people (Sanit Tangthawi 1984: 189).

³² Additional details to support the assumption can be found in the topic '*Anison* manuscripts and the *Bun Phavet* preaching ritual'.

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


Different pieces of paper are connected

Code: BAD-13-2-038, Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang

The manuscript contains four texts: *Salòng Maha Wetsantara Chadok* (Benefits derived from listening to the *Vessantara Jātaka*), *Salòng Sapphathan* (Benefits derived from all kinds of giving), *Salòng Dòkmai Thup Thian* (Benefits derived from offering flowers, incense sticks, and candles to monasteries), and *Salòng Khaochi* (Benefits derived from offering baked rice to monasteries)³³. At the end of the fourth, the scribe wrote the colophon but left some empty with underlined space, thereby being able to be filled in with a sponsor's name. Wishes or author statement of Thit Niao itself was not written on; the manuscript could be therefore assumed as a prototype for copying other manuscripts sponsored by different donors.

³³ *Salòng Khaochi* (Benefits derived from offering baked rice to monasteries) is also contained in the manuscript. Having been imposed as a donating ceremony with a definite period of time, *Bun Khaochi* festival is regularly held at in the third month thereby being known as *Bun Dūan Sam* which means 'a meritorious occasion of the third month' (Thai: บุญเดือนสาม). A *Bun Khaochi* festival that the researcher surveyed in Luang Prabang was held on the first waning day of the third month (in 2017) - one day before the fifteenth waxing day of the third lunar month or *Makha Bucha* festival as mentioned by Parinyan Phikkhu นอกจากบุญข้าวจี่นี้แล้ว ปัจจุบันนี้เพิ่มการทำบุญมาฆบูชาเข้ามาอีก เพราะมาฆบูชาก็เป็นวันสำคัญอีกวันหนึ่ง มาฆบูชาตรงกับวันเพ็ญเดือนสาม" English: "In addition to making merit at the *Bun Khaochi*, meritorious activities at the *Makha Bucha* festival has also been added thanks to being another (religious) significant day. *Makha Bucha* is held on the fifteenth waxing day of the third lunar month" (1952: 62). The festival in Laos is held not over one month before the *Bun Phavet* festival. Presumably, the scribe included the texts *Salòng Khaochi* in the manuscript for being easily used on the two occasions organized in the proximity period.



Code: BAD-13-2-038, Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang

Transliteration: สาธุๆ ข้าพเจ้าชื่อ.....พร้อมด้วย.....ได้สร้างหนังสือผูกนี้ไว้คำพระพุทธศาสนาพระโคตมะเจ้าตรับต่อเท่า ๕ พันพรรษา ผู้ข้า.....ขอโกศลผลบุญช่วงนี้ ทาน.....


Transcription: สาธุๆ ข้าพเจ้าชื่อ.....พร้อมด้วย.....ได้สร้างหนังสือผูกนี้ไว้คำพระพุทธศาสนาพระโคตมะเจ้า ตรับต่อเท่า ๕ พันพรรษา ผู้ข้า.....ขอกุศลผลบุญช่วงนี้ ทาน.....

Translation: Well done! (religious salutation). I whose name is...together with.....have copied the manuscript to support the Teachings of the Buddha Gotama to last for five thousand years. I.....may the merit [derived from copying this manuscript] reach to.....

Among the ten *anisong* manuscripts under study, the manuscripts for being read in the thirteen-episode *Mahachat* preaching outnumber those being read in the ritual of the 1000-rice ball procession, seven manuscripts and three manuscripts respectively; each of the latter has five folios. This reflects the dominant belief in meritorious benefits derived from the *Mahachat* preaching ritual over the other.


***Anisong* Manuscripts and the *Bun Phavet* Preaching in Laos**

Anisong sermons are given after the thirteen-episode *Mahachat* preaching. The manuscripts consisting of those containing thirteen episodes and those containing *Anisong* texts are thus prepared before the preaching begins at a specific place or a container: trays, boxes, space in the vicinity of preachers, etc.




Palm-leaf manuscripts containing thirteen episodes of the Mahachat story were prepared on a tray for preaching in the Bun Phavet festival at Wat Wiangsaen Chaiyaram (Wat Phonthan Nūa), Vientiane, on March 5, 2017


Due to the length of preaching, individual episodes contained in fascicle(s) (Thai: *phuk*) need to be assembled into a bundle (Thai: *mat*). In order to avoid confusion between the manuscripts of the thirteen episodes and of *Anisong* during the sermons, each of episode fascicle(s) has its title on the first folio. The following four examples show the obviously written titles on their cover pages. Unlike the last three manuscripts, the first one contains several texts in one fascicle (Multiple-Text manuscript); together with decorations, all titles are therefore recorded on the cover folio.




*A multiple-text manuscript made of mulberry paper, code: BAD-13-2-038
 Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang*



*Tham Anisong Maha Wetsantara, Code: VatXiangCai-3, red wooden cover
 Vat Xiang Cai, Müang Sing, Luang Namtha*



*Tham Anisong Maha Wetsantara, Code: Anisong Vessantara 2, front cover
 Library of the École française d'Extrême-Orient (EFEO), Paris*




*Sòng Maha Wetsantra Chadok, code: BAD-13-1-0157, folio 27 (recto)
 Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang*

Transliteration: ส่องมหาเวสสันดรชาดก พรวิริจิตโต (คำฉัน) วัดแสนสร้างไว้ในพุทธศาสนา เมื่อวันพุธขึ้น ๑๐ ค่ำเดือน ๑๑
ปีวอก (กาบสัน) พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๗ เพื่อระลึกในคราวอายุครบ ๒ รอบวันพุธขึ้น ๑๐ ค่ำเดือน ๑๑ ปีวอก (กาบสัน) พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๗

Transcription: ส่องมหาเวสสันดรชาดก พระวิริจิตโต (คำฉัน) วัดแสน สร้างไว้ในพุทธศาสนา เมื่อวันพุธ ขึ้น ๑๐ ค่ำ เดือน ๑๑
ปีวอก (กาบสัน) พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๗ เพื่อระลึกในคราวอายุครบ ๒ รอบ วันพุธขึ้น ๑๐ ค่ำ เดือน ๑๑ ปีวอก (กาบสัน) พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๗

Translation: Sòng Maha Wetsantara Chadok. Phra Wirachitto (Kham Chan) at Wat Saen produced and dedicated it to the Teachings of the Buddha on Wednesday, the tenth waxing day of the eleventh lunar month, a year of monkey (*kap san*), B.E.2487, to commemorate the second twelve-year anniversary on Wednesday, the tenth waxing day of the eleventh lunar month, a year of monkey (*kap san*), B.E.2487³⁴.


Whereas, there is not any cover folio or cover page in the two (out of three) of *Salòng Khao Phan Kòn* manuscripts (Benefits derived from offering rice to the Buddha *Gotama*); the texts begin on the recto side of the first folios. The preaching to declare meritorious benefits derived from offering rice is done immediately after the procession of one thousand rice balls has been finished. There is only one *Anisong* preaching in the ritual; the manuscript can therefore be used independently without confusion taking place among other manuscripts.



***Salòng Khao Phan Kòn*, code: 0601850600706, folio 1 (recto)**

The National Museum, Luang Prabang

Title



***Salòng Khao Phan Kòn*, code: BAD-13-1-0093, folio 1 (recto)**

Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang

Title

The following multiple-text manuscript (MTM) also derives from Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang. It is composed of *Sòng Dòkmai Thup Thian* (Benefits derived from offering flowers, incense sticks, and candles to monasteries), *Sòng Fang Tham* (Benefits derived from listening to the Buddha's Teachings), *Sòng Raksasin* (Benefits derived from following the Buddhist moral precepts), *Sòng Phao Phi* (Benefits derived from attending funerals), and *Sòng Maha Wetsantra Chadok* (Benefits derived from listening to the *Vessantara Jātaka*). Separated by at least one blank folio, the five texts were, as already mentioned in the recent topic above, written in the same fascicle with single writing template; each of which has one folio containing title, date and a specific reason of production, and scribe.

³⁴ 1306 Asvina 10 = Wednesday, 27 September 1944.

13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THAI STUDIES
GLOBALIZED THAILAND? CONNECTIVITY, CONFLICT AND CONUNDRUMS OF THAI STUDIES
15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND


Pagination on the recto sides -
Nai Tham numerals



Pagination on the verso sides -
Combination of consonants
and vowels



Sòng Dòkmai Thup Thian (Benefits derived from offering flower, incense sticks, and candles to monasteries), code: BAD-13-1-0157, folio 1-5 (recto and verso), Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang



Sòng Dòkmai Thup Thian (Benefits derived from offering flower, incense sticks, and candles to monasteries), code: BAD-13-1-0157, folio 6 (recto), Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang

Unlike other palm-leaf manuscripts, page-marker symbols are on both rectos and versos. The pagination on the recto sides is marked by *Naitham* numerals ordering folios through each individual text; whereas the pagination on versos is marked by a combination of consonants and vowels, ordered by orthographic steps of the consonant set, running throughout (all five texts of) the manuscript. The co-existence of the two pagination styles plays a role as an aid to order pages of the manuscript. The recto sides order 'pages' of individual texts; while the verso sides order 'the whole five texts' of the manuscript. Each text can consequently be used by picking out the fascicle and then returning it back to its right positions inside the manuscript. In addition, at the end of the first text or *Sòng Dòkmai Thup Thian* (Benefits derived from offering flowers, incense sticks, and candles to monasteries), a temple name, Wat Saen (Lao: วัดแสน), located in Luang Prabang, was written with a blue pen as an ownership statement. It can be presumed that the manuscript had been circulating among local temples as a shared object³⁵ and, assumed by the co-existence of two different pagination styles, each of individual texts was borrowed by different users; either an monastic officer or one of the users consequently marked a possessive label to

³⁵ Manuscripts could be circulated among local temples themselves as a shared object. They were sometimes kept in a certain monastery and borrowed by monks from other temples.

show the manuscript origin.

Produced in A.D. 1990, the following palm-leaf manuscript contains the text *Salòng Khao Phan Kòn* or “Benefits derived from offering rice to the Buddha *Gotama*”; the text was written on only five pages by a typewriter in modern Lao script.




Salòng Khao Phan Kòn, 1990, (Benefits derived from offering rice to the Buddha *Gotama*)
Code: BAD-13-1-0112, folio 1-4 (recto), Wat Saen Sukharam, Luang Prabang

The declaration on the recto of the first folio clearly shows the homiletic purpose of the text inscribed in the manuscript; it means ‘an *anisong* sermon for meritorious festive occasions’ (Lao: ເທສ໌ຍອານິສັງສະກະຖາ ສຳຮັບບຸນເທສການ). The manuscript was thus certainly typed to be used for preaching on *Bun Phavet* festivals in Lao-speaking communities. The short length (five pages) implies the short sermon and the modern scripts imply preachers who did not read the ancient *Tham* script. It indicates the production development to properly shape the manuscript for preaching in the festival. Namely, monks or preachers were not required any longer to be able to read the *Tham* script; contemporary monks who do not know the *Tham* script can also preach in the festival, reflected on the recent year of manuscript production, A.D. 1990.


Manuscript productions done by typewriters date from the 1980s-1990s, their purpose was to support monastic and laity education in Luang Prabang. *Phra Khamchan Wirachitto*, a Venerable monk and abbot of Wat Saen Sukharam published books on the Lao Buddhism which were hardly accessed and understood due to *Tham* Lao and Thai scripts in those extant materials. In order to solve the problem that many Lao monks lack familiarity with Buddhist scriptures, he transliterated books into Lao script versions and published thousands copies of books on Buddhist discipline (*Vinaya*). The following manuscript entitled **Anisong Het Bun Wankoet** (Benefits derived from making merit on birthdays) exemplifies a reproduction commissioned during that time. According to the colophon, the manuscript *Anisong Het Bun Wankoet* (Code: Bad-13-1-0206) was reproduced by *Phra Khamchan Wirachitto* in 1988, in which 3,000 copies of *Winaya Part I* (Thai: วินัยภาค ๑) were also published (Khamvone Boulyaphonh

2015: 226) and typed by a monk *Chinna Thammo Phikkhu*³⁶. Based on the inscribed original version produced in 1973, the manuscript was made with a typewriter in Lao script; the inconvenience of textual accessibility was thus solved.



Anisong Het Bun Wankoet (code: BAD-13-1-0206), 1988, folios 1, 5 recto, Luang Prabang

The typewritten manuscript above was commissioned based on the original handwritten version *Salòng Tham Bun Wankoet* manuscript (Code: 0601140600515) which was sponsored in 1973 by *Sathu Yai Somdet Phra Sangkharat Mahathera Thammayan*, a Supreme Patriarch monk, and archived at Wat Mai Suwannaphumaram (see the excerpt below). The two manuscripts evidently show the identical text with slightly differences caused by spelling corrections.



Salòng Tham Bun Wankoet (code: 0601140600515), folio 6 verso, Luang Prabang, 1973

Transcription: พุทธศักราชได้ ๒๕๑๖ ตัวปีกาเปา เดือน ๘ ขึ้น ๘ ค่ำ ขามกองแลง หมายมีศรัทธาสาธุใหญ่สมเด็จพะสังฆราช มหาเถรธรรมญาณเป็นเจ้ามูลศรัทธาได้สร้างธรรมผูกนี้ไว้กับพระศาสนา

ขอให้ได้ดั่งมโนรคคำปรารภของเพิ่นสู่ประการแด่เทอญ นิพพานะ ปัจจะโย โหตุ อะนาคะเต กาเล จารยวันคืออิทธิ วัดโคมเสลา เป็นผู้เขียนเนื้อ

Translation: In A.D.1937, a *ka pao* year, the eighth waxing moon of the ninth lunar month³⁷, at the time of the sunset drum (*Yam Kòng Laeng*), (the manuscript was sponsored by) Sathu Yai Somdet Phra Sangkharat (Supreme Patriarch) Mahatherathammayan, a Venerable monk, to be dedicated to the Buddhist religion. May all his wished be fulfilled. Nibbāna Paccayo Hotu Anāgate Kāle (May this be a condition [to reach] Nibbāna in the future). (A)chan (teacher) *Wandi Itthi* from *Wat Khom Salao* inscribed (the manuscript).

³⁶ In 1988, sponsored by Phra Khamchan Wirachitto, he also reproduced another palm-leaf manuscript with a typewriter. *Chinna Thammo Phikkhu* was certainly more or less responsible for the Buddhism book publication projects in 1980s-1990s. He had been perhaps known as a typewriter hand then was in collaboration with *Phra Khamchan Wirachitto* with his typewriting assistance. Manuscripts typed by him were therefore formatted in a certain single layout.

³⁷ 1299 Sraavana 8 = Sunday 15 August 1937.

As for the length of preaching in the festivals, as already mentioned with regard to the *Anisong Khao Phan Kòn* and *Anisong Wetsantara* sermons, even though the sermons are usually given in *Bun Phavet*, they take different preaching durations. The following table shows the numbers of folios or pages containing the texts, which are exactly associated with preaching durations. The data is categorized by writing material: palm-leaf manuscripts and mulberry-paper manuscripts. 'Folios' has two sides, recto and verso, and is account for palm-leaf manuscripts; while 'Pages' is for mulberry-paper manuscripts (*phapsa*). Regarding the manuscripts in this study, one folio of palm-leaf manuscripts can be equally estimated as two pages of mulberry-paper manuscripts. The table therefore shows the '*Estimation in Folios*' in the last column; so that the analysis can be more easily done and understood

Material	Title		Quantity		Estimation in Folios
			<i>folios</i>	<i>pages</i>	
Palm-leaf manuscript	1	Salòng Khao Phan Kòn	5	-	5
	2	Salòng Khao Phan Kòn	5	-	5
	3	Salòng Khao Phan Kòn	5	-	5
	4	Salòng Wetsantara	10	-	10
	5	Anisong Wetsantra	18	-	18
	6	Sòng Maha Wetsantara Chadok	15	-	15
Mulberry-paper manuscript (<i>papsa</i>)	7	Salòng Maha Wetsantara Chadok	-	32	16
	8	Tham Anisong Maha Wetsantara	-	10	5
	9	Anisong Wetsantara ³⁸	-	8	4
	10	Anisong Wetsantara ³⁹	-	18	9


The first three Anisong manuscripts are used for preaching after the procession of one thousand rice balls; each of which has five folios thereby carrying quite short texts. The short length therefore indicates short preaching durations. The sixth and seventh manuscripts contain the word '*chadok*' or '*jataka*' in their titles implying the stories of previous lives of the Buddha *Gotama*. Such texts in the two manuscripts are comparatively long as to emphasize events in the *Vessantara* birth and to describe benefits of each episode people could get from venerating or listening to.

³⁸ The extant text is incomplete.

³⁹ The text was accurately copied from the *Anisong Wetsantara* manuscript no.9 above. They are kept in the Library of the École française d'Extrême-Orient (EFEO) in Paris and have identical texts but different handwritings. They are unprovable which one is the prototype for the other due to the lack of production clues.

Anisong Texts and the *Bun Phavet* Chanting Ritual in Laos


The study also focuses on textual analysis of the ten *Anisong* manuscripts. The manuscript *Anisong Wetsantara*, produced in November A.D. 1826 at Ban Khònkham, Nalae district in Luang Namtha province, has significant textual features. The monk *Khuna Phikkhu* sponsored and inscribed the manuscript. He was certainly educated in *Pali* language thereby being able to write an introduction and panegyric in *Pali*; which are clearly distinctive from the other texts in the study corpus. Then he continued with *Phra Saribut*'s enquiry towards the Buddha *Gotama* about benefits derived from listening to the whole *Vessantara Jātaka*. The Buddha explained the benefits gained from different thirteen episodes and the numbers of their prayer words, then summarized the story. The red frame below shows the beginning *Pali* expression.



***Anisong Wetsantara* (Benefits derived from listening to *Vessantara Jātaka*)**

Code: 0305050700404, folio 1 (recto), Ban Khònkham, Nalae district, Luang Namtha province

Not to mention the evidence showing the author's religious knowledge, the text itself includes a narrative⁴⁰ and some details from the *Tiṭṭaka*. In the manuscript the scribe clearly refers to the *Tiṭṭaka* as the source of the text.



***Anisong Wetsantara* (Benefits derived from listening to *Vessantara Jātaka*)**

Code: 0305050700404, folio 17 (verso), Ban Khònkham, Nalae district, Luang Namtha province

Transliteration:


กาลกณาสุตตมวณนานิตติตกริยาอันกล่าวยังกาลกณาสุตอันมีในฎีกาจริยาเวสสันตรชาฎกมหานิบาดอันสังคายนาเข้ามาในทีฆนิกายคัสระเจจบรมวารกาลควรเท่านั้นก่อนแล

Transcription: กาละกณาสุตตัง วณณะนา นิตติตา กริยาอันกล่าวยังกาลกณาสุต อันมีในฎีกาจริยาเวสสันตรชาฎกมหานิบาด อันสังคายนาเข้ามาในทีฆนิกาย ก็เสด็จบริบูรณ์กาลควรเท่านั้นก่อนแล

Translation: *Kālakaṇḍa suttam vaṇṇanā Nitthitā*. The *Kalakanthasut* in *Dikachariya Wetsantara Chadok* of *Mahanibat*, integrated into the *Thikhanikai* (*dhīgha nikāya*), has been completed here.

⁴⁰ The embedded narrative will be explained and analyzed in the following part.

The text therefore mentions miraculous abilities (*ṭiāṇa*) gained from Dharma attainment⁴¹, and the crystal black sword as a metaphor of attaining the *Nirvata* as followings.





Anisong Wetsantara (Benefits derived from listening to Vessantara Jātaka)

Code: 0305050700404, folio 16 (verso), Ban Khònkham, Nalae district, Luang Namtha province

Transcription: จักได้หักเสียดเสียดยังวิชาตนหาด้วยดาบดำแก้วคืออรรหตมคณาน

Transliteration: จักได้หักเสียดเสียดยังวิชาตนหา ด้วยดาบดำแก้ว คือ อรรหตมรรคณาน

Translation: Avijja (ignorance) could be refrained (destroyed) by the *Dap Dam Kaeo* (a black crystal sword) which is regarded as the *Nirvāna*.



Anisong Wetsantara (Benefits derived from listening to Vessantara Jātaka)

Code: 0305050700404, folio 16 (verso) and folio 17 (recto)

Ban Khònkham, Nalae district, Luang Namtha province

Transliteration: อันว่าบรยา ๓

อันคือทิพพจักขุญาณในอรรณมที่ไกลกับวิไสตคนทั้งหลายทิพโศวิญาณคือหูทิพไดยันสทามที่ไกลกับวิไสหุคนทั้งหลายบุพเพนิวาณาสญาณคือได้ร้นักรู้ยังชาติสรณานอันไปเกิดภายหน้าแลรู้ยังบุพเพนิวาณายังอันสูกแลกทุกเมื่อก่อนด้วยบทาเอวโนโมเอวโคตโตนั้นคตบรจิตตตวิชาอันสลดรู้ใจทานผู้อื่นก็จักมีแก่คนทั้งหลายในสำนักพรพุทธเจ้าตนชื่อเมตเตย

Transcription: อันว่าปัญญา ๓ อัน ก็คือทิพพจักขุญาณ ในอรรณมที่ไกลกับวิไสตคนทั้งหลาย ทิพโศตถิญาณคือหูทิพไดยันสทามที่ไกลกับวิไสหุคนทั้งหลาย บุพเพนิวาณาสญาณ


คือได้ระลึกรู้ยังชาติสรณานอันไปเกิดภายหน้าและรู้ยังบุพเพนิวาณายังอันสูกแลกทุกเมื่อก่อนด้วยบทา เอว โนโม เอว โคตโต นั้นก็ดี บรจิตตวิชาอันสลด รู้ใจทานผู้อื่นก็จักมีแก่คนทั้งหลายในสำนักพระพุทธเจ้าตนชื่อเมตไตรย

Translation: The three divine wisdoms are **the divine eyes** or abilities to see things from long-distant places that are inaccessible by human beings; **the divine ears** or abilities to hear things from long-distant

⁴¹ Six divine abilities or the six *Apiṭṭhā* consist of **Supernatural Powers** (showing oneself invisible body, flying into the sky, travelling through the underground earth), **Divine Ears** (hearing things from long-distant places that are inaccessible by human beings), **Divine Perception** (knowing others' minds), **Divine Perception of Births** (knowing things in one's own previous lives), **Divine Eyes** (seeing things from long-distant places that are inaccessible by human beings), and **Divine Knowledge of Desires Elimination** (knowing how to eliminate desires).

places that are inaccessible by human beings, and **the divine perception of births** or abilities to know things in the future or previous rebirths as the [Pali] expression “*evaṃ nāmo evaṃ gotto*”. Perceptions of knowing others’ minds are also owned by those who follow the Buddha Maitreya.

A typical feature in a colophon is the scribe’s apology for his unattractive handwriting. The manuscript clearly shows that the monk scribe expected more or less his manuscript to be used for preaching by someone else; it was certainly produced for a homiletic purpose. The manuscript was probably used in preaching with a large number of audiences since the text includes a narrative and additional descriptions derived from the *Tipiṭaka*, which can probably aid preachers to take more attention.



Anisong Wetsantara (Benefits derived from listening to Vessantara Jātaka)

Code: 0305050700404, folio 18 (verso), Ban Khònkham, Nalae district, Luang Namtha province

Transliteration: ค่อยพิจารณาดูเทอญ ตัวบ่งงามหยังเหิงแล

Transcription: ค่อยพิจารณาดูเทอญ ตัวบ่งงามหยังเหิงแล

Translation: Please consider my handwriting. It is unattractive and messy.


The Embedded Narratives

Anisong texts illustrate benefits of making merit on a particular occasion and, by means of including a narrative(s) mentioning a person (or persons) who did the same and who were reborn in the Heavens, to congratulate people on the benefits they could gain through such a meritorious donation. The purpose of *anisong* preaching is accordingly to praise and show activities and results of making merit by giving examples about those who gained the benefits from doing this. They play a role of convincing people to have faith or appreciate the merit they made on occasions or festivals; *anisong* manuscripts are often brought up to deliver a sermon by monks during or after ceremonies. There are basically two elements in an *anisong* text: the introductory text and an embedded narrative. Introductory texts explain the occasion or background of the merit; they sometimes include the narrator of the story before an ‘embedded’ narrative is told. Narratives in *anisong* texts as a consequence introduce an exemplary character who performs particular meritorious acts and consequently had an exalted life thereby purifying listeners’ minds. *Anisong* sermons can make people blissful due to the merit they have done and can assure people that none of the merit is unfruitful; people can look forward to the expected beneficial returns.

Narratives in *anisong* are defined as *another story embedded, perhaps conveyed by the Buddha, a disciple, or others, illustrating people who made a meritorious deed and gained rewards then of doing this*. Some of them do not contain a narrative; namely, they merely show the Buddha’s descriptions in

details of benefits or returns gained from a meritorious act without any relevant stories. *Anisong* or beneficial returns of making merit are not able to be precisely estimated or enumerated. Narrative is thus a device of making rewards more tangible and concrete by giving an example of those who performed similarly and gained pleasant returns aftermath to the listeners. Listeners, as a religious belief, can clearly see how exactly they could get and expect from the outcomes of the certain merit; narratives in *anisong* texts serve this purpose. Embedded narratives were either acquired from various sources: canonical Jātakas, non-canonical Jātakas, and prevailing folktales or newly created; many of them contain multiple narratives.

The manuscript *Anisong Wetsantara* (Benefits derived from listening to Vessantara Jātaka), coded 0305050700404 and found in Luang Namtha as recently mentioned, contains an embedded narrative about a frog who listened to the Teachings of the Buddha and got a better rebirth in the heaven. The story of a frog getting an exalted rebirth after listening to the Buddha's *Dharma* is similar to *Manthukathewabutwiman* (Pali: *Maṇḍukadevaputtavimāna*).⁴² It is contained in *Mahārathavakka*, *Vimānavatthu*, *khuddakanikāya*), *Suttanta* section in the *Tipiṭaka* Buddhist canon.



Anisong Wetsantara (Benefits derived from listening to Vessantara Jātaka)

Code: 0305050700404, folio 15 (recto), Ban Khònkham, Nalae district, Luang Namtha province

Transliteration: เปนดั่งมหามณฑกบตัว ๑ แลอยู่ใต้กองหยากเหยียดังใจฟังธรรมยังมีเด็กน้อยผู้

๑ ไปเลี้ยงงัวขึ้นอยู่ใกล้ที่ไม่ค้ำตากไล่จัวหัวกบตัวนั้น

ก็ถึงเชิงอันตายก็ได้เมื่อเกิดเมืองฟ้าก็ได้เสวยทิพสมบัติมากนักรู้ชื่อวามณฑกเทวบุตรแล

คำด้วยผลอันสงอันได้ดังใจฟังธรรมนั้น

Transcription: เปนดั่งมหามณฑกบตัว ๑ แลอยู่ใต้กองหยากเหยียดังใจฟังธรรม ยังมีเด็กน้อยผู้ ๑

ไปเลี้ยงงัวขึ้นอยู่ใกล้ที่ไม่ค้ำตากไล่จัวหัวกบตัวนั้น ก็ถึงเชิงอันตาย ก็ได้เมื่อเกิดเมืองฟ้า ก็ได้เสวยทิพสมบัติมากนักรู้

⁴² พระผู้มีพระภาคตรัสถามมณฑกเทวบุตรว่า [๕๑] ใครมีวรรณงามยิ่งนัก รุ่งเรืองด้วยฤทธิ์และยศ ยังทิศทั้งปวงให้สว่างไสว
ไหว้เท้าทั้งสองของเราอยู่? มณฑกเทวบุตรกราบทูลว่า เมื่อชาติก่อน ข้าพระองค์เป็นกบที่เฝ้าหาอาหารอยู่ในน้ำ
เมื่อข้าพระองค์กำลังฟังธรรมของพระองค์อยู่ คนเลี้ยงโคได้ฆ่าข้าพระองค์ ขอพระองค์ทรงดูฤทธิ์ ยศ อานุภาพ
ผิวพรรณและความรุ่งเรืองของข้าพระองค์ผู้มีจิตเลื่อมใสครั้งหนึ่งเท่านั้น ข้าแต่พระโคตม ก็ผู้ใดได้ฟังธรรมของพระองค์สืบกาลนาน
ผู้นั้นพึงได้บรรลุนิพพานอันเป็นฐานะไม่หวนไหวเป็นสถานที่ที่ไปแล้วไม่เสว้าโศกเป็นแน่. (English Translation) Lord Buddha asks
Manthaka Thewabut, "Who are you who have fair skin with powerful and honorable glory shining to all directions
and are saluting me on my feet?" Manthaka Thewabut replies, "I lived as a frog surviving underwater with food in
my previous life. I was killed by a cattleboy when I was listening to your Teachings. Please take a look for a short
while at the power, rank, almighty ability, skin colour, and prosperity of mine who has religious faith. Ones who
always listen to your Teachings, they could attain the permanent and unmiserable Nirvāna.

ได้ชื่อว่ามันทกเทวนุตรแต่ ก็ด้วยผลอันสงสันได้ตั้งใจฟังธรรมนั้น

Translation: [The story is compared to] a frog named *Mahamanthaka* (Mahā Maṇḍaka) inhabiting under a pile of rubbish and paying attention to the Buddha's Teachings. [At that time] a child took care of cows and stood at a forest in the vicinity of the frog's habitat. He accidentally killed the frog with a cow-controller stick pressing against the frog's head. Then the frog was reincarnated in the heaven surrounded by divine property and got the name of *Manthakathewabut*, rewarded by the meritorious incentives gained from listening to the Dharma.

The two manuscripts from Luang Prabang bearing the same title, *Salòng Khao Phan Kòn*, also contain similar narratives about a layman who reincarnated as a heavenly deity and then as a worldly prosperous man as he offered one thousand rice balls to the Buddha. The motif⁴³ of offering rice or food to monks or to the Buddha commonly appears in various parts⁴⁴ of the *Tipiṭaka*. However, the motif of one thousand rice balls is not mentioned in the Buddhist canon; it could be possibly added to fit for the traditional rice ball procession of the *Bun Phavet* festival.

Conclusion

The ten extant *anisong* manuscripts are therefore involved in the annual *Bun Phavet* festival because they carry preaching texts read by monks. *Bun Phavet* shows the instantly inherited belief in the heavenly rebirths and rebirths full of happiness in the Buddha Maitreya period. Besides attending the thirteen-episode *Vessantara Jātaka* chanting, people copied and dedicated the manuscripts to monasteries in response to meritorious occasions. The manuscripts were made within six months before the festivals began. On the one hand this reflects the donors' intentions that the manuscripts ought to be used in *Bun Phavet* and reflects common durations of inscribing manuscripts from the ninth to the twelfth months on the other hand. The donors dedicated *Anisong* manuscripts to gain merit both for themselves and for deceased relatives, and to get a better life in the next Buddha period in accordance with the legendary story of *Phra Malai* who got informed by the Buddha *Maitreya* about his reincarnation at the end of the present five-thousand-year Buddhist era. Some manuscripts provide several texts preached in *Bun Phavet* festivals due to the convenience of their usage; others were made as prototypes for copying forthcoming manuscripts by different scribes and thereby spreading the merit. In addition, the outnumbered *Anisong* manuscripts containing *Mahachat* or *Vessantara Jātaka* represent the dominant belief in the merit derived from paying homage to the *Vessantara* story over the other – the merit derived from offering rice to the Buddha or monks.

The preaching about benefits (*Anisong*) derived from listening to the *Vessantara Jātaka* is given after the

⁴³ 'Motif' (Thai: อนุภาค) means characteristic or distinctive elements, events, things, etc. which mark a story itself more memorable and sometimes can differentiate one story from the others.

⁴⁴ For example

Sunisawiman (Pali: *Suṇisāvimāna*) in *Piṭhavakka*, *Vimānavatthu*, *Khuddakanikāya*, the *Suttanta* section

Kaluthayitherapathan (Pali: *Kāḷudāyitherapadāna*) in *Kunaḍadhānavakka*, *Therāpadāna*, *Khuḍḍakanikāya*, the *Suttanta* section

Suchinatitatherapathan (Pali: *Sucinatitatherāpadāna*) in *Sakimsaṃmajjakavakka*, *Therāpadāna*, *Khuḍḍakanikāya*, the *Suttanta* section

preaching of all thirteen episodes has been accomplished. Manuscript covers showing titles are thus necessary as to avoid confusions. Having marked with a distinctive pagination system and a temple name showing the ownership, a multiple-text manuscript (MTM) including an *Anisong* preaching text for *Bun Phavet* reflects the circulation of the manuscript as a generally shared object among temples in a certain locality. Insufficient knowledge of the Tham script does not matter the preaching since some manuscripts were reproduced in modern Lao script by typewriters; preaching was not particularly done by monks who were trained in Tham scripts.

Concerning textual analysis of the ten *Anisong* manuscripts, based on the numbers of folios, preaching on benefits derived from listening to *Vessantara Jātaka* outnumbers the other – *Anisong Khao Phan Kòn* – due to the length of the story. A palm-leaf manuscript inscribed by a monk carries a rather long content mentioning things referred to the Buddhist canon. Texts including the word *chadok* or *jātaka* in the titles are especially contained in even more folios in order to explain meritorious rewards from venerating each episode of the whole story. The narrative that a frog was accidentally killed by a boy, then got a rebirth in the heaven thanks to morally paying attention to the Buddha's Teachings is similar to a story in the Buddhist canon and was well embedded in the *Anisong* text as an exemplary character. Whereas the element of offering one thousand rice balls is not mentioned in the Buddhist canon, it was certainly added to suit the traditional rice ball procession as part of the *Bun Phavet* festival. In conclusion, the *anisong* manuscripts carry preaching texts for the festival and undoubtedly reveal the relationships between the manuscripts and *Bun Phavet* itself. Even though *Anisong* texts are nowadays mostly found in printed books, features of the festival are still left in the manuscripts as historical clues for looking back into religious beliefs and manuscript cultures.

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German Migrants in Pattaya: Negotiating Cross-Cultural Marriage, Family and Relationships in Thailand

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Abstract

This study examines the link between transnational marriages and German migration to Pattaya, a well-known tourist beach city on the east coast of the Gulf of Thailand. An estimated number of 7,000-8,000 German nationals, a vast majority of whom are males in their advanced age, have settled in Pattaya with their Thai partners. Instead of women from less affluent countries migrating as brides to more economically advanced countries, these German men have decided to resettle far from home as husbands and sometimes fathers to Thai nationals. In-depth interviews with German migrants in Pattaya reveal that their migration stories do not always follow the stereotype of German men coming to Thailand alone looking to meet available Thai women. Some German migrants moved to Thailand with Thai partners they had met elsewhere while others did not intend to seek relationships with Thai women when they arrived in Thailand but ended up appealing to and partnering with local women they met by chance. Although the experiences of these cross-cultural relationships are quite diverse, they point out the vital role Thai women play in the German migration to Pattaya. The opportunities to meet and settle down with Thai women, most of the time much younger than themselves, fulfill older male migrants' quest for desired masculinity and sexual relations not available to them in their home countries. Without age discrimination in forming new relationships and a family life, the men enjoy active sex life, marital companionship and the role of family providers. However, cross-cultural families and marriages are also a space of tension and negotiation, especially between German men and their Thai wives' families. We found that a number of German migrants intentionally choose to settle down in Pattaya, a tourist contact zone, instead of relocating to their Thai partners' communities in the Northeast region, in order to lead a life of their choice at a distance from their Thai in-laws.

Keywords: German migration, cross-cultural marriages, Thailand, Pattaya

1. Introduction to German Migration to Pattaya

At the beginning of our fieldwork in Pattaya, a German woman Kwanchanok made friend with at the Meeting Center Pattaya offered to give her a ride back to the hotel. On the way to the hotel, Kwanchanok and her new German friend stopped by the 'Walking Street' as the new friend wanted to show Kwanchanok the most famous attraction for Pattaya's nightlife. A buzzy red-light district, rows of night clubs, beer bars, go go bars, massage parlors along the Walking Street is crowded with people of different nationalities. In front of one bar, a big neon sign stated the famous credo we often heard during the time in Pattaya "GOOD GUYS GO TO HEAVEN | BAD GUYS GO TO PATTAYA". This statement may ring true to what most people think of Pattaya in general. It is indisputable that Pattaya is often called Disneyland for male adults and Western men in Pattaya are generally stereotyped as sex tourists. The statement, however, only reveals the dark and dirty side of Pattaya, neglecting the diversity of the city and its people. As a matter of fact, Pattaya has been a second home for a growing number Westerners who intend to live a peaceful life in this cosmopolitan city. In contrast to the hustle and bustle in the heart of Pattaya where a lot of foreigners are drinking and flirting with bargirls, a group of German residents are enjoying their leisure time at the Meeting Center for German speakers in the outskirt of the city. Some others are enjoying their German food, participating in the German group talks, reading German novels and chatting with other German speakers.

German citizens are among the largest groups of Western residents in Thailand (Koch-Schulte, 2008 and Howard, 2009) and German residents of Pattaya are relatively visible in this city. While Germany is the world's number two destination for migration according to a survey by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and development, the number of German citizens relocated abroad is also increasing. Approximately 140,282 Germans left Germany in 2013 (Statista, 2015) and roughly 710,000 departures were registered during 2009 – 2013 (Spiegel, 2015). Thailand, in particular Pattaya, is one of the preferable destinations among German emigrants. According to Deutsche Botschaft Bangkok (2016), an estimate of 700,000 German tourists visit Thailand each year and approximately 30,000 German nationals reside in Thailand. German citizens have relocated in many parts of Thailand but a large number of them have settled in Pattaya. Rudolf Hofer, honorary consul for Austria and Germany in Pattaya, estimated that 7,000 – 8,000 German nationals are living in the city as a part of approximately 15,000 German speakers (including Austrian and Swiss nationals) living in Pattaya (Kubelka, 2013). According to the literature, the first group of German visitors in Pattaya was (sex) tourists who visited the beach resort when the Vietnam War was over. (Chantavanich et al., 1999). Somkiat Boonsiri (2007) proposed that German nationals started to establish their community in Pattaya in around 1975. They settled in North Pattaya in an area that is later known as 'Little Germany' because of numerous German-speaking service facilities in the area.

The German migration to Pattaya is highly gendered and closely linked to transnational marriages (Jaisuekun & Sunanta 2016). There has been a long history of transnational mobilities between Germany and Thailand. Ruenkaew (2012a) assumed that Thai women were among the first Thai transnational migrants to Europe, with Germany being one of the most important receiving countries. The trend of transnational migration from Thailand to Europe began in 1960 (Ruenkaew, 2009; Chantavanich et al., 1999), consisting of students and people who went to find work and to get married. At that time, Thai

citizens were allowed to stay in Germany for up to 90 days at a time without a visa. In 1975, nearly 2,000 Thais lived in Germany, with the number of male and female migrants being almost equal. While the number of Thai male migrants slightly increased over the years, the number of Thai female migrants rose dramatically. The number of Thai female migrants in Germany trebled between 1975 to 1980, and by the end of the 1980s the majority of Thai migrants in Germany were women. In 1981, Germany imposed visa requirement for Thai nationals. Still, the number of Thai female migrants continued to grow. In 2011, there were approximately 57,000 Thais in Germany, 85% of which were women and about 60% of these women were married to German husbands (Ruenkaew, 2012b).

The vast majority of German migrants in Pattaya are male and relationships with Thai women significantly influence their migration decisions and experiences. According to Chantavanich et al. (1999), German men rank first among sex tourists to Thailand from the West, followed by the American and British. An estimate of 359,719 German tourists has traveled to Thailand since 1995. Nowadays, around 700,000 German tourists visit Thailand each year (Deutsche Botschaft Bangkok, 2016). The ratio between male and female German tourists to Thailand has been imbalanced. In 2011, 62.35% of German tourists who arrived in Thailand were male and only 37.65% were female (Tourism Authority of Thailand, 2012). Thailand becomes the second most important country of origins of foreign wives of German men from economically weaker countries after Poland (Glowsky, 2006). Meanwhile, Germans topped the list of foreign husbands married to Thai women (Seepai and Senerat, 2010). This illustrates the special characteristic of Thai–German migration that could be regarded as a marriage migration (Ruankaew, 2009).

This study examines the link between transnational marriages and German migration to Pattaya. Through six months of ethnographic study and in-depth interviews with 11 German nationals, all of whom are males in their advanced ages and have settled in Pattaya with their Thai partners, this study found that Thai women are involved in almost every aspect of German migrants' lives – especially motivation to migrate –and are an integrated part of the enhanced lifestyle migrant men now enjoyed. Instead of women from less affluent regions migrating as brides to more economically advanced countries, German men in our study take the opportunity to resettle far from home as husbands and sometimes fathers to Thai nationals.

2. Gender and Lifestyle Migration

In this study, we argue that German migration to Pattaya is part of the 'lifestyle migration', a relatively new concept in migration studies referring to the "spatial mobility of relatively affluent individuals of all ages, moving either part-time or full time to places that are meaningful because, for various reasons, they offer the potential of a better quality of life" (O'Reilly & Benson, 2009, p.2). Practices previously studied as retirement migration, leisure migration, counter urbanization, second home ownership, amenity-seeking and seasonal migration, have been incorporated into a broader concept and study of lifestyle migration (Benson and O'Reilly 2009, p.609). Consistent with the narrative of lifestyle migration, German migrants in Pattaya cite negative circumstances before migration and a better life after migration as their motivation.

Studies of lifestyle migration tend to neglect the role of gender, kinship and interpersonal relationship in migration decisions and experiences (Croucher, 2014; Green, 2015). What is not normally recognized is

that lifestyle migration is a gendered process and concepts of a good life, home, belonging, community and ethnicity are highly gendered. Gender, in fact, exerts a profound and pervasive influence on lifestyle and frequently acts as a signifier for 'lifestyle,' and vice versa (Croucher, 2014: 21). Gender is not only about differences between men and women, but a constitutive element of migration (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2000). It is an important factor that distinguishes the difference between male and female migrants' lifestyles and experience in a receiving country as well as their motivations (Croucher, 2014). Pessar and Mahler (2003, p. 818) introduced gendered geographies of power: "a framework for analyzing people's gendered social agency – corporal and cognitive – given their own initiative as well as their positioning within multiple hierarchies of power operative within and across many terrains". In other words, this concept helps in understanding how gender operates or negotiates across transnational space and different scales and how it intersects with other axes of identity. The concept highlights whether mobility across national borders reinforces prevailing gender norms, or, on the other hand, does transnational migration provide women and men opportunities to dispute hegemonic gender ideologies. (Pessar and Mahler, 2003; Croucher, 2014).

Gender informs migration processes and experiences of male and female transnational subjects (Parrenas, 2009). Croucher (2014) posited that the desire to escape from and negotiate with gender norms and expectations in their home country motivate many women lifestyle migrants who seek to enjoy themselves traveling instead of keeping the household. Pruitt and LaFont (1993) explored the negotiation of gender norms by Western female tourists who engaged in emotional and intimate relationships with local men in Jamaica. Away from their usual social circles, the women behaved the way they would never do at home, namely pursuing relationships with men during their travels.

Although existing scholarly works on gender and lifestyle migration focus mainly on female migrants, male migrants' experiences are also gendered. While female lifestyle migrants move to escape from traditional gendered norms, male lifestyle migrants seek to realize traditional masculine roles in their new home (Wilde-Menozzi, 2003). Western men in Thailand attained a sense of empowerment and the status of "real white man" through their role as provider and master of the house, something they had wished for but could not realize in their home country. Although not conventionally attractive in Western standard, Western men in Thailand found that they have an advantage in finding romance and receive full attention from local Thais (Maher and Lafferty, 2014).

Within spaces such as Isan and the Pattaya tourist zone, our informants found they had additional resources for performing dominant masculinities and constituting themselves as privileged white men. A key dimension of their privilege as Westerners in such spaces was how it could convert into assets in erotic or romantic relationships in ways that enables performances of a masculine identity as a 'player, or alternately, as a 'provider' and patriarch in a family. (Maher and Lafferty, 2014, p.435)

Most studies of lifestyle migration portray elderly couples or young families moving together (Casado-Diaz, 2012), with a proportional male to female ratio of migrants. Western migration to Thailand stands out as predominantly male migration. The vast majority of Western residents in Thailand are elderly males from Europe, Australia and the US who arrived alone without wives or children (Howard, 2008, 2009; Husa et al., 2014; Maher and Lafferty, 2014). The possibility of forming romantic

relationships with Thai women is one of the key attractions to Thailand (Howard, 2008, 2009; Husa et al., 2014; Maher and Lafferty, 2014) and many Westerners view Thailand as a more suitable destination for men rather than women (Husa et al. 2014). The history of international sex tourism in Thailand has evidently shaped the current trend of Western migration to the Kingdom.

3. Data and Methods

This study is based on Kwanchanok's six months of ethnographic research in Pattaya, a tourist resort located on the eastern coastline of Thailand's Gulf of Siam. In 2012, the city attracts around nine million visitors from around the world (Tourism Authority of Thailand, 2014) and it tends to appeal to long stay tourists rather than short - stay visitors (Pattaya City Hall, 2012). From a small fishing village, the city had become a world famous tourist town by 1959, when American troops arranged with the Thai Government to use U-Tapao airport as their base during the Vietnam War. It was not only used as a military base to supply American troops in Vietnam, but also for rest and recreation (R&R) for the soldiers (Cohen, 2003). When the US troops began to withdraw from the city in 1970, the decreasing number of American soldiers was replaced by foreign tourists from various countries (Chantavanich, Rattanaolan- Mix, Ruenkaew, Nittayananta & Khemkrut, 1999). Since then, the city has been developed intentionally to attract an influx of foreign tourists with major developments including infrastructure, services, and entertainment businesses. Therefore, the economy of Pattaya relies predominantly on tourism and the service industry. Undeniably, prostitution was a highly influential part of Pattaya's tourism image (Suntikul, 2014). Pattaya was chosen as the research site for this study because of the high number of German residents and the prominent German community in the city. The area 'North Pattaya' is known as German village because of the high concentration of German residents with shops, restaurants, book stores and other facilities catering specifically to German customers.

Research methods were a combination of participant observation in several meetings and group talks among members of the German community in Pattaya, non participant observation, semistructured interviews and informal interviews. Access was gained through the German speaking Pattaya Expats Club and the Meeting Center Pattaya. Research participants were Germans who met the following criteria: male or female of German nationality, aged 18 and above, had been living in Pattaya for at least three months and was neither an employee of an international corporation nor a diplomat. A total of 11 interviews were conducted. All of the interview respondents were men. Thus, no claims of a representative sample of all Germans in Pattaya can be made. The respondents' ages ranged from 55 to 84 years old, and, although, there was initially no age limitation for the participants, those of retirement age were clearly overrepresented. During the fieldwork, the young foreigners we encountered were mostly tourists. Female Germans were relatively few and far between. The migrants' duration of stay was from one year to 20 years. Their previous employment varied, for example, business owner, government officer, engineer, skilled worker and others. Almost all of the participants lived on a pension of about 1,000 Euro – 4, 0000 Euros a month. The marital status of the male participants prior to migration to Thailand was: eight of them were divorced, two widowed, and the other was single. All male participants had established relationships with Thai women in varying forms: four participants were married to Thai women, four lived with their Thai girlfriend and three regularly visit bargirls.

4. German Migration to Pattaya: a Search for a Better Life

The concept "lifestyle migration" responds to personal accounts of German migrants in Pattaya who state that the decision to move to this Thai seaside city half the world away from home is to seek a more desirable way of life. What distinguishes lifestyle migration from other migration typologies is the motivation for migration. Lifestyle migrants' motivation is based on "their belief that a change of residential place will lead not simply to better opportunities in life, but rather to something which might be described as a better lifestyle and/or a more fulfilling way of life" (Torkington, 2010: 102). According to the literature on lifestyle migration, the search for a good life was considered a comparative project between life before and after migration; life before migration is presented negatively while the advantages of life in the destination are often overstated (Benson & O'Reilly, 2009). Conforming to the narrative of lifestyle migration, many German migrants in Pattaya explain their relocation to the Thai beach city as an escape from the negative lifestyle in their home country in search for a more fulfilling way of life in Pattaya where they have visited several times as tourists.

Unpleasant life before migration and an image of freedom and relaxed lifestyle in Pattaya are important factors behind German migrants' decision to migrate. When we asked our respondents why they made the decision to leave their home country, they usually described their lives in Germany in very negative terms. The majority of our participants depicted life in Germany as stressful. Many respondents mentioned unhealthy work-life balance as a factor that they disliked. Boredom from monotonous routines, stress from work, the pressure to conform to norms and culture, loneliness and difficult financial situation cause life dissatisfaction that drove migrants to leave for a place that would allow them to live a better life. Moving to Thailand is a way to escape from problems and dissatisfaction migrants used to confront in their home country. In some cases, lifestyle migrants often migrate at vital points in life such as serious illness, a birth or death in the family, a marriage or divorce, and job loss or other employment changes (Hoey, 2009; Benson & O'Reilly, 2009).

Many of the participants emphasized that they had a better life in Pattaya. They stated that they lived in Pattaya with no special plans and deadlines, something they had never experienced in Germany. They did not have to work hard like they did in Germany. In Pattaya, they had time to do any leisure activities they liked such as surfing the internet, gardening, walking along the beach, working out, reading, shopping, drinking beer or simply hanging out. German migrants in Pattaya have a relaxed, stress-free, yet active lifestyle. Martin noted, "I have a better life in Thailand, I am happier than when I was in Germany because I have more freedom which is good for my life" (Martin, 76). Sebastian said he is healthier living in Thailand. "The weather here makes me healthy. See, it's sunny. Compared to Germany or Sweden where it is cold for seven to eight months a year, I feel better here". Moreover, German men in Pattaya gain the attention of Thai women and almost everyone in the service industry. Westerners have a special status in Thailand. As Ruenkaew (1998) pointed out, when German men are in Thailand their physical appearance is not so important; German men are treated differently and nicely in Thailand, especially by prostitutes. Maher & Lafferty (2014, p.435) similarly found that Western men who were marginalized in their home country due to "class, age, body type, or physical appearance" received attention and social respect in Thailand; the men asserted this privilege to access erotic and romantic relationships with Thai women and converting these opportunities into a resource for a better way of living.

5. Couple Relationships: Role of Thai Women in German Migration

Male German migrants mostly come to Pattaya alone. The reputation of Pattaya and the migrants' prior tourist experience make them know that they are going to find someone. Robert (71), for example, bought a package tour to Thailand for the first time in 1980 and kept visiting Pattaya every two to three years to visit bargirls. The more times visiting Pattaya, he saw a channel of self managed tour. He has learned how to live in Pattaya at the reasonable price. Besides, he noted that life in Pattaya is completely different from his life in Germany. Since he had been divorced from his German wife, he had to live alone in Germany. On the contrary, he had an absolute blast in Pattaya. Robert went out with many Thai women and he had never felt lonely since then. Therefore, he was very determined to settle in Pattaya when he has enough money. He had worked very hard while he was in Germany to collect money. Finally, he migrated to Pattaya in 1998. Robert's migration story is not atypical and it reveals a close connection between lifestyle migration and marriage migration in the case of German migration to Pattaya. Enjoying sexual freedom and escaping loneliness in Germany constitute a better life in Thailand for Robert who later settled down in a marriage with a Thai woman. He gains an improved quality of life similar to residential tourists and lifestyle migrants in other studies. For German husbands of Thai women in Pattaya, the quality of life remains the same or even better than their lives in Germany.

In Pattaya, German migrants are free from western norms and taboos. They can do whatever they want to, especially drinking, visiting bargirls and pairing with a young Thai woman, in many cases, much younger. In contrast to the west, Thailand lacks overt ageism (Howard, 2008 and 2009). Living in Pattaya gives German migrants who are mostly in an advanced age possibilities to do what is not normally acceptable in German society: dating a young woman. Kevin stated that he would never be able to find another partner if he still lived in Germany "The advantage of living here is that I am 70 years old now but I can still have a girlfriend. You can't do that in Germany" (Kevin, 70).

For those who refer to themselves as 'sex tourists', Pattaya is a place they choose to live. Frank (66) accepted that he is a sex tourist. He first visited Pattaya in 1999 and continued to spend his holidays in the beach city once or twice a year for several years. He could not deny Thailand is a very beautiful country, but the main factors that brought him here were the women and the bars. In 2011, he bought a condo in Pattaya and has started to live in two countries. He allocates his time between Pattaya and Germany. Every time he is in Pattaya, he visits the bars almost every night. He loves traveling and has visited many countries in Asia but he chose Pattaya as his second home. He likes the freedom in Pattaya because it makes him feel like a young man again. Although Frank told me he was in a relationship with a Filipino woman who is now living in the Philippines, he still goes to pubs and buys sex in Pattaya.

Not everybody wants to call themselves a sex tourist or be judged as one. Some male participants stated that they did not come to Thailand to seek relationship with Thai women, but eventually they became attracted to and partnered local women they met by chance in Thailand. While Christian (61) said he wandered his way to Pattaya in 2001 following his interest in Buddhism and the lower costs of living, he admitted his attraction to exotic Thai girls with beautiful bodies. "I lived alone for ages and there I met only western women. When I see Thais, who are slim and have long black hair, I am curious and want to touch their bodies" (Christian, 61). Similarly, Kevin (70), a former businessman cohabits with his 20-something girlfriend whom he met by chance in Pattaya, insisted that he never expected to find a new relationship in Thailand. Unfortunately, Kevin's brother did not believe the story and stopped

talking to Kevin because the brother thought Kevin had bought the girl and thereby supported human trafficking in Thailand.

The experiences of cross-cultural relationships between German men and Thai women are in fact quite diverse. It is not always the case that German men arrive in Thailand alone looking to meet available Thai women. There are also those who come to Thailand with Thai partners they had met elsewhere. Some participants stated that they moved to Pattaya mainly because of their wives who wished to return to Thailand after many years in Germany. Phillip (58) divorced from two German ex-wives. He met his current Thai wife while she was visiting her cousin in Germany in 1999 - 2000. He flew back and forth between Germany and Thailand as the relationship blossomed. In 2003, he finally married her and the couple settled in Germany. Philip knew his wife's life in Germany was not easy. She deeply missed her home country and her family. He would have loved to spend his twilight years in either Germany or America if not for his Thai partner. Moving to Thailand was a big decision for him. The only reason he moved to Pattaya was because of his wife.

We moved to Thailand because of my wife. She has a massage shop and her hands, arms and bones ached. She wanted to take a break in Thailand. So we talked and I said if she wanted to leave for Thailand, we had to do it now when I didn't have to work anymore. If I were 65 or 70 years old I would not give it try. (Phillip, 58)

Having spent a year in Thailand he realized he does not belong here. He tries to adjust to life in Thailand because he thinks this is the only thing he can do for his wife. His wife patiently lived in Germany for him for more than ten years and now it should be his turn to do something for her. Although he wants to go back to Germany, he will let his wife decide their future. "Will we move back or will we stay here? I don't know. It depends on my wife. I begged her to live in Germany for 14 years. Now it is her turn" (Phillip, 58).

Phillip's case illustrates the role of the Thai spouse in German migrants' decision to migrate. In this case, the reason for moving to Thailand was the desire of the Thai spouse to spend the rest of her life in her home country. Hence, aside from various motivations mentioned earlier, German immigration to Thailand is also the result of German-Thai couples' negotiation over a place of residence in their advanced age. German husbands were typically in their late fifties or sixties when the German-Thai couples decided to leave Germany. Released from responsibilities in their work life, moving to Thailand is the start of a good life project for some retired German-Thai couples. German husbands of Thai return migrants relocate to Thailand at an important point in life and gain an improved quality of life similar to residential tourists and lifestyle migrants in other studies. For German husbands of Thai women in Pattaya, the quality of life remains the same or even better than their lives in Germany. Although Phillip does not enjoy his life in Pattaya much, he could not deny that his way of life is now more relaxed and free.

6. "We'd Rather Settle Down in Pattaya"

Living in Thailand with their Thai spouses, German men have to negotiate their role within their Thai families. In Thai society, men are expected to provide financial support to their girlfriends and Thai women are also expected to support their families as dutiful daughters. Thus, Western men who cohabit with Thais may face repeated requests for money from girlfriends' families which can lead to relationship problems (Cohen, 2001, Howard, 2008, Maher & Lafferty, 2014). Many German men, though not all, complained about their wives' family members who repeatedly asked them for money. For some male German migrants, living in Pattaya instead of in their wives' communities in Isaan helps mitigate the tension between them and their Thai in-laws.

Phillip (58) was always upset with his wife's family. During the time they were in Germany, his wife sent monthly remittances to support her large extended family. She was the youngest of nine children. One of her brothers wanted to run for a local political election and asked Phillip and his wife for 50,000 Baht. When Phillip refused to provide the money, he immediately had a serious problem with his wife's family. Phillip decided to rent a house about 15 minutes drive from Pattaya, although his wife is now living in her hometown in Isaan.

Andreas and his girlfriend agreed to live in Pattaya in order to avoid such problems. They had lived together in Germany for eight years before moving to Thailand in 2008. From the time the couple lived in Germany, Andreas' girlfriend has worked very hard to support her big family in Isaan. When the couple moved to Thailand, it was her idea to build a house and settle down in Pattaya in order to avoid future conflicts between Andreas and her family members. The couple continues to send money every month to support the girlfriend's entire family.

Thompson, Kitiarsa and Smutkupt (2016) considered Isaan as settled space for Western men in Thailand who are in intimate and marital relationships with Thai women. The authors regarded (sex) tourist contact zones, such as Pattaya, as liminal and unsettled space for Western male migrants. Likewise, Kubelka (2013) had initially assumed that, because of the strong relationship in their close - knit Thai family, Pattaya was simply an intermediate station for western male retirement migrants before they ultimately settle in their Thai partner's hometown in a rural area. Contrary to this assumption, we find that German migrants intentionally choose to settle down in Pattaya. Instead of relocating to their Thai partners' villages in the northeastern region, German men in this study chose to live further in Pattaya and just spend a few days visiting their wife's families in Isaan. Similarly, Kubelka's (2013) study of Western male migrants in Pattaya revealed that only half of the migrants interviewed planned to move to their partner's hometown while the rest did not. We find that apart from the availability of tourist facilities and international environment, Pattaya is a place where German migrants feel free from the bother of their Thai partner's family.

The cosmopolitan settings in Pattaya make it easier for German migrants to adjust to their new lives. Similar to British migrants in Costa del Sol, a famous touristic area in Spain (O'Reilly, 2009), German migrants in Pattaya live among other tourists, share tourist spaces, and spend their leisure time doing tourist activities. They also enjoy the amenities typical of an established tourist resort and the services provided by local inhabitants. While Western migrants who live in remote areas with their Thai partner's extended family are exposed to Thai way of life, German migrants in Pattaya can maintain Western lifestyle and live their lives like a tourist.

A tourist resort and international metropolis, Pattaya offers German migrants opportunities to live close

to their co-ethnics and other expats. Apart from spending time with their Thai partners, almost all of the participants in this study spend much of their time socializing mostly with German speakers and actively participating in the German communities. Two German social organizations that function as German communities in Pattaya around which the participants gravitate are German Language Pattaya Expats Club (Deutschsprachiger Pattaya Expats Club) and the Meeting Center Pattaya (Begegnungszentrum Pattaya). Many of the participants, though not all, visit the Meeting Center regularly in order to participate in group talks, meet friends or simply have lunch at the café. German transnational communities like this play a key role in providing social contacts and networks for German migrants in Pattaya. Migrant communities are a good starting point for migrants who arrive without any personal contacts (Casado-Díaz, 2009). When Frank (66) visited Pattaya in 2011, some Germans he met told him about the Meeting Center in North Pattaya so he went to the Center and took part in the activities provided. Since his first visit to Thailand in 1999, he has been to many places in the country but chose to live in Pattaya because of the farang - friendly infrastructure and the German community there.

I have seen many things in Thailand but Pattaya is different. Pattaya has a social structure like this Meeting Center. I think if I have to live in Isaan, I will go bananas. There is no Farang infrastructure. Other Farangs in Isaan will live 10 kilometers away and might be alcoholic (laugh). I want to do some activities rather than only drinking. Right now, I participate in a group talk, run my own writing class and drink beer in the evening (Frank, 66).

Expat social networks and communities in Pattaya attract migrants to move in. The existence of German social circles is one factor migrants consider when choosing Pattaya as their second home. Frank compared himself with Western foreigners in Isaan. Based on his experience, Western foreigners in Thailand's remote areas do not have much to do; they do not have language skills to socialize with Thais and lack Western social circles to embed themselves in. While Koch-Shulte (2008) reported that Western retirees in Udonthani lack contacts with other foreigners, German migrants in Pattaya do not have such a problem. They participate in various social and recreational activities—English class, Thai class, Chess and Theatre group—arranged by organizations such as the Meeting Center and Pattaya Expat Club. Instead of doing nothing or drinking all day long, Frank offers English and writing courses for those who are interested. At the Meeting Center he meets many other German speakers and has become friends with some of them. He explained, "When we meet some people regularly or when we have to work together with someone, we will feel close to them." Frank becomes good friends with Christian (61) after they prepared Christmas theatre shows together. They often hang out together in the evening with other German speaking friends. Christian used to have a girlfriend from Isaan so he visited Isaan a few times for two weeks each time. He insisted however that he could not live in Isaan.

It's too boring. There is nothing to do in the village. I need to live in a place where German is spoken. I need to speak my mother language. My own language is German and I want to speak my language further. In Pattaya, I can speak German. Speaking German makes me feel at home. (Christian, 61)

Living in a tourist enclave extends the privilege and feelings created while on holidays to a longer time

period. While Western son-in-laws in Isaan lose their farang privilege over time due to their dependence on Thai partners for day to day matters, German migrants in Pattaya can maintain their independence and Western foreigner status. In a study of Western male partners of Thai women in Isaan, Maher & Lafferty (2014) found that Western male migrants who do not have Thai language skills lose control in their daily life and have to rely on their Thai partners for translating, handling local matters such as finances, legal issues, and even daily errands. This is not the case for German migrants in Pattaya where services such as translation centers, law firms, and international hospitals with language interpreters are available. A cosmopolitan city such as Pattaya enables German migrants to live more independently in a familiar environment. Our German informants appreciate this aspect of Pattaya noting that in Isaan, they had almost nothing to do while their wives were busy with house work and their family (Fieldnote 2015, October 7).

7. Conclusion

The flow of Western migration to Thailand is a highly selective process in terms of age and gender (Husa et al, 2014). Western migrants in Thailand are predominantly male, especially elderly migrants from European countries and the USA who arrived alone without wives or children (Howard, 2009). Husa et al's study (2014) reveals that the availability of a potential new Thai partner stands out as one of the main attractions to Thailand, a destination that some Westerners think is more suitable for men than for women. This study finds that German migration to Pattaya is highly gendered in that a vast majority of the migrants are male over the age of 55. Existing relationships with Thai women or the desire to meet Thai women for sexual and romantic relationships motivated many of the migrants to relocate to Pattaya. Being alone after divorce, pairing with Thais is one route to achieving a better life for German male migrants. Similar to other studies on Western male migrants in Thailand (for example, Howard 2008 and 2009, Mahler & Lafferty 2014), this study finds that the lure of far younger Thai women who are willing to marry and settle down with older Western men represents a good life not available to these men in their home countries. The fulfillment of sex life and romantic relationship as well as the possibility to form and maintain family life are important part of many German migrants' lives in Pattaya. Our findings are consistent with Croucher's (2014) argument that gender plays a crucial role in lifestyle migration and that concepts of a good life, home, belonging, community and ethnicity are highly gendered. While female lifestyle migrants are motivated by the desire to break away from traditional gender roles and expectations (Croucher, 2014), German male migrants move to Pattaya in order to reaffirm their masculinity. Moving to Thailand allows German men to enjoy a good lifestyle with less money and to support their Thai partners and children like a real man. However, cross-cultural families and marriages are also a space of tension and negotiation, especially between German men and their Thai wives' families. We found that a number of German migrants intentionally choose to settle down in Pattaya, a tourist contact zone, instead of relocating to their Thai partners' communities in the Northeast region, in order to lead a life of their choice at a distance from their Thai in-laws.

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The Paradox of Morality: The Cultural Forces of Emotion in Thai Political Conflicts

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Abstract

After the political crisis of the last decade, the idea of Thai morality with the King as the center and symbol of legitimate power has faced more troubles from the new consciousness of many groups within Thai society. This new consciousness has appeared in the diversity of social sub-groups who joined with the yellow shirts, the red shirts and the People's Democratic Reform Committee movement with their different desires, demands and thoughts. However, the problem lies in the illusion of morality that has concealed and suppressed the diversity of thoughts and other moral decision values of many groups of people in society. Subsequently, Thai political conflicts and polarization demonstrated the struggle for power in the meanings of politics, democracy and justice among several social sub-groups. This struggle is reflected in the differences of the cultural force of emotion, which refers to the intense feelings and experience of learning within the context of the subject's position. This cultural force of emotion showed the complexity of conflicts within the seemingly binary conflicts between the yellow shirts and red shirts.

Keywords: morality, Thai political conflicts, cultural forces of emotion

Introduction: Morality and Cultural Forces of Emotion

Morality is the principle of social practices. It is the way of our thinking, emotion and value (Nidhi, 2003). It conducts what people ought to do and what is right and wrong in a society. If someone violates the moral principles or acts in any immoral actions, they are often taken to blame, disgusted or punishment from society. In general, morality is related to religious beliefs (Eckersley, 2007). However, I argue that Thai morality is also involved with power. Since Thai morality had been integrated as part of the legitimate power of the monarchy and the concept of Thai state and nation as well as Thai cultural identity. Meanwhile, the sources of power of Thai morality had derived from the charismatic legitimacy in moral power or goodness (barami) and magico-divine power (saksit) of the King. The Buddhist doctrines help to justify the meaning and reality of morality. On the other hand, the legitimate power of the King supported by the process of symbolic construction of meaning which linked to morality and the Hindu-Buddhist cosmology. Then, the King created as the exemplary center of the state, the highest good man who acts according to the moral-law (dharmaraja) and embodied with the sentiment of

nationalism (Reynolds, 2005) as well as legitimized by the virtuous power.

As we can see, during Sarit government (1957-1963), the King Bhumibol was created in the highest status as the Head of the State and situated as the symbol of nation and the spirit of people including the source of morality and ethics in the concept of Divine kinship. This has become the traditional moral values of Thai people and sources of legitimate power of Thai political culture (Thak, 2007). Therefore, the discourse of a royal-nationalism, with the good King at its center, intensified after this period, as the Buddhist model of Kingship also came under the authority of King, included the Buddhist rituals and ceremonies has been used for justifying the King status in Devine kinship again. As a result, the Thai monarchy has been re-divinized in the face of political culture and democratic rule through the mass media technologies and making the monarchy to be a popular and situated in the highest moral power (barami) and magical-devine power (saksit) (Jackson, 2009). That is to say, the image of the King in royal activities created and republished several times through medias. It portrayed the King Bhumibol as a popular King who devoted himself for Thai people and manifested the moral power (barami) of the King in superiority. All these recreated the legitimate power in barami (charismatic power) and saksit (magico-divine power) of the King in Thai-Style Democracy model, which is based on traditional political culture with the King is the center and basis of legitimacy. It means Thai democracy principle cannot separate from the concept of virtue man in the politics. While the moral concept in the politics and society centered by the King as a moral standard (Hewison and Kengkit, 2010). This political model was encouraged by Field Marshal Sarit Thannarat and it has been redefined and reproduced several times by the elite establishment. Subsequently, morality helps to justify the moral power of the King in the highest status, the authority of the ruler, and identify Thai national identity (Thainess) in term of the good citizen, which combined with the national ideology in nation, religious and monarchy (Connors, 2007).

All these have resulted in the illusion in modes of perception, representation and actualization of people to the King's image and morality which produced by the symbolic construction of meaning (Geertz, 1980). This illusion has still strongly existed in Thai people's perception until now. It also embedded in a consciousness of many Thais. This is the reason why morality is involved with power.

Moreover, morality became the cultural force of emotions, which refers to the intense feelings and experience of learning within the context of the subject's position (Rosaldo, 1989, p. 2). Since it has combined with socialization processes and cultural learnings of Thai people. Thus, morality is involved with a long term experiences on learning and perception of Thai people to cultural system. The notion of force involves both affective intensity and significant consequences of experiences which based on cultural learning over a long period of time (Rosaldo, 1984). It is the power of feeling that force in human conduct and somehow it underlie cultural forms (Lyon, 1995). Hence, emotion is not only cultural constructed, but emotion also plays the key role in human actions and constitute the social and cultural system (Scheve, 2013).

As one can see, Thai Buddhist doctrine teaches people to fear sin, evil and the consequence of karma. Thus, some Thai people may avoid doing bad things because they fear the sin and karma that result. Nevertheless, the fear of sin, karma and evil also merges with the morality within socio-cultural context of Thainess (Thai identity). Therefore, as a Thai, if you do not love the nation and the monarchy—including the King, then you are a bad Thai, as you are seen as betraying your country and the King, and

as sinning; someone lacking gratitude toward the land (pandin). This gratitude to the land (katan-yu, rukun tor pandin) discourse is always embodied with the notions of royal-nationalism of the state and the concept of goodness in Thai morality. Consequently, the feeling of love combined with belief (in Buddhism), the goodness and faith (also loyal) to the King and nation in royal-nationalism discourse. This feeling of love embedded in cognition and consciousness of Thai people. Since they have been engaged with promoting of Thai morality and royal-nationalism discourse for a long time. Then, it became the long experiences of cultural learning and occurred in the deep feeling relevant in sentiment to the King of many Thais, especially to the King Bhumibol (Rama IX). This is a kind of feeling in cultural force of emotion constrained by Thai morality. It helps to understand why many Thais expresses their utterly love as well as loyalty (khawm chong rak phak dee) to the King. Meanwhile, it also became the standard of morality as well as moral emotion of Thai society that help to maintain the traditional institution as monarchy and the royal-nationalism discourse promoted by the ruling elites.

However, the problem lies in the absolutism of moral illusions and cultural force of emotions such as love. Because it needed tantalization of belief and emotion of people to support and maintain it righteousness and reality in Thai political culture. While it has concealed and suppressed the diversity of thoughts and other moral decision values of many groups of people in society. Moreover, it do not more align with the new consciousness and reality faced by most people in their everyday lives of the new social contexts (Nidhi, 2012).

This incompatibility between Thai morality and new consciousness of many Thais has increased since Thaksin Shinawatra's government periods (2001-2006), especially after the military coup in 2006 and after the military violent suppression on May, 2010. It was also involved with the changing of economic, politics and socio-cultural structure during the past few decades of Thai society. As a result, Thai morality has faced more troubles from the new consciousness and perceptions of many groups within a society. This new consciousness has appeared in the diversity of social sub-groups who joined in the political protests during the last decade. It reflected the paradox of morality which based on the legitimate power of the King during the contemporary Thai political conflicts.

To sum up, this paper demonstrates the differences of cultural forces of emotion that linked to the diversification of social backgrounds in experiences, perceptions and classes of several social sub-groups inside the yellow shirts and red shirts. The method draws on the interpretative understanding of the meaning in phenomenology of the politics of everyday life approach.

That focused on the common-sense experiences of social actors. It is included the previous experiences and the way that they understands the social and political reality within their contexts and positions (Bernstein, 1976, p.146-147). In short, it is an interpretation of experiential meaning and perception which contributes to the constitution of meaning to social reality and politics of social actors (Taylor, 1979, p. 45-57).

The aims is to reflect the diversities of thoughts, moral values and emotional culture within the seemingly binary conflicts between the yellow shirts and red shirts. Besides, this paper attempted to understand why people in Thailand still so divided? and what are the perceptions and cultural forces of emotion among yellow shirt and red shirt protestors in Thai political conflicts? Hence, I argue that Thai political conflicts cannot understand simply through the contrasting between two political ideologies and desires or conflicts between two political groups (Chairat, 2012; Apichart et al, 2013; and Watcharobon,

2014). I proposes to focus more on the differences of cultural forces of emotion of those who had ever joined in the political protests with their different desires, demands and thoughts.

The Paradox of Morality and Cultural Forces of Emotion in Thai Political Conflicts

In this section, I would like to demonstrate the differences of cultural forces of emotion of those who had ever joined in the yellow shirt and red shirt protests during the last decade from Chiang Mai and Bangkok. Most of the key informants are in aged between 50 to 70 years old and came from various professions such as university lecturer, businessman, retired civil servant, vendor, agriculturalist, NGOs and etc. Hence, it shows the differences of their background in experience, knowledge and perception as well as a social class.

1). Moral Politics: Fear, Hate and Disgust of the Yellow Shirts Middle Class in Bangkok

Several academicians defined most of the yellow shirt protesters as the established- middle class according to their economic and social status (Nidhi, 2010; Apichat et al., 2013). The changing of economic and social structure during the past few decades of Thai society, and the influence of royal-nationalism discourse encouraged many established-middle class to join with the yellow shirt protests. In their views, Thaksin regime was regarded as a threat for them, the nation and monarchy because they believed that Thaksin wanted to exploit the country through his crony capitalism while he gained the tremendous support from the rural voters as well as the red shirt protests. In addition, they were disappointed with the elected political system that failed to prevent the Thaksin regime from governing the country. The yellow shirt protestors believed that if the Thaksin regime was destroyed, Thai politics and society would be brought back to the normal principles of social order and moral order with the monarchy in the center of this order. In other words, it is nostalgia of the middle class to the traditional social order in a hierarchy structure with the King at the top of this structure (Nidhi, 2010). All these became the possible reason why they hate and fear Thaksin and want to destroy Thaksin regime, and return Thai society back in the track of old social order and moral order as it had ever been before Thaksin Shinawatra's government (Ekkapollanut, 2012).

However, I argue that these explanations are insufficient to understand the middle class groups who joined the yellow shirt protests. I believe that these people exhibited the common-sense of experiences in their own meanings. That is to say, the middle class joined the yellow shirt demonstration with their good sense and sound judgment to those social and political realities backed by their experiences and beliefs formed by their cultural contexts. Furthermore, this common-sense of experiences was also derived from their class-specific experiences of socialization, which Bourdieu called "habitus" referring to the mental structure of disposition of people as a product of internalization of the division into the social classes in society (Bourdieu, 1997, p.173).

It means what they perceived as truth or reality in their sense, thinking and belief was the results of their experiences of socialization within the social class positions. It is part of their disposition that led to distinction between them and other social classes in a society.

Hence, the common-sense of experiences could reflect the influence of the moral community which showed a belief and emotion into the Thai social and political order based on morality and charismatic power. It means the common-sense of experiences of the middle class actually showed the sense of classes and beliefs in morality which was cultivated and socialized within the moral hierarchy structure. It

appears in the perceptions of social and political realities and expresses in the class bias sense, and a feeling of disgust to the other fellow-men in a society, such as anti-vote buying, anti-corruption and anti-the rural class as uneducated and uncivilized people, as well as lack of good moral due to their easily brought votes and being easily deceived by the politicians (Thongchai, 2008). In the meantime, it became their cultural forces of emotions and reasons as well as their intuition why they supported the power of the traditional institutions like the monarchy, and expressed their feelings in the ultra-royalism to protect the monarchy including their fear and hate of Thaksin. Then, they decided to join the political protests, challenge the election in 2006 and 2014, and support the military coups in 2006 and 2014 to destroy the Thaksin regime.

In this regard, I would like to begin with the yellow shirts in Bangkok who are mostly the urban middle class. Most of them were retirees and came from several occupations such as civil servant, academician, and business owner. Even the yellow shirt movements represented the royal-nationalism discourse. However, the most influential forced in their mind and political ideas was the ideal in moral politics discourse which shows the moral superiority in anti-corruption and cheating as well as the corrupted politicians. Nonetheless, I don't want to say that this political discourse effected in the anti-democracy and anti-politician sense of the urban middle class. On the contrary, it was precisely appeared in the moral politics ideal and the bias sense of urban middle class to the rural class. This contributed to the cultural force of emotions in hate, fear and disgust of many urban middle class who joined or supported the yellow shirt protests. It occurred along with a stirring of moral politics discourse by the yellow shirt movements as their political strategy to anti-Thaksin government and Thaksin regime. Also, this was affected to many urban middle class due to it based on the discourse of royal-nationalism and morality in Buddhism (Sinpeng, 2014).

Besides, it is also linked to the prior experiences of many urban middle class as well as the role of elite establishment in promoting the moral politics in Thai society. For instance, the taken role of General Prem Tinsulanonda in arguing that corruption was a threat to the nation, after the arosion of Sondhi fever in Bangkok during 2005 (Baker and Pasuk, 2010). In addition, it was the consequence of moral politics discourse which has promoted by the roles of the King and elites in the network monarchy since the late 1970s and early 1980s. It emerged alongside with the trend of anti-money politics and vote-buying among the urban middle-class. Then, it created the corruption as the threat of the nation and country. And the only way to fight and solve the corruption issues is to promote morals and ethics in every sector of Thai society (Thongchai, 2008, p. 24).

Subsequently, the utterly moral politics and extremely royalism of the yellow shirt supporters manifested the view of good man (khon dee) which also considered as a good Thai citizen. The duty of good Thais is protecting the country and loyalty to the monarchy, religion and the nation which are the main pillars of Thai society, and promoting the good people to govern the country. And this duty should be served by the urban middle class who educated and experienced in Thai democratization rather than the rural class. This is the consequences of integrating the discourse of good people (in Buddhism doctrine and moral politics discourse) with democracy ideal as well as the royalism (Apichart, 2006, p. 93-94).

The discourse of moral politics and good man are both the cultural force of emotions and political ideal in moral democracy because it is a merit earned and a dharma-based with strong of righteousness.

Meanwhile, the monarchy (as well as the King in personal) situated as the highest moral righteousness and charismatic power. Thus, they believed that be a good man is doing a goodness and merit altogether, while they supported the monarchy rather than Thaksin regime due to the King (Rama 9) has a merit (bun) accumulated more than Thaksin. On the other hand, Thaksin attempted to control all the power of country. So, he was considered as a threat to the monarchy (Jemsak Pinthong, personal communication, February 20, 2017). As we can see, the merit is considered as the source of legitimate power in Thai political culture. This is based on the moral hierarchy structure which the King situated at the top of this structure. Moreover, the King also represented as the highest good man. Thus, it is the reason why the middle class viewed Thaksin as a demerit person (without a goodness or merit accumulated) when compared to the King (Rama 9). Thaksin was, therefore, considered illegitimate in the politics and became as a threat for the monarchy and the nation.

In the meantime, the discourse of moral politics ultimately created the bad image of the opposition such as Thaksin and other politicians, and the red shirt protesters who supported the bad man as Thaksin (Thongchai, 2008). On the one hand, Thaksin was also criticized for many corruption issues and violation of royal prerogatives by Sondhi Limthongkul, one of the PAD leaders and his alliances during 2005 and 2006. Violation of royal prerogatives has frequently been used to question the legitimate power of Thaksin and to create Thaksin as a threat to the monarchy. A book subjected “Kam Khon Lom Chao” (The karma of the royal traitor) by Mho Noi was published in 2010 to promote the discourse of “lom chao” (overthrow the royal) during Abhisit’s government before the military violent suppression on the red shirt protests took place during 13-19 May 2010. The book accused Thaksin and his alliance of an attempt to challenge the monarchy. It said Thaksin treated himself as equal to the royal (Tee Ton Sa-mer Chao) while his supporters attempted to create the belief that Thaksin was King Taksin (the king during Thonburi period) in his past life. Therefore, Thaksin’s intention to act as equal to the King and the royal family was a bad karma to himself and his family (Mho Noi, 2010, p.152-158).

