




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The Authoritarian Personality in Thailand¹

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Abstract

The concept of the authoritarian personality was developed in the 1950s by Adorno amongst others in an attempt to explain the psychological root of prejudices in particular anti-Semitism that led to the success of Fascism in Germany. Characteristics of an authoritarian personality are such as conventionalism, submission to authority, aggression towards rule breakers and over-emphasizes of the ego. As such, the authoritarian personality often supports authoritarian political regimes and societies in which a high number of people display an authoritarian personality tend to adopt authoritarian forms of government. Here the authoritarian personality of Thai university lecturers will be discussed. University lecturers are a fraction of the middle class that has been shown to have a tendency for authoritarianism. Using data collected through participant observation, qualitative interviews and an RWA scale test with 147 students and 20 lecturers from different faculties it will be argued that Thai lecturers do develop an authoritarian personality within five years of starting to work at the university. This is rigorously enforced with co-workers and students and any challenges to the suppressive environment at the university are met with unequal enforcement of regulations, malicious rumor, and aggression of the challenger to achieve compliance. Given this oppressive culture at Thai universities, it is unlikely that university graduates who form the bulk of the middle class will be encouraged to embrace democratic values or critical thinking. This has to be understood as one of the obstacles that Thailand is facing on its way to democracy or academic excellence.

Keywords: Authoritarianism, Thai education, University lecturers

Introduction

I would like to start this paper with a short explanation as to why I have decided to do this particular research. Indeed, this effort was born out of a culmination of both academic curiosity and personal experience. The first time I came to Thailand, I was a 16 years old high school student who was to spend one year in a Thai family and school in the rural South. There I was tossed into a daily school life that was very different from what I was used to. While I have many positive memories of the time there, a number of less fortunate incidents have impressed themselves on me. The almost ritual shaming of students, who did not follow the prescribed hairstyles and regular instances of beating or the militarized training of the boy and girls scouts were foremost amongst them. These events have followed me since and I continued to interpret them in different ways throughout

¹ The author would like to express her gratitude to the Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute for making it possible to attend the 13th ITSC.

my life. My undergraduate and graduate education had no small part in the directions these interpretations took. While majoring in Southeast Asian Studies, I took a minor in Political Science. It is there that I first learned about the concept of the authoritarian personality. In a seminar on anti-Semitism, I was introduced to the work of Adorno et al. (1950). They argued that this personality trait that was to be found in a large part of the German (and American) population made the Nazi regime and with it the Holocaust possible. One possible origin of the authoritarian personality was in a Freudian sense caused by the distant relationships in German families and corporal punishment. This particular origin of the authoritarian personality has long been disproved (Altemeyer, 2006) but as an undergraduate, this interpretation had made a deep impression.

None of these issues have been at the forefront of my concerns or academic endeavor until they jumped back into focus on a stint of field work in late 2014. By now I had children of my own one of which spend the three months we were in Thailand in a Thai kindergarten. The school was a respectable private school with for Bangkok moderate tuition fees. The majorities of families sending their children there appeared to be from a middle class background. One day my son came back from school and reported that one of his classmates had been hit by the teacher.² As a concerned mother, I went to talk to that teacher and told her that I do not agree with her hitting my child or children in general. I was stunned with her answer: "Am I supposed to give them sweets then?" This incident has incited the current research. Ever since, I have observed, child-rearing principles in Thai families and pedagogic concepts at Thai schools. This effort has extended to universities when I joined the faculty at Thai universities in 2015.

The search for an origin of authoritarianism in Thailand is one that is shared by numerous scholars. Case (2009, 2011), Connors (2009) as well as Veerayooth and Hewison (2016) are just a few examples of investigations of the issue. However, these scholars have mainly been concerned with the authoritarianism on the level of politic decision making and the political regime in general. Attempts to understand authoritarianism within the Thai population which is needed to support such political regimes and tendencies have been the topic of much fewer inquiries. Most notably in this endeavor is the contribution of Baker (2016) who has convincingly argued that the middle class is bolstering the current political regime. He ascertained that the political attitudes [of the middle class] have been shaped by its migrant origins, lack of affinity with rural Thailand, a history of royal associations, and development against the background of the Cold War.

In this paper, I will further Bakers (2016) inquiry into the origins of authoritarianism in Thailand. By focusing on university students and lecturers as fractions of the middle classes, it will be argued that Thai universities are a breeding ground for authoritarianism. Further, it will be shown that the positive effect of higher education on lectures' authoritarian attitudes is negated by their working experience at Thai universities. The working culture at Thai universities rigorously enforces conformity and any challenges to the suppressive environment at the university are met with regulations, malicious rumor, and aggression. Given this oppressive culture at Thai universities, it is unlikely that university graduates who form the bulk of the middle class will be encouraged to embrace democratic values or critical thinking. This has to be understood as one of the obstacles that Thailand is facing on its way to democracy or academic excellence.

² It should be noted that my son has to that point only attended kindergarten in Denmark where corporal punishment is not only illegal but also contrary to a very egalitarian worldview.

The Authoritarian Personality

Before turning our attention to Thai universities, the emergence of the authoritarian personality should be discussed. The concept was introduced with the publication of a thousand page long book by the same name in 1950. Behind the book was a group of psychologists from the University of California at Berkeley: Theodore W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford. It was part of the *Studies in Prejudice* series edited by Max Horkheimer and Samuel Flowerman. As such it was a collaboration of American and German scholars some of whom are better known as philosophers than as psychologists. The concept of the authoritarian personality was born in the political climate shortly after the end of the Second World War and the advent of the Cold War. The experience of the Nazi regime in Germany and the unspeakable atrocities perpetrated by it raised the question how such political doctrines could seemingly gain mass support. The group set out to discover if there are individuals whose personality attracted them to antidemocratic doctrines. It is out of this context that the concept of the authoritarian personality was developed. Adorno et al. (1950) viewed "personality as consisting of many 'layers'" (Norris, 2005) which they aimed to measure with innovative techniques. In this effort they constructed the F-Scale and identified nine variables that define the "structure in the person that renders him receptive to antidemocratic propaganda" (Adorno et al., 1950: 157) as follows:

1. Conventionalism - Rigid commitment to the conventional values of the middle class
2. Authoritarian Submission - Uncritical subjugation to idealized authorities of their own group
3. Authoritarian Aggression - The tendency to look for people who do not follow or fit conventional values to condemn, reject and punish them.
4. Anti-Intraception – Resistance of the subjective, the imaginative, the sensitive.
5. Superstition and Stereotype - Faith in the mystical determination of one's own destiny and a disposition to think in rigid categories.
6. Power and Toughness - Thinking in dimensions such as domination - subjugation, strong - weak, leader - followers; Identification with forms of power. Overemphasizing of the conventionalized attributes of the Ego and exaggerated display of strength and robustness.
7. Destructiveness and Cynicism - General hostility and defamation of humanity
8. Projectivity - Disposition to believe in dangerous events in the world and the projection of unconscious drive impulses to the outside world.
9. Sex – Excessive concern with perceived sexual promiscuity. (Adorno et al., 1950: 57-170)

These variables were translated into a 38 items questionnaire which's conception was described in great detail. The items were indirect as they were composed of statements to which participants could rate their agreements on a Lickert-type scale from -3 to +3.³ The researchers argued that a combination of character traits such as anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism and conservative attitudes were symptomatic of an authoritarian personality, in other words of an individual that is prejudiced

³ To be precise, the researcher designed a number of scales: Anti-Semitism (AS), Ethnocentrism (E), Political and Economic Conservatism (PEC); Potentiality for Fascism (F). The F-scale was the key measure for authoritarianism. A total of 2000 individuals from diverse backgrounds participated in the study. From the questionnaire respondents, the researcher selected each 40 women and men for in-depth interviews. They have been chosen on the basis of extremely high or extremely low values on the questionnaire scale. Whereby, it was aimed to have equal representation of age and religion. The interview included the topics of politics, economics, religion, minorities.

and potentially anti-democratic (Roiser and Willig, 2002).

Based on their findings the authors claimed a person with an authoritarian personality is psychologically unhealthy; a condition that was caused by punitive child-rearing practices. The authoritarian personality is formed in the first few years of an individual's life. Adorno et al. (1950, pp. 482–484) saw hierarchical, authoritarian and exploitive family structures as crucial factors that shape this personality type. Parents, who often have an authoritarian personality themselves, dominate the child into conforming with conventional behaviors and demand obedience. Any discretion of the child is answered with threats or corporal punishment. The child builds up feelings of resentment and aggression towards the parents. These are however repressed and in adulthood directed against others, mainly minorities or persons that do not adhere to conservative norms. The parents, on the other hand, are idealized and admired. Adorno et al. (1950) argued that these individuals with authoritarian personalities had the potential to become fascists and form fascist organizations.

The authoritarian personality, while at first greeted with enthusiasm, came soon under attack. Nevertheless, it has been highly influential over time and its main thesis is largely intact. An excellent review of the initial reception and subsequent treatment of the study was written by Roiser and Willig (2002). They show that the first minor criticism was of a methodological nature. The F-scale was seen as imbalanced because all items were phrased in a negative way that would equate agreement with authoritarianism (Christie & Jahoda, 1954; Cohn, 1956). More fatal for the study, however, were the accusations that it was politically motivated as it only examined right-wing authoritarianism and neglected the possibility of left-wing authoritarianism (Shils 1954). This prompted a search for left-wing authoritarianism that was, however, largely fruitless. Consequently, the authoritarian personality was proclaimed dead by a number of scholars (Roiser & Willig, 2002).

Despite the proclamation of its death, the authoritarian personality was brought back to life. In the 1980s and 1990s, Bob Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996, 1998) helped to revive the investigation of authoritarianism. He concluded the search for left-wing authoritarianism by asserting that extensive research by him and other scholars have failed to produce any evidence for its existence (Altemeyer, 1996: 229). However, later he relativized this statement by defining right-wing authoritarianism as authoritarianism that is geared at upholding conventional values and the status quo which conceptually could also be found on the left of the political spectrum (Altemeyer 2006). He also devised a new measuring scale, called Right-Wing Authoritarian Scale (RWA-Scale) that took on board the criticism of the F-Scale. The RWA-scale consists of 24 items and is conceptualized into three interrelated variables:

1. Authoritarian Submission – The uncritical following and submission to authorities that are perceived as established and legitimate
2. Authoritarian Aggression – Aggression that is perceived to be sanctioned by authorities towards various individuals or groups
3. Conventionalism – adherence to social norms and values that are perceived to be endorsed by established authorities (Altemeyer, 1996: 148)

His scale has been extensively used in many different settings and has been translated into several languages.




Figure 1: Authoritarianism Variables

Altemeyer's (Roiser & Willig, 2002) greatest contribution to the debate was, however, the shift of emphasis from personality to attitude. He strongly disagreed with the Freudian influenced concept that the authoritarian personality derived from early childhood experiences. Rather he supports Albert Bandura's (1973) social learning theory of aggression. Accordingly, authoritarian individuals will become aggressive when two conditions are met: (1) "anger or envy result in hostility" and (2) something triggers that aggression to erupt. An angry person will not necessarily become aggressive or even violent because they are held back by fear of retribution or moral concerns. However, under certain conditions, these fears or moral concerns are overcome. This trigger is most likely to be fear. Individuals who score high on the RWA-scale also score high in the dangerous world index. Compared to low-RWAs they are scared of the abyss. They have grown up in a world that is more dangerous or is perceived as being more dangerous than others. Often they also have fewer experiences than low-RWAs which reinforces their fear. On the bright side, however, these individuals can become less authoritarian when their range of experience increases. Additionally to increased experiences, higher education is particularly effective in decreasing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996, 2006). This possibility of social learning shows that authoritarianism is not part of an individual's personality but rather an attitude that can change over time.

This possibility of social learning and attitude change in regards of authoritarianism will be investigated in this paper. Before, we embark on this effort; I would like to clarify the term authoritarian or authoritarianism here. In much of the literature on Thailand, these terms are used in connection with the political regime or political ideology in general. In this paper, it is the later meaning that applies. When I use the word authoritarianism, I refer to the mindset of people. This mindset should not be equated with any particular political orientation. Rather it should be seen as a tendency to submit to established authorities and be aggressive towards others who do not submit to these authorities or other social values. Here we will ask how authoritarianism becomes widespread in the Thai middle class by examining university students and lectures. It will be shown

that in Thailand too higher education has the effect of reducing authoritarianism. However, the working experience in Thai universities that lectures work in reverses this process. Thus, Thai universities foster authoritarianism.

Methods

In order to investigate the authoritarianism in Thailand, I have employed a mixed-method research strategy. I have engaged in participatory observation in my capacity as a lecturer at two Thai universities over a two year period. The first was based in Bangkok while the second is a large university in the Eastern region of the country. I have had the opportunity to interact with lecturers and students on a wide range of occasions that are part of the university life. Such occasions included teaching, faculty meetings, preparation for graduation, workshops and disciplinary hearings. Many of these occasions led to informal unstructured interviews and conversations that have greatly enriched this research. Observations and interviews have allowed me to identify authoritarianism as a widespread and dominant trait of Thai universities. To safeguard the identity of all individuals referred to in this paper, I have not used their real names.

As has been discussed in the previous section, there have been a number of endeavors to measure authoritarianism and changing methods to do so over time. The F-scale introduced by Adorno et al. (1950) was used extensively until the 1980s despite gaining early methodological criticism. The methodological issues of the F-scale were addressed to a great extent by Altemeyer's (1981, 1988, 1996) RWA-scale, which itself is not without flaws. Some of the items of the scale have been argued to confuse authoritarianism with its hypothesized effects (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). Nevertheless, it is widely used and has been repeatedly validated.

More recently, scholars have used child-rearing values as an indicator for authoritarianism. Thereby, the emphasis of children's obedience and respect for authorities has been singled out as a strong indicator for authoritarianism. Already the creators of the F-scale realized that child-rearing values are an important variable of authoritarianism. They included the item "obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn" (Adorno et al. 1950, 246) into their scale. Child-rearing values are suitable measures for authoritarianism because they are distinct from the authoritarianism's hypothesized effects and do not bear any reference to specific political circumstances (e.g., Stenner 2005, 23-24; Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 48-50)

For the purpose of this research, a questionnaire was designed that combined the RWA-scale with questions about child-rearing and Thai universities. The questionnaire consisted of five sections: (1) Demographical data, (2) Thai Family Values, (3) Thai Schools and Universities, (4), Discipline at Thai Schools and Universities, and (5) the RWA-scale. The RWA-scale used in this study is a 14 item version proposed by Mavor, Louis & Sibley (2010, 2012).

The respondents of the questionnaire consisted of two groups: 147 undergraduate students and 11 lecturers. All students are undergraduates and the majority of students (57 percent) who answered the questionnaire survey were enrolled in an elective summer course in the Chinese language. Thus, the students came from various faculties: 57 percent from engineering, 31 percent from management, 6 percent from political science and law and the remaining 6 percent from assorted faculties. The high percentage of students from the faculty of engineering was coincidental. The lecturers who took part in the survey were contacted by me personally and asked to send the link to other colleagues. I also send out a request for participation in my faculty which has a total of 40 lecturers. The intention was for the responses to snowball. However, as can be seen from the low

number of respondents this did not turn out to be the case. The lecturers who answered the questionnaire came from the faculty of engineering (28 percent), management and tourism (36 percent) and political science and law (36 percent). They have teaching experience between one and 19 years whereby 64 percent are below 10 years. The lecturers are between 29 and 52 years old: 27 percent are between 29 and 31, 64 percent are between 40 and 43 and 9 percent are 52 years of age. I know most of the lecturers who responded personally. While the questionnaire was designed to be anonymous due to the small number of respondents it is possible for me to identify some of them.

The vast majority of respondents of both groups are part of the middle classes. However, the definition of what the middle class is, is anything but straightforward. Marx's (1867, 1872, 1890) analysis of class focused on the ownership of economic resources. He divided society into the lower class consisting of wage-laborers and the upper class made up by capitalists, and landowners. Marx (1890: 1031-1032) acknowledges the existence of "middle and intermediate strata" but argued these would ultimately become part of one of the major classes. However, the intermediary classes have not disappeared but rather increased both in numbers and in complexity. This makes it necessary to talk of middle classes in the plural rather than the singular. The boundaries of these middle classes are difficult to make out and categorization is hindered by high social mobility in these classes. King (2008: 98) states that in non-Western countries the situation is often even more complex because "newly-emerging classes generated by Western invention and established, indigenous classes which have emerged from local circumstances are interrelated in complex ways". Categorization is further complicated when considering status as a dimension of class. King (2008: 98) summarized that status represents the social aspect of inequality and is expressed by honor, prestige, and estimation. The concept of class and status was further developed by Bourdieu (1986, 2010 [1984]), who argues that class is a group of people who share conditions of existence that are characterized by economic and non-economic capital. Given this complexity of the middle class, we can agree with Ünalı et al. (2014) in saying that Thai "middle classes are often strongly diversified; rising and aspiring, they are confronted with more established peers, who defend the fortunes they acquired in previous development cycles against their new competitors".




Figure 2: Class Affiliation of Respondents (Subjective)

In the sense of Ünalı et al. (2014), the students are part of the rising and aspiring middle class while the lecturers are part of the established middle class. These differences are, however not apparent when we consider the response to the question: Which social class do you assign yourself (Figure 2). An overwhelming majority of respondents of both groups - 85 percent of students and 91 percent of lecturers - categorize themselves as middle class. This classification is not incorrect but does not do

justice to the internal differentiation that can be seen within the middle class. Differences can be observed most prominently in two aspects: (1) the regional origin and (2) the parent's educational level of both groups. The majority of students come from the Eastern region while the lecturers have more diverse regional origins. That the students largely come from the Eastern region is to be expected for a university that was set up to serve that particular region. However, it also tells us that these students do not spring from the Bangkokian middle class that Baker (2016) describes. It is of this portion of society, however, that 27 percent of the lecturers come. This is further affirmed when considering the educational level of the students' parents. 65 percent of students' fathers and 55 percent of their mothers have received education up to the level of high school. The educational level of mothers is significantly higher than that of fathers with 29 and 12 percent have gained an undergraduate education. The educational level of the lecturers' parents is even lower than that of the student and 73 percent have not gained schooling beyond high school. This shows that for this group education was a pathway to social mobility. From these differences, we can see that the lecturers are one generation ahead of the students in establishing their status as members of the middle class.




Figure 3: Regional Origin of Respondents

Table 1: Level of Education of Respondents Parents

Level of Education	Students				Lecturers			
	Mother		Father		Mother		Father	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Primary School	43	29.25	42	28.57	6	54.55	6	54.55
Middle School	21	14.29	12	8.16	1	9.09	1	9.09
High School	17	11.56	42	28.57	1	9.09	1	9.09
Vocational School	20	13.61	28	19.05	2	18.18	1	9.09
Undergraduate	42	28.57	17	11.56	0	0.00	2	18.18
Graduate	4	2.72	5	3.40	1	9.09	0	0.00
Doctoral	0	0.00	1	0.68	0	0.00	0	0.00

Authoritarianism in Thailand: Students and Lecturers

The results of the RWA-scale alone are not conclusive about the students' and authoritarianism. The possible score for the 14 item RWA-scale used in this study ranges from 14 to 84. The average score of the students who took part in this study is 49.14 which corresponds to slightly high authoritarian. There is a minor decline of the average RWA score depending on which year of study of the students, whereby the first, second, third and fourth years students have an average score from 50.53, 49.22,

48.73 and 48.25, respectively. Much more pronounced are the differences in regards to the gender of the students, whereby female, male and students of other genders have an average score of 50.17, 46.71 and 36.00. This opens up interesting questions about the relationship between gender and authoritarianism. However, these questions are beyond the scope of this study.

The results of the lectures are much more conclusive than that of the students. The average score by lecturers who took part in this study is 35.7 which corresponds to moderately low authoritarian. In the lecturers' sample, we can observe a sharp increase in the RWA score with increasing amount of experience in the profession. Lecturers who have less than five years experience have an average score of 25.25. Those with six to ten years and those with more than ten years of working at the university have an average score of 45.00 and 39.25, respectively. This is undoubtedly in relation to the respective age of lectures. Lecturers aged 29 – 31, 40 – 43 and 52 have an average score of 20.00, 40.57 and 49.00, respectively. However, working experience is the more dominant variable here as can be seen from lectures of the same age but different working experience. The differences in regards to the gender of the lecturers reaffirm the findings from the student sample, whereby female and male lecturers have an average score of 38.50 and 32.40, respectively.

The distribution of summed scores of students found in this study does correspond to that of Altemeyer (1996: 90), however, Thai students appear to be less authoritarian than their Canadian counterparts. As shown in Table 3, the majority of students are concentrated in the middle of the scale and only a small minority can be found to be either very low or very high authoritarian. It has to be noted that the Thai students in comparison to Canadian students appear to be slightly less authoritarian. This difference, however, is largely caused by methodological issues. First of all the sample used in the present study is significantly smaller than that of Altemeyer. As possible errors tend to balance out in large samples this present study is more vulnerable to inconsistencies in respondents' answers. Second, there is a large time difference between this and Altemeyer's study and we are practically comparing two different generations. In the past decades, Canadians have become less authoritarian (Altemeyer, 2006). Most importantly, however, is the fact that Thai students have very low scores for conventionalism, as shown in Table 4. The combined mean agreement in the category of conventionalism is on 1.97 or strongly disagree with the statement. In contrast, the combined mean agreement with the items in the categories aggression and submission are 4.41 and 3.94, respectively, which corresponds to strong agreement with the statements made. The low agreement in the category of conservatism has reduced the overall RWA scores.

Table 3: Distribution of Summed RWA Scores Among Students
Comparing Altemeyer (1973-1995) and this Study

Year	N	Very Low	Moderately Low	Slightly Low	Slightly High	Moderately High	Very High
1973	976	3.5	11.2	30.9	40.2	13.2	1.0
1979	527	1.3	6.5	31.3	43.8	16.0	1.1
1985	533	0.2	2.8	22.5	51.2	22.0	1.3
1991	902	0.6	3.9	25.9	52.4	16.9	0.3
1995	1070	0.7	5.9	27.2	46.9	18.1	1.2
2017 (S)	147	0.0	4.5	42.9	47.4	3.8	0.0
2017 (L)	11	18.2	27.3	36.4	18.2	0.0	0.0

The distribution of Thai lecturers varies greatly from that of both Thai and Canadian students, whereby Thai lectures are significantly less authoritarian. The tendency of Thai lecturers as shown by

the RWA-scale is much less authoritarian than of Canadian students in 1995. This appears to support the theory that higher education and the exposure to diverse people decreases authoritarian attitudes. However, methodological issues have at least in part influenced this result. Not only are we dealing with a small sample that due to an unavoidable sampling bias is likely to contain more people with low authoritarianism. The majority of respondents answered the questionnaire as a favor to the author and forwarded it to their friends. Friends tend to be at least somewhat of a similar mindset which would indicate that low authoritarians are likely to be friends with other low authoritarians. Finally, the RWA-scale can be deceptive in cases where the respondents are self-aware of their authoritarianism and try to hide it or perceive themselves differently as their actions. Further it should be noted that lectures score low in the category of conventionalism with the combined average of agreement on items of these category being as low as 1.41.

Given the low scores in the category of conventionalism shown by both students and lecturers, we need to ask if Thai respondents are non-conventional or if the items are not appropriate for the Thai context. The answer is to be found in the middle. The items in this category are to some extent outdated. While the question of premarital sexual intercourse is wrong may have been a valid question only ten years ago, it is less relevant for today. In general, most of the questions in this section are concerned with private matters that in the Thai cultural context undergo less scrutiny than in the Western context (Jackson, 2004). In other matters, respondents may well be more conventional.

Table 4: Mean Agreement with each Item of the RWA-Scale

Variable	Question	Mean	
		Student	Lecturers
Aggression	Strong leader	4.94	3.45
	Government authorized aggression	4.76	3.18
	Strongest methods to eliminated troublemakers	3.86	2.45
	Silence troublemakers	4.07	2.55
	Combined	4.41	2.91
Conventionalism	Premarital sexual intercourse	2.64	1.64
	Own lifestyle. religion and sexual preference	1.89	1.36
	The one right way to live	1.68	1.27
	Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral	1.67	1.36
	Combined	1.97	1.41
Submission	Obedience and discipline	4.79	2.82
	Normal proper appearance	4.71	3.73
	Obedience and respect are important virtues for children	4.66	3.09
	Needs free thinkers	3.02	2.82
	Challenging our government	3.79	3.64
	Protesters and radicals with open arms and open minds	2.66	2.36
	Combined	3.94	3.08

The authoritarianism and conventionalism of Thai students come into focus when we consider their attitudes towards child rearing and discipline. One indicator for authoritarianism that is commonly used is a question in the World Value Survey (2017). The respondents are given a set of eleven values from which they can choose the five most important to instill in one's children. Those respondents who chose obedience as one of the values are classified as authoritarian. In the seventh wave (2013) of the survey, 44.2 percent of Thai respondents made precisely that choice. This represents some

decline from the sixth wave (2007) when 53.8 percent mentioned obedience as an important value for children. When the respondents in this study were asked the same question 53.44 percent and 27.27 percent of students and lecturers, respectively, mentioned obedience as an important value for children to learn. This suggests again that students are more authoritarian than lectures. It has to be noted that a disproportionally high percentage of students who had a slightly low RWA score chose this value. This suggests that this group of students is more authoritarian than the scale will allow which is likely connected with the low scores on conventionalism.

Table 5: Mean Agreement with each Item of the RWA-Scale

Group	Very Low	Moderately Low	Slightly Low	Slightly High	Moderately High	Very High	All
Students	0.00	33.33	64.91	46.03	40.00	0.00	53.44
Lecturers	0.00	33.33	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	27.27

Table 6: Students' Attitudes Towards Child Rearing and Discipline

Question	Moderately Low	Slightly Low	Slightly High	Moderately High	Total
Children must learn to follow authority	3.00	4.84	4.97	5.40	4.84
Hitting important to raise good children	2.33	2.53	2.94	2.80	2.75
Discipline most important in school	2.82	4.68	4.68	5.00	4.61
Always respect lecturers	1.00	3.47	2.75	3.60	3.20
Cut student's hair as punishment	2.00	2.37	3.25	1.60	2.75
Soldiers teaching discipline in schools	1.67	3.25	3.43	3.40	3.27
Good students are dressed correctly	1.33	2.40	4.13	5.40	3.29
Students not challenge lecturers	2.75	4.61	4.24	3.80	4.39
Female students should wear skirts	2.17	2.90	3.39	2.40	3.08
Mean	2.12	3.45	3.75	3.71	3.58

Table 7: Lecturers' Attitudes Towards Child Rearing and Discipline

Question	Very Low	Moderately Low	Slightly Low	Slightly High	Total
Children must learn to follow authority	2.00	2.67	4.50	2.50	3.18
Hitting important to raise good children	1.50	1.33	2.00	1.00	1.55
Discipline most important in school	2.00	3.33	2.75	6.00	3.36
Always respect lecturers	1.50	1.33	2.00	2.50	1.82
Cut student's hair as punishment	3.50	4.33	3.00	1.67	3.09
Soldiers teaching discipline in schools	1.00	2.00	1.67	4.00	2.27
Good students are dressed correctly	1.50	2.00	1.67	4.67	2.55
Students not challenge lecturers	2.00	2.33	2.25	2.50	2.27
Female students should wear skirts	1.00	3.00	3.33	2.33	2.55
Mean	1.78	2.48	2.57	3.02	1.78

The student's attitude towards child rearing and discipline in school and university was more authoritarian than that of lectures'. As shown in Table 6 and 7, students were much more likely to agree with the importance of discipline in general as well as specifics such as that soldiers teaching discipline in school is an appropriate practice. The average agreement with all these statements by students and lecturers was 3.58 and 1.78 respectively. In regards to the differentiation between the low and high RWA scores in each of the two samples, it can be noted that the student's responses to

each of the questions are consistent with their RWA scores. In other words, those with a moderately low score also show low agreement with these items. However, the agreement does not increase proportionally with the increased RWA score. Rather we can observe a jump from those of moderately low to slightly low scores and only insignificant increases thereafter. In the lecturer sample, the increase is much more in proportion with the RWA score.

The combination of the RWA-scale and factors such as attitudes to child-rearing and discipline shows that Thai undergraduates are authoritarian. The RWA score alone does not suggest that Thai students are authoritarian. Indeed they appear to be less authoritarian than their Canadian counterparts. However, their attitude to child-rearing and discipline in school or at university reveal a much stronger authoritarian leaning than the RWA-scale suggested. This is explained by low scores for conventionalism which is likely caused by the different cultural context found in Thailand.

Both RWA scores and responses to questions concerning attitudes to child rearing and discipline suggest that Thai lectures are not authoritarian. As the following section will show this is in direct contrast to the behavior that many of them display in their daily interactions at the university. I believe that can largely be explained by the relative newness of most of the respondents in their profession. As has been shown above, the RWA score increases significantly after the first five years as a university lecturer. In the following section, I will show the process that molds young lectures into authoritarians.

How Authoritarians Are Made

This section of the paper aims to answer the question: How do highly educated people become authoritarians? Higher education, experiences, and exposure to a variety of people are seen as the core of social learning that leads to low authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). Lecturers have gained graduate degrees often from abroad. They come in contact with students who come from a number of different walks of lives. Thus, they theoretically should be low authoritarian. Yet when looking at our small sample of lectures it becomes clear that after spending five years at the university, lectures' authoritarianism increases drastically. This observation is shared by a university employee who said: "When they [the lectures] start here they are all nice but after five years they all turn crazy for power." Crazy for power is a good euphemism for authoritarianism. In this section, we are going to follow the journey of new lectures to uncover what happens to them that changes their attitudes so fundamentally. Thereby it will become clear that three aspects of university life, in particular, shape their attitude: regulations, rumors, and finally verbal assaults.

The new lecturer is initiated to the world of university regulations on the day they sign their contract of employment. Two copies of fifty pages each of legal papers have to be filled in by hand and signed on every page. However, not only the lecture has to sign a contract, their parents too have to sign in the role of guarantors who will have to pay a fine of twenty thousand baht if the lecture fails to commence their duty.⁴ On the first day on duty, they are then presented with a hundred or more pages of regulations.⁵ This is a fitting commencement for their working life in which regulations stipulate almost every detail.

⁴ The procedures for employment can vary with the type of employment. What is narrated here is a university lecturer paid with government funds without having received government or university scholarship for their education.

⁵ In comparison, when I stated work at two different European universities, I given the set of regulations relevant for me too. These, however, were no more than two to three pages long.

Regulations at Thai universities control almost every minor detail and are aimed to create uniformity amongst lecturers. This becomes most visible in regards to working hours. The stipulated working hours for lectures are from nine o'clock in the morning to five o'clock in the evening amounting to 35 working hours per week. These working hours, in accordance with regulations, have to take place at the university. Any working hours that take place at a different location, in particular outside the province the university is located, require a formal application for leave. How working hours are recorded varies from faculty to faculty. Some faculties have opted to not record working hours at all (Faculty of Humanities), some keep hand written logs in which the lectures enter the time they arrived at and left work, yet other faculties require lectures to scan their fingerprints in the morning or indirectly force them to provide a fingerprint by installing scanners as opening mechanisms to faculty offices. These regulations are, however, not deemed sufficient, so complicated systems of calculating working hours have been invented. For example, one journal article is equated to a set number of working hours that can only be claimed if the lecturer has asked for permission to write the article in advance. Administrative work and teaching work have their own calculation methods for working hours. These systems are not based on the real amount of time that went into writing articles or fulfilling administrative tasks that do vary significantly from case to case depending on the type of research conducted. Yet the regulations are trying to create a once size fits all system for all lectures. The example of working hours shows that there are a number of overlapping regulations which inevitably lead to conflicts in particular for lectures that do not fit into this standardized version of their profession.

Lectures' working time is not the only example of attempts to making lecturers uniform, regulations also reach into the core of the lectures profession: teaching. Higher education reforms have led to the implementation of quality control of teaching (Rattana: 2015) While the quality control itself is dictated at the ministerial level, universities and even individual faculties have implemented them in different ways. The calculation of working hours mentioned above is part of this effort. However, more strikingly are faculty and program internal regulations with the aim to ensure the quality of teaching. Faculties issues regulations that set up quality assurance committees in each program. These committees are charged with ensuring quality of teaching by ways of scrutinizing the appropriateness of teaching material and exams. One lecturer, who is using problem based learning⁶ as a teaching method, relates the following about such a committee meeting:

The head of the committee asked me things like: How do you give grades? Why don't you give an exam? And how can you make sure the students learn all the theory. She was very aggressive and I felt like in an interrogation room.

In this particular committee meeting, quality assurance took a backseat and was taken over by the intent to ensure uniformity: that is a traditional lecture method of teaching. The head of the committee conflate conventional methods of teaching with the quality of teaching and aggressively pressured in her eyes nonconforming lecturers to change their ways. She justified her aggression

⁶ In Problem Based Learning students are presented with a problem which they have to find a solution for. In the process of finding this solution the student acquires both theoretical and practical knowledge in a self-directed manner while the lecturer takes over the role of a coach. This teaching method often does not use traditional exams to evaluate the students' achievement and used project reports and presentations instead. Also the knowledge acquired by each student in the course varies in accordance to the approach they take to solving the problem.

with the regulations written and approved by the faculty leadership. This is quintessential authoritarian behavior.

Regulations paired with their inconsistent enforcement are effective tools to scare lectures into conformity. While regulations are omnipresent in lecturers' daily life many of these regulations are not generally followed. The issue of working hours and application for leave are prime examples of regulations that are bent or outright ignored. In those faculties that require manual writing down of working hours, this is usually done just before the records have to be sent in and lecturers simply fill in the forms without regards for their actual working hours. The same applies for leaves from work for work related, such as field work, and private matters, such as holidays. This is a well known fact, however, these often minor discretions can be used to chastise lectures that do not fit the conventions. One example is Dr. Sompong, who had joined the university as a lecturer two years ago after having worked as a professional on the international level for several years. He has spent the better part of a decade living in Europe and is used to a very egalitarian working culture. Dr. Sompong is among the group of lecturers who took part in the questionnaire survey and had a very low authoritarian score. He was given the responsibility to lead a new curriculum at the faculty but his for Thailand unorthodox working style has met with much opposition. Recently, he went on a holiday abroad, however, had neglected to file his application for leave well in advance. While this issue could have been dealt with at the faculty level, it went all the way up to the university level and a disciplinary hearing was held there recently. While this is unlikely to have serious consequences for Dr. Sompong it was a show of power of his direct superiors. They are to scare him into compliance. That regulations are indeed enforced unequally is confirmed by the lecturers who took part in the questionnaire survey, as illustrated in Table 8.

There is a fear amongst lecturers and administrators to violate regulations. This fear in many instances is pair with an incomplete understanding of them. In discussion with lecturers, in particular, those who have worked at the university for a long time, express that violation of regulations will land lecturers and in particular the administrators in prison. As one lecturer puts it:

If you don't follow the regulation than the ministry of finance will come to get you. Like our administration now; they have one food in prison already. Everyone just has to protect themselves. This is why they are all so strict with the regulations.

This statement expresses adequately the fear that many lecturers have. Any minor even honest mistake could potentially be very harmful to the lecturer involved. This almost blind following of regulations paired with to a certain degree unrealistic fears are a symptom of authoritarian submission.

Table 8: Lecturers' Perception of Enforcement of Regulations and Rumors (in percent)

Question	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Regulations are enforced equally	36,36	63,64	9,09	-
Rumors are widespread	-	9,09	45,45	45,45

When regulations are not available, rumors can be used to ensure conformism with unwritten laws. One example for this is the morning attire for the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej. After his death in October 2016, the government had asked all government employees to dress in mourning for a full year. In the first few weeks after the death, this translated into plain black (or white) clothing only,

which was relaxed to include patterns and greys after the first 90 days had passed. However, it came to my attention around March 2017, that in the building in which the president's office is located employees were reported for not wearing black clothes. It is uncertain on what grounds such a report could be made since the wearing of mourning is not anchored in any law or university regulation. Also, I have not been able to locate any person who has been subjected to such a report. However, this rumor was effective in ensuring that mourning was properly observed at least in the building of the president's office. Rules like the morning clothing cannot be implemented using official means as they are not codified. Thus, rumors are resorted to as a means of enforcement.

Rumors are widespread and can alienate non-conventional from other lecturers. As can be seen in Table 8 the majority of lecturers taking part in the survey think that rumors in the university are widespread. The impact such rumors can have on progressive thinkers who aim implement changes to the status quo has been demonstrated by Tamara Loos (2016). In her study of Prince Prisdang, she has shown how rumors have isolated him from the patronage of the king, made working and living in Thailand impossible and eventually forced him into exile. While we do not know what initially caused the rumors about the prince the effects are clearly visible. Similarly, in present day Thai universities lecturers that threaten the status quo too much soon find themselves subject of rumors. These rumors make it difficult for them to push any innovative ideas and often force them to conform to the boundaries set by conventions.

Phantom rumors are even more effective than real rumors in achieving compliance. A phantom rumor is a rumor that has been invented by one person in order to pressure another person to conform to any requests made. It is more effective than rumors because it can be used in a more targeted way. Phantom rumors tend to be given in form of advice and there is an unbalance between the giving and receiving end of the phantom rumor. One typical example is that of a young and relatively new lecturer, Ms. Ploy. She has started to teach about two years ago and is one of the youngest lecturers in her department. This summer she agreed to teach several courses for which she receives additional income. Ms. Ploy was taken aside by a senior colleague who told her: "Some of the other lecturers are saying you are teaching too much", implying that she is taking others the opportunity to earn money too. While this on some level is an indirect method of communication, it results in an increased unbalance of power as Ms. Ploy has no opportunity to address the origin of the reproach. Thus, phantom rumors are part of authoritarian efforts to enforce conformity with norms that are often not spelled out.

The final measure to bring nonconventional lecturers into the fold is to use verbal violence. Verbal violence includes actions such as aggressive shouting and abusive words. Lecturers and administrators rarely raise their voice against another member of faculty which makes its occurrence all the more forceful. Verbal violence is seen as last ditch attempt to coerce others to comply with perceived norms. Verbal violence is, however, only used by lecturers who perceive themselves to be in a superior position, such as members of the administration or senior lectures. One example for this is the dean of one faculty who uses verbal violence to emphasize his orders and, thus, achieves compliance. On the other hand, verbal violence by a junior member towards a more senior lecturer would be seen as highly inappropriate. Thus, verbal violence is an effect of authoritarianism.

Conclusion

This paper set out to investigate the authoritarian personality of Thai university lecturers, as a fraction of the middle class that has been shown to have a tendency for authoritarianism. It has been

shown that students are more clearly authoritarian than lecturers. However, the authoritarianism in lectures increases significantly after the first years in the profession which suggest that universities foster such attitudes in their employees. Senior lecturers enforce conformity with unequal enforcement of regulations, malicious rumor, and aggression towards the challengers to achieve compliance. Given this oppressive culture at Thai universities, it is unlikely that university graduates who form the bulk of the middle class will be encouraged to embrace democratic values or critical thinking. This has to be understood as one of the obstacles that Thailand is facing on its way to democracy or academic excellence.

These findings have to be seen relatively as there were some methodological limitations. The RWA scale used to measure authoritarians needs to be further adapted as in its current form it is not able to capture conventionalism in the Thai context. Further, the sample of lecturers surveyed in this study was small which impacted the findings. Therefore, further study of a larger sample of lecturers with an improved RWA scale is needed to verify these finding.

This paper may have given the impression that all Thai lecturers are authoritarians. This is, however, not the case. If all lecturers would be authoritarians and would be confirmative than the expression of authoritarian aggression and submission that were disused in the second part of the paper would not be necessary. Also as has been shown in the first part of the paper, very high authoritarianism is rare. The majority of people, including Thai lecturers are in the middle of the scale.

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Dr John Girling's Œuvres:
Reconsidering Development and Democracy: Thailand in a Globalized World

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Abstract

The paper aims to pay tribute to Dr John Girling's life and scholarship. It will provide an overview of his substantial body of works, focusing on issues concerning development, democracy and social transformation in Thailand. The overview includes his major contributions to development theories and debates on the 'grand theories' in relations to capital and power, corruption, social movement, myths and politics, emotion and reason in social change in both 'modernized' and 'modernizing' societies. While committed to assisting the unprivileged and unfortunate, he strongly opposed any dogmatism in theories and ideas by having them countervailed with historical and empirical research in a synthesized and even-handed manner. Without such evenhandedness, he was afraid that one hostile camp would 'seek unprofitably to destroy the other' while diverting 'attention from the pressing problem of the relationship between theory and content.' In attempting to address this concern, he proposed an avant-garde scholarship, especially in his last book to encourage those engaging in a social science theory to explore and enhance its explanatory power so as to comprehensively understand emotionally-charged beliefs which play a vital role in human motivation and behavior in social change processes. This should be done, following his 'pacifiste,' with the view to providing new critical insights into the understanding of social conflicts and creating an open, tolerant and compassionate society.

Keywords: John Girling, Thailand, development, democracy, social change, moderation and dogmatism.

Throughout his academic life of over 40 years, Dr John Girling attempted to provide a meaningful explanation to help later generations to understand and put into perspective political and social change. His research, which covers 'modernizing' and 'modernized' societies (e.g. Thailand, the US, the UK, France and Germany), was carefully pursued in a free-spirited, independent and moderate manner. Being avant-garde and moderate in any field often results in loneliness. Nonetheless, this state of scholarly affairs seldom deterred his will. Instead, he acknowledged the fact of academic life and thanked the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, where he had worked for 26 years, for allowing him to pursue his work above and beyond the boundary of a required discipline.

This paper aims to pay tribute to Dr John Girling, whose collection of works explores academic disciplines from International Relations/Politics, History, Political Science, Political Sociology and Political Philosophy; and cover the major themes of development, democracy, capitalism, myths and politics in Western societies, social movements and symbolic power, and emotion and reason in social change. The paper will present a sketch of his life, followed by a summary of his works on

development, social change and democracy from 1963 to 2006. It will discuss the intellectual legacy of this scholar who devoted his life and scholarship to search for a meaningful way to understand and create a better world.⁷

Snapshot of John Girling's Life and Work

John was born in Farnborough in the UK in 1926 as the eldest of three children. His father, who came from 'a long line of Anglican priests,' was an army officer working with the British Foreign Office. His mother came from a Scottish doctor's family and was the first female in the family to attend university.

After finishing high school (St Edwards School, Oxford, 1941-1944), he took a gap year in Munich, Germany, assisting war refugees, mostly Russians, with resettlement. His humanitarian concern was something he carried with him in later years. While in Munich, he also acquired German as his third language in addition to English and French.

From 1947 to 1950, John was enrolled at the Queen's College, Oxford, studying Modern History (focusing on the French Revolution) and Literature that endowed him with in-depth knowledge of European history and culture. Soon after graduating with a BA (Oxon), he joined the British Foreign Office following in his father's footsteps.

In addition to his Foreign Office duties, John continued assisting refugee resettlement in Britain. This led him to learn Russian as his fourth language and subsequently to meet Nina, a French-Russian lady, whom he married in 1953.

While working with the Foreign Office in London, John wrote a number of articles concerning the plight of people in British colonies and had them published under a *nom de plume*. His 'civic engagement,' driven by his pacifist beliefs, agitated his British superiors who tried to find a way to teach this smart young officer a lesson.

The opportunity arose when H.E. Mr. Pote Sarasin, the first Secretary-General of the now-defunct Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), requested the replacement of the British representative.⁸ John was duly dispatched to Thailand in the early 1960s as a 'punishment' to work with SEATO at the dawn of the Cold War era.

John and Nina 'fell in love' with Thailand, especially its culture underpinned by Theravada Buddhism.⁹ John subsequently adopted Thailand as his country of study and began to learn Thai as his fifth language, providing a window to deeper understanding of Thailand's politics, society and culture. With his analytical mind and propensity for writing, John published a book: *Thailand: A Political, Social and Economic Analysis*, in 1963, under the *nom de plume* of 'D. Insor' (literary meaning

⁷ It should be noted that this paper partially covers John's work. Other contributions he made, e.g. ASEAN and International Relations at large, are beyond the scope of this paper. As such, there is a gap to be filled if anybody intends to explore and interpret John's contributions and achievements. In reviewing John's collection of work, I will try to distinguish, as clearly as I can, which ideas and/or opinion coming from the 'master' or from the 'pupil' in the case of different interpretations.

⁸ SEATO was formed after a special meeting in Canberra in 1957. I was told that Khun Pote Sarasin felt uncomfortable working with the previous British representative, but was happy working with John who understood how to work professionally with people from different cultures and backgrounds. Consequently, he received a further two-year extension (twice) to work with SEATO in Bangkok where he and his wife lived for six consecutive years before a brief return to London and then joining the ANU in Canberra (Conversation with Nina Girling, 17 April 2016, Toulouse, France).

⁹ 'It [Thailand] changed our perceptions, and became the turning point in our lives,' *Ibid*.

‘pencil’) while working with SEATO. The book set the stage for his continued interest in Thailand and the Southeast Asian region, especially his profound analysis of Thailand’s society and politics in the following years.

After ‘a short spell back in the Foreign Office in London,’¹⁰ John was offered a senior research fellow position in the ANU’s Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (RSPAS) and joined the ANU in early September 1966. Besides his work on international relations/politics, the US role in the regional security of Southeast Asia and numerous articles and books (see below references), he completed his PhD on Thailand which was eventually published as a book: *Thailand: Society and Politics*, in 1981. The book is still ‘one of the best books about Thailand’ and regularly cited.¹¹

John’s enquiring mind did not stop at the boundaries of academic disciplines. From the mid-1980s onward, his scholarly interests broadened to include development theories and issues concerning Third World countries in general and Thailand in particular. One of the signposts of this change was a discussion paper: ‘Southeast Asian Area Studies and Political Science Methodology: Four Essays,’ written by ANU’s four fine scholars: John Girling, Ben Kerkvliet, Harold Crouch and Dick Robison and published in *Asian Studies Review* in 1985.

In his essay, John tactfully opposed ‘dogmatism’ expressed in academic work from different schools of thought: modernization theory, Marxism, neo-Marxism and the like of the 1960s-80s. He searched for a synthesis and a balancing act between politics, economy and society, especially the link between ‘concept’ and ‘content’ or theory and practice. Without the even-handedness of such a balance, he argued, each hostile camp would ‘seek unprofitably to destroy the other’ while diverting ‘attention from the pressing problem of the relationship between theory and content.’

The ‘required synthesis’ to which he referred could ‘only be created through a real commitment to, and understanding of one side [be it political ideology] which is then carried over, without losing contact with the original position, to an equally serious commitment to the other side.’¹² The prime example of this commitment was shown in his book: *Capital and Power: Political Economy and Social Transformation*, published in 1987, which continues to be a significant contribution to development debates and theories at present.

After his retirement and move to Toulouse (the South of France) in 1992, John’s academic interests extended from Political Science (underpinned by intensive, historical research) and Political Sociology to Political Philosophy, with reference to France, Germany, the UK and the US. With his analytical mind and prolific writing skills, he produced a significant number of publications, including: *Myths and Politics in Western Societies* (1993); *Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy* (1997); *France: Political and Social Change* (1998); *Social Movements and Symbolic Power* (2004); and *Emotion and Reason in Social Change* (2006). Endowed by the virtue of moderation, I believe, John’s collection of works has provided the present and future generations of scholars with new ways to understand how the world works, through the balancing view of both social concepts and content, so as to create the better and more compassionate world. An overview of John’s publications from 1963-2006 follows in the next section.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Dr Sakkarin Niyomsilpa of Mahidol University, Thailand, *per com.*, 13 October 2015.

¹² John Girling *et al.*, 1984, ‘Southeast Asian Area Studies and Political Science Methodology: Four Essays,’ *Asian Study Review*, Vol. 9, Issue 1, p. 16.

John Girling's Œuvres: An Overview

As shown in References at the end of this paper, John's publications demonstrate the development of his theoretical position, personal observation and practical advice concerning the nature and state of development and democracy in modernized and modernizing societies. All of his publications, from the first to last, consistently reveal his thematic synthesis and analysis: the relationship between the state, economy and civil society; between theory and practice; and the balancing act between the extreme positions of the Right and the Left. Thailand is often used as a relevant example in comparison with other modernized and modernizing societies in a globalized world.

This section provides an overview of a selection of John's work. It covers, firstly, an investigation of his theoretical position between the competing 'grand theories' of modernization on the one hand, and Marxist-oriented theories on the other. Secondly, his arguments on development, democracy and corruption are summarized. Thirdly, his synthesis of 'social movements' and 'symbolic power' is discussed. Fourthly, his views on myths and politics in modernized and modernizing societies; and on the relationship between emotion and reason in social change are considered. Fifthly, and finally, his analysis of Thailand's state of development and democracy is discussed in the context of its position in a globalized world.