The belief in karma plays a crucial role in cultivating the feeling of hate, fear and disgust to Thaksin and his supporters, who were portrayed as the evil people. Additionally, Thaksin was also considered as a demerit and immoral person due to his bad karmas. Therefore, the karma in Buddhism, which means an action or deed in the moral causation, became a moral reason and moral judgment of the yellow shirt supporters. Karma also reflected a belief in the moral hierarchy structure. Thus, when Thaksin tried to act as equal to the royal without enough merit (goodness) accumulated, it resulted in the bad karmas for him and his illegitimacy in the politics. So, the moral righteousness justified the feeling of hate to Thaksin and his supporters, the red shirts, because they were considered a threat to the monarchy and an evil force in Thai morality.

Buddhist morality is clearly integrated with the politics. Thus, righteousness is judged by morality, and Thai political legitimacy is based on the moral power rather than the political consensus in a democratic system. As a result, political legitimacy in Thai elected democracy was questioned. Meanwhile, the moral politics was also used to support the military coup on 19 September 2006, which aimed to remove Thaksin’s government and to reform Thai politics by restoring morality and peace as well as protecting the monarchy. The military coup was considered legitimate by the moral politics ideal and the charismatic power of the King when the political consensus of Thai people and the rule of democracy could not uphold the morality of the country’s leader.

The moral politics contributed to feelings of hate, fear and anxiety by many yellow shirt supporters because it had been emphasized that Thaksin would assume control of the country and overthrow the monarchy. Thaksin became the enemy or threat of the nation and the King while corruption had been the central problem of Thai politics. In this regard, the yellow shirt supporters did not join the political protests because they were only forced by the royal-nationalism discourse which extremely promoted the loyalty to the King. They joined the protests because they were forced by the moral politics discourse which is based on the belief in morality in the Hindu-Buddhism and in the nature of the royal power in charisma or barami (merit/goodness) of the monarchy. They wanted to protect the monarchy in order to maintain the normal (prakati) of Thai social order and moral order as the true value (khā) of morality. They hoped that this would enable Thai society and people to live in peace and harmony although this moral order is based on the moral hierarchy structure.

In addition, the yellow shirt supporters wanted to preserve their status and prestige of the middle class in the moral hierarchy structure, and to protect the legitimate power of their belief. This was regarded as the symbolic interests rather than the economic interests. The middle class's discourse of moral politics showed their superior status over the red shirt supporters most of whom were in the lower middle class or the rural class. Thus, this moral politics discourse helped justify their social status and maintain the power relations within Thai moral hierarchy structure. The middle class's fear and hate of Thaksin and the red shirts concerned their interests which was beyond the economic interests. Consequently, this fear and hate were a result of the cultural force while their feeling of disgust was a moral reaction to the politicians' corruption and greed. This feeling also extended to a reaction against the rural class who were considered as uncivilized naive in politics because they supported a bad man as Thaksin.

In sum, it is possible to say that the sense of bias of the middle class and feeling of fear, hate and disgust are the cultural forces motivated by the sense of morality. The feeling of disgust was a moral reaction to an action or behavior that violated normative standards in the moral politics discourse (Rozin et al., 1993, p.588). The meaning of democracy and politics from the yellow shirt middle class's perspectives signified morality and the sense of class in the moral hierarchy structure of Thai political culture. As well as their desires for preserving their interests, their actions had been shaped and motivated by their moral mind. As a result, it cultivated the culture of fear and hate of Thaksin and the red shirts that they would topple the monarchy and destroy the nation and Thai society.

Meanwhile, the feeling of hate and disgust were formed by the class bias sense within the Thai moral hierarchy structure. This ultimately led to a division between the middle class and the lower class, and a division between the urban group and rural group. Consequently, many urban middle class wanted the moral democracy which is based on the morality (in Buddhism) and the charismatic power (in merit and goodness) where the King (in personal) is the highest and a standard of righteousness. This can be argued that the urban middle class did not disregard democracy and an election in a democratic system as claimed by some scholars such as Surachart Bamrongsuk (Matichon, 2016). However, they wanted the country to adopt the moral democracy which is legitimized by goodness and supported by the charismatic power of the monarchy.

2). Loyalty: Love and Anger of the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai

Even I argue that the royal-nationalism cannot totally explain the cultural force of emotions and thinking of all yellow shirt groups. Nevertheless, it can use to understand the intense feeling of love to the King

(Rama 9) and monarchy of many yellow shirt supporters.

According to Thongchai (2014), the success of royalist democracy has not simply been the result of politics and opportunism, but has rested more on social and cultural capital, that which no other political group has been able to match. Also, the royalist democracy discourse has proliferated through commodified, visual representations of the royal family (Jackson, 2010, p. 42). These processes can be called “commodified fetishism”, and have been used widely through media operations, based on the standard but total view of royal nationalism. Thus, pictures, books, CDs., DVDs, t-shirts and development projects have been produced about the King. It is the economy which has been commodified as an intrinsic trend, to generate stories regarding the monarchy which are in high-demand, and that stimulate— through versions of the truth— people’s emotions (Sarun, 2010). In the meantime, the royal democracy as well as Thainess also integrated as the everyday life of Thai people. Meanwhile, the Buddhist doctrine used as a tool of Thai state to support the royal-democratic nationalism. All these have effected in the cultural force of emotions of many Thais, especially the emotion of love. This love means love for the nation and the monarchy.

As we can see, the yellow shirt groups in Chiang Mai, it had led by the People Alliance for Democracy of Chiang Mai and it was comprised of various social groups and individuals such as Santi Asoke group, Vihok Radio, Democrat party, NGOs and university lecturers, doctors and business owners. Most of them are the urban middle class in aged from 50 to 70 years old. They had frequently organized the social activities and joined the royal celebration in Chiang Mai as well as invited other people to join with them and cooperated with the People Alliance for Democracy (PAD) in Bangkok. The most influential force in their mind is protecting the monarchy institution. As one yellow shirt supporter said to me when I asked why people came out to protect the monarchy, “It is not too much. I don’t want anyone to harm our King” (Ta (pseudonym), personal communication, June 30, 2015).

This cultural force of love has causes and conditions. One cause is a feeling of being bound in a relationship; another is feeling relevant in sentiment to the King. In Thailand, the King is shown or written about every day in the media, rituals, products, projects in schools, the actions of government officials, royal projects and in everyday activities in Thai society. It is the everyday process of commodification of fetish that resulted in the belief, faith and a deep sentimental in relevance of people to the King (Rama 9). This process has reproduced for a long time. Subsequently, Thai people perceived the King as a person dedicated to the people and the country, who is righteous and generous, and a protector of Thai society. The King is the center of everything in people lives. This supports the perception that the King is an important part of Thai society and the central pillar of the country. So, that is why they are happy and cry when they see the King or listen the stories and watch the pictures of the King Bhumibol, even though they cannot touch him or the rest of the royal family. The consequences of these is very powerful in terms of the emotional force generated by a majority of yellow shirt protestors, those who utterly love and have total faith in the King; who come out to protect the monarchy and its institutions, as though it is their duty to do as good members of Thai society, or ‘lukkhangpor’ (literally, ‘child of the father’). It is also a consequence of the shared love and sense of union felt for por (father or the King). Even the PAD leaders have employed and stimulated these powerful feelings as part of a strategy to support their political movement and to criticize the opponents. Understanding these cultural force of emotion is very important if one wants to understand those people (mostly from the middle

class) who joined the yellow shirt protests and People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) movement with their extremely love and loyalty to the King.

On the other hand, the emotion of love can actually contribute to feelings of hate and anger, if they found someone do not share the same emotion with them or they lost the cultural force in their mind and violated their feeling by other people. This feeling of anger occurred to many yellow shirt supporters in Chiang Mai and several places of Thailand. It needs to consider both of the political and social situations that stimulated their intense feelings and the socio-cultural system that formed and shaped their perceptions to social and political reality. Even the Buddhist teachings views anger as a hindrance to realization and purifying ourselves of anger is essential to Buddhist practice. There is no such as righteous or justifiable anger (O'Brien, 2017). And many Thai people may avoid to anger because they fear to violate the Buddhist doctrine as well as fear in suffering. However, the emotion of anger (also hate and disgust) can show the moral reaction to the wrongness or evil as well as manifest the courage and sacrifice in royal-nationalism discourse. It is the paradox of emotions in Thai cultural context. The righteous anger and hate can occur from the consequence of love in royal-nationalism. As members of the yellow shirt groups really love and are loyal to the Thai King Rama 9, who for them represents moral righteousness. They are; therefore, angry with and resent anyone who threatens, would wish to harm or disrespect the person they love and respect; the King. In particular, Thaksin Shinawatra and the red shirts are seen as a threat to the monarchy. They are the objects of disgust, and are seen as having poor moral judgment by the yellow shirt members, because Thaksin is seen as a cheating and greedy person. Hence, anger is embodied in the yellow shirts' desire to take care of and protect the King. Anger (also disgust and hate) is the driver or stimulus for their protective behavior, and this behavior is a major criterion of human goodness as well as a good Thais.

Thus, the moral foundation of Thainess supports righteous anger when anyone violates the moral standards set by the yellow shirts, and this is why anger is usually accompanied by feelings of disgust and hate. On the other hand, the feeling of love and anger are also accompanied by the feeling of fear and anxiety that the monarchy will be destroyed, that no one love the king as they are, that there is a lack of morals in Thai society, and especially among the younger generation that there is a disorder in Thai society. It is generally perceived that the yellow shirts express love and loyalty to the monarchy, to the King and the nation, based on their meaning to social and political actions and their strategy in royal-nationalism discourse, which is to fight to protect the King and so save the nation. In short, it is love and anger with fear in security and uncertainty of the yellow shirt supporters and those who defined themselves as the loyalists. Consequently, the cultural emotions in love, anger, hate, fear and disgust often occur together, and what has really divided people in Thai society is the emotions and disparities seen within the political and cultural arenas. The socio-cultural structure of Thailand is strongly linked to the morals and emotions felt by Thai people, so one cannot separate morals and emotions when judging other Thai people and the groups they belong to.

3). Love and Anger: Justice and Hope of the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai and Bangkok

Scholars have tried to explain the feelings held by and which motivated the red shirt protesters during the Bangkok protests and the violent crackdown that followed, such as anger (Walker, 2012), dissatisfaction, fear, sadness and anxiety (Sopranzetti, 2012), frustration, and vengeance (Apichart et al, 2013), disappointed and painful (Pinkaw, 2013, p. 27). However, there has been little discussion about

feelings of love.

In contrast to the yellow shirts, members of the red shirt groups represented people (mostly lower middle class or from the grassroots class) who profess to love and support Thaksin Shinawatra and his sister Yingluck Shinawatra. However, the red shirt movements contains a wide variety of characteristics in terms of its members, groups and networks (Nidhi, 2010; Nostitz, 2014; and Naruemon, 2016). Hence, it cannot be said for certain that all red shirt members are the pro-Thaksin people who love and admire Thaksin. In fact, love among the red shirts emanates from several sources. For instance, the red shirt members love their communities and their companionship; they empathize with each other, feel appreciated and also wish to find the truth, righteousness, justice and democracy together. This love emanates from the stories, experiences, feelings and actions they shared, and especially those combative experiences gained as part of the protest movement. All this makes many of the members love being part of the red shirt community.

Nevertheless, the feeling of love among the red shirt supporters involves with their common-sense experiences and the background of socio-cultural contexts that formed their emotions, perceptions and identity, including the influence of the new media which effected in their social cognitions. Thus, the feeling of love can manifest the differences of red shirt sub-groups which joined the red shirt movements, especially during the political conflicts from 2011 to 2014.

In this sense, I would like to demonstrate the emotion of love and also anger of the red shirt groups in Chiang Mai and Bangkok. In Chiang Mai, I went to interview with several red shirt groups such as the Rak Chiang Mai 51 (Love Chiang Mai 51); the UDD Red Shirts Chiang Mai; the red shirts group in San Kamphaeng district (San Kamphaeng Love Democracy group); and Chom Rom Khon Rak Fang- Mae Ai-Chai Prakarn 93.00 MHz (the Red Shirt Lover Fang-Mae Ai-Chai Prakan group) in Fang district. Even the red shirts in Chiang Mai stopped their political movement. However, there exists a number of independent red shirt groups and individuals in Chiang Mai. Those separated by the differences of political opinions and conflicts inside their groups.

According to Pinkaew (2013), the red shirt in Chiang Mai has organized their group since the military coup in 2006. The first demonstration emerged at the Tha Pae Gate in the city of Chiang Mai on June 17, 2007. Then, it expanded to several districts of Chiang Mai under the name of "The Federation of Northern People who love Democracy" (Samaphan Khon Nuea Rak Prachathipatai). Most of them were from the middle class in Chiang Mai and came from various occupations such as university lecturer, businessmen from 12 business networks and etc. They had intensified by economic reason after the military coup in 2006 as well as they wanted to anti-the military coup. Until the Chiang Mai 51 group has organized on August 26, 2008. It has led by Petchawat Watthanaphongsirikul, who is the owner of Warorot Grand Palace and head of the local radio station 92.5 MHz. The group had set up to react with the yellow shirt movements in Bangkok. After that, it has led to development of many red shirt groups in several districts of Chiang Mai and also establishment of many local red shirt radio stations. Then, the UDD red shirt of Chiang Mai has organized in 2009 and played the active role during 2009 and 2010. This group separated from the Chiang Mai 51 group and connected with many red shirt groups in several districts of Chiang Mai as well as coordinated with the UDD red shirt in Bangkok (Pinkaew, 2013, p. 33-43).

However, after the violent crackdown in Bangkok on May 2010, the red shirts in Chiang Mai

disintegrated and many of them stopped their political movement. They felt disappointed and defeated in the protest at Ratchaprasong in Bangkok. Nevertheless, they insisted in fighting for democracy and justice. Especially, they wanted fairness in the legal procedure. This was a different meaning of justice from the yellow shirt groups. They did not focus or talk about Thaksin for a long time after the military violent suppressed on the red shirt protests on May 2010. So, the red shirts in Chiang Mai developed their own political ideology and consciousness after they experienced in a long term political protests. The experiences changed their perceptions to the political system. All they wanted was democracy and justice which was not under the rule of military and the elite. Nevertheless, they did not aim to oppose the military power and monarchy, but they believed that the monarchy and the elite should not involve in politics. Thaksin became an example of the social injustice in which the villagers could identify with as they themselves had the same experience before. Therefore, gaining justice for Thaksin meant they would gain justice for themselves too (Pichit Tamul, personal communication, March 30, 2015).

These reflected the new political consciousness of many those who joined in the red shirt protests. In the background, this new consciousness occurred from feeling of dissatisfied to Sondhi Limthongkul, the key leader of the PAD who heavily criticized Thaksin Shinawatra, ex-prime minister. Because they love and admire Thaksin as their hero, beloved leader and their people. This was due to a far good relationship between people in Chiang Mai and Thaksin. In particular, the San Kamphaeng district where it is the birthplace of Thaksin Shinawatra and his family. It has showed a close relationship between people in San Kamphaeng community, Thaksin and Shinawatra clan in the areas for a long time.

Furthermore, the red shirt supporters felt and believed that Thaksin did not do anything wrong prior to being overthrown by the military coup in 2006; the economy was doing well and their lives had hugely improved from his policies such as the 30 Baht universal health care program, One Tambon One Product (OTOP) program, and the village fund initiatives. Thaksin's the global economy and government policies did not only improve the lives of the poor, but they also benefit the wider community (Noppol, 2013). Thus, without Thaksin as the country's leader, they felt their lives and their future were facing uncertainty. They wanted a democratic system which ensured that people were provided with enough food (The edible democracy or Prachatippatai Kindai), eradicate poverty and improve people's quality of lives (Pa Pan (pseudonym), personal communication, October 13, 2015).

As one can see, many of rural red shirt protesters had never been interested in politics prior to this event, but they had joined the red shirt protests in Bangkok for several times. It was because they felt and recognized the impact politics had to their life. In particular, the "edible democracy" reflected the political desire in capitalism of many rural people. In this view, democracy is not only the political ideology, but it also defines as their hopes, lives and new values of Thai society. Democracy should come with equality and justice in the society while morality of Thai society should be based on fairness in the legal system. However, since the military coup in 2006 took place, their hopes, desires and opportunities in capitalist were destroyed as they were separated from their beloved leaders like Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra (Sopranozetti, 2012). This made them angry and dissatisfied with the military coup and they wanted to protect the person that they loved. Thus, their hope for the "edible democracy" that responded their capitalist desires and enhanced equality and justice within Thai society, and their passion to protect their beloved Thaksin forced them to take part in the red shirt protests and form the independent red shirt groups in Chiang Mai. The desire for justice in the legal and political procedures,

and hope for changes of political and social system in Thailand also stimulated the political actions and consciousness of some radical red shirt groups.

Subsequently, the red shirt protestors in Chiang Mai were really motivated by the new political ideas and emotions such as angry and love due to their experiences and new perceptions to the political and social system. Also, their emotion in love and anger intensified by the feeling of unfairness. Since their beloved people as Thaksin and Yingluck have been treated unfairly in the legal procedure and from the military government. In the meantime, they had been denied to desire and possess for the capitalist and asking for the eatable democracy which can improve their lives.

Hence, the cultural force of emotions of many red shirt protestors in Chiang Mai was derived from the experiences of injustice with the emotions of love and angry. On the contrary, this cultural force of emotions turned to anti-monarchy sense and grievance with anger and love for several red shirt protestors from changing of their perception such as the red shirts group in Fang district. The red shirt in Fang has developed their group to the radical red shirts group. It is due to they changed their perception to the monarchy institution after the military coup in 2006 and the violent crackdown in Bangkok on April and May 2010. They have increased many questions to the role of monarchy in Thai politics. Many of them believed that the monarchy was behind the scene of the military coup in 2006 and several violent incidents. Because there were published the picture of the Queen went to the funeral of Nong Bo, one of the two yellow shirt protestors who had died on 7th October 2008 during the yellow shirt protests (Nostitz, 2014, p.181). Therefore, their new perception and believed resulted in the loss of faith and feeling of hate to the monarchy. This apparently expresses in the “ta sawanng” (awakening or means knowing the truth) community of the red shirts. That showed in the anti-monarchy rhetoric and gossip about the King and royal family underground (Thongchai, 2008 and 2014). It was due to the excessive and exaggerated ultra-royal-nationalism displayed during protests and events, and integrated into people’s everyday lives. It has actually led to the emergence of an anti-monarchy sense of several red shirt groups. In particular, the royal projects and government projects in sufficiency economy which is the King’s philosophy has showed in contrast to the edible democracy ideal of many rural people. While it manifested the discrepancies between the royalist elite’s ideals and the rural ideals and aspires in economy (Rossi, 2012).

Therefore, the sufficiency economy is considered as the elite fantasy for many rural villagers. Whilst this development of anti-monarchy sense can be closely linked to state suppression and control of public discourse on the monarchy in relation to Article 112 of the Criminal Code– also known as the Lèse-Majesté law– as this has led to a rapid loss of faith in the monarchy and to more questions and gossips arising within the ta sawanng community of the red shirt supporters. Actually, the ta sawanng reflects the political resistance of the rural class people to the state power which attempted to dominate and oppress them in the forms of knowledge, ideology, government projects and policies, and also forcing them by laws and violent suppression. It is a constant struggle for power of the rural class in their everyday lives. It implied the angry sense of injustice from the socially devastating loss of political and social position as it is loss of opportunities and rights in socio-politics and economic structure. Thus, they attempts to struggle for this. It is what James C. Scott (1985) called “the everyday resistant in form of the hidden transcripts”. By contrast, the ta sawanng terms did not mean to overthrowing the monarchy. In fact, they wanted to communicate with the state that they don’t accept the ideological domination

which everything centered on the monarchy. Ultimately, Thai social structure should be changed to more equality and more open the opportunities for the rural class.

On the other hand, many red shirt protesters felt they were part of a brotherhood. It occurred from during the protests; they shared food, stories and feelings, and carried out activities together. They felt a level of friendship and sincerity with the other members, with no hidden agendas or interests. These are the reasons why they stayed at the protest sites for several days or even months, even after it became uncomfortable and dangerous. Some even chose to stay permanently or return after finishing work. This is the second form of love which constituted from the feelings of sympathy among red shirt members. This love was clearly expressed in the red shirt groups in Bangkok.

The red shirts in Bangkok were comprised of wide diversity of independently social sub-groups and networks. They were in a set of loose networks and horizontal organizations structure (Naruemon, 2016). Besides, they also expressed their social relations in the multi-social class relations. In Bangkok, the red shirts protestors came from various professions such as teachers, university lecturers, businessmen, street vendors, and taxi drivers. It is difficult to say that most of them were the lower middle class. Hence, we should understand the red shirts in Bangkok from the diversification of their backgrounds in experience and perception rather than the economic class. Moreover, the red shirts in Bangkok were not all the pro-Thaksin groups. Several groups and individuals joined the red shirts with their own will and different desires, but they had the common ideal in justice and democracy while several groups developed their own ideologies after fighting for Thaksin and depending on the UDD.

Additionally, I found that the feeling of love in their community and their companionship mostly motivated them to the protests. This feeling of love has been rarely mentioned by the scholars who studied the red shirts. This kind of feeling came from empathy, appreciation, and wish to find the truth, righteousness, justice and democracy. This love emanated from the stories, experiences, feelings and actions they shared, and especially those combative experiences gained as part of the protest movement. The feelings became a cultural force that made them part of the red shirt community like a brotherhood and a family.

After the violent crackdown event on May 2010, the UDD Red Shirts in Bangkok were disintegrated because of the conflicts inside the red shirt groups and the development of different political ideas, strategies and goals of several sub-red shirt groups. The structure of the red shirt network had become horizontal organizations and networks rather than a unity organization. The expansion and development of the sub-red shirt groups in Bangkok demonstrated the difference of desires, identities, interests and socio-political ideas of the groups of people. For instance, the members of red shirt group TV24 hours organized a public cremation service association, volunteer networks and career support group to support their economy and promote a connection among the sub-red shirt groups and individuals. While they still focused on fighting for truth and justice in Thai society, they did not aim to oppose the government and the state power. They wanted the government to provide reliable justice system and equality for all people. Significantly, the red shirt supporters in Bangkok fought for recognition in their identity, prestige and truth as well as righteousness (based on the legal system not morality) in Thai society. This reflected the struggle for the symbolic power of the red shirts in Thai society which also defined as their social value. It showed the struggle for power in the politics of their everyday life.

Meanwhile, love was also reflected the social capital of the red shirts. The red shirts were alienated and

oppressed by the socio-political and economic structure of Thai society. It had been exacerbated by the double-standards practice of Thai society that was considered as the cause of injustice issues perceived by many red shirt supporters. Tum (pseudonym) who was the key red shirt leader metaphorically described, "We received an unequal love from this Thai family. In fact, we love our family and we are their children, but our father and mother do not come out to protect us." The red shirt supporters felt the monarchy did not come out to protect their lives during the military violent suppressions. Actually, many red shirt protestors did not want to overthrow the monarchy and they believed that the monarchy was the main pillar of Thai society and they regarded the monarchy as the protector of the society. However, the monarchy, as well, exercised the legitimate power of double-standards practice in Thai society. They exercised injustice and inequality. As a result, they were disappointed with the persons they loved. Love had also become a new social capital for them and it also created the economic capital among the sub-red shirt groups such as the career support association.

In sum, the perception shared by the red shirt communities and groups was the injustice in Thai society which was heavily based on inequality and unfairness in the justice procedure. Therefore, they struggled for justice and equality. To them justice meant universal justice that was based on the rule of law and equality was referred to the belief that all human beings were equal and respected each other. Notably, they fought for a social recognition within Thai society that was meaningful to their life. Thus, the reason why some people still remained red shirt supporters was not only because of ideology; for they sincerely hoped and believed that one day the truth and justice (also democracy) would prevail in Thai society. They would fight for their political ideal, with or without the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), Thaksin Shinawatra and Pheu Thai party.

In addition, the fear of state suppression, and especially the application of Article 112 of Thailand's Criminal Code, forced many red shirts to go underground. The Red shirt communities used metaphors, codes, whispering conversations and restricted group communications on social media to share their opinions about the royal family and criticize the sensitive or prohibited political issues. The red shirts were called by those who did not share their ideology as *khwai daeng*, or the red buffalo, which means a stupid person who foolishly supported Thaksin. Some of the more 'radical' red shirts hoped that changes in Thailand's social and political structure would occur while some hoped Thaksin would return after the political situation changed.

Thus, the love felt by the red shirts had different meanings, and was embodied with other emotions and feelings, such as fear, dissatisfaction, anger and hope. The power of love can be seen in their passion to protect their ideal, their struggle to be loved and for happiness, and their desire to be recognized (as a symbolic capital). However, differences in the meanings and values associated with their love led to a disintegration of their moral righteousness. When you love or admire someone who has done something wrong, others may feel you have also done something wrong too, and may think you are a fool. This has become one of the primary driving factors of the political conflicts in Thailand. Love has also led to other feelings such as hate and anger among the social sub-groups depending on their circumstances.

Conclusion: The Complexity of Thai Political Conflicts

The cultural forces of emotions are related to the diversity of common-sense experiences in socio-cultural contexts of social actors. In this regard, we can interpret and understand the cultural

forces of emotions in the intersubjective term of social meanings. This reflects the diversity of meanings and perceptions of social actors towards the social and political realities. As one can see, the truth of the yellow shirts and red shirts are diverse based on the meanings that they gave to the social and political realities. It depends on what they perceived as truth and how it is meaningful to their lives and social actions. This is also related to the long cultural and social learning of experiences of the social actors. It is very important to understand the diversity of thoughts of the groups of people in the contemporary socio-political conflicts of Thai society.

The middle class expressed their emotions of hate, disgust and anger as well as love in the political and social conflicts. These emotions were forced by the morality ideal and experiences of cultural learning which was based on a belief in the morality and the charismatic power of the monarchy. Hence, morality has intertwined with power and it has never been based on equality. At the same time, the emotions of anger, hate and disgust were justified by the moral politics discourse and they are treated as the moral emotions when they are used to counteract an immoral person or an evil force like the Thaksin regime and the red shirts. Although these emotions are negative emotions and are considered sinful according to the Buddhist doctrines, they are justified by the righteousness in morality.

These cultural forces of emotions reflected the structure of state power which finally justified the practices of the government over people. In particular, it is a conduct in the disposition of people (or called *habitus*) and power relations in society. Hence, the cultural forces of emotions are always linked to a social class or social classification in Thai society. The feeling of disgust implies a sense of class in the moral hierarchy structure of Thai cultural politics while the state of fear shows a class bias towards a certain group of people in the society such as the rural red shirts.

Therefore, justice was differently perceived by different social sub-groups who were involved in Thai political conflicts. It was also supported by the prior experiences or common-sense experiences of the social actors within their positions and contexts. In particular, the state violent suppression has formed and shaped different emotional experiences and perceptions of people. Finally, it became their cultural forces of emotions in the feelings of injustice. The feeling of injustice was also forced by the new experiences and perceptions toward the social and political reality of the red shirts through the new forms of media and technology and their participation in the long protests of the red shirt groups. It created a common experience and social memory among them. Ultimately, it made them reconsider the power relations within Thai society as evident in the double-standards issue, *ta-sawang* discourse and *Phrai-Ammart* metaphor reflecting their understanding and experience of “injustice” and “inequality”.

The cultural forces of emotions are closely related to the sense of class which are derived from specific experiences in a socialization process and socio-political and cultural learning within Thai society. Notably, the cultural forces of emotions reflect a class conflict within Thai society. This issue has rarely mentioned by the scholars. This can also be seen in the conflict of interests among the socio-political groups. For instance, some yellow shirt groups felt the economic policies during Thaksin’s government was unfair because the rural class was benefited hugely from the policies. At the same time, they felt Thaksin wanted to monopolize the country and he became a threat to the monarchy. This social bias became the feeling of hate and fear. The feeling of bias and envy reflected the class conflicts. However, the conflict of interests was not only about the economic interests. It also included the conflict of symbolic interests such as the legitimate power of recognition and a belief by virtue. In this regard, the

conflict showed in the struggle for recognition and righteousness in the politics and society. As a result, it has led to alienation among groups of people in Thai society. For instance, the red shirt protestors were not treated as Thais because they supported Thaksin who was seen as evil and disloyal person to the King and the country and the corrupted politicians who were portrayed as a national disaster and a threat to the nation. This cultivated the feeling of fear, disgust and hate among Thai people who live in the society where moral politics has been heavily promoted.

In contrast, the red shirts were forced by the emotional of love and anger. This cultural force of emotions depended on their experiences and perceptions in politics and society. Hence, several sub-red shirt groups in several parts of Thailand were developed. As we can see, the red shirt group in San Khampheang was formed by their desires and feelings of love and sympathy to Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra as one of their own. Meanwhile, this feeling turned into anger, hate and fear. This also involved the political and social contexts that intensified the cultural force of emotions. Some radical red shirt groups wanted to fight for justice and equality. Their struggle was derived from the common experiences, emotions, and memories in the issues on state violent suppression and injustice in Thai legal procedure. In addition, they felt unequal in Thai society.

Thus, the cultural forces of emotions can be changeable and tend to be related to the social class positions of subjectivity within the socio-cultural contexts. The cultural forces of emotions reflected the power of state domination and resistance as well as a struggle for power among the social sub-groups in Thai society. Meanwhile, the crucial problem is the conflicts in political meanings and moral values in politics, democracy and justice. In particular, the justice which one is based on the rule of law and another justice which is based on morality or goodness (in religion). In addition, the illusion of morality suppressed the diversity of moral values and thoughts and it divided people by its righteousness. People do not question the idea of righteousness when it is linked with the legitimate power of monarchy. This is the reason why several red shirt groups do not share the same ideal and emotion with the radical red shirt groups. Therefore, it is not easy to determine that people are simply divided because of their political ideology or their belief in religion. We need to consider different cultural forces to be able to determine people's stance among the political conflicts.

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15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND

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On the Effect of Communication of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* in Thailand: The Role of Feedback in Cross-cultural Literature Communication

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Abstract

As one of the four great classical novels in Chinese literature, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* is broadly communicating worldwide, especially in East Asia and Southeast Asia. In Thailand, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* enjoys high popularity. *Samkok*, the first Thai version of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, is highly respected by generations of Thai people. Most interestingly, *Samkok* is actually more regarded as Thailand's national literature than being foreign. *Samkok* is deeply rooted in Thai people's everyday life, and becomes a part of Thai traditional culture.

The communication of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* in Thailand is a classic case of cross-cultural literature communication. The issue should be discussed from an internal Thai perspective, which is the only way to understand why it could have happened. In the process of the communication, feedback has played a significant role. An effective feedback process can decide whether a literary work could be totally accepted by the readers in a foreign cultural context, which is the vital link to achieve the best communication effect. Through the active feedback of "Gatekeeper", "Opinion Leader" and the "Diffusion of Innovations", *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* is highly appraised and adopted by Thai people, and has been localized by Thailand's vernacular culture and has turned into a Thai literature masterwork.

Keywords: Literature Communication, cross-culture, feedback, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, Thailand.

In Southeast Asia, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (三国演义), one of the so-called "Four Masterworks of the Chinese Classical Novel," has communicated widely, such as in Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Cambodia, especially in Thailand and Vietnam. Vietnam in the past, like Japan, Korea (both South Korea and North Korea), was one of the Chinese cultural circle countries, which had the similar cultural context for receiving the influence of China, namely, in terms of historical material culture or spiritual and cultural level, these countries had accepted the profound impact of Chinese culture. Until modern times, among these countries, Chinese culture had been regarded as an advanced culture and drawn the attention and respect by the local rulers, in addition, Chinese characters had long been used as the official writing characters before they invented their own ones. Therefore, it is not surprising that *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* can be well accepted by these countries. However, in

sharp contrast to it, ancient Thailand is known as a traditional “Indianized” country, Indian culture is more influential in the religious beliefs, ideas, literature and art, etc. Most interestingly, the popularity of *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* in Thailand is in no way inferior to those Chinese cultural circle countries, even more influential in some aspects.

An Overview of the Effects of Communication of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* in Thailand

In 1802, at the behest of Somdet Phraphutthayotfa Chulalok, King Rama I the Great of the Chakri dynasty, Chaophraya Phraklang (Hon) supervised the translation of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, which essentially became an important part of the “National Literature” renaissance after the destruction of the literary tradition in Thai-Burmese war lasting for several years. *Samkok*, the first Thai translated version of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, which is known as Chaophraya Phraklang (Hon) translated version *Samkok* (or Hon version for short) in Thai, soon became popular throughout the whole nation, and highly respected by generations of Thai people in the following 200 years. Most notably, *Samkok* was actually more regarded as Thailand’s national literature than being foreign. *Samkok* was selected as the “Best Prose Story Work” by Literature Club of King Vajiravudh (King Rama VI), the authoritative literature institutions at the time, and some wonderful chapters, such as “Borrow Arrows with Thatched Boats” and “Battle of Red Cliffs”, were also selected into school textbooks. Moreover, *Samkok* also played a major role in the development of Thai literature. It not only promoted the development of prose style literature, which became the mainstream in literary creation instead of poetry since then, and also promoted the generation of Thai ancient fiction genre, thus promoted the generation and the subsequent development of “modern novel genre” in Thai literature (Pei 2007, 2009; Jin 2010). Following *Samkok*, Thailand introduced more *Samkok* “rewritten” versions of *Samkok* or *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* thereafter, including various translations, adaptations, imitations and re-creations. In addition, *Samkok* also participated in the Thailand’s political life, and has formed so-called “*Samkok* culture” with a unique Thai characteristics. Thai people have a saying that “คนอ่านสามก๊กครบสามรอบคบไม่ได้” (Those who have read *Samkok* three times can not make friends with them), it means that *Samkok* is full of political struggles and smart strategies, the one who has read too much will tend to be deceitful and shrewd which is not suitable for making friend. From this, we can understand how well Thai people know and love it.

In a word, Thai people have already regarded *Samkok* as a literature masterpiece of their own, for they can tell the stories and characters of the book in every detail and use the proverbs and aphorisms from the book with great familiarity. It is no exaggeration to say that *Samkok* is deeply rooted in Thai people’s everyday life, and has become a part of Thai traditional culture. From literature sociology and literary genealogy perspective, it is not simple for *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* to get wide acceptance from Thai society under Thailand’s “cultural context”. Just as mentioned above, Thailand is not among the Chinese cultural circle countries, and has never used Chinese characters as the official writing system. Language barriers are important obstacles for the communication and communication of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* in Thailand, and the vast differences in culture between China and Thailand also has made the acceptance through a long process. Despite so many obstacles, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* or *Samkok* still achieved an extraordinary success and has obtained a very good communication effect. As a translation of a foreign literature, *Samkok* is regarded as a representative of

local literature, and has been raised to the height of national literature. It is very rare even in a worldwide range, including those Chinese cultural circle countries.

There are many reasons for such phenomenon. Various scholars have tried to answer it from their own research fields, both directly and indirectly. Some underline the extremely high literary value of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* from a purely literary perspective (Luan 1998: 56-61; Damrong 1973); some contribute it to Chaophraya Phraklang (Hon), the main translator, for his literary attainments and writing skills (Pluang 1980: 423-424; Saksri 1974: 467); some emphasize that *Samkok* was adapted greatly for Thai readers' appreciating habits, thus it was Thai intrinsically (Malinee 1983: 282-286); some put it in the political and social context, suggest that the translation was supported by the monarch for his special political intention (Sombat 1995; Kannika 1998), or argue that the translation is the reflection of the growing influence of Chinese society in Thailand (Reynolds 1996), so on.

In this article, I will focus on the process of communication of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* in Thailand. Based on the effect of communication, the crucial role of "feedback" in this typical cross-cultural literature communication issue will be examined. A good effect of literature communication depends on the attitude of receivers, who have the authority of accepting or rejecting the works. Only after Thai readers become psychologically identified with *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, make it localized and apply it to the local life experience, can it truly achieve a good communication effect. It, of course, does not happen overnight, and needs constant feedback in the process of the communication.

"Feedback" in Cross-cultural Literature Communication

The cross-cultural literature communication is actually a kind of external communication which needs to cross national and cultural boundaries, belonging to the broad sense of international communication. In terms of cross-cultural literature communication, the communicator, as the information source, is the author (or translator) of the work; the receiver, as the information destination, is the native reader; the information or content is the literature text; and the process of communication can be divided into two stages, the encoding (creation in broader understanding) and decoding (reading in broader understanding) of information processes. Comparing with the general literature communication, cross-cultural literature communication is facing complex and diverse cultural differences. There are "noises" that may hinder the smooth communication or influence the accuracy of information transferring in the process of communication, such as misunderstanding or so-called "understanding incorrectly", hence it is understandable that how difficult for a literature work to take root in a foreign country in a different cultural context.

As to the cross-cultural literature communication, the most profound effect is to "influence" the literature and culture of a foreign country. Instead of imitation, homology, popularity and borrowing, the connotation of this effect is "a process of a life transplanting, presenting in the works through the deformation of filtering by local culture" (Yue 2004: 179), is to develop from nothing and to grow stronger in different cultures. The literary information of a work of reaching the receiver through the media does not mean the effect has been produced yet. Only after the readers have appreciated the feelings and aesthetics of the author, and their minds are infected and touched, so that some of their attitude or ideas has been changed, can it be said that the effect of literature communication has really

achieved, and a successful process of cross-cultural literature communicating has reached an end finally. During this process, the “feedback” step has played a key role.

The term “feedback” is borrowed from the term of electronic engineering, it originally refers to the electromagnetic wave or the information carried by the routed back that forms a circuit or loop, when applying in the study of communication, it refers to the receiver’s response to the information sent by the communicator. In the 1950s, the idea of “feedback” was introduced into the study of communication patterns, especially in “Osgood & Schramm Communication Model”. This model or pattern indicates that there is feedback in the delivery process and that the results of these feedback are shared by both parties of the communication. It breaks the traditional one-way understanding of the communication process, represented by Lasswell’s “5W model” and “Shannon-Weaver model”, instead, forms a multi-directional circular idea. A good feedback mechanism can determine that a literary work can be truly recognized and accepted by readers in a different cultural context or not. It is an essential part of achieving the best effect for communication.

Feedback has played an important role in cross-cultural communication of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* in Thailand. Feedback is conducted by the agent in the cultural field, basing on local experience, and the result is to spawn various new texts or new cultural issues that link to the local culture closely. Feedback also breaks the boundaries between communicator and receiver, and establishes an interactive relationship between the two sides through communication. Some of the agents even take the responsibilities of receiver and communicator at the same time, the receiver may become a new communicator of secondary level communication through feedback. Therefore, feedback can provide cross-cultural communication a dynamic, three-dimensional vision. The more feedback, the more levels of communication; and the more levels of communication, the more diverse forms of communication. The following three key factors can make the feedback mechanism work smoothly, not only promote the smooth progress of communication, but also ensure that the communication has achieved an excellent effect. The three factors are “gatekeeper”, “opinion leader” and “diffusion of innovations”.

The Feedback of “Gatekeeper”

First of all, literary works need to get the gatekeeper's feedback, in order to enter the context of different cultures. This check or feedback is the “culture filtrations”. The idea of gatekeeper was first proposed by Kurt Lewin and introduced into journalism research field by David Manning White. In the process of cross-cultural literature communication, the communicators and the receivers in different cultural backgrounds will always have different understanding, appreciation, choice of motivation and purpose for the same work. The production and communication of information do not have a pure “objective neutrality”. Therefore, in the communicating process will appear some gatekeepers, who provide feedback to some extent before others, only the contents in line with local norms or values of gatekeepers could enter the channel of communication. That’s why a literary work always has a different appearance before and after translation during literature communication.

In terms of the communication of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* in Thailand, the most important gatekeeper is definitely Chaophraya Phrakhleng (Hon) who supervised the translation duty. He had established a translating team, which was divided into two groups, one was consisted of Chinese

immigrants who interpreted the contents of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* from Chinese to simple Thai first, then the other group which consisted of Thai court poets began to polish the interpreted contents, and then Chaophraya Phrakhleng (Hon) summarized the rough drafts and finalized the translation. Cultural difference is one of the main obstacles, especially for those with strong cultural connotations. If translated literally word by word, Thai readers can either understand or it is difficult to accept for it was contrary to Thai cultural traditions. For a variety of considerations, Chaophraya Phrakhleng (Hon) had made the Chinese culture “assimilated into Thai people’s context harmoniously and tactfully” (Malinee 1984: 132), put Thai local culture elements into the translation, so that the translation would be more in line with Thai people's appreciating habit. Despite some mistakes and misinterpretations caused by translation groups due to misunderstanding and having troubles in communication and cooperation between Chinese immigrants and Thai translators, the contents that were not convenient to translate were all deleted. Furthermore, some contents were modified intentionally by the translator, Chaophraya Phrakhleng (Hon), for fitting the king's political intentions, the whole translation thus could be described as a positive feedback. Hence *Samkok* was not a real translation work in a strict sense, but a re-creation which took *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* as the original version, just as Thai *Samkok* studies expert Malinee Dilokvanich indicates that Hon’s translating version “merely keeps the same names, places, and narrative sequences of the Chinese work, but it makes no attempt to provide a faithful translation of the majority of the material in the Chinese original....merely looks superficially like the original Chinese work, but it has actually been transformed into something very new and different. It may extrinsically appear Chinese but it is Thai intrinsically”, she even believes that *Samkok* thoroughly adapt the Chinese original “not only by translating it into Thai, but also by rewriting large parts of it – as much as 60% -- and by reorienting it to Thai perceptions and experiences, and even to the Thai religious and philosophical world view” (Malinee 1983: 283-286). For such reason, Thai people have regarded *Samkok* as a Thai local literature work, and Thai scholars always did analysis and research on it from the perspective of Thai literature. It is a vital reason that has led *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* to a success in Thailand.

The feedback also can be divided into two types, namely, positive feedback and negative feedback, which link to positive acceptance and negative acceptance. Positive acceptance means to make the work blending into local culture positively through absorbing and adopting, to ensure the newly created text full of vitality; on the contrary, negative acceptance, of course, means to accept in a negative way, more precisely, local culture does not participate in constructing the accepted text, recipients just transfer every detail of the Chinese original. The latter may meet the problem of acclimatization, so the effect of communication is likely to be simple and temporary. Gatekeepers are responsible for the initial feedback that may decide whether the feedback will be positive or negative.

In *Samkok* case, the translators were the primary gatekeepers. Besides Hon translated version *Samkok*, which is also viewed as the most classical one, there are three other full translated versions, namely, Wanwai Phathanothai translated version (Wanwai 1977), Wiwat Pracharuangwit translated version (Wiwat 2001) and Kanlaya Suphanwanit translated version (Kanlaya 2013). Three newly translated versions share one feature, that is, they all highlight and emphasize their own version’s “integrity”, completely “faithful” to the original one, and thus more authoritative than Hon’s version. Wanwai speak frankly in the preface of his *Newly Translated Version Samkok* that “It’s a pity that the first translation

(refers to Hon's version) had many deficiencies and omissions, range from the use of vocabulary to names of persons and places, culture, proverb idioms and language, with the original author's work. It makes the readers cannot appreciate the taste of its proper, the difference is very big.... As a result of the discovering that there are too many mistakes in Chaophraya Phrakhleng (Hon)'s version *Samkok*, I decide to re-translated it according to Luo Guanzhong's original Chinese version *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* into Thai completely and faithfully." (Wanwai 1977: preface) Wiwat, just as Waiwai, has noticed that lots of newly created books about *Samkok* are all basing on Hon's version and those mistakes are all inherited, he thus decides to re-translate it (Wiwat 2001: preface). Indeed, the new translated versions are more faithful to the Chinese original if compare with Hon's version, for example, Wanwai has translated 120 chapters as original one and tried to translate every detail, even those poems that really difficult to translate and thus deleted by Hon. Some issues that Chinese culture-related or Thai reader hard to understand which Hon had omitted, Wanwai has supplemented and added explanatory footnotes. But the person's names he remains Min dialect pronunciation for the old reader's habit. Wiwat continues to push forward the faithfulness pursuit basing on Waiwai by adding the preface and annotations of Jin Shengtan (金圣叹), the famous Chinese literary critic in Qing dynasty, and imitates the headnote form of Chinese ancient works in typesetting. Wiwat emphasizes his version's "integrity", that he considers it as a more faithful symbol. Kanlaya's version is the latest one, although she doesn't mention the faithful intention directly, but she has titled her book "*The Full Version Samkok*", she adopts the most "foreignized" strategy in translating, sometimes word-by-word strictly, and uses mandarin (Putonghua) pronunciation to translate names for the first time. Another *Samkok* research expert Thongthaem Natchamnong, who writes a preface for Kanlaya's version, praises that her translation is "totally full of Chinese flavor" (Kanlaya 2013: 10).

It is obviously that these three new translations are all aiming at Hon translated version's "unfaithful to the Chinese original", but from the effect of communication perspective, the "authenticity" or "faithfulness" they treasure most is not recognized by Thai readers, rather, the parts of so-called "understanding incorrectly" have already been internalized in Thailand's culture and widely accepted by Thai people. Apart from the canonization of Hon's version, which is historically constructed by generations, Chaophraya Phrakhleng (Hon), as a gatekeeper, in contrast to others, has practiced a good positive feedback, thus followed by subsequent success of *Samkok* in Thailand.

The Feedback of "Opinion Leader"

The process of feedback has several different levels, and need "opinion leaders" to lead the communication. The cross-cultural literature communication usually needs longer communicating time, and literary information reaches different level receivers at different speed, there is always someone getting the literature text earlier than others. Surely, those translators are the first people to get the literary information, they are the gatekeepers, and some of them also act as the opinion leaders in communication studies sense.

The term "Opinion Leader" is a concept presented by Paul Felix Lazarsfeld in his "two-step flow of communication" theory. He argues that the process of communication is influenced by a variety of mediating factors that limits the communicating effect, and the media messages and ideas are not directed to all individuals, but to the opinion leaders first, and then flow through the opinion leaders to

other individuals in the crowd that are less active. In cross-cultural literature communication, opinion leaders belong to a special group, they are not leaders in a general sense, but usually are famous writers, literary critics, cultural celebrities or well-known scholars. They can be early contacts or have keen insights into literary information, and practice translation, creation, criticism and other cultural activities. At the same time, they themselves have a certain prestige in society, and have a definite influence in the literary field. Their works or comments can be accepted and disseminated on a larger scale by the readers. It should be pointed out that many opinion leaders also have the function as a gatekeeper, such as some translators mentioned above.

In the case of *Samkok* in Thailand, some important opinion leaders are Chaophraya Phrakhlung (Hon), "Jacob" (Chot Phraephan), M.R. Kukrit Pramoj and Sang Phathanothai, etc. Chaophraya Phrakhlung (Hon) is not only one of the most outstanding writers and poets at the time, and also one of the "four ministers" (จตุสดมภ์ in Thai) in charge of the state finance that had won King Rama I's trust and praise. Although his translated version *Samkok* is recognized as the most classic version, but the influence of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* is not achieved only by *Samkok* one version, but also by a generation of Thai writers through continuous feedback. Many subsequent writers have illustrated, rewrote, reviewed and re-translated *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* from their own point of view for various purposes. Among these "Re-writing" works, Jakob's *Storyteller version Samkok*, Kukrit Pramoj's *Capitalist version Samkok*, and Sang Phathanothai's *War Strategy of Samkok* are the most influential ones.

"Jacob" - is a pseudonym, his name is Chot Phraephan - is a famous Thai newspaper columnist in the first half of the 20th century, and the author of the first *Samkok* rewriting version. Although *Samkok*, if compared with other classical literature, is considered very popular and easy to understand, but for the majority people who have just got free from slavery and corvée systems and begun to accept modern education not long ago, the language in *Samkok* is still too hard to understand for them. Furthermore, *Samkok* is a lengthy masterpiece, displays the sprawling and panoramic war of China in the 3rd century with countless characters and complex plot, which are really difficult for general readers to remember. In fact, *Storyteller version Samkok* is a compilation of a series of books. Jacob chooses 18 important characters from *Samkok* and re-writes stories in the form of biography. He mimics the tone and narrative skills of the Chinese storytellers along the street, using the simple spoken language, which makes the narrative concise and smooth, sometimes even adds some of the popular romance novels of the time. These are all reducing the difficulty of reading and warmly welcomed by readers. Both separate edition and collected edition are all sailing very well and has been reprinted continuously, such as "Khong Beng" (Kong Ming/孔明) volume at least has been reprinted 20 times since 1943.

Another eminent writer Kukrit Pramoj, inspired by Jacob, published his *Capitalist version Samkok*. He also imitates Jacob's narrative style, mimics the tone as a storyteller, but in different social status. Instead of acting as a folk artist telling stories for money, Kukrit pretends himself as a rich capitalist or tycoon telling stories to delight his high society friends who are invited to attend the dinner. Kukrit is of Thai royal descent, as the great-grandson of King Rama II, and a politician who has been serving Prime Minister of Thailand from 1975 to 1976. He is a leading authority on traditional Thai culture and has a polymathic range of interests from Thailand's classical dance to literature. He is also known as a journalist and publisher, a scholar, an actor and narrator, a professional Thai classical dancer, and of course, a famous writer. His novels are well-known for his unique sense of humor, satirical language and

fantastic imagination. He had planned to make a book series of *Capitalist version Samkok*, just like Jacob, but he only finished two books, *Beng Hek: Being Swallowed Whole* and *Jo cho: Forever Prime Minister*, then had to give way to his political life. In these two books, Kukrit breaks the conventional view, as his own personal style, has given *Samkok* a totally new face. In *Jo cho*, on the contrary of “supporting Liu Bei, suppressing Cao Cao”, the conventional view, he stands in the position of Cao Cao, takes him as a real guardian and loyal person to the country, and Liu Bei is the treacherous and dangerous person. The protagonist of the other book is Meng Huo, Kukrit assumes him a Thai leader who resists Shu, the powerful military power from central China bravely. These two books are written in the era of extreme nationalism in Thailand, some nationalist ideas in the books has deeply influenced Thai people. There are still some Thai people believe that Meng Huo is a Thai, in fact not. Its influence is evident. Different from Jacob and Kukrit’s version, Sang Phathanothai’s *War Strategy of Samkok* is not a novel, but a review and illustration. Sang is not a professional writer nor a politician, but a media mogul and is one of the closest advisors to Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram. He was named the official government spokesman in charging of all government propaganda. He was well-known among the Thai people as a radio host “Nai Man”, propagating Phibun government’s policies. When Phibun was overturned by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat's military coup, Sang was arrested and put on trial for seven years. During his prison years, Sang finished *War Strategy of Samkok* with the help of his inmates. He puts his personal political ideas and political ambitions into the book through the characters and stories from *Samkok*, and uses *Samkok* as a tool for political expression.

These new re-writing versions have changed Thai people’s understanding of *Samkok*, let them realize that *Samkok* is a ductile and plastic text that can be converted into various forms. These new version writers, as opinion leaders, have made private interpretation and adaptation of *Samkok* that provide a strong demonstration effect on other readers. The relationship between readers and authors has been changed in literary consumption that the reader and the author's identity are frequently converted, the nature of traditional literary text is unidentified. It is both “readable” and “writable”, just as distinguished by Roland Barthes, readers no longer become consumers, but become producers of text (Barthes 1995: 154). Since then, readers begin to individualize reading of *Samkok*, and produce their own works by feedback. Successive waves of feedback have consolidated the position of *Samkok* in Thailand, and have spawned a new Thai *Samkok* culture.

Feedback and “Diffusion of Innovations”

The last factor links to the first two factors closely that it would stimulate “diffusion of innovations” through those gatekeepers' and opinion leaders’ feedback. Both gatekeepers, opinion leaders and other general public are all receivers that are equal in status in the process of communication. They are prior to the communicators in status when discussing the effect of communication. Stuart Hall indicates, “Producing meaning depends on the practice of interpretation, and interpretation is sustained by us actively using the code — *encoding*. Putting things into the code — and by the person at the other end interpreting or decoding the meaning” (Hall 2002: 62). In other words, meaning of the information is not “transferred” by communicator, but “produced” by receiver. Reading is a kind of social behavior, and a process of social negotiation, readers (audiences) can either agree or oppose when facing the texts transferred by the communicator, even apply new construction and interpretation to the accepted

literary texts basing on their own social conditions, such as education, social status, artistic talent, etc. The receivers are not completely passive, they have the authority to dominate the text, and form “diffusion of innovations”.

The “diffusion of innovations” refers to “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system”, it’s a “special type of communication concerned with the spread of messages that are new ideas” (Rogers 1983: 34-35). The “diffusion” here extends the previous Lazarsfeld’s “two-step flow of communication” theory to “multi -step flow of communication” theory, by continuous feedback, it will lead more “innovating” forms, both in text form and in non-text form or cultural form, to communicate to more people.

Why do Thai people love *Samkok* so much? Thongthaem Natchamnong gives his concise answer: “*Samkok* is an immortal masterpiece, because it can always bring innovations.” (Kanlaya 2013: Thongthaem’s preface) Since Hon’s *Samkok* had been translated, Thai writers, scholars and thinkers, represented by Jacob, Kukrit Pramoj and Sang Phathanothai, have creatively re-written and illustrated *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*. According to my statistics, by 2016, Thailand had already published nearly 170 books of various versions about *Samkok* or *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (see the chart), in which some column articles scattered in various newspapers or failed to compile for publishing, as well as a variety of academic research books and papers on *Samkok* are not included. Until now this “rewriting” phenomenon still continues, a variety of Thai versions of *Samkok* are still constantly being innovated.




Figure 1 Thai “*Samkok*” books published period statistics (ending of 2016)

Among these books, the types of texts are varied and of different styles, both pure literary texts, and the texts with other social functions, for the needs of different groups of people. It has significantly improved in quantity as well as in quality. The improved quality here does not mean that the succeeding re-writing texts are beyond the classic version *Samkok* in literary field, but that people’s understanding of *Samkok* and Chinese history and culture are improving greatly. No matter appreciating or criticizing, they are all following their own will, they can borrow and apply the stories, idioms and allusions of *Samkok* without hesitation, there is no jerky feeling of borrowing the foreign culture in it.

The innovations are not limited to the field of literature, but have gradually extended to other cultural

areas too, such as Thai Buddhist temple murals, rock paintings and carvings, sculptures, Thai Buddha amulet, drama performance, theme gardens, folk songs, etc. The most distinctive and interesting one should be Thai *Samkok* political culture; it has already deeply rooted in Thailand's social cultural context. Thailand has been ruled by the military government dictatorship for a long time, but Thai people never give up their fighting for democracy and the efforts of fighting against the military dictatorship. During the high-pressure politics and culture-control years, Thai people had been struggling in finding ways to express their political appeals and point of views. They came to notice *Samkok*. *Samkok* is an excellent material to innuendo military authoritarian government, for *Samkok* is full of the vagaries of the political situation, bloody military struggle, and the powerful heroes in the book are soldiers, the regimes are all established through military means.

From 1960s on, a kind of unique performance called "Ngiu Thanmmasat" appeared in Thailand, and became prevalent in Thai society. It was a combination of Chinese and Thai performance style, performing Chinese opera in Thai language, and the repertoire was mostly selected and adapted from the classical Chinese literature, *Samkok*. In fact, the performance was not played for aesthetic purposes, but was utilized to allude to Thai contemporary political events, imitating, satirizing and commenting on politics. With carnival aesthetic features and disruptive traits, Ngiu Thanmmasat was warmly welcomed by the Thai people under the coercion of military authority. As a product of the communication of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, Ngiu Thanmmasat had joined in several important political events in Thailand, especially in 1960s-1970s, therefore, was called "patriotic ngiu performance" (Ngiu ku chat) by some Thai people. Some persons who had participated in performing and script writing, later became Thailand's influential men in politics, including M. R. Seni Pramoj, Chuan Leekpai, Samak Sundaravej, Meechai Ruchuphan, Phiraphong Isaraphakdi.

After the "Black May" event of 1992, Thailand finally entered a more stable period of democratic politics. With the ease of the political situation, the use of *Samkok* in the press to address the shortcomings, satire and even public criticism of political figures, did not fade away, but were becoming more commonplace. Many newspapers opened up the "*Samkok*" column, partly for the popularization of knowledge of humanism and history or literary criticism, but many are intended to comment on the current affairs and political events by talking about "*Samkok*". If compares with the political intention of King Rama I, this newly emerging *Samkok* political culture is not in a top-down pattern, instead, is built from the bottom up perspective. People have learnt political wisdom from *Samkok*, using the past to allude to the present, which is obviously more energetic.

This has fully demonstrated that after decades of localization, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* has been truly integrated into the social context of Thailand. And it is the result of diffusion of innovations, through several levels of feedback, the information of the original text has been deformed in the new concept, and then updated, adding more local cultural factors, eventually becomes a cultural variant.

Conclusion

In short, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* has been able to achieve good communicating effect in Thailand, a good "feedback" has made an undeniable contribution. It is the significant link of the communication that has provided a dynamic, three-dimensional vision of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* in cross-cultural communication in Thailand. The communication is the product of cultural

exchanges between China and Thailand, through a process of cultural contact, cultural filtering and cultural localization, in which the relationship between the identity of the communicator and the receiver is dynamically established. The receivers would become the communicator of the sub-level communication through feedback, and push forward the communication to the next step. All feedback, no matter big or small, together constitutes the whole process of the communication of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* in Thailand.

In this multimedia era, to observe the classic communication case of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* in Thailand from a feedback perspective would be helpful for breaking the text centrism in the literature communication studies. Various forms of communication and communicating channels have comprehensively constructed the appearance of a literature in a different cultural context.

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Conflicts, Marginalization And The Creation Of Modern Nation-State: The Comparative Analysis Of Pattani And Okinawa

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Abstract

In the wake of the arrival of western countries to Asia in the second half of 19th century, imperialism and colonization heavily influenced both Japan and Siam. Among numerous reforms (conducted by state), one is particularly worth to mention: the reform concerning the creation of modern nation-state which led to the integration of tributary states namely the Ryukyu Kingdom, in the case of Japan and the Pattani Kingdom, in the case of Siam. Within the process of the creation, assimilation policy was used to build up the same imagination of the nation. The assimilation policy engendered both conflicts in Pattani (the so-called South Thailand Insurgency), as well as the anti-American military base movement in Okinawa, Japan. This research is a comparative analysis of the cause of the conflicts seen from the perspective of two areas that share similar experiences.

These two aspects resulted in the creation of modern nation state concept through marginalization. The research used documentary research method in order to identify the common features of marginalization. In particular, narratives and historical evidences of development are scrutinized to elucidate this point. Results show that the two areas underwent significant processes that led the local people to have different images about nation. People of Pattani had difficulties to cope with their identification because of external forces, such as assimilation policy. Okinawan people, on the other hand, have established their own sense of identity. Based on these, the concept of marginalization noted in both countries may have different experiences but support the creation of a well-defined growing but not merely modern-state.

Keywords: marginality, marginalization, modern nation-state, conflict

Introduction

This research is a part of my Master degree thesis result in the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of the Ryukyus, Okinawa, Japan. My curiosity to study about Pattani and Okinawa in comparison has started when I was an exchange student of the University of the Ryukyus from 2009 to 2010. At that time, opposition movements against the US military base which existed in Okinawa

Prefecture have been thriving. Also in my hometown, the means of "Patani Independence Movements" in the three southern border provinces (Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat), Thailand, became more violent, and its target changed from government officers to citizen. The situations in both areas at the time reminded me to consider that there are conflicts in the areas. Moreover, looking at the conditions of the areas, there are five similarities are found in both areas.

First, geographically, both areas are located in the southern border of the nation states, of Japan and of Thailand, where are away from the capital of the countries. In the other hand, both areas are situated in the margin of the nation states.

Second, in terms of ethnicity, culture, language and religion, both areas are different from the overwhelming majority of the two countries.

Third, as historical aspect, both areas were independent kingdoms with important trade ports in the 16th and 17th centuries, and had been under tributary relationship with other kingdoms. In the second half of 19th century, almost same time, both areas were annexed to be part of the Siamese (Thai) and Japanese modern nation states.

Fourth, both areas are still in conflicts and there exist anti-government movements. Three southern border provinces have had independence movements since 1959, and in the form of insurgency and cruel cases such as shooting, disturbance, blasting, arson, injury, gun and weapons robbery have occurred. In case of Okinawa, the anti-US military base movements as a form of anti-government movements was done against the US military bases, and also the movements for independence is growing.

Fifth, Thai and Japanese government have established special administrative organizations to resolve the conflicts. In case of the three Southern Thailand, the "Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC)" was established by Thai government. In case of Okinawa, Japan, the "Special Committee for Okinawa and Northern Problems" is established under the Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan. Through these special administrative organizations, the governments of both countries have invested huge budgets for regional developments.

For me, these similarities in both areas were not felt to be mere coincidence, it was thought that they shared structural problems. As a result of this, I became interested in comparative research between Okinawa and Pattani. Then, I explain the structural similarity of both areas and have studied empirically by the viewpoints and methods of international sociology about how it relates to the consciousness of residents.

Purpose of the Research

The research in the master thesis was aimed at clarifying the following four questions,

- 1) How can we explain the structural similarity between the two Areas,
- 2) What is the cause of the similarity,
- 3) What kind of process caused the similarity,
- 4) What is the current conflict, how they occurred, how each similarity is related

Research Hypothesis

In order to answer the above questions, I made the following four research hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1) The concept of "Marginality" can explain the structural similarity of both areas.

Hypothesis 2) The cause of the similarity is the formation of a modern state.

Hypothesis 3) After the establishment of the modern nation-state, the process of marginalization began in both regions.

Research Method

In order to verify the above hypothesis, I used the following methods,

1) The documentary research method to consider the structural similarity of both areas with the concept of "Marginality".(Verify Hypotheses 1 and 2)

2) The documentary research method to study the "marginalization" which related to the establishment of the modern nation states of Thailand and Japan. (Verify hypotheses 2 and 3)

Documentary Research Result

1. Spatial and Societal Marginality of Pattani and Okinawa

Gurung and Kollmair (2005) state that the concept of marginality is generally used to describe and analyze conditions that "disadvantaged people struggle to gain access to resources and full participation in social life"⁴⁵. Primarily, marginality could be defined and described by two major conceptual frameworks: spatial and societal.

Spatial framework is based on physical location and distance from the center of development. Using this framework, Pattani and Okinawa could be described as "spatial marginality". Both areas are located far away from central governments (in Bangkok and Tokyo, respectively).

In this research the name Pattani refers to area where the former "Pattani Kingdom" and "Monthon Pattai" were located in the past. Nowadays, it covers three southern provinces, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat of Thailand, located close to Malaysia. Okinawa is one of the prefectures of Japan, located within a 1,500 kilometer radius, surrounded by other Japanese islands, China, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines.

From the 16th to 18th century, both areas had the status of marginal states, and there located between two bigger, culturally and ideologically different states.⁴⁶ Situated as the marginal states, both areas were heavily influenced by two factors: culture and politics.

Societal framework focuses on human dimensions, such as demography, religion, culture and social structure. Based on this framework, Pattani and Okinawa could be depicted as 'societal marginality' because of Pattani's separatist insurgency and Okinawa's anti-American military base issue.

⁴⁵ Gurung, S. Ghana and Kollmair, Michael (2005). Marginality concepts and their Limitations, IP6 Working Paper No.4. Zurich: Development Study Group, Department of Geography, University of Zurich. P.10

⁴⁶ Pattani was situated between Siam and Jahore, while Okinawa as Ryukyu Kingdom was between China and Japan.

2. Marginalization in a Context of Creation of Modern Nation-state.

Wankaew (2003) states that contain 'marginalization' involve studying conditions that people or a group of people are refused access in obtaining an important position, even if this particular group consists of the majority of the society. The study of social marginalization and marginality contributes to understanding how the society defines its own specialty. In order to visualize relationship of power structures, a key question regarding marginalization is "how people has been marginalized by historical determinant". The process of marginalization could be not only cause by internal factors within one society, but can be also related to external factors, such as global capitalism.

Wankaew also mentions that marginality can be viewed in terms of economics, politics, social, culture, environment and area (geographical area and ideological area), and concerns the issues of the development and creation of a nation-state.

In terms of creation of a nation-state, he suggests Winichakul's research: "Siam Mapped: a history of the geo-body of a nation" showing Siam's "creation process of the geo-body of a nation" which resulted in marginalized people in Thailand, since Siam integrated her own tributary states into the territory by mapping. Following the "creation process of cultural identity", especially the writing of mainstream Thai history, that is unrelated to folk culture of various ethnic communities in the border area of Siam.

2.1 "Creation Process of the Geo-body of a Nation": Demarcation and Territorial Integration

Winichakul (1994) explores the history of Siam's mapping during King Rama V's reign. According to the logic of modern nation-state geography, which focuses on sovereignty and clear territory, unclear boundary and overlapping of more than one state's territories, brings overlapping of sovereignty in the area. Based on such a logic, Siam, France and Britain attempted to make territories clear by integrating them to be a part of their territory.

In the case of Siam, mapping, military, and diplomacy were used as methods for claiming sovereignty over disputed territories of Siam's tributary states. Winichakul argues that the loss of territories by Siam and administrative reform made by the King Rama V should be perceived as elements of the same process of integration of tributary states into Siam's territory. Since Siam has never had modern boundaries and territory until competing with France and Britain to annex marginal tribute states into her own territory (as much as she could), it was not Siam who lost territories to France and Britain, but the marginal tributary states who lost territories to France, Britain and Siam.

The modern nation's geo-body and mapping had replaced another ancient geography, shown as a historical phenomenon under dispute, misunderstanding, negotiation, demarcation and treaty which had Siam, France or even Britain as actors claiming sovereignty over marginal states.

In the light of marginalization aspect proposed by Wankaew (2003) and Winichakul (1994), Pattani was one of the marginal tributary states annexed into Siam territory as above mentioned. Before being annexed by Siam, Pattani was depicted as a prosperous Sultanate state and an important port in Southeast Asia, during two centuries of prosperity of marine trade (16th-18th century) (Chonlaworn, 2001). At that time, Pattani was not part of Siam, but as a tributary state, it sent golden and silver flowers to Siam over a span of three years. After the destruction of (the city of) Ayutthaya by Burmese in 1767, Pattani did not send troops to help Siam, this followed by the stop in the sending of golden and silver flowers. In 1785, under the rule of the King Rama I, Siam sent troops to invade Pattani and forced the region to go under the control of Songkla. In 1810, under the rule of the king Rama II, Siam used the

divide-and-rule strategy, dividing Patani into seven cities (Pattani, Saiburi, Yaring, Nongjik, Yala, Raman and Ra-ngae). Until King Rama V's reform (1895-1906), the boundary between "Monthon Pattani" of Siam and Malaya of Britain was demarcated.

Using Winichakul's aspect however changing from a Thai to Japanese context, the Meiji government also dealt with ambiguity of the territorial sovereignty over Okinawa by integrating Okinawa to Japanese territory as well. Mapping, however, was not a key method, because Okinawa has no land boundary with other Japanese prefectures

Before being annexed to a Japanese modern nation-state, Okinawa was once the Ryukyu Kingdom with her own language, culture and prosperous ports. In the 14th century, the Ryukyu Kingdom was established, as a tributary state under China's influence. In 1609, the Edo era, Ryukyu was invaded by Satsuma domain under Tokugawa Shogunate's government. After the Tokugawa Shogunate lost the Boshin War in 1869, the reform-oriented Government of Meiji Japan was formed. The country underwent a transformation from a feudal state ruled by Shogunate to a modern state ruled by constitutional emperor who embodied the centralization of power. After that change, the Meiji government started to gradually transform to an unclear territorial sovereignty, between Japan and China's Qing dynasty, over Ryukyu Kingdom to benefit Japan. In 1872, the Meiji government made claims to the Ryukyu Kingdom, on the basis of racial, lifestyle and language homogeneity, and also as having been under the rule of Satsuma for a long time. Then the Ryukyu Kingdom was changed to become the Ryukyu Han or Ryukyu Domain of Japan and appointed King Shotai to govern. In May 1873, Soyeshima Taneomi, a Japanese diplomat, went to China with one mission: to clearly claim sovereignty over the Ryukyu territory. On March 27, 1879, Matsuda Michiyuki, Secretary of Japanese Internal Affairs went to Shuri Castle, Center of Ryukyu power administration, and declared to enhance Ryukyu Han to become Okinawa Prefecture, which was annexed to be part of Japan officially.

2.2 "Creation Process of Cultural Identity" through "Imagined Nation"

In the context of modern nation-state, the "creation of cultural identity" took place next to or at the same time as "Creation process of the geo-body of a nation", through the "Imagined Nation" process.

If "Nation" is "an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" as Benedict Anderson stated in "Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism", Nationhood demands a system that citizens could have the same imagined nation. So the assimilation policy was used.

Chonlaworn (2011) mentions that in the King Rama V period, the administrative reforms had been conducted between 1895 and 1906, and used compromising ways to govern the natives of Pattani while Japan used a strong policy to assimilate the Ryukyuan natives to be Japanese.

Regarding Ongskul' thesis: "The administrative reform of Monthon Pattani (B.E.2449-2474)", Siam annexed Pattani to be part of Siam's modern nation-state under the new administrative unit called "Monthon". Starting from 1906, Siam created a new government system over Pattani by allowing Sultans of the seven cities (Pattani, Saiburi, Yaring, Nongjik, Yala, Raman and Ra-ngae) to still have power of taxation and court of justice under control of the commissioner from Nakornsri Thammarat and annexed the seven cities into "Monthon Pattani" latter.

Ongsakul divided the administrative reform of Monthon Pattani into three stages. During the first stage (before 1915), Siam gradually created a central administrative system at Bangkok and sent the governor

from Bangkok to Monthon Pattani. During that period, the administrative system was seen as flexible. Siam was aware about the local tradition of the natives, Melayu muslims. Due to the natives having the relativity between the natives and Melayu people under British colony to make dissatisfaction to the natives. This could lead to chaos among the natives and intervention by British.

In the second period (1915-1923, the King Rama VI era), Siam changed Monthon Pattani's administrative policy, with special emphasis put on the issue of abolition of the powerful Islamic judges. Moreover, from the perspective of the Pattani natives, the burden of taxation imposed by Siam seemed to be too heavy, particularly if compared to the Malaya under the British rule. Dissatisfaction among the natives caused the chaos and the clash between the natives and Siamese officers in 1922.

During the third period (1923-1931), Siam commissioner from Bangkok (Pan Sukhum) went on inspection to Pattani and reported the faulty administrative policy of Pattani to the King Rama VI. Consequently, Siam decided to make the policy change to render it more flexible. Arpornsuwan (2008) mentions that during 1923-1938 period "there was virtually no or very little of Siam's discrimination policy to Melayu Muslim Pattani". The last uprising of the anti-Siam character occurred in 1922. The changing of Siam's policy on Pattani' administration showed that "The Bangkok Government realized that nationalism among the Malays in the northern states of Malaya was rising and they were ready in reaching across borders to help their brethren" Arpornsuwan divides the history of Pattani after 1922 as follows: The "Changing image of Thai state about Melayu Muslims" period (1932-1948) was the time of transformation of a Thai state from absolute monarchy to constitutional democracy that brought "hope to Pattani Melayu Muslims". It was the first time when "the Melayu Muslim felt of being part of Siam nation". There were some social movements that called for the self-determination of Melayu identity. Arpornsuwan mentions that it was a reaction to the development of modern nation-states, but from the viewpoint of the Thai government, the movement was separatism.

With reference to the second period, "Thai nationalization and cultural assimilation policy" period (1939-1944), Arpornsuwan adds that the rising of Japanese imperialism and WWII in Europe led General P. Phibunsongkhram, the Siam prime minister of that time, to establish the closer relations with Japan. Both the prime minister and his consultants perceived Japan as the example of successful modernization and by the imitation of Japanese methods they hoped to facilitate the process of modernization also in Siam. Consequently, General P. Phibunsongkhram created the "Thai nationalization and cultural assimilation policy" to force all minority ethnic groups to become Thai. The policy deeply affected many ethnic groups since it contained the legal punishment to persons who did not obey the law. In the case of Melayu Muslims, many were taken to the police station because they wore religious clothing. Furthermore, the government revoked the law concerning the Friday religious celebration, abolished religious judgment and called Melayu as "Thai Islam".

Comparing these two assimilation policies, Thai nationalization and cultural assimilation policy of 1939-1944 and the Japanese assimilation policy over Okinawa in 1879, their similarity in terms of time can be easily noticed.⁴⁷ Legal framework are even shorter since Pattani was annexed as a part of Siam under Anglo-Siamese Treaty in 1909, whereas Ryukyu was annexed into Japan in 1879.

After Okinawa had been annexed into Japan in 1879, the Meiji government introduced an assimilation

⁴⁷ The Japanese assimilation in Okinawa had preceded its Thai counterpart by 60 years.

policy. First change concerned the shift of power, from the King of Ryukyus to the commissioner from Tokyo. Secondly, the land tenure system was transformed from community ownership to private ownership. That change resulted in the establishment of citizenship consciousness due to work for the prefecture instead of work for the community. Furthermore, the Japanese government assimilated Okinawan people by using both educational (the obligation to send children to Japanese schools) and linguistic constraints (the obligation to use solely Japanese names).

The Japanese assimilation policy over Okinawa during 1879-1941 seemed to succeed to build up royalty among Okinawan people who were eager to serve in the Japanese army during the Pacific War. Okinawa was the only part of Japanese territory where the battle took place. The tragic consequences of the battle include more than 62,000 died civilians and more than 10,000 had to hide in caves, forests or tombs.

According to the provisions of the Treaty of San Francisco (1952), Okinawa had remained under the American administration until 1972, looked to make The American authorities in Okinawa strived to transform the islands into the democracy model of Asia by allowing Okinawan people to have political rights, such as the right to vote. On the other hand, however, the USCAR (the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus) did not hesitate to use violence toward the Okinawan people who protested against sell of their lands for building American military.

Under American administration, Okinawan people wanted to become independent of Americans. Some wanted to return to Japan, while others wanted Okinawa to be an independent state. In 1961, Okinawa labor unions, established the People's Union for Okinawan Civil Liberties, which had more 13,000 members. During the Vietnam War in 1968, Okinawan people, led by students of the University of the Ryukyus protested in Kaneda Air Base and asked an American soldier to join in a peace demonstration. Finally, the USA returned Okinawa to Japan on May 15, 1972.

2.3 “The Differences in Nation Imagine”: Turning points during and after World War II.

In the context of modern nation-states as above mentioned, Pattani was annexed to be a part of Siam under the Anglo-Siamese Treaty in 1909, followed the example of Okinawa that was annexed to Japan thirty years earlier – in 1879.

The important difference between these two cases concerns the character of the assimilation process. The authorities decided to introduce the assimilation policy not in in 1909, when Pattani was annexed to Siam, but 30 years later in 1939 during the General P. Phibunsongkhram era. In the case of Okinawa, on the other hand, the assimilation policy has been adopted immediately after Okinawa was annexed to Japan in 1879.

Moreover, the creation of the modern nation-states of Siam and Japan were different. As Jitpiromsri (2007) mentions “the King Rama IV created the Thai modern nation-state by copying the systems of the Dutch colony in Jawa and the British colony in India and Malaya, not British and German systems directly. In contrast, the modern Japan nation-state had been created under the rule of Emperor Meiji by establishing a modern military and education system to serve Japanese nationalism.

Based on the cases of both Pattani and Okinawa, the “creation of modern nation-state, a creation process of cultural identity” through “assimilation policy” for common imagination of a nation, could be analyzed.

In the case of Pattani, after being annexed to Siam in 1909, Siam did not succeed in the building up the

same imagination of the nation among the Melayu Muslims, but Siam also did not push the native Melayu people, who had different “imagination of nation” much more faraway from central Thai like the assimilation policy in 1939 had done. Prior to the adoption of policy, Siam might be resistant to the native Melayu people, but the state authorities had never been as violent as in the case of “Dusongor incidence” which had been mentioned as the beginning of Pattani separatism.


In the case of Okinawa, the Japanese assimilation policy that had been introduced in 1879 and was continued over the span of sixty-six years until the end of the Pacific War (1945), did not succeed in building the strong sense of being Japanese among the Okinawan people. The turning point occurred after Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, due to the fact that the presence of the US military bases has resulted in the sense of betrayal among Okinawan people, and became the start of the ongoing campaign against the US military bases.

Considering the period after the turning point as mentioned above, the anti-government in both areas, namely the separatist groups in Pattani, Thailand and the anti-American military bases movement in Okinawa, all occurred after the period (see figure1 below). And we can say that the anti-government in both areas are the variable of continuing conflict in both area nowadays.

Summary

For summary of this research, I would like to argue that colonization and the pressure from the western countries (British to Siam and United States of America to Japan) influenced both Siam and Japan to reform country to modern nation state. The creation of the modern nation state led to the annexation of Pattani by Siam and of Okinawa by Japan. Followed by assimilation policy for nation building until the end of WWII. Then, there are occurring of some anti-government movements in the both areas which are significant variable of the conflicts namely insurgency in Pattani, Thailand and anti-American military base issue in Okinawa, Japan. Therefore, I propose that the creation of modern nation state of Siam and Japan resulted the conflicts in Pattani and Okinawa. The conflict itself is “marginality” and the creation of modern nation state is “marginalization”. (see figure1)

Figure 1: The Conflict and Marginalized Process of Pattani and Okinawa



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Digital Humanities Research Approach for Folksongs Studies

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Abstract

This research aims to use digital humanities research approach to the scholarly community by giving a view on how semantic ontology and advanced information technology can enhance the research on folk songs in GMS. Semantic ontology development processes comprised of four interrelated phases: (1) Content analysis of GMS Folksongs from key resources, (2) Analysis of existing metadata schema for folk songs, (3) Organization of the knowledge on folk songs in the GMS by using the domain analytic approach in order for ontology development, and (4) Development of an ontology. In all phases, knowledge domains and ontologies on folk songs were analyzed, captured, structured and revised, and finally evaluated by the experts in the field of folklore studies, literary studies, Asian studies and ontology development. The results of this research were (1) Knowledge organization of GMS folk songs. The knowledge on GMS folk songs was divided into 8 concepts including Genres, Purpose of creation, Moods, Features, Occasions, Languages, Ethnic groups, and Place of origins. (2) Domain ontology of GMS folk songs. Approximately 123 concepts of folk songs on GMS were defined and classified into classes and sub-classes, including some necessary scope notes and semantic network relationships of the domains. The ontology was developed by using Hozo Ontology Editor. This developed ontology will be useful for the development of semantic knowledge-based system of GMS folk songs in the next steps of this research.

Keywords: Digital Humanities, Folksong ontology, Greater Mekong Sub-Region, Thai studies

1. Introduction

Folksong is a type of folklore, classified in a group of verbal knowledge which includes folktale and riddle. Folksongs are the songs originated among the people of a country or community, passed by oral tradition from one generation to the next, often existing in several versions, and marked generally by simple, modal melody and stanzaic, narrative verse. The contents of folksongs or lyrics usually express the stories about people and the important issues in their lives, therefore it contain the stories about the

history, ways of life, tradition, culture, places, events, or even the social-economic and political situations of the country or community. It is no doubt that folksongs have been one of the essential resources for the researchers in folklore studies, sociology, and anthropology to explore about the historical development and traditional culture of the society (Leopenwong, 2009; Kaewboonma & Tuamsuk, 2016). The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) is a natural economic area bound together by the Mekong River, covering 2.6 million square kilometers and a combined population of around 326 million. The GMS countries are Cambodia, the People's Republic of China (PRC, specifically Yunnan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region), Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The rich human and natural resource endowments of the Mekong region have made it a new frontier of Asian economic growth. Indeed, the Mekong region has the potential to be one of the world's fastest growing areas (Asian Development Bank, 2017).

Music of the Mekong River like the Yangtze, the Nile, and the Mississippi, the Mekong River in Southeast Asia is a giver of life; countless communities depend on it for their existence. Like these other rivers as well, the Mekong River means more than environmental and economic stability—it has taken on a cultural significance in each of the areas it touches and inspired a dazzling array of ritual, musical, and artistic expressions. The Mekong flows through regions of enormous ethnic and cultural diversity on its journey from the melting glaciers of the Tibetan Plateau, in China's Qinghai Province, to the Pacific Ocean in southern Vietnam some 3,000 miles away. Traversing Myanmar (Burma), Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia, the river passes through steep mountain gorges, daunting rapids, and immense alluvial plains in six nations. Its watershed encompasses 85 percent of Laos and Cambodia, one-third of Thailand, and smaller parts of Vietnam, Myanmar, and China. The music of the more than 60 million people who live in the Mekong basin reflects this vast diversity (Smithsonian Institution, 2017).