Capital, Power and Social Transformation

Overall, the book: *Capital and Power* comments on the grand theories of pluralist and Marxist approaches, and their limitation in providing a meaningful explanation for understanding political and social change. By using Marxism as the point of departure, this work attempts to explain how a modern society works and transforms. From the outset, he clearly stakes his theoretical position as 'bipartisan,' bearing between Marxist and pluralist conceptions.¹³ He remarks that this study is not the interpretation of any theory but of 'theory-in-practice.' His approach is to use 'mid-level themes'¹⁴ and specific case studies to examine social transformation and change. He explains his preference for the mid-level approach in that if a theory is pitched at such a high level of abstraction with the view to explaining all case studies of social change, its explanatory power becomes too vague to provide a meaningful analysis of the cause and effect of and, more importantly, response to the change in a given society. However, if many attributes are added to explain a variety of situations, such an explanatory tool loses its coherence which is its major quality and strength.¹⁵

Instead of adopting the term 'political economy' leisurely or carelessly, John intensively examines historical evidence from developed and developing nations so as to understand its use and misuse. He then asserts that Marx failed to take into account the responses of the capitalist system to its crises and its potential to improve the social conditions of the 'working class.' He adds that Marx also under-estimated the significant role of politics, whereby state intervention is pursued to regulate

¹³ The word 'pluralist' is used interchangeably with 'modernization,' in comparison to 'Marxist' theory. Pluralism refers to both political theory and political philosophy, noting that the political power is distributed among many groups in a society and that the politics are established through bargaining power and consensus. His reasons for using Marxism as the point of departure are based on his perception of social justice and the unequal and unfair distribution of the product at the expense of the primary producers; and the ways in which 'the ruling class' sustains its dominant power through the use of political and cultural institutions.

¹⁴ John Girling, 1987, *Capital and Power: Political Economy and Social Transformation*, London: Croom Helm, p. 109. It is also called the 'middle-range theories' by Robert Merton, an American sociologist.

¹⁵ Girling, 1987, *Capital and Power*, p. 110.

market forces and to implement welfare reforms beneficial to those who are disadvantaged by the negative impact of the capitalist system. Hence, he concludes that a political economy is the 'interaction' between economic and political factors rather than the use of the economy as the determinant factor for explaining political upheavals as well as a series of social transformation stages (e.g. from feudalism to capitalism, socialism and communism).¹⁶

Capitalism is more than an economic system, John argues. It is also 'the hierarchies of wealth, of state power and of culture, that oppose yet support each other.'¹⁷ Its spirit, according to the German sociologist, Max Weber, is based on individualist values or the 'bourgeois ethic' of motivation, enterprise, self-improvement and strict personal behavior. Other conditions supporting the development of capitalism include rationally-organized 'law-based' societies, the strengthening of the social order by the state, skilled and capable labor, the application of science and technology, and the accumulation of capital.¹⁸ Throughout history, he notes, since the Roman Empire, various forms of capitalism were pursued and produced prosperities mixed with crises. Nevertheless, capitalism has survived these crises, one after another, by re-producing and transforming itself with the assistance of the state and support of civil society. He points out the character of the Roman Empire and its survival were grounded on the interaction between capitalism, the state and civil society and the changes in social relations between the three spheres over time.¹⁹

He sums up that Marx's base-superstructure concept is flawed as a theory and is therefore inadequate as an explanatory tool for predicting social change. As he explains, capitalism viewed as a social phenomenon, cannot be understood without the comprehension of the particular context in which it operates.²⁰ Each context normally comprises three thematic elements: realism (a belief that reality exists independently from scholarly observation), specificity or unique features of a given society, and the awareness of change. This is what he calls a theory-action thesis.

To understand how a society works and to avoid being bogged down by dogmatism requires four conditions. John advises that one has to work, firstly, on both general theories and specific features via synthesis and analysis. For instance, the 'general' becomes the context in which the significance of the 'specific' is realized. Secondly, if and when new evidence emerges against one's hypothesis, the awareness of change would transform one's perceived concept of that situation accordingly. And if the evidence of change increases quantitatively and qualitatively and appears contrary to the established paradigm, then 'either elements of theory, or even the entire paradigm, may have to be discarded and replaced by one that brings theory more satisfactorily into line with reality.'²¹ Thirdly, one must recognize that development and change is never static but dynamic throughout time, place and space. Fourthly, as a result of the above, a new paradigm or conceptual framework is to be developed with the view to 'classifying the variety of specific combinations in the world; and re-thinking in response to change.'²² These methods of synthesis and analysis are, he argues, 'essential' for understanding a society and how it works and transforms.

He also gives critical attention to the importance of three thematic elements: realism, specificity and

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 2 and 109. See also Raymond Aron, 1967, 'Karl Marx,' *Main Currents in Sociological Thought*, trans. by Richard Howard and Helen Weaver, Vol. 1, London: Penguin Books, pp. 111-182.

¹⁷ Girling, 1987, *Capital and Power*, p. 54.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-83.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-61.

²⁰ John Girling, 1997, *Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy*, London: Routledge, p. xi.

²¹ Girling, 1987, *Capital and Power*, p. 111.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 111

social change awareness, which challenge pluralist theories.²³ Since the end of World War II, modernization theories (e.g. liberalism, neo-liberalism and the like) with the promise of the economic growth spearheaded by the elite in the state and business sectors, and of 'trickle-down benefits' to the poor and the powerless, have rather resulted in social malaise and widening gaps between the rich and the poor. Despite state interventions and capitalist transformations, social issues persist. In this regard, he asserts that:

A basically economic orientation, whether Marxist, dependency, neo-classical or reformist, is no more adequate than its political counterpart, whether pluralist, liberal, conservative or populist. The evidence of change, above all, reveals the weaknesses of one-sided perceptions of society.²⁴

He adds that effective theories of social transformation are evidenced by their ability to handle and cope with change but that development practitioners are often faced with 'the recalcitrance of powerful forces to desired change' [emphasis as original].²⁵ His study suggests that there is a need for the 'convergence in political economy' of both Marxist and pluralist approaches. To carry out an effective political economy research, one must acquire detailed knowledge of an area study and combined it with theoretical insights.²⁶

What are the crucial forces that can help countervail the negative impact of capitalism and bring about social change? The ideas of Rousseau, Georges Sorel, Graham Wallas and Antonio Gramsci are thoroughly explored to address these issues. It is Rousseau who identifies the mixture of reason and feeling that brings about social change. While Sorel's work focuses on change through emotional and a violent approach, Wallas' focus is on reason and gradualism. The result of John's investigation of Sorel and Wallas is, he concludes, that 'the first tends to enthusiasm that is all too easily distorted into viciousness and brutality; the second tends to welfarism that eventually fails to inspire even those who benefit materially from it.'²⁷

After examining both spectrums of emotion and reason through the history of ideas (including Rousseau's) and evidence, John turns to Gramsci for further explanation. He considers that Gramsci's idea is a 'heady mixture' of the Hegelian tradition, Marxism, and pluralism while asserting that:

It comes wonderfully alive in his reflections on Western culture and history, the role of intellectuals and of education, the pervasive influence of the (elite) Renaissance and the (populist) Reformation. Gramsci perceives the negative – coercive – role of the state in disciplining citizens to obey the law; while the positive – liberating – role of civil society induces awareness of a higher conception of the world and man's place in it: a myth for [the] intellectual!²⁸

Gramsci was able, John adds, to 'theorize the persistence of capitalist society with the most famous of his pairs of linked but contrasting concepts: hegemony and domination.'²⁹

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 135

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 205

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

Hegemony, according to Gramsci, is exercised through leadership (of different social classes, regardless of whether either elite or non-elite) as opposed to coercion and domination; and through the institutions of 'civil society' or 'the intermediate groups or associations between the economic structure and the apparatus of power.'³⁰ Gramsci's concepts do not work in a vacuum but in 'historicism' or an 'appreciation of the specific conditions in which an "abstract scheme" is realized and a tendency to interpret the reality as a whole in relative terms.'³¹ As John asserts, Gramsci's concepts become the 'turning point' as they not only provide the synthesis between the capital and power but also 'the struggle for political and moral leadership based on popular consent; and the transformation of economic, political and social structures through the exercise of hegemony.'³²

Gramsci argued that, as John explains, domination emerges from 'the primitiveness and immaturity of the social structure with a weak civil society' whereas hegemony arises on the basis of advanced cultural-historical development and civil complexity. He also argued that 'alternative hegemony' which represents the ideas and interest of the common people can and should be created.³³ This notion will be brought into discussion in the section below on Thailand.

In sum, *Capital and Power* identifies the inherent problem of Marx's base-superstructure concept and its theoretical flaws which make it inadequate as an explanatory tool for guiding social change. The crucial problem of Marxist theory lies on the fact that it under-estimates the notion of 'the political' whereby the representatives of the state, economy and civil society interact and negotiate their interest (e.g. material benefit and/or structural reform). To fill this void, John proposes Gramsci's ideas of political and social struggle through the exercise of hegemony as opposed to domination and coercion. More details of John's ideas and perception on development and democracy are discussed in the following section.

Development and Democracy

What exactly are John's perceptions on how a capitalist or market-oriented economy brings about development; and on democracy that acknowledge the 'sovereignty of the people'? Is democracy feasible for Third World countries from his point of view?

As appeared repeatedly in several publications, John's perceptions on these notions are presented consistently. By using historical accounts to contest how the system works for the benefit of the common people, he identifies the critical bond between capitalist-oriented development and democratic systems and institutions despite the fact that it contains inherent ambiguity. For instance, while the private sector is encouraged by representative governments to generate wealth, such prosperity is supposed to be the commonwealth for all according to the capital-democratic principle. However, confusion occurs in practice because the trickle-down effect does not work as anticipated. What can democracy then do, John asks, to rectify the asymmetrical power between the private and public sectors so that a re-distribution of wealth is to be achieved?

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2. See also, Carlo Antoni, 1962, *From History to Sociology: The Transition in German Historical Thinking*, trans. by Hayden V. White, London: Merlin Press, p. xvii. White notes that 'the concurrence of an historical attitude in romanticism, post-Kantian idealism and Darwinism has resulted in historicism.' Its emphasis is on the idea of change itself, including religion and ethics, which was subjected to an analysis on the logical ground of not being but of becoming.

³² Girling, 1987, *Capital and Power*, p. 2.

³³ John Girling, 2006, *Emotion and Reason in Social Change: Insights from Fictions*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 217-8.

Contrary to what many democratic enthusiasts espouse, democracy is not only a philosophical but also a dynamic concept. It is a product of social forces comprising economic, political and cultural elements. Once established, John argues, democracy never reaches its perfection but 'continues to be shaped (and mis-shaped) by the forces that brought it into being.'³⁴

To understand how democracy and its system work, John suggests, one must acknowledge the following aspects. The first is its valuing of the people's sovereignty and of liberty that inspire the people's belief, existence and entitlements as human beings. The second aspect concerns democratic processes and procedures as a means to achieve concrete objectives and abstract values. The third is to assess what democracy can do (e.g. the solving of social conflicts through negotiation and discussion rather than the use of force). The fourth, and most important aspect, is to evaluate what democracy cannot do (e.g. the irreversible division between the state and civil society).³⁵ These related factors help explain why deficits of democracy occur in modern societies.

Realistically, democracy can be assessed in terms of 'assets' and 'deficits.' John considers that the latter derive from the representative system of present-day democracies that only allows citizens to vote for whoever is presented to them by the machinery of a political party and/or interest group. The voters meet with the limited choice of those candidates who have been made available to them through the party's list of candidates (or through both elected and non-elected avenues). The practical result entails 'the formation of the "political class" of more or less professional politicians, whether in government or opposition, with interests that increasingly diverge from those who "elect" them.' The divergence of interest and relatively-flawed representation inherently bring about the 'deficits' to discredit the present-day democratic systems.³⁶

The other crucial aspect of the democratic deficits is 'the overconcentration of democratic theorizing on politics.' John explains that this aspect is inherited somewhat from the 'historic origins' of democracy itself. Although democracy emerged as a means to settle different interests in Asia Minor, its widespread development in Western societies, especially Europe and the US, 'emerged in the course of political struggle against absolutism, at a time when economic concerns were subsidiary.'³⁷

While the situation in a globalized world is starkly different nowadays, democratic theorists and practitioners consequently find it difficult to deal effectively with the rapid and constant changes of economic systems and circumstances. He argues that in theory the two systems of democracy and capitalist economy are supposed to be 'mutually exclusive;' in practice, it is nonetheless 'the other way round.'³⁸ The only hope, it may seem, is to strengthen the sphere of civil society as a countervailing force between the state and economy. Having said this, John recognizes various hurdles of its application in Third World countries as discussed below.

Is pluralist democracy (through a representative, parliamentary system) feasible in Third World countries? By refuting the claim that democracy ought to give way to the priority of 'development,' John strongly argues that the '[r]ealisation of pluralist democracy is not utopian: it is feasible in Third World countries' provided that certain structural factors (e.g. a publicly-endorsed constitution, law reform and reformed party system) are prepared for and readily support the development of a

³⁴ Girling, 1997, *Corruption*, p. 156. John's view on the dynamic and imperfection of democracy is similar to what Tocqueville perceived it as 'Providential fact.' See also, Alexis de Tocqueville, 2010, *Democracy in America*, ed. by Eduardo Nolla, trans. by James T. Schleifer, Vols. I & II, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc.

³⁵ Girling, 1997, *Corruption*, pp. 157-8. See also, Girling, 2006, *Emotion and Reason*, pp. 127-9.

³⁶ Girling, 1987, *Capital and Power*, p. 158.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 158; See also Girling, 2006, *Emotion and Reason*, p. 129.

³⁸ Girling, 1997, *Corruption*, p. 158.

parliamentary system. Nevertheless, he notes the pressure for placing emphasis on economic development in that:

[E]ven if the rising professional and managerial middle classes have a political (and economic) 'interest' in democracy, they have a greater stake in [the continuity of] development. At critical times they prefer the 'lesser evil' of a return to authoritarianism – safeguarding capitalist development – to the perceived danger of mass democracy getting out of control.

And that:

Nevertheless, when there is a stand-off between the bureaucracy and political parties, and this is accompanied by a reduction in their fear of the left, constructive possibilities for pluralism emerge.³⁹

His comments above show the ambiguous nexus between development and democracy which continues to be shaped and misshaped by social forces in a given society.

Having said this, he still encourages further debate on a number of existing political economy issues. For example, whether democracy is feasible after the attainment of a certain level of development; or in a word, must development have the priority? Is democracy a 'luxury' for developing countries due to the fact that it is unpredictable and prone to crisis? If one refuses to accept that democracy to be a secondary to development, how the analysis of development and democracy nexus could be renewed or recreated? Debates on these matters, he suggests, would 'illuminate the fundamental relationship between economic structures and political power – and [democratic] values – in society.'⁴⁰

Corruption

Why is it important to study corruption and to understand the inter-relationship between democracy, capitalism and corruption in the modern world? Are the rules made by those in power similar or different from social norms, custom and culture in daily life? Who loses or benefits from the rule-breaking? What is the impact of the rule-breaking upon the state and society?

In the book: *Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy*, published in 1997, John argues that 'corruption does not disappear as countries develop and modernise.' Rather, it is manifested in various, new forms due to the fact that 'corruption is symptomatic of a deeper problem: the collusive system in which politicians mediate the often contradictory claims of capitalism and democracy.'⁴¹

Such a 'normal' political behavior, he adds, resorts to the 'collusion' between capitalism and democracy that makes the system prevail despite the fact that it results in the ambiguity and 'misfit between political theory and economic practice.' During the collusive process, he explains, corruption takes front stage when private interest predominates or even takes over the public or common interest in terms of the 'excessive exchange between wealth and power.'⁴²

The study of corruption helps reveal the nature of democracy led by capitalism. As John explains, the belief in 'popular sovereignty' which informs democratic theory requires the shaping of a society

³⁹ Girling, 1987, *Capital and Power*, p. 207.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

⁴¹ Girling, 1997, *Corruption*, introductory section without page number.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 4 and 9.

following the majority will. While the conditions of modern democracy have given rise to market penetration into non-economic spheres to improve material living standards and allowed corporate political funding to compete and secure political elections, the overlapping between capitalism and democracy has produced what he calls 're-confusion'⁴³ between public and private sphere and created the 'tendency' for unchecked power to corrupt. The re-confusion of private and public values, resulting from the growth of government and the ascendancy of capitalism, not only raises the crucial question about value-oriented conceptions and procedural processes of democracy but also creates a 'crisis of confidence' arising from the widespread suspicion and mistrust by the public of the misconduct by local and national members of political parties, their representatives and their 'entourage' in the bureaucracy and political-related machinery.⁴⁴

Normatively defined, corruption is the abuse of a public position and of public trust for private gain. It reflects a clash of values between the public interest and private profit. Once the abuse of the public position undermines social trust, John argues, corruption becomes not only a criminal or legal issue but a social issue as well. It becomes the product of economic, political and social forces as it 'derives from capitalist conditions, collusive politics and normative (social) perceptions.' He emphasizes that corruption cannot be assessed only from one dimension as legal, social, economic or political as it requires a synthesis and analysis of all dimensions.⁴⁵

To emphasize corruption as a social issue, John evaluates it in terms of structure, process and outcome. He argues that corruption, as a social phenomenon, cannot be understood without studying the particular condition in which it operates. Through three case studies selected from developed and developing countries, he demonstrates variable forms and conditions of corruption. The first showed a functional corruption when being used to overcome institutional rigidities; the second a dysfunctional corruption when it is prone to discredit democratic institutions; and the third when corruption is 'offset by normative strengths elsewhere in society.' The third case shows the non-economic values of being a 'gentleman,' of applying 'moral regeneration' and rational utilitarian principles that 'inspired the eradication of corruption from public life' through the education system in the era of Victorian Britain.⁴⁶

The very real threat of corruption, he warns, is the damage to the democratic system, values and beliefs. Citizens are either estranged from the system or even worse take benefit from the corrupted system. The worst scenario is when the state of corruption is accepted as a social norm with the belief that nothing can be done about it, then the 'crucial institutional mediation between people, politicians and business is destroyed.'⁴⁷ Thus, the solution is not a more neo-liberal but a more democratic approach. As he puts it:

Only the regeneration of democratic values – through the 'remoralisation' of society, with renewed integrity of professional standards, can re-establish the autonomy of political and social spheres, making them more resistant to the encroachment of market forces, strengthening the distinction between public and

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 4. The word 're-confusion' has been adopted from John's usage. I am not sure why he uses the word re-confusion; instead of confusion. I guess that re-confusion might imply a historical debate between public and private spheres in relations to wealth and power.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 4 and 9.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. ix, xiv and 7.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. x, xi, xii, 123-7, 129-36 and 163.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-7.

private, and restoring democracy's vital representative function.⁴⁸

From the above discussion, two important issues remain to be addressed. The first is how social forces would be inspired and mobilized to countervail the democratic deficits. The second is how to restore a democratic system in accordance with its normative democratic values. These lead in the next section to his discussion on social movements and symbolic power led by two prominent French sociologists.

Social Movements and Symbolic Power

In his book: *Social Movements and Symbolic Power*, John examines the conceptual frameworks and empirical research of the two prominent French sociologists: Alain Touraine and Pierre Bourdieu with a view to providing a synthesis between the two approaches. He cites ten books written by Bourdieu in comparison to four by Touraine. He uses France as his case study by addressing its social issues (e.g. inequality, discrimination, and political illusion) and investigating how social movements and symbolic power have been used to tackle political and social problems.⁴⁹ His ambitious aim, as I understand it, was to advise a 'social activist' to think radically and to act practically. While this book has its merit, I am of the view that his synthesis might somehow remain a moot point.

Each and every country has its own path of political and social transformation. France has gone through the various stages of political and social change since the French Revolution in the 18th century and five faces of the Republic during the 19th and 20th centuries. Modern France of the Fifth Republic established after World War II continues to change, economically, politically and socially. The book provides a snapshot of France's social transformation from the Third Republic (1870-1940), through the '*trente glorieuses*' or 'thirty glorious' years (from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s), and on to the early 2000s. Despite the promise of 'indispensable' reforms by President Chirac, major social and political problems still persist. French citizens, especially the young, feel alienated from the existing political system. For example, almost 40 per cent of eligible voters abstained in France's legislative elections in 2002.⁵⁰

As John argues elsewhere, the deficits of democracy demand attention and approaches to address them. The democratic values, he adds, need to be inspired and democratic procedures established to achieve concrete democratic objectives and to fulfill the abstract values. The reason given is that 'procedures without values are sterile; values without procedures (to realize them) are futile.'⁵¹ What can Bourdieu and Touraine offer to address the democratic deficit and social concerns?

John labels Touraine as a 'reformist;' and Bourdieu 'revolutionary.'⁵² As he understands it, Touraine's work is based on the belief that the system is capable of change under the pressure of individuals and organizations. On the contrary, Bourdieu's work manifests less subtlety. He 'supports the "revolutionary" aim' based on the belief that 'the system of hierarchical power and conditioned behavior is incapable of reform and must be overcome by practice (strikes, demonstrations, disruption) and above all by the a change of mentality, rejecting the "categories" of perception and

⁴⁸ Girling, 1997, *Corruption*, p. 173.

⁴⁹ See also John Girling, 1996, *France: Political and Social Change*, London: Routledge.

⁵⁰ Girling, 2004, *Social Movements and Symbolic Power: Radicalism, Reform and the Trial of Democracy in France*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 6-12.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 31.

action imposed from above.’ Bourdieu proposes that, ‘the only salvation is through the uprising of those who have nothing to lose, the “marginal” of society.’⁵³ Hence, John categorizes Touraine’s work as ‘the modern equivalent of Alexis de Tocqueville’s whereas Bourdieu is more a combination of Rousseau and Sartre.’⁵⁴ While I consider that his categorization may need further debate, it is beyond the scope of this paper. I would, therefore, rather stay on the track of John’s political and social thoughts and contributions.

Besides the brief biographical note of both sociologists provided in the Introduction, Chapter 2 of the book gives the relevant accounts of both Bourdieu’s and Touraine’s work. John explains that Touraine largely focuses his work on the role of ‘social movements’ which are ‘inspired by the free and creative action of ‘subjects’ (individual and collective).’ On the contrary, Bourdieu accentuates a ‘symbolic power’ created by ‘the structural condition of elitist domination, reproduced social origins and scholarly attainment and “legitimized” by the belief among dominant and dominated alike that the system is “natural” and therefore right.’⁵⁵ John asserts that both Bourdieu and Touraine ‘share a common diagnosis of the state of France;’ yet ‘they differ in their theoretical perspectives.’ As such, the differences ‘produce divergent conclusions’ or approaches to address France’s social and political issues.⁵⁶

The central features of Touraine’s work comprise modernity and its ‘decomposition;’ hence, social movements are the means to address social malaise. Touraine argues that the unifying model of modernity, defined as the union between man and nature, the correspondence between actors and system and the rational functioning between economy, politics and cultural values, has already ‘reached its highest stage of development in industrial society, with the achievement of democracy and social welfare.’⁵⁷ He characterizes the present-day secular society as the decomposition of modernity resulting in a ‘fragmented society’ due to the separation between economic system and cultural values. For instance, he argues ‘[r]eason is no longer a matter of ends and means, for the attainment of values,’ rather, it is only ‘an instrument to satisfy needs, which are determined by those who hold economic and political power.’⁵⁸ While lamenting the loss of integrating forces between science and conscience, between personal freedom and the rationalization of the world, between the economic and cultural, he strongly argues that ‘[o]nly the “return of the subject” with the use of reason can reunify the fragmented world.’⁵⁹

How can the return of the subject be related to social movements and democracy? What is the relationship between these concepts? Touraine, John says, defines the subject as the agent of change, who must be constituted by democracy, personal freedom or liberty, and have the ability to transform emotional wishes into recognition of or solidarity with others. The subject must be effectively engaged with community and society at large through ‘social debate’ or ‘moral discourse’ that confronts political power and external constraints so that sustainable change can be affirmed. He concludes that ‘social movements are not in the service of any “perfect” model of society, nor of any political party, ideology or political strategy’ as it remains independent, comprising both theory

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-2. See also Girling, 2006, *Emotion and Reason*, p. 185.

⁵⁴ Girling, 2004, *Social Movements*, p. 32.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-5.

and practice in itself.⁶⁰

For Bourdieu, the structure of any society can be analyzed, by and large, as hierarchical divisions of patterned behavior of groups and individuals and the production of knowledge.⁶¹ Symbolic power derives not only from the way in which the dominant class internalizes their view and behavior and imposes them upon the dominated class but also the acceptance of this by the dominated as their natural and appropriate role in society. This acceptance behavior is conceptualized as 'habitus' which explains the 'disposition' by the dominated as they accept an inferior role assigned to them by the dominating classes. Bourdieu claims that habitus is 'structured by the economic and social conditions of class-divided society' and subsequently 'structures people's behavior.'⁶²

How can the dominated revoke symbolic power and reclaim their independent and equal position with the dominating classes? Bourdieu suggests that it could be pursued through the 'field' or the 'structure of relationships anchored in certain forms of power... where it produces and reproduces itself.' Each field (e.g. political, economic, cultural and religious) has its own values and regulatory principles, prescribing 'the limits of socially-structured space in which agents struggle... to change it or to conserve it.' For instance, political struggle takes place in 'the field of ideological production' whereby social agents learn how to think and act politically.⁶³

However, in John's view, Bourdieu's theory falls short of explanation while encountering a query of the inter-relationships between varieties of particular fields with their own logic and prescription. It is unable to explain how different fields would interact with one another and produce an outcome in a meaningful way. Eventually, Bourdieu admits his dilemma, saying that his theorization is close to Marxist grand theories whereas his empirical research is short of hard evidence to support his theoretical proposition. John comments that Bourdieu's thesis does not prescribe how subordinate classes could refute their habitual practice. The crucial point, he adds, is that the possibility of changing the social world must 'go beyond a purely negative critique: it must advance an alternative vision, utopia, project [and] programme.'⁶⁴

What exactly is John's view on the theses of both Touraine and Bourdieu? Based on those who provide an in-depth study of the work of both sociologists, he asserts that they have made valuable contributions in 'their insistence on universal criteria by which to judge and to orient particular policies.' He emphasizes that both theoretical frameworks introduced by Touraine and Bourdieu need to be understood and analyzed in a particular contextual situation. For instance, he refers to the evidence of the teachers' strike in France and cites a comment made by a teacher saying that 'young teachers behave very differently from the old trade union practice. Sometimes they tend to extremes, without understanding how negotiations should be carried on, the fact that one should seek a compromise.'⁶⁵ John sums up that Bourdieu's theoretical framework gears toward a 'deterministic perspective' and contains 'the possibility of social change.'⁶⁶ On the contrary, Touraine's social movements 'are an intellectually attractive conception... however, this aim [of social

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 40-2.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

justice] is far from being achieved.’⁶⁷

John claims his position as a synthesizer between the two approaches. While he sees both perspectives are complementary to carry out the social change, he identifies the difference between the two perspectives. He argues that Bourdieu’s symbolic power is radical, ‘deterministic’ and yet ambiguous; and that the rigidities of habitus need to be adjusted or even replaced by ‘the relatively autonomous and even indeterminate character of the field’ to help envisage and carry out substantial changes in class relations.⁶⁸ On the contrary, he claims that Touraine’s social movements contain only reform processes with vague directions to achieve any substantial changes in class relations. However, while I am of the view that John’s synthesis position may be debatable, I am certain about its merit as an invaluable advice for social activists to think radically but act sensibly and pragmatically to engage in social change. His reaching out to Touraine and Bourdieu extends his scholarship beyond political sciences to search for a meaningful explanation for addressing persistent social ills by engaging with other relevant disciplines as shown in the next section.

Myths, Politics, Emotion and Reason

The most feasible criterion of a good theory, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, a French political theorist of democracy, is one that ‘explains a social phenomenon by making it the consequence of understandable behavior on the part of the individuals concerned.’ It persists to examine ‘whether and under what conditions the observer has properly “understood” the reasons and motivations of the individuals observed, whether he has been able to reconstruct them faithfully, and whether as a result his analysis can claim objective validity.’⁶⁹ The late Raymond Boudon, a French sociologist, argued that by identifying this criterion, the theoretical stance of Tocqueville ‘prefigures’ many social scientists,’ including Max Weber.

John often cites Weber’s work in his publications. It is because, as I understand it, Weber’s ideas are not only even-handedly formulated but also dynamically powerful as an explanatory tool. For instance, Weber examines the widespread phenomena of capitalist development during the period of US nation-building in relation to the spirit of modern capitalism. The goal of his study is to find the source of that spirit. What he found was that the Protestant ethics, especially Calvinism, was a vital source that played a crucial role in breaking down the traditional economic system while paving the way to modern capitalism. In contrast to his previous argument that a society would change logically from a mystic to rational structure, this study of Weber demonstrates the anti-thesis.

With a strong determination to explain how a society develops, disrupts and sustains itself, John has taken the initiative, like Weber did, to explore the crisis of modernity in selected Western societies and demonstrate the limitation of the rationalist tradition of social science to explain an ‘extraordinary’ state of affairs. As shown in the heading of this section, two books are somewhat intertwined. The first is: *Myths and Politics in Western Societies*, published in 1993; and the second

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 61. Jacques Hamel of the Université de Montréal argues otherwise. He asserts that empirical studies demonstrate little discrepancy between the sociological theories of both Bourdieu and Touraine. Further information, see Jacques Hamel, 1997, ‘Sociology, Common Sense, and Qualitative Methodology: The Position of Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Touraine,’ *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 22, pp. 95-112. The article is also available at:

<http://flacso-sociologia-reflexiva.wikispaces.com/file/view/comparaci%C3%B3n+m%C3%A9todos+bourdieu+touraine.pdf/284660188/comparaci%C3%B3n+m%C3%A9todos+bourdieu+touraine.pdf> – accessed 17 May 2013.

⁶⁸ Girling, 2004, *Social Movements*, pp. 44-5.

⁶⁹ Raymond Boudon, 2006, *Tocqueville for Today*, London: Bardwell Press, pp. 107-8.

(which is his last book): *Emotion and Reason in Social Change*, published in 2006. Whether in his analysis in these books, John is able to provide 'good theory' following Tocqueville's criterion is discussed below.

John argues that it is unlikely one could comprehend the changing dynamic and impact of mass ideologies, power politics and capitalism at the national and international levels through the sole 'analysis of a rational mode of production and power structure.' He adds that '[a] full understanding must also take into account belief systems' that include the mixture of concept, reason and emotion whereby social, economic and political 'drives' are manifested in 'mystic-cultural forms.'⁷⁰

He defines myths as 'emotionally-charged beliefs that reflect the way in which people experience formative periods in their history.' He adds that they are 'symbolic representations of reality that, from a rational standpoint, contain incorrect assumptions; but they are nonetheless authentic, deeply-felt responses [be it frustration or liberation] to critical social conditions.' They are not 'timeless creations' but 'the product of specific historical conditions.' They are revealed in various ways that can be observed and studied through the mode and means whereby popular energies are mobilized, their endurance through periods of critical change, and their role in providing emotional security and comfort while confronting adversarial culture and uncertainties.⁷¹ They are to be interpreted and analyzed in their situational context or in a critical period in the 'life-history' of a particular community or country. In this regard, the understanding of myths and their usefulness help us to 'come to terms with' the illusive and non-rational sources of human behavior called emotion, feeling and sentiment.

What is the difference between myth and ideology? John explains that myth is a mixture of concept and emotion or 'a passionate desire to achieve a primordial objective.' It can be interpreted as 'manifest destiny' (as shown in the case study of the United States), 'will to power' (Germany) and 'progress' (Victorian Britain) that help explain the obsession, intensity, commitment and perseverance of human behavior at critical times. He considers that it is unlikely that the themes of conventional analyses such as 'rational actors,' 'modes of production' or even 'power structures' would inspire mass movement in a way similar to such myths.⁷²

At its most basic meaning, ideology is referred to as the 'conception of [a] society, the world, and our place in it.' It represents the 'systematization of both emotional and conceptual elements' which may be either 'loosely articulated' or 'elaborately structured' and is likely to be taken for granted. For instance, democracy as an ideology contains 'democratic myth' that creates the intensity of sentiment among those who believe in it. Thus, myth plays a significant role in mobilizing the democratic forces as opposed to their adversaries.⁷³

But, John warns, myth can be a double-edged sword. While a democratic myth inspires its believers to conform to its ideal element of the 'people's sovereignty,' it may also include an emotive component that may be led to misjudge the changing reality.⁷⁴

Myths are timeless creations. They render the 'capacity to respond mythically to critical situations' whereas logic and reason are evoked in the periods of peace and stability. Thus, 'phases of mythic expression alternate with phases of rational discourse; [t]here is no historical progression from myth

⁷⁰ John Girling, 1993, *Myths and Politics in Western Societies: Evaluating the Crisis of Modernity in the United States, Germany and Great Britain*, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, pp. 2 and 14.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 8 and 11.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 12 and 18.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

to rationality,' as Mark Oromaner, a sociologist, explains.⁷⁵ There is no end to myth, ideology and history, John concludes, as long as the competition and conflicts over capital and power continue to propel social change in adventitious and unpredictable directions.

The last book: *Emotion and Reason* shares a similar tone to *Myths and Politics* even though they were published thirteen years apart. The difference between the two is that the latter dwells deeper into the private sphere in relations to the public space, which the Enlightenment tradition of the rational actor fails to penetrate.⁷⁶ Furthermore, it moves slightly away from political sociology to 'sociology of emotions' - story-telling, literature and philosophy writ large. He tries to find ways to understand human behavior in the ambiguous nexus of economy, politics and society in the context of change, showing a combination of passion and intellect, as many social-concerned thinkers, including Tocqueville and John Maynard Keynes, previously explored in various forms of publications (e.g. books, letters and diaries).

He uses two distinct methods of investigation. The first is the 'analysis of the subject-matter guided by informed hypotheses,' that is in line with the traditional convention of social science disciplines. The second is through 'vicarious experience drawn from works of imagination, which is emotionally fulfilling.' He remarks that '[n]either offers a sufficient explanation in itself' but they complement each other.⁷⁷

Kant's 'trilogy of passions' forms his conceptual framework. It includes possession, power and esteem which represent existential imperatives of survival. With reference to Paul Ricoeur's idea, he argues that these passions could lend themselves to both negative forms (e.g. selfishness, greed and domination) and positive as well as redemptive forms, as he explains:

'possession', governed by rules and regulations, is essential for the production of goods and services on which everyone depends; 'power' to make someone do what he or she would not otherwise do (and vice versa) is essential to any social order; and 'esteem' is that knowledge of self and society, however derived, that makes that order meaningful. It is when these 'natural' qualities are taken to extremes – considered as ends in themselves – that possession becomes 'greed', power becomes 'anger' and esteem becomes 'illusion':

⁷⁵ Mark Oromaner, 1995, 'Review: *Myths and Politics in Western Societies: Evaluating the Crisis of Modernity in the United States, Germany and Great Britain*,' *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 540, pp. 160-1. His review praises John's book that '[i]n a fewer than 200-well-written pages, Girling has been able to raise issues of an enduring nature in social and political theory, such as classical versus romantic perspectives, rationality and order versus inspiration and change, social structure versus human agency, and historical versus transhistorical explanations. We are in his debt for reminding us of the larger concerns that brought us to our work.' Mark Oromaner was a former dean of the Hudson County Community College, Jersey City, New Jersey. For a contrasting review of this book, see R. Michael Smith, 1994, Review: *Myths and Politics...* *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 110-2. R. Michael Smith is a political scientist and was chairperson of the Department of Political Science, Glenville State College, Glenville, West Virginia, USA. The two reviews reflect two different sources of academic disciplines: the first is from a Sociology whereas the second Political Science perspective.

⁷⁶ This goes beyond Psychology as it involves 'dark energy' and mystical expressions. It is not an expression of cultural determinism either.

⁷⁷ Girling, 2006, *Emotion and Reason*, pp. xi and 11. The connection between politics and 'the work of imagination' was shown during the formation of Greek democracy. A large number of works can be referred to, for instance, Mark Chou, 2013, *Greek Tragedy and Contemporary Democracy*, London: Bloomsbury.

the causes of suffering in this world.⁷⁸

Whether these passions are to be either destructive or constructive to a given society, he argues, depend largely on the structural conditions of the economy, politics and society and 'the intensity of passions aroused by these conditions.'⁷⁹

Structural conditions, John argues, 'result from the need to systematize the means of production, power and knowledge in order to maintain and reproduce the existing order.'⁸⁰ It is the most effective way to ensure peace and stability whereby investors (regardless of domestic and foreign companies) feel confident to invest and the subordinates feel at ease to obey. While the structural conditions can be rationally analyzed, the social values such as freedom, merit, justice and equality are the matters of emotionally-charged beliefs beyond the scientific measures of social sciences.⁸¹

In my experience, John never uttered any social theory without putting it in a situational context. In *Emotion and Reason*, he formulated his thesis comprising three inter-related components: conditions, emotions and society; and used historical accounts and comments from selected literature to substantiate this thesis. The components work consequently: the first denotes inspiring, stimulating and/or traumatic conditions; second comes emotional reactions (regardless of whether constructive or destructive); and the third results in social impacts of emotional drives. He elaborated his thesis, for instance, by quoting Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, especially the second epilogue of 'The Forces that Move Nations,' as follows:

in no case can one admit that intellectual activity controls people's actions, for that view is not confirmed by such facts as the very cruel murders of the French Revolution resulting from the doctrine of the equality of man, or the very cruel wars and executions resulting from the preaching of love.⁸²

This quotation somehow coincides with the aim of the book: *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*. The book by Tocqueville examines the background and nature of the French Revolution with a view to advising later generations to avoid any violent path while pursuing social change. This is because the French had to build a new society on the old ruins and there was nowhere else to escape from the traumatic predicaments caused by violent disruptions.⁸³ Despite being born to an aristocratic family, Tocqueville supported democracy as he viewed it to be an irresistible or unstoppable force and perceived it as 'Providential fact.'⁸⁴ John thinks likewise but expresses his view in secular language as he allies himself with political philosophers like Rousseau and Mill.

Citing Vaclav Havel, a former President of the Czech Republic, he agrees that democracy is to be 'a living organism, inspired by a robust, lively and diversified civil society.'⁸⁵ He strongly believes that

⁷⁸ Girling, 2006, *Emotion and Reason*, p. 6. As Nina points out in her conversation with me, John was influenced by the general law of Buddhist thoughts while living in and working on Thailand.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8. See his related argument on pp. 6-8 and 15.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8, 11 and 15.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

⁸³ Alexis de Tocqueville, 2011, *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer, edited with introduction by Jon Elster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Book III. 5: 'How Attempts to Relieve the People Stirred Them to Revolt', pp. 160-6.

⁸⁴ See also Alexis de Tocqueville, 1964, *Democracy in America*, Vols I & II, trans. by Henry Reeve, Intro by John Stuart Mill, New York: Schocken Books.

⁸⁵ Girling, 2006, *Emotion and Reason*, p. 134.

Gramsci's proposal of an 'alternative hegemony' could express the ideas and represent the interest of the subordinate classes. Yet, he is inclined to accepting the 'salutary' advice of Tocqueville that:

It depends [on nations: read people] whether or not equality will lead them to slavery or freedom, to Enlightenment or barbaric behavior, to prosperity or misery.⁸⁶

He then adds that

if the ideology of progress is an illusion, the myth of progress may yet inspire people to act when they sincerely believe ... for a better society. The future is open: there is no fatal determinism.⁸⁷

In summary, the above section has shown John Girling's attempt to find meaningful and powerful tools that help explain how a society works and transforms; and, more importantly, how to obtain desired change amidst rapid and uncertain circumstances driven by globalization. He commences his search by using a theory-action hypothesis with mid-level themes to examine the grand theories of competing ideologies: modernization or pluralist theories on the one hand; and Marxist-oriented approaches on the other. By using extensive historical research to countervail the grand theories' principles and promises, he concludes that both camps fail to adequately explain social development and change. He suggests an alternative approach through the convergence between politics and economy or the political economy nexus with in-depth knowledge of an area study; the approach that helps create and recreate a new paradigm with respect to reality and avoids being bogged down by dogmatism.

Regarding democracy, he views it as a dynamic concept which never reaches its perfection. He considers that it is a product of social forces, and continues to be shaped and misshaped by the forces in the political economy sphere. He suggests various elements for considering democracy: first, its values of 'grace' or the goal of a good society in secular terms; second, its process or means to realize its values; third, the appreciation of what it can do by ways of resolving social conflicts peacefully; and fourth, the limitation of what it cannot do when there occurs an irrevocable division between dominant elites and powerless people. He also identifies two aspects of the legitimation crisis of modern democracy. The first derives from the formation of the political class by professional politicians whose aim is to win the election rather than connecting with and serving those who elect them. The second is the fixation of democratic theorizing on politics while neglecting the economic dimension that helps reduce the people's poverty.

Among other social issues, John provides an in-depth study on corruption in relation to democracy and capitalism or the market-oriented economy which is a vital force driving development. He argues that the study helps reveal the nature of democracy led by capitalism through their collusion. As he explains, while the government or elected representatives provide conditions that allow market penetration into non-economic spheres to improve material living standards of the electorate, an overlapping between the private and public interest inevitably occurs. When corruption, defined as the abuse of a public position and trust for a private gain, is rampant and accepted as a social norm by the public, it becomes a social issue which subsequently creates a crisis of confidence among the public; and, more importantly, undermines democratic values and beliefs.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

John suggests that the social epidemic of corruption can be tackled through the regeneration of democratic values and remoralization of civil society, making them more resistant to negative impacts caused by market forces. He proposes Gramsci's notion of alternative hegemony be created and developed for the sake of the unprivileged and the unfortunate. While he identifies myths and emotion embedded in social movements, he strongly encourages social-concerned theorists and practitioners to think radically but act sensibly and practically. Whether his advice is feasible for Thailand as a modernizing society in a globalized world will be discussed in the following section.

Thailand in a Globalized World

As a renowned scholar on Thai studies, John's work retains a focus on his 'adopted' country over a 30-year period, ranging from 1963 to 1996 (four years after he retired and left Canberra to live in Toulouse, the South of France). Even then, though his later publications are mainly concerned with theories of society, development and democracy (e.g. myths and politics, corruption, emotion and reason in social change), they still include Thailand as a case study as appropriate. In doing this, he implies Thailand's position in a globalized world, conceptually and practically.

This section provides an overview of John's works on Thailand. It begins, firstly, with his understanding of the Thai society and politics and the uniqueness of his theoretical analysis. Secondly, it describes his analysis on Thailand's society and politics from the 1950s to mid-1990s, covering the interaction between three spheres of the state, economy and civil society through the thematic notions of social change and response to change.⁸⁸ It also highlights his analysis on the nature of the middle class and his advice on creating an alternative hegemony. Thirdly, and finally, his reconsidering of development and democracy with a view to creating a tolerant and open society is summarized.

John considers sympathetically the ways in which traditional societies are changing toward 'modernity' while trying to recreate and maintain their personal identity on the world scene. Such change brings about new methods of production that demand new ways of life and new types of social relations, the reform of national politics and the renewed connection to the world. His first book, published in 1963, describes Thailand's society, politics and economy during the 1950s and early-1960s. It notes, for instance, that 80 per cent of the country's economy was dominated by small-scale peasants whose livelihoods were becoming infringed by the market-oriented economy; the sharp division emerging between the rural hinterlands and urban cities due to limited transportation and communication means; and the strong cultural heritage influenced largely by Theravada Buddhism which he viewed as 'the most reasonable of religions' with its 'Middle Way' - dynamically and flexibly located between the extremes.⁸⁹

He defines politics as 'a human activity' reflected in the 'habits, traditions and ideas of Thai people.' He notes the disconnection between the state and society at that time, saying that 'public opinion is

⁸⁸ As previously mentioned on p. 6, civil society also refers to as 'the intermediate groups or associations between the world of production and the state apparatus.' See John Girling, 1985/5, 'Hegemony and Domination in Third World Countries: A Case Study of Thailand,' *Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 437.

⁸⁹ D. Insor (pseudonym), 1963, *Thailand: A Political, Social and Economic Analysis*, New York: Praeger, pp. 54-5. See also two reviews of the book: the first is by G. William Skinner, 1964, 'Review,' *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 3 No. 11, pp. 117-9; the second is by M.U.B., 'Reviewed Work,' *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 73-5.

almost non-existent;’ and that the ‘middle class is weak.’⁹⁰ The relationship between ‘the authoritarian and in part corrupt government and the majority of the people is immaterial.’ As long as a crisis is handled and partially solved, the people preferred to be left alone. Such a problem of democracy in Thailand, and elsewhere in Asia, he remarks, stems from the fact that ‘the majority of people felt no need to defend it when it is threatened.’⁹¹

But this view of the people’s divorce from democracy in Thailand would change radically in the following decades as shown in his second book: *Thailand: Society and Politics*, published in 1981. From the mid-1960s to early-1970s the Thai economy grew rapidly under the influence of the World Bank which inspired the First and Second Economic Plans (or five-year plans commencing from 1961 onwards). The economic growth and development led to a rapid rise of the Thai middle class which began to challenge the corrupt military regime and bureaucratic polity. The middle class of the 1970s included a new generation of students⁹² whose political movements disrupted the *status quo* resulting in the fundamental political and social change which, he argues, could make or break Thailand’s unity unless a new consensus was to be created.⁹³

Significantly, John provides several insights into Thailand’s society and politics, which shows the uniqueness and relevancy of his theoretical analysis. These include, firstly his astute observation on the ways in which consensus and conflict operated in Thai society; and secondly his critique of Rigg’s notion of bureaucratic polity; both of which seem relevant to present-day politics.

On the first, he notes that commentators generally accept as a norm that ‘consensus’ in Thai society is embedded in its traditional Thai values, in social behavior and in its institutions. He argues, however, that the claims of consensus based on these values ‘does not mean mutual cooperation.’ Rather, cooperation, to the extent that it exists, derives as a consequence of clique rivalry, internal fighting between leaders and followers, resulting in a compromise for the sake of order and peace and a certain fear of the threat of force and unforeseeable negative impacts. John adds that individuals in Thai society need to understand their own place in the rules of the game so as to steer away from unnecessary conflicts and be sensitive enough to comprehend and comply with the unwritten rules of the hierarchical order. Despite being eroded over time, this consensus, he explains, ‘is expressed through personality, patronage, customary values, and – the embodiment of all three – the bureaucracy.’⁹⁴

On the second, John argues that bureaucratic power is ‘best understood in hegemonic terms as a [*sic*] historical phenomena... and sustained by effective elite adaption to the encroachment of capitalism.’⁹⁵ He adds that although Riggs’ thesis on ‘bureaucratic polity’ is useful for understanding Thai politics, it contains several weak points that hamper its full explanatory power. The weaknesses include, firstly, its failure to identify the difference between military and civilian factions which define the public interest differently.

Secondly, it ‘overstates the purely factional content of political rivalry.’ With regard to Thailand’s historical phenomena, Sarit’s seizure of political power in 1958 was not simply to replace one rotten

⁹⁰ D. Insor, 1963, *Thailand*, p. 177.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁹² Inspired by the domination and rivalry of the ‘superpowers’ namely the US and the former USSR, regional instability in general and the traumatic consequences of the Vietnam War in particular.

⁹³ John Girling, 1981, *Thailand: Society and Politics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 12 and 288.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁹⁵ John Girling, 1984/5, ‘Hegemony and Domination in Third World Countries: A Case Study of Thailand,’ *Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 439.

political group by the other, but it marked the turning point of economic strategy from 'public-oriented enterprise' led by Phibun to private-led capitalism implemented by Sarit following the World Bank's guidelines.

Thirdly, as John argues, it is 'unduly influenced by the "consensus" model of Thai politics which plays down the conflicts and cleavages in Thai society.'⁹⁶ He adds that the emphasis on economic growth guided by the First and Second Economic Plans, resulted in the growth of manufacturing industries where labor was drawn out from the agricultural sector causing the influx of internal migration from villages to cities and giving rise to slum dwellings with poor hygiene and inadequate social services. The requirements for a skilled workforce from capitalist-oriented industries create a need for university education and the rise of the middle class in Thailand, whose characteristics are largely 'materialistic, pragmatic and individual.'⁹⁷ All of these yield political implications, especially the new demands for political participation and a greater share in the new wealth amidst the scandals of massive corruption in the state and business sectors.