In the last decades, the use of ontologies in information systems has become more and more popular in various fields, such as web technologies, database integration, multi agent systems, natural language processing, etc. Artificial intelligent researchers have initially borrowed the word “ontology” from Philosophy, then the word spread in many scientific domain and ontologies are now used in several developments. There are several types of ontologies. The word “ontology” can designate different computer science objects depending on the context. For example, ontology can be: (i) a thesaurus in the field of information retrieval or (ii) a model represented in OWL in the field of linked-data or (iii) a XML schema in the context of databases and etc. (Roussey *et al.*, 2011).

In this research, we examine the view of how semantic ontology and advanced information technology can enhance the research on folksongs in the GMS.

2. Digital Humanities Research Approach

Burdick *et al.* (2012) describe the ‘Digital Humanities’ is born of the encounter between traditional humanities and computational methods with the migration of cultural materials into networked environments, questions regarding the production, availability, validity, and stewardship of these materials present new challenges and opportunities for humanists. In contrast with most traditional forms of scholarship, digital approaches are conspicuously collaborative and generative, even as they remain grounded in the traditions of humanistic inquiry. This changes the culture of humanities work as well as the questions that can be asked of the materials and objects that comprise the humanistic

corpus.

Computation, relies on principles that are, on the surface, at odds with humanistic methods. Specifically, computation depends on disambiguation at every level, from encoding to the structuring of information. The second level involves *Processing* in ways that conform to computational capacities, and these were explored in the first generation of digital scholarship in stylometrics, concordance development, and indexing.

Both *computational* foundations and *processing* activities have endured, but other platforms, tools, and infrastructures have also developed to support *curation*, *analysis*, *editing*, and *modeling*. These depend upon the basic building blocks of digital activity: **digitization**, **classification**, **description** and **metadata**, **organization**, and **navigation**. Designing and building digital projects depend on knowledge of these fundamentals and on a nuanced understanding of the networked environments in which the projects will develop and variously reside.

3. Related Work

Rho *et al.* (2009) propose Context-based Music Recommendation (COMUS) ontology for modeling user's musical preferences and context for supporting reasoning about the user's desired emotion and preferences. The COMUS (Context-based Music Recommendation) ontology consists of about 500 classes and instances, and 52 properties definitions. It's provides an upper Music Ontology that captures concepts about the general properties of music such as title, artists and genre and also provides extensibility for adding domain-specific ontologies, such as *Music Feature*, *Mood* and *Situation*, in a hierarchical manner. This ontology describes music related information about relationships and attributes that are associated with people, genre, mood (e.g., sad, happy, gloomy), location (e.g., home, office, street), time (e.g., morning, spring), and situation events (e.g., waking-up, driving, working) in a daily life. The key top-level elements of the ontology consist of classes and properties that describe User Preference, Music, Situation, Mood, and Genre classes (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Overview of Music Recommendation System (Rho et al., 2009).




Figure 2: Overview of the Event ontology (Raimond et al., 2007)

Raimond *et al.* (2007) describe the Music Ontology (MO): a formal framework for dealing with music-related information on the Semantic Web, including *editorial*, *cultural* and *acoustic* information. The Music Ontology model for music production is based on a chain of events, from the composition of a musical work to a recording of one of its performances. This enables the ontology to be very descriptive and easily extensible. The Music Ontology builds on four main ontologies: 1) FOAF, a vocabulary for describing people, groups of people and organizations. 2) The Event Ontology, a vocabulary for describing events, from 'this performance happened on that date' to 'this is the chorus of that song' (see Figure 2). 3) The Timeline Ontology, a vocabulary for describing time intervals and instants on multiple (possibly related) timelines, e.g. an audio signal's timeline, and 4) The FRBR ontology, a vocabulary for describing works, expressions, manifestations and items and their relationships, as defined by the Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records.

Tai *et al.* (2008) provided an example of how to build 'Yamiontology' from traditional songs by employing Protégé. For the aspect of Yami Nouns, categorized the nouns into 10 basic noun categories following *WordNet*, including entity, abstraction, psycho-feature, natural phenomena, activity, event, group, location, possession, and stage (see Figure 3). For the sake of correctly linking meanings of each word, the ontology builder can check the ontology with the DL Query Tab in Protégé. The connection between the two items minangyid, "reached the harbor" and "to hold a new workhouse celebration," shown in shadow in Figure 4, is solely based on the structure of the inputs, since each of them are from a different domain of verbs. This structure is in harmony with Yami custom and contextual structure.




Figure 3: An example of four Yami nouns in the ontology of Yami lyrics (Tai *et al.* (2008))




Figure 4: An example of three Yami verbs in the ontology of Yami lyrics (Tai *et al.* (2008))

4. Semantic Web and Ontology

4.1 Ontology Classifications

Several classifications of ontologies have been presented in the literature (Kaewboonma, 2014; Borgo 2007; Agrawal, 2005; Gomez-Perez *et al.* 2004; Fensel, 2003; Lassila and McGuinness 2001).

Among others, the following ontology types can be distinguished:

- 1) *Terminological ontologies* such as lexicons specify the terms that are used to represent knowledge in the domain of discourse.
- 2) *Information ontologies* which specify the record structure of databases.
- 3) *Knowledge modeling ontologies* specify conceptualizations of a knowledge area. Compared to information ontologies, knowledge modeling ontologies usually have a richer internal structure.

- 4) *Application ontologies* contain all the definitions that are needed to model the knowledge required for a particular application. Typically, application ontologies are a mix of concepts that are taken from domain ontologies and from generic ontologies.
- 5) *Domain ontologies* are reusable in a given specific domain. These ontologies provide vocabularies about concepts within a domain and their relationships, about the activities taking place in that domain, and about the theories and elementary principles governing the domain.

4.2 Ontology Engineering

Ontological Engineering refers to the set of activities that concern the ontology development process, the ontology life cycle, as well as the methodologies, tools and languages required for building ontologies (Ontology Engineering Group, 2015). Ontology engineering aims at building a formal representation of domain knowledge and creating a common understanding of the structure of information in the domain among people or software agents (Predoiu & Zhdanova, 2007; Studer, Benjamins, & Fensel, 1998; Gruber, 1995). The summaries of major ontology development process are shown in Table 1.

Researcher	Development process
Noy & McGuinness (2001) <i>Ontology Development 101: A Guide to Creating Your First Ontology</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Determine the domain and scope of the ontology 2) Consider reusing existing ontologies 3) Enumerate important terms in the ontology 4) Define the classes and the class hierarchy 5) Define the properties of classes (slots) 6) Define the facets of the slots 7) Create instances
Fernandez et al. (1997) <i>METHONTOLOGY: From Ontological Art Towards Ontological Engineering</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Speciation 2) Knowledge Acquisition 3) Conceptualization 4) Integration 5) Implementation 6) Evaluation 7) Documentation
Uschold & King (1995) <i>Towards a Methodology for Building Ontologies</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Identify purpose 2) Building the ontology <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2.1. Ontology capture 2.2. Coding 2.3. Integrating existing ontologies 3) Evaluation 4) Documentation
Gruninger & Fox (1995) <i>Methodology for the Design and Evaluation of Ontologies</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Motivating Scenario 2) Informal Competency Questions 3) First-Order Logic: Terminology 4) Formal Competency Questions 5) First-Order Logic: Axioms 6) Completeness Theorems

Table 1: Summary of major ontology development process.

4.3 The Ontology Languages for the Semantic Web

Gomez-Perez and Corcho (2002) analyze the most representative ontology languages created for the Web and compare them using a common framework. Ontology languages, several ontology languages have been developed during the last few years, and they will surely become ontology languages in the context of the Semantic Web. Some of them are based on XML syntax, such as Ontology Exchange Language (XOL), SHOE (which was previously based on HTML), and Ontology Markup Language (OML), whereas Resource Description Framework (RDF) and RDF Schema are languages created by World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) working groups. Finally, two additional languages are being built on top of RDF(S)—the union of RDF and RDF Schema—to improve its features: Ontology Inference Layer (OIL) and DAML+OIL.

However, Pulido et al. (2006) describes that the Ontology Web Languages (OWL) is the result of some hard-work carried out by the experts and semantic web enthusiasts. OWL, it now an standard ontology languages for the semantic web. It is compatible with early ontology languages, including SHOE, DAML + OIL, and provides the engineer more power to express semantics. It includes conjunction, disjunction, existentially, and universally quantified variables. Reasoners can make use of this to carry out logical inferences and derive knowledge.

4.4 The Ontology Building Tools

Ontology tools can be applied to all stages of the ontology life cycle including the creation, population, implementation, and maintenance of ontologies (Polikoff, 2003). Youn and McLeod (2006) said that the XML is not suited to describe machine-understandable documents and interrelationships of resources in ontology (Gunther, 1998). Therefore, the W3C has recommended the use of RDF, RDFS, DAML+OIL, and OWL. Since then, many tools have been developed for implementing the metadata of ontologies by using these languages.

There are several ontology languages like XML, RDF(S), DAML+OIL, and OWL that are used to implement tools for implementing the metadata of ontologies. For example, *Protégé* (developed by Stanford Medical Informatics), *Oiled* (developed by the Information Management Group of the CS Department at the University of Manchester, United Kingdom), *Apollo* (developed by the Knowledge Media Institute of Open University, United Kingdom), *OntoEdit* (developed by Ontoprise of Germany), *WebODE* (developed by the Technical School of Computer Science in Madrid, Spain), *KAON* (developed by the FZI Research Center and the AIFB Institute of the University of Karlsruhe, Germany), and *Hozo* (developed by Department of Knowledge Science, The Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research, Osaka University).

5. Using Ontology to Capture and Share Knowledge on GMS Folksongs

In this research, we using the ontology of digital humanities methods to capture and share knowledge on GMS Folksongs. The purpose of this study was to extend previous research on knowledge organization of the GMS that aims to analyze and organize the knowledge on GMS folksongs by using the knowledge organization concept. The knowledge on GMS Folksongs can be divided into 8 concepts including Genres, Purpose of Creation, Moods, Features, Occasions, Languages, Ethnic groups, and Place of origins. 123 concepts of folk songs on GMS were defined and classified into classes and sub-classes (Kaewboonma & Tuamsuk, 2016). The knowledge concepts must be able to link the relationships between concepts and

sub-concepts. The semantic network of the concepts of GMS Folksongs is shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Semantic network of GMS Folksong




Figure 6: Wholeness Concept Tree of GMS Folksong

This semantic network of the concepts of GMS folksongs describes folksongs (Figure 6) related information about relationships and attributes that are associated with *Place of Origins* (e.g., Laos, Guangxi, Yunnan, Thailand), *Ethnic Groups* (e.g., Khmer, Han, Lao Tai, Bamar, Thai, Kinh people), *Occasions* (e.g., Festivals, Seasons, Rituals), *Genres* (e.g., Ballads, Love songs, Lullabies, Songs of praise, Soul stirring songs, Religious songs, Work songs), *Moods* (e.g., Pleasure, Displeasure), *Languages* (e.g., Khmer, Southwest Mandarin, Mandarin Chinese, Lao, Burmese, Thai, Vietnamese) and *Features* (e.g., Form, Melody, Rhythm, Sounds, Texture).

Furthermore, advanced information technology can enhance the research on folk songs in GMS such as Semantic Web & Linked Data. For example, Huber et al. (2014) reported on the Linked Open Data Enhancer (LODE) framework developed as part of the Linked Humanities project. LODE can be support non-technical users to enrich a local RDF repository with high-quality data from the Linked Open Data cloud. LODE links and enhances the local RDF repository without compromising the quality of the data. In particular, LODE supports the user in the enhancement and linking process by providing intuitive user-interfaces and by suggesting high-quality linking candidates using tailored matching algorithms. Frontini et al. (2015) presented an algorithm to perform NEL on a corpus of 19th century literary criticism, with the specific goal of disambiguating and referencing author mentions for research purposes. The NEL module is meant to be used in combination with a NER module, and will help researchers in the creation of digital literary editions enriched with information about authors. The main purpose of this work is to help scholars in history of literature to perform complex queries in order to study the literary appreciation of authors over time, and investigate the history of literary criticism in French literature. More specifically the enrichment of the aforementioned “Corpus critique” is meant to enhance ongoing research in the history of scientific ideas, and to provide a way to follow the dissemination of theories and concepts defined by Charles Darwin, Claude Bernard, and Henri Bergson in non-scientific texts of their time.

For semantic retrieval of music metadata can be easily achieved by using semantic query languages such as the *SPARQL* query language. SPARQL can benefit from the semantics made explicit by the XSD2OWL and XML2RDF mapping. It can, as well, exploit the results of semantic rules for metadata integration in order to retrieval all the related multimedia information for a given query (Prud'hommeaux and Seaborne, 2007; Kompatsiaris and Hobson, 2008).

```
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#FolkSongs" />|
</owl:ObjectProperty>
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="has_Artists">
  <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="#hasAttribute" />
  <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#FolkSongs" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="has_DateOfCreation">
  <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="#hasAttribute" />
  <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#FolkSongs" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="has_PlaceOfOrigin">
  <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="#hasPart" />
  <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#FolkSongs" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="has_PurposeOfCreation">
  <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="#hasPart" />
  <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#FolkSongs" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="has_Occasions">
  <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="#hasPart" />
  <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#FolkSongs" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="has_TimeOfOrigin">
  <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="#hasAttribute" />
  <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#FolkSongs" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="has_Language">
  <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="#hasPart" />
  <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#FolkSongs" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="has_Genre">
  <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="#hasPart" />
  <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#FolkSongs" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="has_OtherNames">
  <rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="#hasAttribute" />
  <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#FolkSongs" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>
```

Figure 7: Example of Occasion of Performing and Place of Origins concepts represented in OWL syntax.

In this section, we will illustrate how GMS Folksongs Ontology can be used to support ontology reasoning for Semantic Search System (Search with meanings). The example questions describe how the ontology can be used for reasoning about the user's Genres, Occasions, Moods, and Place of origins (Figure 7).

- Q1: What kinds of folksong should kids listen before sleeping?
(Concept >Genres, Sub-concept >Lullabies)
- Q2: What kinds of folksongs should user listen in a wet season rice crop?
(Concept >Occasions, Sub-concept >Seasons)
- Q3: What kinds of folksongs does user listen to when user feels cheerful?
(Concept >Moods, Sub-concept >Pleasure)
- Q4: What kinds of folksongs originated in Guangxi?
(Concept >Place of origin, Sub-concept >China)

6. Example Semantic Based Information Retrieval

Semantic information retrieval tries to go beyond traditional methods by defining the concepts in documents and in queries to improve retrieval that there is a current trend toward content based or

semantic, retrieval. In a similar manner semantic based information retrieval is the next evolution of text IR. The main methods for accomplishing semantic based IR are ontologies, semantic networks, and the semantic web. Ontologies and semantic networks can bring domain specific knowledge that allows for better performance. The semantic web, which has been a big buzz word for the past years, promises to bring semantic information in the form of standardized metadata (Ren & Bracewell, 2009).

The example research project of Rho et al. (2009) proposed context-based music recommendation (COMUS) ontology for modeling user's musical preferences and context for supporting reasoning about the user's desired emotion and preferences. The COMUS provided an upper music ontology that captures concepts about the general properties of music such as title, artists and genre and also provided extensibility for adding domain-specific ontologies, such as Music Feature, Mood and Situation, in a hierarchical manner. The ontology can express detailed and complicated relations among the music, moods and situations, enabling users to find appropriate music for the application (Figure 8).




Figure 8: Screenshot of Music Recommendation System (Rho et al., 2009)

7. Conclusions

In this paper, we examine the view of how semantic ontology and advanced information technology can enhance the research on folksongs in the GMS. We have developed GMS folk songs ontology based on the knowledge organization of GMS folk songs as part of ongoing research on developing semantic digital libraries of GMS folk songs. We used the ontology of digital humanities methods to capture and share knowledge on GMS Folksongs. The knowledge on GMS Folksongs can be divided into 8 concepts including Genres, Purpose of Creation, Moods, Features, Occasions, Languages, Ethnic groups, and Place of origins. The knowledge concepts must be able to link the relationships between concepts and sub-concepts. The semantic network of the concepts of GMS folksongs describes folksongs related information about relationships and attributes that can be used to support ontology reasoning for semantic search system (Search with meanings).

8. Acknowledgement

This research is supported by the Digital Humanities Research Group, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Khon Kaen University, Thailand.

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Japanese Rolling Stock on Thai Railways: From Steam Locomotives to Shinkansen?

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Abstract

This article aims to analyze the role of Japanese rolling stock on Thai Railways. There were three waves of importing Japanese rolling stock into Thailand. The first wave was the influx of Japanese rolling stock in the 1930s and 1940s, especially steam locomotives and freight wagons, for both civilian and military purposes. The second wave was the import of Japanese rolling stock for the rehabilitation and modernization of State Railways of Thailand (SRT) during the latter half of the 20th century. The third wave was the first import of electric multiple units (EMUs) for Bangkok's urban railway, or the Purple line, in the 2010s, and the import of EMUs for both urban railways and high-speed railways will follow.

The Japanese rolling stock on Thai railways contributed to the rehabilitation and modernization of SRT while Thailand used to be the important market for Japanese rolling stock manufacturers. However, as Japanese rolling stock has been losing its competitiveness in terms of cost, its leading role on the traditional SRT lines as well as on the urban railways, came to be challenged by other countries' rolling stock. On the other hand, Thailand still needs the import of railway system as a package, including rolling stock, signal and power system, operation system, and marketing, to develop its new railway system such as urban railways and high-speed railways. Therefore, Japan should change its policy from the export of rolling stock to the export of railway system, and aim to participate in railway operation business in Thailand.

Keywords: Railways, Japanese rolling stock, State Railways of Thailand (SRT)

1. Introduction

The 23-km Purple line, the fourth urban railway system in Bangkok, started its operation on August 6, 2016. Since it was the first urban railway that used Japanese rolling stock in Bangkok, many Japanese media reported its opening proudly. It was regarded as the first package-style export of urban railway that the Abe government promoted as one of the Japan's development strategies since a Japanese consortium was awarded the contract of railway-system, including the production of electric multiple units (EMUs), installing electric and mechanical (E&M) system, with 10-year maintenance⁴⁸. However,

⁴⁸ AS 2016/08/17 "Purple Line Jo."

there were almost no reports regarding to the problem of low ridership after its opening.

It is true that these EMUs are the first urban railway's Japanese rolling stock exported to Thailand. However, Thailand has been importing many Japanese rolling stock since the 1930s; Japanese rolling stock is still running on the State Railways of Thailand (SRT)'s conventional railways, although few Japanese know the fact. On the other hand, the recent arrival of new rolling stock for the SRT, either 20 diesel locomotives in 2015 or 115 air-conditioned sleepers in 2016, came from China. Only used rolling stock came from Japan during the past 20 years. Therefore, the trend in Thailand's rolling stock import from Japan is changing.

The real image of Japanese rolling stock on Thai railways has not yet been revealed. The author used to analyze the SRT's procurement of diesel locomotives between the 1950s and 1970s, and found that the ODA-based procurement resulted in the diversity of diesel locomotives of the SRT during the period (Kakizaki 2004, Kakizaki 2012). Ramaer's book also explained the history of rolling stock in Thailand, although it is not an academic book (Ramaer 2009). However, both did not reveal how many Japanese rolling stock imported into Thailand and how the trend of import changed. Therefore, this article aims to construct the real image of Japanese rolling stock on Thai railways since the 1930s and analyze the change of trend in import.

As for the materials, the number of Japanese rolling stock on Thai railways can be traced from both Thai sources and Japanese sources. The annual reports of the SRT (*Raingan Pracham Pi Kan Rotfai haeng Prathet Thai*: RRF) usually indicate the origin and number of new rolling stock put into service during each year. In Japan, the Nihon Tetsudo Sharyo Yushutsu Kumiai (Japan Overseas Rolling Stock Association, the present Japan Overseas Railway System Association) compiled its 50-year history, including the numbers of rolling stock and values exported to each country since the end of World War II, though recent data in 21st century has not yet compiled (Nihon Tetsudo Sharyo Yushutsu Kumiai 2003). By using these materials, it became possible to reveal the detailed situation of the import of Japanese rolling stock into Thailand.

2. The First Wave: Japanese Rolling Stock in Early Period

2.1 The First Import of Japanese Rolling Stock

Japan has entered into the railway age in 1872 when the first railway between Tokyo and Yokohama opened. As many late-comer countries experienced, the construction of Japanese railways in early period had to depend on Western technology, including engineers, materials such as rails, and rolling stock. However, Japan tried to produce railway materials by itself together with its policy of industrialization. Japan started producing, or rather assembling, passenger carriages and freight wagons at state railway's workshops by importing parts such as wheels and couplers since the 1880s (Sawai 1998: 40). Then, the first steam locomotive was produced in 1893 under the supervision of Western engineers at state railways' workshop, followed by private manufacturers (Ibid.: 33-34). Japan ceased to import foreign steam locomotives by World War I; the nationalization of rolling stock was finally achieved.

Japan also started export of rolling stock during this period. The first export of rolling stock should have been the export to Taiwan, the Japanese colony, during the 1890s, mostly passenger carriages and freight wagons (Ibid.: 21-22). Then, Taiwan imported its first Japanese steam locomotive in 1901, which

was the first export of Japanese locomotive to abroad (Sakagami 2005: 7). Although Korea did not introduce Japanese rolling stock before World War I, it became another important market for Japanese rolling stock after the war (Sawai 1998: 86-87)⁴⁹. The South Manchurian Railway also became an important market for Japanese rolling stock during the 1930s after the “independence” of Manchuria in 1931 (Ibid.: 171-199)⁵⁰. With the few exceptions of export to China, most export of Japanese rolling stock was limited to its colonies.

In such circumstance, Thailand became one of the pioneer independent countries that imported Japanese rolling stock. Thailand has been importing its rolling stock from abroad, mainly from European countries by international bidding except some bodies of passenger carriage and freight wagons that were produced at its Makkasan workshop. In 1936, Thailand decided to order 300 freight wagons to Japan. According to a newspaper, twenty seven countries participated in this bidding and Japan, the second lowest bidder next to Belgian, gained the order since Thailand appreciated Japanese technical skill⁵¹. The bidder, the Mitsui Bussan Company, distributed the production to the members of Yayoi-kai, the association of Japanese rolling stock manufacturers: Nihon Sharyo Seizo, Kisha Seizo, Kawasaki Sharyo, and Tanaka Sharyo (Ibid.: 188)⁵². These wagons were the first Japanese rolling stock ordered by Thailand.

Then, Japan gained the order of eight Mikado-type steam locomotives in the same year⁵³. The bidder was also the Mitsui Bussan, and four manufactures: Nihon Sharyo Seizo, Kisha Seizo, Nihon Sharyo, and Hitachi Seisakusho, produced two cars each (Ibid.: 188). These locomotives arrived at Thailand in the same year and the result was quite satisfactory. Therefore, another eight-car order was also made in 1938, followed by twice six-car orders, totaling additional 20-car order (Ramaer 2009: 56). However, the locomotives of third and fourth orders arrived at Thailand after the outbreak of war as well as ten Pacific type locomotives ordered in the end of 1930s⁵⁴.

As a result, Japanese locomotives, totaling 38 cars, became the third largest part on Thai railways. As Figure 1 shows, German locomotives accounted for the largest part with 39 per cent, followed by Britain with 21 per cent and Japan with 16 per cent. While locomotives from other countries had longer history on Thai railways, Japanese locomotives rapidly increased since the latter half of 1930s. It might be the reflection of favorable attitude of Thailand toward Japan during the 1930s (Reynolds 1994: 10-15).

⁴⁹ Since the Korean railways were standard gauge railways, Japanese rolling stock manufacturers could not produce rolling stock for standard gauge in early period.


⁵⁰ After the “independence” of Manchuria, the South Manchurian Railway contracted with the Manchurian government to operate its state railways in 1932, which resulted in the rapid increase in rolling stock import from Japan [Sawai 1998: 175-182].

⁵¹ BTWM 1936/01/29 “Siam’s Railway Order.”

⁵² The Yayoi-kai was founded by leading five manufactures as a cartel [Sawai 1998: 133].

⁵³ BTWM 1936/03/02 “Railway Tenders.” The Mikado-type locomotive was the four-axis-drive locomotive, which was popular for freight train traction in Japan.

⁵⁴ The Pacific type locomotive was the three-axis-drive locomotive, which was also popular for passenger train traction in Japan.



2.2 Influx of Japanese Rolling Stock for Military Transport

During World War II, or the Pacific War, Japan brought its rolling stock to the Southern area (Southeast Asia) for military transport. Since almost all railways in Southeast Asia were the narrow gauge railways, either meter gauge or Cape gauge (1,067 mm), it was not difficult to bring Japanese Cape-gauge rolling stock into Southeast Asia. The most famous rolling stock was the C56-type steam locomotives that were mainly used on the Thai–Burma railway. Therefore, Japanese rolling stock for military transport emerged on Thai railways after the outbreak of war.

The C56-type locomotive was the three-axis-drive small tender locomotives for branch lines, produced during the 1930s (Ramaer 2009: 79). Among 160 cars produced in Japan, 90 cars were sent to the Southern area for military purpose in 1941. All of these cars were sent to Thailand and Burma, most of which were used for the construction and operation of the Thai–Burma line. Since it was the light axis-load locomotive for branch lines in Japan, it was quite suitable for the rapidly-constructed low-standard military railway as the Thai–Burma line (Hiroike 1971: 98-99). Apart from the C56-type, at least four C58-type locomotives, the larger three-axis-move locomotives, were brought into Thailand during the war. After the end of the war, Japanese rolling stock was taken over by the Allied and sold to Thailand. Therefore, Thailand bought 46 cars of C56-type locomotives and four C58-type locomotives (Ramaer 2009: 78-80).

Apart from Japanese locomotives, Japanese freight wagons were also brought into Thailand with larger number. Although the actual number of freight wagons from Japan is unknown, Thai historical materials show that at least more than 200 wagons had arrived at Bangkok port at the first stage of war. Table 1 shows the number of rolling stock arrived at Bangkok port during the former half of 1942, based on the materials regarding to the entry of Japanese vessels into Bangkok port. It shows that a total of 223 wagons arrived at Bangkok port. As far as these materials show, there was no arrival rolling stock after May 15, 1942. The reason of few locomotives recorded should have been the insufficient records during

December, 1941 and January, 1942⁵⁵. The Brett's report regarding to the Thai–Burma line indicates that 45 Japanese locomotives and 400 Japanese freight wagons were used on the Thai–Burma line (Brett 2006: 175). Supposed that some were directly sent to Burma, the number of freight wagons arrived at Bangkok might have been the realistic figure.

Table 1: Arrival of Japanese Rolling Stock at Bangkok Port during Worl War II (1942, in car)

Date	Number of Arrival			
	Locomotives	Freight Wagons	Unknown	Total
Jan 25	-	8	-	8
Jan 28	-	24	-	24
Feb 1	-	6	-	6
Feb 8	-	10	-	10
Feb 9	-	27	-	27
Feb 14	-	30	-	30
Mar 1	-	24	-	24
Mar 23	-	8	-	8
Mar 25	3	21	-	24
Apr 2	-	22	-	22
Apr 13	-	9	-	9
Apr 16	-	9	-	9
Apr 17	6	10	-	16
Apr 24	-	-	15	15
May 2	-	7	-	7
May 15	-	8	-	8
Total	9	223	15	247

Sources: NA Bo Ko. Sungsut 2. 4. 2/2.

Japanese rolling stock also played an important role in the military transport on Thai railways, especially on the Southern line. Figure 2 shows the number of Japanese rolling stock used for Japanese military transport. The use started in January, 1942 and its number reached almost 500 cars in the following month. After that, the number of Japanese rolling stock differs in each month with several peaks. Although some were used on the Northern line during the former half of 1942 and on the Eastern line till the beginning of 1943, most cars were used on the Southern line. Its share on whole rolling stock used for Japanese military transport reached its peak of 10 per cent in January, 1943. The use of Japanese rolling stock on the Southern line should have been the through traffic with the Thai–Burma line, which was the center of Japanese rolling stock's working place.

2.3 Japanese Rolling Stock Bartered with Rice

After the end of War, many Japanese rolling stock was left in Thailand, mostly on the Thai–Burma line. The Allied took over all property of the Thai–Burma line, including rolling stock, and decided to sell the line within Thai territory to Thailand. In 1946, the British government agreed with Thailand to sell all

⁵⁵ The record started on December 25, 1941 but the details of freight were not mentioned until the middle of January, 1942.

property of the Thai–Burma line to Thailand with 1,250,000 pounds (Kratoska ed. 2006: 164-165). By this, all Japanese rolling stock on the Thai–Burma line became the property of Thailand. Although the actual number of rolling stock that Thailand gained was unknown, at least 58 locomotives and 531 wagons, among which 169 Japanese wagons were included, existed on the line as of September, 1945⁵⁶.




Figure 2: Numbers of Japanese Rolling Stock Used for Japanese Military Transport (1941/12-1945/09)

Note 1: The actual number of passenger carriages is a half since a bogie-carriage is converted as to two-axle wagons

Note 2: Excluding empty carriages/wagons

Sources: NA Bo Ko. Sungsut 2.4.1.6/3, NA Bo Ko. Sungsut 2.4.1.6/14, NA Bo Ko. Sungsut 2.4.1.6/25 and NA Bo Ko. Sungsut 2.4.1.6/27

During the war, the number of unusable rolling stock increased due to poor maintenance. As of the end of war, 105 out of 186 steam locomotives were unusable while 2,084 out of 3,915 freight wagons were in need of repair (Kakizaki 2012: 94). Therefore, Thailand seriously suffered from the shortage of rolling stock after the war. Although Thailand added 142 steam locomotives after the war, including those on the Thai–Burma line, the shortage of locomotive was not relieved⁵⁷. The shortage of rolling stock brought the shortage of transport capacity on Thai railways. At that time, food scarce was the serious problem in many countries and Thailand's surplus rice was in need of many countries. The International Emergency Food Commission (IECF) was responsible for rice allocation from Thailand and asked Thailand to increase its rice surplus for export. However, Thailand replied that the shortage of rolling stock hampered the rice transport from the Northeast to Bangkok (Ibid.: 96).

⁵⁶ NA Bo Ko. Sungsut 2. 4. 1. 2/21 "Samruet Phanthong Thueng O. Do. Pho. Ro. Fo. 1945/10/03"

⁵⁷ Apart from 50 Japanese locomotives, 6 locomotives from Java and 18 locomotives from Malaya that were used on the Thai–Burma line, Thailand purchased 68 American locomotives [Kakizaki 2004: 3, Kakizaki 2012: 96].

The U.S. Force in Japan showed interest in it. Since it desired large volume of rice for Japan and the Korean Peninsula, it suggested the barter between Japanese rolling stock and Thai rice (Ibid.). That is, Japan would send rolling stock for Thailand, which would enable to transport rice from the Northeast to Bangkok before exporting to Japan. The U.S. Force aimed not only the secure of rice but also the rehabilitation of Japanese rolling stock industry that were badly damaged by the war. As a result, Thailand ordered 50 steam locomotives, 200 passenger carriages and 500 freight wagons from Japan in 1948 (Ibid.: 96-97). It was the first barter between rice and rolling stock. Then, Thailand re-ordered 50 steam locomotives and 500 wagons from Japan in 1950, which was the last order of steam locomotives in Thailand.

As such, the number of Japanese rolling stock on Thai railways further increased: a total of 288 Japanese steam locomotives were brought into Thailand within 16 years between 1936 and 1951, including 50 used-locomotives as war surplus. Although the share of Japanese rolling stock before the war was only 16 per cent, its share should have rose to 70 per cent in 1951, supposed that all Japanese locomotives were still in use⁵⁸. The first wave of Japanese rolling stock during this period was the rapid influx of Japanese rolling stock in Thailand, which resulted in the dominance of Japanese rolling stock over other countries' rolling stock on Thai Railways. Japan secured Thailand as an important rolling stock market within a short period.

3. The Second Wave: Japanese Rolling Stock for State Railways of Thailand

3.1 Import of Japanese Rolling Stock for Rehabilitation


The former Department of State Railways was converted into a state enterprise as the State Railways of Thailand (SRT) in 1951. As the former Department of State Railways ordered Japanese rolling stock in its last stage, the SRT succeeded the trend, which was the reason of high share of Japanese rolling stock import during the era of rehabilitation.

Figure 3 shows the numbers and shares of Japanese rolling stock imported during the era of rehabilitation⁵⁹. It indicates that the number of Japanese rolling stock imported during this period was 1,836 cars, accounting for 83 per cent of the total import. The highest share is the share of diesel railcar with 100 per cent, followed by passenger carriage with 92 per cent, although the actual numbers of import were small comparing with freight wagons. On the other hand, the share of diesel locomotive was only 35 per cent. It can be concluded that Japan's competitiveness was high in the field of diesel railcars, passenger carriages and freight wagons. Although it is unknown how the SRT ordered its rolling stock during the former half of 1950s, the international bidding should have been conducted just same as the former Department of State Railways. Then, the procurement of rolling stock by loan came to be majority. The SRT signed the first loan from the World Bank in 1950, which mainly aimed at the rehabilitation of the Makkasan workshop (Kakizaki 2017a: 112-113). It was true that the SRT demanded to purchase rolling stock by using loan, but the World Bank advised that the rehabilitation of workshop should have been done before procuring new rolling stock. Therefore, the second loan from the World

⁵⁸ Calculating from the total number of steam locomotives with 412 cars in 1951 [RRF (for 1951): 22-25].

⁵⁹ Although the actual era of rehabilitation ended in 1957 before entering into the era of development, this figure includes the number of import until 1961 since there was a time lag between order and delivery.

Bank in 1955 included the procurement of rolling stock: 30 diesel locomotives, 170 passenger carriages, and 844 freight wagons, for the first time (Ibid.: 89).



Since the World Bank required international bidding for the procurement, the SRT had to call international bidding under the supervision of the bank. Such international bidding was advantageous for Japanese manufacturers whose price was basically lower than European and American suppliers. The most interesting example was the bidding of 30 diesel locomotives in 1955. In this bidding, the Japan's Hitachi submitted the lowest price of US\$ 98,900 per car among eight companies considered by the SRT. Although it was overwhelmingly lower than the second lowest price of US\$ 140,000 per car, many SRT officials insisted to select the General Electric of the United States since they doubted the quality of Japanese diesel locomotives (Kakizaki 2012: 100). As a result, five Hitachi locomotives were ordered for trial use, which arrived at Thailand in 1958. It was the first export of diesel electric locomotives from Japan. Then, despite some objections, the remaining 25 locomotives were finally ordered to Hitachi in 1959 (Ibid.).

3.2 Import of Japanese Rolling Stock for Modernization

After entering into the era of development, started by the entrance of Sarit into political field in 1958, Thailand changed its transport policy to road-oriented policy, emphasizing on the construction of high standard highways in all over Thailand. Such road-oriented policy collapsed the monopoly of railways on inter-regional transport. The first high standard highway: the Friendship highway between Saraburi and Khorat, deprived the parallel railway of both passenger and freight transport. Therefore, the SRT had to cope with the competition by modernizing its service. Therefore, the dieselization was the main measures of modernization in the field of rolling stock.

Figure 4 shows the number of Japanese rolling stock imported during the era of development between 1962 and 1975. During this period Thailand imported a total of 1,519 cars among which 1,179 cars came

from Japan, accounting for 56 per cent. The share of diesel railcars was the highest with 100 per cent, followed by passenger carriages with 97 per cent while there was no Japanese diesel locomotives imported.




Figure 4: Numbers of Japanese Rolling Stock Imported during the Era of Development (1962-1975, in car)
 Sources: RRF (or various years)

During this period, the supply of diesel locomotives was monopolized by American, German, and French manufacturers (Kakizaki 2004: 5-8). It can be said that the share of Japanese rolling stock remained high although the actual share had dropped from 83 per cent in the era of rehabilitation.

As for the dieselization, Japan monopolized the diesel railcar market in Thailand. Thailand had already introduced its first diesel railcars before World War II, which were deteriorated by the war. Then, it ordered eighteen Japanese diesel railcars for the Maeklong line and put in service in 1959 (Kakizaki 2012: 131). The bidding of twenty diesel railcars for main line was held in the same year, and six were ordered to the Niigata Tekko, the Japanese manufacturer, for trial use. These railcars arrived at Thailand in 1961 and put into service in the following year (Ibid.). Since these cars were satisfactory for the SRT, the bidding for the remaining fourteen cars were also held, which was awarded to another Japanese manufacturer: the Tokyu Sharyo, and arrived at Thailand in 1966. Then, two more biddings for twenty and sixty-eight diesel railcars, respectively, were also awarded to Hitachi, which were put into service in 1967 and 1971, respectively (Ibid.)⁶⁰. As a result, all biddings of diesel railcars were awarded to Japanese manufacturers. The reason of monopoly by Japanese manufactures was that Japan had been developing both EMUs and diesel railcars rather than locomotives since Japan's narrow gauge railways could not bear heavy axis load of large locomotives (Aoki 1986: 217-218).

Japan's loan was used for the bidding of the last sixty-eight diesel railcars for the first time⁶¹. In fact,

⁶⁰ The bidding of sixty eight diesel railcars aimed to procure fifty six railcars (twenty eight sets) for main line and twelve railcars (three sets) for the Maeklong line.

⁶¹ NA Kho Kho. 0202. 9. 5. 3/384 "Banthuek Raingan Kan Prachum Dan Kitchakan Doen Rot lae Khonsong Khrang thi 15/2511. 1968/04/16"

Japan's special yen payment should have already been used for previous purchase of fourteen and twenty diesel railcars⁶². During this period, the official development aid (ODA) by Western countries came to be used for infrastructure development in Thailand. However, since these ODAs were tied-loan, the bidding restricted to the specific country's firms usually cost higher than international bidding⁶³. Therefore, it became common to call international bidding as the World Bank's loan program first and then switched to the ODA supplied by the winner's country.

3.3 The Last Supply

The SRT's import of rolling stock stagnated during the era of economic stagnation and boom between 1976 and 1997. The reasons of stagnation can be divided into two: the nationalization of rolling stock and the loss-ridden operation of SRT. During the era of development, the SRT tried to produce rolling stock by itself at its Makkasan workshop, and started producing passenger carriage and freight wagons vigorously since 1969. Although the production ceased in 1987, a total of 1,748 cars were produced during nineteen years⁶⁴. This nationalization policy brought the temporal suspension of importing new passenger carriages/freight wagons during the 1970s and the former half of 1980s.

Under the severe competition with road transport, the SRT came to see deficit since 1974. Although the actual reason was the skyrocketed oil price in previous year due to the oil shock, the SRT could not improve its financial situation after that; the cumulative deficit increased steadily. The procurement of new rolling stock became difficult for the loss-ridden SRT, especially after entering into the 1990s when the reformation of loss-ridden state enterprises became unavoidable. Therefore, the SRT had to cope with the shortage of its rolling stock by importing used rolling stock: 21 passenger carriages from Australia in 1995 and 26 diesel railcars and 28 passenger carriages from Japan in 1997. The import of new rolling stock temporary suspended since 1997 before importing 112 freight wagons in 2010.

Figure 5 shows the situation of Japanese rolling stock imported during this period. The number of new rolling stock recorded the lowest level of 834 cars. The share of Japanese rolling stock also recorded the lowest level. Although diesel railcars still maintain the majority, the share of passenger carriage fell to 39 per cent and no freight wagons were supplied by Japan. The absence of freight wagon import from Japan brought the lowest share of Japanese rolling stock with 23 per cent. The only positive change was the import of 22 diesel locomotives from Japan, which was the second Japanese diesel locomotive series after procuring 30 diesel locomotives during the 1950s. The manufacturer was also the same: the Hitachi.

The reason of decrease in import from Japan was the Japanese manufacturers' loss of price competitiveness in rolling stock market. Due to the yen's appreciation since the Plaza Accord in 1985, Japanese manufacturers suffered from disadvantage in export from Japan; they accelerated the shift of producing bases from Japan to abroad, especially in Southeast Asia. However, since demands were limited, it was difficult for the rolling stock manufacturers to shift their producing bases to abroad.

⁶² NA Kho Kho. 0202. 9. 5/32 "Banthuek Raingan Kan Prachum Rueang Kan Hai Khwam Hen Chop Phaenphang Kon San-ya Mi Phon Chai Bangkhap Samrap Rot Disenrang 7 Chut. 1965/08/27"

⁶³ The price for sixty eight diesel railcars submitted by Hitachi was about 10 per cent higher than the price for previous twenty-railcar bidding since only Japanese firms participated in the bidding.

⁶⁴ Composed by 406 passenger carriages and 1,342 freight wagons [RRF (for various years)].




Figure 5: Numbers of Japanese Rolling Stock Imported during the Era of Economic Stagnation and Boom (1976-1997, in car)
Sources: RRF (or various years)

Another reason was the catch-up of late comers such as Korea and China in railway industry. Since their producing cost was lower than Japanese manufacturers, they could suggest lower price, which resulted in the success in bidding.

Since tied-loan became uncommon during this period, the bidding by using Japan's ODA could not guarantee the Japanese manufacturers' win any more. For example, the order of 31 passenger carriages by Japan's ODA was awarded to Korean manufacturer, which were delivered in 1990 (RRF (for 1990): 34). The order of 312 freight wagons by Japan's ODA was also awarded to Chinese manufacturer, which were put in service in 1993 (RRF (for 1993): 35). The last win of Japanese manufacturers in bidding was the procurement of above-mentioned 22 diesel locomotives; they were the last new rolling stock to the SRT. As such, the second wave of Japanese rolling stock ceased by the 1990s. After entering into the 2000s, the procurement of new rolling stock became further difficult: the SRT suffered from the shortage of its rolling stock seriously. Under such situation, the railway market in Thailand has shifted from the SRT's conventional railways to the newly-created urban and high speed railways.

4. The Third Wave: Electric Multiple Units on Thai Railways

4.1 Failure of Supplying Subway's Rolling Stock

As the rapid increase in population at Bangkok, the traffic congestion became the serious problem since the 1960s. To solve traffic problem, both expressway and urban railway projects emerged during the 1970, among which the former preceded first; the first section of expressway opened in 1982 (Kakizaki 2014: 210-211). Although the first urban railway project did progress to some extent, with the reduction of initial network from 59 km to 39km, it was quite difficult to find a bidder to agree the condition that the bidder have to owe 75 per cent of total investment cost (Ibid.: 211-215). The first endeavor finally failed after the first contract to Canadian firm was revoked in 1992.

On the other hand, two urban railway projects emerged in the 1990s: the Hopewell project under the supervision of SRT and the Skytrain project under the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration. Both

adopted the Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) system; the contractor would build the system with its own capital and operate it until the contract would expire before transferring the asset to the owner. While the latter, later known as the BTS project, named after the contractor's name, got over several obstacles to reach the goal of opening in the end of 1999, the former met deadlocks and finally suspended due to the economic crisis in 1998 (Ibid.: 238-242).

As for the first urban railway project under the Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (ETA), the project revived during the 1990s by changing the previous lines to the 20-km Hua Lamphong–Bang Sue line, aiming at the BOT-type construction. However, since the government decided to permit only underground lines in central Bangkok, the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authority (MRTA), the successor of the ETA, changed original BOT system into two-tiered system; the MRTA would conduct the civil engineering work using Japan's ODA, and the private contractor would operate the train by procuring rolling stock and installing operation system (Ibid.: 184). Although the construction started in 1996, the selection of contractor delayed; the contract with the Bangkok Metro Company Limited (BMCL, the present Bangkok Expressway and Metro, or BEM) was finally signed in August, 2000 (RFM 2004: 52).

The BMCL called the bidding for supplying subway operation system, including the procurement of rolling stock, and four suppliers applied it: the consortium of Alstom and Mitsubishi from France and Japan, the Bombardier Group from Canada, the Japan Metro Consortium from Japan, and the Siemens from Germany⁶⁵. Since the price submitted by the first group was the lowest, it was selected as the preferred bidder⁶⁶. At first, Japan hoped that the Japan Metro Consortium would win the bidding. However, it changed to support the Alstom-Mitsubishi consortium since Japan's consortium could not cope with others in terms of price⁶⁷. The France-Japan consortium planned to produce rolling stock in France and use Japanese signal and power system.

However, the game was overturned at the last stage. The signing ceremony of contract between the BMCL and the Alstom-Mitsubishi consortium was suddenly cancelled on the day in October, 2001⁶⁸. Then, the BMCL announced in January, 2002 that it had already contracted with the Siemens⁶⁹. It explained the reason of sudden change that the Siemens discounted the price and guaranteed the delivery within 30 months while the Alstom-Mitsubishi consortium could not shorten the delivery period of 35 months⁷⁰. Since the Siemens had already supplied the 105 EMUs for the BTS, it aimed to monopolize Bangkok's urban railway market. As such, Japan could not participate in the procurement of first subway's rolling stock although its civil work was financed by Japan's ODA.

4.2 The First EMUs for Bangkok's Urban Railways

Although the first endeavor to supply Japanese rolling stock for Bangkok's urban railway failed, the MRTA's second line, the Purple line, finally selected Japanese EMUs in 2013, which were put into service since August, 2016. It was the third wave of Japanese rolling stock to Thailand and virtually the first

⁶⁵ BP (OE) 2000/09/08 "B16n Contract for Trains and Operating Equipment Signed."

⁶⁶ RGI (OE) 2002/02/01 "Siemens Scoops Bangkok Order."

⁶⁷ NKS 2002/01/30 "Nihon Kigyo Kyoso-ryoku ni Kageri."

⁶⁸ DN (OE) 2001/10/17 "Sen San-ya Phalit Rotfaifa Taidin Lom."

⁶⁹ BP (OE) 2002/01/10 "Siemens wins Contract to Supply Trains."

⁷⁰ RGI (OE) 2002/02/01 "Siemens Scoops Bangkok Order."

import of EMUs from Japan⁷¹.

The Purple line project emerged during the 2000s. Although the Thaksin government once decided to construct the 23-km Purple line between Bang Sue and Bang Yai in 2005 and called for bidding, the government suddenly cancelled it, claiming that it was found that this line would not be profitable (Kakizaki 2014: 267-269). After the collapse of Thaksin government, the interim government decided to construct it by using Japan's ODA as the former subway, or the Blue line in Bangkok's urban railway master plan. After bidding for civil engineering work was finished, the construction started in 2009 (Ibid.: 305).

As for the operation, the MRTA selected the contract operation system, or so-called public-private-partnership (PPP) gross-cost system, that the contractor would operate trains by receiving operation cost from the MRTA while the agency would receive whole fair revenue. It differed from the contract of subway that adopted the PPP net-cost system; the contractor operated trains and gained all fair revenue before dividing its profit to the MRTA. After the MRTA called the bidding in 2010, two existing operators: the BTS and the BMCL, applied it (RKK (for 2011): 126-127). Since the latter suggested the lower price, the contract was finally awarded to the latter in 2012⁷².

The BMCL had already announced the bidding for Purple line's operation system, including 63 EMUs, in 2011, and Japanese Consortium, led by the Marubeni and the Toshiba applied it⁷³. After the negotiation behind the closed doors, the Japanese Consortium was awarded the contract in 2013⁷⁴. These EMUs were the same series as those operating in the Yamanote line, the busiest urban railway in Tokyo, manufactured by the Japan Transport Engineering, or the former Tokyu Sharyo. They were delivered to Thailand in 2015, and the line officially opened in August, 2016. However, the existence of 1-km missing link between Taopun and Bang Sue resulted in small ridership on the line: about 22,000 passengers per day against initial estimate of 70,000 passengers (Kakizaki 2017b: 52).

Following the Purple line, another group of Japanese EMUs will be supplied for the Dark Red line under the SRT. The 23-km Dark Red line between Bang Sue and Rangsit is the succeeded project of former Hopewell plan with constructing four-track elevated railway for the SRT's long-distance passenger and freight trains and suburban EMU trains. Although it was also funded by Japan's ODA as the Purple line, the process before starting construction took longer time than the Purple line; the construction finally began in 2013⁷⁵. The bidding for procuring operation system, including rolling stock, was called in 2011, which was bid by four consortium: the Mitsubishi, Hitachi, and Sumitomo from Japan, the Siemens, Mitsubishi, and Cho. Kanchang consortium, the Marubeni, Italian Thai, and Hyundai Rotem consortium, and the Samsung Engineering⁷⁶. However, since only one group cleared the conditions that the SRT imposed, it became problem whether calling another bidding or not. After the SRT negotiated with the remaining bidder: the Japanese consortium, the contract was awarded to the Japanese consortium in

⁷¹ In fact, nine EMUs for the former electrified Paknam line were imported from Japan in 1949, although they were the small EMUs for light railway.

⁷² RGI (OE) 2012/10/23 "Bangkok Purple Line Contract Awarded."

⁷³ AS 2016/08/18 "Purple Line Chu."

⁷⁴ RGI (OE) 2013/11/06 "Toshiba and Marubeni Awarded Bangkok Purple Line Contracts."

⁷⁵ PCT (OE) 2013/04/08 "Lang Songkran Thup Nae."

⁷⁶ PCT (OE) 2011/04/21 "Chap Ta Pramun Sai Si Daeng Bang Sue-Rangsit Sut Uet."

2016⁷⁷. It was a turnkey contract, including design, supply and install of E&M system. As a result, the 130-Japanese EMUs will be added to Bangkok's urban railways by 2020.

4.3 Prospect for *Shinkansen* in Thailand

Following the Japanese EMUs for urban railways, the Japanese EMUs for high-speed railway, or *Shinkansen*, will be put into service in Thailand in the future. Since Thailand and Japan had already agreed to introduce *Shinkansen* on the Northern high speed line between Bangkok and Chiang Mai as the government-to-government (G to G) project, the emergence of *Shinkansen* in Thailand is guaranteed unless the agreement will be abandoned.

The *Shinkansen* is the first high-speed railway system in the world; the first Tokaido line between Tokyo and Osaka opened in 1964 with a maximum speed of 200 km/hour. As of 2017, there are seven Shinkansen lines opened for traffic with a total length of 2,537 km (Kaigai Tetsudo Gijutsu Kyoryoku Kyokai 2014: 23). The maximum speed is also rose to 320 km/hour in certain lines. The *Shinkansen* technology was firstly exported to Taiwan; the first 345-km Taiwanese high-speed railway opened in 2007 (Ibid.: 53). Following Taiwan, India has already agreed with Japan in 2015 that its first high-speed railway project between Mumbai and Ahmedabad will adopt the *Shinkansen* technology⁷⁸. Therefore, Thailand will be the third or fourth country that adopts the *Shinkansen* system.

The first high-speed railway plan appeared in Thailand during the 1990s as the Bangkok-Rayon high-speed railway via the planned new Bangkok international airport (Kakizaki 2012: 200). Although the plan finally failed, the part of line was materialized as the Airport Rail Link in 2010. The Thaksin government considered another high-speed railway between Bangkok and Khorat via the planned new town at Nakhon Nayok, which failed again (Ibid.). Then, the Railway Development Project in 2009 included four high-speed railway projects: the Bangkok-Chiang Mai line, the Bangkok-Nong Khai line, the Bangkok-Chanthaburi line, and the Bangkok-Padang Besar line. Although the Yingluck government tried to proceed the high-speed railway projects by appealing the so-called huge Two Trillion Baht Scheme, including four high-speed railways, it was finally collapsed by the coup de tat in 2014 (Kakizaki 2015a: 27-34).

The following Prayut interim government showed its attitude to review high-speed railway project at first, announcing the Transport Infrastructure Development Strategy in 2014 (Kakizaki 2015b: 28-32). While the plan omitted the former four high-speed railway projects, it included two middle-speed standard gauge lines between Nong Khai-Maptaphut and between Chiang Khong-Ban Phachi. Since the supposed lines would not reach Bangkok, it was obvious these lines aimed at freight transport, especially between Thailand and China. Since this change favored China, China showed its interest on the Nong Khai-Maptaphut line; the memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed in the end of 2014 to construct two middle-speed lines: the Bangkok-Nong Khai line and the Kaeng Khoi-Maptaphut line, totaling 867 km (Ibid.: 32-33). China had already been negotiating with the Aphisit government for the high-speed railway between Bangkok and Nong Khai, and with the Yingluck government for the construction between Bangkok and Chiang Mai. However, China's real object was to construct trans-Southeast Asian standard gauge line from China to Singapore and the construction plan in Laos was

⁷⁷ IRJ (OE) 2016/03/30 "Japanese Consortium Wins Bangkok Red Line E&M Contract."

⁷⁸ RGI (OE) 2015/12/04 "India and Japan Sign High Speed Rail Memorandum."

under negotiation; it aims to realize the Bangkok–Nong Khai line to connect with the planned Laos line. While the negotiation with China was proceeding, Thailand also asked Japan to cooperate the construction of standard gauge railways, especially the East-West Economic Corridor line between Tak and Mukdahan. However, since this line's profitability was doubtful, Japan suggested the construction of the high speed railway between Bangkok and Chiang Mai and the development of Southern Economic Corridor line between Kanchanaburi and Laem Chabang/Aranyaprathet (Ibid.: 35-36). At last, both countries signed the MOU in May, 2015 that Japan would cooperate with the feasibility study for the construction of high-speed railway between Bangkok and Chiang Mai by using *Shinkansen* technology and the development of Southern Economic Corridor railways (Ibid.: 37). It was the starting point of *Shinkansen* project in Thailand.

This decision was another setback of the high-speed railway policy of the Prayut government. Although it had already changed the former high-speed railway projects to the middle-speed railway projects, it again changed the policy to return to the high-speed railway. As for the middle-speed railway project with China, such setback also occurred in March, 2016 when the government announced that it would construct the section between Bangkok and Khorat as the high-speed railway at first stage after long negotiation with China met a deadlock⁷⁹.

5. Roles of Japanese Rolling Stock on Thai Railways

5.1 Leading Part for Modernizing Thai Railways

As we have examined above, many Japanese rolling stock has been imported to Thailand since the 1930s; at least more than 5,000 cars have been imported from Japan, including those for military transport during the war. Among the three waves of import, the second wave was the largest, especially during the 1950s and 1960s.

Table 2 shows the numbers of SRT's rolling stock produced domestically or imported from abroad between 1951 and 2015. The total number of produced/imported rolling stock was 7,931 cars among which Japanese rolling stock accounted for 3,636 cars, or 46 per cent of the total, which was the largest number and share. The number of domestic production was the second largest with 1,748 cars, followed by import from Belgium and China. As this table shows, it is obvious that the Japanese rolling stock has been the largest group in the SRT's rolling stock.

⁷⁹ KT (OE) 2016/03/24 "Lan Mai Ruam Chin Rueang Rotfai Reo Sung."

13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THAI STUDIES
GLOBALIZED THAILAND? CONNECTIVITY, CONFLICT AND CONUNDRUMS OF THAI STUDIES
15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND

Table 2: Numbers of SRT's Rolling Stock Produced Domestically/Imported from Each Country (1951-2015, in car)

	Domestic Production	Japan	Belgium	China	Korea	United States	Taiwan	Australia	France	German	Others	Total
1951-55	-	364	250	-	-	38	-	-	-	7	3	662
1956-60	-	1,426	66	-	-	7	-	-	-	2	-	1,501
1961-65	11	46	650	-	-	150	-	100	-	27	5	989
1966-70	373	1,462	-	-	-	10	150	-	-	30	3	2,028
1971-75	730	57	-	-	-	-	-	-	54	-	-	841
1976-80	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	500
1981-85	134	116	-	-	-	-	-	-	51	-	100	401
1986-90	-	57	-	-	31	-	-	-	8	34	-	130
1991-95	-	22	-	312	27	38	-	21	-	-	20	440
1996-00	-	54	-	-	191	-	-	-	-	-	-	245
2001-05	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2006-10	-	32	-	112	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	144
2011-15	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50
Total	1,748	3,636	966	474	249	243	150	121	113	100	131	7,931
Share (%)	22	46	12	6	3	3	2	2	1	1	2	100

Note: Including the import of used cars.
Sources: RRF (for various years).

Japanese rolling stock played most important role during the era of rehabilitation and development. Although Table 2 shows only the import of rolling stock since 1951, the former Department of State Railways had already ordered 100 steam locomotives, 200 passenger carriages, and 1,000 freight wagons as the barter with rice. Therefore, during the era of rehabilitation, the share of Japanese rolling stock was the largest; most of newly-introduced rolling stock came from Japan. It played an important role to relief the shortage of rolling stock in order to increase transport capacity. Since the actual transport volume during this period was increasing in both passenger and freight transport, it is no doubt that Japanese rolling stock contributed to the expansion of railway transport.


Then, during the era of development, Japanese rolling stock played an important role for the modernization, especially in the field of diesel railcars. Although Japanese diesel locomotives were not appreciated well, its diesel railcars were mostly welcomed by the SRT, which resulted in the monopoly of Japanese diesel railcars until the end of 1980s. Such diesel railcars contributed to the modernization of rail transport, especially the reduction of travel time for passenger trains. In addition, the production of passenger carriages and freight wagons at the Makkasan workshop was also supported by Japanese manufacturers since most of parts for production imported from Japan⁸⁰.

However, the import of Japanese rolling stock reduced after the era of development. The last import of new rolling stock was the import of 22 diesel locomotives during the former half of 1990s. The import of a total of 86 cars after that in Table 2 was the import of used diesel railcars and passenger carriages. The change in suppliers can be found from this table: from Japan to Korea and China. Therefore, since no new Japanese rolling stock was imported after the 1990s, the share of Japanese rolling stock on the SRT should be inevitably falling.

As for urban railways, the share of Japanese rolling stock remains low. As Figure 6 shows, the number of

⁸⁰ At least 557 bogies for passenger carriage and 738 bogies for freight wagons were imported from Japan during the latter half of 1960s for rolling stock production [RRF (various years)].

Japanese rolling stock was 63 cars, accounting for 19 per cent of total with 299 cars. Since the Siemens of Germany is monopolizing three urban railway systems: the BTS, the BMCL's subway, and the ARL, it accounted for the largest part. Although the BTS firstly introduced the Siemens, it later purchased the Chinese rolling stock in 2010 for line extension. Since the BTS has just ordered additional 88 EMUs to Germany and 96 EMUs to China in 2016, the shares of each country would further change in the future⁸¹.



5.2 Thailand as Important Market for Japanese Rolling Stock Manufacturers

While Japanese rolling stock had played an important role on the modernization of SRT, Thailand has been one of the most important markets for Japanese rolling stock manufacturers. Table 3 shows the number of Japanese rolling stock exported to top 15 countries between 1946 and 2000 on contract base. It shows that Thailand was the third largest country of export from Japan, exporting a total of 4,756 cars, or 10 per cent of total export number. The number of export is more than 1,000 cars larger than the number of import from Japan in Table 2 because Table 3 includes the export during the 1940 s and the export to other than SRT. Although this table do not include the recent figures, it can be said that Thailand, or the SRT, has been the important customer for Japanese rolling stock manufacturers in terms of number of export. Especially, during the latter half of 1940s to the former half of 1960s, the export to Thailand accounted for the large part.

However, Thailand's role as the rolling stock market decreases in terms of export value. Table 4 shows the values of Japanese rolling stock exported to top 16 countries during the same period as Table 3. It indicates that the total export value to the United States was the highest with about 1.6 billion dollars, followed by Egypt and Hong Kong. Thailand's rank is the sixteenth with about 212 million dollars. It is worth noting that the large number of export is not necessarily related to the high export value; New Zealand, the second largest market in terms of number, is not ranked in Table 4.

Table 3: Numbers of Japanese Rolling Stock Exported to Top 15 Countries (1946-2000, in car)

⁸¹ BP (OE) 2016/05/24 "BTSC Budgets Bt60 bn for Rail Investment."

13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THAI STUDIES
GLOBALIZED THAILAND? CONNECTIVITY, CONFLICT AND CONUNDRUMS OF THAI STUDIES
15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND

Country	1946-50	1951-55	1956-60	1961-65	1966-70	1971-75	1976-80	1981-85	1986-90	1991-95	1996-00	Total	Share (%)
Korea	1,025	1,493	140	1,133	2,200	360	13	11	-	8	-	6,383	14
New Zealand	-	-	-	2,200	1,117	1,781	85	19	-	-	-	5,202	11
Thailand	1,299	1,107	611	1,367	153	-	-	155	38	22	4	4,756	10
Argentina	-	65	199	420	1,444	92	-	156	-	113	72	2,561	5
Egypt	-	-	1,175	160	106	162	458	73	-	147	184	2,465	5
Burma (Myanmar)	-	376	1,185	509	23	-	119	70	13	-	-	2,295	5
Zambia	-	-	-	30	1,068	386	600	-	-	-	-	2,084	4
Indonesia	-	-	585	190	20	57	385	786	1	24	-	2,048	4
East Africa	-	-	-	7	1,635	360	-	-	-	-	-	2,002	4
Taiwan	16	20	655	145	893	17	12	65	85	3	68	1,979	4
India	-	1,618	156	112	20	18	-	12	-	-	-	1,936	4
Philippines	42	149	303	1,037	245	73	35	-	-	-	-	1,884	4
United States	-	-	-	-	172	-	34	343	14	251	804	1,618	3
Pakistan	154	70	468	188	385	-	44	50	10	-	-	1,369	3
Australia	-	-	12	489	452	325	-	-	-	12	-	1,290	3
Total	2,953	5,230	6,053	8,508	11,227	4,976	2,870	2,546	358	643	1,706	47,070	

Note 1: Figures are based on export contracts.

Note 2: East Africa includes Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Sources: Nihon Tetsudo Sharyo Yushutsu Kumiai (2003): 88-91

Table 4: Values of Japanese Rolling Stock Exported to Top 16 Countries (1946-2000, in thousand dollar)

Country	1947-50	1951-55	1956-60	1961-65	1966-70	1971-75	1976-80	1981-85	1986-90	1991-95	1996-00	Total	Share (%)
United States	-	-	-	15	7,008	14,887	32,877	410,221	296,063	355,870	505,651	1,622,592	16
Egypt	-	-	19,418	9,574	7,438	40,706	146,658	55,569	15,374	388,631	219,472	902,840	9
Hong Kong	-	-	-	-	-	3,773	42,214	34,805	2,941	107,496	474,555	665,784	7
Korea	11,166	14,344	1,648	18,018	41,382	83,718	91,010	114,123	26,081	95,084	155,965	652,539	7
India	-	47,041	31,446	44,214	19,290	47,244	67,823	90,469	107,553	33,452	12,150	500,682	5
Singapore	-	-	-	-	56	-	-	255,179	-	1,400	228,399	485,034	5
China	-	-	-	1,496	13,473	3,441	33,015	83,251	234,699	23,720	59,966	453,061	5
Brazil	-	-	9,813	2,330	31,066	39,126	122,417	175,498	30,919	15,333	4,835	431,337	4
Argentina	-	8,078	20,733	59,474	12,679	48,484	5,690	212,642	4,711	12,442	25,858	410,791	4
Indonesia	-	-	3,903	7,860	607	11,014	59,683	181,236	14,703	58,508	18,360	355,874	4
Australia	-	-	644	5,412	6,653	15,104	43,694	65,474	113,618	34,868	17,315	302,782	3
Taiwan	407	1,029	12,313	5,179	25,970	6,303	20,875	26,506	65,659	22,956	67,648	254,845	3
Mexico	-	-	-	111	938	19,398	61,798	117,282	20,885	4,415	10,458	235,285	2
Russia	3,141	-	1,756	326	16,857	68,592	59,117	71,552	8,496	-	-	229,837	2
Pakistan	466	3,316	2,972	7,834	7,693	1,207	52,222	64,792	19,133	50,520	1,705	211,860	2
Thailand	9,409	9,501	10,384	8,311	11,599	10,262	3,584	55,459	30,539	58,742	3,921	211,711	2
Total	25,344	94,945	136,839	205,660	344,785	642,862	1,200,552	2,316,350	1,298,009	1,406,636	2,217,838	9,889,820	


Note: Figures are based on export contracts, including parts for rolling stock.

Sources: Nihon Tetsudo Sharyo Yushutsu Kumiai (2003): 92-93

Therefore, Thailand is not the only country that imported large number of Japanese rolling stock but the import value was relatively low.

The reason of Thailand's low rank in terms of export value can be explained from two points: the concentration of export in early period and the absence of recent EMU export. Since the number of rolling stock exported to Thailand was large during 20 years after the end of World War II, the price of rolling stock was relatively low comparing to the price at the end of 20th century. Table 4 shows that the highest export value to Thailand reached its peak in the former half of 1990s although there was only export of 22 diesel locomotives during the period. Therefore, the few export to Thailand during the end of 20th century was the main reason of lower export value.

Another reason is that there was no export of EMUs to Thailand during the 20th century. Comparing with passenger carriages and freight wagons, the price of power cars such as locomotives, diesel railcars, and EMUs are inevitably higher. Japan has been shifting its export target from non-power cars such as passenger carriages and freight wagons to power cars, especially EMUs. As Figure 7 shows, the export number of freight wagons had been the largest until the latter half of 1970s, followed by passenger carriages. However, the export of EMUs exceeded freight wagons in the former half of 1980s, and its share reached the highest during the latter half of 1990s; the EMU export became the majority.



While the rolling stock export from Japan had been concentrating to EMU export in recent years, Thailand did not import Japanese EMUs until the 2010s, which was another reason of Thailand's low rank of export value from Japan. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Thailand's role as an important rolling stock market for Japan was the highest during the era of rehabilitation and had been falling since the end of era of development before reviving in the 2010s as the export of EMUs for urban railways was materialized.

5.3 Change in Rolling Stock Market in Thailand

The fall of Thailand's role for Japanese rolling stock export was the reflection of the change in rolling stock market in Thailand. During the 20th century, the SRT was virtually the sole user of rolling stock in Thailand. Since the SRT operates the conventional railways, with no electrified lines, it needed large amount of conventional rolling stock such as diesel locomotives, diesel railcars, passenger carriages and freight wagons. Apart from diesel locomotives, Japanese rolling stock manufacturers had been advantageous in rolling stock market of SRT since their prices were relatively low comparing with other Western countries manufacturers until the 1980s. However, as the manufacturers in late-coming countries such as Korea and China were catching up, Japanese manufacturers' competitiveness in terms of price disappeared and overwhelmed by the low cost manufacturers from these late-coming countries. As a result, the rolling stock export to the SRT from Japan ceased in the 1990s except the used car export.

During the same period, another new rolling stock market emerged in Thailand: the urban railway market. Since urban railway was completely new type of railway in Thailand and the operators were not necessary limited to the SRT, they required the import of urban railway system rather than the import of rolling stock. Therefore, the large Western suppliers such as the Siemens were advantageous than Japanese manufactures in the field of railway-system export since they had more experiences in this field. On the other hand, Japanese manufacturers tend to concentrate in specific field such as rolling stock, bogies, signal system, and so on. While the wide coverage in urban railway system is required, the lower price is also indispensable for the operators. Therefore, the balance between high quality and low cost became the crucial point for Japanese manufacturers.

The Japan's Galapagos-type technology may become another obstacle for Japan's railway- system export. Japan's new technology tends to be exclusively developed within Japan, which often differs from the international standard, or the Western standard. The *Shinkansen* system is the typical example. Since the operation system of *Shinkansen* is unique one, Japan firmly insisted that the *Shinkansen*-dedicated track must be constructed in the section between Bangkok and Ban Phachi where the Chinese-type middle/high-speed railway is overlapping⁸². As a result, the construction of the two dual-standard-gauge tracks, or four standard-gauge tracks, became unavoidably needed, paralleling the existing three meter-gauge tracks.

It is also worth noting that Thailand is trying to develop its infrastructure by increasing the participation of private sector. Since the infrastructure project need huge capital, the government is now seeking for the way to utilize PPP-style investment to restrain its burden. As for the middle/high-speed railway project with China, Thailand wished the co-investment with China to construct and operate the railway at first, although it later changed to develop by its own capital. It is said that Japan is also asked to co-invest into the *Shinkansen* project since the investment cost is too huge for Thailand's sole investment⁸³. So far Japanese rolling stock manufactures have been acting as the supplier, often relying on Japan's ODA. However, Thailand is demanding more actual role of Japanese firms, not only as a supplier but a co-investor of the project. If Japanese firms could change their roles from the suppliers of rolling stock to the investors of railway-system, the role of Japanese rolling stock on Thai railways would revive again.

6. Conclusion

This article aims to construct the real image of Japanese rolling stock on Thai railways since the 1930s and analyze the change of trend in import. There were three waves of importing Japanese rolling stock into Thailand: the first wave during the 1930s and 1940s, the second wave between the 1950s and 1990s, and the third wave after entering into the 21st century. The first wave was the import of steam locomotives, passenger carriages, and freight wagons, including those brought by the Japanese army for its military transport and the post-war procurement by the barter with rice.

The second wave was the import of Japanese rolling stock by the SRT. During the era of rehabilitation, the share of the newly-imported Japanese rolling stock was the highest, mostly passenger carriages and

⁸² PCK (OE) 2016/12/01 "Khliia Yaek Thang Wing High Speed Yipun."

⁸³ NKS 2017/02/06 "Kosoku Tetsudo Seibi he Kyogi."

freight wagons. Then its share slightly fell during the era of development, though Japan still maintained the largest share, especially in the field of diesel railcars. During this period, Japanese rolling stock contributed to the rehabilitation and modernization of the SRT. However, the import of Japanese rolling stock reduced after that; the import of diesel locomotives during the former half of 1990s was the last supply for the SRT except used cars.

The third wave was the first import of EMUs for urban railways in Bangkok. Japan aimed to export its rolling stock for the first subway, constructed by Japan's ODA, although it could not be materialized. Then, the Purple line that has just opened in 2016 introduced Japanese railway-system, including rolling stock for the first time, and the Dark Red line under construction would use Japanese system as the second. Apart from urban railways, the EMUs for high-speed railway, or the *Shinkansen*, will be put into service in the future as Japan cooperated with Thailand to promote the high-speed railway project between Bangkok and Chiang Mai.

Since the number of Japanese rolling stock imported by the SRT was the largest, especially during the era of rehabilitation and development, it can be said that the Japanese rolling stock on Thai railways contributed to the rehabilitation and modernization of SRT. On the other hand, Thailand used to be the important market for Japanese rolling stock manufacturers, especially between the 1940s and 1960s. However, although the number of rolling stock exported to Thailand up to 2000 was the third largest, the export value to Thailand during the same period was relatively low. It was due to the fact that Japanese rolling stock has been losing its competitiveness in terms of price and absence of the relatively high-value EMU export to Thailand until recent years.

The Japanese manufacturers' competitiveness is being challenged by the manufacturers of late-comers with low price and the Western firms with wide coverage of railway-system. However, since Thailand seeks for the PPP-style infrastructure development, Japanese firms could cope with the situation if they could change their roles from suppliers of rolling stock to the co-investors of railway system.

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Cultural Politics of Long Boat Racing Festival in Nan Province

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Abstract

Previous studies of long boat racing festivals, especially in Nan province, have been problematic as regards their view of the festival, focusing on issues of traditional customs, local communities and authenticity, and romanticized local knowledge in particular. This paper proposes that other perspectives need to be taken into account, in order to understand the multiplicity of power relationships among those who have been engaging with the festival in the neoliberal context; for example the roles of companies, media and the provincial authority.

This study adopts a cultural politics approach to focus on the incorporation of the multiple powerful groups which participate, and their cultural practices. I also apply anthropological methodology, collecting information from in depth interviews with different groups such as communities, civil and religious leaders, central and provincial officers, private companies' staff, and media experts. The study shows that the festival seen culturally and politically is treated as a 'negotiated space' where interaction of power groups intersects, in order to take advantage economically, politically and socio-culturally. It also demonstrates that the cultural politics of these power groups are more fluid and dynamic for political and social legitimacy, especially in Nan province.

Keywords: cultural politics, long boat racing festival, multiplicity of power relationships, negotiated space

Introduction

In the past, long boat racing in Nan province appeared as a traditional custom and community recreation. It promoted harmony among villagers and supported the belief in Buddhism of Nan people. According to local culture the boat represented a vehicle for carrying people to make merit. It supported people's aim to attain enlightenment according to Buddhist doctrine (Aumporn, 2008; Saksee, 2012; and Gwyntorn and Patcharin, 2013). Hence, traditional long boat racing complemented the cultural meanings, historical contexts and beliefs of Nan people. Also, it expressed their romanticized local knowledge. The decorations on the long boat exemplified their cultural beliefs and knowledge. For instance, the colorfully-painted boats made from whole tree trunks and adorned with an elaborately-crafted Naga head at the prow represented the ancient belief in "Naga" which combined the story of Nan River and the belief in Buddhism of Nan people (https://www.thailanddiscovery.info/thailand-festivals-longboat-racing, 2016).



Picture 1: Ancient boat named “Phayakhu” (พญาขี้), the biggest racing boat in Nan Province.

Source: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/mauve55/6217466745/in/photostream/>

Long boat racing became a national festival after 1979. It has changed from a traditional custom and community amusement to a “festival” and become more of a sport. It began from the policy management of local traditions by Thai government offices. That has resulted in adding sport forms to local long-boat racing, such as setting regulations and qualifications and appointing referees. They have also added rewards and trophies. Thus it became more of a sports contest, and well-known as a national Thai festival. Nan long-boat racing has been organized by several entities, especially the provincial and national government offices. In addition, the festival has been promoted by national media such as television. All these developments have transformed the local traditions and power relationships among local people. For instance, local gambling on long-boat races has been restricted by new regulations, while the traditional pattern of boat racing has become more competitive, losing touch with its cultural background (Saksee, 2012 and Wasin and Supanee, 2013).

Additionally, the application of boat building science has diminished the important of local knowledge: long boats have been re-designed to be more modern. Meanwhile, several villages have applied sports science to develop the training of crews in physical fitness and muscular strength. As a result, there are many new boat clubs supported by private organizations or businessmen. These groups are not part of the local community. Now there are more than 200 long boats in Nan province (Manageronline, 2559). This is how traditional long-boat racing has finally transformed into a sport and a national festival.

However, the transformation is not undisputed. There are attempts by local people to preserve the ancient traditions of long boat racing. For instance, the local group in Tha Wang Pha district of Nan restored long-boat racing in its traditional form, and many local offices also attempted to promote the traditional identity of Nan long-boat racing. On the other hand, the Thai Health Promotion Foundation has promoted a campaign for Nan long boat racing to be “non-alcohol”. Thus there are discrepancies between traditional long-boat racing and modern long-boat racing in Nan province (Saksee, 2012).

In the meantime, long-boat racing has become a 'negotiated space' where different power groups intersect - communities, business groups, provincial authorities and national government offices. There is a struggle for economic, political, and socio-cultural interests among these groups, and a cultural politics dimension within the long-boat racing festival of Nan province in the neoliberal context of modern sport. This paper aims to explore the cultural politics of the power groups who have been engaging with the long boat racing festival in Nan province. The objective is to understand the multiplicity of power relationships of these power groups in the neoliberal context.

Understanding the Cultural Politics of Long Boat Racing in Nan

The changing culture paradigm is the crucial turning point for understanding the cultural politics concept. For example, Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (1997) consider the relationship between culture, place and power, taking culture as a product of people and place. In his seminal work *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973), Geertz outlined culture as "a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life".

In this sense, "culture" is not an object of its own existence and waiting for human beings to search or put out, but a power relationship that determines who is the social leader. Culture is not just a tradition as we understand it. But it is a reflection of how social knowledge is built, which determines what is good and bad. "Knowledge" is about creating a "truth" about culture. Anthropologists in the late 20th century (1980s) reexamined old theories that have created cultural knowledge, and proposed that "culture" studies needed to examine the paradigm behind cultural definition in order to understand "culture" as a discourse relating to the use of social power – for example Sherry Ortner 1984, George E. Marcus and Michael Fisher 1986, James Clifford and George E. Marcus 1986, Clifford Geertz 1988, James Clifford 1988. (<http://www.sac.or.th/databases/anthropology-concepts/page/1>)

When it comes to "politics", people understand that politics is about the "power" that exists in the metropolitan, political and constitutional spheres – i.e. the political economy, or macro-politics. Politics is about the use and control of power (Denton & Woodward, 1990:14). But nowadays, it can be said that the area of "Power / politics" is not limited to politics and economics but extends to the cultural area (Barker, 2002:176-180), and to the everyday life of people in general. What we call political style includes cultural politics or micro-politics

Glick Schiller, N. (1997: 2) defines "cultural politics" as referring to the processes through which relations of power are asserted, accepted, contested, or subverted by means of ideas, values, symbols, and daily practices. Power is the ability to make somebody do something, and relations of power include domination, oppression, discipline, struggle, resistance, rebellion, co-option, subversion, and sedition. In a recently published overview of the field, Jordon and Weedon (1995: 5) tell us that those who study cultural politics are concerned with the ways in which culture is used to legitimate the "social relations of inequality" and to contribute to "the struggle to transform them".

In "The SAGE Dictionary of Cultural Studies" (2015:42):-

Cultural politics is about the power to name, and thus legitimate, objects and events, including both common sense and 'official' versions

of the social and cultural world. One of the central arguments of cultural studies is that culture is a domain in which competing meanings and versions of the world have fought for ascendancy. In particular, meaning and truth are constituted within patterns of power and subject to processes of contestation. Thus, cultural politics can be understood in terms of the ability to represent the world and to make particular descriptions 'stick'. Here social change becomes possible through rethinking and re-describing the social order and the possibilities for the future.

In "Introduction: the cultural and the political in Latin American social movements", Alvarez et al. (1998: 7) cultural politics is:-

The process enacted when sets of social actors shaped by, and embodying, different cultural meanings and practices come into conflict with each other. This definition of cultural politics assumes that meanings and practices... can be the source of processes that must be accepted as political.

For Newell (2014) The term "cultural politics" refers to the way that culture—including people's attitudes, opinions, beliefs and perspectives, as well as the media and arts—shapes society and political opinion, and gives rise to social, economic and legal realities.

For example Lauren Nicole Adrover (2014) "Festival Encounters: Value Logics and the Political Economy of Cultural Production in Ghana". This shows the changing power relations that surround a festival in Ghana, focusing on the convergence of cultural production and the collaboration of sponsors, to investigate the influence of world capitalism to control resources and achieve social and political status. The festival extended to diverse economic and political actors. The chiefs use the festival to promote their authority and for the audience to observe their performances. Global marketers support corporate sponsorships. The festival is a cultural production area. The show is a collection of local traditions and concepts. Adrover focuses on an analysis of the historical situation of the relationship between cultural production and the political-economic movement in Ghana since the colonial period, examining various forms of value-producing and cross-contextual conversions. Sponsors explore the benefits of cultural differences by linking festivals with consumer products. Some leaders promote products from sponsors to confirm new claims. To maintain the political power of their ancestry and they become involved with the global economic network. Shareholder support for the festival is the emergence of a new logic of challenging values, an assessment of the underlying social and economic relations in the development of political power in Ghana. The author argues that business support offers a new logic of value that challenges people to assess social and economic relationships. Political power in Ghana is based on production. Value logic refers to how people understand the relationship between economic values (money and access to economic networks) and social values (social recognition and political authority). While the leader (the chief) has tied himself to political power and economic prosperity today, these leaders fight the paradox that their political rankings depend on the meaning of the relationship of the

mother's relatives - a matrilineal system that does not create a wealthy social network. Some leaders have insisted on a new claim to political power based on their family's status and participation in the global economic network. Some fear that the presentation of the partner's logo will honor international sponsors and reduce the role of local hierarchies, local politics, and local cultural expression patterns. From this thesis, it is evident that all of the cultural producers are working in parallel, but at the same time sometimes in competition.