Fourthly, and finally, Rigg's 'bureaucratic polity' focuses on factional motivation and rivalry without taking its *social context* into account. It 'overlooks the objective effect of political-economic linkages in sustaining unrepresentative regimes.'⁹⁸

Concluding that Riggs' thesis fails to provide a realistic way of understanding political situations in Thailand, John moves on to a discuss what he calls a complex pattern of 'assets' and 'liabilities' as a useful tool for analyzing the Thai ruling system. As he notes, '[t]he strength of the Thai elite [e.g. the government] is its ability to keep going from day to day, to "muddle through." It is flexible, not rigid; pragmatic, not doctrinaire. Its weakness is the obverse of its strength: its inability to look ahead, to discern larger issues, and to cope in time with the deteriorating trend.'⁹⁹

In an article: 'Development and Democracy in Southeast Asia,' published in 1988, John argues that development, democracy and social change are never logically linear. His analysis of these notions is based on the dynamic interaction between state power, economic development and civil society supported by the hard evidence of social reality (facts and figures) from an area study combined with the theoretical insights selected from a synthesis of both Marxist and modernization theories. While using a Marxist-oriented approach as the point of departure, he argues that the 'logic' of progress from development to democracy derives from the ambiguity between the two – in theories and practice; neither 'a purely *political* concept of democracy' nor 'a purely *economic* concept of development.'¹⁰⁰

His ongoing concern with the theories of society and development is continued in the book: *Interpreting Development: Capitalism, Democracy and the Middle Class in Thailand*, published in 1996. It describes key factors contributing to economic growth, the change of state power and the emergence of civil society from the early 1980s. It analyses the complex and dynamic interaction between the three spheres of Thai society. The study reveals the ascendancy of capitalist development, the intermittent switches between elected and non-elected governments and the emergence of civil society and the middle class. It is indeed the development ideology, he argues,

⁹⁶ John Girling, 1981, *The Bureaucratic Polity in Modernising Societies: Similarities, Differences and Prospects in the ASEAN Region*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p. 11.

⁹⁷ John Girling, 1996, *Interpreting Development: Capitalism, Democracy and the Middle Class in Thailand*, Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Programme, Cornell University, p. 43.

⁹⁸ Girling, 1981, *The Bureaucratic Polity*, p. 11.

⁹⁹ Girling, 1981, *Thailand*, p. 288.

¹⁰⁰ John Girling, 1988, 'Development and Democracy in Southeast Asia,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 339.

that justifies the ascendancy of capitalism, renews drives for its legitimacy, and creates the political role of the middle class in response to social issues (e.g. corruption, the unfair distribution of economic benefits and the rising gap between the rich and the poor). However, one must always ask, he emphasizes, about the implications of 'capitalist development' in relations to the system of democracy implemented and whether capitalist development and the form of democracy together address major social concerns, as mentioned above.

He comments on Huntington's 'third wave' approach to democratization arguing that it 'assumes a direct political transition (to democracy) as a result of economic development' while ignoring the 'intermediary' role of civil society in relation to the state and economy.¹⁰¹ Instead, he proposes that 'contradictions' be used for understanding the state of development in Thailand in the 1990s. One such area of contradictions is that each sphere (of the state and of economy) is 'essentially autonomous – a "driving force" of its own' as he explains:

The present role of business... is far greater than that of early 'pariah' capitalism, which was dependent on state patronage and protection, for business now has the capacity and the will to act independently – to form an alliance with military leaders, at a particular conjuncture, or with civil society, in furthering democratic institutions, when the time seems right.

The 'democratic period' of the mid-1970s was indeed a real turning point. As John notes, bankers and investors felt 'more secure about their right to hold on to their wealth.'¹⁰² Later, almost half of the Prem's cabinet ministers, in the mid-1980s, were businessmen acting to support the military government.¹⁰³ Hence a new era requires the new rules of the game to be drawn and enacted.

As happened in democratic societies elsewhere, John notes, the practice of trading power for wealth and wealth for power are evident throughout history. However, the extent to which they coalesce as the 'political economy of corruption' to discredit the principles of democracy is the matter of concern. This is because 'money politics' or corruption is 'born of the incongruity – the misfitting – between the claims of democracy (popular sovereignty) and the exigencies of capitalism (the economic base of state power).'¹⁰⁴ John points directly to the core principle of democratic values of fairness and justice and where shortcomings exist. It is, he argues, the '... distributional rather than the productive aspect of the economic system that is most at fault. Nevertheless, for the distributional shortcomings the political system must also bear responsibility.'¹⁰⁵

Such shortcomings need to be addressed earnestly by social-concerned parties, regardless. Chapter 3 of the book: *Interpreting Development* provides extensive examples which demonstrate the responses of various groups in civil society (e.g. the peasants, working class, and the middle class, and especially non-government organizations) to countervail the negative impacts of capitalist development and to oppose the corruption in the government and business sectors. Among others, John argues that the middle class in the context of civil society can play a crucial role in counter-balancing the corrupt power of the bureaucracy and corporations.

¹⁰¹ Girling, 1996, *Interpreting Development*, p. 16. See also Samuel P. Huntington, 1991, *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.

¹⁰² Girling, 1996, *Interpreting Development*, p. 32.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

In his attempt to provide a different perspective, John reviews Nidhi's assumption that the Thai middle class 'has lost its bourgeois world outlook – in favor of democracy, equality, freedom, and the rule of law – and come to rely instead on wealth and power, divorced from any "philosophical foundation" on which to sustain its resources and its power.'¹⁰⁶ He asserts, however, that the core values of the middle class are generally materialistic, individualistic and pragmatic; and thus it:

is more differentiated in its practice and its outlook. Part of it – perhaps the leading part – is materialistic and power-driven; but another part, inspired by civil society, is reform-minded and idealistic. ... The struggle between self-interest and idealism for the 'soul' of the middle class reflects the perennial dilemma of the need for order competing against the desire for freedom and justice.¹⁰⁷

He adds that even though middle class order may be power based, it:

does not lack a component of 'freedom' and 'justice.' Political freedom (to form parties, to campaign for elections) has its economic counterpart in 'free enterprise' and consumer choice. As for justice, an established and impartial legal system is a precondition both for economic expansion and for political expression. Order and justice are therefore not mutually exclusive – even if they are located at opposite ends of the scale.¹⁰⁸

He sums up his conception of the middle class saying that it 'acts in symbiosis with capitalist development, on the one hand, while benefiting from the erosion of "alternatives" (whether of left or right), on the other.' He further explains that 'the situation of the middle class is complicated... and so resists the boundaries typically established by neat theoretical systems.'¹⁰⁹ Hence, the development and democracy nexus can be interpreted as a 'field of force' in which concerned parties operate their issues of concern and propose better alternatives with the benefit of the whole society in mind.

John argues enthusiastically that the Thai middle class, especially its 'progressive forces' that engage with the civil society, are capable of building and developing a tolerant and open society because their values are based on development and change toward democracy (e.g. liberty and equality) rather than hierarchy and authority in traditional terms. He suggests that Gramsci's conception of hegemony (as opposed to dominance) could be adapted as a guide for establishing a new 'integral autonomy' entity, independently from the domination of the Right and the Left in their extreme positions. The reason for retaining independence is due to the fact that both extremes are capable of breeding fascism.¹¹⁰

John also argues that Gramsci's insights are relevant to Thailand's situation for at least two reasons. The first is the persistence of a bureaucratic polity revamped for managing 'national affairs' at present. The second is the global expansion of the capitalist system (or the so-called 'neo-liberalism') which deeply and broadly affects individual countries and may even bypass state sovereignty. Thus, the subsequent political-economy-society synthesis produces a new challenge in the way one perceives social phenomena, globally, nationally and locally; and how one seeks to explain the

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 46 and 56.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 46 and 47.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 55

¹¹⁰ Girling, 1985/5, 'Hegemony and Domination,' p. 446.

specific state of affairs meaningfully.¹¹¹

John contends that Gramsci was able to theorize the regeneration of capitalist society through a pair of linked yet contrasting concepts: hegemony and domination as mentioned above. By hegemony, he referred to as a socio-economic activity exercised through the institutions of civil society in contrast to domination enacted through force and compulsion. The real purpose of hegemony, he clarifies, is 'to *transform* society by integrating the world of production with the cultural-ideological superstructure of civil society.'¹¹²

Hence, Gramsci's notion of hegemony can be exercised by various social classes' members provided that the exercise meets the above criteria. John gives three examples considered to correspond to the Gramsci's hegemony concept. The first is the radical political movement of *sam prasan* or triple alliance of students, workers and peasants during the 1974-6 'democratic period.' The second is the rural development project, focusing on the creation of rural employment and income distribution to the *tambon* (sub-district) council, introduced and enacted by the Kukrit government in the same period. The third is the work of people-centered non-government organizations whose activities take place, amidst conflicts and domination, in response to economic, social, environmental and political issues faced by the common people since the 1980s.¹¹³ Although the second example is described as a 'passive revolution,' it signifies that the Thai state, through its conservative element, was prepared to adapt itself to 'compromise' in response to popular demands for the renewal of a parliamentary democracy, especially during the peak period of regional conflicts of the late 1970s.

John concludes that neither pluralist nor Marxist theories can adequately explain the dynamic of social change and political behavior of the individuals concerned. Nonetheless, particular insights of both theories are of significance. He adds, for instance, that the Marxist critique of structural domination on the 'dispossessed' majority should be taken into account in contrast to the pluralist notion of 'autonomous possibilities' created by modernization. He also adds that it is not difficult to prescribe a solution to address the political and social problems fundamentally persistent in Thai society, which would include two main aspects. The first is to develop a 'countervailing power' with provides check and balance within the systems and structures. The second is to mobilize a 'mass movement' to 'revitalize structures that are unresponsive to popular needs; thus, utilizing human and material resources efficiently and fairly.' The difficulty is, he emphasizes, how to beget them.¹¹⁴

He adds that neither traditional persuasions nor convincingly radical alternatives are feasible in Thailand's situations since the mid-1990s. As a critical friend of Thailand, he urges social concerned analysts, practitioners and the like to reconsider the 'problematic of development and democracy' reflected in the ambiguities of the civil society sphere in terms of 'growth' and 'equity' and analyze how to manage them appropriately, effectively and efficiently.¹¹⁵ Development means different things to different people who respond to it following their perceptions, as he explains:

If development ('capitalism') is understood and widely accepted as the natural operation of market forces, healthy competition, and level playing fields, resulting in economic growth and consumer comforts, then members of capitalist society think and behave in the appropriate manner. But if development is understood –

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 444.

¹¹³ Girling, 1996, *Interpreting Development*.

¹¹⁴ Girling, 1981, *The Bureaucratic Polity*, pp. 7 and 39.

¹¹⁵ Girling, 1996, *Interpreting Development*, p. 93

as the exploitation of the powerless..., then people think and act very differently.¹¹⁶

Democracy also means different things to different people. He noted that the military leaders 'see themselves as "guardians" of the three sacred institutions (nation, religion, monarchy) in the belief that whatever is contrary to military interest is a threat to democracy' whereas the middle class think and act differently. By drawing some lessons learnt from the British history of its democratic development, he suggests the Thai middle class, especially its forward-looking, social-concerned elements, can play a significant role in progressing both development and democracy through 'a (reformed) party and parliamentary system.' And his last word for Thailand writing in 1996 was that: '[i]t is only in this way, with the symbiosis of civil society and political organization, that order and justice can be achieved,'¹¹⁷ especially in the current socio-political climate whereby Thailand's position is now connected more closely to regional and global development than in the past.

Contributions to Social Sciences and Thai Studies

This section aims to provide a brief assessment of John's contributions to social sciences in general and Thai studies in particular. It will discuss some significant factors contributing to his analysis of issues concerning the ambiguous nexus between development and democracy; and, more importantly, the way in which he was able to steer his socio-political analysis away from any theoretical dogmatism. It will then sum up the messages he tried to pass on to future generations of those whose social concerns rest upon the building of a tolerance and open society that is capable of managing social conflicts peacefully and ensuring an equal opportunity as well as distributive justice for all.

John's primary contribution derives from the valuable theoretical insights and research methods he applies to all his work. His ideas and approaches offer a sound basis for contemporary research on development, democracy and social change in Thailand and elsewhere. His strong belief in the need to strive for a deep understanding of the history and culture of a society under study with a non-judgmental and respectful attitude remains important today. As part of this approach, he also placed a high priority on the acquisition of language skills as described in the first section of this paper. This enabled him to consult primary sources, provided him with an in-depth knowledge of the traditional and modern societies he studied, and enhanced his capacity to contrast and compare them. His first and second books on Thailand (published in 1963 and 1981) show his commitment with humility to this belief. His knowledge of Thailand's past centuries endowed him to provide a persuasive analysis of its present and to foreshadow its future. His book on *France: Political and Social Change*, published in 1998, also shows a similar approach.

Second, he always sought for an explanatory tool that would enable him to effectively explain social transformation and change with a view to building a better and more compassionate society. As illustrated in this paper, he had an open mind and engaged intellectually and pragmatically in both modernized and modernizing societies throughout his careers and life experiences, with a belief that it is important to look to different disciplines and to analyze and synthesize their relevant contributions in the search for an explanatory tool to understand how a society works and transforms. His study of *Emotion and Reason in Social Change* provides us with a novel approach to

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

understand human behavior in economy, politics and society in Thailand and elsewhere. In this work, he warned readers to be prudent and wary of emotionally-charged beliefs in abstract terms such as 'the preaching of love' and 'the equality of man' can have not only positive effects but also lead to forms of violence against those perceived as the opponent or 'other.' In the book: *Myths and Politics in Western Societies*, where he used sociological and anthropological concept of 'myth' to explain the positive side of emotionally-charged beliefs in the way the US, Germany and the UK moved their societies forward by using the power of myths to inspire the people's imagination while lessening their anxiety when comforting was desperately needed. Here we see the importance of crossing disciplines away from the narrow paths of politic and economic theories to gain a wider understanding of social change and how it may be directed.

Third, he taught us that moderation (neither pessimism; nor blind optimism) is an important virtue in research scholarship. This virtue guides a path to dialogue rather than the enlargement of an existing conflict. It also opposes the 'dogmatism' that can be concealed in abstract social theories, regardless of whether modernization, Marxism, neo-Marxism or the like. His advice is to search not only for an analysis but also a synthesis or a balancing act between competing theoretical frameworks through the pair of links between concept and content or between theory and practice. For this, it is necessary to have a social theory and/or hypothesis countervailed by historical and empirical research and be synthesized in an objective and even-handed manner. Without moderation, he warned that blind attachment to theoretical abstraction and claims risks diverting attention from the analysis of the theory-action thesis towards unsolvable disputes over competing grand theories and narrow disciplines. Furthermore, he was afraid that hostile camps, regardless of whether of the Right or the Left, would 'seek unprofitably to destroy the other' rather than focus on tackling social issues of great concern to the majority poor.

The importance of moderation is also taken up by Aurelian Craiutu of Indiana University (Bloomington) who praises its virtue in that:

[M]oderation is a difficult virtue for courageous minds... The principles chosen by moderates have been – and will always be – inseparable from their concrete choices and decisions regarding certain actions performed in specific political, social and historical contexts. What is moderate in one context and period may significantly differ from another. More importantly, moderation has many faces connected to each other. It is much more than a simple trait of character, a certain state of mind, or a disposition. ... [Thus] political moderation rests on a bold constitutional vision based on a complex institutional architecture. As such, moderation requires great skills, strong determination, a great deal of courage, and (often) a good dose of non-conformism.

He adds that:

By adopting the soundest attitudes and principles of all parties, moderates seek to facilitate agreements for the common good, and prevent the country from slipping into atomism, anarchy or civil war.¹¹⁸

Although this quotation addresses critical issues concerning political polarization in the 19th century

¹¹⁸ Aurelian Craiutu, 2012, 'In Praise of Moderation,' *Princeton University Blog*: <http://blog.press.princeton.edu/2012/05/04/in-praise-of-moderation-an-original-op-ed-by-aurelian-craiutu/> - accessed 26 August 2013.

France and to some extent in the US at present,¹¹⁹ it rings true to modernizing societies, including Thailand. Furthermore, it helps describe the virtue which is dear to John's belief, his determination and commitment to create, maintain and cherish it.

Fourth, John reminds us repeatedly, through his publications, of the core principles and values of democracy (e.g. the people's sovereignty, liberty that inspires the people's belief, their existence and entitlements as human being) cannot be divorced from democratic processes and procedures aimed at achieving democratically defined concrete objective and abstract values. Like Mill, Tocqueville and many others, John believed that democracy is an irresistible or unstoppable force and, thus, strongly urges us to think realistically about democracy: what it can do (e.g. to handle a social conflict peacefully); and what it cannot do: this refers to a breaking-down division between the state and civil society (or the government and the people, especially 'the powerless') beyond reconciliation.

This advice is crucially relevant to present-day Thailand as it has connected itself more closely to a globalized world than in the past. What is needed is for more analysis of the Thai economic development, politics and society that crosses the boundaries of disciplines and theories as John proposed. In the search for the security and welfare of the people, it is more than ever important that economic, political and social issues are considered together in the struggle for democracy and social wellbeing. This quest will be well aided by following John's prescription for in-depth analysis and understanding of contemporary Thai society; the study and appropriation of the best on offer from varied approaches; and, more importantly, an appeal to moderation to search for, in the first stance, dialogue rather than confrontation.

Concluding Remarks

In paying tribute to John Girling's life and scholarship, the paper has demonstrated the development of his political and social thoughts through the collection of his works on theories of development and of society and the factors contributing to his intellectual legacy to be passed on to younger generations. His attempt is to search for an explanatory tool which is powerful and effective to help understand how a society works and transforms. The attempt leads him to study the relationship between the state, economy and civil society; the ambiguous nexus between development, democracy and social change; and the role of the middle class as an intermediary force embedded in the civil society sphere.

He strongly urged social concerned analysts and practitioners to re-consider the ambiguous nexus between development and democracy as both notions mean different things to different people. He believed that development without democracy tends to inherit authoritarianism; but democracy

¹¹⁹ Political polarization seems to have been intensified across the globe over the past decade. Margaret O'Mara of the University of Washington traces the history of political polarization in the US since the late 1960s and claims that it is getting worse under the impact of a diverse social media. She remarks that when people express discontent regarding any social or political problem, the 'media capitalizes it.' People choose to listen to what they want to hear rather than analyzing issues. She then comments that it is 'difficult to reach bipartisan support;' and that there is 'no political reward for being moderate anymore.' Furthermore, she adds, one has to 'pay a political price for being a moderate.' Philip Ruddock, the Australian Government's Special Envoy for Human Rights, argues likewise. Interviewed with Tom Switzer on the Sunday Extra Programme, broadcasted on 18 June 2017, by the Radio National, a media channel of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). More information is available at:

<http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/sundayextra/2017-06-18/8624630>; and
<http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/sundayextra/2017-06-18/8624264>

without development is unstable. More importantly, the failure to distribute economic benefits fairly could spark social discontent and subsequently challenge the legitimacy of democracy itself.

He considered that the democratic-oriented and forward-looking forces embedded in the middle class are capable of providing a countervailing power in response to unaccountable structures. He also considered that they are capable of mobilizing a mass movement to revitalize the structures which are unresponsive to the people's needs; and of utilizing material and human resources fairly and effectively. With a strong commitment to the ideals of liberal-cum-social democracy, his analysis, synthesis and advocacy to achieve democratic values exhibit moderation, prudence and social responsibility while engaging in political and social discourses.

As he concluded, neither traditional persuasions nor convincingly radical alternatives are acceptable to the majority of the Thai people. He added that whatever alternative is to be undertaken, with the presence and absence of normative inspiration, one must accept the fact that 'political-bureaucratic-business relations continue to provide the ground rules of a modern political economy.'¹²⁰ He then turns to 'alternative hegemony' being built on 'civil complexity and advanced cultural-historical development.' Amidst competing development paradigms of economic progress on the one hand and social conflict on the other, he strongly argued that democratic values must be regenerated 'through the "remoralization" of society' with a view to contesting against 'the exigencies of capitalism and realpolitik' in order to create not only an open and tolerant society but also a vibrant and better nation.¹²¹ As John said at the end of his last book: '[t]he future is open: there is no fatal determinism.'¹²²

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The Challenge Of Studying ‘Invisible’ Subjects – Tai Lue Cross-Border Traders In The Yunnan-Laos-Thailand Borderland

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Abstract

Before leaving for my doctoral fieldwork, I had proposed a rethink of the scholarship for Southeast Asian borderland peoples by foregrounding transnational social relations of Tai Lue cross-border traders in the borderlands of Yunnan, northern Laos and northern Thailand. Early in my fieldwork, however, encounters with literature and scholars made me gradually realize that there was, at least academically, no own conceptual space for 'Tai Lue cross-border traders'. In this paper, I will demonstrate how a highly compartmentalized landscape of academic and 'local' knowledge in the domains of Tai Lue (Studies) and cross-border trade has rendered my potential research subjects irrelevant or even non-existent.

When trying to break away from this epistemological grid, Tai Lue cross-border traders eventually became 'visible' to me in a Tai Lue village in northern Thailand. Rather inconspicuous within the mapped landscapes of Tai Lue ethnicity and transnational GMS and ASEAN connectivity, but central for small-scale fruit trade to Laos and China, this village functioned as an entry point for exploring further trade dynamics within different settings of this broader tri-national borderland economy, extending to a wide range of commodities, ethnicities and nationalities. Drawing on those, I will critically reflect on my initial research approach still largely relying on an 'ethnic lens' and outline through which other layers cross-border traders navigate mentally, rhetorically and physically these borderlands. Paying closer attention to their actual 'transnational mental maps' might enrich significantly our understanding of Southeast Asian borderlands – by transgressing overly ethnically or spatially conceived regional representations.

Keywords: Tai Lue, Cross-Border Trade, Ethnicity, Transnational Mental Maps

Introduction

Upon leaving for my doctoral fieldwork, I had ambitiously proposed to rethink the scholarship on Southeast Asian borderland peoples by foregrounding the field of transnational social relations in the case of Tai Lue cross-border traders at the intersection of Yunnan (Xishuangbanna), northern Laos (mainly Luang Namtha and Bokeo provinces) and northern Thailand (mainly Chiang Khong district in Chiang Rai province). However, through my encounters with several scholars in China and Thailand at the beginning of my 11-month multi-sited fieldwork (February 2015 – January 2016), I gradually realized that there was, at least academically, no own conceptual space for 'Tai Lue cross-border traders'. In this paper, I will demonstrate how a highly compartmentalized landscape of academic as

well as 'local' knowledge in the domains of Tai Lue (Studies) and cross-border trade, delineated by rigid spatial, scalar and conceptual boundaries, has rendered my potential research subjects irrelevant or even non-existent.

For this purpose, I will illustrate exemplarily some prevailing Chinese and Thai academic epistemologies of Tai Lue ethnicity in relation to cross-border trade, which I came across through personal conversations and recommended and collected literature during my stays in Kunming and Chiang Mai, both considering themselves as academic hubs of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). I will link them up with some anecdotes of my initial fieldwork period mainly in Xishuangbanna, but also in Chiang Khong in northern Thailand. I will argue that they constitute interlocked building blocks of self-explanatory, well-organized epistemic maps in which only certain research agendas and directions can have their qualified place. I will subsequently clarify this rather abstract point by concretely describing how I got to know my first informants in northern Thailand— or how Tai Lue cross-border traders eventually became 'visible' to me - and how this further impacted on my subsequent research.

Studying the Dai¹²³ in Yunnan as Ethnic Linkages between Southwest China and Southeast Asia

Due to Yunnan's ethnic diversity, being home to 25 out of 56 Chinese ethnic nationalities (*minzu*) according to the official 'ethnic classification' (*minzu shibie*) conducted in the 1950s, ethnology and anthropology have long-standing traditions there, significantly contributing to the overall course of anthropology in China (Tapp, 2010, p. 98f.). The increasingly dense institutionalization of academic institutions in Yunnan dedicated to the study of its ethnic groups and their cross-border linkages also reflects recent national and provincial policies of promoting Yunnan as a geopolitical and geo-economic 'bridgehead' (*qiaotoubao*) between Southwest China, South and Southeast Asia formulated on the national level in 2010 (e.g. Summers, 2013). Whereas Chinese ethnology had previously been a nation-building project to classify and categorize its non-Han groups, whose often exoticized difference from mainstream Han Chinese culture was especially in the border regions often considered dangerous to national security, Chinese scholars have been, since the gradual opening of borders in the 1980s, focusing on aspects of transnational or cross-border ethnicity (*kuaguo minzu*, *kuajie minzu* or *kuajing minzu*) as a 'new domain of Chinese ethnology' (Liu, 2007, p. 4). In an early example of putting together the ethnic peripheries of Southwest China and Southeast Asia, Shen Xu and Liu Zhi (1988, p. 14) stress that cross-border ethnic groups are an important factor for the economic opening and development of Southwest China's borderlands.

A strengthened research focus on cross-border history and ethnic cultures is therefore meant to underline the politically intended idea of regional cross-border connectivity. The historical fact that 'Yunnan's geography as well as its ethnic diversity nourished strong traditions of cultural and economic interaction across political boundaries' (Atwill, 2005, p. 248) has now become political capital. Now, ethnic groups in China's southwestern borderlands, with their stressed and assumed

¹²³ 'Dai' (*daizu*) constitutes one of China's 56 official ethnic groups, subsuming all Tai-speaking groups, thus mainly Tai Lue in Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, but also, for instance, Tai Nuea and Tai Yai in Yunnan's Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture (closely related to the Shan in neighboring Myanmar). I will use 'Dai' if explicitly referring to the Chinese context, otherwise Tai Lue or names of other specific Tai-speaking groups such as Tai Yuan, Tai Yai, Tai Dam and so forth.

cultural similarities, commonalities and relations to other groups across the border, have become a useful tool to demonstrate cultural closeness and familiarity within the framework of China's 'policy of good neighborliness'.

This role is particularly true for Yunnan's 'Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture'. 'Only in our Xishuangbanna can you get a strong sense of our Dai culture, various other ethnic minorities and Southeast Asian culture all in the same time', the host of a 'Xishuangbanna Ethnic New Year Singing and Dancing Evening Show' in Jinghong put it fittingly.¹²⁴ In this sense, mainly for domestic touristic purposes, Xishuangbanna is promoted to be, besides a domestic exotic paradise and playground, an ethno-cultural showcase of neighboring Southeast Asia – especially of Thailand, which it is not directly bordering though. In this picture, the Dai, among other cross-border ethnic groups, are considered as an ethnic connecting link across the Southeast Asian frontier, potentially contributing to peaceful and harmonious relations with its neighboring states. For instance, the Chinese scholar Zheng Xiao Yun, with more than 20 years of experience of researching the Tai Lue in Xishuangbanna and beyond, believes in the possibility 'to promote regional peace, stability and development on the basis of common cultural traditions of Dai-Tai People' (Zheng, 2008, p. 38 (English Summary)). He further sees the transnational 'cultural zone of Dai-Tai people' as a 'valuable asset for the people in this region to cooperate with each other, and jointly develop, so as to promote peace and development' (Ibid, p. 39).

Unlike in the case of rising political concerns about ethnic separatism in the northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (e.g. Davis, 2008; Debata, 2007), Xishuangbanna's Dai are deemed the ethnic foundation for subregional cooperation mechanisms such as the GMS or the 'Golden Quadrangle' between Yunnan, Northern Laos, Northeastern Myanmar and Northern Thailand.

The Dai and Cross-Border Trade? – Reflecting on Academic Encounters in Kunming

Informed by this general context of studying Yunnan's ethnic frontiers, I could further explore the epistemological landscape revolving around the potential role of Dai ethnicity in regional cross-border trade through manifold academic and non-academic encounters during my initial stay in Kunming. I will in the following illustrate this exemplarily through my encounters with He Ping, professor at the Center for Studies of Chinese Southwest's Borderland Ethnic Minorities of Yunnan University, and Prof. Zheng Xiao Yun, affiliated with the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences (YASS). Both historians by training, they have been doing extensive research on the Dai.

While expectedly starting our conversation with historical references to their origin and migration, only to underpin the *longue durée* of their intra- and interregional cultural, economic, political and social networks, He Ping revealed that recently it has become more popular to put historical, cultural and 'traditional' dimensions of Dai people into the context of modernity. Although he mentioned that he was involved in some works on more contemporary cross-border movements of Dai to Laos and Myanmar, he admitted that he was still largely operating within the historical domain. While vaguely mentioning another scholar being more involved in research on trade, both illegally (he explicitly mentioned drugs) and legally (trade in fruits, vegetable and all other 'normal', 'legal' goods), He Ping's own view was that Dai would not be that important for cross-border trade after all: 'Han Chinese are much more important traders as they operate large-scale. The Dai are only doing small-scale trade.'

¹²⁴ I attended this primarily touristic event during the Chinese New Year celebrations in Jinghong on 10 February 2016.

This down-scaling of the economic relevance of Dai traders — a practice which I could observe numerous times among non-Dai and Dai informants throughout my subsequent fieldwork — is also reflected in the Chinese terminology distinguishing between ‘cross-border trade’ (*kuajing maoyi*) and ‘people-to-people trade’ (*minjian maoyi*). When I used the former to inquire about Dai cross-border traders, I was often corrected that I should rather refer to the latter as we could not talk about large-scale trade between companies or other larger business entities, but just about small, individual activities.

Despite of this down-scaling, He Ping still associated the Dai with their (again) historical role in tea trade between Laos, Myanmar and China. He also assumed that, in the present, they might be indeed of use to some larger Han-Chinese trading companies because of their language skills. Apart from their assumed utility for more relevant, large-scale companies mainly run by Han Chinese (another example of the ‘ethnic asset-approach’ already observable in terms of potentially contributing to peaceful and harmonious cross-border relations), Dai economic activities could be approached and explained through an ethno-cultural lens within the academic domain of ‘Nationality Economy’ (*minzu jingji*).¹²⁵ He Ping explained *minzu jingji* as a way of studying how culture and economy influence each other and thereby related it to ‘Economic Anthropology’. As one example specific to the Dai, he cited the ‘Buddhist monks’ economy’, thereby referring to transnational economic networks established by earlier cross-border mobility and networks of Tai Lue monks between China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand. These Tai Lue Theravada Buddhist networks and their economic significance have been already widely studied within the general focus of a ‘revival’ of Buddhism and by extension of a transnational Tai Lue identity in Xishuangbanna and beyond (e.g. Cohen, 2000, 2001; Davis, 2003, 2005; Panyagaew, 2010, 2013).¹²⁶ A cultural focus appears to be necessary to make sense of Dai economic activities which are otherwise irrelevant (‘small-scale’ or ‘illicit’) if viewed from a purely economic perspective. Only a cultural marker like Buddhist networks makes their commercial activities academically visible, it seems.

When I met Zheng Xiao Yun at his office at YASS), he similarly linked Dai trading activities to a cultural dimension. He focused on distinct cultural commodities such as religious objects and textiles to argue that Dai trading activities were still very much related to Dai culture. Interestingly, he also listed Thai goods such as fruits, diverse food products, cosmetics and other household articles as commodities related to Dai culture – strongly arguing with a certain Dai-Thai cultural similarity and affinity. This prompted him to the statement that the shops selling Thai products in Xishuangbanna were run by almost only Dai people as they were more familiar with them and might have more sophisticated cross-border networks. However, this assertion could not be sustained at all during my subsequent stays in several towns throughout Xishuangbanna. In my numerous encounters with the owners or employees of small- and medium-sized ‘Thai shops’, I learned that most of the shops were run by Han Chinese of whom the majority had moved to Xishuangbanna mainly from Hunan and Zhejiang,

¹²⁵ ‘National Economy’ is the official English translation of the Chinese term *minzu jingji*, following the translation of *minzu* as nationality as in *minzu daxue* (‘Nationalities University’), for example. Otherwise, *minzu* is often translated as ‘ethnic group’ or only as ‘ethnic’. Thus, *minzu jingji* could be also translated as ‘Ethnic Economy’. However, this translation could be easily mistaken for the established English term ‘Ethnic Economies’ as used in the migration literature, rather explaining certain degrees of entrepreneurialism (‘ethnic entrepreneurship’) within ethnic migrant communities (or ‘ethnic enclaves’), especially in Europe and the United States (e.g. Kaplan & Wei, 2006; Light & Gold, 2000; Zhou, 2004).

¹²⁶ In this connection, Roger Casas (2016) interestingly examines economic aspirations of former Buddhist monks in Xishuangbanna.

but also Sichuan provinces. One shop owner in Jinghong, a Han Chinese man in his 50s who described himself as a 'local' to Jinghong (bendiren) (which was rather the exception), assured me that the Dai were not really involved in Thai product trading. Another Han trader from Hunan in her 30s similarly explained the Dai non-involvement with their tendency to be rather lazy so that they also would not dare to do some larger business: a stereotypical phrase I heard by far the most in all kinds of encounters in Xishuangbanna – both with Dai and Han Chinese.

Zheng Xiao Yun's statement could be understood as one instance of hastily imagining Xishuangbanna as part of a broader, blurred Dai-Thai cultural landscape in which the Dai are inevitably seen as carriers of a Chinese perceptions of (closeness to) 'Thai-ness', thereby *following* the common localization of Xishuangbanna as China's 'Mini-Thailand' as often described in tourist brochures and travel guides (including the *Lonely Planet* for Southwest China). And indeed, there have been several top-down attempts of provincial political and economic actors to establish an architectural and symbolic Thai landscape mainly in Jinghong — for instance, through re-building the Tai Lue royal palace, which was also planned to be the center of a suggested theme park called 'Thailand City' (McCarthy, 2009, p. 89), opening a 'Thailand Street' (*taiguo jie*) on the bank of the Lancang/Mekong River (with a daily Thai transvestite show as its highlight), or establishing its new prime tourist attraction 'Gao Zhuang Xishuang Jing' (sinicized version of Tai Lue, meaning 'Nine Towers, Twelve Villages', usually only referred to as *Gao Zhuang*), which is meant to be a replica of ancient Jinghong. Although the latter is advertised as comprising 'Dai-style guesthouses, unique commodities from every Southeast Asian country, gourmet food' and 'bringing together the unique culture of the entire Golden Triangle region'¹²⁷, it still mainly tries to resemble a northern Thai place, with numerous Thai restaurants, 'Thai-style' (often also emphasizing 'Lanna-style') hotels, guesthouses and spas, and countless shops mainly selling Thai products, ranging from daily life consumer goods to food, beverages and souvenirs. Xishuangbanna's project of ethnically reconstructing the Tai Lue as *Dai*, mostly through exoticizing and commodifying them for touristic purposes through food, festivals, stage performances and cultural theme parks (Cable, 2006, 2008; He, Luo, & Luo, 2008; Li & Wall, 2008, 2009), has been thus put on a larger regional scale of being closely associated with a Chinese conception and imagination of a material-symbolic 'Thai-ness', leading to the interchangeable and blurred reference to *Dai* (傣) and *Thai* (泰).

Yet, throughout our conversation, Zheng Xiao Yun importantly opened the spatial domain of Dai commercial activities in China beyond Xishuangbanna. He often stressed that there were numerous Dai traders in Kunming as well as Dai women travelling as far as to Zhejiang province or other places to look for fabrics for further processing them to traditional Dai dresses. However, he related their trading activities again exclusively to Thai cultural products or Dai ethnic commodities. When speaking of the possibility of more 'trivial' goods such as daily consumer goods both from Thailand and China, Zheng Xiao Yun was quick to refer to aspects of illicit smuggling activities, of lacking regulation, of border security issues. He stressed that it was therefore difficult to measure trade volumes or to capture their 'underground' commercial activities at all. If not trading Thai or Dai cultural commodities, it seems, Dai cross-border traders are not visible because of the otherwise small scale or the illicit nature of alternative trading operations.

¹²⁷ Own translation of an excerpt from a Chinese tourist brochure.

The Dai and Nature – Natural Purity as the Dai Cultural Domain

Zheng Xiao Yun's apparently largest research focus is ethnic traditional 'water culture' (*shui wenhua*) and its changes, adjustments and probable value for and innovative impact on modern ecological problems. Within his remarks on Yunnan's multi-ethnic 'water culture' (Zheng, 2012b), the Dai play a large role, regarding their historically traceable migration patterns along and subsequent settlements at rivers, which let them develop wet-rice cultivation based on sophisticated irrigation systems. Amidst references to other ethnic groups, he repeatedly highlight the Dais' close and respectful relation to forests, also having established harsh penalization measures against cutting trees to protect forest spirits (Zheng, 2012a). Therein, he also often refers to Gao Lishi. Himself being of Bai ethnicity, Gao Lishi devoted more than 60 years of studying Dai language, culture and history - making him in China 'an authority on Dai Studies' as one of his companions, Wang Junjian (2013) puts it in an edited bilingual volume dedicated to Gao Lishi's 60-year engagement in Dai Studies. His extensive writings on agricultural and ecological aspects of Dai culture gained the most prominence - such as his study *On the Dais' Traditional Irrigation System and Environmental Protection in Xishuangbanna* (Gao, 1999). He promotes to abandon the perception of water and forest worship as 'a symbol of feudal superstition' (Gao, 2006, p. 600) and rather to concentrate on its value for presently needed measures for environmental protection. His work has been unanimously praised in Chinese academic and local governmental circles for its transfer of the seemingly simple concept of worshipping, preserving and managing nature into a multidisciplinary, scientific, systematic form of knowledge, applicable to present environmental challenges. He thus contributed to what Song Shuhua (2013, pp. 550-551) calls for, namely, 'to attach great importance to the issues of carrying forward the cultural essences in ethnic tradition that are conducive to ecological preservation and sustainable development, and simultaneously, by enhancing their scientific quality, making these traditions more contributive to modern development.' Behind his call to lift the traditional 'cultural essence' to a more scientific and systematic level lies the image of purity, simplicity, and plainness associated with a very much nature-centered culture, often being contrasted with urban modern society having forgotten the very natural essence of life.

Qi Qingfu (2013, p. 553) proposes that '[p]eople of modernized civilization should learn from those 'natural people' on the pure land, learn to harmonize into nature, and learn to protect of [*sic*] our Earth.' Thus, Dai people, whom Wei Xuede (2013, p. 528) asserts 'a strong awareness of environmental protection, which is the most remarkable among the 56 nationalities in China', are in this idealized picture equaled with nature, being integral part of nature, while their territory is identified with purity – purity which only can be found in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities: 'If we intend to look for a piece of 'pure land' in China today which is close to nature, we have to go to communities of ethnic minorities' (Qi, 2013, p. 552).

This primordialist and beautified understanding of Dai ethnic culture with its ancient biological heritage and with water as its core also quickly paves the way for the exoticization as well as eroticization of the desirable feminized ethnic 'other'. It is common practice to advertise to tourists young and beautiful women taking a bath in the river as Sandra Teresa Hyde (2007, p. 116) describes. As the search for those 'pure lands' displaying an ideal Dai culture of harmony between man (and indeed woman) and nature seems to prove increasingly difficult, Cun Chongde (2013, p. 488) urges to 'rescue, recover, and promote the Dai people's simple concept of natural ecosystems'. This paternalistic attitude of having a certain moral responsibility to rescue Dai cultural ecology amidst modern economic and industrial development can also be read as the attempt to keep the Dai in

their allegedly traditional domain of nature. Rapid environmental and social changes within these Dai natural domains, despite being mainly a result from nationally imposed agricultural policies, are at times culturally moralized. Zheng Xiao Yun (2012a, p. 36), for instance, reproaches Dai small-scale farmers who have been since the 1990s increasingly engaged in planting rubber¹²⁸ with disregarding their culture:

But at the present stage, people's thought has been already changed under the circumstance of pursuing economic interests, people's sense for the sacredness of the forest has already disappeared; at the same time, the social norms of managing the forest of the traditional society has been already lost. Cutting down the forest has already no restrictions within traditional rules. The loss of cultural tradition is an important reason for Xishuangbanna's deforestation. (*Own translation*)

He then nostalgically looks back to his research site 20 years ago, when 'a lot of small rivers passed by, the river water was clear, after work all people went to the river to take a bath, to wash their clothes, to wash vegetables. The river water was clean and sweet, every evening the women carried the burden to go to the well to fetch water' (Ibid., own translation).

Interestingly, Dai engagement in rubber cultivation has not been only cited for (and not credited to!) a gradual cultural decay, destroying the ecological foundation of their alleged traditional habitat, but also attributed to a new dimension of rapidly increased wealth - generating a new spoilt generation 'not interested in doing anything' as Mr. Ye, director of Jinghong's 'Dai Food Association', explained to me in Jinghong. As he had been previously responsible for cross-border trade fairs in Jinghong, I thought it was a good idea to ask him about the role or involvement of Dai traders and entrepreneurs. Himself a Han Chinese with roots in Zhejiang province and married to a local Dai woman from Jinghong, he explained that the Dai were still mostly engaged in agriculture, mainly simply relying on the richness of their fertile agricultural lands which they might rent out so that money was 'cashing in automatically'. This prompted him to his blunt statement that 'Dais are not much interested in doing real business. Many got rich and are now just satisfied with what they have. They just want to spend money for having fun, like drinking, eating, going to Karaoke and so forth.' He repeatedly stressed particularly the young generation in the countryside who would only rely on their parents having got rich through the rubber boom, only spending and wasting their money. Hence, he denies Dai agriculturalists a more sophisticated business sense, also inserting commonplace stereotypes such as culturally inherent idleness, a tendency to prefer convenience and the satisfaction with the *status quo*. Regardless of having a business sense or not, the Dai are still in a wider sense located in the interlocked domains of nature, agriculture and 'traditional' culture, often idealized as traditionally non-urban and non-modern. What was regarded as a primitive lifestyle in the past is now worth to revive, as it might benefit aspects of environmental protection and tourism development (Cun, 2013).

This conceptualization of different demarcated domains lies at the core of my argument that my

¹²⁸ Starting in the mid-1980s, land was contracted to individual households what became known as the 'Household-Responsibility System' (*jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi*). Agents from the large state rubber farms established in the 1950s and 1960s began to teach farmers of diverse ethnic minorities how to plant rubber on their own land. See, for instance, Janet Sturgeon's studies on rubber cultivation in the Sino-Lao borderland (Sturgeon, 2011, 2013).

proposed research subjects of Tai Lue (Dai) cross-border traders become rather 'invisible' as they are located at the interstices of several larger epistemic landscapes with their own inner conceptual architectures and scales. While, at least in the Chinese context, the ethnic component (Tai Lue) is located in the natural and cultural landscapes, generating the body of Dai Studies, the focus on cross-border trade is likewise tied to an ethno-cultural dimension and only visible within formal (otherwise only informal, 'illicit' and thus irrelevant) geographies of cross-border connectivity. This practice of placing my would-be research subjects of Tai Lue cross-border traders across different cultural and economic geographies also became apparent during my initial stay in northern Thailand as I will demonstrate in the following sections.

Studying the Tai Lue in Thailand – A Cultural Source for 'Lanna Thai'

Similar to the Chinese context, tracing the historical origins of Tai people has also been of paramount interest to Thai scholars. Nicholas Farrelly (2009, pp. 69-72) describes the 'Tai Studies Project' of Thai intellectuals and scholars as a 'relative seeking movement' (*krabuan kansuebha yat*) which aims to trace the roots of their envisioned genuine Thai communal or village culture, as an alternative to Western models of development and modernity. Chatthip Nartsuphat, one of the key figures of the 'community culture' (*wathanatham chumchon*) discourse emerging in the late 1980s, prominently coined the 'Thai village economy' (Nartsupha, 1999), which was also internalized by the Thai royalty with the late King Bhumibol's proclaimed 'sufficiency economy' (*sethakit phophiang*) in 1997 amidst the Asian Economic Crisis. The very Thai essence of village life was to be found in the notion of 'authentic' proto-Thai Tai transnational communities beyond Thai national borders, which could be seen as 'a kind of ethnic nostalgia, a reclamation of identity that resides in the yet-to-be-globalized Tai minority peoples in the region' (Reynolds, 1998, p. 138), which 'emphasizes affinity and thus draws these people into a Siamese Thai orbit' (Ibid.).

On a regional level, this is particularly observable for northern Thailand, where the idea of 'reviving' ethno-cultural heritage is central for stressing a distinct regional 'northern Thai culture' closely tied to Tai-speaking peoples, recently framed within policies and programs of promoting a 'Lanna Style' or initiating a 'Lanna Renaissance' with a conjoint national-local 'Lanna Thai' discourse (Johnson, 2014).

The starting point of this ethno-regional cultural resurgence is often dated back to 1996 when Chiang Mai celebrated its 700th anniversary, which James Austin Farrell (2009) terms 'the year of the Lanna revival'. Interestingly enough, on this occasion, Chiang Mai was for the first time hosting the International Conference on Thai Studies, which then also included panels on Lanna history and Tai Yuan culture, clearly marking a shift away from dominant national, Bangkok-centered historical narratives and towards a focus on regional histories and identities (Jory, 2000, pp. 18-19). In this connection, Sipsongpanna, as the homeland of the Tai Lue, acts as one original source for 'Lanna Thai culture', which is also utilized for touristic purposes. For instance, the 'Maekhong Delta' travel agency, based in Mae Sai in Chiang Rai province, offers package tours from Chiang Saen to Chiang Rung (Jinghong) by boat, named 'The Charm of Chiang Rung: The Area of Tail-feather Spreading Peacocks – The Land of Tai Lue – The Much-cited Ancient Kingdom'.¹²⁹ Under the slogan of 're-tracing Lanna Thai culture', the travelers are invited 'to feel the original way of life of Lanna Thai in the past'. During my stay at Yunnan University I was also told about Thai tourists travelling to Xishuangbanna to

¹²⁹ Translated from the Thai advertisement on the website of the Maekhong Delta Travel Agency: <http://www.maekhongtravel.com/โปรโมชั่น/2-อินทกยู่ร่าแพน-ดินแดนสิบสองปันนา-สู่-เมืองแห่งใบชาเลื่องชื่อ-ชื่อเหมา-เดินทาง-ไปรถ-ตามเส้นทาง-r3a> (last accessed on 25 April 2017)

'trace their cultural origins'. However, upon arriving in Xishuangbanna, they would often be rather disappointed or disenchanted because of processes of rapid urbanization, modernization and also 'sinicization' (*hanhua*). I heard similar comments from several Thai tourists when I once took the agency's boat back to Chiang Saen. Mainly from Bangkok, they tried to escape the very urban modern surroundings of their working lives to immerse in more rural, traditional landscapes ('already hard to find in Thailand') to reflect on their own 'Thai-ness'.

Based on the understanding of different historical waves of forced, but also voluntary southward migration during which 'Tai Lü in northern Thailand have been largely assimilated, both linguistically and culturally, into the local Tai Yuan mainstream' (Liew-Herres, Grabowsky, & Wichasin, 2012, p. 8), Thai studies on the Tai Lue in northern Thailand and Xishuangbanna are mainly intended to make sense of the concept of a distinct Lanna culture unifying an ethnic diversity of different Tai-speaking peoples. The study 'Tai Lue – An Identity of the Tai Ethnic Group', published by the Social Research Institute of Chiang Mai University to promote the university's project of the 'Lanna Cultural and Ethnic Museum' (*phiphithaphan wathanatham lae chatphan lanna*), makes this clear (Project of Lanna Cultural and Ethnic Museum, 2008, p. v):

The north of Thailand includes numerous ethnic groups living together. According to history, the migration of communities of a variety of ethnic groups from several *muang* in Upper Lanna let the ethnic groups living in the flat valleys, including various Tai-speaking groups such as the Tai Yonok, Tai Yong, Tai Khuen, Tai Lue and Tai Yai, all have a role in propelling or developing an economic and social system, in creating the cultural uniqueness of Lanna, causing the north of Thailand to have notable characteristics different from other parts of the country. (*Own translation*)

Behind these 'notable characteristics' of unique Lanna culture lies also the concept of *phum panya*. Translatable as 'native consciousness' or 'native wisdom', 'which bears the mark of a Thai authenticity uncontaminated by foreign knowledge' (Reynolds, 1996, p. 113), *phum panya* is being attempted to be traced through studies on Tai-speaking peoples within and beyond the national boundaries of Thailand as the proceedings of a conference on 'Belief and Ritual: *Phum panya* of Thai-Tai villagers', organized by Chiang Mai Rajabhat College in 1994, exemplarily show (Rajabhat Chiang Mai, 1994). In the realm of architecture, Kwin Wongwikkan (2005) explicitly compares *phum panya* in local houses in selected areas of Thailand's Chiang Kham district in Phayao province and China's Sipsongpanna. However, specifically regarding the Tai Lue, besides religion and architecture, the craft of weaving textiles is considered by far the most important element of their *phum panya*.