In Thailand Kasian Tejapira (Prajak, 2015), was the first person to define cultural politics as political struggle in the periphery of culture by individuals and social groups to present, communicate, compete and conquer areas of definition, meaning, and values. Culture means the system that humans use to look at the world and direct their behavior - food, eating, dress, sexual orientation, art, education, religion, history, the political system of government. And in the culture, there is politics, intertwined in every particle whether in fiction, film, music, drama, postmodernism, paintings, art, stamps, calendars, advertising, food, architecture, monuments, sculpture. Cultural political struggles are a struggle to take on the definition of a new set of rules. It may not be clearly visible because it is not in the parliament building or the cabinet meeting room. This is a political change. It can be said that the creation of community and identity cannot avoid the importance of power. Identity and culture are the result of power relations and inequalities between groups. Likewise, community and locality are created by historical processes linked to power relations and spatial relationships that are broader than local. Through negotiation and competition between different groups community and local identities are a never-ending process, constantly changing and rebuilding from the interaction of various forces, bargaining and reacting in which each group of human beings is subject to unequal power relationships. (Yos, 2008:33)

Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger (eds.) (1983: 1) said "Invented tradition" is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetitions, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past. Just like the reinvention of boat racing traditions again and again through narrative and through various organizations and government agencies and power groups that co-funded the activity. Festivals are the area of practice that emphasizes the power relationship in the bargaining process. Also, individual actors in such operations can find gaps in their power relationships to reposition themselves. And in the context of today's Thai society, where we have the tourism festival and cultural tourism linked to globalization - tools to serve various purposes, both politically and economically in capitalist society.

Sportization: the Cultural Politics of Long Boat Racing

In the historical sociological approach of Elias, sport was defined as a key area in the development of the civilizing process of European societies. The civilizing process was characterized by continuous state control of the legitimate use of force, the development of social organizations to reduce open conflict among social groups, and the elaboration of codes for social behavior oriented towards the exercise of individual self-control. Sport became a typical activity of leisure that, historically, fulfilled some of the required functions for the consolidation of the civilizing process. The postmodern turn foregrounded the

body as a cultural construction, overcoming the limitations of the biological paradigm. It generated a more complex understanding of representation, turning away from essentializing sports and games as the embodiment of a national or ethnic character and replacing modernization paradigms with more complex theories of social development. (Niko Besnier and Susan Brownell, 2012:444):-

Boat racing is a local sport until it becomes a sportization.

There are universal rules that are central or national. **Formerly** boat racing in Nan Province was held in the rainy season from August to October. There were no winners, and no tournament organizers. The races were held after the Buddhist Lent and had to be celebrated only after the Lent, and adhering to the tradition of being based on Wat Luang Wiang or Wat Phra That Chang. The ceremony was held on the first day of the 12th lunar month.

From 1979 the races were gradually adjusted to become full sports with rules, regulations and elements of competition including prize money and trophies, and the beginning of management by government agencies and local government organizations (Yottaporn, 2009). In addition to the policy of government agencies, the media, especially television, had a great effect on the transformation of tradition, including reshaping the racing boats. And the powerful driving force behind the transformation of tradition was gambling, that results in more rigorous racing rules. Since 2007, scientific processes have been incorporated into the shipbuilding process - calculating boat weight, boat shape design, new shipbuilding methods like adding a keel. Plus training programmes focusing on physical fitness, muscular strength, endurance, and performance. At the same time, the Office of Social Development and Human Security kept the youth from the children's shelter and observation center from competing. New groups have been established by more traditional or non-traditional organizations or by business people focusing on modern management. To promote provincial youth athletes to the national level in 2010, Miss Wanida Thammachart joined the Thai national rowing team (Nan Provincial Public Relations Office, 2015)

Winning and the royal trophy became important. Traditionally, the Nan Boat Racing tradition places great emphasis on the harmony and festivity of the community. But in the 1960s the Royal Kathina conferred the title of "Kathin Luang" on Wat Phra That Chang Kam Worawihan, and boat racing that year was Royal Kathina. In 1982, Chaiwat Huttharoen, Governor of Nan Province, asked for a trophy from His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej to be awarded to the winning boat. Nan province has won the most boat race Royal Cup Awards in Thailand (Office of Health Promotion Online, 2016)

The focus on winning and rewards for "prestige" opened the door to national competition and the hiring of skilled oarsmen from other regions instead of using paddlers from the home⁸⁴. In addition feuds developed between the communities competing in the finals. The traditional atmosphere of the boat race is less fun than it used to be.

It is evident that the long-boat race of Nan Province was based on "merit" to create fellowship and joy in the community. But nowadays, the whole focus is on "victory" and the winning of the cup rather than merit.

Government agencies play an important role in driving traditional events. Nowadays, Nan Boat Racing

⁸⁴ The preliminary data collected in the area showed that the village had won the championship last year. This year, fearing that they will not win the championship, they have to hire a good waterman from outside to make sure they win the royal trophy. If they win 3 years running they get to keep it

starts on Lent or commences with the Kathin ceremony which is held every year from September to October. The "organizers" or agencies that play an important role in managing this tradition are government agencies, especially local government agencies (provincial administrative organizations, municipalities), who are policy-makers in promoting tourism and encouraging the promotion of local traditions. Traditionally, boat races are considered as the first goal in the annual calendar to be budgeted. Important preparations before the start of the race include finding "sponsors" from local and non-local parties. The public sector is also a link between the people and the central government. Government agencies are primarily responsible for determining rules and patterns of competition. The Nan Boat Racing Association serves as the community coordinator across Nan province. In 2016, there were long boat races in 6 districts of Nan province, namely Nan town, Tha Wang Pha district, Pua district, Wiang Sa district, Chiang Klang district and Phu Wiang district number 11. More than 200 boats participated. The budget for each community - not less than one hundred thousand baht - will be spent on maintenance and training. The government budget is at least 5 million baht each time. Private or corporate group also contribute - at least 50 organizations at the provincial, regional and international levels.

However, the government, which is the main "host" for the event during the two months of competition, is determined to be the primary determinant of the conditions of paddle sports for Nan. There is a system of performance evaluation and performance appraisal to inform the budget spending of the agency.

The actions of government agencies that have been allocated budgets for traditional events have stimulated the process of sportization of the city's traditional boat race. Nan's long boat competition is aimed at winning and to meet the goals of government agencies and central government policies. Nan's community is powerless to fight the government. There are strategies and pressures to provide opportunities and colors for each type of vessel and a variety of different types of competitions. A lot of money is wasted and it is necessary to calculate whether it is worth the investment or not.


Media channels and public relations stimulate interest and promote the boat race as a sport, especially the central media such as the Thai Public Broadcasting Service (Thai PBS). The "Long Boat Fighting Water Festival" was set up in 2008 together with Thai Health Promotion Foundation, National Broadcasting Services of Thailand (NBT), Internet and radio. The motivation of such media is to accelerate the development of youth or youth organizations in the local community to develop provincial or national athletes. For example the Office for Social Development and Human Security encouraged children from shelters and observation centers to participate in long boat races. New groups have been established by both more traditional and non-traditional organizations or business people that focus on modern management.

It can be seen that the long tradition of boat competition in Nan is the connection between the boat, the religion, the people, and the river. The process of becoming a sport has transformed a tradition tied to "merit" into one tied to "prestige" and victory. As (Frey1991) remarks, the consequences of the commercialization of sport are significant. *First*, changes may be made in the game format or rules. *Second*, the orientation or values of the participants may change from those based on self-development and satisfaction to those of entertainment and self-interest. *Third*, control and influence are largely in the hands of persons and organizations who are not direct participants. The *fourth* consequence of

commercialization is the decline of amateurism and the rise of professionalism.

The Multiplicity of Power relationships in Long Boat Racing Space

The tradition of boat racing in Nan Province is regarded as one of the most important traditions of the province. The provincial motto gives it precedence. It can be said that this tradition has a diverse group of people who engage with it. This article will try to distinguish them, by grouping the people who engage in all 4 levels: the community level; the provincial level; the state level; and the international organization level.



Picture 2: showing multiple powerful groups and their cultural practices which participate in long boat racing space.

Before explaining the picture, the author recognizes that these groups are not completely separate. There are intricate internal links in the relationship structure, for example kinship and relationships that overlap in economic and political interests. From the first level, we can see that there are people in the community that are related to this tradition. At village level they include monks, trainers, ritualists, boat builders, paddlers, cheerleaders, housewives, as well as boat crews. There may be local investors who may come to finance the construction of the boat. The key local agencies that coordinate at the provincial level are the district municipalities, coordinating with the Community Racquet Board and Health Promotion and Health Promotion Office, Provincial Administrative Organization, private enterprises and local politicians. At the district level, a long-standing boat race board will be set up to run and compete. It depends on local management. For example, in the district of Wiang Sa in 2012, the board organized a total of 19 races drawing all relevant departments within the district into the tradition. For example, there is a first aid department, peacekeeping field radio, field spokesman, etc. At provincial level Nan is the main host city for centralized operations. There is a parallel partnership

with Nan municipality, the Nan Thai Boat Racing Association and the Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT). At 1 December 2016 there was a boat race and parade of 89 boats in Nan to honor King Rama 9. There are a number of key organizations that support this. Provincial Administrative Organization, Military Region 38, Nan Municipality, Nan Boat Racing Association, Cage Brewer Network, Health Promotion Fund, Hongsa Power Company Limited, Big C Nan Branch, Company Phra Praduvawit Ltd., Nok Air, AirAsia, Phakkasatran Hotel, Chayit Nan Partnership, Kasikorn Bank, Government Savings Bank And some restaurants in Nan. (schedule, 2016)



Picture 3: The "Honouring King Rama 9" boat race in Nan town

Source: <https://changnoi1.blogspot.com/2016/12/the-honouring-king-rama-9-boat-race-in.html>

Nationally central government agencies have linked Nan's long-boat policy with provincial policy. The central policy that directly affects Nan is Tourism policy. As a result of the announcement of Nan Province as a "Living old city", Nan is known for its tourism. In the last quarter of 2014, Nan was selected among 12 hidden gem provinces by the Tourism Authority of Thailand, attracting more visitors. At the national level, the organizations that engage are larger.

At the international level, under the ASEAN Agreement, Nan is aligned with regional and international policy in inter-regional relations by interacting with neighboring countries such as Lao PDR and Vietnam. In 2013 there will be boat races between the 3 countries, on 4 rivers: Laos, Thailand and Vietnam (Nan river, Hong river, Da river and Kan river) to jointly preserve the tradition of boat racing among ASEAN countries as part of social and cultural cooperation. It is evident that central government policy is at the core. However, the community of Nan province itself also plays an important role in determining the direction of the long-boat race in the province. The long-boat competition area in Nan is a negotiated space for all power groups to interpret and define meaning or power.

Conclusion

The traditional long-boat race of Nan province at the beginning was a game activity or tradition of the local community, depending on the traditional social values of the community. Today it has developed into a regular sport festival of Nan Province and expanded into the national and international arenas. It is evident that in such a forum, there are multiple levels of participation, including local, state, private, etc., that benefit, including economically, socially and politically. Interactions among various interest groups are fluid and therefore have implications for cultural politics. There have been some studies on the traditions of the long boat race in Nan province focusing on its history, community resource

management, and the view that such a tradition represents a single area of participatory power and community value systems. But there is a lack of openness to the view of the power relations of the diverse people who are involved in the definition of the meaning and tradition of the long-boat race in the context of neoliberalism. This is a new perspective on the culture which is more fragmented, with more powers, regulations and frameworks. There are power relationships that may be more contradictory than a common value system. And culture is about creating meaning based on specific contexts including the scramble between the various groups. This makes the meaning of culture not fixed.

Because this article is preliminary the author wishes to make note of the issues that might affect future study. The first issue is of agricultural companies that support the farmers in Nan area, such as corn and rubber plantations, who contribute to the long-boat race. And how do groups such as Thai Beverage Public Company Limited or Singha Corporation Co. Ltd. get involved, given that Nan is the first province in Thailand to hold a long-boat race as “no alcohol”? The next issue is the group of rowers especially the youth, because some of them come from different provinces. However, when the season is over, boating will be back to the village itself or boating to other areas. At the end of the season the province will also provide rowers to other boats in the central region.

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An Analysis of Filipino's Identity in Thai-ASEAN Juvenile Books: Implications for Filipino Psychology

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Abstract

For more than 40 years, Filipino psychology (Sikolohiyang Pilipino), as a discipline and as a movement, has advocated practice of psychology in the Philippines. Thus, the analysis of the Filipino's identity would rely less on Western models and views and would focus more on the Philippines' local viewpoint. However, with the advent of ASEAN Integration, the trend of writings looking into Filipino's identity started to shift from Western perspectives to ASEAN perspectives, with Southeast Asians serving as researchers and writers. This study aims to examine the Thai writers' views on the Philippines and the Filipinos as an initial attempt to determine possible impact of the regional integration to the field of the Filipino psychology. Using 10 juvenile books written by Thai authors about the Philippines-ASEAN as data sets, the study found 11 perceptions on Filipino's identity: (1) being culturally and linguistically diverse; (2) having colorful and joyful lives; (3) having high political awareness; (4) religious advocate; (5) having gender equality; (6) being educated; (7) being friends of Thais; (8) being friendly; (9) having strong family ties; (10) having similar physical appearance with Thais; and (11) having poverty problem. These perceptions are constructed through lexicons and images used by the authors. The results are used as a springboard for discussion on possible research directions for Filipino psychology in the context of ASEAN Community.

Keywords: Thai-ASEAN juvenile books, Filipino Psychology, Filipino identity, ASEAN Integration

1. Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) by the Founding Fathers of ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand⁸⁵. In 2015, 10

⁸⁵ The Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2014. Overview. Available on: <http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean>. [Accessed 10 September 2014]

member-states of ASEAN, consisting of Brunei Darussalam (1984), Cambodia (1999), Indonesia, Laos (1997), Malaysia, Myanmar (1997), Singapore, The Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam (1995), became collectively known as the “ASEAN Community”.

Prior to regional integration, references to ASEAN are often politically and economically driven. Politically because ASEAN Declaration, in the first place, was signed by the founding members as a display of solidarity against communist expansion in Vietnam and communist insurgency within their own borders. And, economically because ASEAN mostly deals with free movement of goods and people. Until in 2011, ASEAN leaders signed the “Declaration on ASEAN Unity in Cultural Diversity: Towards Strengthening ASEAN Community”. From here, an alternative paradigm of ASEAN emphasizing diversity, and for other reasons other than economic, started to develop. ASEAN is now seen not just an intergovernmental association but more importantly a “people-centered ASEAN”.

With this scenario, every ASEAN member-state is expected to come up with its own program promoting ASEAN Community. Thailand is well-prepared and highly alert to this call. School curriculums include a session on ASEAN Community. There is also an ASEAN corner in schools. The ASEAN Community remains a major topic in media, such as television, radio, newspapers, and books. We can see this awareness in the education policy issued by the Minister of Education, as follows:

On 24 June 2013 at the Committee Conference Room, Parliament Building, Mr. Phongthep Thepkanjana, the Minister of Education, delivered a keynote speech on “Thai Youth Readiness Preparation for ASEAN Strategies”, arranged by the Senate Standing Committee on Social Development and Children, Youth, Women, the Elderly, the Disabled and the Underprivileged Affairs. He said “At present we are in a knowledge-based society and are competing on the quality of our people, not the amount of them, our resources, or our good location as in previous times. Many countries with high-quality people have been developed and accepted by others. They also have a Per Capita Income and life quality of a high standard. In order to improve the quality of our people, we have to focus on education. Thailand has invested in education considerably and when compared proportionally to the national budget, it is higher than other budgets and the gross national product income. However, the quality of education is still not satisfactory. When measured by the results of education assessments or by people satisfaction, there are several aspects which have to be improved. Therefore, the Ministry of Education has set out model approaches to prepare Thai youth readiness for ASEAN as follows: critical thinking, curriculum reform, language, knowledge about the ASEAN Community, preparation for labor market, equalizing vocational to academy qualifications, and ethical, moral, and democratic consciousness”⁸⁶.

⁸⁶ Thailand teaching. 2014. Thai Youth Readiness Preparation for ASEAN Strategies. Available on: <http://www.thailandteaching.asia/education-news-from-other-countries/23783-thai-youth-readiness-preparation-asean-strategies.html>. [Accessed 10 September 2014]

Although Thailand prepares for the ASEAN Community in every possible way, it seems that Thais do not yet have sufficient knowledge about the ASEAN Community and its members, especially the Philippines. Thais have little knowledge about the island country despite the fact that Thailand is the Philippines' oldest friend in ASEAN. In fact, diplomatic relations between these two countries were first established through the signing of the Treaty of Friendship on June 14, 1949 in Washington D.C., USA (RTE Manila, 1999; Ratanapruckse & Jayanama, 1999; ERPKTH, 2012; Navarro, 2015). From then on, these relations led to the expansion of their cooperation through the conclusion of 23 bilateral agreements that covers trade, culture, defense, investment, tourism, air services, telecommunications, agriculture, justice and environment, among others (ERPKTH, 2012).

As a way of addressing this lack of knowledge about other ASEAN countries, many publishing houses in Thailand started to develop Thai-ASEAN books written in Thai language by Thai authors. For this study, the focus is on the Thai-ASEAN juvenile books regarding the Philippines. Through these books, the Philippines is showcased based on the perspectives of the Thai writers. This kind of dynamics makes it an interesting topic of study due to its implications on the scholarship about the Philippines, particularly on the Filipino identity, as well as its relations to Thailand and ASEAN, in general.

Psychology is one of the fields that study identity. As an academic discipline and profession in Asia, it is usually viewed as continuous with the development of psychology in the West (Enriquez, 1992: xix). In line with this, psychologists talk about Philippine psychology and Thai psychology, for example, in the Western tradition and not in the Asian/Southeast Asian/ country's own tradition.

With the aim to address the colonial background of psychology, ergo challenge and question the social relevance of dominant Western psychological perspectives and theories, Virgilio G. Enriquez pioneered the conceptualization and theorization of a Filipino psychology (*sikolohiyang Pilipino*) as a movement in psychology and other related disciplines in the Philippines during the 1970s. Highlighting the experiences, ideas, and cultural orientation of the Filipino, it focuses on the following themes: (a) identity and national consciousness; (b) social awareness and involvement; (c) national and ethnic cultures and languages, including the study of traditional psychology; and (d) bases and application of indigenous psychology in health practices, agriculture, art, mass media, and religion but also including the psychology of behavior and human abilities as originated in Western psychology but applicable to the local setting (Enriquez, 1992; cited in Yacat, 2013; 551).

For more than 40 years now, Filipino psychology continues to advocate practice of psychology in the Philippines, hence analysis of the Filipino identity, which is critical on the blind importation and imposition of Western models and views. It has started collaboration and exchange with other approaches of indigenization of psychology in other geo-political regions of the world. Filipino psychology found resonances with anti-Eurocentric discourses in different Asian social sciences. In the book, *Alternative Discourses in Social Science* (2006), Syed Farid Alatas has documented counter-discourses to Eurocentrism in the social sciences (Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, India) and has identified Filipino social scientists among the very first postcolonial thinkers to work on decolonization and indigenization of the social sciences (Paredes-Canilao & Babaran-Diaz, 2013; 775-776).

Now, with the advent of ASEAN integration, the potential of shifting from Western perspectives to a more ASEAN perspectives in writings about the Philippines and the Filipino identity becomes eminent, as

proven by the production of books on ASEAN including Thai-ASEAN juvenile books. Therefore, it is very timely to study the perspectives of the Thai writers toward the Filipino's identities which are presented in the said juvenile books, ergo the possible impact of the regional integration to the field of Filipino psychology.

The aim of the study is two-fold: first, to investigate the Filipino's identities described through the Thai-ASEAN juvenile books written by the Thai writers; and second, to determine the possible implications of these writings on the study of Filipino psychology in the context of ASEAN Community.

The sources of data are the ten Thai-ASEAN juvenile books which are deliberately written as a non-fiction, in order to be an "informative source" about ASEAN countries. The books were written in Thai. The target readers are in primary to high school levels (age 7 to 18 years old). They may use these books as extra reading materials, or references for term papers or projects in schools or for general reading purposes. The collected data focuses on the ASEAN Community member country: the Philippines. Ten books were selected by simple random sampling from the four leading bookstores in Thailand: B2S, Se-ed, Naiin, and Chulalongkorn University bookstore. The list is as follows.

Book no.1: Welcome to ASEAN เรียนรู้เพื่อนบ้านอาเซียน (Welcome to ASEAN: Getting to know ASEAN countries)

Book no.2: Oh! Do & Don't in ASEAN มารยาทในอาเซียน (Oh! Do & Don't in ASEAN: Manners in ASEAN)

Book no.3: ที่สุดในอาเซียนที่สุดในโลก (The most in ASEAN, the most in the World)

Book no.4: มหัศจรรย์นอกห้องเรียนมรดกโลกมรดกแห่งประเทศอาเซียน (Amazement outside classroom: World heritages: ASEAN heritages)

Book no.5: เกร็ดน่ารู้อาเซียน (Anecdotes of ASEAN)

Book no.6: เราคืออาเซียนประชาคมอาเซียน (We are ASEAN: ASEAN Community)

Book no.7: บุคคลสำคัญในอาเซียน (Important persons in ASEAN)











Book no. 8: สวัสดีอาเซียนฟิลิปปินส์46เกร็ดความรู้ให้รู้จักฟิลิปปินส์มากกว่าที่เคยรู้ (Hello ASEAN: The Philippines: 46 anecdotes: Getting to know the Philippines more than before)

Book no.9: เราคืออาเซียนฟิลิปปินส์จับมือกันก้าวสู่ประชาคมอาเซียน (We are ASEAN: The Philippines: stepping forward, hand in hand with the ASEAN Community)

Book no.10: 100 เรื่องน่ารู้ในฟิลิปปินส์ (100 interesting stories in The Philippines)

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15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND

Table 1: The Thai-ASEAN juvenile book covers

			
Book no.1	Book no.2	Book no.3	Book no.4
			
Book no.5	Book no.6	Book no.7	Book no.8
			
Book no.9	Book no.10		

This study adopts the Discourse Analysis as its research framework. Fairclough (1995: 4) defined Discourse Analysis in this manner: “It is traditionally understood to be a piece of written language – a whole ‘work’ such as a poem or a novel, or a relatively discrete part of a work such as a chapter. A rather broader conception has become common within discourse analysis, where a text may be either written or spoken discourse, so that, for example, their works used in a conversation (or their written transcription) constitute a text. In cultural analysis, by contrast, texts do not need to be linguistic at all; any cultural artefact – a picture, a building, a piece of music – can be seen as a text.” Phanphothong (2013: 27) defined it as a study of language that is higher than sentence level. The study might focus on discourse structure, discourse components, discourse coherent, discourse production and interpretation, discourse communication components, language strategy in discourse, and communication goal. Since the study focuses on the perspectives of the Thai writers toward the Philippines, especially it’s people: Filipino, the other perspectives regarding the country such as the environment, infrastructure, political and economic regime are not included in the scope of this study. In addition, this study is just an endeavor as a preliminary study regarding Thai and ASEAN member countries. The in-depth study is expected and suggested to conduct in the future. Moreover, it is expected to provide a better understanding of ASEAN member countries in way of people, culture and society, and to promote the ASEAN Community as well.

2. The Filipino's Identities

To convey ideas to another person, we need language or some other system of communication (Scollon, Scollon, & Jones, 2012: 5). The types of language or system of communication in discourse analysis can be either written or spoken discourse. Texts do not need to be linguistic at all; any cultural artefact – a picture, a building, a piece of music – can be seen as a text (Fairclough, 1995: 4). Regarding the Thai-ASEAN juvenile book discourse, the Filipino's identities were described through the use of lexicons involving each identity. In addition, they were described through the use of pictures. In brief, the Filipino's identities were described through the use of verbal language i.e. lexicons, and non-verbal language i.e. pictures. The selected Thai-ASEAN juvenile books suggested 11 categories of the Filipino's identities as following.

2.1 Filipino Varies in Race, Culture, and Language

Filipino was presented as varying in race, culture and language, in the following examples:

Example 1

“วัฒนธรรมฟิลิปปินส์มีลักษณะผสมผสานระหว่างตะวันออกและตะวันตกโดยได้รับอิทธิพลทางวัฒนธรรมตะวันตกมาจากสเปนและสหรัฐอเมริกาในช่วงที่ตกเป็นรัฐในอาณานิคม...” (Book no.10: 62)

/wát-tha-ná-tham Fí-líp-pin mii lák-sa-na pha-sôm-pha-săan ra-wàaŋ ta-wan-ʔòok lé ta-wan-tòk dooy dāay-ráp ʔit-thí-phon thaaŋ wát-tha-ná-tham maa càak Sa-peen lé Sa-ha-rát-ʔa-mee-rí-kaa nai chúaŋ thii tòk pen rát-nai-ʔaa-naa-ní-khom/

(“Filipino culture is a blend between the west and the east. The western culture comes from Spain and U.S.A. when The Philippines was colonized by them...”)

From the excerpt, the word “ผสมผสาน”/pha-sôm-pha-săan/ (blend) was used to show that Filipino culture varies because it originates from many sources; both eastern and western cultures, especially the influences of Spanish and American cultures.

Example 2

“อาหารการกินของชาวฟิลิปปินส์เป็นกระจกสะท้อนวัฒนธรรมอันหลากหลายของประเทศได้เป็นอย่างดี...และผสมผสานจากหลายวัฒนธรรมทั้งจากอาหารสเปน จีน อเมริกัน และชาติอื่นๆ ในเอเชียโดยปรับให้เข้ากับส่วนผสมพื้นเมืองที่ฟิลิปปินส์มี” (Book no.10: 68)

/ʔaa-hăan-kaan-kin-khǎw-chaaw-Fí-líp-pin pen kra-còk sa-tóon wát-tha-ná-tham-ʔan-làak-lāay-khǎw-pra-thêet dāay pen yaaŋ dii...lé pha-sôm-pha-săan càak lāay wát-tha-ná-tham thaaŋ càak ʔaa-hăan-Sa-peen Ciin ʔa-mee-rí-kan lé cháat ʔin ʔin nai ʔee-chia dooy pràp hâi khâw kâp sūan-pha-sôm-phín-muaŋ-thii-Fí-líp-pin-mii/

(“Filipino foods reflect variety in Filipino culture. ...It is a blend from various cultures such as Spanish, Chinese, American, and other cultures in Asia by adapting those cultures with local Filipino ones.”)

From the excerpt, the phrases “วัฒนธรรมอันหลากหลาย” /wát-tha-na-tham-ʔan làak-lăay/ (variety of cultures) and “ผสมผสาน”/pha-sôm-pha-săan/ were used to describe the varieties in Filipino cultures which are reflected through foods which are influenced by different cultures such as Spanish, Chinese, American and Asian. But it is unique in its own way.

Example 3

“ฟิลิปปินส์มีประชากรหลากหลายเชื้อชาติทำให้มีภาษาพูดมากกว่า170ภาษาโดยมีภาษาตากาล็อกและภาษาอังกฤษเป็นภาษาราชการ” (Book no.10: 64)

/Fí-líp-pin mii pra-chaa-koon làak-lăay chîa-châat tham-hâi mii phaa-săa-phûut mâak-kwàa 170 phaa-săa dooy mii phaa-săa Taa-kaa-lók lé phaa-săa ʔaŋ-krit pen phaa-săa-râat-cha-kaan/

(“The Philippines has a variety of races, with more than 170 spoken languages. Tagalog and English are formal languages.”)

From the excerpt, Filipino was presented in the way that they vary in races, as reflected in the following sentence “ฟิลิปปินส์มีประชากรหลากหลายเชื้อชาติ” (ibid.) /Fí-líp-pin mii pra-chaa-koon làak-lăay chîa-châat/ (The Philippines has variety of races.) They were also presented as multilingual society such as “...มีภาษาพูดมากกว่า170 ภาษา...” /...mii phaa-săa-phûutmâak-kwàa 170 phaa-săa.../ (ibid.) which means there are more than 170 spoken languages in the Philippines.

2.2 Filipino Life is Colorful and Joyful

Filipino life was presented as colorful and joyful. There are lexicons which shares the semantic features that the authors (Thongphoon, 2013; Khamtho, 2012) chose to describe this topic as following.

การเต้นรำ	/kaan-tèn-ram/	dancing
การแสดงดนตรี	/kaan-sa-deey-don-trii/	music performance
ขบวนพาเหรดแฟนซี	/kha-buan-phaa-rèet-fien-sii/	fancy parade
ขบวนแฟนซี	/kha-buan-fien-sii/	fancy parade
ความสนุกสนาน	/khiwaam-sa-nuik-sa-năan/	joy
งานรื่นเริง	/ŋaan rîŋ rœy/	entertaining event
ฉลอง	/cha-lăay/	to celebrate
เฉลิมฉลอง	/cha-lăem-cha-lăay/	to celebrate
เต้นรำ	/tèn-ram/	to dance
ประกวด	/pra-kuat/	to contest
ศิลปะ	/sîn-la-pă/	art
เสียงเพลง	/siaŋ-phileey/	sound of song

These lexicons show that the colorful and joyful life of Filipino; as expressed from the list of words that involves events on entertainments, such as music, parade, celebration, contest, dancing and art.

Thongphoon (ibid: 74) boldly stated that the Philippines is the country of art and music.

2.3 Filipino is Politically Aware

It was directly stated that Filipino is highly politically aware, shown in the following examples:

Example 1

“ชาวฟิลิปปินส์ได้ชื่อว่ามีความตื่นตัวทางการเมืองสูงเมื่อประเทศตกอยู่ในภาวะวิกฤติ

ประชาชนจะออกมาแสดงพลังต่อสู้เสมอ...” (Book no.10: 56)

/chaaw-Fí-líp-pin dâay chíi wâa mii khwaam-tîn-tua-thaang-kaan-miang sǔnɯŋ nîi pra-thêet tòk yùu nai pha-wá-wí-krit pra-chaa-chon cà ʔòok maa sa-dɛɛŋ pha-lan tòw-sǔn yùu sa-mǎw/

(“Filipinos are well-known for being highly awakened to politics. When the country is in a political crisis, Filipinos will always demonstrate their political power struggle...”)

From the excerpt, the phrases “มีความตื่นตัวทางการเมืองสูง” /mii khwaam-tîn-tua-thaang-kaan-miang sǔnɯŋ/ (...has high political awakening) and “แสดงพลังต่อสู้เสมอ” /sa-dɛɛŋ pha-lan tòw-sǔn yùu sa-mǎw/ (...always demonstrate their political power struggle) were chosen to describe that Filipinos are concerned about politics. They are awakened and ready to participate in political events at all times.

Example 2

“...ประชาชนทุกระดับชั้นสนใจการศึกษาโดยไม่จำกัดอายุ

จึงมีส่วนทำให้เกิดวัฒนธรรมทางการเมืองแบบประชาธิปไตยเพราะประชาชนมีความตื่นตัวทางการเมืองสูง

องค์กรนักศึกษาอายุระหว่าง 18-30

ปีถือว่าเป็นพลังหนุ่มสาวที่มีพลังมากพอที่จะสนับสนุนผู้ลงสมัครรับเลือกตั้งให้ได้รับคะแนนเสียงได้...” (Book no.10: 89)

/pra-chaa-chon thúk ra-dàp-chán sǒn-cai kaan-sík-sǎa dooy mâi cam-kàt ʔaa-yú cɯŋ mii sǔan tham-hâi kǎet wát-tha-ná-tham-thaang-kaan-miang-bèep-pra-chaa-thíp-pa-tai phrɔ́ pra-chaa-chon mii khwaam-tîn-tua-thaang-kaan-miang sǔnɯŋ ʔoŋ-koon-nák-sík-sǎa-ʔaa-yú-ra-wàaŋ 18-30 pii thîi-wâa pen pha-lan-nùm-sǎaw-thîi-mii-pha-lan-mâak-phow-thîi-cà-sa-nàp-sa-nǔn-phûu-long-sa-màk-ráp-hiak-tâŋ-hâi-dâay-ráp-kha-nɛɛn-sǎaŋ-dâay/

From the excerpt, the phrases

“วัฒนธรรมทางการเมืองแบบประชาธิปไตย” /wát-tha-na-tham-thaang-kaan-miang-bèep-pra-chaa-thíp-pa-tai/

(democratic political culture), “ประชาชนมีความตื่นตัวทางการเมืองสูง” /pra-chaa-chon mii khwaam-tîn-tua-thaang-kaan-miang sǔnɯŋ/ (People have high political awakening.) and “พลังหนุ่มสาวที่มีพลังมากพอที่จะสนับสนุนผู้ลงสมัครรับเลือกตั้งให้ได้รับคะแนนเสียงได้” /pha-lan nùm-sǎaw thîi mii mâak phow thîi cà sa-nàp-sa-nǔn-phûu-long-sa-màk-ráp-hiak-tâŋ-hâi-dâay-ráp-kha-nɛɛn-sǎaŋ-dâay/ (power of the young people is enough to support the political candidates win an election) were used to emphasized that Filipinos are always awakened to and participate in politics.

2.4 Filipino has Strong Religious Beliefs

It was stated that Filipino has strong religious beliefs as in the following examples:

Example 1

“เอกลักษณ์ของชาวฟิลิปปินส์ที่นำเคารพคือความเลื่อมใสศรัทธาและความเคร่งครัดในศาสนาคริสต์นิกายโรมันคาทอลิก...” (Book no.2: 21)

/ʔèek-ka-lák-khǎw-chaaw-Fí-líp-pin-thíi-nâa-khaw-róp khǎ khwaam-ɰam-sǎi-lé-khwaam-khrêṅ-khrát-nai-sàat-sa-nâa-khrít-ní-kaay-roo-man-khaa-thwǎ-lik/

From the excerpt, the phrases

“ความเลื่อมใสศรัทธาและความเคร่งครัดในศาสนาคริสต์นิกายโรมันคาทอลิก”/khwaam-ɰam-sǎi-lé-khwaam-khrêṅ-khrát-nai-sàat-sa-nâa-khrít-ní-kaay-roo-man-khaa-thwǎ-lik/ (strong respect for religion, Roman Catholic, and strict adherence to the practice), the words เลื่อมใส /ɰam-sǎi/ (strong respect) and เคร่งครัด /khrêṅ-khrát/ (strict adherence to the practice) were used to state the strong religious belief of Filipino.

Example 2

“...ชาวฟิลิปปินส์ผูกพันเหนียวแน่นอยู่กับศาสนา” (Book no.10: 57)

/chaaw-Fí-líp-pin phùuk-phan-nǎw-nên-yùu-kàp sàat-sa-nâa/

In this excerpt, the phrase “ผูกพันเหนียวแน่นอยู่กับศาสนา” /phùuk-phan-nǎw-nên-yùu-kàpsàat-sa-nâa/ (strongly bonded to religion) was also used to emphasize strong bond between Filipino and Roman Catholic religion, especially the phrase “ผูกพันเหนียวแน่น” /phùuk-phan-nǎw-nên/ which its meaning helps affirm the idea of “strongly bonded” to the religion very well.

2.5 Equality Between Male and Female Exists

The concept of equality between Filipino males and females was frequently mentioned, for example:

“ผู้หญิงในฟิลิปปินส์ได้รับการยอมรับเท่ากับผู้ชายและเป็นที่ยอมรับจากสังคมอย่างสูงเมื่อเทียบกับประเทศอื่นๆ ในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้...การยอมรับในสิทธิของผู้หญิงยังมีสูงมากทั้งในด้านการเมืองการปกครองและการศึกษา” (Book no.10: 59)

/phûu-yîṅ nai Philippines dǎay ráp kaan-ywǎm-ráp thǎu kàp phûu-chaay lé pen thǎi-ywǎm-ráp cǎak sǎṅ-khom yǎṅ sūṅ mǎa thǎp kàp pra-théet ʔim ʔim nai ʔee-chia-ta-wan-ʔwǎk-chǎṅ-tǎay...kaan-ywǎm-ráp-nai-sít-khǎw-phûu-yîṅ mii sūṅ mǎak thǎṅ nai dǎan kaan-maṅ-kaan-prók-khǎw lé kaan-sík-sǎa/

(“Filipino females are equal to males. This idea is highly accepted in Filipino society when compared to other Southeast Asian countries. Filipino females are accepted and hold positions in the political, ruling, and educational fields.”)

The idea of equality between genders in Filipino society was re-affirmed with the use of the following key words:

การยอมรับ	/kaan-ywom-ráp/	accepting
ที่ยอมรับ	/thii-ywom-ráp/	accepting
การยอมรับในสิทธิ	/kaan-ywom-ráp-nai-sìt/	accepting in the right of

These key words were used in the contexts which emphasize that females have equal rights and status as males in Filipino society. Females are accepted in many positions in the political or educational fields which are normally held by males.

2.6 Most Filipinos are Educated

This idea was mentioned many times throughout those discourses. It was claimed that Filipinos are educated, as shown in the following examples:

Example 1

“การศึกษาของฟิลิปปินส์พัฒนารุดหน้าประเทศเพื่อนบ้านในภูมิภาคโดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งในช่วงที่อยู่ภายใต้การดูแลของสหรัฐอเมริกา...ตัวอย่างเช่นการเปิดโอกาสให้ทุกคนเรียนหนังสืออย่างเท่าเทียมและเรียนฟรีตั้งแต่ระดับประถมศึกษาจนถึงมัธยมศึกษา” (Book no.10: 83)

/kaan-sìk-sǎa khwǎn Fí-líp-pin phát-tá-naa rùt-nǎa pra-thêet phǎan-bāan nai phuu-mí-phǎak dooy-cha-phǎ-yǎn-yín nai chǔan thii yuu phaay-tǎay kaan-duu-lɛ khwǎn Sa-ha-rát-ʔa-mee-rí-kaa...tua-yǎn-chén kaan-pǎet-ʔoo-kàat-hǎi-thúk-khon-rian-nǎn-sǎn-yǎn-thǎw-thiam-lɛ-rian-frii-tǎn-tɛ-ra-dǎp-pra-thǎm-sìk-sǎa-con-thǎn-mát-tha-yom-sìk-sǎa/

(“Education in the Philippines developed faster than other countries in the region, especially during the colonization of the United States of America. The following example shows that people have an equal chance to study and tuition fee are not required from primary to high school.”)

The key words such as “พัฒนา” /phát-tá-naa/ (develop), “รุดหน้า” /rút-nǎa/ (progress), “เปิดโอกาส” /pǎet-ʔoo-kàat/ (open chance), “เท่าเทียม” /thǎw-thiam/ (equal), “เรียนฟรี” /rian-frii/ (free education) were chosen to describe the education status in the Philippines as developing and progressing. The chance for free education is always open, and everyone gets an equal chance for it.

Example 2

“ปัจจุบันประเทศฟิลิปปินส์ยังคงเป็นผู้นำด้านการศึกษาในอาเซียน...” (ibid.)

/pàt-cù-ban pra-thêet Fí-líp-pin yǎn-khon pen phuu-nam dân kaan-sìk-sǎa nai ʔaa-sǎn/

(At present, the Philippines is still an education leader in ASEAN...)

The word “ยังคง” /yǎn-khon/ (still) implies that the Philippines is affirmed as an education leader. This leads to the idea that Filipinos are highly educated in terms of the country's education policy.

2.7 Filipino is a Friend of Thai

The writer (Bunthong, 2013) used the word “ประเทศเพื่อนๆ สมาชิก” (Member (friend) countries) 18 times in his chapter to refer to the ASEAN member countries, including the Philippines. This leads and emphasize the readers to the idea that those ASEAN member countries are all friends and Filipino is friend of Thai, as shown in the following examples:

“ประชาคมการเมืองความมั่นคงอาเซียน (ASEAN Political-Security Community: APSC) อาเซียนตั้งใจที่จะให้ประเทศเพื่อนๆสมาชิกร่วมมือกันในการเมืองและความมั่นคงเพื่อสร้างสันติภาพและความมั่นคงให้กับประเทศเพื่อนๆสมาชิกทั้งนี้เพื่อให้อยู่ร่วมกันอย่างมีความสุขไม่ทะเลาะหรือขัดแย้งกัน” (Book no.7: 2)

/phra-chaa-khom-kaan-maaṅ-khwaam-mân-khoṅ-ʔaa-siān (ASEAN Political-Security Community: APSC) ʔaa-siān tâṅ-cai thîi cà hâi pra-thêet phâan phâan sa-maa-chîk rūam-mh kan nai dân kaan-maaṅ lé khwaam-mân-khoṅ phîa sâaṅ sǎn-ti-phâap lé khwaam-mân-khoṅ hâi pra-thêet phâan phâan sa-maa-chîk thâṅ-nîi phîa hâi yuū rūam kan yâaṅ mîi khwaam-suk mâi tha-ló rǎ khàt-yéṅ kan/

(“ASEAN Political-Security Community or APSC, ASEAN focuses on the cooperation between member (friend) countries in the political and security aspects so as to build a cohesive community, without quarrels or conflicts.”)

2.8 Filipinos are Friendly

Besides being friend of Thai, Filipinos were described as being friendly, as shown in the following example:

“ชาวฟิลิปปินส์มีความเป็นมิตรและเข้ากับคนได้ง่ายซึ่งชาวฟิลิปปินส์จะให้การต้อนรับพูดคุยสอบถามและจัดหาอาหารหรือเครื่องดื่มให้แก่ผู้มาเยี่ยมชมซึ่งถือเป็นมารยาทที่สุภาพของชาวฟิลิปปินส์...” (Book no.2: 22)

/chaaw-Fí-líp-pin mîi khwaan-pen-mít lé khâu kâp khon ṇâay sṇṇ chaaw-Fí-líp-pin cà hâi kaan-tǝwṇ-ráp-phûut-khuy sǝp-tâam lé càt-hǎa ʔaa-hǎan rǎ khwîaṅ-dîm hâi kée phûu-maa-yān sṇṇ thîi pen maa-ra-yâat thîi sù-phâap khwǝṅ chaaw-Fí-líp-pin.../

(“Filipinos are friendly and sociable. They will welcome, converse, and prepare food or drinks for guests. This is a characteristics and politeness of Filipinos...”)

The friendliness of Filipino, as expressed throughout those books, plays an important role in promoting the positive perspective of Filipino, and the readers will in turn have a positive perception of Filipino.

2.9 Filipinos are strongly cohesive

The next idea is Filipinos were described as a strongly cohesive group, for example:

“วัฒนธรรมการเคารพผู้ใหญ่การสำนึกบุญคุณและรักใคร่พวกพ้องยังคงมีให้เห็นเด่นชัด...” (Book no.1: 41)

/wát-tha-ná-tham kaan-khaw-róp-phûu-yâi kaan-sǎm-ník-bun-khun lé rák-khrâi phûak-phǝwṇ yaṅ-khoṅ mîi hâi hěn dên-chát/

(“The culture of respect toward adults, showing gratitude, and love toward their community is an outstanding feature in Filipino society.”)

The in-group characteristic was affirmed by the souvenir/gift-giving practices in Filipino society. It was described that Filipinos present gifts to people in their circle during festivals and events such as Christmas, birthday, wedding ceremony, wedding anniversary, welcoming a new-born in the family, and father’s and mother’s days. Christmas is the most important day for Filipinos. They present gifts to everyone in their circle such as family members, relatives, friends, colleagues, and employees such as a security guard, a house maid, and even a newspaper delivery person. An important phrase which was used in describing this idea is “ให้ความสำคัญ (กับ)” (to value) as shown in the following example:

“ชาวฟิลิปปินส์ให้ความสำคัญกับการให้ของขวัญและของฝาก...” (Book no.2: 25)

(chaaw-Fí-líp-pin hâi khwaam-sẵm-khankàpkaan-hâi-khǎwṭ-khwǎn-lé-khǎwṭ-fàak...)

(“Filipinos value presenting of gift and souvenirs...”)

In this regard, the concept of “face” is related to the in-group cohesiveness in Filipino society. Goffman (1967; cited in Hongladarom & Choksuwanit, 2008) defined “face” as “public self-image”. People want face and they can also lose face. From this point of view, it can be explained that Filipinos gain ‘positive faces’ for themselves by the souvenir/gift-giving practices. Besides, they try to avoid the shameful behaviors such as kissing in public because they will damage their ‘faces’ or ‘images’ and that of others as well. Regarding this, it was mentioned that

“...ชาวฟิลิปปินส์ยังมีความละอายเป็นจุดเด่นสำคัญ โดยจะให้ความสำคัญกับการนับถือกันในที่สาธารณะและให้ความสำคัญกับความเสื่อมเสียที่จะทำให้เกิดความเสียหายกับบุคคลหรือครอบครัวของชาวฟิลิปปินส์” (Book no.2: 22)

/...chaaw-Fí-líp-pin yaṇ-khoṇ mii khwaam-la-ʔaay pen cùt-dèn sǎm-khan dooy cà hâi khwaamsǎm-khan kàp kaan-náp-thîi-kan-nai-thîi-sǎa-thaa-ra-ná lé hâi khwaamsǎm-khan kàp khwaam-sǎm-sǎa thîi cà tham-hâi kǎet khwaam-sǎa-hǎay kàp bűk-khon rǎ khǎwṭp-khrua khǎwṭ chaaw-Fí-líp-pin/

(“The awareness of shame is an outstanding characteristic of Filipino. They will show respect to others, especially in public. Moreover, they are aware of behaviors that may affect others or other families.”)

2.10 Filipino and Thai have Similar Physical Appearance

The idea of Filipino and Thai having similar physical appearance was mentioned as in the following example:

“คนฟิลิปปินส์และคนไทยมีหน้าตาที่คล้ายคลึงกันมากขนาดที่หากเห็นหน้าอย่างเดียวยังแต่ไม่เอ่ยปากพูดก็จะไม่สามารถระบุได้ว่าเป็นคนฟิลิปปินส์หรือคนไทย” (Book no.8: 31)

(“Filipino and Thai are very much alike. If you see only their faces, you will not be able to tell the difference between them.”)

The word “คล้ายคลึง” /khláay-khlɯŋ/ (similar) was used to describe the similarity of Filipino and Thai. It was further emphasized that “หากเห็นหน้าอย่างเดียวยังแต่ไม่เอ่ยปากพูดก็จะไม่สามารถระบุได้ว่าเป็นคนฟิลิปปินส์หรือคนไทย” /hàak hěn nâa yàaŋ diaw tɛɛ mâi ʔə̀əy-pàak-phúut kɔ̀w cà mâi sǎa-mâat ra-bù dâay wâa pen khon Fí-líp-pin rǎi khon Thai/ (If you see only their faces, you will not be able to tell the difference between them.)

2.11 Filipino is poverty-stricken

The last idea mentions the poverty stricken in the society, for example:

Example 1

“อุปสรรคสำคัญต่อการพัฒนาเศรษฐกิจของฟิลิปปินส์คือปัญหาความยากจนและการทุจริตทางการเมืองซึ่งรัฐบาลชุดปัจจุบันกำลังเร่งปรับปรุงโดยเน้นแก้ไขภาวะขาดดุลและฟื้นฟูสถานะการคลังให้มั่นคง” (Book no.1: 40)

/ʔuip-pa-sak-sǎm-khan-tɔ̀w-kaan-phát-tha-naa-khɔ̀wŋ-Fí-líp-pin khɯ pan-hǎa-khwaam-yâak-con-lé-kaan-thút-ca-rít-thaay-kaan-maay sɯŋ rát-tha-baan-chút-pát-cuì-ban kam-lay rɛ̌ŋ práp-pruay dooy nén kɛ̀ɛ-khǎi phaa-wá-khǎat-dun lé fɯn-fuu sa-thǎa-ná-kaan-khlay hâi mân-khɔy/

(“A major obstacle to the development of the Philippine economy is poverty and political corruption. The present government is expediting the improvement of the run deficit and reforming the country’s financial status.”)

From this excerpt, it was mentioned that poverty is a major obstacle in developing the country with the stated problem as “ปัญหาความยากจน” /pan-hǎa-khwaam-yâak-con/ (poverty problem). It shows that Filipino is facing with poverty and it should be resolved urgently.

Example 2

“...ในปัจจุบันมะนิลาประสบปัญหาจากโครงสร้างเมืองที่ไม่สอดคล้องกับจำนวนประชากร เช่นการจราจรติดขัดอย่างหนัก ความยากจน มลภาวะ...” (Book no.5: 45)

/...nai pát-cuì-ban Ma-ni-laa pra-sòp pan-hǎa càak khrooy-sǎay-maay-thii-mâi-sòt-khlɔ̀wŋ-káp-cam-nuan-pra-cha-a-kɔ̀wŋ chên kaan-ca-raa-cɔ̀wŋ tít-khát yàaŋ nǎk khwaam-yâak-con mon-la-phaa-wá.../

/khon-Fí-líp-pin lé khon Thai mii nâa-taa khláay-khlɯŋ kan mâak ka-naat thii hàak hěn nâa yàaŋ diaw tɛɛ mâi ʔə̀əy-pàak-phúut kɔ̀w cà mâi sǎa-mâat ra-bù dâay wâa pen khon Fí-líp-pin rǎi khon Thai/










(“...Now Manila faces the problem of the imbalance between city structure and population. For example, heavy traffic congestion, poverty, and air pollution...”)

Again, the poverty was mentioned in this excerpt, it was pointed out with the phrase “ความยากจน” /khwaam-yâak-con/ (poverty) in line with the issues on population and city congestion.

3. Discussion

Firstly, this study aims at investigating the Filipino’s identities from the Thai-ASEAN juvenile books written by the Thai writers. The study suggests 11 categories of the Filipino’s identities, namely: (1) Filipino varies in race, culture, and language; (2) Filipino life is colorful and joyful; (3) Filipino is politically aware; (4) Filipino has strong religious beliefs; (5) Equality between male and female exists; (6) Most Filipinos are educated; (7) Filipino is a friend of Thai; (8) Filipinos are friendly; (9) Filipinos are strongly cohesive; (10) Filipino and Thai have similar physical appearance; and (11) Filipino is poverty-stricken. Regarding the ways that the authors used to convey their ideas, they not only used lexicons in the making of those identities but also the pictures. It is found that the authors used cartoon pictures and photographs throughout the books to illustrate the images of Filipino. This tool is considered useful in drawing the positive images of Filipino in the readers’ minds and to get attention from the target readers who are juvenile as well, for examples:

Table 2. The examples of pictures used in the Thai-ASEAN juvenile books

		
Picture 1	Picture 2	Picture 3
		
Picture 4	Picture 5	Picture 6
		
Picture 7	Picture 8	Picture 9

The authors used cartoon picture number 1 to 4 to illustrate Filipino national costumes. They used cartoon picture number 4 and 5 to illustrate Filipino traditional dance and festival called Cariñosa and Ati-Atihan, respectively. Moreover, they used cartoon picture and photograph together in number 6 to show the image of Elpidio Quirino, the former president of the Philippines, and the Philippine revolution. In picture number 7 and 8, the writers used photographs to illustrate Filipino food called 'Caldereta' (Filipino stew) and Filipino dessert called 'Halo-Halo'. In the last picture, the writers used cartoon picture to illustrate the famous public transportation in the Philippines called 'Jeepney'. In sum, the authors use a combination of cartoon pictures and photographs to portray Filipino as a strategy of attracting juvenile readers. The combination of cartoon pictures and photographs is considered useful for story-telling. It can aid the young readers to understand the story better and faster. Last but not least, the friendly cartoon pictures and photographs play an important role in constructing the positive image of Filipino in the mind of the readers.

Another aim of this study is to determine the possible implications of these writings on the study of Filipino psychology in the context of ASEAN Community. The study on the Filipino's identities through the Thai-ASEAN juvenile books highlights 11 perceptions. Ten of those can be considered positive characteristics: (1) Filipino varies in race, culture, and language; (2) Filipino's life is colorful and joyful; (3) Filipino is politically aware; (4) Filipino has strong religious beliefs; (5) Equality between male and female exists; (6) Most Filipinos are educated; (7) Filipino is friend of Thai; (8) Filipino is friendly; (9) Filipinos are strongly cohesive; (10) Filipino and Thai has similar physical appearance. Only one – (11) Filipino is poverty-stricken – is seen as negative. The reason for this presentation of the Filipino's identity lies on the nature and objective of the text. The books are intended for Thai juveniles and aimed to cultivate among its young readers – using lexicons and pictures – a positive understanding of Filipino/Philippines in particular and ASEAN in general as a means of promoting harmony in the region, therefore an ASEAN Community.

These Thai perspectives of Filipino do not necessarily deviate from the usual perceptions of the West or even of the Filipinos themselves, though reasons or explanations based on traditions and contexts may vary. The juvenile books presented here are not intended to elaborate on the tradition and context, though it can be inferred that the explanations are in line with the idea of connecting ASEAN with Thailand as the reference point (or as the "center") for the Thai juvenile readers (e.g., Filipino is friend of Thai; Filipino and Thai have similar physical appearance). This kind of perspective is the relevant and fresh contribution of the books in the literatures on Filipino psychology. Further investigations on Thai-ASEAN books on the Philippines can possibly enrich this view.

Finally, this preliminary study opens possibilities on the research directions regarding Filipino's identity, hence on Filipino psychology, and the strategies in doing it. Connections and collaborations among ASEAN scholars are necessary in building up the literatures written about the Philippines and other ASEAN countries, particularly those written in the country's own language just like the juvenile books presented here, in order to be able to contribute toward a better understanding of the country/region and to contribute to the attainment of an adequate well-being for the people. In the Philippines, there was an initial attempt in the 80's to look into psychology materials in Malaysia, Thailand, China, and Japan and made it available to the Filipino reader who tends to be familiar with psychology in the United States only. This resulted to a compilation on *Sikolohiya sa Silangan: Pinagmulan at Patutunguhan*

(Psychology in the East: Source and Direction) edited by Layug, Ramilo-Cantiller, and Esguerra (1987; cited in Enriquez, 1992; 120). It is about time to continue researches on this, in line with the ASEAN community. Because integration recognizes the diversity of cultures and identities in ASEAN, disciplines like indigenous psychologies (i.e. Filipino psychology, Thai psychology) are necessary contributions to the understanding of the identity of ASEAN community and the possibility of an ASEAN perspective in psychology.

4. Concluding Remarks

According to the study, there are some concluding remarks needed to mention as following. Firstly, the words, phrases and sentences used in the Thai-ASEAN Juvenile Books are both simple as well as complex in order to serve a wide range of readers: primary to high school level students. For examples,

(1) “เพื่อน” /phǎn/ (friend)

(2) “เพื่อนบ้าน” /phǎn-bāan/ (neighboring country)

(3) “ภาวะขาดดุล” /phaa-wá-khàat-dun/ (the run deficit),

(4) “สถานะการคลัง” /sa-thǎa-ná-kaan-khlan/ (the country’s financial status),

(5) “อุปสรรคสำคัญต่อการพัฒนาเศรษฐกิจของฟิลิปปินส์” /ʔùp-pa-sàk-sǎm-khan-tǔw-kaan-phát-tha-naa-khǔwng-Fí-líp-pin/ (An important obstacle to the development of the Philippine economy).

(6) “ประเทศฟิลิปปินส์ตั้งอยู่ในเขตอากาศร้อนชื้นเช่นเดียวกับประเทศไทย ได้รับ

อิทธิพลจากลมมรสุมตะวันออกเฉียงเหนือและลมมรสุมตะวันตกเฉียงใต้และได้รับฝนจากลมพายุดีเปรสชันและไต้ฝุ่น”
/pra-thêet Fí-líp-pin tǎng yùu nai khêet ʔaa-kàat rǔwng-chhín chên-diaw-kàp pra-thêet Thai
dāay-ráp ʔit-thí-phon càak lom-mǔw-ra-sǔm-ta-wan-ʔǔwng-chhǎn-nǎ lé
lom-mǔw-ra-sǔm-ta-wan-tòk-chhǎn-táay lé dāay-rápʔon càak lom-phaa-yú-dii-préet-chân lé tâay-fùn/

The Philippines is located in a tropical area so is Thailand. It is affected by monsoon from northeast and southwest, and it is also affected by Depression and Typhoon.

Secondly, this study is an endeavor to adopt the “Critical Discourse Analysis” (CDA) in the analysis. This is an attempt to reveal the relations of power expressed through the use of language. Luke (1999, cited in Graham, 2005: 4) proposed that language not only produces meaning but also particular kinds of objects and subjects upon whom and through which particular relations of power are realized. Taylor (2004: 436; cited in Graham, 2005: 4) defined it as “relationship of language to other social processes, and of how language works within power relations”. It is “type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (Tuen A. van Dijk, 2008:85). Fairclough (1995: 97) defined it as “It is moreover a ‘critical’ approach to discourse analysis in the sense that it sets out to make visible thorough analysis, and to criticize, connections between properties of texts and social processes and relations (ideologies, power relations) which are generally not obvious to people who produce and interpret those texts, and whose effectiveness depends upon this opacity.” Anyway, Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis were adopted as research frameworks in Thai language studies regarding

textbook discourse before. Sukwisith (2011) studied the relationship between language and ideologies in the Thai language textbooks for the elementary school curriculum B.E. 2503 – 2544. The findings show that 15 linguistic strategies are adopted in the textbooks to construct and represent various ideologies. The crucial strategies include lexical selection, reasoning, using a certain sentence structure to indicate interpersonal relations, presupposition, and multi-voicedness. The ideologies repeatedly found in all textbooks are ideologies related to children and gender ideologies. Some sets of idea that are repeatedly presented in all textbooks are 1) a good child is a desirable member of the society; and 2) Thailand is fertile, civilized and peaceful country. Some sets of idea that appear in some textbooks are 1) a good child is a person who follows that concept of sufficiency economy, as found in the B.E. 2544 textbooks; and 2) governmental officials are friendly to people, as found in both the B.E. 2521 and the B.E. 2544 textbooks. As for the analysis of discourse practice, textbooks are discourses which were controlled by the governmental education agencies. The users of the textbooks are teachers who are licensed to transfer knowledge to pupils. Therefore, textbooks are a type of discourse which is supported by the governmental agency, and it is interpreted as the correct and appropriate knowledge which is accessible by all levels of population in the society. Consequently, the ideologies presented in the textbooks somewhat influence the society. For the analysis of socio-cultural practice, the ideologies conveyed through textbooks are influenced many social notions and values such as the notion of seniority, the notion of patronage system, the notion of Buddhism, the notion of patriarchy, as well as the state's policies. On the other hand, these ideologies may have certain influence upon Thai people's ways of thinking regarding the definition of desirable citizens, the representation of ideal people and conditions, and the construction of interpersonal relationship in the society. Critical His study reveals the ideologies hidden in Thai society. Those ideologies are what the government and adults want the children to be and not what the children themselves want to be. These ideologies originate from the society and affect the society itself. Those reproduced ideologies of the dominant group are made in order to prepare the children to be good members of society. Meanwhile, those bias discourses may bring about inequality in Thai society.

Another study regarding Thai textbook analysis was conducted by Chutintaranond et al. (2014). This study aimed to investigate nationalism in Thai primary, secondary, and high-school textbooks that concerned Thailand's neighboring countries: Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia. It is found that Myanmar is presented as Thailand's enemy and is inferior to Thailand. Laos is presented as Thailand's sister country but is both inferior and troublemaker. Cambodia is presented as Thailand's colony, which is both a small kingdom and weak. Malaysia is presented as Thailand's colony and had become Thailand's neighbor after World War II. The idea that Thailand's neighbor countries are enemies, inferior and undeveloped still exists and such concepts are being reproduced through medium such as textbooks, printed media, and entertainment media. Chutintaranond et al's study reveals the bias discourses in the Thai textbooks to its neighboring countries. These bias discourses affect the way of thinking in Thai society for a long time, and they cause negative images of those neighboring countries as well.

By the way, in the current study, the relations of power expressed through the use of language is not obviously found in the Thai-ASEAN juvenile books. There are possible explanations as follows: firstly, those books were intended to be the informative sources and references about ASEAN countries, not a textbook, and secondly, the producers of the books are private companies. They might not be involved

or controlled by Thai government. Thus, they might not have power or might not need to exercise power through their books. It might say that the purpose of the Thai-ASEAN juvenile books is different from the Thai textbooks in the studies of Sukwisith and Chutintaranond et al. In these two studies of Thai textbooks, it was found that ideologies were constructed or influenced by the Thai government directly as they wanted to deliver those ideologies to the Thai students as Sukwisith stated that those ideologies are what the government and adults want the children to be and not what the children themselves want to be. Moreover, Chutintaranond et al also revealed the bias discourses in the Thai textbooks to its neighboring countries. They stated that these bias discourses affect the way of thinking in Thai society for a long time, and they cause negative images of those neighboring countries as well. In contrast, the ideologies and bias discourse are not found in the Thai-ASEAN juvenile books. The possible answer is that this kind of book aims at providing information and constructing the positive image of Filipino than dominating its readers. This leads to a rough conclusion that CDA may not appropriate in analyzing this kind of text as it is not intended to convey ideology of the dominant group to the dominated group. Lastly, this study is positioned as a preliminary study. It tries to open the possibilities on the research directions regarding Filipino identity, hence on Filipino psychology, and the strategies in doing it. Therefore, an in-depth study regarding Thai and Filipino is expected and suggested to further continue. The studies on other ASEAN member countries' identities are also suggested to conduct as to promote a better understanding among ASEAN Community people which will be able to take part in leading us to the sustainable community.

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GLOBALIZED THAILAND? CONNECTIVITY, CONFLICT AND CONUNDRUMS OF THAI STUDIES
15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND

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Qing China's View of the Sipsongpanna in the 1720s

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Abstract

Sipsongpanna was a Tai pre-modern state which was located at the southernmost part of the present-day Yunnan Province of China. In the 1720s, Qing China began annexing the southern part of Yunnan, and many native rulers, including those who governed the northern area adjacent to Sipsongpanna, were replaced with regular imperial officials, under a policy known as *gaituguliu* 改土歸流. As for Sipsongpanna, the Qing established Pu'er Fu 普洱府 in the northern region in 1729. However, the Qing did not replace any Tai rulers of Sipsongpanna with regular imperial officials, and Sipsongpanna as a Tai pre-modern state continued to exist until the 1950s.

This paper revealed how the Qing's view of Sipsongpanna had changed in the process of trying to annex it in the 1720s and the reason why the Qing did not replace any local Tai rulers in Sipsongpanna.

The Qing tried to annex the east bank of the Mekong River in Sipsongpanna. However, the Qing found this to be a difficult task. If the Qing placed the region under the control of regular imperial officials, most of the Tai people would flee to other Tai principalities adjacent to Sipsongpanna, which were beyond the Qing's control. In addition, even if the Qing dispatched officials and workers there, they would face the threat of deadly diseases such as malaria.

On the other hand, the Qing planned to profit from the tea cultivated in the Tea Hills of Sipsongpanna. The Qing also needed to prevent conflicts between the native people of the Tea Hills and the Han tea traders. Therefore, the Qing established Zongchadian at Simao to monopolize the tea trade and establish Pu'er Fu as a relay point in the transportation of tea from Sipsongpanna to the north.

Keywords: Sipsongpanna, Cheli, Qing, *gaituguliu*, Pu'er

1. Introduction

Sipsongpanna was a Tai pre-modern state that was located at the southernmost part of the present-day Yunnan Province of the People's Republic of China⁸⁷ (Fig.1 and Fig.2). It consisted of twenty-odd principalities or autonomous political units called 'moeng (muang)'⁸⁸, and was governed by its own lord

⁸⁷ Most of Sipsongpanna belongs to the present-day Xishuangbanna Autonomous Prefecture of Dai Nationality (西双版纳傣族自治州). It borders on Myanmar and Laos.

⁸⁸ I have written Tai words from Sipsongpanna in a form as close as possible to the pronunciations of Tai in Sipsongpanna. For some words, spellings showing Thai pronunciation are added in parentheses when they first

called 'Chao Moeng (Chao Muang)'.

Sipsongpanna had paid tribute to both the Chinese and Burmese dynasties since the latter half of the sixteenth century and the lord of Moeng Cheng Hung (Muang Chiang Rung)⁸⁹, who also held the position of supreme ruler of all of Sipsongpanna, was given official titles by both the Chinese and Burmese dynasties. The Chinese title was Cheli Xuanwei Shi (車里宣慰使). He was the head of a Chinese office named Cheli Xuanwei Si (車里宣慰司) which was usually located at Moeng Cheng Hung⁹⁰.

In the 1720s, Qing China began annexing the southern part of Yunnan, and many native rulers, including those who governed the northern area adjacent to Sipsongpanna, were replaced with regular imperial officials, under a policy known as *gaituguiliu* 改土歸流.⁹¹ As for Sipsongpanna, the Qing established Pu'er Fu 普洱府 in the northern region in 1729, as well as Simao Ting 思茅廳 under Pu'er Fu in 1735, to which most of the moengs of Sipsongpanna belonged. However, the Qing did not replace any Tai rulers of Sipsongpanna with regular imperial officials, and Sipsongpanna as a Tai pre-modern state continued to exist until the 1950s.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss Qing China's view of the Sipsongpanna region in the 1720s. This paper will reveal how the Qing's view of Sipsongpanna changed in the process of trying to annex it in the 1720s and the reason why the Qing did not replace any local Tai rulers in Sipsongpanna.

Most discussion on the Qing's annexation of Yunnan claims that it was based on the *gaituguiliu* policy of E'ertai 鄂爾泰, the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou at that time. The Qing adapted their policy in response to the circumstances. I will thus focus on how the Qing expanded their understanding of Sipsongpanna and how their policies concerning the region changed as a result.

Some studies have discussed the establishment of Pu'er Fu not in the context of annexation but in the history of 'Pu'er tea', which was tea gathered from the Tea Hills (Chashan 茶山) of Sipsongpanna, carried to Pu'er, and distributed from there. Increasing numbers of Han traders advanced into the Tea Hills of Sipsongpanna to obtain tea in the 1720s and Pu'er Fu was established in 1729. This fact is important in understanding the establishment of Pu'er Fu.

We should note a study by Christian Daniels (Daniels, 2004) as a remarkable argument representing both points of view. While most previous studies only focus on the 1720s when *gaituguiliu* was being conducted in southern Yunnan, Daniels 'put the events of the 1720s', including the establishment of Pu'er Fu, 'in the long-term perspective of violence by ethnic hill peoples living in the area to the north of Sipsong Panna that had continued since the 17th century.' In addition, he showed that 'inter-ethnic strife between hill peoples and Han traders in the Tea Hills, an area under the jurisdiction of paramount leader

appear so that they can be related to Thai words used in previous studies. On the other hand, Tai place names outside Sipsongpanna are spelled showing Thai pronunciation.

⁸⁹ The names of moeng (muang) were called 'Moeng' ('Muang') plus the proper name following that. If the proper name had more than one word or syllable, it was sometimes called only by the proper name without 'Moeng' ('Muang'). I also sometimes follow this system to indicate a moeng's (muang's) name, such as Cheng Hung, Chiang Tung, and Chiang Khaeng,

⁹⁰ When the one appointed as Saenwifa was forced by another having a claim to the throne to leave Moeng Cheng Hung, Cheli Xuanwei Si also moved to the place where the Saenwifa was.

⁹¹ Gai means to 'change' or 'transform', tu means 'native rulers', gui means 'in charge of', and liu or liuguan means 'imperial officials sent to the area that had belonged to native rulers before'. Thus, *gaituguiliu* means 'replacing native rulers with regular imperial officials'.

of Sipsong Panna, precipitated the rebellion which ultimately led to the annexation'.⁹²

Regarding Daniels' argument, first I will discuss how the Qing regarded the southern part of Yunnan, including Sipsongpanna, in the 1680s. Next, I will examine how the Qing treated the powerful, non-Han natives of the Xinping 新平 and Xinhua 新化 areas at the end of the 17th century. Third, I will move on to the area south of Xinping and Xinhua and will discuss how the Qing treated the powerful, non-Han natives there in the 1720s. Finally, I will consider how the Qing expanded their understanding of the physical and social environments of Sipsongpanna in the 1720s and how, by this expansion of understanding, their behaviour toward Sipsongpanna changed.

2. The Qing's View of the Southern Part of Yunnan in the 1680s

Before examining how the Qing regarded the southern part of Yunnan in the 1680s, I will first explain Lukuishan's 'bandits' 魯魁山野賊. Lukuishan was a part of the Ailao 哀牢 Mountains, which extend from south of Dali 大理州 to Honghe 紅河州.⁹³ (Map 1) After the Ming established Xinping Xian 新平縣 in 1591, Lukuishan's bandits revolted five times over the course of 30 years. Another revolt by Lukuishan's bandits broke out in 1623-1624 (Daniels, 2004, pp.106-110).

Cai Yurong 蔡毓榮, who was the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou from 1681 until 1686, wrote that the bandits came 'inside' of Lukuishan, namely, Xinping, Xinhua, Yuanjiang 元江, Yimen 易門, E'jia 石硯嘉, Nan'an 南安, and Jingdong, and that they escaped to 'outside' of the Lukuishan, namely Cheli 車里, Pu'er 普洱, Menggen 孟艮, Zhenyuan 鎮沅, Mengmian 猛緬, and Jiaozhi 交趾 (Cai, p.36). What is worthy of attention here is that Cai Yurong divided the area into two: the area inside of Lukuishan and the area outside of Lukuishan.

The towns referred to as being inside Lukuishan were governed by Chinese regular imperial officials. Map 1 shows their locations with red ellipses, which indicates that they were located near the central area of Yunnan.

On the other hand, the towns referred to as being outside Lukuishan were governed by non-Han, native leaders, who refused to arrest the Lukuishan bandits fleeing into their domains, even providing them with protection. Map 1 indicates that the towns, which are shown with green rectangles, were widely distributed. While the northernmost town, Zhenyuan, was near the centre of Yunnan, Mengmian (Burma)⁹⁴ and Jiaozhi (Vietnam) were also cited as being outside. In other words, Lukuishan was a kind of boundary, and Zhenyuan was considered to be outside, as well as Burma and Vietnam. This was the Qing's view of the southern part of Yunnan in the 1680s.

Cheli 車里, which was the Moeng Cheng Hung of Sipsongpanna, as well as Pu'er, were also mentioned as being outside Lukuishan. This shows that at that time, the Qing regarded Sipsongpanna as a place that the bandits could escape to and the Qing could not pursue them.

⁹² Daniels also argued that 'the Qing intervened in order to enforce Chinese style law and order on local society rather than territorial aggrandisement as some scholars have claimed'.

⁹³ Cai Yurong wrote that Lukuishan ranged through the territories of Xin 新, Xi'e 山習, Meng 蒙, Yuan 元, Jing 景, and Chu 楚 (Cai, p.36). These names may refer to Xinping 新平 and Xinhua 新化, Xi'e 山習峨, Menghua 蒙化, Yuanjiang 元江, Jingdong 景東, and Chuxiong 楚雄.

⁹⁴ Menggen, which means Kengtung or Chiang Tung, is now located in the Shan state of Myanmar.

3. The Qing's Treatment of the Xinping and Xinhua Areas

Next, I will discuss how the Qing treated the Xinping and Xinhua areas, where Lukuishan's bandits were. Cai Yurong wrote about the situations in 1672, when Wu Sangui 吳三桂 ruled Yunnan, that Wu gave the titles of shoubei 守備⁹⁵ and then Zhonshun Ying Fujiang 忠順營副將⁹⁶ of Xinping and Xinhua to one of the bandits, Le Ang or Yang Zongzhou 楊宗周.⁹⁷ Wu Sangui also gave the title of dusi 都司 to Le Ang's three subordinates, namely Pu Weishan 普為善, Fang Conghoa 方從化, and Li Shangyi 李尚義⁹⁸ (Cai , p.37).

In 1681 (Kanki 20), when the Qing's military force reached Yunnan, all of the four persons mentioned above swore allegiance to the Qing. The Qing, according to precedent, appointed Yang Zongzhou as tu fujiang of Xinping and Xinhua 兩新土副將 and the others as tu dusi 土都司. (Cai , pp.37-38). Fujiang and dusi were the titles of military officers. Tu means 'native' and 'non-Han'. Therefore, tu fujiang and tu dusi were military titles given to non-Han people.

In 1687 (Kanki 26), the four were given other Chinese titles. Yang Zongzhou was appointed to tu xiancheng 土県丞 and Pu Weishan, Fang Conghoa, and Li Shangyi to tu xunjian 土巡檢. (Ni, 1846, vol.11, p.12). Both xiancheng and xunjian were civilian titles. The Qing gave them the civilian titles in addition to the military titles. We can confirm that Li Shangyi was appointed to Yangwuba tu xunjian 陽武壩土巡檢 as the chief of Yangwuba of Xinping Xian (Ni, 1846, vol.11, p.21). This shows that the other two who were given the titles of tu xunjian and Yang Zongzhou, who had more prestigious titles than the other three, would be chiefs of each place.

Li Shangyi, however, killed himself in 1691 after being seized by the Qing because he had encouraged thousands of people to plunder. Since then, regular imperial officials were sent to Yangwuba as its governors (xunjian 巡檢). In other words, gaituguiliu was conducted in Yangwuba. (Ni, 1846, vol.11, p. 21; Daniels, 2004, p.109). It may be the first case of gaituguiliu as a response to Lukuishan's bandits⁹⁹.

We can summarize how the Qing treated the Xinping and Xinhua areas at the end of the 17th century as follows. At first, in the 1680s, the Qing appointed powerful local people to military and civilian posts, but before long, in 1691, the Qing replaced one of them with a regular imperial official. In other words, gaituguiliu had already been conducted with a Lukuishan bandit in 1691. The removal of a native person who led people to plunder was the reason for this instance of gaituguiliu.

4. Gaituguiliu in Weiyuan 威遠 and Zhenyuan 鎮沅

4.1 Gaituguiliu in Weiyuan

After the gaituguiliu in Yangwuba, there was an interval of about 30 years. In 1723 (Yongzhong 1), Pu Youcai 普有才 and Fang Jingming 方景明, who were also Lukuishan bandits (魯魁賊種)¹⁰⁰, surrounded

⁹⁵ Shoubei was one of the titles given to a military officer.

⁹⁶ Zhonshun Ying Fujiang refers to the vice commander of the Zhonshun encampment.

⁹⁷ After being appointed to Shoubei, he changed his name to Yang Zongzhou.

⁹⁸ They were Yi people (Daniels, 2004, p.110).

⁹⁹ The area was not outside of Lukuishan, as Cai Yurong had stated

¹⁰⁰ When they were formulating a plot against Shi Heshang, they stayed in Yangwuba 陽武壩, where Li Shangyi had governed until 1691 and regular imperial officials were sent as governors (Ni, 1846, vol.12, p.5).

and attacked the city of Yuanjiang 元江, where their enemy, Shi Heshang 施和尚 had fled to. The Qing's regular imperial officials who governed Yuanjiang gave up protecting Shi Heshang and drove Shi and his family out of the city (Ni, 1846, vol.12, pp. 4-5; Daniels, 2004, p. 109). After this event, Fang Jingming swore allegiance to the Qing, but Pu Youcai did not (Ni, 1846, vol.12, p. 5, p. 9].

In the next year, 1724 (Yongzhong 2), Pu Youcai plundered the Tea Hills of Sipsongpanna. The Qing tried to catch Pu Youcai, but the Tai ruler of Moeng Wo or Weiyuan,¹⁰¹ who was given the title of Weiyuan Tuzhizhou 威遠土知州, sheltered Pu Youcai and the Qing could not capture him (Daniels, 2004, p.109, p.112; Ni, 1846, vol.12, p.7). The Tai ruler of Moeng Wo sheltered Pu Youcai because they had established a fictitious father-son relationship (*Gongzhongdang Yongzhongchao Zouzhe* vol.2, p. 499; Daniels, 2004, p. 112].

The Qing replaced the Tai ruler of Moeng Wo with a regular imperial official because he had sheltered Pu Youcai (Daniels, 2004, p. 106, p.112)¹⁰². This maybe the first case of gaituguiliu outside of the Lukuishan. Gaituguiliu was conducted when a native, non-Han ruler sheltered another native person who had attacked a city governed by the Qing. We can see that the removal of hiding places for native bandits who did not swear allegiance to the Qing was one of the justifications for gaituguiliu.

4.2 Gaituguiliu in Zhenyuan

Two years later, in the sixth month of 1726 (Yongzhong 4), the Qing also replaced the native ruler of Zhenyuan¹⁰³ with a regular imperial official. (Ni, 1846, vol.12, p. 19, *Daoguang Pu'er Fu Zhi*, vol.3, p. 15; Daniels, 2004, p. 106). We cannot find any documents explaining the reason for this gaituguiliu. Before long, at the beginning of 1727, the native people of Zhenyuan attacked the city of Zhenyuan and killed the imperial officials there. This revolt was soon suppressed and the native government was not restored. (*Gongzhongdang Yongzhongchao Zouzhe* vol.7, p.453, pp. 598-602; Ni, 1846, vol.12, pp.24-26 Daniels 2004, p.106).

This gaituguiliu might be based on E'ertai's policy. E'ertai was appointed as the governor of Yunnan 雲南巡撫 and moved there in the second month of 1726. He was then appointed as the governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou 雲貴總督 in the tenth month of 1726. E'ertai took responsibility for implementing gaituguiliu in Yunnan starting in the second or tenth month of 1726.¹⁰⁴ Zhenyuan was closer to the 'inside' area than Weiyuan. This situation might have made E'ertai think that Zhenyuan should be governed by regular imperial officials instead of native, non-Han leaders.

5. Qing's Behaviour toward Sipsongpanna in the 1720s

5.1 Qing's Trial of Gaituguiliu in Moeng Ham

In the 1720s, increasing numbers of Han tea traders came to the Tea Hills of Sipsongpanna, which Pu Youcai had plundered in 1724 (Yongzhong 2) as mentioned above. By loaning money at high interest rates, the Han tea traders caused trouble with native people. In the fourth month of 1727 (Yongzhong 5), the native Woni (Hani) people killed 38 Han people in the Tea Hills. The Qing ordered the Tai ruler of

¹⁰¹ Moeng Wo was called Weiyuan in Chinese.

¹⁰² The Qing placed Weiyuan Zhiliting 威遠直隸庁 there. Zhili means 'directly controlled'.

¹⁰³ He was given the title of Zhenyuan Tuzhifu 鎮沅土知府.

¹⁰⁴ E'ertai was in Yunnan until the tenth month of 1731.

Moeng Ham or Ganlanba 橄欖壩, Dao Zhengyan 刀正彦, to suppress the riot, but he instead chose to defend the Woni people and thus disobey the order. Dao Zhengyan was captured in the third month of 1728 (Yongzhong 6) and killed by the Qing (*Gongzhongdang Yongzhongchao Zouzhe* vol.9, pp. 286-288, vol.10, p.174; Ni, 1846, vol.12, pp.28-29; Daniels, 2004, p.104, pp.112-113).

Just before capturing Dao Zhengyan, E'ertai sent several letters to the Yongzhong Emperor explaining his ideas regarding the treatment of Sipsongpanna. In a letter written during the first month of 1728 (Yongzhong 6), E'ertai presented his plan that the area outside (west) of the Mekong River would be governed by Cheli Xuanweishi, as had been the way until then, and that on the inside (east) of the Mekong River, which included areas under the control of Dao Zhengyan, military camps should be established (*Gongzhongdang Yongzhongchao Zouzhe* vol. 9, pp.580-584). In the second month of 1728, E'ertai sent a letter again to say that both the outside and inside of the Mekong River belonged to Cheli. Then, a few months after capturing Dao Zhengyan, in the sixth month of 1728, E'ertai wrote in a letter to the emperor that the six panna on the inside of the Mekong River should be transferred to the control of imperial officials (*Gongzhongdang Yongzhongchao Zouzhe* vol.9). The six panna consisted of Simao 思茅 or Moeng La, Puteng 普藤 or Moeng Hing, Zhengdong 整薰 or Moeng Cheng Tawng, Moeng Wu 猛烏, the six big Tea Hills 六大茶山, and Ganlanba 橄欖壩 or Meng Ham. (Daniels, 2004, p.103) (Map 2) These were all Tai principalities, except for the Tea Hills.

However, the execution of Dao Zhengyan made some people of Moeng Ham rebel. The Yi people of Yiwu 易武 also rebelled. In addition, people from Moeng Chae and Moeng Long prepared for rebellion (*Gongzhongdang Yongzhongchao Zouzhe* vol.9, pp.286-288, vol.10, p.174, vol.11, pp.246-247; Ni, 1846, vol.12, pp.28-29, pp.32-33; Daniels 2004, pp.104-105, pp.112-113) (see Map 2).

During the rebellions, most of the Tai people of Moeng Ham fled into Lang Sang or other outer areas. (Ni, 1846, vol.12, p.33; Daniels, 2004, p.105). The Tai inhabitants of Sipsongpanna were familiar with the areas located south of Sipsongpanna, which were also inhabited by Tai or Lao people who spoke the same or similar languages. Even if the Tai people of Moeng Ham left Sipsongpanna and fled into the southern area, they could live in a similar environment. However, for the Qing, the areas were beyond its control and this emigration meant a loss of population. The Qing had to implement an appeasement policy to bring the refugees back¹⁰⁵.

On the other hand, the Qing tried to send regular imperial officials to govern Moeng Ham as well as Youle 攸樂, which was a place in the Tea Hills. However, the trial ended in failure. E'ertai sent a letter to the emperor to report that they had tried to construct new cities there, but many of the dispatched officials and workers had died of diseases such as malaria¹⁰⁶ (Daniels, 2004, pp.104-105; Ni, 1846, vol.12, pp.33-34).

Through these experiences, the Qing must have understood that even if they removed the Tai rulers, they would not be able to govern the areas directly due to the risk of disease. In addition, if the Tai people there would not accept Qing's rule, they could easily take refuge in the regions beyond Sipsongpanna. The Qing abandoned the implementation of gaituguiliu in Sipsongpanna in the end.

¹⁰⁵ In 1729 (Yongzhong 7), the Qing recovered the honor of Tao Jinbao 刀金寶, the supreme ruler of Sipsongpanna or Cheli Xuanwei Shi, and declared that he was not to blame for the rebellion (Ni, 1846, vol.12, p.33; Daniels 2004, p.105).

¹⁰⁶ We can find this in the records of 1729 in *Dianyunlinienchuan*. (Ni, 1846, 12, p.34)

5.2 Establishment of Pu'er Fu

On the other hand, the Qing might have understood that trading in tea from the Tea Mountains of Sipsongpanna was so profitable. Although the Qing gave up replacing native Tai leaders by regular imperial officials in Sipsongpanna, it did not miss the chance to make a profit from the tea trade.

In 1729, the Qing established Pu'er Fu 普洱府 in the northernmost part of Sipsongpanna. (Map 2). However, the establishment of Pu'er Fu was not a case of gaituguiliu. There is no evidence that the Qing replaced the native non-Han leaders of Pu'er Fu. Pu'er Fu might have been established as a town where Han migrants could live, and would be used as a relay point in the transportation of tea from Sipsongpanna to the north.

Almost at the same time, the Qing established Zongchadian 總茶店, which means general tea shop, at Simao 思茅 to monopolize the tea trade. The tea farmers carried and sold all their tea to this official shop directly (Ni, 1846, vol.12, p.35; Daniels, 2004, pp.113-114). The Qing profited from this monopoly system and prevented conflicts between the native people of the Tea Hills and the Han tea traders, because the traders were not allowed to obtain tea from the Tea Hills themselves.¹⁰⁷

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, I will summarize the major points of this paper.

First, Lukuishan formed a kind of boundary that divided the 'inside' from the 'outside' of the Qing dynasty until the 1680s. In 1724, the Qing began to annex the 'outside' of Lukuishan. Weiyuan 威遠 was annexed in 1724 and Zhenyuan 鎮沅 in 1726.

Next, the Qing tried to annex the east bank of the Mekong River in Sipsongpanna. However, the Qing found this to be a difficult task. If the Qing placed the region under the control of regular imperial officials, most of the Tai people would flee to other Tai principalities adjacent to Sipsongpanna, which were beyond the Qing's control. In addition, even if the Qing dispatched officials and workers there, they would face the threat of deadly diseases such as malaria.

Finally, the Qing planned to profit from the tea cultivated in the Tea Hills of Sipsongpanna. The Qing also needed to prevent conflicts between the native people of the Tea Hills and the Han tea traders. Therefore, the Qing established Zongchadian at Simao to monopolize the tea trade and establish Pu'er Fu as a relay point in the transportation of tea from Sipsongpanna to the north.

¹⁰⁷ This tea monopoly continued until the end of the Yongzhong Period.

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Fig. 1: Location of Sipsongpanna





Fig. 2: Map of Sipsongpanna

13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THAI STUDIES
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15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND



Map 1: Inside and Outside of Lukuishan

Inside of Lukuishan:


Xinping 新平, Xinhua 新化, Yuanjiang 元江, Yimen 易門, E'jia 石硯嘉, Nan'an 南安, Jingdong 景東

Outside of Lukuishan:

Cheli 車里=Sipsongpanna, Pu'er 普洱, Menggen 孟良=Kengtung or Chiang Tung, Zhenyuan 鎮沅,

Mengmian 猛緬=Burma (Ava 阿瓦), Jiaozhi 交趾=Vietnam (Thang Long 昇龍)

(based on the map of Yunnan in Tan Qixiang ed. *The Historical Atlas of China* 7, 1982, Cartographic Publishing House, pp.76-7)



Map 2: The six panna on the inside of the Mekong River

The six panna:

Simao 思茅 or Moeng La, Puteng 普藤 or Moeng Hing,
Zhengdong 整薰 or Moeng Cheng Tawng, Moeng Wu 猛烏,
Ganlanba 橄欖壩 or Meng Ham, the six big Tea Hills 六大茶山,

**The Paperwork Done by the Siamese Government
during the Reign of King Rama III:
A Case of the Documents Used in the Process of Receiving Tax-in-Kind**

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Abstract

It has been noted that during the Rattanakosin Period in Siam, as well as during the Konbaung Dynasty in Burma, the central administration tended to grow more literate as well as more dependent on routines. While I have previously examined the processes used to deal with documents exchanged between the Siamese government and provincial officials during this period, actual paperwork, especially written communication within the Central Government, warrants further consideration. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to examine the paperwork process followed by the government during the reign of King Rama III (1824–51), using documents that relate to the receipt of tax-in-kind (*suai*) sent from the provinces as examples.

From the 1820s onwards, the Bangkok government increasingly imposed tax-in-kind on the provinces, especially northeastern Thailand. This was one reason why more documents entered circulation, not just between the government and provincial officials, but also between governmental agencies. Provincial authorities under the jurisdiction of the Mahātthai ministry sent tax as well as reports to their superiors, while Mahātthai officials forwarded tax and another kind of document to a variety of departments referred to as Phrakhleng. After weighing these tax enclosures, departments informed the Mahātthai of the taxed amount by subsequently returning receipts. The aim of this paper is to examine the extrinsic elements and textual formats of documents used in this process, the officials that dealt with them, and relationships between them and tax records. By understanding them, we can elucidate the routines of day-to-day work, administrative communication between governmental agencies, and the development of archives.

Keywords: diplomacy, public administration, taxation.

Introduction

It has been noted that during the Rattanakosin period in Siam, as well as the reign of the Konbaung Dynasty in Burma, the central administration tended to become more literate over the years, as well as more dependent on routines (Lieberman, 2003, pp. 33-36). While I have previously examined the processes pertaining to the exchange of documents between the Siamese government and provincial

officials during this period (Kawaguchi 2006, 2010, 2011, 2013), actual paperwork, especially written communication within the central government, warrants further consideration. Thus, this study examines the paperwork process followed by the government during the reign of King Rama III (1824-1851) using documents related to the receipt of tax-in-kind (*suai*) sent from the provinces as examples. I consider the extrinsic elements and textual formats of the documents used in this process, officials who dealt with them, and relationships between them and tax records. By understanding these factors, we can elucidate the daily work routines, administrative communication between governmental agencies, and development of archives during the period.


1. The Outline of the Existing Documents from the Early Rattanakosin Period

First, I describe the outline of the existing documents from the early Rattanakosin period (1782-1868). For official documents, mainly two types of paper were used: *kradāt sā* and *samut khōi*. As described below, *kradāt sā* is a white paper made using *Broussonetia papyrifera* (*pō sā*), which was used for original documents that were actually sent. On the other hand, *samut khōi* is a type of a folding-book. Its paper is made using *Streblus asper* (*khōi*). Most of the *samut khōi* used for official documents were blackened and written with white chalk or yellow ink. *Samut khōi* was used for writing drafts and copies of documents, account books, and lists.

According to Wyatt and Wilson (1965, pp. 111-112), the National Library of Thailand reserves 6487 volumes of documents categorized as *čhotmai het*, which date from the period of King Rama I to that of King Rama IV (1782-1868). They seem to comprise only a small proportion of all the documents that were actually made. Although there were many departments within the government, most of the existing documents have been derived from only two departments: the Krom Phra-ālak (department of the royal secretary) and Krom Mahāthai (ministry of civil affairs). Most of the existing documents, which date from 1782 to 1851 and were from the Krom Phra-ālak, pertain to foreign affairs. They were reserved in the Hō Phramontiantham, or Royal Library, which was built in the so-called Wat Phrakāo temple adjoining the royal palace. Meanwhile, the documents of the Krom Mahāthai pertain to the administration of central, northern, and northeastern Thailand. They seem to have been reserved in the Sālā Lūkkhun, or main office hall, built in the royal palace. Most of the existing documents dating from the 1820s onward are those of the Krom Mahāthai. This study mainly deals with these documents.


Figure 1 depicts the number of documents (*čhotmai het*) reserved in the National Library for different years. It indicates that the number of existing documents increased from the 1830s onward. If this figure reflects the number of documents that were actually written to some extent, why were more documents used since the 1830s compared to earlier years? Figure 2 shows the provinces under the jurisdiction of the Krom Mahāthai on which tax-in-kind was imposed in 1824/5. The tax was imposed on only 16 provinces. However, following the war with King of Vientiane Anuwong, the Siamese government's control extended to northeastern Thailand, and it imposed tax-in-kind on local governors. Figure 3 shows all the provinces on which tax-in-kind had ever been imposed from the reign of King Rama III to that of King Rama IV. They consisted of 99 provinces under the Krom Mahāthai, 7 provinces under the Krom Phrakhlāng (ministry of treasury; another practical name was the Krommathā, or ministry of harbor affairs), and 8 provinces under the Krom Kalāhōm (ministry of military affairs). The government intensified taxation in not only northeastern Thailand but also the central and northern areas.

Figure 1: The number of official documents (*čhotmaihet*) from the early Rattanakosin period kept in the National Library of Thailand.




Source: Catalogs of the National Library of Thailand.

Figure 2: The provinces on which tax-in-kind was imposed in 1824/5 by the Korm Mahāththai.



Source: *Čhotmāihēt ratchakān thī 3*, vol. 1, (1987), pp. 85-89.

Figure 3: All provinces on which tax-in-kind had been imposed from the reign of King Rama III to that of King Rama IV.



Source: Boonrod, 1975, pp. 65-66, 91-93.

Notes*: ●: Province under the jurisdiction of the Krom Mahātthai. ▲: Province under the jurisdiction of the Krom Phrakhleng (Krommahā). ■: Province under the jurisdiction of the Krom Kalāhōm; ** The names of the provinces are omitted

The collection of tax-in-kind was one of the reasons for the increase in the documents exchanged between the government and provincial governors, as well as among the governmental agencies. Many previous studies have already considered the socioeconomic aspects of tax-in-kind (Boonrod 1975; Koizumi 1992, 1994; Puangthong 2004). Instead of such aspects, this study focuses on the governmental paperwork pertaining to the receipt of tax-in-kind.

2. The Governmental Document Related to the Receipt of Tax-in-Kind 1: *Māi rap sang* (Written Royal Order)

During the period of King Rama III, local governors had to pay tax-in-kind to the government each year. There were various taxes-in-kind: gold, silver, teak, cardamom, bastard cardamom, lacquer, and so on. The government defined the type of tax to be paid by each governor. The amount of tax paid was dependent on the population under a governor's control. Sometimes, tax-in-kind was paid for other goods. In particular, local governors in the northeastern area tended to pay in money instead of goods (Koizumi 1992).

If a province was under the jurisdiction of the Krom Mahātthai, its governor sent tax-in-kind to the Mahātthai. The officials of the Mahātthai forwarded the tax to various departments named Phrakhlāng (treasury)¹⁰⁸, depending on the type of tax-in-kind imposed. For example, taxes-in-kind of gold and silver were sent to the Krom Phrakhlāng Mahāsombat (department of treasury of wealth), which was the most important treasury, by the officials of the Mahātthai. Cardamom, bastard cardamom, and so on were sent to the Krom Phrakhlāng Sinkhā (department of treasury of commodities) to be exported in accordance with royal monopoly system. Timber, lacquer, white cloth, and so on were forwarded to the Krom Phrakhlāng Nai Sāi (department of left treasury) and Krom Phrakhlāng Nai Khwā (department of right treasury) (Boonrod, 1975, pp. 53-62).

We will consider this process from the perspective of documents and tax accounts. A local governor or official submitted *baibōk* (written report) with respect to taxes-in-kind. *Nāi wēns* and *samiantrās*, who were lower officials of the Mahātthai, received the taxes and reports. Subsequently, they copied the contents of taxes-in-kind from the report into the tax account. For example, the following quotation is the translated version of a part of the "Account of tax-in-kind paid in silver or goods in the Lesser Era 1192 (1830/1)":

¹⁰⁸ These departments were different from the so-called Krom Phrakhlāng (Krommathā).

Source A

๑วันขึ้น ๑ ค่ำ เดือน ๔ ปีเถาะตรีนิศก หมื่นจางข้าหลวง (และ) หลวงปราบเมืองอุบลอิทธิหนังสือบอกขุนภักดีสงคราม
ขุนรามภักดีข้าหลวง พรพรมราชวงษา เมืองอุบลสงสิงของลงมา เป็นสิ่งของ เมืองศรีทันดอร์ หลวงประเล่ห์สุนทร
เจ้าภยริเอาเงินสวจัดซื้อถวาย งามาง ๑๗ กิ่ง ๓ หาบ ๔๑ ชั่ง ๑๔๗ ก่อ (หนัก) ๒๕ หาบ ๓๕ ชั่ง เงิน ๑๓ ชั่ง
บุตโคขเมืองแสนปางงามาง ๑๓ กิ่ง ๑ หาบ เงิน ๗ ตำลึง ๑ บาท ๑ สลึง เมืองปากแก้วหนัก ๕ หาบ เงิน ๑ ชั่ง ๕ ตำลึง
ในจำนวนปีขาร โปรฎาไหเอาเงินในจรรสงครามจำนวนแล้วไหหมายส่งเป็นจำนวนปีเถาะตรีนิศก
เจ้าพนักงานพรคลังมหาสมบัติสินคารับไว้ได้ รายหลวงประเล่ห์สุนทร เมืองศรีทันดอร์ งามาง ๔ งา ๔ กิ่ง หนัก ๑ หาบ ๒
ชั่ง ๕ งา ๑๓ กิ่งหนัก ๒ หาบ ๖๒ ชั่ง (รวม) ๑๗ กิ่ง ๓ หาบ ๖๔ ชั่ง ๑๔๗ ก่อหนัก ๒๕ หาบ ๓๕ ชั่ง (รวม) เงิน ๑๒ ชั่ง ๒ ตำลึง
เพียบุตโคขเมืองแสนปาง งามางยอย ๑๓ กิ่งหนัก ๑ หาบ ๔ ชั่ง เงิน ๗ ตำลึง ๒ บาท ๒ สลึง เมืองปากแก้วหนัก ๔ หาบ ๘๐
ชั่ง เงิน ๑ ชั่ง ๔ ตำลึง เข้ากันงามาง ๓๐ กิ่ง หนัก ๔ หาบ ๖๘ ชั่ง ๑๔๗ ก่อหนัก ๓๐ หาบ ๕๕ ชั่ง (รวม) เงิน ๑๓ ตำลึง ๒ หาบ ๒
สลึง¹⁰⁹

On the first day of the waxing moon of the fourth month, the Year of Rabbit, the third year of the decade¹¹⁰, the royal emissary Mūn Čhang and Luang Prāp of müang Ubon brought a report. [It says that] (1) the royal emissary Khun Phakdīsongkhrām and Khun Rāmphakdī, and Phra Phromrāčhawongsā of müang Ubon sent goods. As for the goods of Sīthandōn, taxman Luang Prasōetsunthōn arranged [goods] instead of tax-in-silver¹¹¹ to hand in: 3 *hāp*¹¹² and 41 *chang* of 17 ivories and 29 *hāp* and 35 *chang* of 147 buckets of bastard cardamom, [which could be counted for] silver [weight] 13 *chang*. [Phia] But Khōt of Sānpāng: 1 *hāp* of 13 ivories [which could be counted for] 7 *tamlūng* 1 *bāt* 1 *salūng* of silver. [Čhan]pāsak: bastard cardamom weight 5 *hāp*, [which could be counted for] 1 *chang* 5 *tamlūng* of silver as full amount of [tax of] the Year of Tiger. (2) [King] ordered to let send full amount of [tax-in-]silver in the residence. Then, [we] issued *māis* to send [tax] as amount of [tax of] the Year of Rabbit, the third year of the decade. The officials of the Phrakhlāng Mahāsombat and [Phrakhlāng] Sinkhā received [tax]. Luang Prasōetsunthōn of Sīthandōn: 4 “four-ivories¹¹³” weight 1 *hāp* 2 *chang* and 13 “five-ivories¹¹⁴” weight 2 *hāp* 62 *chang*, [total] 3 *hāp* 64 *chang* of 17 ivories; bastard cardamom weight 25 *hāp*, [which could be counted for] 12 *chang* 2 *tamlūng* of silver. Phia But Khōt of Sānpāng: 13 tips of ivories weight 1 *hāp* 4 *chang* [which could be counted for] 7 *tamlūng* 2 *bāt* 2 *salūng* of silver. (3) [Čhan]pāsak: bastard cardamom weight 4 *hāp* 80 *chang* [which could be counted for] 1 *chang* 4 *tamlūng* of silver. Total: 30 ivories weight 4 *hāp* 68 *chang* and bastard cardamom weight 30 *hāp* 55 *chang* [which could be counted for] 13 *chang* 13 *tamlūng* 2 *bāt* 2 *salūng* of silver.

¹⁰⁹ Čhotmāihēt ratchakān thī 3, vol. 5, 1987, pp. 86-87. Clearly, this transcription in the specified edition does not reflect the format of the original tax account.

¹¹⁰ March 2, 1832.

¹¹¹ Else, these words should probably be translated; Luang Prasōetsunthōn used tax-in-silver to purchase [goods].

¹¹² *Hāp*, *chang*, *tamlūng*, *bāt* (bath), and *salūng* are Siamese units of weight equal to 60 kg, 1200 g, 60 g, 15 g, and 3.75 g, respectively.

¹¹³ The meaning of “four-ivories” is ambiguous.

¹¹⁴ The meaning of “five-ivories” is ambiguous.

As shown by this quotation, in 1832, taxes in the form of ivories and bastard cardamom, instead of those in silver of Sīthandōn, Sānpāng, and Čhanpāsak, arrived from Ubonrātchathānī with a *baibōk*. The officials wrote the underlined part (1), contents of the tax in detail, based on the *baibōk* from Ubon. The underlined part (2) mentions how, on receiving the king's order, the Mahātthai officials sent the tax to other places. Here, the point is *māi*. It is a document type called *māi rap sang* or "document written royal order received [by official]"¹¹⁵. The underlined part (2) means that based on the king's order, the officials issued *māi rap sangs* to send tax to two Phrakhlāng. Although these *māi rap sangs* were lost, I consider another *māi rap sang* related to the tax-in-kind of Phetchabūn in 1835 as an example.

Source B

ด้วย พญามหาอำมาตย์ ๑ รับพระราชโองการใส่เกล้าฯ ทรงพระกรุณาโปรดเกล้าฯ สั่งว่า พญาเพชรบูรณ์
กรมการ
บอกหนังสือแดงไห่ขาว ของ เมืองสมคักถึงมาแจ้งราชการแก่กรุงเทพฯ ๑ แลคุมพลเรือสำเภาจำนนวนริมเม
ล็ดศกถึงมาส่ง ๑๕ นั้นให้เจ้าพนักงานของพระคลังสินค้าซึ่งรับอาผลเร็วไวแล้วให้มิฎฐีกาบอกมายังเว
๑๐
มหาไทย์ให้แจ้ง หั้ยมาวัน ๔ ๑ ๑ คำปิ่นเมล็ดศก (NL. CMH. R. III. C.S. 1197, no. 14)
๑๑

Phayā Mahā-ammāt received a royal order, which says: Phayā Phetchabūn and the officials submitted a report. [They] had Thāo thōng and Thāo Phim of Lomsak go to Bangkok to report official work and to bring 15 bāt 10 salūng of bastard cardamom as the full amount of tax-in-kind of the Year of the Sheep, the seventh year of the decade. Have staffs in charge of treasury of the [Krom] Phrakhlāng Sinkhā receive bastard cardamom to weigh. Then have [them] issue a dīkā (receipt) addressed [nāi] wēn of the Mahātthai to report [amount of tax]. The māi is addressed on Wednesday, the eleventh day of the waning moon of the first month, Wednesday, the Year of the Sheep, the seventh year of the decade¹¹⁶.

It is through a *māi rap sang* that an official informs another official or a department in the government of a king's order on receiving it. In other words, *māi rap sang* is a document written in the format in which, on receiving a royal order, an official conveys it to other officials or departments. Its format was completely regulated. First, the name of the one who received a royal order was written in it. In the above *māi rap sang*, it is Phayā Mahā-ammāt, a high-ranking official of the Mahātthai. Second, the contents of the royal order were written, which were divided two parts. The first part details the situation, whereas the second part mentions the royal order. In the above quotation, because the governor of Phetchabūn sent tax-in-kind, King Rama III ordered the staffs of the Krom Phrakhlāng Sinkhā through Phayā Mahā-ammāt to receive the tax to weigh it. Subsequently, they had to issue a receipt to

¹¹⁵ Although Boonrod (1975, pp. 53-62) does consider the process of receiving tax-in-kind, she does not mention *māi rap sang*.

¹¹⁶ December 16, 1835.

the *nāi wēns* of the Mahātthai. In a *māi rap sang*, a royal order is usually followed by the words “Obey the received order (*tām rap sang*).” However, in the aforementioned *māi rap sang*, this sentence is absent. At the end of the *māi rap sang*, the date was written. Based on the format of the *māi rap sang*, senior officials, like Phrayā Mahāammāt, had to inform the king about the arrival of tax to obtain a royal order to send it to the treasuries.

Some tax accounts contain copied texts of *māi rap sangs*. However, today, only a few original *māi rap sangs* related to taxes-in-kind exist. The following source is a precious one, depicting the extrinsic elements of a *māi rap sang*.

Source C

(Recto)

๑ ด้วยพญามหาอำมาตย์รับพระราชโองการใส่เกล้าฯ ทรงพระกรุณาโปรดเกล้าฯ สั่งว่า ท้าว ^{ฝ่าย}เมือง ^{ขัติย์}
สุวัณณมแตงไหท้าว ^{บุต}ศรี ^{ล้า}คุมเอาฝักรวณจำนวนปี ^{๑๖}ส่งมาส่งเร็วหนัก ^{๒๕}
ภาสริช(?) ^๑ ^{๒๗} นั้นให้เจ้าพนักงานพระคลังสินค้าชั่งรับไว้ตามรับสั่ง ครั้นเข้าประ
การได้ให้มิฎฐีกาตามทำเนียมมาไหแจ้ง ^๑ หมายมาวัน ๑๓ ค่ำปีมะแมสัฟสก

(Verso)

เวนนายควร

คลังสินค้า(NL. MRS. R. III. C.S. 1197, no. 4)

(Recto)

Phayā Mahā-ammāt received a royal order, which says: Thāo Fāi and Thāo Khattiya of Suwannaphūm had Thāo But and Thāo Silā bring bastard cardamom as the full amount of [tax of] the year. [Reportedly,] bastard cardamom weighs 16 *bāt* 25 *salüng*, and tax in resin (?) weighs 1 *bāt* 27 *salüng*. Have staffs in charge of the treasury of the [Krom] Phrakhlāng Sinkhā receive [the bastard cardamom] to weigh [it], in obedience to the received order. [Then,] have [them] issue a receipt (*dīkā*) to report whether [the amount of tax] is enough or lacking, in accordance with the custom. The *māi* is addressed on ... of the third month, the Year of the Sheep, the seventh year of the decade¹¹⁷.

¹¹⁷ January or February 1836.

(Verso)

On duty, Nāi Khuan.

The Khlang Shinkhā.

This is the *māi rap sang* that ordered the Krom Phrakhlāng Sinkhā to receive the tax of Suwannaphūm in 1836. The original *māi rap sang* was written in the white paper called *kradāt sā*. Taking the sizes of other documents into account, this *māi rap sang* seems to be approximately 10 cm × 40 cm in size. It is worth noting that on the *verso* of the paper, we can see the following words: “on duty (wēn), Nāi Khuan” and “the Khlang Shinkhā.” The latter was the address. The former, Nāi Khuan, or more accurately Nāi Khuan Rū At, was the formal title of one of the four *nāi wēns* of the Mahātthai (*Kotmāi trā sām duang*, vol. 1, 1994, p. 225). It is thought that Nāi Khuan, who was in charge of receipt of this tax, made this document under the instruction of Phrayā Mahā-ammāt.

However, it is likely that this *māi rap sang* was not actually issued to send the Khlang Shinkhā. The first reason is that the day and day of the week are not written on the last line on its *recto*. The second reason is that a seal is not put on its *verso*. As I discuss later, after drafting a *māi rap sang* related to tax, the officials seem to have required the approval of a higher official to issue it. It can be thought that they wrote the date and day of the week and put a seal on the document after getting approval. The next example is a *māi rap sang* with seal, which must have been actually issued.

Source D

(Recto)

๑ ค้วยพญาหมาอำมาตย์ รัปพระราชโองการใส่เกล้าฯ ทรงพระกรุณาโปรดเกล้าฯ สั่งว่า
พญาเพชรบุรีกรมการแต่งให้หลวงคลังคุมเอาไม้ยางจันทรวรเคนส่งมาส่ง ^{ยาว๑๑ว่า}
ไพร่รอบปศ ^{๑๐ต้น}
นั้นให้เจ้าพนักงานทำวัดพระเชตุพลตรวจนับรับไวตามทำเนียมแล้วให้มีฎีกาบอก
มาให้แจ้งตามรับสั่ง หมายมาฉวัน ^{๑๑} ^{๑๑} คำปิมแมสัศศก

(Verso)


เวนนายศวร
พญาเพชรบุรี รัปไม้ยาวไว๑๐ไป
๑๐ต้น¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ NL. MRS. R. III. C.S. 1197, no. 5. The round shape means the seal.

(Recto)

Phayā Mahā-ammāt received a royal order, which says: Phayā Phetchabūn and the officials had Luang Khlang bring *mai yāngs* as the amount [of tax] levied: 10 *mai yāngs*, [their] length 11 *wā*¹¹⁹ and [their] circle 8 *kams*¹²⁰. Have the staff in charge of building Phrachētuphon Temple check to receive, in accordance with the custom. Then have [him] issue a *dīkā* (receipt) to report [amount of tax]. Obey the received order. The *māi* is addressed on Thursday, the eleventh day of the waxing moon of the second month, the Year of the Sheep, the seventh year of the decade¹²¹.

(Verso)



Source D is an original *māi rap sang* that conveys a royal order to have the official in charge of building Wat Phrachētuphon Temple receive 10 *mai yāngs* (which is a collective term for the wood categorized as *Dipterocarpus*) submitted from Petchabūn in 1835. This tax may not be a regulated, annual one but a temporarily levied tax for building Wat Phrachētuphon Temple. Its reserve side contains a seal with the words “On duty (wēn), Nāi Khuan. Phayā Phetphichai. 10 pieces,” which were probably written by Nāi Khuan. It is likely that this is one of the seals of the minister of the Krom Mahātthai, the *Trā Phrarāthasīs* or Seals of Lion King. These words also show that Phayā Phetphichai (the chief of the Krom Lōm Phrarāthchawang, or department of royal palace guards) was in charge of building the temple. Further, the phrase “Received 10 *mai yāngs*” was probably written by an official under him on receiving them.

From Thonburī period to the reign of King Rama II (1767-1824), most of the *māi rap sangs* were used to convey detailed instructions to officials or departments regarding the performance of court rituals (*Prachum māi rap sang*, vol. 1-3, 1980-1985). However, during the period of King Rama III, especially about 1831, *māi rap sangs* also began to be issued to transfer smaller instructions for managing the royal court life or the routine running of the administrative system¹²². They include the *māi rap sangs* ordering the Krom Phrakhlans to disburse money or goods or receive taxes. In other words, *māi rap sangs* functioned as the key to open the royal warehouse for receipts or disbursements.

¹¹⁹ It is noted that 1 *wā* is approximately 2 m.

¹²⁰ It is noted that 1 *kam* is about 20 cm.

¹²¹ December 30, 1835.

¹²² *Prachum māi rap sang*, vol. 4, parts 1 and 2. 1993. From Thonburī period to the reign of King Rama III, few *māi rap sangs* were used to convey the king’s political messages.

3. The Governmental Document Related to the Receipt of Tax-in-Kind 2: *Dīkā* (Bill of Receipt)

Let us now reconsider the process of receipt of tax-in-kind. After the officials of the Phrakhlang received the tax and *māi rap sang*, they weighed or counted the tax. Then, they wrote documents addressed to the officials of the Mahātthai to inform them of the actual amount of the tax, in accordance with the instruction in the *māi rap sang*. This document was called the *dīkā*¹²³, which functioned as a bill of receipt in this context. I depict an example of a *dīkā* here. It is not original; in fact, it seems to have been copied in the Mahātthai.

Source E

ฎีกา ขุนอุดมโกษา กรมพระคลังสินค้าไหวแก่นายรัต นายเวนมหาดไทย ด้วยมีหมายไปว่า
หลวงประเสริฐสุนทรเจ้าภาษีเอาเงินสวตว์แลกเมืองศรีทันดอรจำนวน ปีเถาะตรีนิศก จัดซื้อ งาขาว ๑๗ กิ่ง นก ๓ หาบ ๔๑
ซั่ง เรว่นัก ๒๕ หาบ ๓๕ ซั่ง เปนเงิน ๑๑ ซั่ง เจาปากักจัดไคเรว่นัก ๕ หาบ สังกแทนเงินสวตว์แลกจำนวนปีเถาะตรีนิศก
ไหหมิ่นจ้งข้าหลวง หลวงปราบเมืองอุบลคุ่มบ่งมาสังนัน ซังรับไคผลเรวรายหลวงประเสริฐ สุนทร ๒๕ หาบ ๓๕ ซั่ง
เมืองปากัก ๔ หาบ ๘๐ ซั่ง (รวม) ๓๐ หาบ ๕๕ ซั่ง ฎีกาไหไฉวันขึ้น ๕ ค่ำ เดือน ๔ ปีเถาะตรีนิศก (*Čhotmāihēt
ratchakān thī* 3, vol. 5, 1987, pp. 81)

Dīkā: Khun Udomkōsā of the Krom Phrakhlang Sinkhā addresses Nāi Rat, a *nāiwēn* of the [Krom] Mahātthai. (1) The *māi [rap sang]* said, Taxman Luang Prasāetsunthōn brought tax-in-silver of the registered people in Sīthandōn as the amount for the Year of Rabbit, the third year of the decade. [Instead of silver tax, he] arranged 17 ivories of weight 3 *hāp* and 41 *chang*, and bastard cardamom of weight 29 *hāp* and 35 *chang*, [which could be counted for] 13 *chang* of silver. The lord of [Čhan]pāsak sent bastard cardamom of weight 5 *hāp* instead of tax-in-silver of the registered people as amount of [tax of] the Year of Rabbit, the third year of the decade. [He] had Mūn Čhang and Luang Prāp of Ubon bring [it]. [The official of Krom Phrakhlang Sinkhā] weighed [bastard cardamom] to receive the following: (2) Bastard cardamom of Luang Prasāetsunthōn is 25 *hāp* 75 *chang* [in weight]. [Bastard cardamom of Čhan]pāsak is 4 *hāp* 80 *chang* [in weight]. [Their total is] 30 *hāp* 55 *chang*. *Dīkā* is addressed on the fifth day of waxing moon of the fourth month of the Year of Rabbit, the third year of the decade¹²⁴.

This *dīkā* was sent from Khun Udomkōsā of the Krom Phrakhlang Sinkhā to Nāi Rat of the Krom Mahātthai in order to inform the latter of the result of weighing bastard cardamom, which was sent from Sīthandōn and Čhampāsak instead of tax-in-silver. In general, *dīkā* was addressed to the *nāi wēns* of the Mahātthai. Sometimes, the *samiantrā* of the Mahātthai received *dīkā*. It is noteworthy that the above document corresponds with Source A, “Account of tax-in-kind paid in silver or goods in the Lesser Era 1192 (1830/1)”, as discussed earlier. While the underlined part (1) of this *dīkā* was written based on the *māi rap sang* sent by the Mahātthai, it is also consistent with a portion of the underlined part (1) of Source A. On the other hand, the underlined part (2) of the *dīkā* shows the result of weighing bastard cardamom. Based on this *dīkā*, Nāi Rat wrote the result of weighing on the tax account, which

¹²³ Sometimes, they were also called *māi*.

¹²⁴ March 6, 1832.

corresponds with the underlined part (3) of Source A. As the result of weighing, we can see that the weight of bastard cardamom sent from two provinces was lesser than the weight reported by the local official.

Unfortunately, I do not have any pictures of the original *dīkā* related to tax-in-kind to examine here. There, however, is an example of the original *dīkā* although it is not a receipt for tax-in-kind but only the document informing the delivery of wood in 1852 (NL. CMH. R. IV. C.S. 1214, no. 120). It is written that the bookkeeper of the Krom Kōng Kǎo Čhindā¹²⁵ addressed the officials of the Krom Mahātthai. The *kradāt sā* paper is used for this *dīkā*. It seems to be approximately 19 cm × 40 cm in size. Two seals of its *recto* are the same and may be those of the sender. One seal contained details regarding the quantity of wood delivered. Therefore, it functioned as a certification mark. The other was put on the date in the last line. On the *verso*, the seal of the chief of the Krom Kōng Kǎo Čhindā was placed¹²⁶. An original *dīkā*, which was a receipt for tax-in-kind, probably had similar extrinsic features, as well.

Receiving *dīkā* was not the end of the procedure. Finally, the officials of the Krom Mahātthai wrote a *sāntrā*, or written order, addressed to provincial officials. Although I have studied the process of issuing a *sāntrā* in the Krom Mahātthai (Kawaguchi 2006, 2011, 2013), I do not discuss it in detail here. Middle-ranking officials of the Krom Mahātthai prepared a draft of the *sāntrā* related to the receipt of tax-in-kind. In general, its contents included the amount of tax reported by provincial officials, actual one weighed by the Krom Phrakhlāng, and order to send the tax next year. High-ranking officials, including the minister of the Krom Mahātthai (Samuhanāyok), approved the issuance of the *sāntrā*. Sometimes, King Rama III also approved the issuance. After receiving approval, the *nāi wēn* or *samiantrā* made a clean copy from a draft to put the minister's seal and then sent it to provincial officials. Together with the *baibōk*, a copy or draft of the *māi rap sang*, an original or copied *dīkā*, a tax account, and so on, the draft of a *sāntrā* was also probably reserved in the Sālā Lūkkhun. These documents constituted the archives of the Krom Mahātthai.


4. The *Māi rap sang* and *Dīkā* used for Inquiry and Reporting

Figure 4 shows the complete process of receiving tax-in-kind, which was discussed in the previous section. By analyzing it, we can say that the governmental agencies implemented the procedure of receiving tax, based on written papers. Regarding tax-in-kind, the Krom Mahātthai and various Krom Phrakhlāngs communicated through the *māi rap sang* and *dīkā*. Relations among documents and those between the documents and tax accounts are also shown in Figure 4.

¹²⁵ This department's name is not listed in the "Law of the Civil Hierarchy" and "Law of the Military and Provincial Hierarchies" in the Three Seals Law, which was compiled in 1805. Meanwhile, we can find its name in the list of governmental departments and officials dating back to 1883 (*Sānbānchī suan thī 1 khū tamnāeng rāthakān cō.sō. 1245, 1998(1883)*, p. 168). Its function is not clear. It is also impossible to provide the English translation for its name.

¹²⁶ The sentence under the seal means "the seal of Luang Čhindāčhakrat, the chief of the department, was put." This sentence is not his signature but only notes the name of the holder of the seal. In general, in premodern Siam, signature had not ever been used as a certification mark. Seals played this role. The functions of seals in premodern Siam must be studied more.

Figure 4: The process of receiving tax-in-kind and its associated documents.



In addition, *māi rap sang* and *dīkā* were used to inquire about the amount of tax that had already been received by a Krom Phrakhlang. The “Account of tax-in-kind paid in silver or goods in the Lesser Era 1192 (1830/1),” which is the same as Source A, includes a draft or copy of a *māi rap sang*, where the minister of the Krom Mahātthai addressed the Krom Phrakhlang Mahāsombat to inquire about the amount of tax-in-kind that had been paid by 11 provinces in northeastern Thailand and Southern Laos in 1831/2. Following a draft or copy, it records the process of issuing the *māi rap sang*.

Source F

รํางหมายนํ หารปลาชเชอํก (และ) หลวงศรีเสนา ดูแล้ววันแรม ๙ คํ่า เดือนยี่เพลาเช้า ๔ พณํฯ สมุหนายก วาราชการณจวน ไดเอรํางหมายนํกราบเรียนแล้วสั่งวา ใหหมายไปตามรํางนํทํิด ในวันเดี๋ยวนัน ไดเอรํางหมายนํไปส่ง ใหพรไชยศ (และ) ขุนพลคํัก ๆ เรียกเอาไปปฏิกาเร็ว นอรรมาต งาข้าง ไปตรวจดูถูกตองแล้ว (*Čhotmāihēt ratchakān thī 3*, vol. 5, 1987, p. 89)

This *māi*'s draft was watched by Thān Plāichüak¹²⁷ and Luang Sīsēnā. Then, in the morning of the ninth day of the waning moon of the second month¹²⁸, the Samuhanāyok (the minister of the Krom Mahātthai) worked on official duties in [his] residence. [An official] offered this draft [to the Samuhanāyok.] Then, [the Samuhanāyok] ordered the issuance of the *māi* according to that draft. On the same day, [an official] sent this *māi* to Phra Chaiyot and Khun Phonlasak in order to have them make a *dīkā* on bastard cardamom, rhinoceros horn and ivory. [The *dīkā* was] confirmed. [It] corresponded [to the tax account].

It is interesting that although the *māi rap sang* conveys a royal order at least in its format, this *māi rap sang* was issued with the minister's approval. As depicted by the quotation, the official of the Krom

¹²⁷ This was another name of Phra Sīsathēp who was the Palat Banchī (the undersecretary in charge of accounts) of the Krom Mahātthai.

¹²⁸ January 14, 1833.

Phrakhlāng Mahāsombat replied through a *dīkā* that the amount of tax reported by the Krom Mahātthai was correct. In this case, the *dīkā* was used as a written notice, rather than a receipt. In addition, it can be said that not only the Krom Mahātthai but also the Krom Phrakhlāng Mahāsombat, and probably other Phrakhlāngs, had tax accounts related to the same tax. The officials of the Krom Phrakhlāng Mahāsombat probably checked their tax accounts by comparing them with the *māi rap sang*.

Conclusion

Through the analysis of the process of receiving tax-in-kind, this study depicts a part of the written communication that was in place between governmental agencies during the reign of King Rama III. This topic has seldom been examined by previous studies. In the procedure of receiving tax, *māi rap sang* and *dīkā* were used by the officials of the Krom Mahātthai and Krom Phrakhlāngs.

Low-ranking scribes, such as *nāi wēns* and samiantrās, were in charge of this paperwork in the Krom Mahātthai. As part of dealing with documents exchanged between the Krom Mahātthai and provincial officials, they also did routine work, such as copying documents, making fair copies, and placing the minister's seal. It can be said that they supported the ever-increasing daily administrative work in the government. Interestingly, Prince Damrongrāchānuphāp, one of the leaders of the modernization initiative dating from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century in Siam, recognized the capacity of these scribes, even though they were not modern officials (Damrongrāchānuphāp, 2002(1925), p. 39).

In addition, I could point out the presence of lost archives. With respect to documents dating from 1782 to 1851, only the archives of the Krom Mahātthai and Krom Ālak exist today. However, the various Krom Phrakhlāngs should also have had archives including tax accounts, original *māi rap sangs*, and probably drafts or copies of *dīkā*s. In the reign of King Rama III, due to the expansion of governmental finance, the use of documents must have increased not only between the government and provinces but also within the government.

Finally, I specify the problems in the published texts of the documents dating back to the early Rattanakosin period. A large part of them comprises a "critical" edition whose spellings are often modernized or "revised," which does not have any information on extrinsic elements, such as the type and size of paper, text written on the *recto* or *verso* of papers, and presence or absence of seals. Since Thai sources on premodern Siam are limited, in order to gain more data from the handwritten official documents, it is desirable that they are digitized to disclose or published in the form of a facsimile or diplomatic edition.

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Discourses, Power, and Communication about Thai Theravada Bhikkhunis

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Abstract

The prominent characteristic of Theravada Buddhism is to conserve the original Buddha's teaching and against all impurities. No Buddha's disciplinary rule should be changed, and no new ones should be introduced. However, under the male-dominated Thai Theravada monastery, the interpretation of the Buddha's teaching has been done only by bhikkhus (male monks).

It has been recognized that the Buddhist philosophy emphasize the equality of human being under the laws of nature. Everyone is capable of attaining the Buddha's teaching and the state of nirvana, regardless of gender. Although the Buddha stated that Buddhism must be patronized by the fourfold Buddhists: namely 'bhikkhus', bhikkhunis (female monks), laymen and laywomen, only bhikkhu orders have been established legitimately in Thai Theravada society.

There are at least two attempts to restore Theravada bhikkhuni's ordination in Thailand. The first attempt was recorded in 1928, initiated by a former governor, Narin Phasit, who attempted to ordain his two daughters. The attempt failed but ignited the dispute about the legitimacy of the revival of Theravada bhikkhunis in Siam. The controversy again erupted fervently in 2001 when Chatsumarn Kabilsingh, former Associate Professor of religion, went for her ordination in Sri Lanka and claimed to be the first Theravada bhikkhuni of Thailand. The gradual growth of bhikkhuni orders has questioned whether the legitimacy of ordaining bhikkhuni would still be in only the hand of the monastery.

This preliminary document analysis will apply the concept of Michel Foucault's discourse, in which connects discourses with power, to show the differences of the power of the discourses and its mechanism of those two attempts.

Keywords: Thai Theravada Bhikkhunis, Discourses, Communication

Discourses, Power, and Communication about Thai Theravada Bhikkhunis

Philosophical Buddhism postulates egalitarian society, regardless of the difference of genders (Thanaprasitpattana, 2015). The wisdom and practices that conquer fear and overcome the suffering are not restricted to any particular gender. Every human being has the potential to attain the Buddha's teaching equally. The opportunity to attain nirvana is opened equally for both men and women. These potentiality have been recognized by the Buddha which can be seen from his announcement of the four

Buddhist communities namely 'bhikkhus' (male monks), 'bhikkhunis' (female monks), laymen, and laywomen. However, in Thai society, rights and opportunities of Thai women have been restricted and limited to certain roles and areas. The role of 'Buddhist monk' which stands at the apex of Thai religious and social order has been restricted to only men. Women stand at the bottom of the Buddhist hierarchy (Kirsch, 1977). The conflict between Buddhist's philosophy and actual practice in Thai society can be seen from the refusal of the revival of bhikkhuni ordination. The main point of the dispute over the legitimization of bhikkhuni ordination is based on the principle of Thai Theravada Buddhism.

There are discourses indicating that women can no longer become bhikkhunis. Michel Foucault uses the term 'discourse' to represent a powerful communication which can lead lives of people. Foucault states that *'discourse is constituted by the difference between what one could say correctly at one period (under the rules of grammar and logic) and what is actually said. The discursive field is, at a specific moment, the law of this difference. It thus defines a certain number of operations which are not of the order of linguistic construction or formal deduction.'* (Foucault, 1991, p. 63)

Charoensin-o-larn (2009) elaborates the definition of Foucault's discourse that it covers more than merely languages or words. There are also discursive practices which include cultural conventions, customs, traditions, ideas, beliefs, values, and institutions in a society, which related to that subject. The power of discourses and discursive practices diffuse over a society. It can dictate people's lives in various ways. It could persuade people to do something, to behave according to their guidelines, or it could set a boundary for some groups of people or exclude them from certain activities or areas. Those people may not even consider about asking why they have been deprived of their right. Discourses could even repress and block some identities or meaning. It could also make existing identities and meaning of something vanish. In every society, the constitution of discourses is controlled, selected, organized and distributed by a set of process. This process could disguise the power and danger of the discourses that manipulating people. The executions from discourses that are prominent in our society are deprivation and ban. Power is a crucial source of rules. Power is not limited to only coercion force or compulsive use. Power has been purged and transformed into 'special knowledge' and is not centralized but diffuses throughout society. To resist or to challenge the power of discourses, it is necessary to react in a variety of ways. Discourses and their power in many religions have dominated women. For example, in Afghanistan where Muslims were under Taliban rules, there were discourses that deprive women from accessing formal education which is available only for men. The exclusion and limitation of this right derived from the religious interpretation of the Taliban. Those discourses have been opposed by Malala Yousafzai, an eleven year old girl. She has stepped out to claim the right for girls to be able to go to schools. The claims were contrary to Taliban's beliefs. As consequences, Malala was physically assaulted almost to death (Yousafzai & Lamb, 2013). Malala's movement has received worldwide attention. Later in 2014, she has received the Nobel Peace Prize. What Malala fought for could be brought to compare with what happened in Thai Theravada Buddhism. Although the Buddha had granted equal right for both men and women to practice and attain dharma and evidently there were female Buddhist monks in the Buddhist history, at the present days, Thai women could not become Buddhist monk legitimately. In secular world of Thai Theravada Buddhism, the area of women in Buddhism have been limited and restricted.

The discourses of Theravada Buddhism derive from The Tripitaka scripture. The fundamental principle of

Theravada Buddhism considers the Tripitaka not only as the Buddha's words but also the only source that can be referred to the Buddha's teaching. The Tripitaka is pivotal for safeguarding the continuity and longevity of Buddhism. (Satha-Anand, 2007). From the First Rehearsal or 'Sangayana', the five hundred arahants, the Buddhist saints, decided to conserve the original Buddha's teaching. They agreed unanimously to purify the teaching from all impurities. The discipline (Vinaya) must not be added, changed nor cut. This agreement is honored until today (Ngamchitcharoen, 2013).

Phra Brahmagunabhorn (P.A. Payutto)(2013) points out that the most prominent characteristics of Theravada Buddhism is the system to maintain and propagate the original Buddha's teaching as complete and correct as possible. However, Theravada Buddhism also the only tradition that keeps Kalamasutta in the Tripitaka. The Kalamasutta suggests how to deal with doubtful matters, and to investigate a doctrine. Phra Brahmagunabhorn adds that to keep the precise information as per its original does not mean to believe the information without consideration. Beliefs and faiths are just guidance to wisdom. The opportunity to study the original information would be a path of wisdom development. Theravada Buddhism also has the criteria to consider and evaluate the authenticity of the teachings of the Buddha, Mahapadesa or the four principal appeals to authority: the appeal to the Enlightened One, to a community of monks, to a number of elders, and to a single elder as authority. If there is any doubt on any teaching whether the Buddha will allow, these four principals can be used for reference or citations. (Phra Brahmagunabhorn (P.A. Payutto), 2008).

Phra Paisal Wisalo (2015) further states that Theravada Buddhism emphasizes on the harmony of the sangha. Causing schism in the Order is one of the Anantariya-kamma or heinous crimes. The Theravada Buddhism views that harmony derives from having the same view (Ditthi) and practicing the same discipline. Practicing different discipline causes the distinction of several Buddhist traditions including Theravada and Mahayana.

Since there is no bhikkhuni in Thai history, Suwanna Satha-Anand (2007) points out that the interpretation of the Tripitaka has been done by only bhikkhus, in particular the issue of the legitimacy of the woman ordination.

There were at least three attempts to restore the Theravada bhikkhuni lineage in Thailand. Two thirds of the attempts have directly attacked to the Thai Theravada Buddhism and ignited the controversy fervently and it is the main focus of this paper. Until now, the Thai Theravada bhikkhunis do not have a clear status in Thai society whether they are clergy or laity. To understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to understand the context of Thai Buddhist society before the first attempt and the motive of the attempts.

Before the Attempts to Revive the Bhikkhuni Lineage

Buddhism was introduced into the current geographical Thailand, not yet as a country of Thailand or either Siam but could be referred as Suvarnabhumi, by Indian civilization during the reign of Asoka, the great Indian emperor, through commercial trade, Buddhist missionaries, and pilgrimage. The cultural waves from India had been through the selection process by kings and elites and had been well assimilated with indigenous beliefs by commoners. The people regarded Buddhism as royalty and nobility (Assvavirulhakarn, 2010). The practices and beliefs of Thai people throughout the country reflect the mixture of numerous traditions and beliefs. Although officially Thailand has identified itself as Theravada Buddhism, the Thai Buddhism's characteristics is complicated. There are some characteristics

of Mahayana Buddhism, Brahmanism, Hinduism, folk religion, animism, supernaturalism, the worship of ancestors and gods of nature adhered to the Thai Theravada Buddhism.

Due to the mixture of beliefs, Tanchainan (2015) points out that Thai society in the past had rather ambiguous characteristics in terms of the relationship between men and women. On one hand, women were inferior to men. Since Sukhothai era, the restricted access to certain roles in Buddhism of Thai women had been influenced from a Buddhist literature, called Triphum Phra Ruang. There were beliefs from this literature that reflected men are superior to women. The past life of a person had determined his or her present life. The reason that one born female was because in her past life she had not accumulated enough Buddhist merits to be born male. There was also belief that the vicious nature of women could enforce men to be slave of desire and anger. Women could be responsible for only facilitating Buddhist ceremonies such as preparing foods, but could not perform major role in those Buddhist rituals. Furthermore, women had been considered as potentially dangerous to celibate men and could derogate the sacredness.

Early of Rattanakosin era, the reflection of men superior to women could also be seen from the Three Seals Law. Women had to be under care and custody of men, either by her parents or her husband. This law allowed men to have more than one wife, but not allowed women to be touched her physical body by other man. Also the law stated that male labor is more important than female labor (Thanaprasitpattana, 2015). The women's inferior role and status in the past had been also reflected from many Thai literatures. For example, 'Krishna Son Nong' is about how women should obey to their husbands. 'Supasit Son Ying' emphasized on how women should select their husbands (Wongtead, 2015). Furthermore, the Thai education system was at monasteries and under supervised of Buddhist monks. This means women had been excluded from education.

On the other hand, there were some social practices that balance the power of women. For instance, women were the center of the family. Generally, after married, a man shall move in to his wife's family, particular in the northern part of Thailand. Women shall took care their households and had been respected as the mother of the house. Also in Buddhism, the motherhood of women has received the respectfulness similar to bhikkhus. In area of work, men and women had similar works. But women may had additional works such as housework, basketry, collecting fruits and vegetables to sell in fresh markets. Men shall be responsible for long distant trading and all hard jobs as there was belief that hard labor works would have destructive effect on reproductive system of women. Anyhow, men and women could be replaced in most of the jobs and could help each other. In addition, women still had areas of indigenous beliefs. Women played important roles to inherit traditional rituals and ancestral spirit. The role of midwife also carried by women who were not merely deliver a child but acted as a mediator who connected between the pregnant woman and the mysterious power that over the new born life. (Bhurisinsith, 2015; Sukphanit, 2015; Tanchainan, 2015)

In the past, the indigenous beliefs and Buddhism coexisted in harmony. Women's role in Buddhism could be considered subordinate to men. However, women played crucial roles in indigenous rituals. It can be said that Thai society in the past had arranged the area of faith and religion for women and men in a balanced way (Chiangthong, 2015; Eawsriwong 2014).

The Development of Siamese Society

In early of Rattanakosin era, from 1782 onward, when the Western world and the concept of science

came to influence the Siam society, there were social changes in various aspects including the emergence of realization for women's rights, and the change in the monastic institution. These led to the change of women's roles and their areas in faith and religious.

The expansion of urbanization had caused the decline of agricultural areas. The monetary economy began to emerge to Siam and caused the state to shift its focus on labor of commoner to tax collecting. Instead of keeping a property as inheritance, land was traded more. Men who no longer did agricultural works moved to work as labors. Women, who lack of educational opportunity which provided at the monastery mainly, had less career options and received less paid compared to men. The only career that women could expect well paid was prostitution, which became a social problem later on. During King Chulalongkorn's reign, the slavery had been abolished and new bureaucracy system had been introduced. New business opportunities were available and led to the emergence of the middle class. Educational system had been reformed. There were schools for girls and women were allowed to entrance to universities for higher education. Women magazines were available for the first time in 1888. This led to the increase of awareness of women's right (Thanaprasitpattana, 2015; Pitipattanakosit & Panich, 1989)

During Rama the third's reign, there was also a drastic change in the Buddhist monastic institution. The influence of scientific views, rationalism and humanism has impact on the interpretation of the Tripitaka. It has moved from the beliefs about next life to emphasis on the consequence of one own deed of current life. Indigenous beliefs have been excluded from the Buddhism due to the rationalism and humanism. That means the role of women in areas of indigenous belief has been excluded from Buddhist area. The major change of the Siam monastic institution was the disunity and the separation into Maha Nikaya and Dhammayuttika (Phra Paisal Visalo, 2015).

All of these social changes, it has emphasized the dividing line between the Buddhism and indigenous beliefs. This means restricted areas for women were more emphasized. At the same time, these social changes had sparked the recognition of women's right in Siamese society and ignited the first attempt of the revival bhikkhuni in Siam. In 1928, there was a man stepped out to claim the right for women ordination in Buddhism.

The First Wave: 1928, the First Bhikkhuni Ordination in Siam

The first attempt to reestablish a bhikkhuni lineage in Siam have been undertaken in 1928 by the former government official and engaged lay-Buddhist, Narin Klueng Bhasit. Chatrakun Na Ayudhaya (1993) provides detail of Narin's life and his attempt to revive bhikkhuni lineage in his books. Narin had recognized the waning of Buddhism and employed various communicational channels to solicit the whole society to purge the Buddhism. One of the strategies that Narin employed was to restore the bhikkhuni lineage in Siam.

Narin was born and grown up in an orchard farmer family. He had ordained and been educated with the Dhammayuttika Buddhism. After unfrocked, Narin had started his career as a clerk in the Ministry of Agricultural and then a clerk at custom facilitation, the Ministry of Finance. Later, he had been bestowed with honorary title as 'Phra Phanom Sara Narin' and appointed as the governor of Nakhonnayok province. He was in this position for about a year and decided to resign because he had conflict with one of his superior. After left the civil service, he set up a publishing house and published a number of pamphlets and publications, in attempt to reeducate the Buddhist to discontinue their fault beliefs and

practices. He studied the teaching of the Buddha seriously and founded 'The Buddhist Society' to compile the Buddhist knowledge and promulgated the Buddhism.

The earlier schism of Siam Theravada Buddhism into Maha Nikaya and Dhammayuttika also created the criticize atmosphere to the society. The teaching concept of Dhammayuttika, which was Narin's educational background and rather strict to the discipline of Buddhism, also encouraged Narin to criticize the non-Buddhist beliefs and practices that contaminated Buddhism.

Besides the idea to bring back the society to the authentic Buddha's teaching, royalty to the monarchy is another principal idea of Narin. He declared that whatever actions he would strive for social improvement had to meet three basic principles. Firstly, the king and his government must approve such an idea. Secondly, majority of the people must support and satisfy with the idea, and the implementation of the idea must be economically feasible, with funds readily accessible. With these three criteria, the monarchy would play crucial role in the revival Thai Theravada bhikkhuni later on (Bhasit, 2001).

At the beginning, Narin had no intention to focus on the revival of bhikkhuni lineage. Narin's harsh criticism to the society appearing on his publications had made him in conflict with both the monarchy and monastic institutions. His newspaper which he employed to voice out for people was not the King's favorite. It could publish only five issues. Then it had been terminated. Later, he had published flyers to reproach to the government officials who were incapable of caring for the people. He had also criticized Thai Buddhist in general whom he believed had followed the ignorant superstitious. These flyers caused Narin to be sued by the state and he was sentenced to jail.

After released from the jail, Narin went for his ordination and witnessed many improper practices of Buddhist monks. He decided to leave the clergy again and started a new business to merchandise a type of medicinal alcohol. His business went considerably well and was expanded rapidly. But it seemed too good for the state and his competitors. Narin's distilling alcohol business had been ceased as the government had forbidden private sector to sell medicine alcohol.

Without his business, Narin had moved his focus back to Buddhism again and this time he put his effort to promote an equal opportunity to attain nirvana for both genders. He arranged the ordination for his two daughters and other six women to be samaneris (female novices) in September 1928. The name of the monk to perform the ordination has never been disclosed until today.

The first emerging of samaneri had ignited the fervent controversy throughout Siam society via newspapers and public discussions. Several newspapers has shown strong opponent to Narin's action. For instances, 'Thai Num' (ไทยหนุ่ม) accused Narin of being a villainous man and an enemy to Buddhism. 'Lak Muang' (หลักเมือง) alleged that Narin was a rebellion against Buddhism and should be put to death immediately for this crime. 'Sri Krung' (ศรีกรุง) had encouraged the authorities to eliminate Narin. Also the Sangha Supreme Council attacked Narin's attempts, accused him of destroying Buddhism and enforced samaneris to be defrocked. After the ordination for 2 months, The Supreme patriarchal had signed a regulation that was promulgated on 18 Jun 1928. It has stated that:

"A woman who can become samaneri correctly after the Buddha's allowance must be ordained by bhikkhuni because the Buddha allowed a bhikkhuni with 12 years standing to become pavattini, or upajjhaya. He did not allow bhikkhu to be upajjhaya. Bhikkhunis have lost their lineage long time ago, when there were no

bhikkhunis to follow the lineage, there were no samaneri who received ordination from bhikkhuni, they have equally lost the lineage of ordination. One who start giving ordination to samaneri is considered establishing that which the Buddha did not established, giving up that which the Buddha has established, become thorns in Buddhism, is setting a bad example, etc. With this reason all bhikkhus and samaners of all sects are not allowed to ordain women as bhikkhunis, sikkhamanas, or samaneris from now on.

June 18, 1928

Kromluang Jinavarasirivathana

Somdej Pra Sangharaja

Wat Bovornnivesvihara, Bangkok."

(Bhikkhuni Dhammananda, 2010b , p.7)

Narin retorted the allegation that he was a throne in Buddhism. He had raised questions to the Sangha Supreme Council to compare between the acts to restore the bhikkhuni lineage and the behavior of Buddhist monks who accumulate wealth or have sex with women. He asked back why those deeds were not considered a throne in Buddhism (Koret, 2012).

The issue of the samaneri ordination had been brought to the council of ministers. The government had commanded officers to arrest samaneris and incarcerate them. Narin's daughters, Sara was given an eight days sentence in prison and a fine of twenty baht while Chongdi, at younger age, was not incarcerated. When they were released, both had changed the color of their samaneri's robe but continue to practice as the samaneri for a while.

Narin tried to call for a public forum to discuss this issue. He contacted the Samakkhayachan Society for permission to make use of a large public hall that was commonly used for talks on religion and culture. But he was resolutely denied for the non-confrontational reason that the hall was not intended for public use.

Narin had supplicated to the King Prachatipok for his support. The King had refused with three reasons. Firstly, the King had pointed out that if the revival of bhikkhuni was a good idea, why it had never been done in the long history of Buddhism. Secondly, the King considered the revival to be the amendment of the Buddhist scriptures which could cause the damage as same as the case of Mahayana sect which allows their monks to have wives and carries the belief of the spinning of prayer wheels to lead them to heaven. Thirdly, laywomen could still practice dharma and achieved spiritual attainment without necessity of being bhikkhunis. The king had concluded that he did not support this revival. Narin replied to the King that, after receiving his royal remark, he had capitulated and shall withdraw his campaign to restore the bhikkhuni lineage and intended to leave the kingdom. For the samaneris, at that time there were three samaneris left included Narin's two daughters, Narin claimed that he could not force them to defrock since he was afraid of conducting a serious sin. The samaneris still continued their practices. Until one day during receiving almsfood, Sara was kidnapped by a local sheriff on a horse for several days. This had created a scandalous spectacle that was intended to disgrace her reputation. The samaneris' practices eventually had faded from public (Mekrungreong, 2014)

Although Narin's movement for revival the bhikkhunis had ended, his struggle for the righteousness from both the state and the Thai Buddhism continued until his death.

Narin had constituted discourses for women's right in Buddhism. He had opened another view to the society that women actually have a right to attain the Buddha's dharma equally to men. This right has been given by the Buddha himself. Buddhism should be no longer left in only male hand. Women, in particular bhikkhunis, who previously had been a great part of the Buddhist patronage during the Buddha's time and later had been vanished in the history of patriarchal societies, should be revived, empowered and granted the opportunity to resume their patronage of Buddhism.

The Second Wave: The Ordination of Voramai Kabilsingh in 1956 and 1971

After the movement of Narin and his daughters, the attempt to revival of bhikkhunis in Thailand had faded out because it was during the World War II. Until the 1956, Voramai Kabilsingh sought for the ordination and received from Chao Khun Phra Prommuni, the deputy abbot of Wat Bavornnives in Bangkok, by taking eight precepts and wear light yellow robes to differentiate from the brown and yellowish brown robe of bhikkhus. The light yellow robe of Voramai had offended to the district chief of Nakhonpathom by that time. He had passed this issue to the sangha to consider. The Sangha Supreme Council of Thailand, with Chao Khun Phra Prommuni was one of the members, simply certified the case as "Do not see any harm to the sangha". There were a number of young women joined Voramai afterward.

In 1971, Voramai and her daughter, Chatsumarn, went to Taiwan to seek bhikkhuni ordination. Bhikkhu Tao An Fashih of Sung San monastery in Taipei was her preceptor. The ordination was proceeded by only bhikkhu sangha. Since Voramai was the only the bhikkhuni, she could not perform any sanghakammas or deeds performed by Buddhist monks in monasteries. Apart from practicing meditation, her clerical activities included teaching dharma and publishing dharma messages. Voramai bought a piece of land in Nakornpathom and built Songdhammakalyani Monastery. Instead of spelling the Thai word of monastery (วัด) according to the Thai standard spelling by the Royal society of Thailand, Songdhammakalyani monastery has used its homophone and follow Pali language, (วัตร), which means the daily practice, the duty of conduct. This can be seen as a strategy to avoid confrontation with the official Theravada Buddhist institution. Bhikkhuni Voramai passed away on June 24, 2003, at the age of ninety-five years. (Bhikkhuni Dhammananda, 2014).

Bhikkhuni Dhammananda (2004) suggests that although the ordination of Narin's daughters was the first bhikkhuni ordination in Siam, it was unclear who the preceptor was. There were also no dual ordinations by both bhikkhus and bhikkhunis. Therefore the ordination of Voramai could be claimed as the first bhikkhuni who has been through full and proper ordination. However, it is still questionable whether the ordination was authentic Theravada ordination since the dual ordinations were performed by the Chinese Dharmaguptaka tradition of Mahayana Buddhism. There was also some criticism about her color robe. But the controversy seems not to be vehemently. Without claiming as Theravada bhikkhuni, although the Sangha institute did not legitimize such the ordination, there was no referring to the previous promulgation of Somdej Pra Sangharaja Kromluang Jinavarasirivathana to against this ordination.

The immense impact from the case of bhikkhuni Voramai's ordination was on the transmission of her interest in Buddhism and the inspiration to revive the bhikkhuni order to her daughter, Chatsumarn Kabilsingh, who later re-ignites the issue of revival of bhikkhuni ordination in Thailand.

The Third Wave: The First Thai Theravada Bhikkhuni in 2001 and 2003

The controversy about the revival of bhikkhuni ordination has been sparked up again when Chatsumarn Kabilsingh went for her first lower ordination in Sri Lanka in 2001. She returned to Sri Lanka again to receive full ordination in 2003. Her ordained name is Dhammananda. There was a claim that Dhammananda was the first Thai Theravada bhikkhuni who completes the proper steps of the dual ordinations and by Theravada sanghas. She went all the way to ensure that she received full training as bhikkhuni and be able to train other samaneris and bhikkhunis after her. Furthermore, she has arranged for proper simas, the mark to indicate the boundary of a Buddhist monastery, in order for the future sangha to have a proper place to perform sanghakammas, e.g. ordination, etc.

Chatsumarn Kabilsingh was the daughter of Kokiatt and Voramai Kabilsingh. She has received B.A. in Philosophy from Visva Bharati University, M.A. in Religion from McMaster University in Canada, and Ph.D. in Buddhism from Magadh University in India. She spent over 30 years in academic life doing research, teaching and attending conferences at international level about religious. Her last academic title before become bhikkhuni was Assoc. Prof. Dr. Chatsumarn Kabilsingh. (Sangseehanat, 2009).

After became a bhikkhuni, Dhammananda played very important role to propagate the Buddha's teaching both domestically and internationally. She followed closely to the inspiration of her mother, who also the founder of the Songdhammakalyani Monastery. She emphasized the ideology of Social Engaged Buddhism in her writing, and teaching, in which not limited the aim only to nirvana but also to help people to achieve the highest dharma. (Hansakul, 2011). She devoted her first decade of ordained life to promote the knowledge of the rightful heritage of bhikkhunis from the Buddha's time through various media such as books, brochures, etc. She had arranged the first lower ordination for samaneris in Thailand in 2009. Up to 2014, more than 400 Thai females have been ordained. In 2013, Dhammananda bhikkhuni has initiated and organized a network of Thai bhikkhunis who locate in more than 20 provinces around the country. Furthermore, in 2014, Dhammananda bhikkhuni was appointed as a female preceptor by a Sri Lanka preceptor during a group ordination for women monks in Songkha, Thailand.

The reaction of the sangha institution to Dhammananda's ordination and the claim as the first Thai Theravada bhikkhuni was same as to the case of Narin's daughters. The Sangha Supreme Council of Thailand explicitly presented their opposition strand to the ordination. The council declared their objection officially and remains vigilant if there was any support the bhikkhuni ordination by any Thai Theravada bhikkhus. One of the evidence was from the report by the Secretariat of The Sangha Supreme Council of Thailand to the Council regarding Phra Visuthsangworathera's action in facilitation bhikkhuni ordination in Bodhinyana monastery, Australia. Phra Visuthsangworathera has been removed from the Ajahn Chah Forest Sangha lineage and announced no longer associated with the main monastery Wat Pah Pong in Thailand. On 11 December 2014, The Sangha Supreme Council of Thailand has restated that the ordination for women by any Thai Theravada bhikkhus was prohibited.

There were incongruent reactions from the state and the monastery toward bhikkhunis. The monastic institution clearly refused the legitimacy of bhikkhunis. But the legal status of bhikkhunis was ambiguous whether to be treated as cleric or laity. This awkward status was similar to 'mae chis', laywomen who receive eight or ten precepts, wearing white robe. For example, while the ministry of the interior treated bhikkhunis as clerics who were not eligible to vote, the Department of Religion and the Ministry of Communications treated them as laypeople that had no right to receive any subsidy which were granted

for monks and novice such as education and discount for public transportation fee.

Discourses, Power and Conflict

This preliminary analysis compared discourses from the two incidents: the first attempt by Narin and his daughters and the current situation that initiated by bhikkhuni Dhammananda. The analysis presents into three main areas which are discourses, discursive practice and communication, and social context.

The first attempt for the revival of the bhikkhuni ordination was voiced out by Narin. It can be said that the key issue that Narin would like to draw public attention was actually the attempt to reeducate Siam Buddhist and reform Siam Buddhist's practices back into original Buddhist discipline, the Vinaya, according to Dhammayuttika's interpretation.

The discourse that Narin tried to constitute was that the real Buddhist should drive out false monks who accumulating wealth, gamble, intoxicate themselves with sex and alcohol and seek out worldly rank and status. This discourse had been produced and distributed before his attempt to revive bhikkhuni ordination. The conflict between Narin and Sangha institution had also been developed before the bhikkhuni ordination. The attempt to revive bhikkhuni ordination was only one strategy to draw people attention and to urge them to reform all improper religious practices.

During Narin's attempt, the dominant discourse of the opposition was from the announcement by the Supreme Patriarch, Kromluang Jinavarasirivathan, which denounced anyone who giving ordination to samaneri as thorns in Buddhism. He commanded clearly "*all bhikkhus and samaners of all sects are not allowed to ordain women*". This discourse was based on the interpretation of the Tripitaka scripture and established the knowledge that the ordination must be conducted by both bhikkhu sangha and bhikkhuni sangha. Since bhikkhunis have lost their lineage of ordination, it was impossible to restore the bhikkhuni ordination.

The recent attempt initiated by Chatsumarn Kabilsingh, who claimed to be the first bhikkhuni Thai Theravada. The intention of bhikkhuni Dhammananda has been communicated clearly that she wants to restore the bhikkhuni lineage for the sake of women and the Buddhism. The power of the Tripitaka scripture has been emphasized that all Theravada Buddhist must comply. Both supporters and opposed parties have claimed the legitimacy from the Buddhist doctrine.

To oppose this ordination, the announcement by the Supreme Patriarch, Kromluang Jinavarasirivathan, in 1928 was carried over and still referred by the current Sangha Supreme Council of Thailand. However, the focal point of the controversy was moved from the denunciation of being "thorns in Buddhism" to whether the ordination must be conducted by both bhikkhuni and then bhikkhu sangha which led to the legitimacy of the ordination. The opposed parties affirmed the interpretation of the sixth of the eight Garudhammas that the ordination must be conducted by both sanghas. It was clearly that only bhikkhu has no right to ordain any bhikkhuni. Furthermore, there was no clear evidence that Theravada bhikkhunis has descended till the present. Therefore, Thai Theravada sangha did not accept the ordination from overseas as Theravada.

The supporters of the current revival bhikkhuni ordination have interpreted the Buddhist doctrine differently. Context and content from other parts of the Tripitaka scripture were brought for consideration. The supporters pointed out that the Buddha had never limited that the bhikkhuni ordination must be conducted by both sanghas. At the beginning, only bhikkhus could perform the ordination for women. In the process, the laity who wanted to ordain must clear oneself that one was fit

for ordination by asking and answering questions, called *Antarayikadhamma*. Some of the questions were very personal for women and she may felt uncomfortable to answer in front of male monks. There was a case that the ordination could not proceed further. Once the Buddha had been reported this obstacle, the Buddha had advised *bhikkhunis* to ask these *Antarayikadhamma* questions and then proceed the ordination further by male monks. This was how the dual ordination began. But once there was no further *bhikkhunis*, *bhikkhus* still legitimize to perform the ordination for women. Regarding the loss of *bhikkhuni Theravada*, the arguments were that it was no distinction of Buddhism during the Buddha's time. There was evidence that the Sri Lanka *bhikkhunis* had descended to China and the *vinaya* which the Chinese *sangha* follow was *Dhammagupta*, the sub sect of *Theravada*. Furthermore, the Sri Lanka *bhikkhuni* who received ordination with the help of Chinese *bhikkhunis* had received a second ordination from Sri Lanka *Theravada bhikkhus*. Therefore, the *bhikkhuni* ordination by Sri Lanka *sanghas* should be recognized as *Theravada*.

In terms of discursive practice and communication, newspapers were main media during Narin's attempt. The number of distributions and audiences who were capable of literacy was still limited by that time. The Supreme Patriarch's discourse was reproduced on newspapers. Majority of the news opposed the ordination. Narin was denounced as a traitor of the Buddhism, an insane man, a man who brought downfall to Buddhism. Furthermore, the censorship from the State authorities was exercised from time to time. It was difficult for Narin to communicate with public. Instead, Narin wrote several letters to state authorities and royal families to seek for support. He opted another form of printed media to exercise his power of an ordinary citizen and a Buddhist. To counter all oppose discourses, Narin issued a book called "Statement regarding samaneri of Nariwong monastery". Narin emphasized that Buddhism was decaying. The restoration of *bhikkhuni* lineage was one way to deal with the degeneration of Buddhism. He offered the alternative approach to interpret the *Tripitaka* scripture that the Buddha had never revoke the authority of *bhikkhus* to ordain women. The ordination was the most convenient way to learn and practice *dharma*, and should not be merely special privilege for men. Narin further pointed out that the announcement of the Supreme Patriarch had never been verified and considered by the *Sangha Supreme Council*. This had implied that the announcement was invalid.

Comparing to the present day, communicational technology has rapidly changed. Broadcast television is considered as mainstream media but may have an issue of self-censorship toward any controversial topic. Printed media still plays an important role in providing depth and academic insight of this issue. This can be seen from the books issued by both supporters and oppositions. For the oppositional view, a rational argument in "Replied Dr. Martin, Buddhist discipline to *bhikkhunis*" by Phra Brahmaganabhorn (P.A. Payutto) (2012) illustrated the limitation that only Buddhist monks could not arrange the ordination for any *bhikkhunis*. For the supporting view, "Dialogues with Luang Mae Dhammananda, the first Thai *Theravada bhikkhuni*" (Mekrungreong, 2014) reflecting the view of Dhammananda *bhikkhuni* which argued with the book of Phra Brahmaganabhorn.

The current communication technology and transportation system, which were not available yet during Narin's time, instantaneously have enhanced international support to the movement. Internet and social media can be considered as a new emerging public space. Users can generate their own contents; respond directly to the original source, exchanges views with other audience without the limitation of time and place of access. This potentiality of new media has shifted the power of main stream media

institution to public. In addition, Bhikkhuni Dhammananda's contribution to the Buddhism since her secular life was also significant complementary factors to the current attempt. She played an important role in the movement for women's right in religions and has been recognized internationally. For example, she had been invited to give a lecture at Harvard University in 1983, and she was the co-founder of Sakyadhita International Association of Buddhist Women and was elected to be the president during 1991-1995. It has developed an international network of supporters from around the world and opened the gate for western scholars to contribute to this issue. Some western scholars have already brought this issue to relate with the domestic violence, human trafficking and HIV affected issues in Thailand.

The social context between these two attempts was another difference. During Narin's movement, the Siamese society was under the absolute monarchy. Women's right was rather new issue which has merely been introduced to the society. The power and relationship between the monastic institution and the state were highly dependent on each other and were closely associated with the monarchy. Discourses and discursive practices of the state, the monastic institution and the monarchy were aligned in the same direction. The monastic institution, represented by the Supreme Patriarch Kromluang Jinavarasirivathana had announced the prohibition of bhikkhuni ordination. There was an order to find out the preceptor of the samaneri ordination. Achan At, the sixty-nine year old monk, was accused for conducting the ordination for Narin's daughters and was enforced to immediate defrock. Achan At filed a petition to the Supreme Patriarch and the king. He claimed that the accusation was untrue. He asked for reinvestigation and permission for him to re-ordain. However, his petitions were denied. The state exercised its power by arresting and imprisoning those samaneris and enforced them to disrobe their monastic attire. The role of the monarchy was another crucial factor. The King Prachatiok's had asked Narin to abandon the idea of reviving the bhikkhuni in his answer to Narin's petition. This had significant impact on the controversy.

Nowadays, the link between the state and the monastic institutions seems to get more distance. The Sangha Supreme Council of Thailand still clearly express their opposition to the revival of bhikkhuni sangha and has requested to the Foreign Affairs to notify Buddhist monks from overseas to seek for permission if they would come to Thailand for arranging bhikkhuni ordination in Thailand. However, the state authority has no clear action whether to align with the Sangha Supreme Council's stance. The unclear stance of the secular state could be the consequences from The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the current constitutional law that protect human rights, freedom, and equality, regardless their religious beliefs if there is no violation of the State's security or public order or good morals. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution in 1948, after Narin and his daughters' attempt. The right and freedoms of people have been recognized and protected without distinction of any kind including their beliefs and religions and have been enforced through Thai laws later on.

At the present time, Thailand is under the constitute monarchy. Although the king is the patron of Buddhism, he has no involvement in any conflict or taken any part in resolving these conflicts. The solution is merely in hands of the monastic institution, bhikkhunis, and Thai Buddhists.

There was an end of the revival of bhikkhuni ordination by Narin and his daughters. Male power was employed over women by the kidnapping samaneri Sara, a daughter of Narin, by a local sheriff. This

operation had disgraced samaneri Sara's dignity in the public views. It was the operation that related to the belief and value of the purity and celibacy of the clergy and a lady. After this abduction, samaneri's religious practice gradually faded out from public view. It could say that the monastic institution had won over the attempt of Narin. However, the current attempt to restore bhikkhuni lineage has not ended yet. The controversy regarding the ordination of bhikkhuni still continues until the present day. The Thai Sangha institute remain explicitly emphasize the objection and oppression the revival of bhikkhuni ordination. In the same time, the growth of bhikkhuni sangha and the Thai Theravada bhikkhuni's activities still continue in Thai society. It gains more and more support from Thai Buddhist. Discourses and discursive practices and the diffusion of power generated from both sides still continue. There is no conclusion about the rightfulness of the ordination of Thai bhikkhuni yet and no sign that a consensus could be reached in the near future.

In order to understand the discourses and the discursive practices and the mechanism of its power that impact on Thai society in depth, further research need to be done in detail of this phenomenon. The comparative study of the area of communication of Narin period and the present will provide a clearer understanding and will enable us to criticize and enlarge the knowledge of Thai Theravada bhikkhuni. More interestingly, the discourses that bhikkhunis constitute and are communicating with Thai Buddhist amid the conflict shall be further studied.

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***Sandonta* Ancestor Worship: From Family Ritual to Provincial Tradition of Surin Province**

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Abstract

This paper aims to study the dynamism of the Sandonta (ancestor worship) ritual. This ritual is normally arranged within family's in the Thai-Khmer ethnic group. Recently, it has become a new tradition in Surin province held by the Surin provincial administrative organization. Data was collected over the period 2012-2016 from two events. First, the Bun Sandonta (งานบุญแซนโถนตา), a family ritual, was held at the Thai-Khmer community at Pruekian Village, Nokmueang Sub-district, Mueang District, Surin province. Secondly, the "Sandonta ancestor worship Tradition" (ประเพณีแซนโถนตาบูชาบรรพบุรุษ) was held by the Surin provincial administrators. Participant observation in the ritual and in-depth interviews with village headmen, community leaders, ritual performers, villagers, and tourists were conducted in both areas. The study indicates that Bun Sandonta in the village is held during the Full Moon of the 10th lunar month, until the first day of the waxing moon of the 11th lunar month, and consists of 9 sequential rites which are animistic worship, paying gratitude to ancestors, and Buddhist rites. Whereas the Sandonta tradition held by provincial administrators shows an attempt to keep certain traditional rites, the core of the ritual has shifted from worshipping familial ancestors to worshipping the spirit of Surin province's founder. It should be observed that the name of the ritual has been changed from "Bun Sandonta" to "Sandonta Ancestor Worship Tradition." This, in a way, reduces the sacredness of the ritual in line with the more casual atmosphere of the festival. The tradition intends to attract more people to attend, so includes more information concerning the Sandonta ritual. Ritual food is provided in an exhibition, and entertainment activities are also included. The tradition is open for people from all ethnic groups, and also provides Surin province with the opportunity to present their identity to tourists.