Weaving Tai Lue Culture: Stressing the Centrality of Lue Textiles

Following Charles Keyes' (1992, p. 16) observation in the early 1990s of an increased state focus on Lue material culture (especially textiles), which reflects the elites' perception of the Lue 'in the context of Tai civilizations which are distinct from but linked to that of Siam' and considered 'as representatives of one variant of northern Thai culture', Paul Cohen (2000, p. 57) also sees his studied case of a Tai Lue textile revival in Nan province as 'a reflection of this process of appropriation, of elite Thai perceptions of where the Lue fit in national culture and what elements can be profiled and commoditized, and of the Lue response to these perceptions'. Appropriated by the state, Tai Lue textiles have been subsequently put into the discourse of cultural 'heritage' (*moradok*). A premium example is the project of the National Culture Commission (*khanakammakan*

wathanatham haengchat) in 1992 to promote and disseminate knowledge of Tai Lue textiles in 'Lanna Thai'. Within this project, two books were published, 'From Lan Na towards Lan Chang' (Prangwatthanakul, 1993) and 'Sipsongpanna' (Office of National Culture Commission, 1994). Hence, the latter added to the first publication on Tai Lue textiles in Thailand and neighboring Laos the Chinese dimension, based on an official 1-week research trip to Kunming and Xishuangbanna in 1992. In the foreword, the then Secretary General of the National Culture Commission, Mongkol Bunwong, repeatedly stressed the project's anticipated contribution to new perspectives of understanding the 'heritage of Tai Lue textiles' (*moradok singtho tai lue*), of investigating 'the origin and brightness' (*khwaam pen ma lae kwaam rungrueang*) of it.

Throughout my fieldwork in Northern Thailand, I could witness a burgeoning landscape of newly promoted 'Tai Lue Weaving Centers' which simultaneously acted as small museums or 'study centers' (*sun kwaamrianru*) and frequently offered 'Tai Lue-style' homestays. These places, which combine the commodification, museumization, heritagization and 'touristicization' ('Homestay' tourism) of Tai Lue culture and associated ethnic identity, constitute the very visible spots on the maps for tourists as well as scholars interested in Tai Lue artistic and cultural heritage. In Chiang Khong district, although in terms of national Tai Lue prominence still far behind Chiang Kham district in Phayao province or Ban Nong Bua village in Nan province, mainly two villages, Ban Hat Bai (located at the Mekong River, midway between the towns of Chiang Khong and Chiang Saen) and Ban Sri Donchai (located at the newly upgraded Asian Highway 3, just 10 km from the 4th Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge) gained some prominence due to their famous woven textiles. Whenever I mentioned in Chiang Khong that I was interested in Tai Lue cross-border trade, the keyword 'Tai Lue' let people inevitably refer to Ban Hat Bai, and even more, to Ban Sri Donchai. And indeed, Ban Sri Donchai boasts an already quite developed Tai Lue 'cultural infrastructure' along the main road, consisting, besides several smaller textile shops, of the 'Sri Donchai Women Weaving Group', the 'Huean Khamphaeng' (i.e. 'house of Khamphaeng') — offering the well-trying combination of homestay, small museum, selling (and renting) self-made traditional textiles and the organization of Tai Lue cultural performances — and the 'Lue Lai Kham Museum'. Only recently opened in November 2015, the latter mainly displays old collections of Tai Lue textiles from different parts of Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and China while it also houses a chic café overlooking a wide plain of rice fields stretching to the Mekong river, thereby offering a panorama which is also advertised for 'traditional Lanna Thai' wedding pictures.

Over the course of my stay in Chiang Khong, I also could observe a certain form of competition to be as much Lue as possible vis-à-vis a mainly external audience, 'in a sense to out-Lue each other' as Paul Cohen (2000, p. 57) puts it in his comparative study of two Tai Lue villages in Nan province (Ibid, pp. 54-56). During several encounters at the Tai Lue culture centers, but also in some random casual conversations throughout Chiang Khong district, I could realize that my eventual research site of the village Ban Huay Meng was being declared as 'not really that much Lue', constituting a Tai Lue village not having set up anything similar to the cultural heritage infrastructure of Ban Sri Donchai or Ban Hat Bai. Before expanding on this village, I need to shortly illustrate the circumstances eventually leading me to work in this village, which again illustrates the well-demarcated epistemological domains of studying the Tai Lue.

Having Found My First Research Site – A ‘Not Quite Lue’ Lue Village as a Gateway of Differently Studying this Borderland Economy

The rather coincidental circumstances leading to my first actual research subjects in northern Thailand demonstrate that my research does not need to or even should not be categorically located within defined domains of Tai Lue Studies or official cross-border economic geographies.

During my research affiliation at the Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development (RCSD) of Chiang Mai University, I could again grasp relatively well-drawn contours of the conceptual and territorial domains of Tai Lue studies and regional cross-border trade, concretely reflected in a topical focus on transnational ‘diasporic’ Lue identities and a geographical focus on the Shan State in eastern Myanmar and the Thai-Myanmar border crossing of Mae Sai-Tachilek, letting my initial interest in the Thai-Lao border crossing of Chiang Khong-Huay Xai and Thai-Lao-China trade dynamics and my rather cautious stance towards the concept of diaspora appear rather counter-intuitive. This should change when Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, the center’s director, introduced me to one of his graduate students, Somchai,¹³⁰ who is Tai Lue and comes from the village Ban Huay Meng in Chiang Khong district, thereby formally fulfilling the criteria of my initial research design. Listening to my interest to conduct research in Chiang Khong, Somchai first referred me to the very visible infrastructure of cross-border ports in Chiang Khong town and the border market in Huay Xai on the Lao side. Only after having called his parents, he came back to tell me that his father thought that cross-border trade in the village was much busier now than at the larger ports in Chiang Khong town. He then helped me to make contact to his father who in turn could introduce me to the subdistrict headman (*kamnan*). Acting as the village headman of Ban Huay Meng as well, the *kamnan* was also highly involved in cross-border trade, I was told. Notably, when Somchai told me that his parents were just simple farmers growing different fruits such as rambutan or longan, he only casually noted that they sometimes also sold them across the Mekong river to different places in Laos. I translated his casual marginal note as a for me significantly central note which only aroused my interest to conduct further research in this village. Gradually, provided with increasingly interesting and promising piecemeal information by Somchai, I got an initial picture of a Tai Lue village which can look back at an impressive success story of cultivating and trading fruits domestically and internationally.

Seemingly being outside of the economic geography of visible spots such as official border-crossings and international ports and not regarded as an authentic or heritage-caring Tai Lue village within the colorfully woven landscape of displaying traditional textiles, my first research site confirmed me in my growing skepticism towards my own initial ‘ethnic lens’ in the labeling of ‘Tai Lue’ cross-border traders. Yet, by ‘provoking the field’ with the very same labels and keywords, I triggered numerous insightful reactions from regional scholars and local people, which let me get more acquainted with local academic discourses and scholarship beyond easily accessible Western English-language publications. Instead of trying to force this village into prevailing discourses of Tai Lue ethnicity and cross-border trade, or in other words, instead of trying to qualify my case study as just another, previously mistakenly neglected case of Tai Lue cross-border trade and thus to make it ‘visible’ on the related cultural landscapes and economic geographies, I want to keep in mind and understand this very ‘invisibility’ only to contrast it with its simultaneous visibility if viewed from yet another angle.

¹³⁰ Name changed

Reversing the Angle – Foregrounding Small-Scale Trade Activities

Ban Huay Meng is by far a blind spot in Chiang Khong district, but well-known for its grown fruits, also far beyond Chiang Khong. Hence, this village is not primarily associated with its display and performance of Tai Lue ethnicity, but mainly for a certain commodity. It is the focus on the commodity of fruits that opens the doors to the domestic and cross-border trading activities of this village. Their individual small scale, economically measured in volume and profit, does not translate into their irrelevance — on the contrary, they constitute a central, indeed very visible, feature of this borderland economy. Crossing the Mekong river at the village's own river port, permitted outside of Chiang Khong's formal-legal infrastructure of four border-crossings (three river ports and the 4th Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge) and one 'temporarily permitted' border checkpoint (*chut phonpron*), this village's trade flow of almost exclusively Thai fruits leaves its marks in markets and small retail shops throughout northern Laos and China's Xishuangbanna. From Thai suppliers to Lao boatmen, Lao and Chinese middlemen (wholesalers and retailers) and market vendors and shopkeepers at markets in Lao and Chinese towns, this cross-border fruit trading activity constitutes livelihoods for a wide range of households and individuals.

Initially tracing this transnational flow of fruits from Ban Huay Meng to Laos and China, I gradually obtained a broader picture of locally manifested dynamics of transnational cross-border trade, extending to a wide range of commodities, ethnicities and nationalities. Hence, Ban Huay Meng, a village rather inconspicuous within the mapped landscapes of Tai Lue ethnicity and GMS cross-border connectivity, functioned as a significant entry point for further exploring three highly interrelated instances of transnational trade dynamics: besides the Thai fruit trade network, highly mobile Lao traders selling Chinese and Thai commodities in markets in northern Laos, and Luang Namtha-based traders regularly visiting trade fairs in Xishuangbanna to sell mainly Thai, but also some Lao commodities. My research gradually focused on northern Laos primarily Luang Namtha province, where an increasing number of households from diverse ethnic and social backgrounds is eager to participate in the promisingly improved regional connectivity to China and Thailand. These Lao small-scale traders, making use of their strategic position of being able 'to get to Thailand and China all within one day' as one trader in Luang Namtha puts it, do not create alternative 'trading-scapes', through which they might possess 'the agency to 'do things differently' from hegemonic development approaches' (Turner, 2013, p. 15), but rather skillfully optimize the combination of the economic geographies of state-sanctioned cross-border infrastructure projects and of more informal cross-border arrangements based on extensive local and transnational social networks which are not necessarily built on notions of shared cross-border ethnicity.

Coming to Terms with Ethnicity

By reversing the angle, I do not dismiss the dimension of ethnicity. But instead of using it as the primary focus or as the main explanatory parameter for the traders' socio-economic relations, I aim to foreground their cross-border trade activities and the associated commodities to obtain insights on different, possibly rather subtle facets of displayed, performed, practiced or articulated ethnicity manifested in different contexts of social interactions and relations — including the interaction with me as an outside researcher.

Especially in the initial phase of talking with the *kamnan* of Ban Huay Meng, he seemingly tried to satisfy my initial scholarly quest for tracing the Tai Lue dimension of this cross-border commerce on a few occasions. For instance, when I once asked him and his wife, who is also largely involved in their cross-border trade operations, whether they would provide me with some of their trade contacts in

northern Laos and Xishuangbanna, they suggested to me to get in touch with Kaew, a female trader in Huay Xai. They repeatedly highlighted that she was a Chinese Tai Lue with outstanding skills in Chinese, Lao and Thai languages. When I eventually managed to meet her in Huay Xai, I learnt that she was a Lao citizen of (Han) Chinese descent with roots in Phongsaly province, which brought her the nickname *Kaew Jin* ('Chinese Kaew'). I suspected behind this 'misinformation' the *kamnan's* assumption that this information about her (Tai Lue) ethnicity might be important to me, while it was not important or even unknown to him. For him, when eventually asked by me, Kaew's multilingual skills and her middleman role might somehow qualify her to be of Tai Lue ethnicity. In other words, he readily participated in the discourse which I opened up through my articulated interest about the Tai Lue ethnic dimension of Ban Huay Meng's cross-border trade. This ethnicity-focused discourse was not necessarily his and also not Kaew's on the Lao side. Kaew frankly told me in Chinese that she did not really know to which ethnic group (*minzu*) her Thai trading counterparts might belong: 'For me, they are all just Thai.' For her, the *kamnan* and his wife were simply Thai traders who were also fluent in Lao language.

I was thus confronted by the seemingly odd situation of the two traders' mutual indifference or even 'misknowledge' of the other's ethnicity. However, this might be only odd for the researcher who assumes that the notion of ethnic belonging is the given main point of reference for establishing and maintaining cross-border ties (conceptualized as inter-ethnic, co-ethnic, or trans-ethnic ties) in a multi-ethnic borderland. And it might be only odd if one is overly concerned with the objectively 'correct' ethnic identity based on the assumption of clearly externally identifiable and internally self-identifying ethnic labels, thereby succumbing to a 'methodological ethnicity' (Glick Schiller, 2008) with its dependence on the notion of ethnic groups as predominant units of analysis.

In another context of my subsequent fieldwork, the Tai Lue label functioned rather as a strategic tool. Attending regional trade fairs in Xishuangbanna, traders from the northern Lao province Luang Namtha performed to a certain degree a 'Lue-ness' to evoke cultural and linguistic intimacy with their main customer base of Chinese Tai Lue, letting several (not only) Han Chinese visitors initially believe that they were Lue. When I first encountered this trading group at a trade fair in Jinghong as part of the Tai Lue New Year festivities, Amnuay, one of the traders who later became one of my key informants in Luang Namtha, told me that they were all people knowing each other from Luang Namtha and that they were all mainly Tai Lue – 'like the majority in Sipsongpanna'. I did not hesitate at all to view them as Tai Lue as this nicely fits into the neat picture of cross-border trade relations based on transnational ethnic kinship, of Lao Tai Lue returning to the 'Tai Lue homeland of Sipsongpanna'. It just makes perfect sense to the scholar who is longing for establishing some order in the messiness and complexity of borderlands through established and easily comprehensible parameters. Only after having been to Luang Namtha several times, I realized in subsequent conversations with Amnuay and other traders that almost everyone regularly going to those Chinese trade fairs was Tai Dam, and not Tai Lue. However, when further asking about the exact ethnic composition of the different travelling Lao traders, I got confronted with rather confusing and contradictory statements, usually being told that most of them were Tai Dam while some Tai Yuan and sometimes Tai Lue were also mentioned. Regarding the latter, the confusion only increased as it happened not only once that a trader referred by another trader as Tai Lue would deny this and even would name yet another as Tai Lue to me. This confusion notwithstanding, once they crossed the Chinese border, they stressed to be Lao altogether while unanimously asserting that they were somehow related (*pen yat kan, pen phinong kan*) with the Lue of Sipsongpanna, often also stating

that ‘the Lue are just Lao’ (*lue kor khue lao*). Hence, a probable advantage of Lao Lue in interacting with Chinese Lue was not articulated as it was merged into the general perception of an ethno-cultural affinity between Lao and Chinese Lue.

This leads me to the next point – the often-observed national dimension of perceiving and handling transnational trade activities and relations.

Adding the National Layer to Transnational Borderland Dynamics

Particularly the constellation of Laos being the contact zone of the much larger national economies of China and Thailand, between which Lao traders physically move or mentally navigate and negotiate on a frequent basis, significantly shapes cross-border social relations. It adds the layer of nationally conceived differences, judgment and stereotypes to layers of cross-border friendship, kinship or ethnic commonality and affinity, which are otherwise all stressing cultural similarity and intimacy outweighing only recently and arbitrarily drawn national borders.

Taking this seemingly paradoxical national dimension of the cross-border traders’ transnational mental maps seriously runs counter to, or at least complicates and completes, the occasionally celebratory tone of assuming revitalizing cohesive transnational ethnic communities. I do not imply that ethnic cross-border ties do not matter; they might indeed increase in frequency or intensity due to more open borders. They are just not always framed in non- or para-national notions of ethnic commonality and solidarity, but also shaped by nationally framed socio-economic hierarchies. I also do not intend to propose that the ‘national’ replaces cross-border ethnic identity perceptions; both, albeit being certainly not the only existent identity markers, overlap and are deployed in different proportional constellations, depending on the respective context. The context of transnationally trading Thai and Chinese commodities, initially traced for Thai fruit trade in Ban Huay Meng and further observed in northern Laos and southern China, is such a context which entails strong national conceptualizations of this borderscape, unleashing nationally framed cultural stereotypes derived from different qualities of the goods and different buying, consumption and payment behaviours of their customers. As I am showing in my ongoing research project, small-scale traders, in various ways involved in Thailand-Laos-China or China-Laos-Thailand commodity flows, capitalize rather on national differences and not on ethnic commonality to make those flows actually flow.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have exemplarily outlined the prevalent epistemic landscape in Yunnan and Northern Thailand of perceiving and studying the ethnic group of the Tai Lue, particularly in relation to their probable role in cross-border trade. My lengthy reflections on encountering regional scholarship and scholars do not reveal anything new; they are rather intended to create a critical awareness of how compartmentalized and conceptually predetermined our knowledge — and consequently our research questions and agendas — tend to be pertaining to ‘ethnic groups’ in (Southeast) Asian nation-states and, recently more importantly, borderlands—also depending on whether we conceptualize my research area as ‘upland Southeast Asia’, ‘northern mainland Southeast Asia’ or ‘Upper Mainland Southeast Asia’ (Laichen, 2000), ‘Southeast Asian Massif’ (Michaud, 2000, 2010), ‘Zomia’ (Scott, 2009; Van Schendel, 2002), ‘Upper Mekong Region’, ‘Mekong Region’, or ‘Greater Mekong Subregion’. Hjørleifur Jonsson (2014, p. 29) comments fittingly on this academic state of affairs:

Our knowledge of the peoples of Southeast Asia has often been an uncritical reflection of

the ethnicized social types within the region that have been routinized by colonial rule, subsequent nationalisms, and the professionalization of anthropology as the study of ethnic types. This is the fundamental problem: Our objects of knowledge, minorities and the state, bring with them a sense of what they are, how they can relate, and the consequences of their interactions. Unless we rethink difference, we are stuck with this epistemology.

Precisely because of its location at the interstices of the neatly woven epistemological domains of Tai Lue (identity) studies and cross-border trade geographies mainly centering on well-known spots of GMS connectivity and being prone to omit 'geographical blind fields' (Harris, 2013, p. 145), the initial focus on the village of Ban Huay Meng provided a much broader picture of this borderland economy extending to a wide range of social relations, commodities, ethnicities and nationalities. It also triggered my evolving focus on northern Laos as a significant middle ground mediating, facilitating and creating old and new identities, social and economic actors, practices and networks in a borderland in which it constitutes the geographical center, but plays a rather minor role in its prominent labeling as Thai-Yunnan Borderland, academically institutionalized as the Thai-Yunnan Project at the Australian National University (ANU), founded by the late Gehan Wijeyewardene and significantly shaped by the late Nicholas Tapp as its director. Corresponding to this naming, the borderland has been approached most prominently from northern Thailand ('ethnographic work emanating from north Thailand has been crucial and pivotal' (Tapp, 2015, p. 10)) and from Yunnan, thus from the regional academic hubs Chiang Mai and Kunming — a tendency which I had also apparently followed in the beginnings of my fieldwork.

Paralleling Tapp's (Ibid, p. 11) welcoming that the 'very strong collaboration between social scientists at Chiang Mai University in North Thailand, and those at Yunnan University in China [...] [leads to] forms of regional cooperation which also, more and more, include researchers in Laos and Vietnam', my ongoing research project intends to add fresh, sometimes probably surprising or counter-intuitive, insights from Lao localities in which processes of bordering both Yunnan and Thailand are lived most visibly on an everyday basis. Proceeding from a 'untypical' Tai Lue village in northern Thailand, I also intend to counter the probable tendency that this borderland becomes the epistemological construct resulting from academic discourses and geographical foci largely defined in Chiang Mai and Kunming by trying to understand it from within in Laos as its central intersection and not as its negligible interstice. This might hopefully contribute to Nicholas Tapp's (2011, p. 11) vision of 'evolving understandings of the region in new ways, through a deepened appreciation of the complexities of border situations, the workings of state power, the intricacies of cultural identifications and reformulations of ethnicity, and the machinations of both formal and informal markets.

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“Materialism Must Die.” A Case Study of Narratives in a Thai Social Science Classroom: A Critical Discourse Analysis Approach

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Abstract

This paper examines the binary opposition techniques used in Narrative Discourse in a social science class of a public school in North Eastern part of Thailand. Our analysis is grounded in P. W. Thorndyke's story Grammar framework and Teun van Dijk's critical discourse analysis (CDA) framework and Claude Lévi-Strauss' binary opposition theory. The findings reveal linguistic techniques used by the subject teacher to tell two stories embedded with ideologies on materialism versus Buddhist moral standards and practices, stratification of different groups of people, both Thai and foreigners, and crypto-colonialist perception of fate. The paper also discusses how Thai national identity is constructed through classroom discourse with the focus on how these multiple ideologies have played a vital role in shaping the national identity through formal education.

Keywords: critical discourse analysis, national identity, Thailand, classroom discourse, binary opposition

Introduction

“Briefly, all education is intrinsically a moral activity which articulates the dominant ideology(ies) of dominant group(s).”

Bernstein, 1990, p. 66

Classrooms are ecological. It is a community where participants communicate to establish and maintain their relationship. Embedded in their communication, ideologies are expressed through their patterns of language use and other non-verbal cues. These can be viewed as actions which serve certain purposes. They are structured, co-constructed and negotiated by community's participants relevant to their socio-cultural background. Classrooms also have distinctive patterns of participants' role expectation where each should perform according to their designated duties.

Classroom verbal acts are identified here as discourse which van Dijk (1997) characterized its dimensions as follows: language use, the combination of beliefs and interaction in social situations. In classrooms, teachers and students negotiated the meanings of their world through what they articulate. It can be typical that classroom discourse reflects familiarity and typicality of social actions of all participants. The concept was discussed by Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist philosopher as “common sense.” The guiding philosophical principle (s) of humans dictating them to do or not doing

something is a result of one's connection to his/her world. In formulating common sense, there will be asymmetrical power relations between various ideologies. In some social context, the commonsensical assumption could be united as one where other may allow varying degrees of common sense.

Moreover, the common sense also grants one an access of that particular community. It is a signal that one "genuinely" belongs to a community (Fairclough, 1989). Cognitively, it seems to be intuitive to examine relationship between language and learning process as it is a tool to facilitate learning. Control over the use of highly complex grammar system may be a part of the child's initial cognitive structures, and activated by an exposure to language in use (Chomsky, 1979). Language used in classroom involves specific social usages to mediate meanings. And eventually when students enter into a larger society, their stored meanings from learning process will also be negotiated by the discourse.

In a wider context, Gramsci discussed "hegemony" as a tool for states to control the masses to follow a certain pattern of cultural and moral standard which aligns with the ruling class' interests (Fairclough, 1995). One example of this phenomenon he pointed out was the interaction between different language varieties and the dormant standardized language use in a society. The modern Thai Thainess has been constructed to follow central Thai identity. Feigenblatt et al. (2010) claimed that Thailand and its education system follow assimilation policies and promote Tai hegemony or favor the central Thai ruling class. Their investigation describes aspects of Thai education and portrays influences of the prescribed worldview of the elite on education at policy level. Also, Reynolds (2002) pointed out that Thai national identity has been constructed by the ruling class through means like the assimilation of Tai ethnicities to single Thai national identity with the focus placed on central Thai people and culture. One of the earliest example was the work of Major-General Luang Wichitwathakan, "Lhak Thai" or Thai pillars narrating the fight between Thai ethnic group and other nations or ethnic groups: Chinese, Khmer and Mon, the nation's independence and the establishment of Sukhothai Kingdom (Chutintaranond et al., 2014).

All in all, to understand the classroom discourse, a critical perspective on power structure between teachers and students is necessary. In this study, why narratives were selected as main linguistic tools to argue her points, and how the narratives are structured to tell what messages will be discussed in order to understand the subject's worldview.

Analyzing ideology needs an analytical tool, Classroom Discourse Analysis or CDA serves the purpose of understanding meanings through language use. It encompasses a variety of focuses. The Hallidayan strands involving functions of language which are:

1. The ideational function: meaning in the world.
2. The interpretational function: meaning in roles and relationships.
3. The textual function: meanings in the message

This study will focus on the first all layers of functions. The textual function will be initially examined through the van Dijk (1975)'s framework of critical discourse analysis to examine functional or transactional meanings the linguistic elements perform. The ideational function of the data will be analyzed with a critical lens portraying views of knowledge teachers perceive with power relations revealed in the social interaction in classroom. The critical view of discourse is critical discourse analysis (CDA) aiming at raising awareness of how ideologies are shaped, influenced, and constrained by institutional, social and cultural structures by demonstrating how texts are constructed and

negotiated with the focus on the view on materialism in this classroom which the subject was transferring to students in the format of narratives.

Materialism in Classrooms

This study focuses on how teachers use narratives to argue her point in a social science class. To be more specific, I analyzed six small episodes of narratives that a Thai teacher used to construct values in the theme of “materialism.” In order to argue about “materialism”, my subject used narratives from various sources such as from her personal experience or references from current news. She portrays both protagonists and antagonists in almost all episodes. Her narratives constantly contain moral evaluation for characters and especially their actions. There are also lexical changes throughout each episode, especially on how the characters were portrayed. In Thai discourse, moral evaluation is rather typical as narratives are a tool used to transmit moral values (Indrasuta, 1988), and according to The Basic Education Core Curriculum (2008), teachers serve as a role model in terms of “standardized” moral values and to transmit those values to students.