Keywords: Sandonta, ancestor worship, Surin province, ethnic tourism

1. Introduction

Thai of Khmer descent have believed in ancestor spirits from a long time ago until present and act accordingly. This belief is demonstrated in the rite of passage especially *Sandonta* rite on the 14th day of the waning moon of the 10th lunar month (วันแรม 14 ค่ำ เดือน 10). The *Sandonta* is a ritual to commemorate ancestors and is a sub-ritual of the *Bon Sandonta* of the 10th lunar month *Bon Sandonta* or *Bun Sandonta* (บ็อนแซนโถนตา หรือ บุญแซนโถนตา) draws its meaning from the three words, *Bon*, *San*,

and *Donta*, which mean: religious ceremony, oblation, and ancestor and relative spirits. Thus, *Bon Sandonta* is a ritual for the commemoration of ancestors. The rite is arranged on the 10th lunar month because, according to Thai-Khmer belief, ancestor spirits will come home once a year during that time.

Bon Sandonta is a practice of the Thai-Khmer ethnic group. However, it was not a well-known tradition until 2007 when the provincial authority of Surin province chose to use this rite to be presented as a provincial ceremony. This tradition was renamed as the *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition (ประเพณีแซนโถงตามชาวบรรพบุรุษ) and has been held annually by every ethnic group in the province.

As a result, the *Bon Sandonta* has been modified from the original focus and purpose to a more secular provincial tradition. This research examined how dynamic the tradition has become.

The researcher collected data between 2012 – 2016 in the Thai-Khmer community. The original tradition, *Bon Sandonta*, was held in the *Pruekian village* of Surin Province. The reproduced, *Sandonta Ancestor Worship*, was held in downtown Surin province. The researcher observed and took part in the tradition in both locations. The researcher interviewed community leaders, ritual leaders, villagers, and monks in the original tradition. However, for the *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition arranged by provincial authority, the researcher interviewed the organizer, ritual leaders, Surin people, and tourists. Moreover, the researcher also examined documents about the *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition held during 2007 – 2016 to gather photos during the past ten years.

2. The Existence of *Bon Sandonta* within the Thai-Khmer Ethnic Group

Collecting information in the Thai-Khmer community at Pruekian village, Nokmuang sub-district, Muang district, Surin province shows that the *Bon Sandonta* included many activities, which related to ancestor spirits, humans, and Buddhism. Those activities take 17 days to complete starting from the full moon of the 10th lunar month until the first day of the waxing moon of the 11th lunar month. Those activities are (listed chronologically) preparing day, Soddar-bentut rite (พิธีโสดดารเบ้นท์ตุต), Kansong rite (พิธีกันซ้อง), Chalongsong rite (พิธีฉลองซ้อง), Sandonta rite (พิธีแซนโถงดา), Jundonta rite (พิธีจุนโถงดา), Jakanjerdonta rite (พิธีจะกันเจอโถงดา), Soddarbenthom rite (พิธีโสดดารเบ้นท์ธม), and the Jundontalobsaruk rite (พิธีจุนโถงดาหลบสรุก).

In the early morning of the full moon day of the 10th lunar month, the villagers prepare foods, local desserts, and offerings to the temple for the monks to pray for ancestor spirits. This ceremony is called the *Soddar* (โสดดาร). Local people have this ceremony because they believe that the angels will release their ancestor's spirits to come home once a year to visit their descendants. In addition, they also believe that their ancestors have to travel a very long distance so they need to have enough food. Therefore, this is the reason why they arrange *Soddar Bentut*, which is a praying ceremony to consign merit to their ancestral spirits. In other words, it is the means to welcoming their ancestor's spirits home.

In the past, on the 1st day of the waning moon of the 10th lunar month to the 14th day of the waning moon of the 10th lunar month (14 days in total), people will maintain their religious practices; observe precepts, and listen to monks' teaching. These are called the *Kansong*. Every family will prepare food for the monks and go to the temple every day during that period. However, modern society and economics do not allow the villagers to do those activities anymore because they have to go to work far from home, which means that they have less time. As a result, those activities in Pruekian village were reduced to 6

days from 9th day of waning moon to the 14th day of waning moon. The *Chalongsong rite* is held on the last day to marking the end of the ceremony.

In the afternoon of the 14th day of waning moon of the 10th lunar month, each family will prepare foods, drinks, clothes, ornaments, and worship ingredient call the “Khan 5” (five groups of personality) and put them on a mattress covered with a white cloth. When all the descendants are ready, they will light candles and joss sticks. They will then give a speech inviting their ancestor’s spirits, which they believe have arrived to accept the things they had prepared. This is called the *Sandonta rite*.

The 14th day of the waning moon of the 10th lunar month is considered as a family gathering day that allows the descendants to prepare things such as clothes, food, drinks, desserts, and money to give to the elderly in the family. In return, the elderly will give the younger generation wishes, which is highly valued in Thai society. This activity for the elderly is called the *Jundonta rite*.

After giving things to ancestor spirits and the elderly, each family bring food, local desserts, fruits, and money to the village hall and put them into a basket called the Kanjerdonta (ก้นเจือโถงตา). Then they will parade into a temple to have the monks pray and give the food to their ancestor’s spirits. While they are parading, they will call out to invite the spirits to the temple with them and will call them back to stay at home because they considered it as an auspicious thing.

Before the sunrise, on the 15th day of the waning moon of the 10th lunar month, every family must return to the temple again and bring “*Baiben and Bayboettabor*” (บายเบิ่นท์-บายเบิดตะโบริ) for the last praying. Phra Sothea Yon explained “*Baiben and Baiboettabor are especially made during this ritual only. Baiboettabor is given to the monks for breakfast while Baiben is placed at the chapel for jinn*” (the starving, emaciated spirit) (interview, 10 August 2015). However, the researcher found that the villagers placed Baiben at the temple wall or “three junction” (Thai-Khmer people believe that “three junction” is a place where the ghosts will pass by) for ghost with no family. They also save some Baiben to spread on the paddy fields and orchards in the belief that this will help the crops to be more fertile. Moreover, the villagers also believe that “*their ancestors might be reborn to be mice, birds, or some small animals, thus it will eventually benefit their ancestors.*” (Chaloey Koerdchock, interview, 10 August 2015).



Figure 1: Baiben

After the monks finish praying, the villagers will turn over the baskets at the temple court to have all the food fall on the floor. This is called *Jakanjerdonta*. It is meant to give merit to the ghosts with no family, jinn and sinful ghost, and to be a fun activity for the villagers when they are snatching the food. Later in the day, the villagers will go back home and prepare the food for the last time. This is called *Soddarbenthom*.

Jundantalobsaruk rite means the returning of the ancestor spirits ceremony, which is the last activity arranged before the dawn on 1st day of waxing moon of the 11th lunar month. Every family will prepare food, local desserts, seeds, and money etc. and put them in small model boats made from a banana trunk. They will light candles and joss sticks to say goodbye to the spirits and then they will float the boat on the water, which means that the *Bon Sandonta* has come to an end.



Figure 2: *Sandonta rite, Jundonta rite, Kansong, and Jundantalobsaruk rite*

All in all, *Bon Sandonta* is a very important annual tradition in which descendants can show their gratitude toward ancestor spirits, the elderly in the family and Buddhism. In addition, it also allows the villagers to share merit to the ghost with no family. These illustrate the love within the family, helpfulness and unity within the ethnic group. In other words, this tradition emphasizes a good relationship between the departed and the living, the departed and the monks, the monks and villagers and between all villagers by having gratitude towards ancestors and activities bonding people together.

3. Dynamic of *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* Tradition: From Community Rite to Public Rite.

The government was trying to promote tourism at every level of society, ranging from village level to provincial level. Furthermore, The Ministry of the Interior and Tourism Authority of Thailand encouraged each province and locality to come up with renowned local things, which could be a selling point such as sightseeing, and local products. Those things that usually come from folk wisdom of a material type, for example, locally weaved clothes, wickerwork, food, and folk wisdom in local performance and ritual. As a consequence of the directive from the government, the local organizations have to present its own “renowned thing of the province” “renowned thing of the community” and “annual ceremony,” while some even create a “new identity” in order to serve the policy. (Siraporn Nathalang, 2017: 17-18)

The *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition is one of the cultural activities which serves government policy. The provincial authority of Surin is a leader in reproducing the tradition along with state agencies, the private sector and people who have helped in designing ceremonies.

The goal of this tradition is to preserve the traditional culture of the province and to create an activity in

which Surin people (Khmer, Kui, Lao, and Chinese) can join together. In other words, the change from ethical ritual to public tradition has shown the dynamic of the tradition in 3 ways, 1) Origin and the purpose of arranging tradition, 2) Naming the ceremony, and 3) Designing the ceremony in accordance with the change in context.

3.1 Dynamic of Origin and the Purpose of Arranging Tradition

The origin of *Bon Sandonta* is to allow Khmer descendants to express the gratitude toward their ancestral spirits, the elderly, and Buddhism. However, Surin provincial authority arranges *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition with 3 purposes: 1) to reserve the traditional rite of Surin, 2) to increase the awareness and importance of *Bon Sandonta*, and 3) to teach the people and teenagers to be grateful for what your parents and ancestors did, and to preserve the good local culture of Surin.

According to the purposes mentioned above, it seems clear that the government has shifted the tradition inherited from Thai-Khmer ethnic group to the people of Surin. This indicates that *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition has become a public issue not a specific group issue as it once was.

According to the field research conducted on the *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition during 2012 – 2016, not only has there been a change in target of the tradition, but also in the number of activities. The researcher observed that the organizer had chosen to use only the most important activities to be reproduced, such as the *Sandonta rite*, the *Jundonta rite*, and the *Jakanjerdonta rite*. Furthermore, the assigned recipients of or focus of these rites are: the provincial governor, respectful seniors in Surin province, and ancestor spirit of Surin people or the spirit of ancient governor of Surin. For the *Buddhistic rite*, the monks still have to pray for the spirits, but there is a slight change from offering breakfast to the monks to giving things.

The assignment of recipient has shown that the organizer used a comparable symbol, which resembles the original thoughts of the tradition. In other words, the Surin province represents a home or a family, the ancient Surin governor represents an ancestral spirits, the current Surin governor and seniors of the province represent the elderly, and the Surin people represent the descendants, with the younger generation having to carry on the *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition.

The selection of the ancient Surin governor's spirit, the current Surin governor and seniors of the province, which are both respectful to Surin people to represent ancestor spirits and the elderly accordingly, unifies the different ethnic groups together to stand as the descendants of the Surin people. This activity encourages diverse people to take part in the tradition together. The organizers have also chosen the date that is not *Ancestor worship day* in the community (14th day of waning moon of the 10th lunar month), which enables more people to come out every year.

3.2 Dynamic of Naming the Tradition to Indicate New Meaning within the Old Thought.

Aside from changing the meaning of the tradition to attract participants, naming the tradition in an appropriate way is an essential factor for clarifying the direction of the tradition.

Pathom Hongsuwan (2016: 269-271) studied the naming of 30 reproduced traditions in the community nearby Mekong river in Northeast Thailand. He found that the tradition organizer used the words embedded in the original tradition and adapted them into the new tradition in order to remind the audience of the linkages between the old ceremony and the new. This is a strategy to make the new tradition more authentic and eventually be able to create faith in the new tradition. The words found in

the new tradition are “event”, “tradition” and “festival”.

Moreover, Pathom Hongsuwan found that the reproduced tradition do not use the word “Bun” in the name of Lao-Isaan group’s tradition like Bun Khawji (Kgawhie festival) Bun Pha Vet, Bun Bangfai (Rocket festival), and Bun Khawphansa (The Buddhist Lent Day) because people do not think that the reproduced traditions have a direct relation with Buddhism, but rather a festival. As a result, people in the North Eastern region living near to the Mekong River normally use the word “tradition”, “Festival,” or “event” to call the reproduced tradition in which it is modernized and simplified the words so that the tradition is easier to understand. Pathom Hongsuwan also suggests that the words *event*, *tradition*, *festival* reflect capitalism and consumerism value in the society because the festival in many contexts refers to joyful, festive and spending whereas “Bun” is normally related to religious belief and the holiness of the spirits. In accordance with the naming tradition mentioned in Pathom Hongsuwan’s approach, the Surin provincial authority has changed the name of the practice to the *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition, and as a result removing the word “Bon or Bun,” which in Khmer refers to spirits and is related to sacredness and religious belief.

During the observation, the researcher found that the joyful events such as folk performance and local games, which have no relation to Buddhism were added to the tradition. Parades that represent a combination of entertainment and holiness were also added. The parades have components of the original ritual similar to the *Sandonta* parade, the *Jundonta* parade, and the making merit parade. As designated by the government, those parades will be festive and very well decorated with many ornaments such as symbols of fertility. Furthermore, the government will arrange to have 9 elephants with good build to join the parades in order to mark the event as a great tradition. Lastly, exhibitions were held in order to educate tourists and participants so that they can learn about the traditions and the historical background. All of the additions are designed to present the tradition as a magnificent event with a not so subtle focus on tourism in a consumerist and capitalist world. Nevertheless, the *Sandonta rite* and the *Buddhistic rites*, which are related to scared spirits, are still closely preserved as the originally practiced and kept scared as much as possible.

In conclusion, the organizers have transformed the original cultural capital to be a tourism selling point in order to fulfill the need of uniqueness and grandiose in the modern world. By removing the word “Bun” from the reproduced tradition indicates the elevation of the ritual from an ethnic group ritual to a provincial tradition. Suriya Samutthakhup et al. said,

“BUN” of the villagers has been upgraded from a rite in the village and local community to a festival or a tradition which is held by a state agency. This has shown the transformation of a sacred ritual in an ethnic group to a festival of joy and entertainment to serve the tourism policy of the government.

(Suriya Samutthakhup et al. cited in Pathom Hongsuwan, 2015: 277)

3.3 Activities and Pattern Dynamics

During the past 10 years, the *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition has been guided by two important people: Mr. Thongchai Mungjaroenphorn (Governor 2007 – 2011), and Mr. Kittiphat Rungthanakiat (Governor 2012 – present). In both periods, the main purpose of the tradition was the same, but during the past 5 years, cultural sightseeing has a role in this tradition, as was mentioned by the provincial governor of Surin and the head of public relations and tourism of the provincial authority, he said the *“Sandonta Ancestor Worship tradition does not only help reserve the local culture, but also promotes*

cultural tourism of Surin.” (Kittiphat Rungthanakiat, interview, 2 September 2015). Additionally, it also helps by unifying and harmonizing the locals who take part in such activities as well as creates an opportunity to favorably present Surin province to tourists.

The *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition is not held only to preserve the tradition but also to unify the diversity of ethnic groups and to be a cultural “sight” so activities in the tradition are designed to harmonize with the new purposes as follows:

3.3.1 The Chosen Essence of Bon Sandonta to be Reproduced in Order to Preserve the Original and Serve the Present Requirement

The *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition brought thought, belief, and activity practices of the *Bon Sandonta* to present in a much larger scale in order to serve the various audiences and as a response to the tourism scheme of the government. As a result, the organizers chose four of the most important ceremonies to be reproduced.

3.3.1.1 Jundonta Rite

The organizers still preserve the ceremony so that descendants can continue to express their gratitude toward the elderly. However, the ceremony was adjusted as follows:

The date and time of the ceremony was changed to be held before the Sandonta rite, because it is easier to schedule the ceremonies. Two additional changes include: 1) the recipients were modified to include the provincial governor and respectful seniors in Surin province, and 2) the ones who make offerings encompass all of the Surin province community.

The objects used for showing respect are similar to the original ceremony. Every agent and every community will prepare desserts, foods, and fruits for the elderly to get wishes from them. Those foods have to be neatly arranged in a tray, basket or other kind of container so that it is suitable for the recipient.

The ceremony procedures; when the procession reaches the monument to Phraya Surin Phakdi Si Narong Changwang (Chiang Pum) who was the founder of Surin province, community representatives will place worship offerings at a specific spot. After Surin provincial governor (or his representative) arrives, folk performance were performed to greet him, followed by the first part of the monk ceremony. For the opening ceremony, governor takes the place of a president in the ceremony while the mayor will give a speech about the purpose of the tradition then the governor and the seniors will receive worship offerings from community representatives.

3.3.1.2 Sandonta Rite

The organizers follow the schedule of the original ritual, but adjust the activity to match the new context where ancient Surin founders play a role as if they are the ancestors of the people of Surin.

(1) Variations from the original ritual are as follows:

The *Sandonta* rite is different from the original since the date of the original was on the 14th day of waning moon of the 10th lunar month, however it is still held during the 10th lunar month. The venue is at Phraya Surin Phakdi Si Narong Changwang Monument (Chiang Pum), which is viewed as the representation of the ancestors of the Surin people.

- Worship offerings

Food, drinks, clothes, ornaments, Baiben, Kanjerdonta and a boat model, which is used to carry food and send it back with the spirits are still preserved in the tradition. The worship objects in *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition are more in quantity, variety, and neat decoration than *Bon Sandonta*. As a result, they would be suitable for recipients' social status. From the researcher's observations, the worship objects are arranged very neatly and grandiosely, perhaps to attract tourist eyes.



Figure 3: Jundonta rite and Sandonta ancestor worship rite

- The Ceremony leader would announce the procedures and the reasons for the tradition.

During 2012 – 2016, the organizer invited Mr. Boonkong Nonthasorn, who is very knowledgeable about *Sandonta rite*, to be the leader of the ceremony. This leader of the ceremony needs to inform the audience about the procedure of the tradition since the number of participants is large, it is a big open space for the venue, and there is a time limit. With this clarification, everybody would be able to follow the appropriate procedures and there would be control over each activity to stay within the time limits.

- Adding inviting speech and asking the spirits for wishes speech in Thai. Changing inviting speech speaker

Surin governor is responsible for inviting the spirits and asking the spirits for wishes but he is not of local origin so the speech has been changed to Thai. This shows that the organizer is trying to preserve the original procedure since every Khmer community only allow the most senior one in the family to give that speech. Therefore, the governor whose status is equivalent to the most senior one is chosen to give the speech in *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition. The speech is as follows:

My name is Atthaporn Singhawichai, Surin governor and a representative of Surin descendants. I am bringing the offerings for Phraya Surin Phakdi Si Narong Changwang (Chiang Pum) who is the founder of Surin province. The offerings consist of clothes, ornaments, incense, foods, sweets, fruits, drinks and many more. These things are prepared for you in the Sandonta rite today. I beg you to protect Surin descendants and to wish us happiness, prosperity, harmony, unity, and a happy life ever after.

(The speech made in front of Phraya Surin Phakdi Si Narong Changwang on 10th Oct 2015 and 28 Sep 2016)

(2) Addition:

The organizers added some activities every year so that ancestor worship tradition has become more special. These activities are “Ram-Buangsuang-Sandonta”, local folk songs, speeches confessing

wrongdoing and worshipping ancestors of Surin, using “Kongmong” in the ceremony, and adding “Baisri” in the ceremony.

- Ram-Buangsuang-Sandonta (Worship by singing and dancing)

The organizers invited a local singer, Namphueng Muangsurin, to perform *Ram-Buangsuang-Sandonta* which is supposed to invite angels and spirits. This performance was added because *the ancestor worship tradition* is a provincial tradition where angels have to come to witness the event and protect the participants according to ancient belief. Based on an interview with a participant, he said that the ceremony that was added is acceptable since it does not ruin the original tradition, but even makes the tradition more scared. In agreement, an officer at the provincial authority who attended the festival in 2012 and 2014 said, “I love Namphueng’s beautiful and powerful voice when she sang during the ceremony and it made the ceremony more sacred” (Nutjarin Phimjan, interview, 19 September 2014).

- Folk songs and singing in the holy ceremony.

The organizers brought in a local Thai - Khmer orchestra to the festival, which is not only to present the identity of Surin folk performance folk performance, but also emphasizes the holiness of the ceremony by combining music and the beautiful voice of the local artist. This was mentioned by Kuy, a participant who understands both Lao and Khmer, he said, “*I’ve got goose bumps when I heard the music, the voice of Namphueng Muangsurin and the ceremony leader spoken in ancient Khmer language along with the performance and the smell of joss sticks. These intensify the sacredness of the ceremony*” (Natthaphat Boonmak, interview, 19 September 2014).

- Confessional speech (Speech apologizing to) and worshipping ancestors of Surin

In 2015 *Confessional speech and worshipping ancestors of Surin* was included by having Mrs. Namphueng Muangsurin read along with local music. This script stated the list of Surin ancestors ranging from the period when Khmer were in power until the Ratanakosin Era. This activity is similar to the original ritual in which a senior has to call out the name of the ancestors because they can remember the older generation names. It is believed that failing to call some of the ancestor names will result in bad luck and being in trouble since the omitted spirit will get angry and curse the descendants. As a consequence, a senior person has to invite them to receive the worship offerings and the descendants will live happily.

- “KHONGMONG” musical instrument in sacred ceremony

“KHONGMONG” (a special brass gong or ฆ้องโหม่ง) is a very essential musical instrument in “TUMMONG BAND” which is a local folk music band in Khmer ethnic group living in Surin province. “*Khongmong*” is usually used to play a prelude and considered as a unique identifier of the group. “*Khongmong*” is presented as a navigator that brings spirits who live very far away to the ceremony, as said by ritual leader who strikes “*Khongmong*” in the ceremony. “*Sound of “Khongmong” is very reverberant and loud and can be heard from where the ancestor spirits reside.*” (Boonkong Nonthasorn, interview, 22 September 2015). Furthermore, using this musical instrument in the ceremony is also considered as paying respect to the ancient spirits. Based on observation, it was hit 3 times; when ritual leader gave a speech inviting angels to witness and protect the ceremony. The second time, when the spirits were called to accept worship offerings. The third time when the monks dedicate merit to the spirits.

- Baisri (rice offering) in worship ingredients

In the original ritual, every family will prepare only “Khan 5” (5 personality groups or *ขัน 5*) of the worship ingredients to confess and invite the spirit but in the reproduced tradition, Baisri 5 steps (rice offering 5 steps or *บายศรี 5 ชั้น*) and Baisri 3 steps (rice offering 3 steps or *บายศรี 3 ชั้น*) are added. *The number of layers of Baisri indicates the use of it. Baisri 5 steps is for angels and high status spirits (i.e. ancient governor) and Baisri 3 steps is for general ancestors.* (Janpen Bamrung, interview, 9 March 2016). In 2016, Baisri was designed to have a shape similar to tiered 5 steps (*ฉัตร 5 ชั้น*). The designer said “*Tiered 5 steps indicates that Surin people respect, and are loyal to the ancient spirits and Surin province. Tiered 5 steps is a very detailed ornament which is rarely made or seen.*” (Sirithipong Champathong, interview, 28 September 2016) According to the interview, it is clear that the meaning of Baisri is not only related to the spirit invitation ceremony but the layers of Baisri also tell the status of recipient. In addition, Baisri is arranged in the ceremony to show the delicacy of the handicraft and also makes the tradition more special than the original *Sandongta* rite among ethnic Khmer. Moreover, it is also very beautiful and attractive for the tourists.

3.3.1.3 Buddhist Rite

Owing to the limit time, the organizers had to choose only the activities which owing to the limits of time, the organizers had to choose only the activities that everybody can participate in, such as praying for dedicating merit to the spirits, giving things to the monks, and receiving the precepts from the monks. *Kansong* usually takes 7 -14 days in the original ritual for offering breakfast to the monk and observing the religious precepts, but the organizers have reproduced those activities in the parade, for example a small group of people carrying “Pin-to” (Thai style food carrier). The wearing of the white costumes, “Pin-to,” and the offering are all symbols of making merit during *Kansong* period.

3.3.1.4 Jakanjerdonta Rite

Even though *Jakanjerdonta* rite is held in the afternoon, the organizers still preserve this ceremony since the ancient people use this ceremony to teach their descendants about giving and sharing to others apart from their ancestors. Besides the teaching, this activity brings joy to the participants too. From the researcher’s observation, the Surin people and participants were looking forward to this ceremony. A few adults carried baskets, trays, or other food containers filled with foods, desserts, and fruit and ran away in order to have other people chasing them and grab the foods. It seemed that the kids enjoyed this the most. In addition, people believe that eating food from the *Sandongta* rite is a way to earn merit and planting the seedlings brought from the festival brings you good luck.



Figure 4: Buddhist rite and Jakanjerdonta rite in the *Sandongta* ancestor worship tradition

Every activity in the *Bon Sandonta* is for teaching about the ancestors in order for the descendants to be a good Buddhist, not to forget the importance of the elderly, and most importantly, not to forget their ancestors. When the Surin provincial authority aimed to preserve this ancient tradition of the *Bon Sandonta* and present it as a provincial festival, it was necessary to choose the vital parts to form the *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition and some of the activities needed to be adjusted to match the modern world. As a consequence, *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition survives through the passage of time thanks to the drive of the Surin people.

3.3.2 The Selection of Cultural Capital to Present Province Identity as Cultural Sightseeing

Other than reserving the sacred tradition, the organizers also created the festival, which fosters unity and tourism by choosing 3 unique aspects of the province's cultural capital, as follows:

3.3.2.1 Parades Around Town

There were 4 separate parades, which are: 1) The folk songs parade that was led by a local artist named Namphueng Muangsurin in order to publicize and educate the participants about *Bon Sandonta*; 2) the parade that originates from the provincial authority of Surin; 3) the parade from the educational institution; and 4) the parade from the youth, communities, and villages in Surin province.

The government assigned each group, institute, and community to wear clothes made in Surin (Surin silk) and to arrange at least 2 sub parades featuring the *Jundonta parade* and the *Sandonta parade*, which can be decorated to show their identities. Competition, complete with judges and prizes ensure a high standard of presentation. As a result, every parade demonstrated their ethnic identities (Khmer, Kuy, and Lao) and the identity of Surin through clothes, ornaments, folk performances, local foods, and Thai-Khmer language. Moreover, having 9 good build elephants in front of the parade helped attract tourists and also mark this as a great festival.

3.3.2.2 Entertainment

During the first 5 year of this tradition (2007 – 2011), entertainment such as “Li-ke Khmer” (folk performance or ลิเกเขมร), “Jriang” (folk music or เจริญ), “Kantuem” (folk music and dance or กันตรึม), and “Nang-phak” (narrated movie or หนังพากย์) were included for Surin people to enjoy the tradition. However, during 2011 – 2016, local folk performances especially folk music and folk dance were included in every ceremony, for instance, in the holy ceremony, parades, folk performance competitions, and entertainment performance on stage.

From 2012 until 2016, the organizers held a parade competition to encourage each community to come up with creative ideas to present at the *Bon Sandonta* along with their ethnic identity and Surin identity, which were shown through the design of the parades. New entertaining activities such as gartering coconut in an old style, were added in some years. Thai boxing dance, Cambodian folk dance, and “*Kantrum teaching*” a type of folk music played by Khmer ethnic group, Thailand or (กิจกรรมสอนน้องรำกันตรึม) were added in some years to bring a joy to the participants and especially the tourists who enjoy watching and participating in such new experiences.



Figure 6: parade



Figure 7: Entertainment

3.3.2.3 Exhibition and local dessert cooking demonstration.

The exhibition was first arranged in 2009 exhibiting the history and importance of *Bon Sandonta*. It also explained the procedure of the ceremonies, the things used in the ceremony and the *Sandonta rite*. Furthermore, history, ingredients, and cooking instruction of desserts and local sticky rice desserts were also illustrated there along with the actual desserts so that the audience can see the real ones.

In 2014, the organizers changed the name of the exhibition to *Nithassakan mee chivit* (Lived exhibition) where dessert cooking demonstrations were added that allowed the participants to try cooking the desserts.

Desserts and local sticky rice desserts such as Ansom-saloeg-dong (sticky rice wrapped in coconut leaf or ข้าวต้มห่อด้วยใบมะพร้าว), *Nom-nial* (dessert cooked in a coconut shell or ขนมเนื้ช), *Nom-kantruam* (Thai-Khmer style donut or ขนมกันตรูม), and *Nom-kantangrang* (Thai-Khmer style waffle or ขนมกันดาราง) were chosen to be shown and demonstrated in the exhibition. The person responsible for preparing the desserts for the demonstration will also create examples of the desserts in small packages as souvenir for the participants, as well. For this reason, the exhibition is a playground for students, tourists and the ones who are interested in eating culture and foods used in the ceremony of Khmer ethnic group and to learn more about the local foods. Moreover, it is a great opportunity for the students in the area to develop themselves by welcoming the participants, helping the teachers sharing knowledge, and to demonstrate cooking local desserts.



Figure 8: exhibition and local dessert cooking demonstration.

These efforts have shown that the government is trying to preserve and carry on the ancient tradition by *transforming cultural capital to be creative assets* (Sukanya Sujachaya, 2012: 227) and add value to the tradition which eventually will become cultural sightseeing. The most important thing is that this tradition has brought people in the whole of Surin province to participate which creates a belief that the tradition belongs to every Surin person.

4. Conclusion

Cultures are produced, consumed, and reproduced by each society. *Reproducing the culture is a way to preserve the culture through the passage of time in which they have been chosen to be maintained through the tradition of selection by the people in the society.* (Kanjana Kaewthep, 2002: 214). Even though most people view traditional adjustment *is only to add value to the tradition, it also serves the mental need of the people and acts as a tool to show the dynamics of cultural adjustment to the community* (Pathom Hongsuwan, 2013: 213-214). Thus, the *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition is another example that reflects a positive drive brought about by the transformation of ethnic ritual to a reproduced tradition.

Due to the fact that the *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition developed from the root of the past to serve the needs of the modern world, the organizer tried to combine sacredness, knowledge, and entertainment into the tradition. There is a selection process in choosing only the key elements of the ancient rite to be reproduced and presented in a modern way. The perfection of worship offerings, sacred ceremonies, elaborate parades and joyfulness of the activities help intensify the meaning of; the history of ancient Surin governor, the importance of the tradition and its value to the Surin people. This value comes in two ways: firstly, it is a treasure to the hearts of the Surin people as they pay homage and receive support from all those who have preceded them, from the founding father to the present day. This gives them energy and hope for the future of their families. Secondly, economic value flows to Surin from this tradition through a synergistic revival of traditional food and handicraft production. The internal market is sufficient to sustain increasing value to the province, but tourism is also a growing industry and value from this activity will likely grow. Given this living dynamic, outside observers may one day remember the *Sandonta Ancestor Worship* tradition as an “identifying mark of Surin province” or even “the identity of Surin.”

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**Operational Process and New Expertise of a Payment for
Environmental Service Forest Restoration Project,
Mae Sa Watershed, Northern Thailand**

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Abstract

This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of market-based natural resource governance projects and their potential usefulness as a conservation tool to restore and conserve watershed forestlands in northern Thailand. The research studies the case of the AURA Payment for Ecosystem Services project (AURA PES), where a bottled mineral water company, Aura, has made payments to participants of Pong Khrai village for their efforts to reforest a plot of land upland from the source of their bottled water. This research identifies local environmentalities prior to the project and new expertise or understandings that result from the AURA PES project. The research finds that the motivations of the diverse actors involved vary greatly, from increasing carbon sequestration at the regional level of LEAF Thailand, which initiated the project, to enhanced reputation of corporate responsibility for the Aura Company, to perceptions of an improved water supply at the local village level. New expertise provided in forest restoration techniques and the participation of an already conservation oriented village proved to be essential for the outcome of the project. While the motivations for participation and expectations for outcomes are different for each of the actors, they align in such a way that the project has been successfully implemented and expanded.

Keywords: payment for environmental services, environmental expertise, forest management, forest restoration, NDEG York University, carbon sequestration, ecosystem services, payment for ecosystem services

Background

Individuals and governments alike are often faced with a conflict of interest in their aims to both conserve forestlands and also to utilize forest resources for income generation and development goals. As governmental agencies have layered their claims to knowledge and authority for forestlands management over local people's claims, dynamics between conservation and development have become more complex. As new understandings of environmental services provided by forestlands are increasingly being incorporated in new economic models, attempts are being made to tangibly link

monetary value to these services and to reward the people who restore and maintain them.

Thailand has shown interest in piloting new market-based natural resource governance schemes. In this regard, pilot projects have recently been introduced to assess their effectiveness at contributing to sustainable natural resource management goals through market-based partnerships. Examples in Thailand of market driven efforts include payment for environmental services (PES) projects, eco-certifications, and legality verification. The Thai public organization, Biodiversity-Based Economy Development Office (BEDO), Thailand Greenhouse Gas Emissions Organization (TGO) and a regional non-governmental organization, Lowering Emissions in Asia's Forests (LEAF), are three groups currently piloting market-based natural resource governance schemes in Thailand.

Lowering Emissions from Asia's Forests Thailand branch (LEAF Thailand) initiated and facilitated a pilot PES pilot project located in the Mae Sa watershed, approximately 30 km northwest of Chiang Mai city in Chiang Mai Province, northern Thailand. Aura Mineral Water Company (Aura), which has its water source located in the Mae Sa watershed, and participants from Pong Khrai village, also in the Mae Sa watershed, agreed to a PES partnership in which Aura made seven payments over a two-year period for efforts to reforest a 10 rai (1.6 hectare) plot of land (Wongsa, 2015). This agreement, called AURA PES, aimed to link economic value to the water related services provided by the watershed forestlands upland of the bottled mineral water source, and offered payment to Pong Khrai village participants for enhancing and conserving those environmental services.

The author was connected with LEAF Thailand through their counterpart in the Thai government, the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP), in April 2015, a few months prior to the kick-off of the two-year AURA PES pilot project in June of 2015. At that time, LEAF Thailand was in the process of selecting and preparing a planting site, and organizing trainings on reforestation techniques, budgeting and planning for Pong Khrai participants. LEAF Thailand facilitated the formation of an AURA PES committee to oversee the project and to settle any disputes. While LEAF Thailand's role in the AURA PES project ended in December of 2015, this research continued to follow the AURA PES project for the entirety of its two-year implementation phase which ended in June 2017.

Why is it that new forms of market-based natural resource governance are emerging? In the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) it states that "between 1960 and 2000, the demand for ecosystem services grew significantly as world population doubled and the global economy increased more than six-fold" (MA, 2005 cited in Engel et al, 2008). "At the same time, the assessment revealed that nearly two thirds of global ecosystems services are in decline" (Engel et al 2008). In one lifetime, we are witnessing a visible, measurable shift in global biological systems and growing concern about the impacts of climate change and the overall ecological health of the planet.

In order "to save the planet, it becomes necessary to environmentalize it, enveloping its system of systems in new disciplinary discourses to regulate population growth, economic development, and resource exploitation on a global scale with continual managerial intervention" (Luke 1995, p.77). This narrative was evident during the 2015 Climate Change Talks where delegates tried to negotiate the balance between national development goals and goals for global environmental management. In addition to highlighting the need to transform the world's energy systems, delegates gave attention to the world's forests because forestlands are seen both as a cause and as a solution to climate change (Gills, 2015). While healthy forestlands remove carbon from the atmosphere, deforestation adds carbon

back into the atmosphere, making climate challenges worse.

In the Asia-Pacific region “forests are, however, disappearing rapidly due to agricultural expansion, unsustainable logging, urbanization and other pressures. Deforestation and forest degradation have been identified as major sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Southeast Asia, and are significant contributors to global climate change” (Winrock, n.d.). How Thailand manages its natural resources has gained the attention of the international community because Thailand is a geographic zone with huge potential for both future ecological depletion and increased individual consumption.

“Thailand has lost more than half of its forests within the lifetime of one generation. An estimated 70 percent of the country was covered by forests in 1936. By 1952 the proportion had dropped to 58 percent and it declined further to 55 and 38 percent respectively in 1961 and 1973. ...The Royal Forestry Department has claimed that the forest cover has stabilized at 25 percent. Other sources, however, maintain that in reality only about 15 percent of the country is forested. ...more than half of the forested areas situated in northern Thailand.” (Isager and Ivarsson, 2002, p. 398)

Historically, when local ecosystems were no longer able to sustain human life, either as a result of human destruction or natural environmental variations, populations were more capable of moving to a new location. As the human population has grown this option has become less and less available. This had sparked interest by new actors looking for solutions to environmental degradation and new ways of valuing environmental stewardship.

Statement of the Research Problem and Justification

Market-based natural resource management projects initiated by non-state actors are being piloted in Thailand with the hope of restoring and conserving natural resources, including watershed forestlands. The Thai Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP) has shown an interest in small-scale programs with hopes of replicating successful results on a larger scale. As a relatively new policy tool in Thailand, little research has been done yet on the mechanisms and actors involved in these pilot projects. The aim of this research is to examine, analyze and understand the operational process of a small-scale payment for environmental service project initiated by a non-state actor in northern Thailand. Insight was gained into how the project was developed and functioned by interviewing the actors that are involved and the written information that was produced. Knowledge was generated on the role of each of the stakeholders, including how they were engaged, how they reacted and their individual motivations for working together. Additionally, this paper will explore what new environmental expertise resulted from the project and how were they promoted.

Introduction to the Concepts of Payment for Environmental Services (PES) and Environmentality

Payment for Environmental Services (PES) is a relatively new environmental economics policy intervention aimed at balancing development goals with natural resource management goals, by recognizing the value of the services that biological systems provide, and enlisting either state or private


fundes to compensate the people who protect and maintain these services. By definition PES programs must have a buyer, a seller and involve a specific service provided (Neef and Thomas, 2009). It is important that a clearly definable and measurable service is identified and the amount of payment and the conditions necessary for payment must be agreed upon. In the case of AURA PES in the Mae Sa watershed, Aura values the quality of the watershed forestlands around the source of its water for the water related environmental service they provide and it is willing to pay local residents for forest restoration services believed to contribute to the quality of the water that they sell. Instead of punishing practices deemed destructive, land users such as the residents of Pong Khrai are presented with new avenues of funding, and in this case, new expertise, that allow them to be successful in efforts that had previously been unsuccessful.

Agrawal (2005) built on Foucault's *governmentality*, when he coined the term *environmentality* to look at the processes and practices through which people come to adopt a certain awareness or ethic towards the environment. The introduction of new language and new ways of thinking about the potential uses of the environmental can result in new ways to imagine environmental governance, or more specifically forest governance (Agrawal, 2005). Market-oriented conservation technologies encourage environmental ethics or 'environmentality' by promoting an understanding of conservation ethics that in time convinces people that acting in a particular way is for their own good (Agrawal 2005). Local, national and global actors all have their own view and understandings of what the optimal state of the environment is, and what policies and behaviors should be practiced to reach their goals. In the case of AURA PES, LEAF Thailand spent many months researching local understandings and promoting their own brand of environmental awareness in the Mae Sa watershed, motivated by belief in the predictions of global climate change, and the importance of forestlands as a buffer to slow this process. Aura and Pong Khrai village both already had a history of planting trees. This made the project easier to start and more likely to be successful, because there was already a like-minded understanding of the value of forestland to build on, even though this understanding had little in common with the understandings of global climate change that originally catalyzed the process.

Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology

The conceptual framework for this research uses interview data from the field and produced reports to analyze the operational process of a PES project initiated by non-state actor (LEAF Thailand). In the international goal to reduce carbon emissions thorough innovative watershed forestland management, diverse actors were brought together to collaborate on the forest restoration of a designated area of land. The concept of environmentality, specifically in regards to forestlands and environmental services, is used to explore the motivations of the stakeholders involved and the expertise they gained as a result of participating in the AURA PES project.

In a multiyear pilot project, LEAF Thailand worked in collaboration with the Thai Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plants Conservation (DNP) to create a PES project between Aura and participating residents of the Pong Khrai village. A PES agreement was successfully negotiated and then implemented from June of 2015 to June of 2017. Thus, the Mae Sa watershed, where AURA PES was implemented, was an ideal site for investigating the mechanisms of an active PES pilot project. The following Google map highlights the AURA PES project location in relation Chiang Mai city.



Approximately one-third of the total land area in the Mae Sa watershed is used for intensive agricultural activities (Wongsa, 2015). The remain two-thirds of the land area is designated as a forest zone (57.8% conservation forest and 4.0% economic forest) (Wongsa, 2015). The forest land is mainly evergreen and tropical rain forests (Wongsa, 2015).

Pong Khrai village and is considered a village unit administratively and is located in the Pong Yang sub district of Mae Rim district of Chiang Mai province in northern Thailand (Wongsa, 2015). In 2006, the population of Pong Khrai village was estimated at 256 people, mainly of northern Thai ethnicity (Wongsa, 2015). Women represent 45% of the population and 18% are under the age of 16 (Wongsa, 2015). “Every household is in possession of a motorcycle, a television set, a satellite dish, and a refrigerator. Eighty-six percent of the households own pick-up trucks; 79% own washing machines; 71% own mobile phones” (Wongsa 2015, p.20).

The author conducted field research over a two-year period, starting several months before the implementation of AURA PES, and ending as it was being completed. Research included interviews with participants and non-participants in the Mae Sa watershed and participating organizations and governmental agencies in the Chiang Mai region, document collection and participation in LEAF facilitated training activities. Data was collected through interviews, participant observation and the review and analysis of project reports and documentation.

Summary of AURA PES Agreement and Payment Mechanism

Table 1 outlines in detail the schedule for the activities and reporting associated with the AURA PES project starting with May 2015 as month 1. Fourteen distinct activities were required of the Pong Khrai participants, as the seller, in order to receive a total of seven payments totaling the 200,000 THB (approximately \$6,000 USD), budgeted by Aura, as the buyer (Wongsa, 2015). Almost half of the total

was earned in the first two months. An AURA PES committee was formed and approved this action plan. They worked with the participants of Pong Khrai village and Aura to draft the management plan that included the system of payment and the indicators that would justify payment. Figure 1 outlines the mechanism for payment. In order to receive payment for environmental services rendered the Pong Khrai participants provided the AURA PES committee with a self-report outlining activities it had completed with corresponding date and budget. After each activity in the plan was completed, the AURA PES committee met to verify that the target activities had been completed to reference standards, and if so they signed and submitted the documentation to Aura. Aura had 30 days to make payment and provide proof of payment to the AURA PES committee. The Pong Khrai participants were then responsible for providing proof of receipt to both Aura and the AURA PES committee to verify that the payment was made. If at any point an activity was not completed or payment was not made, it was the responsibility of the AURA PES committee to resolve the issue by extending the timeframes or negotiating partial payment. If a payment was not made within 90 days of request the project would be considered cancelled.

LEAF Thailand considers the AURA PES mechanism to be a very clear and easy to follow agreement. All environmental service restoration activities were successfully completed and all payments were successfully transferred from Aura to Pong Khrai participants. LEAF Thailand met their goal to successfully foster a small-scale pilot PES project in the Mae Sa watershed.

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15-18 JULY 2017, CHIANG MAI, THAILAND

Table 1: Schedule of Activities, Reporting and Payments (Source: Wongsu, 2015, p.35)

	1 st Month = May 2015																							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Activities	Rapid site survey & planting planning, 9-10 May 2015	I																						
	Weeding, 13 May 2015	I																						
	Spraying, 27 May 2015	I																						
	Training on planting technique, 17-18 June 2015		I																					
	Site preparation for kick-off and planting days, 19-20 June 2015		I																					
	AURA-PES Kick-off day, 19 June 2015		I																					
	Planting day, 21 June 2015			I																				
	Weeding & fertilizing, August 2015				I																			
	Weeding & fertilizing, Sept 2015					I																		
	Weeding & fertilizing, Nov 2015						I																	
Report	Forest fire monitoring and prevention, Jan - April 2016																							
	Weeding & fertilizing, August 2016															I								
	Weeding & fertilizing, Sept 2016																I							
	Weeding & fertilizing, Nov 2016																	I						
	1 st Self-reporting, 3 July 2015		X																					
	2 nd Self-reporting, December 2015							X																
	3 rd Self-reporting, December 2016																			X				
Payment	1 st Payment: THB 12,000	0																						
	2 nd Payment: THB 7,190	0																						
	3 rd Payment: THB 76,940		0																					
	4 th Payment: THB 34,800			0																				
	5 th Payment: THB 20,000							0																
	6 th Payment: THB 36,192															0								
	7 th Payment: THB 12,878																				0			




Figure 1: AURA PES Payment Mechanism
 (Source: Wongsu, 2015, p. 30)

Pre-existing Environmentalities in the Mae Sa Watershed

Pong Khrai informants consistently cited water quantity and quality as the main environmental service that watershed forests provide, along with cooler temperatures. The village headman remembers one year when he was child that there was a particularly large about of clearing and burning of forestland. The following rainy season he said there was not enough water. One elder felt that the recent drought in the Chiang Mai Province was the result of forestland being removed. Another resident of Pong Khrai, and member of the AURA PES committee, commented that when lots of trees are cut or burned that the weather becomes dry and hot. Within the environmentality of this area, and indeed in Thailand in

general, watershed forests are considered the source of the quantity and quality of the water supply. In fact, Pong Khrai residents had attempted several tree planting activities in the past with limited success. Aura has a history of corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects including building check dams and fire breaks, donating bottled water for events and an annual tree planting. The Aura Factory Manager, Mr. Attapon, believed many of the areas upstream from their factory were environmentally degraded but expressed that their past CSR projects often felt like a one-way dialogue that was not sustainable. Unfortunately, tree plantings were often done with only one species and then forgotten after a photograph was taken.

Aura representatives were invited to many of the PES meetings, as well as to workshops in Lam Dong, Vietnam, so that they could compare CSR and PES projects and see if PES was a good fit for them. It was Aura that originally identified water related environmental services associated with forest restoration as an activity they would like to support. Mr. Attapon stated that Aura want a healthy ecosystem around their water source and wanted to be a part of the success of this restoration process. The head of CSR at Aura believes that water comes from a good forest so AURA PES is in Aura's own interest. Representatives at Aura felt that Aura's contribution to AURA PES was a sustainable way to accomplish their goal of forest restoration around their water source.

Aura was partially motivated by the positive reputation that was associate with participating. One piece of evidence for this is that they were originally interested in forest restoration for an area of 20 rai, twice as large as the 10 rai agree to for the project. However, Aura and members of Pong Khrai decided that it was too ambitious and required too much work to be successful. They were concerned that if the project was not successful it would hurt the reputation of both Aura as well as Pong Khrai village. With their reputation in mind, they decided instead on a 10 rai planting site.

Aura also takes pride in being a leader in these kinds of projects in the region. They believe the success of this project will encourage the other private businesses in the area to be interested in joining PES projects. Finally, through their participation Aura received a lot of free positive marketing in the form of media reports, awards and even education boards describing their successful partnership in the nearby National Parks.

Promotion of New Expertise

Both Aura and Pong Khrai residents had attempted forest restoration activities multiple times in the past. Both actors reported they had very limited success in terms of tree survival rates. Approximately 20 years ago the residents of Pong Khrai decided to let the land at the planting site rehabilitate itself, but in reality, it did not regrow over time. They then began a process of trial and error to see if they could assist in the process of restoration. Pong Khrai residents have planted many trees on numerous occasions corresponding with events like the King's birthday, however, none of their methods have been effective. What new expertise were introduced during the AURA PES project that changed the outcomes and resulted in a higher tree survival rate?

LEAF Thailand asked Forest Research Restoration Unit (FORRU) to join the project as a local forest restoration expert. FORRU, established in 1994, is a research unit of the Faculty of Science at Chiang Mai University and is based in the Faculty's Biology Department. FORRU's mission is "to carry out research to develop efficient methods to restore tropical forest ecosystems for biodiversity conservation,

environmental protection and carbon sequestration” ([www. forru.org](http://www.forru.org)). FORRU had previous experience in the Mae Sa watershed and had been involved with forest restoration in the area for more than 20 years. Since 1997 the unit had been adapting the framework species method of forest restoration to local conditions. The technique involves choosing tree species from amongst the local forest tree flora that survive well and grow fast in degraded sites, shade out weeds and attract seed-dispersing animals (Elliott et al 2013). When planted well, and looked after for the first two rainy seasons, the planted trees close canopy rapidly and foster rapid biodiversity recovery.

The framework species method originated in Australia. Its differs from other local forest restoration methods which plant trees well, but then do not follow up with care, and therefore the survival rate is often low. Local methods also generally plant only one species in rows instead of multiple species which can regenerate habitat. FORRU advocates for the planting of 20-30 different native species to kick start recovery of a more natural looking forest habitat instead of economic tree plantations. Fast and wide-growing ‘pioneer’ trees are chosen to block out weeds. In four or five years, these species produce fruits or flowers that attract birds and other animals, which in turn bring in seeds from nearby remnant forest and deposit them at the site. FORRU research has shown that a site, originally planted with 29 tree species, may accumulate more than 70 incoming, recruit, tree seedling species in 8-9 years. A thick forest can be witnessed at about nine years.

The FORRU method is considered intensive for the first two years, but after that the trees are self-sustaining. FORRU has conducted extensive research on the methods optimal for success. They found that in the past, people planted too few trees, too far apart, so that the tree crowns would take many years to coalesce into a forest canopy necessitating prolonged (and expensive) weeding over many years. It is important to select the right type of trees and they must be weeded and have fertilizer applied three times in the first year and three times in the second rainy seasons after planting. In field trials, FORRU found that weeding twice per rainy season was not enough to prevent the weeds reclaiming the site, and weeding four times was a waste of money. The optimum size of tree seedlings is 30 to 50 centimeters tall. If they are smaller, weeds can overtake them, and if they are larger, they may suffer from root shock when transplanted.

Given the history of poor tree survival rates by Pong Khrai, LEAF Thailand facilitated and funded three FORRU trainings aimed to assist with site surveys, site preparation, planting, species selection, planting planning, financial planning, monitoring, and maintenance. The plan was for FORRU to help for the first two years. After making sure the participants knew how to prepare, plant and monitor the trees it was expected that the participants would be able to continue without FORRU assistance and repeat the process by themselves.

The first training focused on rapid site survey techniques, site preparation and planting techniques. Between 20 and 25 people attended this first training including LEAF Thailand staff, Aura Company representatives, the Pong Khrai village headman, his assistant, and members of the village committee who volunteered to attend. The AURA PES forest restoration site near Pong Khrai village was used as a demonstration site for the first training. During the site survey, it was estimated that 1,660 native trees already existed at the planting site (Wongsa 2015). With a goal of attaining a tree density of 500 trees per rai, it was determined that 3,340 additional trees would need to be planted (ibid). At this first training, FORRU helped the participants develop a detailed project budget and the planting plan, which

included weeding, fertilizing and fire prevention. The training participants also weeded at the site to start the preparations for the planting day.

The second training focused on post-planting treatments such as techniques for monitoring survival and growth rates of the trees in order to identify any potential problems, and to evaluate their level of success for self-reports in agreement with the project plan. FORRU reference standards were introduced as a means of self-evaluation and to be able to quantify that completed activities met some standard. These monitoring techniques were essential to the AURA PES agreement as they allowed for the formal evaluation and reporting of progress in terms of tree growth and survival rates. Other indicators such as the number of trees planted or number of hours worked would not have been accurate indicators of the level of progress towards reaching the agreement goals of successful forest restoration.

The third training focused on nursery techniques including seed collection, treatment and propagation. This training was the result of Pong Khrai participants expressing interest in producing the tree seedlings by themselves in order to expand the site in the future. Pong Khrai participants contributed their knowledge of what trees were useful for them and at the same time trees were consciously chosen that did not have timber value. Together, they identify suitable species for the area, including the altitude, and the number of each kind of seedling that would be needed. Additionally, FORRU and Pong Khrai residents experimented with different methods of weed control, including a test plot where cardboard was placed on-the-ground to deter weed growth. Ultimately, it was decided to include herbicide in the budget to control reoccurring weeds instead, because it was significantly less labor intensive, and also limited the amount of erosion caused by weed root removal.

The Pong Khrai village headman described that residents already knew how to plant trees but they worked side by side with FORRU staff to learn more about the correct time of year to plant. FORRU recommended that they clear the land of weeds before planting which they had not done in the past and FORRU encouraged them to use fertilizer. Previously they had let the seedlings grow naturally because they did not have a budget for fertilizer and the area of planting was too large to be supported by homemade fertilizers.

FORRU representatives reported that generally tree survival rates can be expected to be between 70-75%. They had never previously seen the high tree survival rates produced at the AURA PES site, which were maintained above 80% over two years. This high success rate can be attributed to the new expertise gained by stakeholders from FORRU's long experience of scientifically testing restoration techniques, in addition to the diligent hard work of the Pong Khrai participants.

The collaboration with FORRU and participants in Pong Khrai, (organized and funded by LEAF Thailand), also provided many new expertise, in addition to on-the-ground forest restoration techniques. These trainings also allowed stakeholders to gain new expertise in the technologies of forest restoration (site surveys, site preparation, planting, species selection, planting planning, financial planning monitoring, and maintenance). These new technologies were essential to the success of the project. They could be applied to other projects in the future without further assistance.

How LEAF Thailand Built Awareness About Payment for Environmental Service Concepts

LEAF was formed in 2011 as a five-year initiative with the primary goal of strengthening the capacity of participants in six countries (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea) to achieve and sustain reductions in greenhouse gases through forestland management. Their main office was located in Bangkok, Thailand. Small offices were opened in all six participating countries. In northern Thailand four full-time staff operated out of the office located in Chiang Mai city that initiated the AURA PES project.

LEAF Thailand was assigned to the Thai Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP) as its counterpart within the Thai government. LEAF Thailand and the DNP had common aims to balance ecological and economic factors in hopes of encouraging sustainable forest management as well as enhancing local livelihoods (Winrock International, 2016). Without this partnership, the AURA PES project would not have been possible. It was the local Thai government officials that chose to pursue PES projects.

At the time that LEAF Thailand was trying to develop a PES project there were not yet any good case studies to learn from within Thailand, therefore they adapted ideas from other countries. In February 2012, LEAF Thailand facilitated a PES study tour for a technical working group from the DNP in Bangkok, representatives from the Protected Area Regional Office 16, and local authorities and leaders to visit to a working PES project in Lam Dong, Vietnam (Winrock International, 2016) to learn first-hand the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in a PES scheme located there (Wongsa, 2015). The intention of the study tour was to expose stakeholders to a working PES project so that they could start to form ideas of how this type of scheme could be implemented in their area.

LEAF Thailand Project Manager, Mr. Somsak stated that, “the concept of payment for environmental services is very new in Thailand and so there is a tremendous amount of work necessary to make governmental official, the private sector and local people aware of the concept and interested in participating.” Most challenging was working with the private sector. With only two staff at LEAF Thailand approaching the many potential private sector actors in the watershed, the task was enormous. They often felt like they were trying to ‘sell’ the concept to them and this was rarely successful. LEAF Thailand PES Project Officer Mr. Chawapich stated, “It is about a general understanding and actually I think it is about the benefit that they will get by being involved with this, so we have to calculate it for them,” Some private sector actors also felt like they were being singled out to buy environmental services when they knew that many other actors were also using these same services.

“Always they say no! Some say wait and see. Some, say, ‘I discuss with my boss’. Some ask, ‘Do you have information?’. Some propose that we can draft a document for them first.” (Mr. Somsak, personal communication, May 20, 2015)

In this regard, Aura was a leader that catalyzed interest into commitment and fast action. Their financial process usually requires two to three years of advance planning for new budget allocations. In order to overcome this time constraint, they decided to use an ‘emergency budget’ to fund the project. This decision was crucial to the momentum and ultimate success of the project.

Staff at LEAF Thailand were aware of the criticism that many projects that were called PES projects were

not related to any environmental service in reality. They were intent on trying to maintain this connection to an actual environmental service throughout the process. However, environmental services are regarded differently depending on the level of the stakeholder and their corresponding relationship to forestland.

The environmental service ultimately agreed to by the stakeholders participating in AURA PES are described in LEAF reports generally as “maintaining and enhancing the quality and quantity of ecosystem services provided by the watershed” (Wongsa, 2015, p. 18). In an interview in May of 2015, LEAF staff Mr. Chawapich elaborated, “Although the source of [Aura’s] resource comes from the water in the ground, we tried to link the environmental service use with the watershed forests in the region. We know somehow that the forest has to connect with the water, above or below ground, or both of them.”

Role of LEAF Thailand in the Operational Process of the AURA PES Project

LEAF Thailand published case studies on land tenure and related policies, and provided support for stakeholders from the Mae Sa watershed to participate in training programs. They surveyed local communities and the private business sector about engagement in PES projects, and successfully engaged buyers and sellers to participate in the pilot program (Chawapich and Somsak, 2014). They also gathered and analyzed data from both buyers and sellers in order to identify potential types of environmental service activities, establish funding mechanisms, and create a public awareness campaign (Chawapich and Somsak, 2014).

From January 2015 until June 2015, LEAF Thailand focused the majority of its efforts on operationalizing AURA PES. Once a buyer had agreed to provide funds for a PES project, LEAF Thailand staff looked for communities within the same watershed as the buyer that would be willing to participate by allowing land to be designated for forest restoration. The funds provided by Aura did not cover the cost of most of the labor required at the planting site but Pong Khrai village chose to participate anyway, due mostly to their belief that forest restoration was in their own best interest for the positive effect it would have on their own water supply and the cool breeze they associate with forestlands.

Once Aura and the residence of Pong Khrai village were linked for the project, many meetings were held between Aura and Pong Khrai representatives. They continued to build awareness about the PES concept and to discuss possible implementation methods for the project. LEAF Thailand staff also made efforts to create a working group to oversee the development of the PES project and finalize the pilot site selection process.

LEAF Thailand worked to involve all of the stakeholders including the Royal Forest Department, DNP, the head of the sub-district office, the mayor, other local authorities, representatives from Aura as the buyer, and the participants from Pong Khrai as the seller (Wongsa, 2015). The involvement, understanding, and commitment of all the stakeholders was important to LEAF Thailand staff because they were aware that they would finish their participation in the AURA PES project at the end of 2015. They wanted to ensure that good communication and rapport was solidly established between the various stakeholders so that the project would continue smoothly and be successful in their absence.

The relationship of the diverse stakeholders became more formalized on May 19th, 2015 when an AURA PES Committee was formed to oversee the AURA PES project. This committee allowed village representatives, a private business, administrative and environmental governmental officials, and local

forest scholars to discuss and negotiate environmental service exchanges with the benefit of LEAF Thailand as a third-party facilitator. The AURA PES committee was tasked with resolving any conflicts or difficulties that might arise during the agreement (Wongsa, 2015).

“The AURA PES Committee is comprised of nine members:

- 1) Chief Executive of Pongyang Subdistrict Administrative Organization, Pongyang Subdistrict, District of Mae Rim, Province of Chiang Mai;
 - 2) Headman of Pongyang Subdistrict, District of Mae Rim, Province of Chiang Mai;
 - 3) Head of Mae Sa Watershed Management Unit, Protected Area Regional Office 16 Chiang Mai, Department of National Parks, Wildlife, and Plant Conservation, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment;
 - 4) a Representative from Forest Resource Management Office 1 Chiang Mai, Royal Forest Department, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment;
 - 5) a Representative from The Forest Restoration Research Unit (FORRU), Faculty of Science, Chiang Mai University;
 - 6) a Representative from Nong Hoi Royal Project of the Royal Project Foundation, Mae Ram Subdistrict, District of Mae Rim, Province of Chiang Mai;
 - 7) the General Manager, Aura bottled mineral water plant, Tipco Foods PCL;
 - 8) the Headman of Pong Khrai community, Pongyang Subdistrict, Mae Rim, Chiang Mai; and
 - 9) Representative from Pong Khrai community, Pongyang Subdistrict, Mae Rim, Chiang Mai”
- (Wongsa, 2015).

LEAF Thailand reported that perceptions of social status and lack of negotiating experience were also challenges in the negotiating process. LEAF Thailand played a pivotal role as a third-party facilitator that helped the stakeholders negotiate the agreement. This experience gave both stakeholders new negotiating expertise that would allow them to negotiate new agreements in the future or assist new stakeholder in doing so.

In summary, LEAF Thailand played a pivotal role as a third-party facilitator in the AURA PES negotiation process, developing the site step-by-step from concept all the way through to the actual planting of tree seedlings. After identifying Aura as the buyer, they searched for a seller, and were able to gain the commitment of participants in Pong Khrai. They then held numerous meetings to strengthen the relationship between these two key stakeholders and clarify the roles and responsibilities of each actor. LEAF Thailand contacted and paid FORRU, from the nearby Chiang Mai University, to offer their expertise in the budgeting and planning process, and to train Pong Khrai participants in forest restoration techniques.

LEAF Thailand was also responsible for engaging other important stakeholders in the process including local administrative and environmental governmental officials. They facilitated the process by which permission was given to use land for the project. They also facilitated the formation of an AURA PES Committee to oversee the implementation of the project and resolve any potential conflicts. Finally, LEAF Thailand organized and partially funded a large Kick Off Event including the public signing of the AURA PES agreement, and tree planting day to plant over 3,300 tree seedlings. LEAF Thailand staff saw themselves as mediators that brought together important stakeholders and made things happen.

Conclusions

As of May 2017, all of the provisions of the AURA PES agreement have been fulfilled and all payments were made in full. By collaborating in this new form of environmental governance the AURA PES project stakeholders finally realized the goal of successfully keeping trees seedlings alive in order to restore forestland. This would not have been possible without the funds provided by Aura, the new expertise provided by FORRU, and the self-motivation of Pong Khrai residents that mobilized the large amount of volunteer labor. Additionally, LEAF Thailand played a pivotal role in facilitating the negotiation of the agreement and establishing a committee that could oversee the project.

In early 2017, the various stakeholders were able to negotiate the replication of the AURA PES agreement for a second iteration through the AURA PES committee. This was accomplished without the assistance of LEAF Thailand. After the second project the Pong Khrai village headman said that they plan to take a break due to the very intensive labor needs that are required to fulfill their part of the agreement.

It may have been helpful that Pong Khrai village participant and the Aura Company were both, in their own ways, previously primed for this sort of arrangement. Resident families in Pong Khrai village had previously received a small amount of money, in the form of annual rent payments, from a zip-line company that rents forested land from the village for its tourist attraction. This money is meant to encourage them not to disturb the forestlands where the zip-line company operates. Therefore, the possibility that intact forestland could be a source to generate income was not completely new to Pong Khrai residents. They were in some way predisposed to being able to conceptualize receiving monetary payment in relation to forestlands.

AURA Company was unaware of the concept of PES before it was introduced by LEAF Thailand staff. However, Aura Company had previously used corporate social responsibility funds to plant trees. Though these previous projects were not considered successful, it did give them some previous experience in funding forest restoration activities to build on. The AURA PES project could be seen as an expansion of these previous projects. LEAF Thailand may have been able to capitalize on these previous experiences in their efforts to build new ways of thinking about economic exchanges in the realm of environmental services.

The DNP must have had previously awareness of the concept of PES. In fact, they were the actor that directed LEAF Thailand to develop a PES project. However, there were no functioning PES projects in the region prior to AURA PES. Members of the DNP who either participated in AURA PES Committee meetings, attended events or read the various reports and media coverage about the project, would also have expanded their understanding of how the mechanism could work and the reality of a tangible experience in the field. The overwhelming feedback at lessons-learned sessions showed that DNP representatives thought the AURA PES project was a success, and that they hoped that it could be replicated throughout the Mae Sa watershed on a larger scale.

Stakeholders at different levels may not always share the same relationship to forestlands or the same beliefs about the environmental services they provide. In this case, at the local level participants are focused on the quality and quantity of water, hopes of cooler temperatures and corporate reputations of social responsibility. At the regional level, goals for fostering forest stewardship focus more on the hope of increasing carbon sequestration. Even though their goals for restoring forestlands may have differed,

it was the common belief that forestlands are indeed valuable, and the introduction of new expertise, that allowed the AURA PES agreement to be developed and ultimately succeed in accomplishing its goal to foster forest restoration.

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Identity Transition: An Overview on Tai Khampti Tribe in Arunachal Pradesh, India

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Abstract

The emphasis for societies to understand their own identity by looking or searching for their origin has become a source of concern. Though some have clear written records or oral sources, others are unsure and unclear about their origins. However, due to the impact of globalization, it has become difficult to hold onto their identities and keep them intact. Further, it also forces them to adopt new practices that become a part of their identity and compel them to drift away from the actual practices of their forefathers. The Tai Khampti tribe, considered descendants of the Tais, are also in transition. They have a set of unique traditional practices in social, economic, political and cultural aspects. The Tai Khampti tribe arrived late compared to other tribes of the state. The tribe is considered well organized, systematic and advanced in their education system. Thus, Khamptis as a tribe are ahead of other tribes in many fields though they have a smaller population. Over time, the Tai Khampti tribe have faced the issue of identity and other social barriers to maintain and promote such as their own script and Customary laws. Further, the social and economic problems left them no choice but to accept changes to survive. Problems faced by their youth have so much impact on the Tai Khampti society. The government of India effort 'Act East Policy' could bring the Tai Khamptis closer to the people of Tai descent in Thailand and Myanmar for better understanding and cooperation with improved communication.

Keywords: Identity, Globalization, Survival, Tai Khampti, Cooperationfp83

Introduction

Every society follows a certain set of practices which has being part of their way of life and that has been pass down from generation to generation. Such practices usually become an established set of culture which is the identity of the particular society or tribe. It was further recognized, distinguished and accepted by people themselves as well as by the others. However, identity is a dynamic concept as it keeps on changing time after time. Practices, customs and norms are integral parts of the tribal culture. The identity of any traditional tribal society emphasis and rely on morality, simplicity and value. Eventually, it changes according to their needs with the changing times either by voluntarily or by force

or by nature. The society needs to adjust and adapt to the needs of the situation prevailing in the society.

Although people are of different interest but the customs and culture bind them as the same unit. It is believe that preservation of tribal culture despite being a much love tool in the hands of a section of a tribal society is not likely to serve their purpose for a very long period of time. Traditional culture is for masses and appropriation of fruits of development for the few will not escape the notice of the former for long (Biswas, 2002). Identity is in transition due to interaction and assimilation with others culture and also due to advance technology and impact of globalization. Protection and preservation of the traditional way of life and culture or such identity is at stake due to prospects and craze for development. Similarly like any tribal society, the Tai Khampti tribe of Arunachal Pradesh are of no exception.

Arunachal Pradesh, India

Arunachal Pradesh, the land of immaculate natural beauty known from the ancient days of the Vedas, the Puran, the Ramayan and the Mahabharat. The state is mostly inhabited by the Tibeto-Burman family, mainly classified on the basis of language. The only roadways lead to Arunachal Pradesh is through Assam (Chutia, 2001). Arunachal Pradesh is, by and large, a mountainous province of the North-Eastern slopes of the Eastern Himalayan and North-Western slopes of the Patkai range. The capital was at Shillong, the then capital of Assam till 1972 but it transferred to Itanagar, in April 1974. Till 1971 the province was known as North East Frontier Agency or NEFA and was constitutionally part of the province of Assam (Bose, 1977). Arunachal Pradesh was constituted and attained statehood on 20th February, 1987. Geographically, the state is the largest state in the North East India and shares international boundaries with three nations i.e. Myanmar in the East, Bhutan in the West and China in the North. The state is inhabited by 26 major tribes and further classified into many sub tribes, thus represent a rich traditional culture (Pulipaka, 2013). The Tai Khampti tribe is one of the major tribes of Arunachal Pradesh.

Origin of the Tai Khampti - Mythological Account

There are different versions with regards to the origin of the word 'Khampti'. Khampti is a combination of two words i.e. 'Kham' means Gold and 'Ti' means place. Thus Khampti means a land of gold. In another version, the people who stays at the kingdom of Mao-lung or Mao-pung are also came to be known as Khamptis because the region is rich in minerals especially gold (Gogoi L, 1971). Further, the Khampti are also a royal title to the princely clans. Another version described Khampti as adhere or stick to a place or country (Gogoi P, 1996). The Khamptis belong to the Tai race. The Tai has a rich culture which flourishes before 2500 BC in China. The inhabited places of Tai is stretches from the interior of China to the coast of the Pacific Ocean and from the Chinese province of Kowangsi to the districts of Goalpara in Assam and Garo Hills in Meghalaya. Tai's are known by various names viz. Tai, Htai, Thai, Lu, Khun, Laos and Shan (Gogoi L, 1971). The Khamptis are believed to be emigrated from the Burma towards the end of eighteenth century (Elwin, 1964). The Khamptis are known as Shan in Northern Burma and characterize the Shan culture (Gogoi L, 1971). The Ahoms considered that ancient Shan

kingdom of Pong is the original place of the Khamptis and also pointed that a place near the sources of river Irrawaddy called Bor-Khampti was a home of the Khamptis. Thus, the Khamptis have a close cultural bond with the Myanmar. It is also established that the Ahom Government either during the times of King Pramatta Singha (1744-1751 AD) or Rajeshwar Singha (1751-1769), allow the Khamptis to enter into borders of Sadiya in Assam, India due to wars and confusion in Mogoung area of Burma as they are close kinsmen of the Ahom ruler of Assam. Then they settle on the Tengapani river in 1751 AD (Pandey D, 2009). The arrival of the Ahom and the Khampti are considered from the same Shan State beyond Patkai range (Gogoi L, 1971). Later on, the Khamptis were drive out by the Singphos from that place (Pandey D, 2009).

The close and peaceful relation between the Ahoms and the Khamptis was broken when Khamptis take the advantage of the bad situation of the Ahom and crossed the river Brahmaputra in 1794, expelled the Sadiya Khowa Gohain, the Ahom governor of Sadiya, and established their rule over Sadiya with two chiefs of Ahom King namely Burha Raja and Dekha Raja (Pandey D, 2009) in 1797. Sadiya Khowa Gohain, who was responsible for maintaining the Ahom relation with the hill tribes of Arunachal Pradesh on the eastern frontiers, (Lego, 2011) when the Khamptis tries to extent their rule to the lower plain, they were defeated by the Ahoms and remained quiet for some time however they troubled the Ahoms during the Burmese invasion of Assam (1816-1824). For the reason, Khamptis were considered as the controller of the entire Sadiya area by the British.

The Khamptis and their chiefs acted as guide to the British Officers during the tours in the Mishmis and the Singpho hills. The Khampti chief of Chowkham was granted a pension and a gun in recognition of his services (Pandey D, 2009). Thus, the Khamptis provided good service to the British during the invasion of Assam in 1824. The Khampti's Chief, Chonsalan Sadiya Khowa Gohain was recognized as the local officer and gave the authority to collect the poll tax from the Assamese subjects of the British by David Scott, the Governor General's Agent. However, the chief has to obey the commands of the Political Officer of Assam and also maintain 200 men contingent to be armed by the British.

In 1835, the British authorities welcomed the new group of Khamptis immigrants from Burma. Meantime, disagreement between the new Sadiya Khowa Gohain and the Bar Senapati arose with related to land. To solve the issue the British officer at Sadiya called both the parties for rightful claim. However, the new Khampti chief, Chowrangfat forcefully possess the land for which the privilege of toll tax collection was taken back and their slaves were also released though they were allowed to maintain their private affairs. Afterwards, they assisted the British during the operations against the Singphos as a reward for which their chief was permitted to return from exile, they remain thenceforth in a state of simmering discontent (Gait, 1926). Many rumors regarding the secret plan to revolt British have come out. In April, 1837, the local officers and Captain Newville (Lahiri, 1971) were warned about dangers from the Khamptis, however, it was ignored due to lack of any reliable warning (Chakravaty, 1973).

The friendly relations between the British and the Khamptis comes to an end when the Khamptis led by the chiefs attack on the British garrison at Sadiya post in the night of January, 1839 which is popularly known as Khamptis Uprising. Colonel Adam White and his eighty men were killed and burnt down the communication lines. The revolt was accomplished successfully on the northern bank which was not so in the southern bank. Later on, Lieutenant Marshall, the British officer able to pursue the Khamptis and killed Raima Gohain, the principal investigator and his 125 men. Further, Captain Henney who took over

the command burnt down all Khampti villages near Sadiya and Derek. In 1839-40, two more expeditions were sent to disperse the Khamptis from the hills and finally in 1843, all the Khamptis surrendered to the British under agreement of good behavior. The British Government then feared that a re-union of the Khamptis posed a great danger to the British foundation at Sadiya. Therefore, the Government undertook a scheme to rehabilitate the Khamptis in different parts of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. They were divided into four divisions in 1843-44 i.e. a) Sunpara above Sadiya, b) near Saikhowa to the south of Bhramaputra, c) Dhemaji and d) Bhodia, West of Lakhimpur. The segregation prevented the Khamptis from any reunion and ceased to have any political importance (Lego, 2011).

The history of the migration of Khamptis was of a long struggle which they had faced from the North, the Chinese imperial pressure and the powerful neighbors in the South from Burma, Laos, Assam and Siam down to modern times (Pandey, 1997). The Khamptis are considered as wonderful and useful auxiliaries in mountain warfare, capable of enduring great fatigue, of subsisting on any kind of food and full of resources. They have a well planned for rebelled in 1839 however they lack the courage to carry them out (Dalton, 1872).

Identity of Khampti

The Khamptis call themselves as Tai or Tai Khampti denoting that they belong to the Tai race. They have attained to a high degree of civilization and culture with remarkable achievements in the field of art and literature. They brought 'Buddhist' religion with them and hence the life of Khamptis are deeply influenced by the Buddhist ethic and morality. The man who is devoted to the service for the propagation of the teachings of Lord Buddha is called by them as Phra-taka or disciple of God. Monastery is a center of religion, culture and learning for them (Pulu, 1997).

According to 1971 Census, their total population is 4087 which is 0.87 percent of the total population of Arunachal Pradesh increase to 6181 in 1981 Census and are listed as a scheduled tribe in Arunachal Pradesh (Singh K, 1995). As per 2011 Census, the total population of the Khamptis in the state is at 12,925. Among all the Arunachal Tribes, the Khamptis are supposed to be the latest migrants to India (Das, 1989). Racially the ethnic groups of the state belong to Mongoloid stock. The Khamptis belong to palaeo-Mongoloid branch (Begi, 2007). Presently, they are found in Chowkham, Kherem, Impong, Ningro, Nanam, Inthem, Lathao, Mamaung and Mahang of Namsai District. The various sub-groups of the Khamtis are - Namsoom, Namchoom, Manchuj, Longkeng, Khankew, Simit, Manlong, Monpong, Mounkang, Mounklang, Mein, Singkai, Longchoot, Mannow, Mannoi and Manchuykhun (Gogoi U, 2012-13). Various Social, Cultural, Economic and Political aspects of traditional life on the Khampti tribe are discuss briefly in the following

Social Life

According to social and economic status, the Khampti society can be clearly classified into four different classes. The Chief and the ruling class occupy the highest position follow by the priests or the monks who are very influential in the society. The next group are those common people of the society who form the majority of the population. The lowest or the bottom class in the social hierarchy is the slaves (Singh K, 1995). The chief is the political and social head in the community. Each clan has its chief (Hina, 2013). Pattern of the waist cloths worn by the men differentiate the clan and according to strength of the clan

the villages also vary in size (Cooper, 1971).

Family

The Khamptis follow Patriarchy system. Polygamy was also socially accepted in which the first wife holds the authority over the others in the society. Though the Khamptis has the ownership of slaves however sell and purchase of the slaves was not done openly like the common practice amongst different hill tribes. The status of slaves is based on the work and functions they have been assigned to such as laborer, soldier and helper (Pandey D, 2009). The Khamptis does not have any social bar or the concept of untouchability nor they practice caste system, however they are classified into khels or sub-clans (Gogoi L, 1971).

Traditional House

Generally, the Khamptis houses are built with strong timber structure with raised floors above the ground called Changghar. With ladder made of trunk of a tree they reach the main door of the house. The roof is made up of thatched which come down so low and covered nearly all the walls. Portico can be seen in every house which is used for various purposes. The house is parted into separate rooms for married couples and young girls and rest of the other family members live together in the same room. Selection of site for the construction of house plays an important part as they want a place where it's safe and pure (Cooper, 1971). Agricultural tools, Bamboo containers, Baskets, Brass or Aluminum utensils are some of the common households' articles in the house. Apart from individual houses, a separate granary is built.

Further, two dormitories were built both the end of the village, one for the boys and the other for the girls. At the age puberty, all the girls are sent to the dormitory known as House of the Virgin. It is a sacred place and no man is supposed to enter there (Pandey D, 2009). This is reserved entirely for the dwelling place of unmarried women. The girls sleep in this place till she got married. In the morning, she goes back to her parents to assist them and come back to sleep in the evening in the dormitory. The dormitory is taken care of by old maids who have outlived the age of romance that prevents any proceeding which might be termed scandalous and immorality. Similarly, the boys also do the same as the girls (Cooper, 1971).

Public granary is one of the notable features of the Khamptis. It stored the food grains for the whole village. To prevent from fire, they build or constructed near the water sources. Bunches of millet and paddy are kept hanging upside down from the ceiling of the granary for preservation of the seeds (Pandey D, 2009).

Traditional Dress

Dresses represent an important part of a culture. It symbolizes the nature of the tribe and also as an identity of status and rank in the society. The Khamptis wears a neat simple dress. The man wears a colored Lungi with a chequered pattern in a combination of green, red, violet and black. A man of a higher status wears the Burmese Patso (a piece of multi colored silk). A tight fitting cotton jacket known as Chyu and a thin white cloth as a turban are wear by man (Singh K, 1995). The women wear a long skirt called Sein and a full-sleeve jacket called Khenyao, an embroidered waist cloth and a turban too. They tie their hair in a bun over the forehead and this gives an appearance of height. The hairs are decorated

with an embroidered band (Pandey D, 2009). The different hair style also represent about a married and unmarried woman. Further, a different cloth (Makhela) in black and green color is wears to represent a married woman. The woman also wears round the waist a colored silk scarf as a sash (Elwin, 1988). Almost all the Khamptis women learn the art of weaving as the routine work (Pandey D, 2009).

Food Habits

The staple food of the Khamtis is rice. They eat fish, meat and varieties of vegetables. Smoking and drinking are also not strictly forbidden. But generally all people and the monks do not touch intoxicating food or drinks. Khampti women are considered as a very good cook. Their famous foods are Khao-Lam - a kind of rice boils in the young bamboo tube, Pa-Sao - a kind of fish curry, Pa-Sa - a kind of indigenous sauce, Topolabhat - a kind of rice boiled and packed in the leaf of a locally available tree name Kaupat are very much tasteful (Gogoi L, 1971). Fish holds important part of the Khamptis in food preparation and very much part of their culture such as fishing as a festival (Gogoi P, 1996).

Status of Khampti Women

The Khampti women are considered as outspoken and joyful. They are free to mingle with male in the social gathering. For such they are not shy of men and strangers. However, they are well behaved but can be outrageous if in case conflict arises. They love to live in the company of family and society. They are hard and tough worker. They entertain guests with very tender heart as they are quite friendly and helpful.

The women are also expert in preparing traditional cuisines like steamed rice, steam vegetables. Wild vegetables from forest are generally collected by women. They very often use to go to forest in groups for collection of wild vegetables. Vegetables are collected in a basket of bamboo over the back or hanged by the side of the body (Gogoi P, 1996).

The male child is preferred than to female child. Though they enjoy equal rights in the family, they are forbidden from many activities. For instance, after delivery, the mother observes a pollution period of seven days in which she is not allowed to prepare food deliberately and do the household work. Menstruating women are considered to be polluted. Thus, they are not allowed to participate in any household work. The women do not have any role to play in political, financial and religious affairs. They exercise their authority to some extent in minor household affairs, particularly in the observation of rituals (Singh K, 1995). A Cheta (horoscope) is prepared for the newborn by the monk. Few days after the birth, child is named generally with Tai words or loan words from Pali. Nowadays Assamese Sanskrit name is also given to the child. The name of the new born is given by Father and mother or Buddhist monks. In case of boy prefix Chao/Chow is added before name and prefix Nang is added is case of female (Gogoi P, 1996).

Marriage System

Marriage is generally settled through negotiations between the parents. There is, however, always a mediator for deciding the hoka (bride price). The bride price may go up to apart from rice, Buffaloes and cash money include more thing such as bead, necklace, dao, spears, metal bells, pieces of silk cloths besides a number of cattle (Pulu, 1997). The mediator/messenger should also neither related to the boy and to the girl. He plays an important role from beginning till the end of the marriage ceremony. Besides

the negotiated marriage, there are marriages by Elopement and Mutual Consent. But they have to give a feast later on as recognition of their marriage in the society. The horoscope, called Cheta, is consulted before the marriage negotiations are finalized. Buddhist monks pray for the well-being of bride and bridegrooms and bless them. Monks are presented with clothes, rice and money for this occasion. An old man knew as Chao Mo reads traditional Tai manuscripts in front of married couple and advise them for future (Gogoi P, 1996). The marriageable age ranges from 17 to 30 years for men and 15 to 30 years for women. Consanguinity is practiced and matrilinear cousin marriages are allowed as well, both with the daughter of mother's brother and daughter of mother's sister. However, marriage with the mother's brothers is preferred the most. Divorce is permitted with judicial approval or with the consent of both the partners. If the wife seeks divorce, she has to pay a fine amounting to the bride price. If the husband is the one seeking divorce, he has to pay a fine to the wife's parents. Children can stay with either of the parents after the divorce. If the couple has two or more children, they are equally divided among the parents. Widow Remarriage is also permitted (Singh K, 1995).

Festivals

People express themselves through different songs/music and dances related to War, Ritual, festive, recreational. The Khamtis have two great festivals in a year, one to celebrate the birth, the other to mourn the death of Gautama. Sangken, is one of the main festivals of the Khamptis is observed in the month of March or April. It is celebrated to mark the advent of spring season and is considered a Khamptis New Year. People worship the image of Lord Buddha and also keep fast on the day. The Buddhas of the Vihara (Chang) are taken out by the priest and move to Kyang-phra in order to clean the idol. During the first morning of the festival, the priest recites the Mangalasutra - a hymn. The priest are given a wash by the common people without touching the body of the priest and preceded by the pouring of water on the Buddhas idol in the Kyang-Phra that goes on till the celebration is over. The boys and girls celebrate by hurling water, color and mud at each other. In the evening the villagers come to the chang and light innumerable lamps. On the following day, the washing of the Buddhas (SanPhra) goes on. On the last day of celebration, the priests gave the last wash to the images of Buddha and put them back in the Vihara (Gogoi L, 1971). Apart from Sangken, seven other different Buddhist festivals like Nawasang, Sare-sitang, Mebi-sitang, Maok-sitang, Choumun Kandapoi, Kathin, and Wanlupoi (Pulu, 1997).

Another important festival is Paya Puthikham or Poi-nen-Hok means Buddha Purnima is held in the full Moon of the month of May, the day on which Gautama Buddha was born, attained Enlightenment and died. The festival is marked by watering the Bo-Tree in addition to the central ritual. The festival for the monks only known as Paribot or Paribasa for self-purification is observed which is lasted for three months.

Dances

Kakong Tokai or Cock fight dance of the Khamptis, the two dancers wear breeches and shirts of spotted designs and on their head put up masks of cock's head with its crown at the top. It is usually performed on various festivals and also to welcome the guests. Kacheng-Aluwang dance of Khamptis area are performed during the time of various festivals. It is also a traditional way of receiving a guest. Khamptis play flute in addition to gong and drum (Pandey D, 2009).

The dance drama is called Kapung (Ka means Dance and Pung means Story) means the story depicted through dance. Women cannot perform Kapung and female role played by the men in female costume. These dramas are generally staged during the religious festivals of Sangken or Khamsang. The dance parties are invited by the affluent villagers to perform Kapung on their houses and given remuneration for the performance (Sarma, 2012).

Art and Crafts

The Khamptis are known for their adept art and craft in wood carving of beautiful religious images, figures of dancers and other object. Apart from wood carving, they were also expert in carving in bone and ivory in making handles of the weapons with great skill, taste of high relief twisted snakes, dragons and other monsters with a creditable unity and gracefulness design (Elwin, 1964). The Khamptis were also expert and renowned for extraction of minerals and smelting of iron. They worked in gold, silver and iron and forged their own weapons and ornaments. The Khamptis made embossed shields and were fond of masks illustrating the temptations of Lord Buddha and other themes (Pandey D, 2009). The monks also act as the custodian and promoter of art and crafts as they are good in carving too. The chiefs as per customary laws, they have to employ themselves in useful and ornamental arts. They make the jewelry of their wives. They also manufacture embossed shields of buffalo or rhinoceros horn, gilding and lacquering them with skill and taste (Elwin, 1988).

Education System

Education among the Monpas and Membas including the Khamptis are imparted by the monks in the temple in traditional manner (Pandey B, 1997). Usually at the age of four or five, the boys are admitted to the monastery not only to learnt Khampti scripts, 'Pali' and studied religious texts but also to woodcarving, arts, gardening and other practical things which were essential in the community life. Skills such as hunting, fishing and agriculture were learnt from the family members on completion of monastery life. The girls had no book education. Their education about how to cook, how to weave, how to take care of the children was at home surrounding with women-folk as guides. The training of the girls used to begin at an earlier stage than of boys, for the mothers needed their help sooner (Behara, 1994). They profess of Buddhist, the source of their knowledge comes at least in principle from the teachings of Lord Buddha. In fact in each Khampti village there is a monastery which regulates the conducts of the youths so as to build them up socially useful and religiously meaningful (Begi, 2007).

Though the Khamptis have their own script, Assamese was introduced as the medium of instruction in the school of Arunachal Pradesh. Further, in March, 1974 English has been introduced in primary and secondary stage of school. At present it is Hindi and English (Gupta, 1997). Thus, their own script has been neglected.

Language

The Khamptis tribe of Arunachal Pradesh has its own script (Sarma, 2012). The script is derived originally from the Tai language. The literature mainly deals with Buddhists tenets, way of life, cosmology and mythology. The religious texts of the Khamptis are nothing but the translation of Hinayana canonical literature. There is a sole Khampti manuscript which contains a complete criminal code, enumerating punishments for both trivial and serious offences. The Khamptis also maintained some form of historical

records called Chyatuie, which comprises of writings on law, social and political events (Pandey D, 2009). The Khamtis have their own language which has keen affinities with the language of the Shans of Burma, China, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Lowang Prabang (Gogoi L, 1971).

Religion

The Khamptis believe that they can attain salvation or Nirvana only by following the Noble Eightfold Path. Khampti are Buddhist of Theravada School (Panday, 1997). People maintain a Gompa - a very sacred place in the house where the images of Buddha are installed and the holy books are kept. Almost every Khampti village has a monastery locally known as Bapuchang (Hasnain, 2009). Khamptis consider Lord Buddha as a great moral preacher, representing the virtues of love and pity, truth and honesty, and they seek his blessings in their daily prayers called Paiphara for the welfare of the family as well as the whole society. The five principles or the Sin-Ha are an important part of the Khampti religion and in every religious prayer, the Sin-Ha are chanted by the devotees. The principles are

1. I should abstain from killing the living beings,
2. I should abstain from receiving unwilling donations,
3. I should abstain from indulging in sexual pleasures and falsehood,
4. I should abstain from telling lies, and
5. I should abstain from taking intoxicating things and wine.

In addition to these, there are the AshtaShila and DasaShila called Sin-Pet and Sin-Sip. The Sin-Pet is generally followed by the aged people since it is stricter and the followers abstain from taking food after twelve noon, from participating in dances and other amusements and also from sleeping on comfortable beds. In Sin-Sip, the followers take a vow to abstain from receiving money and wealth from others. The monastery where the monks or priests live is called Chong or Kyong and the chief monk is responsible for the maintenance of the monastery and he is assisted by other monks. The monastery is the center of religion, cultural and learning, and in earlier days it also had political influence on the society. The office of the monk is not hereditary and anyone who prefers to lead a life of celibacy and austerity can become a monk (Pandey D, 2009).

There are two categories of Monk namely Chowsra (Principal Monk) and Chowsang (Ordinary Monk known as Shramana or Agi in Pali literature). Anyone can become Chowsang but to become principal monk, one has to study Buddhist philosophy through Pali Literature and have a minimum experience of 10 years. The monks give religious teaching to the villagers and perform birth, marriage and death rituals of all the families (Singh K, 1995).

Arunachal Pradesh Indigenous Faith Bill, 1978 was passed in 1978 to promote the indigenous faith like Donyi polo, Intiya, Rangfra, Buddhism in Arunachal Pradesh and preserve them for the future generations. It advocated against forcible conversion of the indigenous tribal people into other religions (Lego, 2011).

The Khamptis also bury their dead bodies. However, the monks are cremated according to a typical Buddhist tradition. In the case of natural death, the burial is done after two or three days, but in case of unnatural death or the death of a child, it is done immediately. Before burial a fishing trap is weaved over the dead body by elderly woman, signifying that the dead should not take away the soul of any

other living being along with. The dead body is put in a coffin called 'Sung'. The personal belongings of the departed soul along with the coffin are buried in the grave (Pandey D, 2009). The bereaved family observes Kan - a pollution period of seven days during which they restrict themselves to a vegetarian diet. On the seventh day of purification rituals known as Som-Poi or Poi-Som are performed by the Chowsra (monk) to satisfy the soul of the deceased (Singh K, 1995). A feast is followed by the charity to the poor (Pulu, 1997).

Apart from the beliefs of Buddhism, the Khamptis also believe in supernatural powers and view the world full of ghosts (phi), demons (phi phai), evil spirits (pik-ta). One is constantly and unpredictably in danger of being harmed. Moreover, they are concerned with health, illness, drought, rain etc. Khamptis believe that devotions, rituals, ethics, scriptures, etc. act as a protective shield against harms and dangers from spirits and ghosts. Illness, natural calamities are believed to be the effect of supernatural displeasure (Behera, 2016). They believe that each village has its own spirit (Phi Moong). A small monument is constructed in the name of Phi Moong at the entrance of the village. This symbolic monument or hut is known as Ho Phi (Singh K, 1995). The Khamptis believe in charms and both monks and ordinary villagers prepare amulet or tie threads around the wrist to ward off evil eyes.

Economic Life

Agriculture is the main source of their living. Every family cultivates in their own land. Sometimes, the youths help each other in wet rice cultivation (Gogoi P, 1996). Generally, the Khamptis are advanced in cultivation and used cattle for ploughing apart from digging sticks or hoes and spades (Lego, 2011). Some of them use power tillers for tilling their land. They use ammonium sulphate and oilcakes as fertilizers. They grow good quality rice known as Khampti rice. The landowners employ landless Khamptis, Nepalis and the descendants of tea garden laborers for tilling (Singh K, 1995). Agricultural tools are kept safely during the off season (Gogoi P, 1996). The Khamptis practiced a common fencing for common cultivation in which each individual has to maintain the well-defined boundary allotted and decided by the Village Council. Another practice is that the villager has a common cultivation from ploughing to harvesting which were kept in a common granary. The income from such is used for public development works such as maintaining the village temple, roads, tanks, irrigations and other developmental activities (Das, 1989). Only few Khamptis do a manual labor, as a rule, all the freemen are hunters and expert in both the land and water. Physically, they are superior as compared to their neighbors. They also had a trade with the Assamese and the other tribes (Cooper, 1873).

According to Khampti custom, all vacant lands belong to the village community. However, individual owned plot is heritable. All the sons inherit property and have equal shares, though the eldest son is often given a larger share than the others because he is responsible for taking care of the widowed mother and unmarried sisters. The widow and the daughters do not inherit any property. Sale of land is generally not encouraged in the society. Donation of land for public purposes is allowed and cannot be objected to by the prospective heirs.

Political Pattern

The Khamptis have a well-established Village Council headed by the Chief called Mockchup or Mukjum. The Mockchup consists of the chief and six members chosen by the general people. The chiefs are chosen from the Royal clan of Namchom descendant. The mental and physical capabilities as well as the

knowledge and wisdom about the culture and modern ways, quality of noble birth, fluency in speech are taken into consideration while choosing the chief (Talukdar, 2002). The chief holds his office till he is either incapacitated due to old age or he dies. The Khampti village council members are recruited from people of various social status. The council has a separate fund. All political power is vested in the chief who exercise his authority through the village council (Panday, 1997).

The Khamptis have a standardized law, codified in their holy book known as Thamasat. The cases brought before the council is judged after a deliberative consideration. The Village Council or Mockchup decide any legal cases are the final verdict. However, for any punishment, the sacred book - Thamasat is consulted. Death, fines, deportation and whipping are the forms of punishments. Death punishment is pronounced in a heinous crime. In delivering the judgment, religious believe of fate of soul after death influences the authority of justice too. The Thamasat also contains a secular law such as criminal law and procedure, law of contract and civil procedure, morality and religion and administration purposes (Pandey D, 2009). If the case cannot be decided by any form, then oaths and ordeals are considered. Ordeals such as stone and fowl feather, hot iron, hot water and oath by swearing in the name of tiger, snakes and elephants (Hina, 2013).

Transition of the Khampti Tribe for its Survival of Identity

The Khamptis are regarded as one of the most advance of all the tribes in knowledge, arts and civilization in the state (Dalton, 1872). Khamptis are described as 'a discontented, restless, intriguing tribe' (Elwin, 1964). However, they are considered as active, intelligent, good hunters and soldiers (Gogoi P, 1996) and also progressive (Elwin, 1988) who speak a language of the Thai family. They have produced entrepreneurs, teachers, administrators, engineers, doctors and businessman. They have also produced political leaders at the state and national levels. For instance, Chowkhamein Gohain was nominated as the maiden Lok Sabha MP from erstwhile NEFA in 1952 and nominated for one more term. Chowkham is once considered as one of the richest villages in South Asia (Singh K, 1995).

Social divisions of different classes like earlier days are no more seen or practice in the society today. Similarly, slave practice has no place in the society anymore. They still follow Patriarchy system though polygamy is rarely practiced however society does not look at it as a prestige. The traditional houses are replacing by the Pucca (Assam Type or Concrete building) made up of bricks and tin sheets however the essence of the traditional house is still maintained by them. Though granary house of an individual can be seen even today especially in the villages but the public granary has disappeared long back. Further, the dormitories for the young boys and girls known as the House of Virgin are also become a matter of distant past. On social gathering and festivals, the Khamptis still prefer to go with traditional dresses due to public stigma and for everyday purposes they prefer to wear modern dresses i.e. the westernize clothing styles. Not like before, the women who knows the art of weaving also slowly fading away with the new generation.

The Khampti women enjoy equal respects in the society but still they are abide by some restrictions within the household chores too. In the recent past, various efforts have been made by the women themselves to confront the problems of daily life. On the other contrary, the male counterparts also encourage them to come forward and empowered themselves. At present, the Khamptis women are more educated and advance in the society as many of the youths especially the male are trap in the bad

habits of drugs and alcohol addiction which have driven them from education and put them down both physically and intellectually. This is one of the major problems faced by the Khampti society today. For this reason, it is also observed that many Khamptis women are married to other community to find out better match. It is also found that the whole process of marriage is not practice anymore due to time and resources constrained however, the mediator or the messenger still plays a vital role in the marriage system of the Khamptis.

Festivals still holds a vital place among the Khamptis. They still celebrate enthusiastically with merry making. They tried their best to bring out and promote the traditional games, dances and customs on such occasions. Art and crafts of the Khamptis are on high demand and popular however the crafts man and artist are dying off its credibility due to lack of expert and low quality. It can be encourage for preserving and promoting as decorative pieces (Dutta, 1997).

Lately, the Khampti start learning the importance of their script, therefore, effort has been made to promote among the masses. The Khamptis are also can be considered as the religious tribe as their daily action and thoughts revolving around it. The monks still holds a special place in the society even today. Economically, a clear division can be observed between the rich and the poor as like the other societies. Though, comparing to other society, the Khamptis are economically well off. Once they were known for timber business, expert in elephant catching and elephant training, traders and vegetables producers (Gogoi L, 1971). They also own saw mills, husking machines and rice mills. The Khamptis give a tough opponent in business to Marwari entrepreneurs (Singh K, 1995) as traditionally; they are progressive cultivators and good businessmen. Except few, the progressive and business nature among the Khamptis has been declining.

Politically, the chief still present in the villages though he does not hold the power anymore but he is still very much respected in the society. Further, with the introduction of modern legal system, the village council or Mockchup decline its authority and popularity. But, the people still have faith and regards for the council and often they are consulted in some minor cases especially on land dispute. Understanding the long procedure and process, one has to go through its legal process; people refer the case to the council for its immediate action and results.

Conclusion

Since India's independence, India has a diplomatic relations with Thailand along with deep rooted ties in historical, cultural and religion spheres. It was a landmark in 1986, when the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Thailand for high level interaction (Singh Y, 2007). The relation between Indo-Thai was basically on education, culture, and technical exchanges (Chingchit, 2015). However, both the countries shared mutual interest on bilateral, regional and multilateral issues linking South and Southeast Asia. A giant effort was evident in 1996 when Thailand introduced "Look West Policy" with a vision to develop the relations economically (Chatchavalpongpan, 2011) with rest of South Asia particularly with India (Chongkittavorn, 2015) to go together with India's "Look East Policy". This helps both the countries to give their full efforts to work together in terms of political exchanges, growing trade and investment in near future. The strategic transformation of Indo-Pacific region and the political changes within Myanmar also open the better opportunity for Thailand and India to take one step further to broaden the scope of relations. India's "Look East Policy" was rephrased to "Act East Policy" in

Myanmar in November, 2014. It renewed the stagnant ties and broadened the field that not only concentrate on economic transaction but also to enhance connectivity and defense security for strategic cooperation to fight against terrorism and defense collaboration. The Policy also expands its geographical coverage to other East Asia (Sajjanhar, 2016). Indo-Thai effort with regional connectivity initiatives India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway project linking Moreh in India (Manipur) with Mae Sot in Northern Thailand, via Bagan in Myanmar is a huge step towards (Chingchit, 2015) North East States of India and also particular for the Tai Khampti to get closer and have proper interaction with the Tai race in Thailand as they have a cultural proximity (religion, language, dress and similar food habits and tastes). Relating to such effort, a positive lap was signed i.e. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Surindra Rajabhat University, Regional Development Strategies Foundation (SRURDSF) of Surin Province, North East of Thailand and Mahabodhi Lord Buddha College of Namsai, Namsai District, Arunachal Pradesh, mainly inhabited by Tai Khampti to promote academic and research interest apart from cultural activities (The Arunachal Times, 2016). Further, it also helps to maintain the cordial relations by conducting cultural exchange and research activities. It will also help in developing tourism and economic aspects of the region by uplifting the good relations between the people of the Arunachal Pradesh and Thailand. Thus, it is just an iceberg in understanding the identity of Tai Khampti tribe of Arunachal Pradesh and to identify the changing scenario that could bring the closer relation with its people of same race in Thailand. However, only coming time will reveal the answer to the question of whether such interaction can help to survive their ever changing culture or whether they could assimilate with other culture completely.

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Retracing the Shared Culture: Tai Aitons of Assam and Tai Luangs of Maehongson, Thailand

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Abstract

Tai population in India is mostly confined to the states of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The various groups comprising Tai people are the Ahoms, Khamtis, Phakes, Khamyangs, Aitons and the Turungs. The Aitons came to Assam from Mong Mao kingdom of Myanmar and entered Ahom kingdom during the latter part of the eighteenth century and lived near the Khamti people. In the time of colonial period in Assam they moved to Dhansiri valley. Due to the oppression in their homeland lead to the migration to India. They brought Tai cultural element along with their migration. On the other hand during 18th century, the Tai Luang people migrated through a ripple state of instable living amidst wars from Shan state to Maehongson of northern Thailand. However, the great migration happened during the colonial period in 19th century. At that time, the British developed a kind of forest industry and hugely invested in the Maehongson area. They needed workers and the shift of Tai Luang workers from Shan state was greatly initiated.

In spite of all their vicissitudes they still maintain many Tai cultural traits of their homeland. Keeping the same place of origin in mind, the paper tries to highlight the shared culture of both the groups inhabited in different locations in two different countries. The main aim of the study is to observe the similarities in the tradition of agriculture, festival, food culture and material culture.

Keywords: Tai Aiton, Tai Luang, Tai Yai, shared culture, migration

"Only one tree cannot be called a forest, one family cannot be called a village"

-Tai Yai Proverb

The history of a group can be orchestrated through a sense of belonging or togetherness. And that kind of history is also a kind of instrument in the construction of that very particular group's ethnic identity. On that matter the paper is started with a mention of a Tai proverb to elucidate that togetherness is the main tool in making sense of 'Tai-ness' amidst the unstable situation from the past until the present. Looking back to the Tai Aiton and Tai Yai history, this paper tries to focus on the history of migration and how the people of both the country live and use their culture as a tool of the revival of 'Tai-ness' through their everyday life. The theoretical approach practiced is more of anthropological which observed the religious-cultural behaviors and beliefs to retrace the root of their origin.

The Tai refers to all the groups and sub groups of a people who usually call themselves as Tai and are the speakers of the languages classified under the Tai family. Sir George Scott, a well-known authority on the Shans gives an exhaustive list of Tai communities as known by their local names. He also points out that 'the branches which are indisputably Tai are known by a bewildering variety of names, which serve to conceal their identity' (Gogoi cited in Gogoi, 1989). Max Mullar said that the original seat of the Tai or Siamese branch of the Indo-Chinese peoples, called Shan by the Burmese, was in Central Asia and it was from that area that these people were the first to migrate towards the south and settle along the rivers Mekong, Menam, Irrawaddy and Brahmaputra (Phayre, 1883).

The Tai people are found in India's North East, in several regions of Burma, all over Thailand and Laos, Northern Vietnam and the five southern provinces of China namely, Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Kuechu and Zechuan and are known under a variety of national, regional and local appellations. They are the Ahoms, Aitons, Khamtis, Khamyangs, Phakes and Turungs in North East India; the Shans, Khuns, Laems, Khamtis in Burma; the Thais, Lao-Tais, Saeks in Laos; the Tai Dams, Tai Khaos, Tai Dengs, Thos, Lues, Nangs, Nungs in Vietnam; and the Chuangs, Puis, Dais, Dai, Nungs, Nangs and the Lis in Southern China (Buragohain, 1994). Regarding the Tai peoples' homeland there is a group of scholars who maintain that it must be sought in the coastal lowlands of southern China and the Red River Delta. Proponents of such theories include Credner who bases himself upon the type of habitat. Present day Tai prefer, the fact that there is rice- growing culture and the fact that they can always be found in the relatively warm lowlands, never on mountain slopes (Credner, 1966). According to B. J. Terwiel (1980) the high degree of similarity of all Tai languages, which may be taken to indicate that the Tai formed a much more homogeneous group at the beginning than at present, puts the quest for origin of the Tai in a completely different perspectives. He also mentioned that to recapitulate, there appears to have occurred a relatively sudden spread of the Tai, and a subsequent isolation of individual groups, causing the development of a large number of separate ethnic identities and speech varieties.

The Tai people of India mostly live in the North Eastern States of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh of India. There are six Tai Groups such as Tai Ahom, Tai Khamti, Tai Turung, Tai Khamyang, Tai Phake, Tai Aitons who lives in various places of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.

The Tai Aitons

The Tai Ahoms were the first Tai group who entered the Brahmaputra valley in 1228 AD under the leadership of Sukapha moved over the Patkai hills and built their own state called Mong- Dum- Sun-Kham and ruled over for six hundred years (1228-1826). Later, various small groups of Tai speakers arrived in Upper Assam from the second half of eighteenth century onward from the same eastern directions crossing Patkai hill. One of such group was Tai Aiton. Tai Aiton group migrated to Assam in order to avoid castigation in their homeland, the then Upper Burma.

According to the oral traditions Tai Aitons originally lived at a place known as Mueng Aiton, in upper Chindwin valley of Myanmar. According to Sir Edward Gait, in his book 'History of Assam'- The Khamti, Phakes, Aitons, Turungs and Khamjang are all Shan tribes who have at different times, moved along the same route from the cradle of their race.' 'A Tai scholar Dr. Padmeswar Gogoi mentioned that 'The Aitons were a section of the Mong Kawang Tai with settlements in the district of Aiton in the region of Upper Chindwin. Aiton's historical records say that captain Newfille of British days one Aiton, names Po Ka tom phalung Shyam was appointed as *Ru ring* (*Hazarika* head of one thousand Aiton people) at Morongi. At the time of Myanmarese attack on Assam, during Ahom rule in between 1812-26, Aitons were probably settled in Morongi, which is evident from their tradition story of migration. At the time of Myanmarese attack, there was a beautiful lady of Aiton named Nang Ramati Romoni and she was wife of Chao Mong Yang Kulu. Myanmarese soldiers killed Mong-yang Kulu and captured his wife to present Myanmarese king. Along with her the soldier took numerous gold. Aitons of Morongi knew not to which place she was taken or whether killed. According to tradition Myanmarese soldiers killed some Aitons also while protesting against their inhuman behavior. One day Po Ka tom Phalung dreamt a dream in which Nang Romoni instructed him to worship her and then he would get 'Kong tom', dap (sword) and accordingly he got them. After that Aitons moved from Morongi to Dhalaguri. At that time Poka tom Phalung resigned from the post of *Ru ring*. Aitons got more things of gold and silver while they dug out according to instruction of Nang Romoni in dream. These materials were given to Ahom officer of Morongikhowa Gohain. Later on Aitons moved to Bhiton Kaliani and he became 'Chao kon' or 'Hu or Ru Ming' a village headman. After that some of the, moved to Borgaon, Dubarani, Balipather etc.

In 1504 A.D., Tai-Aitons of Aiton principality revolted against Ahom King Sue-Hung-Mung. But as Ahom sent their soldiers under leadership of Thaomung Nangrang lai and Tyao Chu lung Khampeng to subdue the revolt, Aiton did not fight against Ahom and subdued by presenting a princess and four Plailoi elephants. (Deodhai Asom Buranji, p. 16); Ahom Buranji, p.54Para 26). Again 1555 A.D. Aitons in alliance with Papuk and Khamteng revolted against Ahom king Sue-Kham Pha alias Khora-Raja, but they were subdued. (Ahom Buranji, Deodhai Asom Buranji). In this way the reference of Aiton people was available in the Ahom historical chronicles also (Gogoi, 1996).

During the middle of the eighteenth century Aitons had migrated to Assam. At first they inhabited in northern Assam, Sadiya. After changing several places, now a days they settled in two districts namely, Golaghat and Karbi Anglong. Their villages are Banlung, Ahomani, Kalioni, Balipathar, Tengani etc. Their total population roughly estimated about two thousand five hundred (2500) as census done by Man Tai Speaking National Council Assam. The population is less in number and they are lesser known tribe of Assam. The people generally speak Tai and they are also acquainted with Assamese.

The people are the follower of Buddhism. Like other Buddhist groups, every village has a Buddhist

monastery known as *vihar*, which they call it in Tai- *kyoung*. Inside the *kyoung*, Buddha images are kept above the *palang*. All religious and cultural activities centered on the advices of the monk, *chauman*. They perform various religious and social functions.

The Aitons have the clan system which is derived from the activities of their ancestors. They strictly follow clan exogamy.

From the past until present time, Aiton people are Theravada Buddhists. They celebrate all festivals and occasions following Buddhist myths. According to Dibyadhar Shyam, a villager, '*Poi*' is a Tai word meant for festival.

Tai Aiton Rituals and Festivals

Poi Sangken or the New Year festival of Tai Aiton is celebrated according to their faith and culture in accordance with the *sakrit*, the Tai almanac in the month of April. The main aim of the festival is to bring out the Buddha statues from the monastery for cleaning and ceremonial bathing.

The statues of Buddha are carried by the people of the village with colorful procession according to the time calculated from the almanac. The womenfolk shower the flower and *khawtak*, a kind of puffed rice accompanying by the dance with the tune of drum, gong and cymbal towards the *kyoungfra*, a temporary house where the statues keep for cleaning and bathing process.

The bathing process is conducted by pouring fresh water is done by the spraying of water to all the statues. The bathing is carried out by people of all ages with pure mind and merry making which is known as *choafra*. The people sprinkle water on the floor of Buddha *vihar*, *chaityas*, *stupas* and other surrounding monuments. The youngsters throw or spray water to each other with full of joy. That is why the festival is also called *poi con nam* i.e. festival of water. After keeping Buddha statues outside for three days, the statues are carried back to the permanent place of the monastery called as *plung fra*. After the re-establishment, prayers are performed and head monk promulgate the *panchshil*, 'five principal of moral conduct' and *astashil*, 'eight fold path of Buddha teaching of morality to the common people and gives blessings to all. A religious teaching is given to the people by the priest.

The origin myth of the *poi sangken* is found in the religious book in Tai language which narrates as:

At the very beginning the formation of the earth was like a honey comb. It was full of sweet and fragrance. This attracted the khunsang (Brahma) named Laka and he did not returned to the Moun sang (Brahmaloka). He was very greedy. Therefore he lived in Moungefee (Devaloka) or heaven. In due course of time Laka got married to the sister of Khunkiew (Deva of misfortune). She gave birth to Nangfee (angels) named Lalaka, Mahalaka, Nandalaka and Tatthilaka.

One day Chowfasikia (Indra, king of all Gods) along with some Brahmas came down to punish greedy Laka on account of his violation of laws of Mungsang and he was attempted to give punishment to behead to death. But he failed to do so. The Devas were worried and thought that one day Laka would destroy the Trilok - earth, heaven and hell.

At last with the hair obtained from the youngest daughter of Laka, Indra tied the hair to his bajra to kill Laka, and then he was beheaded to death. In the meantime incarnated Buddha was born as an elephant. There was a fear that the head of the Brahma could make danger and destruction. Therefore, Indra was advised to bring the heads of the elephant and transplanted it to beheaded Laka and brings back alive to the Brahmalok.

On the other hand the chief of the Brahma gave punishment to the daughters of Laka as they gave their hairs to Indra. That is why they had to keep the beheaded head of their father all the day. Duration of one day in the Mounsang is equal to one year of earth. Thus every year in the earth, the head is handed over to another sister. The Khunkiew was not satisfied by the regaining of life of Laka. He imposed misery, misfortune and all kinds of diseases to the Deva as well as to human beings.

The Tai Aitons believes that to get rid of the misfortune, they practice the Buddha prayer, wash and clean of the Buddha statues, the Buddha trees, the sacred religious books, stupas etc. as per the traditional process with festive mood in the time of spring. This poi sangken is celebrated to welcome New Year with the hope of peace and prosperity to the society.

During the time of this festival, the Aitons refrain from everyday life and perform strict religious rules and regulation. People observe *astashila* and prayed for the well-being of the universe. In the evening the villagers come to the *kyoungfra* and light innumerable candle lamp. On the poi sangken day's people observe the law of nature. They do not cut trees, kill animals, even they do not pluck the leaves of the plants. They do not use harsh words to others. Transaction of money or properties is also prohibited during those days.

Poi Lu Chong/Kyong- Lu means donation and Chong means temple. This festival is celebrated after the new built monastery. This ritual signifies the faith in Buddhists. In the Buddhist myth, the king Bimihara of Magadha was one of the most noted and great patron of early Buddhism. He offered his '*Veluvan Vihara*' to Lord Buddha as his followers. The story of '*Veluvan Vihara*' was the first *Vihara* ever presented to the '*Sangha*' in Buddhist history. Later on, Buddhists celebrated this festival and they would tell the story of *Veluvan Vihara* from generation to generation.

Poi Lu Fra – It is a festival of donated function of Buddha image to the sangha.

Poi Khaw Wah and Poi Poot Wah – '*Khaw Wah*' is the festival of enter in rain retreat cycle. This festival follows the Buddhist myth about *Veluvan Vihara*. *Veluvan Vihar* was offered to Lord Buddha by King Bimbisara of Magadha, who was a great follower of Buddhism. This *Veluvan Vihar* was the first *Vihar* presented to sangha. While the Buddha was staying at *Veluvan Vihara*, he told the other monks to observe the '*Varsa Wah*' to refrain from peregrination during entire rainy season. In due course of time, it becomes customary for Buddhist monks to take up *Vassa* residence on the day after the full moon of mid-June and continued for three months. During the time of observation of *vassa*, every morning the monks visit their *kyoung* or *vihar* and offer prayers. At that time plucking of fruits and flowers, killing of animals is taboo. They observed final day of '*Poot Wah*' as a conclusion ceremony of 90 days rain retreat with prayers, rituals, feast and merry making.

Poi Kathin – This festival is concerned with offering of '*Sivar*' or '*Sangkan*' (Yellow robes) for Bhikkhus after *varsah* period.

Poi Noon Si – It is celebrated in every Tai Forth Month of the year on the occasion of Phaguni Purnima. This is to commemorate of attain, enlightenment and Buddha's return to his home in Kapilabastu. It is celebrated among the community with strong attachment at Bhiton Kalioni Vihara village in Karbi Anglong district of Assam. This *Vihara* is famous in whole North East India as '*Sutongpea Fra*' (wish fulfillment God).

Poi kham sang -is a ceremony where young boys (*Sang lang*) of the village go for novice of Buddhist

monks by shaving their head, wearing of brown piece of cloth. The Tai word '*Kham Sang*' or '*Kham Key*' denoted for convocation of *Sraman* (primary stage of Bhikku) and Upasamsada of Bhikkus respectively.

Poi Kanto Sangha – This occasion is celebrated after rain retreat or Sangken festival to perform thanksgiving and honor to the Sangha (group of monks)

Poi Mai Ko Sumphai - It is celebrated on Maghi Purnima to commemorate the '*Ayu Bisarjan*' (impending death) declaration of Buddha himself to take *maha pari nirban* after 3 months which was occurred in next Bohagi Purnima day. *Mai ko Sumphai*, on the full moon day in the month of January, where they burn firewood. Firewood is stacked vertically and they first lit the fire from top of the cone of the wood stack. Aiton people believe that the fire of the frame works is donation of fire by king of Malla on '*Maha Pari Nirvana*' occasion. This has a myth of Theravada Buddhist.

Poi Buddha Purnima -is celebrated with all religious sanctity, where prayers are done in the Buddha *vihar* by the head monk. The impact of Buddha Purnima is very highest and greatest in the society because this Purnima coincides with three important events of Lord Buddha's life. Those are birth, enlightenment and *mahaparinirbana* (demise) of the Buddha. On that day people take out Buddha statues for procession in and around the village. According to one informant, the Buddha statues in the monastery are smaller in size as the Tai Aitons were migrated from Myanmar carrying small Buddha statues with them for light weight. That is why in all Tai Aiton villages small Buddha statues are seen. Big Buddha statues which are existed in the monastery as well as in the village are brought from Thailand.

Regarding Tai folklore, the Tai folk tales of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh are same with the folk tales of South East Asia. For example, the story of the big tortoise is to be found amongst the Tais of North East India, Shans of Myanmar and Thais of Thailand. The Story tells about two wives, one wicked and other wise. The wicked one cast black art on the wise thus transforming her into a big tortoise. The daughter of the wise one had to face severe oppression at the hands of the step mother, the wicked one. Ultimately the wise one overcome the black art and regained her original form and returned to the king and the wicked one was given punishment (Buragohain, 1994). These folk tales are orally transmitted from one generation to other. It was told by one villager from Banlung village of Karbi Anglong that when Buddhist monks or anyone comes from Myanmar narrates the folk tales of Myanmar they recollect their memories of the past, when their grandparents used to tell these folk tales. There are resemblances

The Tai Aiton people are generally agriculturist. They practice wet rice cultivation, which is generally seen in all South East Asian countries and this cultural trait which they bought along with their migration. Some ethnic foods are *peng* (cake made out of powdered rice), *khaulam* (rice made in a bamboo cylinder) etc. Food items are mostly boiled or steamed.

Tai Aiton people used to live in a raised house (pile house) constructed above the ground. The traditional dresses of Tai Aiton womenfolk are *sinh* (Wrapper, lower garment), *lang wat* (small wrapper, wrap around the waist), *fa-bai* (long scarf, upper garment), *thung* (bag) and a long blouse. Color used in *sinh* is black and *lang wat* is green. Man generally wears *toong* (lower garment) of various colors with harmonious arrangement (check pattern). Both man and woman wear *fa-pok-hu* (head turban).

Regarding the culture which is shared with the place of the origin of the Tai Aiton are observed from the festivals, dress and food behavior. Head monk Bichitra Mohathero of the Bali pathar village of Karbi Anglong district of Assam, India informed that the memory they had, the relationship they had with Myanmar has always remind them to look back and trace their culture of their origin. As because of

belief in the Theravada Buddhism, most of the religious and cultural festivals are same with little difference in language. Monk Bichitra Mohathero was a disciple of U. Indrasara Mohathero of the then Burma (Myanmar) narrated that, 'In the year 1953, eleven member *Dhamma Duta* (Religious ambassador) by Burma Buddhist Mission to popularized Theravada Buddhism. Again in the year 1957 a group of nine member monks came to India, Assam and U. Indrasara Mohathero did not return to Myanmar. Monk Bichitra Mohathero too visited Myanmar by taking the land route from Assam, Nagaland, Manipur (Moreh) to Myanmar. They have a close contact with Burmese monks. But the first ever Dhamma Duta sent to India in 1889 by then Burma Buddhist Mission was U. Narinda Mahathero popularly known as Pien Duin Shayadaw and he went back to Burma. They always keep contact with the monks of Myanmar.

Though the Tai Aiton people are got assimilated with the neighboring Assamese people, they have not forgotten their past. One of the reason for retracing their roots can be geographical proximity with same ecology and landscape. The dress pattern, food behavior, festivals clearly shows the Tai roots which projects their identity towards "Tai-ness" or revival of "Tai-ness".

Tai Yai of Maehongson, Thailand

Arguing from the point of historical perspective in viewing the history of migration of Tai Yais since 13th century, Maehongson city formation can be taken into account, because, this period can well talk about the shared history between various groups in Maehongson province. Moreover, the nineteenth century fact, that the significant period of the notion of modernity has arrived with a romanticized idea about 'Tai the Great race', should also be counted here. Tai Yai history cannot be studied as a single unit, because, the Tai history comes along with the history of Shan State and the chronicle of Thai kingdoms and Lanna Kingdom which are related to the foundation of Tai Yai community in Maehongson.. Maehongson has a distance from Chiang Mai of around 349 kilometers. It is located in the north-western part of Thailand, next to this province of the north-western side is Shan State, Kachin State and Kayah State in Burma. The eastern neighboring province of the city is Chiang Mai. The southern part of it connects with Tak Province. Thai people give the name to this province as '*Mueng Sam Mohk*' (the city of mists in every season). Since the past until the present, Maehongson is the border city between Thailand and Myanmar. This geographical location becomes very important in the sense of an identity building process which can have a history uninterrupted by external factors.

'Tai Yai' generally means the group of Tai people who migrated from Shan state, Myanmar to stay in Thailand. Tai Luang is the same group of Tai people as Tai Yai. Tai Luang normally is used for calling Tai people in Shan state and Tai Yai is used in Thailand. The word '*Luang*' means 'big' which is same as '*Yai*' in Thai. The oral history tells us that Tai Yai people migrated from Shan State, the Eastern part of Myanmar. The story of migration is found in the oral traditional stories or folk-tales. During 1830s Tai Yai people used to travel across the border without the boundary of nation-state. They chose to practice cultivation for their livelihood in Maehongson. After the harvesting they go back to Shan state.

The history of Tai Yai cannot be found in the mainstream history. Tai Yai historian Pradit Prasert said that the history can be traced back to 700 years ago, when Tais and Burmese migrated to Maehongson easily by crossing across the Salawin River to Maehongson and other border cities. In 1856, as the record holds, the migration of Tai Yai people who escaped from the war in Shan state to Maehongson happened, and they started to settle down especially mingling with the Tai Yais who already lived here. The 1976 history

of Maehongson explains that Tai Yais were the big group of people who formed this province along with Karen and Burmese.

Life in Ban Pangmoo

The pride the people carry as the first village of the Maehongson region would eventually reveal the story of identity formation. Any kind of pride associated with an establishment of a village can only evoke the sense of togetherness and thus identity and history. The population of the village is around 2,700 people. The religion of the people is Buddhism.

Pangmoo temple or monastery is only one religious place in Tai Yai called 'Jong'. Pangmoo temple was built in 1468. The temple is a sacred space for the Tais and a major physical source that enhances a get-togetherness. So, beyond the sacred, the temple became a space of identity-construction. For example, Tai Yai boys can opt to become monks during Poi Sanglong. During the ritual, *Sanglongs* have to learn Buddhist philosophy and learn Tai Language and Tai culture. Tai Yais are Buddhists. A temple becomes then a community hall for meeting and sharing about life as well. During any Buddhist holy day, some elderly people will stay in the temple for a night. They would wear white dresses, observe religious precepts and take care of the temple like their own home. Elderly people involve themselves in every ritual to maintain the correct proceeding in the rituals. Moreover, '*Thom Lik*' or reading religious book in Tai language is one of the main programs. The one who can read Tai religious book is called '*Ja-reh*'. Mostly *Ja-rehs* are men; they would read all about the proverbs, folktales and religious stories etc. in the temple itself.

Tai Yai's houses are constructed as pile house with the wooden columns. Woods are the main materials for the floors and the walls. The roofs are thatched with leaves. The square form of the house has a big verandah and a lot of space. Ground floor mostly is used for relaxing, doing craft work etc. Nowadays, their houses are constructed as semi-cement and semi-woods following Thai style.

The traditional dresses of Tai Yai womenfolk are '*sinh*' (Wrap skirt), '*Sue Tais*' (Tai Yais blouse) and hair pins which are made of silver and gold. Some of them would put the flower instead of hair pin. Tai Yai women love to wrap their hairs and clip with the beautiful hair pin. Color used in *sinh* is colorful and it should be matching with the color of blouse. Man generally wears '*Konh Tai*' (lower garment) of various colors, '*Sue Tak Poog*' (Tai Yai men's shirts) and '*Toog*' (bag). The interesting to note that knife is also the main element of Tai Yai traditional dress for men. Knife signifies Tai Yai men that they are warriors. Both man and woman wear '*pha-pok-hua*' (head turban).

Food of Tai Luang almost is made up of soy bean and rice which are the main crop of Tai people here. '*Tua Nao*' is the main product of Pangmoo Village. '*Nam Prik*' or chili dip is always in every meal which adds '*Tua Nao*' and others ingredients. Boiled food is also in their main course. Moreover, they cook so many salad which depends on seasonal vegetable for example; bamboo shoot, star fruit, vegetable fern etc. The interesting sweets of Tai Yai are *Kao Pook Nga Dam*, *Aalawa*, *Suaytamin*, *Kaotomtua*, *Kaopong*, *KaoTokPun*, *KaoYakoo* etc. which are made of Pang (Rice Flour), *Nga* (black sesame), *Kao* (rice) etc.

Rituals of Tai Yai

The Tai Yai are and always have been traditional Theravada Buddhists. Their religion was greatly

influenced by the Burmese Buddhists. The religious beliefs of the group are deeply rooted in their society. The elaborate festivals and traditions celebrated in honor of their religious beliefs each year are of great importance to their way of life. To this day the Tai or Shan perform some of the most colorful and visually beautiful Buddhist festivals in all of Thailand. Besides, Tai Yais believe in a kind of 'superstition' in terms of ancestor spirit and auspicious time. The life of Tai Yai from the first day of birth until death is related with this ritual.

Tai Yai rituals:

'Lern Jeng' (the first month) is in December of every year. The ritual is called '*Garb Som Oou*' or '*Boon Koa Mai*'. The ritual is related to the story of Buddha. Tai Yais believe that, the more one donates rice after cultivation, the better one can reach the enlightenment. Tai Yais will, thus, offer food to monks and the elderly ones in the village.

'Lern Kum' falls in January. The ritual is called '*Poi Karb Som Boon Joa Kao Kum*'. Tai Yais would offer food to monks for 3 or 5 or 7 days. Interestingly, they believe that they should not bring out their rice from the barn during this month, or they may get good amount of rice in the following harvest.

'Lern Sam' is celebrated in February. '*Poi Lu Kao Ya koo*' is the time of sharing the food. Tai Yais would share their red sticky rice, sugar, coconuts and peanuts in making a special sweet and sharing to all the villagers. Another ritual is '*Poi Low*'. It happens following the Tai lunar calendar. Tai Yais would fetch wood and burn the staffs together at the temple premise.

'Lern Si' is observed in March and April. The big Tai Yai festival is '*Poi Sang Long*'. The festival is the celebration of young boys who want to become a monk. The boys have to shave their heads and wear the garments along with a crown like a prince. Then the procession would be held to announce that all the boys would turn themselves to be monks soon. After the ritual, being monks, the boys have to learn Buddhist religious philosophy and Tai Yai cultural norms.

'Lern Ha' is celebrated in April. Tai Yai calls this ritual as '*Keun Jong Pi Mai*'. This ritual is all about the new year festival. There will be the splashing of water game, donation, and '*Gun Tor*' which means that all the Tai Yais are to apologize to the monks and the elders.

'Lern Hok' falls in May. Visakha pooja happens during this time with '*Poi Ja Ti*'. Tai Yais would fetch sand and give it to the temple to build something.

'Lern Jed' is observed in June. Tai Yais would offer food to ancestor spirits. This ritual is called '*Wan Pa Lik*'. Besides, they would carry some tanks full of water and sand along with some special sacrificial stuff that may have a hexagonal shape.

'Lern Pad, Kao, Sib' is celebrated in July, August, and September. These 3 months have the same ritual. It is called '*Tang Som To Loung*'. These 3 months are the month for practicing the *dhamma*. The other villagers would cook a special rice-dish called '*Kao Madhupayas*' for them.

'Lern Sib Ed' is observed in October. The ritual is called '*Han Som Go Ja*'. Tai Yai would pray for their

ancestors at the temple and offer food to monks. Moreover, the market called 'Gard Pid Lern Sib Ed' would open all day, all night. The procession of 'Jong Para' or the small temple would be built modeling a temple.

'Lern Sib Song' is in November. During this month, there are so many rituals like; 'Poi Wang Ka Pa', 'Poi Pai Loy' 'Poi Long Pong Choa Tai Yai', 'Lu Sang Gan' and 'Sang Kathin' etc.

It can be said that the whole life of Tai Yais is attached to Buddhism and ritualistic ways of living. This promote a sense of togetherness.

Conclusion

The revival of Tai Aiton identity with Tai culture as well as Tai Yai is observed clearly within the framework of Great Tai Culture. Sharing of religion, culture, language can accelerate the process of a kind of history making along with a distinct identity formation of the Tai Aitons and Tai Yais which can promote a sense of togetherness or 'Tai-ness'.

As all the Tai groups, originated in what is now Southeast China, the people were undoubtedly formerly little distinguishable but a millennium of relative isolation on Burma's Shan Plateau has led to their cultural distinctiveness. But after migrating from Burma they carry forward their unique cultural trait for which they recognize them as the beads of the same thread.

Situating in Assam, India's North East, the Tai Aitons in their traditional culture show their uniqueness through which they project their identity and trace back to see their roots of their origin where they see more similarity in their culture, everyday life through cultural memory. Migrant people often use food, festival, dress as a strong means of retaining their cultural identity. The areas in which families live and where their ancestors originated always influence these.

On the other hand the living in the majestic northwest corner of Thailand's border with Burma Tai Yai are migrant Shan farmers early in the nineteenth century the group moved back and forth between Thailand and Burma for several centuries. Hence the people have a close relation with the Burmese culture. And the peoples from Myanmar too visit Maehongson in the time of religious festival especially in Poi sang long.

- The architecture of the Buddhist monasteries of both the areas are elaborately roofed and integrated into Tai society and culture.
- Wet –Rice cultivation is one of the shared trait seen among the two studied areas.
- Recent arrivals of the Burmese ground bark face powder (*thanaka*) is seen in their Thai neighbours like Tai Yai and Indian neighbour Tai Aiton in Assam.
- Food, Festival, Bamboo culture, house pattern, tangible and intangible culture demonstrates the shared culture.
- The high degree of similarity of all Tai language displays the mutual relationship of various Tai languages with slightly varying dialect. The change of tone of a word can give different meaning. However some words are same in three different countries- Thailand, Myanmar and India. For example, the word 'poi' means 'festival', 'khou' means 'rice' etc.

Concluding with the words of renown Tai Scholar Chatthip Nartsupha- *The mutual help through intra-Tai transferring of culture would strengthen Tai cultures everywhere and allow the Tai civilization to thrive and flourish in the world.*

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Land Grabbing and the Right to Border Land Tenure at Si Sa Ket Province

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Abstract

The Si Sa Ket border area contains fields show intense interaction between the forces of “nationalism,” which seeks to control the borderlands in the name of national security, and “neoliberalism,” which aims to maintain the border as an open space for free trade and investment. This paper presents the conditions that caused the process of land grabbing along the Thai-Cambodian border in Si Sa Ket province, the effects of the land grabbing process on villagers’ land tenure, and the negotiation process of minor land tenure that was used to claim the land. Under this context, this review of land grabbing will help us see the complex power relations present in this situation. Although we have seen that the government has power over the land and can intervene in land management issues, we have also seen that borderlands are sold and changed both openly and secretly, away from governmental oversight. The villagers have both fought against land grabbing, and participated in land grabbing themselves.

Keywords: neoliberalism, nationalism, border land grabbing

Border Land Grabbing in Thailand: Hidden Social Inequality

Thai people are not familiar with the manifestation of land grabbing on the grounds that they do not get access to the information of gigantic plots of land possessed by Thai tycoons and international entrepreneurs alike. Furthermore, local agriculturists are more likely to abandon their lands to work in large cities or seek for jobs with more incomes instead of gaining minimal wages in agricultural sectors. Consequently, negative impacts and problems from unfair or illegitimate land ownership are overshadowed by some more important problems. In this respect, the conflicts of land grabbing have been deeply rooted in Thai society.

According to Sirichai Veeriyannun (2005), since General Chatichai Choonhavan had announced his policy to turn Indochina from "a battle field into a marketplace" in 1987, land grabbing could be seen along the Thai borders, targeting buffer lands that were turned into international trading areas. A new form of land grabbing process was introduced. Despite the fact that borderlands had been forced by globalization to be widely opened, it was found that the areas were still under the strict control of the central government including the use of lands, law restrictions and implementation of certain rules. It was also of no doubt that large plots of land along the border were possessed and grabbed by governmental organizations. Under this condition, we need to redefine the meaning of the term land grabbing and thoroughly investigate its process. The clash of the discourses of neoliberalism, with its focus to

transform lands to merchandises, and the discourses of nationalism, which focuses on national security, perplexes us. The contradiction of such discourses encourages us to question and formalize the process of land grabbing, to study under what conditions the government can play its vital role, to investigate the feasibility of having entrepreneurs involved in the land grabbing process and, most importantly, to examine the negotiation and involvement by local villagers whose lands are grabbed.

Neoliberalism, the Reimagination of Land Grabbing Process and the Contradiction of Defining Borderlands

Comparing the cases of Si Sa Ket province's borderlands of Pri Pattana Sub-District, Phu-Sing District and of Sao Thongchai Sub-District, Kantaraluk District, we can see that the lands do not signify a single idea. On the one hand, the Si Sa Ket borderlands are presented and defined as areas of national security. They had been used to claim the rights of Thailand's ownership of Preah Vihear temple over Cambodia. The conflict over Thailand-Cambodia borderlands, thus, had led to strict supervision and control by both governments. On the other hand, the development of the Chaong Sa-Ngam Cambodia-Thailand border checkpoint to become an international point of entry has responded to the needs of free trade. The Si Sa Ket borderlands are the presentations of both of these governments' attempts to control the borderlands and the expectation to overcome the governments' control at the same time.

A lengthy dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over the ownership of Preah Vihear Temple and its vicinity arose from the conflict over territorial sovereignty (Kanokwan Raruk, 2013; Pongthong Pawakkarapan, 2008, 2009, 2013; Pichet Sangthong, 2008; Suphalak Kanchanakundee 2008). The conflicts and seizure of territorial sovereignty are directly related to national identities that were dismantled. Nevertheless, fighting for power over the Preah Vihear was related to the problem of national identity that was dismantled and then the concept of nationalism was adopted to produce space (Lefebvre, 1991).

Vandergest and Peluso mentioned that nationalism had given power to state to control land that they claimed the ownership and called it "state territorialization". They argued that "a territorialized local administration and market system are only one aspect of a much broader process of territorialization. Thus in this article we systematize and generalize the analysis of territorialization. We then illustrate the process through a discussion of the establishment of territorial civil administrative units, and the state's attempts to take over the administration of rights to land and "forest" in Thailand." (Vandergest and Peluso, 1995: 386)

The production of space was done in terms of taking control the border and defining the area to facilitate land manipulation. However, the fluctuating relationship between Thailand and Cambodia considerably affected land use in Thai borderlands. In other words, the conflicts over the Preah Vihear temple reflected the concept of nationalism which was used by the Thai government to claim the rights over some areas of the borderlands. This in turn caused the border to become a "state of exception" (Agamben, 2005; Wood, 2011). Such conditions resulted in the exception of state power to intervene the border for national security reason. The government also used this condition to declare several wars with Cambodia. Therefore, this area was under martial law, allowing the Thai army to control and manipulate the area to ensure peace and order. Local people's rights to own the land were also limited because of this law.

During the dispute over the Preah Vihear temple between Thailand and Cambodia, the Thai government started a border development policy to turn the disputed area into an economic zone. In other words, Chong Sa-Ngam Border Crossing was developed as “the new Chong Sa-Ngam town” which was an economic zone that was separated from the areas designated for army, protected national forest, and local land use. To elaborate, the government had separated some areas to be developed as part of the economic zone to respond to free trade policy. At the same time, in some areas, the government had strictly controlled the community's land use. Therefore, to better understand the power relations present in management of Si Sa Ket borderlands, it is impossible to merely view it on a superficial level. On the one hand, it is necessary for us to view it carefully to identify the complex and different uses of power ranging from absolute power to flexible power, which allowed a particular activity to take place in the area. As you can see, capitalism along the Si Sa Ket border was a capitalism taking place under the concept of national security. In other words, the growth of the economy along the border resulted from the accumulation of capital based on the logic of capitalism. But the growth was then controlled by the government using the discourse of national security.

Most importantly, the conflicts between economics, under the concept of nationalism, and neoliberalism brought about an “imagined border communities.”(I adopted this concept from Anderson, 1983) Amid the conflicts between Thailand and Cambodia over the borderlines and Preah Vihear temple, the Thai government had to put effort into turning this area into a “border village” which allowed the government to manipulate the area conveniently. At the same time, due to the fact that Chong Sa-Ngam Border Crossing is part of a protected national forest, it was exempt from the law and was turned into the full range economic zone as well as the border city.

As a result, when considering the issue thoroughly, it was found that the forms of power that were used to control Si Sa Ket borderlands were extremely complicated. During this particular time, the influence of nationalism caused fear and tension in the area. At another time, neoliberalism had demolished the mistrust and turned an area full of violence, suspicion, and hatred into an area of cooperation. Therefore, it is impossible to explain the development of border relations through one particular ideology. On the other hand, it is important to identify how nationalism and neoliberalism were integrated. It is possible to refer to the ideology that resulted from the integration of these two totally different concepts as “neo-national liberalism.”

The integration of nationalism and neoliberalism did not fall into place. Rather, it was contradictory and paradoxical. To explain more, the government claimed that the opening of Chong Sa-Ngam Border Crossing aimed at enhancing the relationship between Thailand and Cambodia. However, if we consider the discourse of “changing the war zone to the trade zone” we would find that the opening of free trade in the border was for enhancing Thailand's capacity to compete in the global market and to make the country become a more economically powerful nation (Phuangthong Phawakkharaphan, 2013). Therefore, free trade did not only support neoliberal economics but also supported economic nationalism.

Moreover, the establishment of Chong Sa-Ngam Border Crossing was not aimed at either helping people cross the border freely or facilitating product transportation between the two countries. In contrast, it allowed the government to have more power to control the border-crossing area. For example, the government increased the rate of the goods transportation fee and checked documents of

border-crossers more strictly and systematically. For Cambodian people to be able to cross to Thailand, they had to present their passport to the border crossing point officials. Cambodian people did not agree with this idea. As a result, the establishment of the border did not necessarily help people of the two countries to cross the border more conveniently. Rather, it was a clever way to increase the government's power to control the people crossing the border. Another way to put it is that it supported national security instead of free trade policy.

In conclusion, it is unarguably that neoliberal economics brings about free trade in borderlands and allows more investments. On the other hand, I found that it is also adopted by Thai state as a discourse to increase their authority to strictly control the borderlands and grab more lands.

Borderlands Grabbing: State and its Power to Control Si Sa Ket Borderlands

According to Ben White et al. (2012) land grabbing is a process resulted from the relations between free trade in the world of capitalism and growth of developing countries. Such factors led to opportunities for land grabbing. Those who were involved in land grabbing had become the allies of government officials, powerful and wealthy local politicians, or both Thai and non-Thai business people. Moreover, the state played an important role in land grabbing in the globalized world. In other words, the government had extended its power to rule and control those areas more by renting big plots of land that had not been governed by the government yet. Therefore, we should not overlook the importance of the government's role in the capitalism era.

What needs to be discussed further is which roles different parties involved in borderlands grabbing in Si Sa Ket play. It was found that the government had the power to control land continuously and grabbed land from the locals who had utilized the land for a living for years. They had done so by referring to three sets of discourses; 1) national security discourse, 2) environmentalism discourse, and 3) development discourse.

Regarding national security discourse, when conflicts took place in border areas, the National Security Agency not only fought a battle with the neighboring countries, but also controlled the population and their land use. For example, the government had people evacuate from the areas they lived in and did not allow locals to do any agricultural activities in the reserved area.

Furthermore, when threats such as wars and communists were gradually eradicated, the government had policies to allocate borderlands to people who immigrated back to the border again as part of the establishment of a self-defense village program along the Thai-Cambodian border (Itthichot Chaungcham, 2004). The reason for this program is to maintain the government's power and to control the population and border. However, the government did not grant the right to the locals to legally own the land, because the presumptive title system of most lands along the Si Sa Ket Border were under the Sor Por Kor. 4-01 category. Such a system allowed the government to allocate land to farmers, but it had a mechanism to prevent them from selling the land. Nonetheless, the system did allow their descendants to have ownership rights.

As in the case of Fao Rai Village in Sao Thong Chai Sub-district, the villagers were notified of evacuation. It was claimed that the villagers had abandoned the land due to wars. This prevented them from doing any agricultural activities continuously since they were worried about their own safety and the properties. The government officials permitted them to temporarily evacuate. After that, the land in that

area was announced part of Khao Phra Wihan National Park. As a result, the villagers could not resettle in the land for any agricultural activities. However, some villagers still encroached upon the land so that they could use the land. This resulted in conflicts between local people and government officials. The locals gathered to reclaim their rights for land use, because after they lost the land to the government, their lives had become more of a struggle. Some of them had to grow cassava in smaller plots of land. Some had to sell flower garlands at the entrance of Preah Vihear Temple. Some locals had to ask their relatives if they could farm on their land. Furthermore, some plots of land were repeatedly claimed to be under ownership of some new occupiers, because they saw the land deserted by the previous occupiers who owned the land for agriculture. What is more, the investigation and verification process to find the true owner of the land had been complicated and has been prolonged until now.

During the 1940s the Si Sa Ket border area was announced as a “protected forest” Later, it was changed from a “protected forest” to “national forest reserve” upon the announcement of section 36 under the National Reserved Forest Act B.E. 2507. Consequently, the forest in Si Sa Ket Border was also controlled under the discourse of environmentalism. In addition, Phanom Dong Rak Wildlife Sanctuary, Huai Sala Sanctuary, and Khao Pra Wihan National Park were announced wildlife sanctuaries. The three designated areas covered 516,250 Rai. The designation of such areas caused loss of land for many local people. Moreover, some people faced land tenure conflicts so they could not construct a house or grow any plants.

In addition, border-land grabbing by the government was based on the discourse of border development. The case of a border area in Prai Pattana indicated that the government use the development discourse as a condition to grab the land from the locals. A village head told us that when he first moved to Sae Prai Village, he inherited some plots of land from his father. The land is part of a rainforest rich in wild animals. Later in 1994, some part of his inherited land had become part of Huai Samran Reservoir. The reservoir caused flooding in large area belonging to other locals. The government officials constructed the reservoir without public hearings. It was a government policy that neglected the locals’ interest. The government decided to construct the reservoir there because the flooded area was part of the rainforest which was owned by the government. Even though some locals owned part of the land with the Por. Bor. Tor. 5 title deed, the government took the land from them with 5,000 baht per Rai paid as compensation. They required the affected locals to sign the receipt in advance. Instead the government only gave them 300 baht per Rai for compensation.

As mentioned above, the government had played an important role in controlling and grabbing land from people who owned the land before. Their voices were silent and they had lacked land rights. Even though some local people worked together to call for their land rights, their long existing problems have not been solved.

Struggling Against Land Grabbing and Land Control from the Government

Even though the government had made an effort to strictly control Si Sa Ket borderlands, the rise of market economy had made it even more challenging for the government to control the land. The local people had shed hope of regaining their borderlands farms due to their continuously increasing value in terms of both the land use and price.

The emergence of recent cash crops such as rubber had made the borderlands a target for land grabbing

which in turn brought about the increase of land price. The continuously increasing price of rubber helped farmers to invest in rubber plantations. At the same time, there are more needs for land use. Furthermore, outsiders such as investors, government officials, and some people from the south of Thailand had become more interested in Si Sa Ket borderlands. They had bought the land in the border areas. Some kept the land they bought and held onto it to make it more profitable for sale. Some of them purchased the land for agricultural activities. This heightened the land price and it attracted more and more land investors to buy the land and hold it for profits. They purchased increasing amounts of land starting from three to five Rai. Some people could purchase up to 60-70 Rai of land. People invested in rubber plantations in large areas of land and some of the land was turned to palm oil plantations. However, some land had also become wasteland.

Although readable research on land grabbing has tried to point out that local people were affected by the land grabbing and manipulated by the government, the case of Si Sa Ket borderlands revealed another interesting set of information. In fact, local people took part in land grabbing. In other words, local people struggled to find new land for their agricultural activities in the forms of protected national forest encroachment, communal land encroachment and governmental land encroachment. In particular, the increasing price of rubber motivated local people to take part in land grabbing to increase their income. Those households whose land adjoins the community forest had moved their land boundary line into the area of the community forest from one to two meters every year. When one household started doing it, others tried to do the same thing too.

Moreover, problems concerning land grabbing had become more complex. Some investors encouraged local people to encroach on the protected national forest land and community forest land. Investors bought rubber tree seedlings for local people to grow. When the trees could produce the latex, the money they made from selling the latex was divided into two parts. Studies found that some systems of local power built a connection with households that had pioneered the land for agricultural activities. Those influential people were from well-known clans. To grab the land, they used the system of family relationships as a tool for land encroachment. Local people had compared the land encroachment by those influential people to a Chinese movie called "Warriors of the Yang Clan" in which one of the clans in the movie was very widely influential and powerful.

Regarding Si Sa Ket borderlands, it was found that local people repelled land grabbing by the government in various ways. One example is that some people crossed the border to Cambodia to purchase the land and moved there to make a living. They did this through marriage to the Cambodian people. They did so because the borderlands were limited and their price had been continually increasing. Furthermore, the government did not allow local people to increase the amount of their land for agricultural activities through the policy of environmental preservation in the border areas. Such policies resulted in the control of land extension for agricultural activities. However, not everyone who moved to Cambodia was as successful as they expected. For example, some people sold their land in Thailand and moved to Cambodia along with all their possessions. They married Cambodian people, but had an unsuccessful married life. They divorced their Cambodian spouse, had failed at building a new life, and had lost their properties. However, some people were fortunate enough to have married the right people, so that they could live a secure life and settle down in Cambodia.

In addition, it was found that the villagers fought back against the land grabbing through the

empowerment strategy. To elaborate, members of a village that I talked to tried to purchase the land back from the land grabbers. At first, they agreed with the idea that they need a community market in which the villagers can sell their own products to earn more income. Therefore, the villagers held a meeting and started fundraising. From the fundraising, they received 120,000 baht, 90,000 of which was spent for purchasing 7 Rai of land from the absentee landlord. That piece of land is perfectly located by the paved road to Chong Sa-Ngam Border Crossing.

There was another way that the effected villagers could find other possible jobs in order to feed their families after they had lost their land and did not have enough land to make a living as a result of the government land grabbing. In 1998, the villagers had to lose their own farms to the government after the demarcation of the Khao Phra Wihan National Park on their land. Inevitably, some of them went out of the village to find work as day laborers. Some of them formed a Klong Yao or traditional Isan long-drum music band. Apart from the cultural inheritance, the members think that it is a part-time job for them to gain extra income. Being recognized and receiving an award from the district contest, the band was regularly hired to perform in different places. The money they earned from each performance was equally distributed to every member after the deduction of expenses.

Therefore, the strategies the villagers used to fight back against the land grabbing varied, namely grabbing the land back from the government, seeking cross-border land ownership, using community empowerment strategy to buy the land back from the land grabbers, or finding other possible jobs to do. All of these activities show that border land grabbing is not undertaken through non-participatory processes, but includes the villagers' fight and negotiation as a counterattack against the government's land grabbing and controlling power over the borderlands.

Concluding Remarks

It can be concluded that the power manipulated by state to control and manage the borderlands has been shaped by the combination of nationalism and neo-liberalism. Firstly, the government's authority over the borderlands is exercised through the law control, law enforcement and violence under the discourse of the nation-state and nationalism. Moreover, the government tried to persuade people that economic globalization could significantly encourage the flow of products, investment, and people within the border areas. In fact, the free border agreement has been exploited as a tool for the government to exercise their power to control and manage the border areas. In other words, the government was granted the power and authority to establish a "special trade area," as it claimed that it would meet the country's need of cross-border trading. Consequently, the government can interfere with and manage the border areas by itself in order to control all activities. So, it is not a free trade area as it was claimed to be. The government's use of national security, environmentalism, and development discourses seems to have been successful in establishing state power over the borderlands as well as continuing its role in borderland management. Moreover, the government could extend their power over the border areas by expanding the free trade market areas. At the same time, the villagers also tried different strategies to regain ownership of the land again after losing it to the land grabbers. These strategies include seeking cross-borderland ownership, intruding on public land, buying the land back through community empowerment programs and changing their careers. This shows the intense circumstances of land grabbing in these areas; despite the government's increasing power over the borderlands, the villagers

are fighting back in different ways. However, the transforming borderlands also attracts more and more outsider investors who aim at owning more and more land even though the government exhibits free hold over the lands in this border area. In other words, even if the government is very powerful, there are ways for the villagers to fight back. The conflict between the government and the villagers is still intense. The government exploits the concept of nationalism and neoliberalism in order to increase its power over the borderlands. However, the government's power is persistently defended and challenged by both investors and villagers. Consequently, the borderlands conflicts are never stabilized but very dynamic. The border land grabbing in Si Sa Ket continues quietly, but the conflicts are intense and ongoing.

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Cultural Resources Management of the Street Culture: A Study of Promoting and Preserving on Crafts in the Night Walking Street Market in Chiang Mai Province, Thailand¹²⁹

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Abstract

In the context of tourism, crafts and handmade products are highly consumed compared to other products. Along with the trend of the night markets in Chiang Mai, crafts and local products are undoubtedly valued. In consequence, Chiang Mai Municipality has been promoting Chiang Mai Night Walking Street Market as “the street culture” in the interest of maintaining and presenting Lanna culture. The aims of this paper are to examine the processes of cultural resource management as well as its impact on crafts and handmade products in the street culture. This study is being formed on an ethnographic study, which is a pilot study conducted in August 2014 and from August to October 2015. The objects of the stated pilot study are to survey, observe, participate, and interview in order to collect general information and data analysis. As a result, the local government made strictly rules and regulations in order to regulate this area especially promoting and preserving on crafts. Therefore, the effective rules and regulations help reorganize the management system and the crafts or OTOP products that sold on the Night Walking Street Market, which advantage the promotion, presentation, and preservation of cultural resources in Chiang Mai Province.

Keywords: cultural resource management, cultural preservation, crafts, street culture

Introduction

“Ten Wonderfulness of Lanna at Tha-Pare” is the campaign of the Night Walking Street Market. It has been promoted by Chiang Mai Municipality as “the street culture” to support cultural tourism in Chiang Mai City since 2002. This street culture is known as the center of local products, arts, paintings and Lanna culture arranged by both local people and ethnic groups in Chiang Mai Province. There have been a large number of domestic and international tourists visiting Chiang Mai and its street culture. According to the statistics of tourism in Chiang Mai in 2015, the numbers of tourists increased approximately 7.18 percent (from 6,928,155 to 7,425,772).

¹²⁹ This paper is based on a master thesis on the title “Cultural Representation: A comparative studies of the Night Walking Street Market and the Night Bazaar in Chiang Mai Province, Thailand.” Cultural Resource Management Program, Kanazawa University, Japan (2016).

Local government established the Night Walking Street Market by applying the urban development approach and the urban space management to be in accordance with the community life. In the first phase (2002), the local government received a budget from the Department of Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) and the National Energy Policy Council (NEPC) to operate the project with three objectives; to save energy, to decrease pollution, and to support tourism in Chiang Mai City. Additionally, the JSL Company was appointed to run all activities on this project under the local government's control. With the slogan "Give back life to the villagers. Give back roads to the rovers." the local government tried to present Lanna tradition and ways of live by managing the street culture's activities in their first move. Besides, they also raised the campaign mentioned above in order to save energy, decrease pollution, and support cultural tourism. In the second phase, Chiang Mai Municipality had a commitment to continue and run on this project on every Sunday night from 14th April to 24th August 2002, instead of JSL Company, which had been campaigning *"Ten Wonderfulness of Lanna at Tha-Pare"* for only ten weeks.

In 31st August 2002, the local government developed the underground public utility along Tha-Pare road in order to improve its landscape. Therefore, the Night Walking Street Market was moved from Tha-Pare road to Rachadamneon road instead. Since then, Rachadamneon road, which is approximately 1.5 kilometers long, has been known as the street culture as well as because of its reputable historical location. On Rachadamneon road, the Three King Monument area is organized as "Kuang Culture" with a view to exhibit Lanna performances and presentations. Associated with the local government, there was a strong network with the cooperation of many sectors, for example, public sector, a private sector, media sector (mass communication) and religious sector (temples). Apparently, the street culture have been organized as one among activities to uphold Chiang Mai identity by emphasizing the beauty of the community's life, arts, and traditional Lanna culture. Unquestionably, it built up touristic destination. Along with other aspects of tourism, the economic and distributional benefits of crafts and handmade products were being concerned. In that event, the local government has been encouraging the community economy to promote and preserve crafts and handicrafts products.

As mentioned above, one of the objectives of the Night Walking Street Market is to support tourism in Chiang Mai City. The local government obviously presented the local life and Lanna culture through various activities, such as selling handicrafts, displaying arts and performances, as well as cooperating with native Lanna and ethnic sellers. Respectively, this paper proposes to examine the processes of cultural resource management and its impact on crafts and handmade products in the street culture. It leads to the following unanswered questions; 1.) How the local government (Chiang Mai Municipality) manages the Night Walking Street Market as the street culture? 2.) How does the management system effects crafts and handmade products?

Review of Theories and Concepts

The concept of cultural resource management is a guideline to manage cultural properties. It aims to sustain cultural resources and benefits of humankind (Chittaworn, 2015). The Night Walking Street Market is a case study. Noticeably, it reflects cultural resource management which supported by a local government policies, regulations, and the public finance. Not only that, the Night Walking Street Market is also a highlight spot for local people and some ethnic groups to offer their crafts and handmade

products. In order to draw a conceptual framework, a number of related theories, concepts, and studies are stated as follows.

The Meaning of Cultural Resources Management

The Cultural Resource Management is normally known as “CRM.” It was originated from the natural resources management concept, such as water conservation and forest conservation. Cultural resource refers to a valuable, representable, or conveyable object made by humankind or characterized by a cultural system (in the past and the present). It also includes the remaining manmade objects. Inscribe, archaeological site, historical site, language, religious tradition, ritual, belief, and folklore are some examples. Besides, natural substances that were not created by a human but convey cultural meaning, such as fossil, pollen, water resource, soil, and stone are also included. In some countries, a cultural resource might be defined in various ways, including cultural property, cultural asset and cultural heritage (Thanik Lertcharnrit, 2011: 12, 14).

However, Thanik Lertcharnrit (2011:19) mentioned that cultural resources have broad implications in terms of the main contents, which cover both tangible cultural resources and intangible cultural resources. “Management” means to execute and operate something with science and art, while “resource” means something that exists and can be useful. Therefore, resource management (including cultural resources and natural resources) covers the science and art of operating something that exists to benefit humankind in the present and in the future.

Classification of Cultural Resources

In referring to UNESCO; there are two kinds of cultural resources (Thanik Lertcharnrit, 2011:21), tangible cultural resources and intangible cultural resources.

Tangible cultural resources are visible and touchable things. Buildings, archeological sites, places/districts, and fossils or natural resources which affect human beings in various ways (used as food, raw materials for households, in ritual and community locations) are some examples.

Intangible cultural resources are practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills, as well as the instruments, objects, artifacts and cultural spaces associated with communities, groups, and in some cases, individuals recognized as a part of their cultural heritage (UNESCO, 2003).

The Value of Cultural Resources

The situation report of the Region 8 Environmental Office in 2008 discussed the value of cultural resource as something that was created and valued by a human. Therefore, it can be defined in different ways based on social environment, historical culture, and the adoption purposes of a group or an individual.

Symbolic Value – a cultural resource (tangible and intangible) which is similar to a mnemonic or a symbol of the past and the present. It conveys the meanings of cultural resources or identities of socials, groups, as well as individual. Some recognized examples are red light means stop, an image of Buddha means Buddhism, and pyramid means Egypt.

Informational Value – a cultural resource in terms of sources of information, data, and knowledge that human can learn, educate, and adapt in their daily lives. For instance, archeology, history, and architecture, which are systematic research, appropriate educational procedures, and methods.

Aesthetic Value – a special attribute of a resource such as a shape, design, clay body, quality, and raw material. These attributes are based on cultural background, taste, and standard of an individual or a culture.

Economic Value – a cultural resource which has utilitarian value. It can be used as a workplace, a food container, a tool, a shelter, a recreational area, and a tourist attraction and so forth. Utilizing cultural resources can be taken as an example as it emphasizes *the business of nostalgia*, which is a popular commerce in nowadays.

Spirit Value – a cultural resource used as a tool to present identities of a community, a village, a sub-district, a district, a province or a state as a symbol of an ethnic group or provincial seal.

Market Value – a cultural resource which is considered as a good spot in engaging trade, dwelling unit, investment or leasing. It is similar to an economic value of a business.

Community Value – political benefits, minority or local style benefits are some examples of community value.

Human Value – a cultural resource which reflects an environmental value, archaeological value. It is also used to educate a human history.

The Methods of Conservation and Preservation Cultural Resources

Conservation and perseveration cultural resources (tangible and intangible cultural resource) can be divided into at least two primary principles. Firstly, the cultural resource is a shared resource that a human can equally and fairly gain benefits. Main ideas of this principle are a nurture of love, an awareness in culture, and a mutual conservancy of cultural resources. Secondly, the cultural resource diverges in relation to history, role, function, significance, spirit, and physical aspects. Therefore, the diversity of cultural resources must be taken into one's consideration when it comes to conserving and preserving cultural resources (Thanik Lertcharnit, 2011: 178).

There are several ways to achieve these principles. In this paper, the significant measures and methods involved in the street culture phenomenon will be focused as follows:

1. Reservation and Restoration

A principle of cultural resources conservation, especially the objects of cultural resources, is taking repairing into consideration rather than replacing. However, repairing or maintaining those resources must be carried out by expert specialists in relevant fields.

2. Law and Regulatory Controlling

The legislation to control, dissuade, and condemn a person, who involves in antiquities trade is one method of a cultural resource conservation and preservation. In some countries, the archeologists, the scholars, the lowers, NGOs, and the governors place a concern on the objects and antiques. If the objects are classified as cultural heritage of humankind, they can be lost and destroyed. Therefore, various measures includes a new legislation and the old law amendment are placed in aiming to protect those

valuable objects and antiques.

3. Public Participation

Public participation is accepted as an essential in cultural resources management processes. It leads to a positive impact on managing cultural resources. Not only that, it particularly leads to the realization of mutual ownership and mutual benefits of cultural resources to decrease a conflict, as well as the opportunities for individuals, groups, ethnic groups to express their right equally in a management system.

4. Creating an Alliance

The cooperation of alliance is one of the methods with an aim to conserve and preserve sustainable cultural resources. This method is an interaction between local, state and international levels in disseminating knowledge of the cultural resources. Moreover, it helps in decreasing the cultural differences problem, creating peace in coexistence, as well as avoiding wars between groups and ethnic groups to occur.

5. Imitation

Creating an imitation, an illusion or a copy of something can be positively useful. By taking Egypt as an example, a source of the antique reproduction has been offering to the tourists. It becomes ideally popular and a local community is also satisfied with the benefits. Additionally, the Egypt government and the historians are not opposing because the imitation helps decrease illegal excavations and antiques thefts. Therefore, imitation, replica, and reproduction are not always negatively influential.

Conceptual Framework




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

The concept of cultural resource management is applied in this paper to analyze the phenomenon of the Night Walking Street Market in nowadays. The conceptual framework describes the process of the management system and the promotion on crafts which have been controlling by Chiang Mai Municipality. Specifically, this management system emphasizes on the strict rules and regulations to regulate the products selling area, which are local-ethnic-imitation products in particular, with the aim to promote crafts and OTOP products of Chiang Mai Province. Bring ones of cultural resources, crafts and OTOP products represent both cultural value (symbolic value, aesthetic value, spirit value, community value), and economic value (market value).

Methodology

This paper is based on my master thesis which I used ethnography as the primary method of the study. A pilot study was between August 2014 and August 2015 in Chiang Mai City. I carried out twenty cases of semi-structured and in-depth interview of the sellers (local people and ethnic vendors). Not only that, I also participated and observed their activities on the Night Walking Street Market, and I had informal conversation with officials of the department of Tourism Authority of Thailand (Chiang Mai office) and municipal inspectors responsible for the Night Walking Street Market. The ages of key informants with whom I spoke in in-depth interviews ranged from twenty-fifth to sixty years. Some of the informants are the students, governors, locals, and ethnic groups. All the interviewees are both from local community in Chiang Mai municipality area and local ethnic groups from the other districts in Chiang Mai Province.

Historical Background of the Street Culture and Promoting on Crafts in Chiang Mai City

The street culture and promoting on crafts in Chiang Mai City involved with the history of tourism development policy in the northern region in Thailand. Chiang Mai had changed gradually due to the urbanization process that began somewhere around the middle of the twentieth-century. In 1960, under the Thailand's first five-year economic plan, there was the birth of a bowling alley, cinemas, as well as massage parlors and brothels around Chang Klan area, which evoked about night market that sold food to customers at night. Meanwhile, the goods such as northern-style dress and textiles, woodcarvings, wickerwork, and other handicrafts started to become popular, especially, among booths and stalls selling tourist goods and souvenirs. Gradually, Tha Phae Road is near Chang Klan Road. It is an important business center where there are many old temples, shops silk and cotton (Apinya, 2008). Moreover, Tha Phae Road is the main road which leads to the railway station, which attracts people who traveling to Chiang Mai. In 1968, the Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) opened the first regional office in order to promote Chiang Mai's tourism and its potential as a secondary international destination from Bangkok. The promotion aimed to present Chiang Mai's historical sites, Lanna culture, lively handicrafts productions and the ethnic groups (Trupp, 2015, Pirote, 2011). The development and the future potentials of international and domestic tourism led to the establishment of two institutions (Trupp, 2015), including the Old Chiang Mai Cultural Center and the Night Bazaar.

The Old Chiang Mai Cultural Center was established in 1971 at Wau Lai Road. It has offered Khantok dinners as well as the northern Thai and dancing performances of ethnic groups. This institution was the first spot for highlanders and it brought to producing and selling handicrafts and souvenirs to tourists.

According to Trupp's study on the development of ethnic minority souvenir business (Akha ethnic group in particular), highlighted that the old Chiang Mai Cultural Center offered employment opportunities to highland ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, the hiring offers were under the low salary for dancing and singing. On the other hands, these minorities targeted to increase their income. Thus, they began offering the products such as bought or borrowed old bags, jackets or leggings from the village and distributed them to handicraft and souvenir shops in town, or sold them themselves at the Night Bazaar. The Night Bazaar Building was established in the mid-1980s. It is located on Chang Klan area between the historical city center and the Ping River. This market is one of the biggest tourist attractions in Chiang Mai. It offers crafts and souvenirs along the roadsides. Initially, there has been a local people from Sankampang district selling goods at the roadside. Then, Hmong and Akha ethnic minorities from the Old Cultural Center started to join this market to sell their product as tourist goods and souvenir. In 1975, there was a statement from TAT to describe the Night Bazaar as below:

1. It emerged from the local trader from Bor Sang and Sankampang district who had enough free time and wanted to find a hobby by selling local handicrafts on the sidewalk.
2. It emerged because it was similar to a destination where the customers from outside were transferred there by coach buses. Therefore, as an important transport link, Chang Klan Road has become a connecting point between insiders and outsiders of Chiang Mai City. At the same time, Chang Klan Road began to grow and it attracted local products sellers who used to be centered only on Tha Phae area. (Pirote, 2011: 75, Translated by the author)

In 1980, the industry tourism was strongly promoted. Besides, the development policies of highland were supported by government and non-government. Moreover, there were ethnic groups resettling in Chiang Mai and running their private companies such as selling authentic tribal art and cultural goods. As a result, the Night Bazaar became a highlight spot of crafts and local products. Moreover, the success in selling crafts and local products in the Night Bazaar led to the street culture, which has known as the Tha Phae Night Walking Street Market, or the Sunday Night Walking Street Market.

The Night Walking Street Market was established in 2002 under the Taksin Shinawatra government. At first, they tried to apply this idea at Sri Lom road in Bangkok on the project of "Seven Wonderfulness" which held only seven days on Sri Lom Road with the objectives in decreasing the pollution problems, saving energy, and promoting people to exercise. The result was really successful. After finishing the project of "Seven Wonderful" the government continued to operate this project by expanding this activity, especially in big cities of the regions. At the beginning, Chiang Mai Municipality held this event under the campaign of "Ten Wonderfulness of Lanna at Tha Phae" with the periods of ten weeks (once a week on Sundays' night) at Tha Phae Road. It had the same purposes of the event in Bangkok. Furthermore, they also encouraged economic of the local community by supporting the OTOP products sell. Obviously, the events presented Chiang Mai identities, the local community life, art and Lanna culture. These events attracted guests both domestically and internationally by offering difference activities on each week stated below:

Ordinal	Dates	Events
1	February 3, 2002	The beauty of flowers
2	February 10, 2002	The beauty of paintings
3	February 17, 2002	The beauty of crafts
4	February 23, 2002	The beauty of dancing art
5	March 3, 2002	The beauty of music
6	March 10, 2002	The beauty of people
7	March 17, 2002	The beauty of knowledge
8	March 24, 2002	The beauty of local food
9	March 31, 2002	The beauty of Nakornping
10	April 7, 2002	The beauty of Thailand

Due to traffic problems and the landscape development of the Tha Phae Road, the local government had to move to the walking street the Rachadamneon Road, which is located near Tha Phae Road and Tha Phae Gate around the old city center. The action was placed after finishing the campaign of “Ten wonderful of Lanna at Tha Phae”. The details about the management system of this market will be described in the next section.

In 2003, there was a cooperation of three communities including Sri Suphan, Nan Tharam, and Muensarn Community. They established the Wua Lai Night Walking Street Market which is located on Wua Lai Road. This night market has emerged because an effort of the communities to conserve and preserve lacquer work and silver as one of Lanna identities as well as folk wisdom. At present, the market is operated from 5 pm until midnight. There are small vending stalls and shops run by the local people and ethnic vendors. It is also one of the popular tourist attractions for its silverware, crafts, the authenticity ethnic products and souvenirs. Still, reproducing goods and fake products can also be found on this market.

These three night markets eventually become sources of art, crafts, and paintings. Nonetheless, they are the centers of local and ethnic goods which fascinated the visitors. Simultaneously, the flows of the street culture have been managed since 1960 with the economic growth and the tourism development policies. However, there are differences on the organizations of those markets that reflected on cultural resources management. Namely, they were controlled by difference sections as following: the Night Bazaar was organized by a private sectors, the Night Walking Street Market was managed by a government sector, and the Wual Lai Night Walking Street Market was controlled by communities. In terms of management processes along with promoting and preserving on crafts, the Night Walking Street Market is strictly regulated by rules and regulations, compared to other markets. I will point out the details of the organization system and discuss the cultural resources management of the Night Walking Street Market in the following steps.

The Management System in the Night Walking Street Market

In present, the Night Walking Street Market is regarded as the street culture, the center of local products, as well as the center of Lanna Culture. It has been providing several kinds of products recognized as Chiang Mai’s identities and Lanna culture. The examples of products are arts; painting,

postcard, clothing; ethnic costume, loincloth, scarves, sarong, decorations; silverware, bangle, ring, ears ring, others; bag, wallet, wickerwork, key ring, book mark, wooden toys, and notebook. Most of the goods are especially handmade and handicrafts products provided by both local and ethnic vendors. To understand more about this area, first, I will highlight the general situations of the Night Walking Street Market. Area management, shop allocation, and the establishment of the committee will be clarified. Then, I will point out the process of preserving and promoting crafts on this area.

Area Management

The Night Walking Street Market is located on the Rachadamneon road. Its distance is approximately 1.5 kilometers from Tha-Pae gate to Phra-Singh temple. It is divided into three parts. First, the Three Kings Monument area which presents exhibitions from both private and public sectors on every weekend. It is also an administration of rescue center, notification and service point. Second, an area along the Rachadamneon road composed of six zones; zone one is the back of Tha-Pae gate to Wat Phan On intersection; zone two is from Wat Phan On intersection to the middle of the city square; zone three is from Pra Pok kloa road to the square of Yupparaj Wittayalai School; zone four is from the middle of the city square to the square of Puttisopon School; zone five is from the middle of the city square to Muang Chiang Mai police station; and zone six is from the Muang Chiang Mai police station to Wat Phra Singh. Finally, there are 4 areas arranged for activities around the temples, including Wat Muen Lan, Wat Sam Pow, Wat Phan On, and Wat Phan Tao. The activities in and around the temples will be organized by the relevant temples. The activities are listening to sermons for young people, teaching young people about prayer activity, meditation activity, and a fresh-food market area, and more.

Shop Allocation

There are currently 3,000 shops at the market. The shops are allocated as, zone one, zone two, and zone three for traders who came from Tha-Pae Night Walking Street Market (Former area). Zone four and five are for traders who are from other cities. Zone six is for traders who live in the Chiang Mai municipal area.

Student's zone, which consists of 100 traders, is included among these zones. The student's zone is allocated at the middle of Zone 3, from the middle of the city square to the area in front of the Three Kings Monument. This specific area is for students to conduct their activities and sell handmade products. The student's zone is approximately 110 meters in length. There is a fixed schedule in every 3 months (or 12 to 13 weeks) for students to demonstrate or sell their products. The yearly schedule is as follows: period one from January to March, period two from April to June, period three from July to September, and period four from October to December.

Association and Participation of the Traders

After moving the street culture to Ratchadamneon Road, the management of this area has been strictly regulated. The local government invites the entrepreneurs and the vendors as members of the traders association to participate in meetings. The purpose is to elucidate details of rules and regulations in selling the products. At the same time, the members also choose a leader of each zone to accomplish and act upon the committee of the Night Walking Street Market. There are several responsibilities of a committee. Firstly, they are responsible for coordinating activities between vendors in the Night Walking

Street Market area and the staff of Chiang Mai Municipality. Secondary, they are responsible for observing their zones in order to regulate the rules and regulations of the traders in this area as well as to support and help the members to solve problems. Lastly, participating in meetings that are held by the Chiang Mai municipality is also appointed, along with other duties which are assigned and cooperated by the Chiang Mai municipality.

Cultural Resource Management in the Night Walking Street Market

The Night Walking Street Market can be defined in terms of both tangible cultural resource and intangible cultural resource. Tangible cultural resource is reflected through a historical site such as the old temple and the Three Kings Monument area. Moreover, the products that sold in this market are also classifiable as tangible cultural resource, including crafts, handmade products, OTOP products, and as well as ethnic goods. On the other hand, intangible cultural resource is specified as expression, representation, and acculturation. For example, northern-Thai dance performance, painting, folk wisdom products, or even a dressing of the vendors, and a spoken local dialect of Lanna and ethnic groups.

The Value of Cultural Resources

“The value of cultural resources is something that created and valued by a human.” This is the starting point to thinking about how the local government presented the value of cultural resource of this market. I classified the value of cultural resource to two ways, that is, cultural value and economic value. Cultural value consists of the following three values.

Firstly, a symbolic value which is a cultural embeddedness and a relation between human and cultural resource, especially in feelings and emotions. For instance, a relation between human and thing, building, and place that also involves the respect of tradition, legend, religion, and symbol. In case of the Night Walking Street Market, the symbolic value obviously reflected on the products. As I observed at some vendor stalls, the products in the market are shown or sold to represent Lanna culture and Chiang Mai provincial identities. These representational products are such as crafts and goods with elephant picture and stamped with the character of *Chiang Mai* or *Chiang Mai Night Market*. Besides, ethnic cultures are also represented in the market through “authentic” tribal goods, clothes, and the portrait paintings of ethnic women. Secondly, an aesthetic value which in this context means the beauty of Lanna culture and also the beauty of Chiang Mai City that are emphasized to localize such as setting shops and stalls on the sidewalk to express a local life. Lastly, a spiritual value which is a kind of passion or inspiration involved with the harmony of human. A spiritual value is sometimes utilized as an instrument to present community identity. In case of the Night Walking Street Market, the spiritual value of Lanna culture and Chiang Mai identity have been presented through various kind of activities, for example, northern-Thai dance, performance, and music instruments.

Economic value revitalizes community value. Currently, a tourism business of nostalgia is really popular in Thailand. The Night Walking Street Market is one of them, which is the cooperation of community and local government. The local government attempts to encourage the development projects of economic community and promote the local OTOP products. As a result, the Night Walking Street Market becomes a source to earn money for local people and increase community value. This project does not only help the local people, but also improves the surrounding landscapes and sceneries to be more attractive.

The Methods of Conservation and Preservation on Cultural Resource in the Night Walking Street Market

Reservation and Restoration

In cases of the Night Walking Street Market, the utilization of the historical sites is a kind of reservation and restoration. For example, the temples and the Three Kings Monument area are used as part of ceremonial space, food selling, as well as a free space for cultural exhibitions. *Kuang Lanna* is also a free space for children and amateurs to practice and perform their talents related with arts and culture.

Law and Regulatory Controlling

Promoting and preserving on crafts are the significant methods that the Chiang Mai Municipality attempts to build up this area as one of the source of local products and Lanna culture. To achieve these methods, they made some rules and regulations to regulate the participants strictly. I will focus on the important rules and regulations that impacted in this market.

"Products showed or sold in the Walking Street can be handicrafts, handmade goods, art crafts, special made goods, folk wisdom products, and similar products."

"Products which are unable to identify as handicraft or factory made should be demonstrated to the staff member, which includes the product process, related document and photographs of the product. The demonstration will prove that the product is made or adapted by that particular seller and it is allowed to be sold on the Walking Street."

These regulations obviously reflected the processes of production of the products sold at the Night Walking Street Market. I have interviewed the officer of TAT about these regulations and found that there are still some problems because some vendors are not following these regulations.

"The Night Walking Street tenants should wear local or native clothes which will be specified differently for each zone. Speaking local dialogue is highly promoted. Also, appropriate manners and clothes are recommended."

Dressing local or native clothes and speaking local dialect have been promoted in the market to generate local atmosphere and preserve local culture.

"Drinking and selling alcohols are prohibited in the Walking Street area. Smoking and other usage of addictive substance are also not allowed in the Walking Street area."

"Participants who join tenants on selling products on the Walking Street should be people whose names are on the house registration document in Chiang Mai province only. If the person emigrated to other provinces with the change of province information in the house registration document, that tenant will be considered as disclaimer. If the person emigrated to live in Chiang Mai with the change of province information in the house registration document to Chiang Mai, the emigration should be at least 1 year to be allowed to participate in the Walking Street area rental."

These strictly rules and regulations are effective in the Night Walking Street Market. As I interviewed the vendors, they told me the similar thing that no rental fees is required for selling the product in the market and so they could get more benefits from selling goods. Therefore, practicing and following these rules and regulations are not inconvenient for them.

Public Participation

As I have already mentioned before, the Night Walking Street Market is the cooperation of various sectors such as local government (Chiang Mai Municipality), private sector, media sector, and religious sectors. The cooperation of the vendors is also important in the management of the market.

Creating an Alliance

Creating an alliance can be defined as trading connection. The vendors in this market have broad connection in the essence of commerce relation. Some of them export products to other countries such as Japan, Korea, and even European countries.

Promotion of Ethnic Goods and Local Handicrafts

Ethnic goods and local handicrafts have been promoted in the Night Walking Street Market as a utilization of local and ethnic capitals such as skills, knowledge, and techniques of craftsmen and the preservation of folk wisdoms as well as cultural resources.

Conclusion

The popularity of the night markets has emerged since the establishment of the Night Bazaar in the mid-1980s. At first, there were a group of local vendors from Sankamphang district who offered their handicrafts at the sidewalk on Tha Phae Road. Then, other ethnic groups especially Hmong and Akha from the Old Chiang Mai Cultural Center have also started to sell their products in this area. Several ethnic groups provided their “authentic” tribal clothes and accessories as goods for tourists. Since 1980s, the local economy in Chiang Mai City has been growing, in the same time; tourism industry has heavily been promoted. In 2002, Thailand under Taskin government attempted to stimulate Thai people to exercise by walking. This starting point led the first Night Walking Street at Sri Lom Road in Bangkok. After that, Chiang Mai Municipality created this project with the campaign of “The Wonderfulness of Lanna at Tha Phae” with the objectives to save energy, to decrease pollution, and to support tourism in Chiang Mai City.

The Night Walking Street Market is a successful case in terms of a cultural resource management. The local government made strictly rules and regulations to regulate this area especially promoting and preserving on crafts. These rules and regulations regulated the management system, the organization, as well as the structure of the market. Moreover, it also controls at a practical level of the vendors, particularly in producing of goods that represent indigenous culture, selling local and ethnic clothes, and speaking in local and ethnic dialect. Therefore, the effective rules and regulations help reorganize the management system and the crafts or OTOP products that sold on the Night Walking Street Market, which advantage the promotion, presentation, and preservation of cultural resources in Chiang Mai Province.

Promoting and preserving on crafts in the street culture are successful due to a well organization and

management system as well as a regulatory for the participants. Thus, I assume that this idea is applicable in bringing the streams of domestic and international visitors to the Night Walking Street Market in other sub-districts, districts, and provinces in Thailand.

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Contested Legitimacy on Land Access: Double Movement in SEZs: Case Study in Tak, Chiang Rai and Trat Province

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Abstract

One clear result of the Special Economic Zones policy in Thailand is the contested legitimization of different groups of actors in order to increase their power to exclude other actors from accessing land. Parallel legitimacies found in this study include those developed by people, government agencies, local governance organizations, whereby each set of actors build legitimacy to protect and exclude other actors from accessing land and also to negotiate for their interests. This research has developed the following findings on the way different groups build legitimacy in accessing land.

(1) Legitimation by the state, including the central state (military regime), local and national government agencies, using special powers (s 44), laws, and regulations to capitalize land as assets, by excluding one group of actors from land in order to transfer it to another set of actors.

(2) Counter legitimization by ordinary people. In the case of the Mae Sot Special Economic Zone in Tak province, local people developed a group identity as a means to build up their power and establish a negotiating platform. They built legitimacy through the use of public space and by relying on laws and state regulations, to delegitimize the government's actions. (3) Counter legitimization between state agencies. In the case of the Mae Sai Special Economic Zone in Chiang Rai province, the Thai Tobacco Monopoly has been assigned the rights to use and benefit from the land. This state enterprise claims legitimacy in the national interest, based on the benefits that the state derives from growing tobacco, in order to argue their opposition to the use of the land by businesses in the Special Economic Zone. (4) Building legitimacy of negotiations to benefit the local people. In the case of the Khlong Yai Special Economic Zone, Trat province, local government organizations use legitimacy of their powers and responsibilities, their tourist income, the beauty of the coast to negotiate against any industrial development in the area.

Keywords: Special Economic Zone, Land dispossession, Land access, Double movement

1. Introduction

The establishment of the Greater Mekong sub-Region (GMS) in 1992, was the starting point of the inclusion of border cities in Thailand within the economic corridors in the Greater Mekong sub-Region. Since 2004, Thailand has proposed Special Economic Zones in the national development strategy, however it has not been able to push these through successfully, because opposition by local people against a Special Economic Zone in Chiang Rai province was taken up as a matter of common national interest to undermine the government then led by Thaksin Shinawatra.

The Special Economic Zones policy was dusted down once again after the military coup of 22 May 2014 through which the National Council for Peace and Order seized power. Under the powers of dictatorship (according to article 44 of the temporary constitution of 2014), the junta declared a plan for establishing 10 Special Economic Zones, by issuing Order number 17/2015 to reorganize land use and accelerate the development of Special Economic Zones. The main component of this Order specified that rights would be given to the private sector to be able to make use of state land for commercial and industrial investment. Secondly, it introduced amendments to the laws bringing in new exemptions to the rules restricting land allocation, the use of land, and investments in the areas which are established as Special Economic Zones. This was targeted at procuring state land, since after Special Economic Zones were declared, the price of private land in those areas immediately soared.

However, this land was already held, without land certificates, by local people and used for settlement and farming. The state therefore used the legitimacy of their rights under law to show their ownership of the land area. They also claimed the national interest in order to access the land. This led to conflict over the land between the state and villagers. However, claiming legitimacy was not just an issue of legality or illegality, it was also an issue of legitimacy in the access to and exclusion from the use of the land. Therefore the state was not the only party who sought to exclude people from the land, actions of exclusion may have arisen from the original settlers of the land, or the people whose rights were torn from them, in the process of push-back and resistance to the state's process of exclusion.

The main aim of this research study was to try to understand how the various actors involved in these struggles, whether they are state actors from national or local government, or local groups, build legitimacy in accessing land and excluding certain other groups from access to land. This study was carried out in three case study areas, in Tak, Chiang Rai, and Trat provinces. We began by studying the history of the land and changes in the land rights regime from the opening up of border trade until the time of the Special Economic Zones policy. We tried also to study forms of legitimacy used by the state to exclude certain parties from accessing land, as well as the forms of parallel legitimacy and negotiation by villagers in order to protect their land rights. We collected information from research studies, related documents, and the collection of field data by interviewing relevant actors.

This study considers the term legitimation following the framework of the work "The Power of Exclusion: Land Dilemmas in Southeast Asia" by Hall, Hirsh and Li (2011) to analyze access and exclusion by the state and counter exclusion by people in the local areas were facing the loss of their land. This study distinguishes four types of exclusions (1) regulation (2) force (3) market and (4) legitimation.

Regulatory exclusion can refer either to a formal or informal determination of access or exclusion. This has four different aspects in relation to land: Statutes that set land boundaries, the determination of land-use classifications according to law, determining ownership and land use rights according to the

different characteristics of land, and establishing criteria to underpin the claims of rights of individuals, households, groups or government agencies.

Forced exclusion is at the heart of regulation. The modern state tends to use force in claiming rights of the state. The state is the only actor which uses the force of the law. However at the same time, the use of force is not monopolized by the powerful and well connected, poor people also use the power of force.

Market exclusion. Building up market power is clearly very important in the dynamics of access to and exclusion from land. For example. The price of land is a primary determinant of who can and cannot access land. Similar to other powers mentioned above, markets do not come to exist by themselves, their existence relies on regulation, force, and legitimation.

Legitimation is an important supporting factor in determining the form of different types of exclusion. This can be in setting up a yardstick for arguments about rights, in ensuring strong regulations and the capacity to enforce them, and in building up market power, in making it legal to exclude [people], and in various discourses which tend to be directly related to the conflict with the other side. The discourse between the state and the people may arise from the mobilization of landless people claiming rights to land. At the same time, the goal of development in the national interest leads to the seizure of people's assets for the construction of dams or large-scale commercial plantations, claiming scientific knowledge or efficient administration and management (along with liberalization of the land market) In building legitimacy of exclusion.

2. The Dynamics of the Land Rights Regime in Border Cities

Starting from the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the geography of the Thailand's border cities has been transformed from a battlefield into a market place. One result of the establishment of the Greater Mekong sub-Region (GMS) In 1992 was to enlist the border towns of Thailand to become part of the economic corridor plans in the Greater Mekong sub-Region which began in the year 2000. These included the East-West Economic corridor, the North-South economic corridor, and the southern economic corridor¹³⁰. The Ayeyawady-Chaophraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) in 2013 also had an impact in facilitating the access to land for private investors from various countries.

Furthermore, Thailand pushed for the establishment of Border Special Economic Zones as well as the industrial estates in the provinces of Chiang Rai, Mukdaharn, Trat, Tak (Tsuneishi, 2005), focusing most on Chiang Rai. The efforts of the government to set up Special Economic Zones and industrial estates were more evident in border cities than in other provinces.¹³¹ This brought significant change to the way

¹³⁰ In 2011, the ADB Added another six corridors were linked to these. These were the North Corridor, the West Corridor, the Eastern Corridor, the North-Eastern Corridor, the Central Economic Corridor and the South Coastal Corridor (ADB 2011).

¹³¹ A Cabinet Resolution on 9 November 1999 approved the plan for Special Economic Zones in the border areas, as proposed by the National Economic and Social Development Board following their study of 271 projects with an approximate value of 22.936 billion baht In 20 cities, 13 provinces, extending over 10 years (1999 to 2008). A further Cabinet Resolution on 19th of March 2002 approved a master plan to carry out development of 13 principal border cities. This also authorised pilot projects in three cities - Chiang Saen, and Mae Sai, both in Chiang Rai province in the North, and Sadao in Songkhla province in the South.

land was held and used in the border areas of the country, and caused land to change hands. Local wealthy individuals and politicians, and external investors played a part in buying land for various purposes, including for speculation, setting up businesses, trade and services, tourism, resorts, guesthouses, and commercial agriculture, influenced by the expansion of cities, zones for business and commerce, new factories for industry, and the policy promoting commercial crop production.

Prior to the first National Economic and Social Development Plan (1961) was a period of pioneering land for agriculture. Ownership of land was originally based on reservation (*jab jong*) and clearing of land. In the example of the border area of Mae Sod, in Tak province, it appears that the city of Mae Sot was established around 1861-1862. The first ethnic group to settle here were the Karen. People started to move into this area increasingly to the point where Mae Sot was established as a District in 1898. Some of the Northern Thai people who came to trade in Mae Sot city, settled in the village of Wangtakhian in Tha Sai Luad Sub-district (one of our case study areas), buying land from the original settlers who had cleared the land before them. They used the land for cultivation, planting rice, sugarcane, tobacco and planting vegetables for their own consumption. The land rights regime recognized the rights of people who reserved the land only after they had made use of it. In the Mae Sai area, Chiang Rai, it was found that migrants moved into the area around 1907. Villagers in the area of Pong Pha Sub-district used the land to grow paddy rice for their own consumption. At the end of the rice harvesting season, the villagers used to go to work in the tobacco plantations for the Tobacco Monopoly station.

Transfers of land reached their peak during the government of Chatchai Choonhavan from around 1987, under his policy of "Transforming the battlefield into a marketplace". In Mae Sot District, the first Thai Burma Friendship Bridge was constructed over the Meuy River (known as the Tongyin in Burma), and the first crossings began from 1997. This led to an increase in land prices in the Mae Sai Luad sub-district. The construction of this Bridge was seen as symbolic of the end of border conflicts between Thailand and Burma. It is also considered the starting point of the era of economic links and trade in the border areas under the policy of the Thai government from the late 1990s onwards. This led to the buying of land for the speculative accumulation of assets in the area of Mae Sot District.

In the Mae Sai border area, during the process of building the railway from Denchai to Chiang Rai from around 1975 to 1976, groups of wealthy individuals bought up land without making use of it. Then from around 1989, there was boom in the price of land. Villagers rushed to sell their land (paddy fields) to traders both from the city of Mae Sai and from elsewhere. Land in the area of the Paholyothin Road was transformed from rice fields to become villages, resorts, commercial shops. Farmers in the sub-district of Pong Pha still grow rice to this day, 47% of the area of rice cultivation is rented (in the 2015-2016 season). All of the rice fields have full land title documents (*chanode*).

Prices of land in Mae Sot District rose yet again in the starting from 2007 when the government authorized the construction project of the second Thai-Burma Friendship Bridge in 2009, as part of the East-West economic corridor and in 2010, the government had a policy to develop a Special Economic Zone for Mae Sot¹³². The price of titled land increased to several million baht per rai. In particular, in areas which were clearly going to be in the path of the road and were close to the area of construction of the Bridge. Thus, in 2015, the average price of land in the district of Mae Sot increased by up to 92%. This

¹³² Matichon Online, 19 October 2010

was the highest increase compared with the Special Economic Zones in other provinces¹³³. Certain areas increased up to 600 times, even 800 times (Matichon Online newspaper, 2015). The type of land which changed hands included both land which had land certification documents and those which did not. Those who had accumulated land included both people who were from the local area of Mae Sot District and people from other provinces. buying and selling included both for accumulation and for the cultivation of rubber.

During the land pioneering years, villagers could go to notify their use of the land and would obtain a basic land use certificate known as (*SorKor1*). However not all villagers made this declaration. Also, land that was cleared after the original certificate was issued did not have land certificates. The National Reserve Forest and the Permanent Forest Estate were declared after the villagers had already begun making use of their land. Land certificates in this area include both properly and improperly issued land use certificates (*SorKor1*). *"In the period of 1975, 1979, certificates known as NorSor3kor began to be issued. Those who did not have cash were unable to obtain them. In those times, the elderly did not have money so they did not obtain SorKor1 or did not go to notify anyone of their use of land. For the most part, people who have land certificates were not those who held the land from the beginning. In most cases, the land had already been sold. Some used flying SorKors¹³⁴ to obtain NorSor3"* (interview with Mr Sunthorn Sribunma, 17th January 2017).

3. Creating the State of Exception, Access and Exclusion

Under the special political powers of the military regime, Special Economic Zones have moved forward very quickly by use of article 44, which has the effect of law. An Order 17/2015 was issued to create exemptions in the sections of the law which limited access to land by foreign investors. The government emphasized the state land, that is, land which was part of the Permanent Forest Estate, the National Reserve Forest, Public common land (*sataranaprayot*), and land governed by the Agricultural Land Reform Office. This was because speculation after the declaration of the Special Economic Zone had meant the price of privately held land had risen sharply.

In the initial phase of the Special Economic Zones policy, the NCPO government issued Order 17/2015, which created exemptions in sections of certain laws to convert the status of various categories of state land into government treasury land (*ratchapasadu*). This Order helped to eliminate certain conditions and limitations of leasing land to foreigners. Since the National Reserve Forest law, the Public interest land law, Agricultural Land Reform law and the Cabinet Resolutions for the allocation of permanent forest estate had many sections which regulate the use of land, including the determination of specific areas of land where leasing was allowed, the type of industries permitted, and the area of land, whereby if the area exceed 100 rai, it must be authorized beforehand by the Director-General of the Land Department.

Furthermore, another Order of the NCPO 3/2006, aimed at implementing the Special Economic Zones

¹³³ Press statement by Jakkrit Paraphatakul, Director of the Treasury Department, on the declaration of the use of the Land Valuation budget 2016 to 2019.

¹³⁴ The "flying SorKors" refers to the use of SorKor1 Certificates issued in one area [illegally] as justification for the applying for land title documents in other areas.

policy, created an exemption in the enforcement of another two other laws - the Urban Planning Law 2015 and the Buildings Control Act 1979 - as a means to speed up the establishment and administration of the Special Economic Zones. This process reflects that the government sought to capitalize its land as assets through the amendment and exemptions of certain provisions of the law which had previously presented obstacles. A follow on consequence of Order 17/2015, was the impact on land users in the area, whose land rights were withdrawn immediately. In the case of the Special Economic Zone of Mae Sot, an area of 2,182 rai was designated, according to the plan that was annexed to the Order. Whereas, even though the most of the land was officially Permanent Forest Estate, that is State land, under the normal process, local people are entitled to offer proof that they have rights to hold and use the land.

4. Creating and Defining Legitimacy in Accessing Land

4.1 Divergent Perspectives for Special Economic Zones; State and Local Businesses

The perspectives put forward by the state and local business people on the Special Economic Zones are divergent. The national government believes that the Special Economic Zones will create opportunities, preserve economic competitiveness, reduce development disparities, raise standards of living of the people, as well as increase border security, by increasing employment in border areas to help resolve the problems of foreign migrant labor (Charnvit Amatamathuchadt, 2015).

This differs from the perspectives of the local business people and business owners who view that the state's policy on the Special Economic Zones has not created opportunities for local business people, but rather has offered opportunities for wealthy groups from other areas. They say the role of local businesses has been diminished as a result of the implementation of the Special Economic Zones policy which is centralized and top-down in nature and relies on waiting for orders from the central government, more than ensuring participation and giving importance to the views of local business groups.

In the case of Mae Sot district, in Tak province, representatives from the Chamber of Commerce put forward the view that the state has given importance to the industrial sector, even though Mae Sot strengths' lie in border trade. Therefore, the state should promote and facilitate border trade, making it faster and improving its competitiveness, rather than promoting the industrial sector.

At the same time, in the case of the Special Economic Zone in Trat province, the Provincial Industrial Council pointed out that the province has a border with Cambodia's Pursat and Battambang provinces, which are important fruit producing regions for Trat province. In their view the state should announce a Special Economic Zone in Bor Rai district to promote investment by the private sector in processing industries for fruit for export. There is no need to set up factories in Khlong Yai district, when the raw materials are in Khao Saming and BorRai district. Furthermore, opening a permanent border trade crossing will not lead to any benefits for local businesses or villagers. Trat province will become merely a crossing point for transit as people from Cambodia will cross over to buy products directly from Bangkok. Furthermore in relation to labor, even though on the one hand, the government has spoken of the impact that they project that the Special Economic Zone will have on raising incomes for local people, in reality there has not been any clarity on the type of employment that will be generated, the terms and conditions, the knowledge and skills required, nor the number of people to be employed.

On the other hand, one of the objectives put forward by the government in setting up the Special

Economic Zones in the border areas, is to absorb cheap migrant labor from neighboring countries. In the case of the Special Economic Zone in Trat province, the expansion of the economy in Koh Kong province of Cambodia, for example through the establishment of the Special Economic Zone of Koh Kong in Cambodia has expanded the alternatives for Cambodian labor. This, combined with the strictness of the regulations on cross-border labor of the Thai Foreign Migrant Labor Regulations 2017, has meant that Cambodian migrant labor has gradually returned to their home country. This has meant that the factories in the fisheries sector have suffered a significant shortage of labor (interview with Mani Labhthamrong, Deputy Leader of Khlong Yai sub-district Administration Organization, 27 March 2017). The proposed Special Economic Zone seems unlikely to help generate incomes for local people. According to an interview with the President of the Industrial Council, given the centralized approach to promoting investment by large external investment groups, local business groups hardly have a chance to step in and take any substantial share of the benefits. *"In the case of the Special Economic Zone In Khlong Yai, the only benefits that the local people will have is feeding raw materials to the production process. Local businesses will not gain any of the main benefits."* (Interview with Pipat Rueksahakul, President of the Industrial Council, 28th June 2017).

4.2 Legitimizing Exclusion and Access to Land: State and People Lose Land Rights

In the case of the Special Economic Zone of Mae Sot, Tak province, the way in which the government legitimizes the exclusion of people from land and loss of their land rights is to use the law, accusing the villagers of encroachment on state land. They also claim that the fact that villagers do not have any lawfully issued land certificates means that they cannot claim land holding rights. Villagers in the area are seen as living on and holding land without rights certification documents. Paying local taxes and holding tax receipts (*porborthor5*) are not taken to be evidence of land rights. The government claim that some villagers sold rights to the land with only a *PorBorThor5*. Some brokers or investors bought up all the land to hold for speculative purposes and grew trees in order to take advantage of compensation on compulsory purchase. This land had been declared by the Cabinet as Permanent Forest Estate since 1983 as a reserve for the protection of natural resources or for other public interests. The communities are therefore abusing the law according to Sanchay Hatayatanti, Former governor of Tak province, (cited in Somchai Tak Governor and Team's Facebook page, 13 November 2015). As for the villagers who have lost their land, they have collected data on their land use and land holding which shows evidence both in writing and from witnesses who maintain that their landholding and land use has been continuous since before the declaration of its status as state land.

4.3 Legitimizing Exclusion and Access to Land: State and State Agencies

In the case of the Special Economic Zone of Mae Sai, Chiang Rai province, an area of land of 870 rai of government treasury land (*ratchapasadu*) has been demarcated along the Paholyothin Road, which is under lease to the Tobacco Monopoly of Thailand. This is an area which the government wants to develop for the Special Economic Zone given its high potential, as it is linked to the Paholyothin Road, and is only 4 km away from the second customs border post of Mae Sai. This would be convenient for the transfer of products to neighboring countries if an industrial estate is established for processing products, since it is close to sources of raw materials (Thansettakij newspaper, 16 February 2016). Tobacco has been grown in this area since approximately 1942. It is the Tobacco Monopoly's most

important source of high quality tobacco. Even though the status of the land is government treasury land (*ratchapasadu*), the Tobacco Monopoly obtained this piece of land by buying the land from the villagers and developing it as an area for cultivation of high-quality tobacco which generates significant income for the state. This is the basis given by the Tobacco Monopoly for its claims of legitimacy in excluding the government from accessing the land.

This area of government treasury land, is used by the Tobacco Monopoly to grow 500 rai of tobacco, an area of 150 rai has been designated as a Royal Project of Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn (Jakraphanphensiri centre), and an area of 220 rai is allocated to a centre for the promotion of learning and demonstration of tobacco cultivation. Taking this land for the purpose of this Special Economic Zone therefore has an impact on the Tobacco Monopoly's operation and the livelihoods of the growers of tobacco, as well as the incomes generated by the Tobacco Monopoly will send to the state. Therefore, the Federation of State Tobacco Enterprise Workers has raised this issue to argue that the state should be excluded from accessing land to set up the SEZ.

"This area of around 500 rai has been growing the best Virginia tobacco in Thailand for a long time, up to 70 years, this has generated incomes from the cultivation of tobacco of around 48.8 million baht per year, not counting the income from the special economic crops such as maize which the villagers grow as a rotational crop also of around 5.4 million baht. Therefore, if this area becomes part of the Special Economic Zone, tobacco factories will lose 400,000 kg of raw materials per year, which will increase production costs and will have an impact on profitability and the production of cigarettes for the international cigarette manufacturers. This will mean that the state will lose the vast income it gets from tax collection. In the 2015 fiscal year, this tax amounted to around 59.354 billion baht" (from the press statement of the Federation of State Tobacco Enterprise Workers, 22 March 2016) *"These three areas of tobacco cultivation have helped to reduce imports of tobacco leaves from other countries from 30% to only 3% per year, to the point where we aim to stop importing tobacco from other countries."* (Daonoi Suthiniphaphant Acting Director, Tobacco Monopoly, cited in Chaikhob newspaper, 27 June 2017).

The Tobacco Monopoly and the Federation of Tobacco Workers have therefore become important actors who have continuously held tobacco growing land in the district of Mae Sai, Chiang Rai province and derived benefit from it over a long period of time. The group of tobacco growers therefore use the legitimacy of the tobacco factory in excluding the state from the land and have collaborated with the Federation of State Tobacco Enterprise Workers so that they can continue to use the land to grow tobacco.

4.4 Legitimizing Negotiations for Local Interests: State and Local Governance Institutions

In the case of the Special Economic Zone in Trat province, the announcement that the status of the land had been converted from "public common land" (*sataranaprayot*) to government treasury land (*ratchapasadu*) was not met with consolidated opposition from villagers. However, this can be considered one area in which local governance institutions, specifically the Mai Ruud sub-District Administration Organization, played a role in negotiating to take part in the decisions to select enterprises that would not have a negative impact on the local area. It also served as a negotiation platform in dealing with the state agencies, local government and central government.

They used their status as a local government unit, which has power and responsibilities to protect and look after the interests of the local people in the area where the Special Economic Zone will be located. The sub-District Administration Organization of Mai Ruud has a role in determining which enterprises can take part in the Special Economic Zone, specifying that the enterprises coming in to invest must not have a negative environmental impact, enterprises such as tourism business or border trade. They also do not accept the establishment of industrial factories in the Special Economic Zone, since Mai Ruud Sub-district is a beach district, and one of Trat provinces' important tourist destinations, and has a border with Koh Kong province in Cambodia. *"The Special Economic Zone that will be set up in Mai Ruud sub-District must not be an industrial factory. Our area is on a trade border, we deal in trade, consolidating products for transport, and tourism. We have consistently put forward this issue, we have not emphasized industrial estate"* (interview with Kridpas Srisaengkajorn, Deputy Leader of the Mai Ruud Sub-district Administration Organization in Khlong Yai district, Trat province, 27 March 2017)

5. Parallel Legitimacies and Negotiations: Case study of Mae Sot Special Economic Zone, Tak Province

5.1 Identity and Establishing Negotiation Mechanisms

The first strategy which the villagers used has been to organize themselves into a group called *"Mae Sot Raksthin Group"* which translates as Mae Sot Local Preservation Group. This group was developed in order to be a mechanism for the negotiations with the local government and to show their identity to the public. Petitions in the name of the group were sent to various government agencies at almost every level. However, this did not lead to any of the changes demanded. On the contrary, the local government agencies used the mechanism of the *Mae Sot Raksthin group* as a means to negotiate informally with the leaders of the group to influence the members of the group to accept the compensation offered for the loss of their land. As a result, members of the group one by one began to withdraw their complaints, opposing the issuance of title deeds by the Ministry of Finance. Thus, the list of those opposed reduced from 33 to just 6 people, as the pressure of members accepting compensation one by one gradually influenced others, also in some cases, leaders took it upon themselves to influence members in the group themselves. This is because leaders received promises from the government that the boundaries would be adjusted so that a part of their lands and the village would be exempted from the SEZ area and villagers would be given rights to lease the land from the Treasury Department (this land is right on the boundary of the SEZ) Some of the leaders received compensation greater than the value of their land when they bought it and the value of the crops in which they had invested. However, many of the villagers had to accept compensation because they were pressured that they would not get any compensation at all, if they did not withdraw their opposition (interview with *Mae Sot Raksthin Group*, 26 September, 2016). However, the groups mobilisation and negotiations did have an impact on the issue of the value of the compensation. This increased from thousands or tens of thousands of baht to a matter of hundreds of thousands of baht. This led to a set of criteria being fixed for the assessment of compensation at three levels, namely: 140,000 baht per rai for land that is not connected by road; 300,000 baht per rai for land that is on a Soi and 560,000 baht per rai for land that is by the roadside.

5.2 Creating a Space for Public Advocacy

In the past, the mainstream media gave importance to monitoring and regularly reporting on the complaints and reflected the voices of the villagers in this area and the mobilizations of the *Mae Sot Raksthin Group*. This meant that this issue became widely known. They started using social media, opening their own Facebook page to communicate to the public. A Google search for the term “*Mae Sot Raksthin group*” returns a total of 39,000 hits. This reflects the success of the villagers in building a public space in the media, they posted messages communicating their opposition, and photos of signs which villagers had hung up on fences next to the road and their farmlands, voicing their disagreement with the use of section 44.

This is a banner opposing the use of article 44 at Wang Takhian village, in Mae Sai Luad Sub-district, Mae Sot district, Tak province which says “*Using art. 44 to seize houses, farms, then letting the private sector sign a cruel lease for 99 years, no “good person” could do this.*”



Source: Thai lawyers for human rights accessible at https://tlhr2014.wordpress.com/2015/10/15/maesot_raktin/



Sign put up in the fields of Kaew Intarak, one of six people who persisted with his case [all the way to] the Administrative Court “*Mr Kaew Intarak has been using this land plot before the Treasury Department ever give it to anyone, before it was taken over by the highways department, and before article 44.*”

5.3 Using Laws and Regulations to Delegitimize the State

Villagers use the legitimacy of the law to counter the rights to request land titles from the Treasury Department, according to section 60 of the Land Code of 1954, by making an appeal to the Administrative Court. At the beginning, 75 villagers who were impacted went to register their opposition to the issuing of land titles by the Finance Ministry (from a total of 93 people). From then on, gradually people dropped their opposition until there were only six people left at the end who submitted their case to the Administrative Court. It was a case concerning the improper issuing of land titles under the law, according to the Land Code of 1954, in which the accused was the Ministry of Finance (Defendant number one) and the Provincial Head of the Lands Department in Tak province, Mae Sot branch (Defended number two). The complaint related to the improper issuing of land titles.

The result of the case in the Administrative Court, led to Land Department staff being prevented from issuing any more titles over the lands belonging to those involved in the case. This meant that the Finance Ministry's land title therefore comprised of a plot with many holes where there were exempted lands, either lands of the plaintiffs or of people who held legal land documents. According to Order 17/2015 (section 5), where a private person has rights of ownership or landholding of any plot that lies within the boundaries of land that has been classified as government treasury land (*ratchapasadu*) according to the Order, the Special Economic Zones policy committee has the power to order relevant government organizations to agencies to exchange their land for another plot of government treasury land (*ratchapasadu*), or order instead offer monetary compensation in for exchange for land all of it or part of it.

6. Conclusions

Thailand's Special Economic Zones are an innovative part of the development of economic corridors under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) which began in 1992. The border areas of Thailand were drawn into the strategy of the economic corridors in the greater Mekong Sub-region, and since the late 1980s, the border areas were included in the strategy of converting the battle places into a marketplace. This was the starting point of significant change in the land rights regime in the area of the borders of Thailand.

The establishment of the new Special Economic Zones with the economic corridors of the greater Mekong Sub-region, was pushed by many groups of actors, both at the Sub-regional level and at the national level. At the Sub-regional level, the Asian Development Bank was an important player, providing financial support and technical assistance to prepare feasibility studies for Special Economic Zones in the various countries in the Mekong sub-region, including Thailand. Actors at the national level included the National Economic and Social Development Board which was responsible for determining the strategy and plan, and the Council of the Chambers of Commerce and the Provincial Councils of Industry. These various actors had a role in promoting a vision for the new Special Economic Zones, which is one way in which access to land was legitimized.

In the case studies areas, the main actors - the state, the people who were about to lose their land, and local government institutions - each developed their legitimacy of access to land and excluding others from the land through the implementation of the Special Economic Zones policy in the following four ways:

(1) Building up legitimacy of state action

The form in which the state built its legitimacy in excluding others from the land in the Special Economic Zone areas included the use of law, regulations, and special powers (section 44) and the policy of turning land into assets.

(2) Building up counter legitimacy of people who face losing their land.

The case of the Special Economic Zone in Mae Sot district, Tak province, illustrated how ordinary people sought to build up their legitimacy in excluding others from accessing their land, including building their identity and power, and setting a negotiating platform. They used public space as way of building negotiating power and used the law and regulations to delegitimize the state's actions.

(3) Building up counter legitimacy of state agencies (the Thai Tobacco Monopoly) in exclusion and access to state land.

The case of the Special Economic Zone in Chiang Rai province, Mae Sai district illustrated the way in which government agencies, including Thailand's Tobacco Monopoly, together with the Federation of Tobacco Workers and the tobacco growers sought to build their legitimacy in excluding the government from access to that land. They claimed legitimacy based on the income that the Tobacco Monopoly sends to the State each year, which is considered an important source of income for the country. Also the fact that this area was the source of the highest quality tobacco produced in the country, which was brought in benefits for the country, generating employment and incomes for groups of tobacco farmers.

(4) Building up the legitimacy of negotiations in the interests of local government units

The case of the Special Economic Zone in Trat province, Mae Sot district, illustrates how local governance institutions sought to build legitimacy to build their negotiating power so they could select the enterprises which will be allowed to do business in the Special Economic Zone. They claimed legitimacy because the area is a tourist destination along a beautiful coast that is inappropriate for the establishment of industrial estates which would have an impact on the touristic area.

The contested legitimation in the new Special Economic Zones, which appear in all the three SEZ case studies, indicate the different parallel forms of building legitimacy by each group of actors to exclude other parties from access to land. This includes the government which wants to turn the land into capital and allow investors to use it in business activities specified for each Special Economic Zones. The various forms of building legitimacy mentioned above are ways in which power is built, for negotiation, protection, and preservation of the interests of various relevant interest groups. This reflects the important challenge of the new Special Economic Zones which are still being argued by economists, that governments in each country which want to implement the SEZs, use large amounts of capital to implement these policies, whether this is through foregoing tax receipts, adjustment of labor laws, pollution of environments, the use of the nation's natural resources, and in particular, access to and exclusion from land as a direct result from the policy of Special Economic Zones.

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10. Chaiwat Witidthamawongse: former President of the Chamber of Commerce, Tak province, 17 January 2017
11. Pongchai Tanarunchai: Deputy Secretary of Chamber of Commerce, Tak province,17 January 2017
12. Kritpas Srisaengkajorn: Deputy Leader, Mai Ruud Sub-district Administration Organization, Khlong Yai District, Trat province,27 March 2017
13. Apakorn Jerinpol: Leader, Khlong Yai Sub-District Administration Organization, Trat province, 27 December 2017
14. Manit Laphalamthong: Deputy Leader, Khlong Yai Sub-District Administration Organization, Trat province, 27 December 2017
15. Pipat Rueksahakul: President of the Industry Council, Trat province, 28 March 2017
16. Prawing Nimmak: Village head, Khlongtakhian village, M 5 Mai Ruud Sub-district, Khlong Yai District, Trat province, 28 March 2017

People's Politics in Thailand: Lessons of Civil Society Movement Practices in Community and Deliberative Democracy

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Abstract

This paper aims to explore the community and deliberative democracy practices through studying the roles of civil society movement in Thai context and applying it to the theoretical framework of local and deliberative democracy worldwide. Although Thailand has embarked upon democratization since 1932, the problems of inactive civil society participation, political conflicts and lack of political consciousness in terms of understanding the concept of democracy and democratic practices among the general population are still clearly seen today. However, the role of civil society movement on bottom-up democratic organizations has been promoted under Thai constitution since 1997 which called "People's Constitution" in terms of encouraging people active roles in politics by democratic ways. During the last two decades, many changes on people's politics issues were appeared in new constitutions. Various governments and independent academic organizations, especially King Prajadhipok's Institution and Political Development Council have supported the concept of "people politics" by introducing community and deliberative democracy in politics not only in the election process but also in the public policy formulations. This study will examine the civil society roles in promoting "community democracy process" and "deliberative dialogue practices" towards democratization. My study will focus on people's politics from 1997 constitution and will review the roles of civil society experience which will be investigated on those activities related to democratization movement.

Keywords: People's Politics, Civil Society Movement, Community Democracy, Deliberative Democracy.

Introduction

Although Thailand became formally a democratic country in 1932, it still lacks People's political consciousness in terms of understanding the democratic concepts and practices. The bureaucratic polity also started in 1932 when Thailand changed from absolute monarchy system to constitutional monarchy. There were both democratic elections and military coups in Thai political situation from time to time. Bureaucratic polity became the main form of government administration throughout the country. There was also underground opposition movement fought against the military rule by establishing communist

party of Thailand (CPT) in 1948. The blooming of democracy period started in 1973 when student-led movement had overthrown the authoritarian ruler and brought Thai democracy into reality. Many kinds of social movement from various groups of peasant, labor, student, and people with hardship went on continuously. Democratic year of freedom came to the end when student massacre caused by right and left wing ideological conflicts in 1976. The return of authoritarian power made student movement join CPT in remote part of Thailand and neighboring countries.

In the late of 1970s and early 1980s was called semi-democracy period. Ex-student activists turned to work in non-governmental organizations to solve the basic problems of rural Thai people – mainly problems related to poverty and environmental issues. This period was called semi-democracy in terms of expansion of business roles in politics, politician and bureaucratic elites, end of armed conflicts with CPT, strong NGOs roles in environmental movement and using money for election (money politics) by the late of 1990. In 1991 local conflicts among political parties, factions' ideology groups of people and increase numbers of protest made unstable political climate. In 1992 military coup (the National Peace Keeping Council) seized power completely but people still fought against military. The new middle class movement using new technology of mobile phone rallied a mob against military and changed country back to democracy which was called a bloody May incident.

Political Reform 1997 Constitution up to Present

In 1996 people participated in drafting a new constitution which was called “1997 People’ Constitution” emphasizing on grassroots democracy, people’ rights and constitution reform process. In 1997 people launched 99-day protest rally on new foundation of constitution, civil society development, decentralization, economic crisis management, new independent institutes such as National Committee on Human Rights, and National Ombudsman were established.

During 2000-1 the movement of NGOs and grassroots became strong and the beginning of Thaksin government by his Thai-Rak-Thai party won the election. New public policy favoring the local people were started such as 30-Baht health for all, village and urban community fund (one million baht revolving fund), and many other programs for the poor. However, there were also many protests against the government during 2004-5.

In 2006 Military seized power from Thaksin government and Thaksin was out the country with the accusation of corruption. New government was set up in order to reform the governance administration in terms of anti-corruption, drafting new 2007 constitution, fair election. This new constitution in 2007 was generally called People’s Politics Constitution emphasizing on development of people’s participation in Thai democratic politics. However, in this year Democratic Alliance (Yellow shirt) protested the Thaksin rally for election in the new name of political party (People Power party). However (Thaksin’s ally) won the election again but could not be government because some alliance party voted for Democrat party. Abhisit Vejjajiva (Democrat Party head) instead became prime minister in 2008. There were at least 10 protests against Abhisit government by Red Shirt groups (alliance of People Power party) during his term. In the new 2011 election, Pheu Thai party (former Thai-Rak-Thai Party) won the election again, Yingluck became prime minister. In 2013 People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) protested a confrontation against United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) on issues of amnesty bill decree which could benefit Thaksin and asked for dissolving the congress. However, the fighting of these two groups still went on then the military coup began again by the name of The National Council for

Peace and Order-NCPO) on May 22, 2014 and General Prayuth Chan-ocha became the prime minister until now.

In sum, there was only one revolution in Thailand in the year 1932. The total number of coups is 26 and half of them failed to seize power during the period of 82 years of democracy (1932-2014). Until now Thailand has 28 prime ministers with 18 constitutions.

In addition to the evolution of Thai democratic movement as mention above, this paper will focus more on community democracy, deliberative democracy practices during the period of political reform (1997-2015). Community Democracy and Deliberative Democracy launched by academic and independent institutions working in Thailand, namely Political Development Council (PDC) and King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI), are surveyed and used as cases in this paper. The brief background of two cases was shown in the following.

Political Development Council (PDC)

Political Development Council (PDC) was first established in 2008 under the Political Development Council Act. The main objectives of PDC are to develop and enhance democracy development, to promote ethic and virtue of politicians and government officers and to promote people strengths in politic.

PDC funds community democracy project which launched at Tambon level throughout the country. The main objectives of community democracy project were to promote people's participation in solving community problems using deliberative forum by local people, to make a community plan that served their needs, and to participate in solving their own problems by self-reliant concept.

King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI)

King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI) has been established in 1998 as an academic institute to promote democratic regime and support civil political development in the form of research, education, academic training, advising and counseling. In addition, KPI also disseminate, publicize and support knowledge and understanding according to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand.

KPI also established of 48 People's Politics Development Centers (PPDC) throughout the country and supported civic democratic development through various forms of activities related to country reform, people's roles in constitution, and civic education in each area.

KPI launched public forum on Drafting New Constitution during the period of 2014-2015. This public forum had been held in 8 regions throughout Thailand. The forum in Phitsanulok province was held during 12-13 March 2015 in Phitsanulok for 200 lower northern participants from 9 provinces including Tak, Kamphaengphet, Sukhothai, Uttaradit, NakhonSawan, Phichit, Phetchabun, Uthaitani, and Phitsanulok.

The main objectives of this forum were to disseminate the details of the constitution draft and to exchange ideas about the appropriate issues in the act through the deliberative dialogues among the different group of participants.

Conceptual Framework

This paper used two concepts and theories including deliberative democracy and civil society.

Deliberative Democracy

The four main characteristics of Deliberative Democracy are: Its first and most important characteristic is its reason-giving requirement. The second characteristic of deliberative democracy is that the reasons given in this process should be accessible to all the citizens to whom they are addressed. The third characteristic of deliberative democracy is that its process aims at producing a decision that is binding for some period of time. The fourth one is its process which is dynamic.

Deliberation is an approach to decision-making in which citizens consider relevant facts from multiple points of view, converse with one another to think critically about options before them and enlarge their perspectives, opinions and understanding. Deliberative democracy strengthened citizen voices in governance by including people of all races, classes, ages and geographies in deliberations that directly affect public decisions. As a result, citizen influence and can see the result of their influence on the policy and resource decision that impact their daily lives and their future (Deliberative Democracy Consortium, 2003).

The general aim of deliberative democracy is to provide the most justifiable conception for dealing with moral disagreement in politics. In pursuing this aim, deliberative democracy serves four related purposes. The first is to promote the legitimacy of collective decisions. The second purpose is to encourage public-spirited perspectives on public issues. The third one is to promote mutually respectful processes of decision-making. The fourth one is to help correct these mistakes.

According to P. Levine (2003), democracy requires deliberation for three reasons:

1. To enable citizens to discuss public issues and form opinions;
2. To give democratic leaders much better insight into public issues than elections are able to do;
3. To enable people to justify their views so we can sort out the better from the worse.

Deliberative democracy simply refers to 'a conception of democratic government that secures a central place for reasoned discussion (rational deliberation) in political life' (Cooke 2000: 94). For Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1990: 1), a deliberative democratic theory offers 'a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life'.

The ambitions aim of deliberative democracy, in short, is to shift from bargaining interest aggregation, and power to the common reason of equal citizens as a dominant force in democratic life (Cohen and Fung 2004 cited in Gaventa, John 2006).

Civic Society

Dryzek (1996) argues the concept of the public sphere broadens the conceptions of where struggles for democratization might occur. "Civil society can constitute a site for democratization because it can be a place where people choose to live their public lives and solve their joint problems. Those who see deliberations as the essence of democracy... should be attracted by the discursive style of public sphere".

Etzioni (1995) and Sandle (1996) argue that civil society is positive for democracy because it provides a site where communities, not self-interested individuals or the state co-determine their own destinies. Communitarians define civil society largely in terms of 'given' social relationships based on such as family, religion, race, and ethnicity. Like liberals, they see civil society as an essentially private realm, but they think of it not in terms of contractual relationships and exchange, but in terms of natural social ties and communal identities.

Hendriks (2002) intelligently and thoroughly discusses and analyses the growing literature on deliberative democracy where there are two emerging streams of thought and both have something different to say on the role of civil society. There are micro deliberative democrats who concentrate on defining the procedural conditions of a structured deliberative forum (Elster, 1997; Gutmann and Thomson, 1996) and macro deliberative democrats who are more concerned with the messy, unstructured deliberation which takes place in the public sphere (Dryzek, 1990; Habermas, 1996). These two streams of deliberative democracy implicitly offered contrasting ideas on the role of civil society with respect to the state. With their focus on procedural, micro theorists encourage civil society to engage in collaborative practices with the state. In contrast, macro theorists advocate that civil society working outside and against the state in oppositional politics.

Furthermore, Barber (1998) contends that what is needed is a 'third sector' or 'civic terrain' made up of families, clans, churches (mosques), communities, and voluntary associations that can effectively mediate between 'prince and market' – between big government and wholly private commercial markets, between public and private, between the power of public communities and the liberty of private individuals. Barber interprets civil society not as an alternative to democratic government, but rather, as the free space in which democratic attitudes are cultivated and democratic behavior is conditioned. He calls it 'the space of unforced human association and also the set of relational networks - formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology – that fill this space'. It is the domain of 'you and me as we gather into we s' (Barber, 1998).

Research Methodology

The methodology used in this research were document research and participatory action in deliberative activities launched by Political Development Council (PDC), and King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI).

In this paper, I will look into PDC funded the community democracy project and the data collection was field survey of 30 Tambons of 15 provinces in northern Thailand during November 2011-January 2012 using After Action Review (AAR) approach with key actor discussion.

While I will examine KPI public forum on Drafting New Constitution during the period of 2014-2015. The forum on Drafting New Constitution was a two-day meeting in 8 regions throughout country. The lower northern forum was held in Phitsanulok province. 200 participants from 9 provinces were attended.

The data analyses were about how community democracy project implemented, and deliberative democracy practices and analyze the deliberative process help participants responding to the addressed issues.

Findings

The results of this paper investigated Political Development Council (PDC) on Community Democracy Project and King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI) on Drafting New Constitution Public Forum by emphasizing on the roles of civil society in these two project activities.

1. Role of Civil Society in Political Development Council (PDC) Project

Community democracy forum launched by Political Development Council (PDC) have organized into 3 steps: firstly, community problems consultation by local participants using forum discussion in positive ways. Secondly, community problem roots analysis using village data and exchange ideas among civil society groups on problem issues. Thirdly, community draft plan from local civil society member participating perspectives and setting up a 3-year Tambon Administrative Organizations and/or Tambon Municipalities plan.

The project implementation started with community situation analysis which earned different information from 3 different types of communities –inner city, surrounding and remote communities. Then the discussion on problems and solution to those problems were organized in each village in target Tambon. Finally, community plan was modified and applied into 3-year Tambon plan. The community development process in terms of community participation and effective management techniques were added to increase community capacities to handle their project activities. Key facilitators in the forum were mostly civil society leaders at village and Tambon levels with a small number of active local people from civic groups who joined the deliberation forum.

Participatory Deliberative Tools in PDC Projects

1. Civil Society as Participants: The number of participants in the dialogue process of community democracy seemed to be small and not outspoken due to the low socio-economic and educational background. On the other hand, most of them could make decision on the real problems and could set priority on what were problems and how to solve them. However, there were many active civic groups in the village who earned much more experiences working on village development and had good network with other active groups.
2. Civil Society as Facilitators: The key facilitators in community democracy were mostly local leaders at village and Tambon levels and they got experience in combating various problems and solutions which possibly they overlooked the situation. Perhaps they could dominate the deliberative dialogue process by jumping quickly into the conclusion.
3. Deliberative Techniques used by Civil Society: The techniques in deliberative dialogue could be new tool for gathering common community problems and solutions. The 3-step process used in community democracy project mentioned earlier could help developing community capacity in designing participatory planning of desired solutions.
4. Contribution of Civil Society on Deliberative Dialogue Issues: The issue coming up in deliberative dialogue of community democracy project such as everyday life plan, community best practices were quite benefit to most local people involved. The project plan stated in 3-year Tambon plan seemed to be clearly stated by the participants covering rural situation which related to their own experiences and

needs. Then the issue books/documents of situation and planning technique handbook seemed to be not much needed.

2. Roles of Civil Society in King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI) Project

Public Forum on Drafting New Constitution was held in the form of two-day forum. The selection of participants came from two types in each province – one type was 40 members purposively selected from active civil groups and the other 160 members of village members randomly from list of household registration number at village level. The purposive group consisted of military officer, police man, political movement (in terms of yellow, red, and multi-colored group, academia, business group, leader of labor group, women group, cultural and religion group, local politicians at provincial and district group, government official. The first day session of public forum focused on giving knowledge background and important details of the new constitution draft. The second day session of public forum emphasized on deliberative dialogue by selecting participants background purposively into small group discussion into 10 important issues of constitution act, such as the rights and duty of Thai people, education, political election and so on. All participants of each group attended a full participatory dialogue headed by facilitator and secretary which group members voted for. Each group have exchanged their ideas and summarized the outcomes of discussion and presented the results in the last public forum session. The overall dialogue of constitution act was organized in a deliberative way to gather more information and comments from all participants.

Participatory Deliberative Tools in KPI Project

1. Civil Society as Participants: The participants in deliberative dialogue of new constitution could gain new information on the new constitution and earned both agreeable and non-agreeable views towards the details of an act. They also learnt how to express their own view and could listen to different idea or view from other participants with much intention. Most of selected members joined the dialogue but the random participants had difficulty to join the replacement participant came instead because they were poor, had no experience to join any activities outside their home and too shy to come and talk in their own voices.
2. Civil Society as Facilitators: Most facilitators were committee members of People's Political Development Centers from 4 target provinces and members of the deliberative dialogue working group. They have been trained well to their job and they also gained much experience working on problem solving process which led to the better deliberative dialogue process.
3. Deliberative Techniques used by Civil Society: The technical problems of deliberation dialogue were time constant; some participants could not express his/her own ideas in designed time. Method to encourage participants was not to discuss overtime limits it seemed to be main problem for facilitators to handle as well as some participants did not join the dialogue. Rules and regulations for deliberative dialogue were not stated clearly before the session began.
4. Contribution of Civil Society on Deliberative Dialogue Issues: The details of new constitution act were rather in large amounts. It was difficult for every participant to capture the key/important information in a short time discussion. However, it was good to make the same conclusion for each group discussion after the dialogue on each topic because it could bring up more understandable and find the common conclusion of the constitution contexts and its process to be collected and analyzed.

Conclusion and Suggestion

Lessons Learnt

From the two cases study: PDC case (community democracy), and KPI case (deliberative democracy) can be summed up as the followings:

1. The reasons given are mostly public interests rather than private ones. The ways of receiving reasons are two sides of one coin which increase the ability to discuss issues reasonably more than emotionally. Methods of giving reasons affect the basic lessons of democratic process. Giving good reasons could lead to decision making in the dialogue. Both reason-giving and decision-making are important in the dialogue process in Thai cases. PDC uses the dialogue for making community plan, while KPI arranges the dialogue for improving the draft of new constitution. Decision-making – The decision-making in each case is different, for PDC comprehends it for village and Tambon plan. KPI uses it to decide on national choice purpose.
2. Facilitators are commonly from two groups as trained facilitators and experienced ones. The facilitators in KPI case uses both provincial and central organizations staffs who earn rather more training skills than the ones in PDC case. Local facilitators are mainly used at the village and Tambon levels for PDC somehow use local provincial staffs to link with national and provincial politicians. The training of the trainer (TOT) should apply for facilitator skills development.
3. Thai cases attempt to introduce various types of public policy outputs. For KPI case new constitutions can be called public policy at national level, PDC case is concerned with public policy at community level. Public policy concept makes the civil society participants think of public property rather than private one and, on the other hand, can stimulate voices of the people and create their public awareness as well. In KPI case, the participants are selected both by purposive and probability random. PDC case uses only voluntary selection because local people know each other well at community level. It should be good to have KPI model for participant selection even for other issues, time duration and different types of places.
4. Deliberative dialogue depends on the forum management styles. Forums of deliberative dialogue can be organized under the different objectives planned, variety of interested participants, and policy approach designed. All two cases in this paper seem to start with policy which already fixed followed up by the key issues, designed objectives, and target participants. However, the flexibility of forum management could be seen in all cases. KPI case enlarge the collaboration of multi-organizations to hold the forum management, while PDC case combines only two concerned institutes - PDC working with KPI.
5. The process of deliberative dialogue is quite an important issue for launching the dialogue activities. Thai cases use the same method of deliberative dialogue process among civil society members in terms of exchange ideas, express supportive or against ideas over the issues discussed, and coming up with inclusive conclusion in a harmonized way. The differences among two cases are the types and sizes of group discussion as well as time allocation for each session. There should be time table schedule for the forum process and the linkages between the issues to be addressed and the characteristics of participants. The success keys for process development depend on the facilitators' ability and how much important the issues are for all participants.

Roles of Civil Society:

The roles of civil society are found in the two cases focus more on the deliberative dialogue and the voice of citizens participating in both PDC and KPI projects.

1. The roles of civil society in deliberative dialogue are important during the civil society plays an active role in joining the dialogue as in the two cases of PDC, and KPI. Variety of civil groups include government staff, private organization, and local civic groups help creating active civil society through the process of deliberative techniques. Capacity building in terms of knowledge extension, training method development, and skills development presentation are needed for long term participation of civil society involved. In KPI case, various types of civic groups attend the deliberative session. Only local people and Tambon administrative organizations/ or municipalities participated in the session for PDC case. The size of the concerned civic groups varies from 50 up to 200 participants.
2. The deliberative dialogue emphasizes on civil society in term of "Citizen Voices" are found from those who participate in the dialogue regardless of age, gender, education, and occupation. The participants' voices also reflect an access to information or an opportunity to handle the discussion as well as show the civil society roles in creating public consciousness among them. The more citizen voices we have, the better deliberative dialogue will be.

Suggestions on Strengthening the Roles of Civil Society:

The suggestions for strengthening the roles of civil society in deliberative dialogue for two cases are the following:

1. Civil Society roles in management system are important for the success of deliberative democracy practices. The management of overall picture of deliberative dialogue forum includes the number of civil society participants (the more the better), appropriate time allocation, as well as availability of deliberative tools.
2. Staff development of civil society members is important for deliberative dialogue especially role of active facilitators. To strengthen the facilitator ability, training skills development and basic knowledge on deliberative techniques should be employed. Professional facilitators are the desired target in the staff development.
3. Policy on deliberative dialogue both community and deliberative democracy is also needed to support the management system and staff development. The desired policy should be designed at national level and implementation flows such as staffing, managing and budgeting should be covered to ensure the success of deliberative dialogue in the long run.

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Knowledge Organization of I-san Proverbs (Pha-Ya) for Semantic Retrieval

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Abstract

Pha-ya is the I-san proverb originated from religion and beliefs. It is a kind of traditional verbal literature widely known in the northeast of Thailand. Pha-ya has been used by local scholars to deliver messages of wisdoms to people in order for teaching the community's moral and ethics. Because Pha-ya is a local wisdom and is a tacit knowledge using a dialect language, it is, rarely found in formal information resources, is normally unrecorded, and now is gradually disappearing. This study, therefore, aims to use a digital humanities research approach to collect, preserve, disseminate and retrieve the knowledge on Pha-ya by using semantic technology. The research processes are comprised of three phases: 1) content analysis of relevant information resources, and collecting knowledge from local scholars, 2) organization of knowledge on Pha-ya using a knowledge classification theory, and 3) development of an ontology on Pha-ya for semantic retrieval. In all phases, the knowledge structure and ontology on Pha-ya were evaluated and approved by experts of I-san literature and an ontology was developed using structured interviews. The results of this research revealed that the scope and knowledge organization of Pha-ya can be divided into 6 classes, 15 sub-classes, and 39 divisions. The next step of this research is to develop the ontology of Pha-Ya for semantic retrieval system.

Keywords: Knowledge organization, Pha-ya, Thai Dialect, I-san proverb, Local verbal literature

1. Introduction

Language is one form of the nation's culture. It is used for communication and it provides a tool for its people to convey their thoughts. Through proverbs and aphorisms, language can reveal the nation's root and wisdom. Similar to language, dialects are part of the nation's culture. They represent their local people's cultural identity. Dialects give pictures of local people's living conditions, ways of life, and beliefs. Dialects, however, have been influenced by the advances of modern communication. A greater number of people prefer to use the official language or national language, which is more prestigious. It can be said that local dialects are endangered of being lost, and currently, they are preserved and used by only some groups of people (Kullawanit, Tingsapat, Laksaneeyanawin & Prasitratasin, 1997).

Proverbs are one form of language that represents Thai cultural identity. Oba (2015) mentioned that proverbs are important because they are cultural transmission that symbolizes social morality, customs, manners, and thoughts of people passed down from generation to generation. Apart from that, local proverbs help represent their people's ethnic, identity, and life philosophy as well morality and local values.

In the Northeast or the I-san region of Thailand, there are a number of local proverbs, or Pha-ya, which represent the I-san culture. "Pha-ya" is a folk wisdom demonstrating how I-san people use their language for verbal communication and compose poetry. Pha-ya means "philosophy" through which different aspects of the villagers' thoughts, intellect, and wisdoms are vibrantly seen. There are many forms of Pha-ya: rhymes, short or long phrases, or sentences. All of them involve almost all aspects of Isan people's lives, whether it is sin, merit, manners, gratitude, duties of membership in society, living one's life, working, and so on. Through Pha-ya, the simple life of the I-san community that likes to be free and to have fun is shown. This makes the I-san society different from other societies in Thailand (Paiboon Paengngern, 1991 cited in Jiraporn Sriboon, 2003).

At present, local literary scholars have categorized Pha-ya into different categories based on the methods they employ. For example, one method is to categorize Pha-ya according to the functions of how Pha-ya is used; based on this method, Pha-ya is divided into four categories, namely, Pha-ya-Phasit (to indirectly teach morals), Pha-ya-Tongtoy or Yabsoi (to prompt the listener about good deeds, or aphorisms), Pha-ya-yoi (short statements containing wise meanings, or epigrams), Pha-ya-khrea (used by men and women in their courting). Another method is based on the content of Pha-ya. This includes Pha-ya-Phasit, also known as Pha-ya-sun or Pha-ya-Tongtoy (to warn and teach people to encourage proper behavior) and Pha-ya-geaw (used by men and women in their courting). The other method is based on purposes. For example, Pha-ya-muanseun (to trade jokes), Pha-ya-yoi (to describe natural beauty), Pha-ya-khrea (used by men and women in their courting), Pha-ya-phasit (to teach moral), and Pha-ya-pritsana (interrogatives to provoke thoughts and interpretations). Similarly, Thammawat (2003) divided Pha-ya into five categories, including Pha-ya-keawparasi (used by men and women in their courting), Pha-ya-phasit (used by the elderly to teach the younger in different situations), Pha-ya-uayporn (used by the elderly to bless the younger in different occasions), Pha-ya-geaw-bab-talok (used by men and women when teasing each other), Pha-ya-geaw-bab-sanrak (used by men and women to describe and convey their love to each other, similar to Plang-yao or Nirat (long lyrical Thai poetry).

Based on the literature review, it was found that Thai researchers were interested in collecting and

publicizing the knowledge on Pha-ya in books and review articles. Also, a number of research studies as well as master degree's theses and PhD dissertations have been conducted to study Pha-ya to understand how it is used as well as to preserve it because Pha-ya symbolizes the Thai local wisdom and I-san community's identity (Chankong, 1987; Pakmareut, 2007; Sribunleau, 2003; Surimat, 2014; Suwannasri, 2003; Wilaiporn, 2003; Wongsanao, 2009). Also, other studies examined the linguistic structure of Pha-ya (Hacheaun, 2015) compared its meanings with Thai proverbs (Chanduang, 2008; Ponrak, 2012), and interpreted the meaning of Pha-ya by adopting religious and philosophical methods (Ponwiset, 2002; Saenburan, Mangthani, and Phetpaniwong, 2005), and a cultural anthropological approach (Kamsaen, 1999).

Pha-ya is diverse in terms of content. As mentioned, Pha-ya can be used to teach or deliver useful knowledge, which is up to date. This knowledge can be useful to people in other areas, not limited only to the I-san region. However, the number of those who have the knowledge of Pha-ya and can create it is diminishing. As such, a study adopting a digital humanities approach to develop semantic retrievals is needed. This approach can help increase the effectiveness of searches and reduce the limitations in regards to its dialectal form. This will help academics as well as those who are interested in Pha-ya to access the knowledge embedded in Pha-ya with no dialectal limitations.

The Digital Humanities Approach is a research and development method which integrates humanities principles such as literature, history, and philosophy, and digital technological principles and applications. This method is efficient in transferring knowledge in the field of Humanities (Stanford Humanities Center, n.d.). Through this approach, the local wisdom of Pha-ya, can be systematically collected and searched. This in turn will help preserve Pha-ya to prevent lost as well as to spread the knowledge to other regions. To create semantic searches that are effective and meet the user's requirements, the knowledge scope of Pha-ya must be examined. Such knowledge will also be used to design and develop ontology on Pha-ya and a semantic search system. This paper, therefore, aims to present the structural knowledge of Pha-ya, which will increase access to this knowledge and reduce lexical barriers (e.g., words with different forms or word variations). With higher access to the knowledge and local wisdom, the user will be able to use this knowledge more efficiently.

2. Literature review

2.1 Organization (KO) is a field of study concerned with the nature and quality of knowledge organizing processes (KOP) and knowledge organizing systems (KOS), which are used to organize documents, document representations, works and concepts (Hjørland, 2008). To conduct the KO, it has been assumed that the practical organization of knowledge can be performed by applying common senses, or, in major research libraries and bibliographical databases, by employing subject specialists, who are required just to apply their special knowledge.

Knowledge Organization Systems include classification schemes that organize materials at a general level for information access and control variant versions of key information. A KOS is a bridge between user's information need and the information resource in the collection. Hodge (2000) has divided the KOS into three groups: term lists, classification and categories, and relationship lists.

In this research, we use the KOS as a tool designed for organizing the knowledge of the I-san proverbs. Classification is a term used both in the process to classify and in the resulting set of classes and the

assignment of elements to pre-established classes (Hjorland, 2017). It is the meaningful clustering of experiences (Kwasnik, 1999). Classification is the organization of a certain type of knowledge which is used to demonstrate the structure comprising categories of knowledge of each discipline in order to explain the scope of contents in the field and relationship within the scope through grouping or classifying. The contents and relationship of each work are organized systematically, such as alphabetically or into classes, subclasses, and divisions (Chaikhambung, & Tuamsuk, 2017; Hodge, 2000). Classification has two meanings: for the broad meaning, classification is defined as the process of distinguishing and distribution kinds of "things" into different groups, and the narrower meaning of classification is based on the broad definition but adding some extra requirements or restrictions to the classification process and the resulting classification system (Hjorland, 2017).

A classification can be used for any branch of knowledge. According to Chaikhambung & Tuamsuk (2017), knowledge classification involves three steps: information analysis and extraction, classification of data, and knowledge structuring. They use knowledge classification concept to analyze and develop a scope of knowledge and structure with respect to ethnic groups in Thailand. The research results provided the knowledge scope and structure of the ethnic groups in Thailand which comprises of 12 classes, 51 sub-classes, and 65 divisions.

2.2 Semantic Search is a data searching technique in which a search query aims to not only find keywords, but to determine the intent and contextual meaning of the words a person is using for search (semantic search, 2017).

Semantic search works on the principles of language semantics. Unlike typical search algorithms, semantic search is based on the context, substance, intent and concept of the searched phrase. Semantic search also incorporates location, synonyms of a term, current trends, word variations and other natural language elements as part of the search. Semantic search concepts are derived from various search algorithms and methodologies, including keyword-to-concept mapping, graph patterns and fuzzy logic. The semantic web is an extension of the current Web in which resources are described using logic-based knowledge representation language for automated machine processing across heterogeneous system. (Wei, Barnaghi, & Bargiela, n.d.)

2.3 Pha-ya is the I-san proverb originated from religion and beliefs. It is a kind of traditional verbal literature widely known in the northeast of Thailand. Pha-ya has been used by the local scholars to deliver the messages of wisdoms to the people in order for teaching the community's moral and ethics. According to Thammawat (1983), Pha-ya is oral statements that help extend knowledge, are informative, rhetorical, appropriate to the listener, and truthful following the truth of nature, while aesthetic and thoughtful, and passing goodwill to the listener.

Pha-ya has been categorized differently, based on such as functions (e.g., Pha-ya-kaewparasi, Pha-ya-phasit, and Pha-ya-auyporn (Thammawat, 2003; Pra Maha Sophan, 2010), values (Suwannasri, 2004), and content (Tavornsawat, 1976 cited in Suvannasri, 2004). Overall, Pha-ya can be divided into fifteen knowledge categories (Pinthong, 1985; Wilaiporn, 2003), including eating, clothing, housing, medicine, happiness and sadness, one's self, human being, work, cautiousness, good deed and sin, fellowship, wisdom, education, dharma puzzles, and general.

From the literature review, the two major classification systems used in libraries to organize books on library shelves are the Dewey Decimal Classification System and the Library of Congress Classification System. Both systems organize knowledge into subject categories and allow libraries to shelve similar books together. Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC) classifies Thai Proverbs by class 300 (Social Sciences) under sub-class 398.9 (Thai-Proverbs) because it is related to Customs, etiquette, and folklore. Library of Congress, on the other hand, classifies Thai Proverbs by class P (Language) and subclass PL (Languages and literatures of Eastern Asia, Africa, and Oceania). However, the knowledge embedded in Pha-Ya has not yet been classified adopting the mentioned classification systems.

3. Related Works

Sangers, Fransincar, Hogenboom, & Chepegin (2013) proposed a semantic Web service discovery framework for finding semantic Web services by making use of natural language processing techniques. The framework allows searching through a set of semantic Web services in order to find a match with a user query consisting of keywords. By specifying the search goal using keywords, end-users do not need to have knowledge about semantic languages, which makes it easy to express the desired semantic Web services. For matching keywords with semantic Web service descriptions given in WSMO, techniques like part-of-speech tagging, lemmatization, and word sense disambiguation are used. After determining the senses of relevant words gathered from Web service descriptions and the user query, a matching process takes place. The performance evaluation shows that the three proposed matching algorithms are able to effectively perform matching and approximate matching.

Habernal & Konopik (2013) present an approach to designing and developing a complete Semantic Web Search Using Natural Language (SWSNL) system. They perform an end-to-end evaluation on a domain dealing with accommodation options. The domain data come from an existing accommodation portal and they use a corpus of queries obtained by a Facebook campaign. In addition to that, the Natural Language Understanding (NLU) module is evaluated on another domain (public transportation) and language (English). The research findings will be valuable for the research community as they are strongly related to issues found in real-world scenarios.

4. Research Methodology

This study is a qualitative research study conducted to examine the meaning of Pha-Ya (I-san proverbs) by adopting a content analysis technique. The scope of knowledge of Pha-Ya was collected from the information resources such as books, research report, theses and dissertations, and related website. 373 Pha-ya were collected and analyzed in this research.

5. Research Results

The knowledge of Pha-Ya were classified by 3 steps. The first is information analysis and extraction. The elements and contents of Pha-Ya were analyzed in order to find correlations and then extracted to identify the knowledge representations based on concepts and terms. The following step is classification of data. We analyzed the knowledge system and reclassified the knowledge of Pha-Ya by placing similar knowledge and related knowledge close to one another according to knowledge management principles.

Then, knowledge structure of Pha-ya was developed. Based on the knowledge structure, Pha-Ya was further divided into six basic classes as show in Table 1; each class has many different subclasses. Each subclass includes a loosely hierarchical arrangement of the topics relevant to the subclass, going from the general to the more specific ones.

Table 1: The scope of knowledge classification on Pha-ya

Class	Scope
I-san subsistence	The I-san' s subsistence, which includes occupation, food
I-san culture	The culture and customs of I-san region, including family system
I-san Social norms	The rules and expectation of behaviors of I-san region
I-san value	The value system of I-san region, including seniority respect, women's value, generous and empathy
I-san wisdom	The knowledge and wisdom of I-san region, including health care, Thai herb and education system
Buddhism and beliefs	The Buddhism and beliefs of I-san regions, including what is concerned with Buddhism that influence their subsistence

In this study, the researchers examined and developed the knowledge structure of Pha-ya adopting the knowledge classification principles in order to develop an ontology on the knowledge of Pha-ya and a semantic search system of the meanings of Pha-ya. In this study, the Digital Humanities Approach has been adopted to extend and spread I-san’s local wisdom.

6. Conclusion

In this study, the researchers examined and developed the knowledge structure of Pha-ya adopting the knowledge classification principles in order to develop an ontology on the knowledge of Pha-ya and a semantic search system of the meanings of Pha-ya. In this study, the Digital Humanities Approach has been adopted to extend and spread I-san’s local wisdom.

7. Acknowledgement

This research was supported by Digital Humanities Research Group, Faculty of Humanites and Social Sciences, Khon Kaen University.

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