Understanding a sample of how Thai teachers construct and co-construct these values in classroom with students could be essential to identify ideologies in classroom and the current reflection on how a teacher views knowledge and how it should be linguistically constructed or transferred in classroom. Unfortunately, current state of research on Thai classroom discourse analysis in Thailand is rather limited. The majority of research conducted in Thailand education context still focuses more on the reported data from students or teachers about their views on certain learning tool or approach or how to measure or assess the quality of the education. Research in the field of social studies was conducted with the emphasis on curricula, pedagogical approaches or assessment methods. Such studies about teacher beliefs and practices in social science related subjects seem to revolve around the issues such as civic education, Thai culture and Buddhism mainly through quantitative methodology (Sirikanjana, 1998; Chongdarakul, 2003; Pitiyanuwat & Sujiwa, 2005). All in all, these researches do not portray social studies as a reflection of the current social context rather the research topics seem to be more on this subject a bubble of education context.

Judging “Materialism” as a Topic in Social Science Classes

In classrooms, moral dimensions of teaching are common, but morality is contextualized and arbitrarily determined by each society. Morality includes interplay of individual personal’s and profession sets of beliefs. At times, these can be complex and overlapping. According to Buzzelli and Johnston (2002), teaching is “fundamentally a moral activity” (p.19) where teachers typically make judgments or evaluation of students’ actions including verbal reactions.

As teachers, there are principles mandated by The Teachers’ Council of Thailand to guide teachers’ desired characteristics and behaviors, or their professionalism. Some principles directly relate on being a role model showing Thai lifestyle and culture, being virtuous, exhibiting verbal appropriateness and “good” moral standards, and following royal sufficiency economy lifestyle model. These reflect three main pillars of Thai society: nation, monarchy and religion. Thus, based on these pillars, teachers are required to role-model proper behavior and ideologies.

Therefore, it seems to be the case that morals are discussed in classrooms as a set of values mandated by the Ministry of Education through identification of desired outcomes of students who should be equipped with secular skills and knowledge and or moral values from based on Buddhism and other religions. This dichotomy portraying values in secular world according to concepts in Buddhism becomes the central theme in my subject’s class. Materialism is despiritualized in

Buddhism as it emphasizes an idea that matters are the reality of human life rather than the spiritual essence human should be seeking in order to find inner peace. In broader sense, materialism has been undermined by major religions in the world because it obstructs the path to spiritual sense people should aim at.

“Materialism” yet again is a spectrum. It ranges from values of everything that is matter to objects represented wealth and secular greed. The analysis of lexical meanings of materialism in this research is achieved through deconstructing the narratives following Labov’s narrative components, Thorndyke’s story grammars, and van Dijk’s principles of critical discourse analysis such as narrative structure, argumentation, rhetorical figures and lexical styles. Conceptualizing “materialism” could shed light on social cognitions being mediated through linguistic interaction of people in this particular society.

Lévi-Strauss, a French anthropologist and the forefather of structuralism who posited that the understanding of the world can be achieved through oppositions or binary oppositions where everything exists in pair, relative but absolute. Humans view their world through the contrast of dual relationship between two opposite concepts. The way language works is also similar as there is relative meaning of a concept within a structure of meaning. This system of oppositions can be called “grammar” which is necessary for deciphering hidden messages in myths. According to his framework, thoughts in myths progress in oppositions. There are opposing, mediating or resolving elements embedded in the myths (Lévi-Strauss, 1969). The relations between units can only be analyzed in pairs. If A:B, A:X, A:%. It is important to understand how A relates to B as C to D. Meanings within unit systems can only be analyzed in binary pairs.

Even though Lévi-Strauss deconstructed myths in his work, he contended that myths still share similarity with language as there are units put together governed by certain rules. These units relate to each other on binary pairs or opposites. He concentrates more on the relations and not individual meanings. In his analysis, he coined “mytheme” which is a generic unit of narrative structure, specifically how myths are constructed. The recurrent patterns occurred in any myths involving binary oppositions could describe assumptions, practices and beliefs a group of people hold. This will be further elaborated in the section discussing the narrative discourse below.

Narrative Discourse

Story-telling perhaps is one of the earliest forms of narrative in human history. Through narrative, humans are able to transmit myths and beliefs, real or imaginative. Narratives are produced by both interlocutors and audience as a co-authorship process (Ochs, E., Taylor, C, Rudolph, D., & Smith, R., 1992). There are many modes and genres of narratives such as performative, written stories, reading stories, myths, or even classroom narrative events (Cazden, 2001; Ochs, E. & Schieffelin, B., 1994; Michaels, 1981). These narratives embodied cultural system, knowledge, beliefs, values and ideologies of a particular society. Thus, analysis of narrative should be based on a cultural particularity and locality of that community (Ochs, 1997).

Unfortunately, spoken narrative discourse in Thai language has been examined based on common Western grounded theories. However, Indrasuta (1988) when conducting a comparative analysis of written work among Thai (L2) and American (L1) students, found that rhetorical structure of Thai seems to be more on analogy and storytelling rather than fact-based and logical sequences. Rhetorical modes in Thai language is also similar to Halliday and Hasan (1976)’s FIELD or the total event with purposes. There are written or spoken genres and modes such as narrative, didactic, persuasive and phatic.

This aligns with Upakitsilapasal (2005) who categorized written rhetorical styles in Thai as follows:

Main rhetorical styles: chronological, descriptive and didactic narrative

Subsidiary rhetorical styles: exemplifying and metaphorical narrative

The narratives found in this data show overlapping styles in chronological and didactic narratives since they are spoken data that the speaker produced utterances spontaneously and may not plan. Nevertheless, understanding genres of narrative still cannot yield the outcomes of what structure the narrative is and what it means. To examine the structure of narrative, I follow grounded theories of Labov (1972) and Thorndyke (1997).

Narrative structure has been studied since the Aristotelian time. The fundamental structure of narrative is beginning, middle and end. In order to uncover deeper level of structure, one needs to understand how a plot is interwoven together. Labov (1972) proposed six stages in a fully-formed oral narrative as follows: (1) abstract (theme), (2) orientation (setting or who, when, where and how in a narrative), (3) complicating action (actions), (4) evaluation (how or why is this interesting), (5) result or resolution (the final actions), and (6) coda (ending remarks). Labov's six stages provide essential elements of story especially the evaluation which frequently occurs in the data as the nature of the discourse is classroom, thus it is more didactically oriented. Then Thorndyke (1977) story grammars provide a more detailed structural analysis of narrative. He identified a structural schema with elements typical to a narrative. His schema portrays relationships of how a narrative is produced. His schema describes ten rules of simple stories as follows:

- 1 Story -- Setting + Theme + Plot + Resolution
- 2 Setting -- Characters + Location + Time
- 3 Theme -- (Event)* + Goal
- 4 Plot -- Episode*
- 5 Episode -- Subgoal + Attempt* + Outcome
- 6 Attempt -- Event*/Episode
- 7 Outcome -- Event*/State
- 8 Resolution -- Event/State
- 9 Subgoal/Goal -- Desired State
- 10 Characters/Location/Time -- State

Thorndyke suggests that structure and its relationship to content play a vital role in memory construction of stories which affects its overall comprehensibility. In this research, story grammars reveal logical and rhetorical structure of a narrative, especially in spoken narrative where narrators are not always aware of details they are presenting in their stories and the structure of spoken narrative may be haphazard. As a result, in one theme, there could be multiple episodes embedded not necessarily in chronological or sequential order as described in Labov (1972).

Also, in narrative interaction participants are tellers and recipients, but their roles are not restricted to only telling or receiving. Both co-author the narrative as it is a sense-making activity. Co-tellers encompass messages along with the tellers. Thus, they also convey moral judgment in one more points of view. Each viewpoint could provoke responses and how tellers and co-tellers react to those responses contribute to truth and causal explanation of narrative they are producing. In effect, when telling a narrative, it should be noted that one constructs his or her notion of self and other as well as

a society relevant to them. Articulating narrative then could also reveal common understandings of what a culture deems ordinary. Thus, this experience can be evaluated by several participants as “possible, actual, reasonable or desirable” (Ochs, 1997, p.203).

Argumentative narratives serve purposes of supporting opinions, beliefs, judgments and feelings. Thus, they are disputable and evaluative (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012). This is the genre of narratives most frequently found in this data. In classroom discourse, teachers seem to assume the role of tellers more than students, but not necessarily that students cannot co-author narratives. Both play a role in constructing narratives. A genre of narrative which is more typical in classroom as narrative does not just serve informative but also referential, cognitive and ideational functions in classroom interaction. The following section explains data collection and methodology used to conduct analysis in this research.

Data and Methodology

The data for this article were collected as a part of my doctoral dissertation to examine epistemological beliefs of Thai social science teachers: five case studies. The data collection process follows participant observation convention. The subjects were identified via educational supervisors from my personal contacts. Because these supervisors are familiar with schools and teachers in their responsibilities; thus, they could provide contacts and introduce the researcher to the schools and the potential participants. I visited Lopburi four times for six different schools in various areas during February to March 2013. The visit began with informal interviews before the class started and a classroom observation, followed by another informal interview if needed.

The case I selected for this research is Juno (pseudonym) due to the completeness of her narratives compared to the rest of my data. Juno is a female teacher with extensive teaching background in Thai language. She graduated in the major of Thai language teaching. Her first subject was handicrafts where she spent two years teaching, and after that she began her career in social sciences teaching. Even though she has one supervisor for social studies group, she has complete autonomy in choosing her textbooks and designing her materials.

This class is the 7th grade. The class was mainly lecture-based and responses from students. It was about Buddhist holidays paralleled with moral lessons from local and contemporary issues such as materialism and concepts of ideal women. She also pointed out the importance of Thai nation in comparison with the threat of foreign cultures. This class lasted approximately 40 minutes.

The narratives were selected because among all five subject Juno used narratives the most. All narratives she used during her class relate explicitly and implicitly under the theme of “materialism.” After an in-depth analysis, I found that this theme consists of three main episodes and three sub-episodes.

Narrative Selection

Identifying boundary of topics for the narratives can be challenging as lessons consisted of exchanges, moves and acts in hierarchical order according to Sinclair and Coulthard (1992). First, I identified explicit verbal and non-verbal shifts in topic changes which can be linguistically realized by metadiscoursal markers (Coulthard, 1977). These are phrases such as *by the way*. Alternatively, less explicit discourse markers can be, for example, *well, so, right*. However, all stretches of discourse may not be as straightforward. Crow (1983) identified six types of topic progress in a discourse stretch:

- (1) Topic maintenance
- (2) Topic drift
- (3) Noncoherent topic shift
- (4) Coherent topic shift
- (5) Topic renewal and
- (6) Topic insertion

The latter three types can be determined by metadiscoursal markers (Watson Todd, 1998).

At this stage, I aim at identifying stretches of discourse where this type of discrepancy occurs. This, these are guidelines I follow in determining the boundary of the selected excerpt. The numbers do not suggest any prioritization.

- (1) Metadiscoursal markers
- (2) Spoken discourse markers such as เอิ่ม (oem) เอ้อ (oe) อ้า (a) เอ้า (ao) which occur at the beginning of the shift in the new topic.
- (3) An abrupt change in content where there is a clear change indicating a new topic which can be realized by the shift in reference, the lack of substitution, and ellipsis, the discrepancy in the use of conjunctive markers or the break of lexical cohesion. Specifically, reference chains can be broken by a shift in demonstrative pronouns or other linking elements within a discourse stretch. A lack of substitution suggests a lack of anaphoric and cataphoric relations. The discrepancy in the use of conjunctive markers reflects the break in meaning. The lack of ellipsis and substitution could mean that there is no reference to earlier stretches of discourse. A lack of lexical cohesion such as repetition, synonymy, meronymy and collocation should also suggest a break in the relations of earlier stretches of discourse (Halliday and Hasan, 1976).
- (4) Non-verbal cues such as laughter or longer pauses (longer than 4 seconds)

Identifying Binary Oppositions

Lévi-Strauss did not linguistically operationalize his framework since he was an anthropologist. He relied on other types of data. In order to investigate this concept and to uncover ideology(ies) embedded in the data under the tradition of discourse analysis, Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis offered by van Dijk in 1993 will be used to decode the meanings of the subject's narratives. These following levels of discourse include but not limited to:

- [1] Topic selection: who selected the topic and what topic (s) was selected.
- [2] Narrative structure: Story Grammar elements and how they were organized
- [3] Local meanings and coherence: level of specificity (boosters), perspective, implicitness (hedges), and local coherence devices such as conjunctions
- [4] Lexicalisations or lexical style: lexical terms used in the pairs and rhetorical devices (parallelism, contrastive comparison and binary metaphors)
- [5] Syntactic style: how discourse was organized

Findings

Juno's Classroom Discourse and her Topic Selection

The textual and interpretive analysis is performed using Story Grammar and binary opposition pairs under the umbrella of Critical Discourse Analysis framework. Juno had complete control of the topic.

Only one or two occasions where she reacted to students' remarks but she resumed her agenda quickly after. Juno began her class with managing previous assignments and assigning tasks to students. Soon after she began her questions to students which clearly were elicitation phases where she tried to introduce her class content "Makhabucha Day" and its importance and background. She proceeded to this in one lengthy turn without any interaction with her students.


Most questions she asked during these turns WH-questions included requiring students to give short, factual and specific answer. And since this school is in Buriram Province in Northeastern part of Thailand, she supported her point in maintaining cultural identity by preserving the local historical site giving examples of what rituals could be performed there. She also provided information of Hindu and animistic influences in Buddhism in Thailand. The transition of this topic to her first narrative of materialism was the binary opposition pair between ghosts and humans. She transitioned to her first narrative by arguing that humans are the scariest ghosts of all. Then she moved on to her narratives on materialism which will be discussed in the sections below. After completed her narratives, she re-emphasized the importance of the same historical site elaborating its unique and exquisite design while inviting students to visit the site.

The following topic she focused on the theme of Thainess again using another narrative about her Japanese friend who adored Thai silk as supportive argument. Then she further elaborated Thainess with Thai regional foods. After this, she came back with another narrative of the Thai silk and how much foreigners have shown appreciation to it by purchasing it a lot during an important international conference in Thailand. After this narrative, she contrasted Thai-style and more provocative dressing style using a temple as a setting. At the end of this episode, she concluded with a long turn describing national identity of Thailand with the emphasis on long history, culture, tradition and beliefs contrasting this with values from foreign cultures.

Organization of Juno's Narratives


Narrative A of Juno directly connects to the theme of materialism. In this particular episode, there are four sub-episodes telling the stories of Furby (A robotic toy doll which is an American electronic robot toy resembling a combination of an owl and a hamster with movement and verbal abilities. It became popular in Thailand during 2012-2013.), Internet, a tricked Thai woman who appears in the news (A girl from news) and the monkey. These three sub-episodes do not fall into any chronological timeline, they are rather scattered; for instance, Juno began discussing Furby in A1-A2 but referred to it again in A18-20 and 22. Similar phenomenon also occurred in the Sub-episode 2: A girl from the news. Juno introduced this character in A3-A5 and elaborated the plots in 53-59.

Figure 1: Narrative A, sub-episode 1: Furby




For themes, there was no clear pattern of how they are introduced. For sub-episode, A1: Furby, theme was introduced after all characters and setting had been laid out. In sub-episode A2: Internet, there was no explicit theme mentioned. It was omitted. Juno simply linked the concept of Internet to Facebook with its functions of shopping and communication (A8-A10). This A2 episode (See Figure 2) does not contain any evaluation or resolution as it serves as supporting sub-episode for sub episode A3.

Figure 2: Narrative A, sub-episode 2: Internet




The next sub-episode is rather complex. It includes the complete elements of story grammar. There were multiple characters in this sub-episode A3 including the girl (A11, A61), the news (A56) and the Nigerian guy (A63-67). The main plot clotted in A53-59 revealing its outcome in A60. Each sub-plot contains attempts and outcomes of actions with evaluation scattered throughout the narrative in A11, A14 and A55. Also, the resolution was introduced in A82-A85 (See Figure 3).

Figure 3: Narrative A, sub-episode 3: A girl from News



Narrative B described Juno's Japanese friend's admiration towards Thai silk. The only character mentioned here was her friend where she immediately referred to at the beginning (B1a&b). Even though this story was rather brief, Juno managed to point out her theme twice in B10 and B19 which was the pride in Thai silk (See Figure 4). There was no resolution of this narrative as this is a supporting narrative for one major theme of this class: Thainess.


Figure 4: Narrative B: Pride of Thai Silk



Narrative C follows convention of storytelling where characters and setting were introduced first, then the theme and the evaluation of the theme even though there was not clear resolution of the story. In terms of content, this story referred to another event in a larger context of Thailand, the APEC or Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Meeting in 2003. Juno did not mention its name explicitly in her lesson but from context clues given in C5, I was able to make this conclusion. There two main characters mentioned here the attendees of the meeting (C3) and their wives (C11-C12). This episode

focuses more on the setting where information about time, location and character was provided (C3-12). Then the theme was described in C10, C12 and C14) with the evaluation of the theme in C15 or labeled as theme realization (See Figure 5).

Figure 5: Narrative C: Silk and the Ladies



Local Styles of Juno's Narratives: Pronouns

Excerpt 1

- (A17) ไอ้สาวไทยกับฝรั่งที่โอนเงินเข้าไปให้เค้าอะไรยังเงี้ยนะกะ
(ai sao thai kap farang thi on ngoen khao pai hai khao arai yang ngia na kha)
Those Thai girls and 'farang' (caucasians or non-Asians) that transferred money to others, how is this [story]?
- (A18) ไอ้พุดถึงไอ้ตัวหมี ๆ เมื่อกี้้นะ
(ai phut thueng ai tua mi kha mueaki na)
That bear-like creature you mentioned just now?
- (A19) ยัย เฟอร์บี้
(yai Furby)
- (A20) เจ้าเฟอร์บี้้นะกะ
(chao Furby na kha)
- (A21) ขนาดเป็นของปลอมนะเธอ
(khanat pen khong plom na thoe)
Even it's a fake one.
- (A22) ขนาดหูมันกระดุกกระดิกแบบนี้
(khanat hu man kradukkradik baep ni)
Even its ears can move like this 'flap-flap.'
- (A23) เกิดจากอะไร
(koet chak arai)
What has caused this?
- (A24) เกิดจากค่านิยมในวัตถุ

- (koet chak khaniyom nai watthu)
It is caused by value in materialistic objects.
- (A25) นั้นเห็นมีค่า ค่านิยมเหล่านี้ละ เธออย่าคิดว่ามันเป็นเรื่องไม่สำคัญนะ
(nan hen mai kha khaniyom laoni na thoe ya khit wa man pen rueang mai samkhan na)
Right, you see? These values. Don't you think it's not important.
- (A26) จากค่านิยม จากความรักความชอบความหลงเหล่านี้นี้แหละเป็นค่านิยมเนี่ย
(chak khaniyom chak khwam rak khwam chop khwam long laoni lae pen khaniyom nia)
From value, from love, like, infatuation. These values.
- (A27) แล้วมันก็เข้าสู่การศรัทธาการหลงใหลนะ
(laeoko ko khaosu kan sattha kan longlai na kha)
Then these lead to doctination and obsession.
- (A28) แล้วมันก็ทำให้กลายเป็นวัฒนธรรมการบริโภคไปนะ
(laeoko thamhai klaipen watthanatham kan boriphok pai na kha)
Then these will become consumerist culture eventually.

Characters Juno told show different uses of pronoun. First, Furby was represented as an animal, a pet and a female because she used these following third-person pronouns ตัว (tua) (A1), ไอ้ (ai) (A18), ยัย (yai) (A19), เจ้า (chao) (A20), มัน (man) (A22). ตัว, เจ้า, มัน are rather common third-person pronouns used with animals, but ยัย is typically referred to a woman. Juno repeated the use of ยัย again with another character, the tricked woman who lost her money to a foreign man. In this case, ยัย represents negative connotation of the female characters in her narratives. When Juno mentioned her Japanese friends and wives of foreign leaders, she used the pronoun เขา which can be gender-neutral and more neutral in terms of its connotation. Also, ไอ้เจ้า (ai chao) (A66) and มัน (A67) were referred to this character. Notice that this was towards the attempt phase of the story. It is clear that an evaluation of this character is implied here. However, Juno also used เขา (khao) as a generic third-person pronoun referring to the woman (A11) at the beginning where her actions had not been introduced yet. Then เขา (khao) (A17) was used again as an impersonal third-person pronoun where I was not able to assign any character in the story. Similar to A71-72, เขา was impersonal and it could mean unidentifiable someone. Moreover, cultural-specific pronouns such as น้อง (nong) (younger brother/sister) was used with a monkey (A38) and the woman (A61) where the monkey was portrayed as an animal with less number of brain notches connoting less mental development. Thus, น้อง here can be interpreted as someone inferior to the speaker.

Lexical Choices and Style

Juno contrasted concepts in her narratives employing various linguistic devices. Beginning of her Narrative A, she used non-verbal cue “oho” (A11) with an emotive verb ที่ง (thueng) or to be stunned. However, her syntactic style differed from the typical use of emotive verb which is subject + verb. In this A11, she mentioned ครูก็มีที่ง (khru ko mi khwam thueng) or I have been stunned which could suggest negative connotation. Further she contrasted with conjunction “but” in A13. Here I can infer that she contrasted Facebook and face-to-face communication with insincerity and sincerity because after “but” she pointed out that this online behavior of transferring money to a stranger was for the kind of love with marriage as a goal (Real love: marriage versus not real love: materialistic). Another instance where she used non-verbal cue “oh” to begin A55 where she discussed love in two

contrastive ideals: passive faith versus active attempt. To elaborate this passive faith could be interpreted as women should not actively look for love. They may end up like the woman character in Juno's story who actively and greedily (A82) tried to get married with a foreigner.

Since the theme is materialism versus non-materialistic values in Buddhism, Juno evaluated the Furby in A21 using the word "fake" or "artificial" linking it to "material" in A24. This can imply the binary opposition between artificial and natural characteristics of animals. The opposite concept of "artificial" is real, so it can be inferred that the real value which students should think (A30) and achieve is non-materialistic values, free from monetary greed. Furby may represent materialism as unreal; thus, it is evaluated negatively in A21 ขนาด (Furby) เป็นของปลอมนะเธอ (khanat (Furby) pen khong plom na thoe) (Even Furby is a fake one.) ขนาด (khanat) is a noun in Thai used to measure something. The use of ขนาด in this case is ขนาด+noun = (verb to be) emphasis of X, and more often the noun after ขนาด is ellipsed. In this case ขนาด is used to highlight Furby as artificial or fake.

In A25, Juno emphasized the value in material as important (เธออย่าคิดว่ามันเป็นเรื่องไม่สำคัญนะ: thoe ya khit wa man pen rueang mai samkhan na) Don't you think it's not important. She uses double negatives to construct this sentence. Horn and Kato (2000) describes negation as correlation of truth, values, false messages and irony. And the use of double negative (อย่า: ya, ไม่: mai) then could suggest opposite expression and serve as an understatement causing ironical effect. Thus, Juno's message could put an emphasis on how important the "value" is. A26-27 revealed that value can lead to faith (ศรัทธา: sattha) and obsession (การหลงใหล: kan longlai) and in A52, she concluded that materialism is a scary value.

The absence of hedges poses a challenge in my analysis as it becomes problematic whether this should be interpreted as a fact-based narrative. To resolve this issue, all 85 t-units were analyzed and clearly, hedges were absent but there are uses of boosters like อย่า (ya: don't), ไม่ (mai: not), มาก (mak: very), เกิน (loei: exceeding a limit), ขนาด (khanat: even), ต้อง (tong: must). When there are boosters involved, I identified the stretches as potentials for binary opposition concepts.

She concluded that this constituted consumerism in A28. This is worth to note as she did not categorize consumerism as value but she uses the terms "culture" or วัฒนธรรม (watthanatham) to describe it. In Thai, culture is defined as things which flourish a group of people such as Thai culture, clothing, lifestyles like local culture or hill-tribe culture (Thai Royal Institute). Thus, the notion of culture in Thai relates more closely to civilization. It seems to entail larger entity in comparison with value as it is marked by a shift in syntactic structure. A26 shows a series of repletion of "from+noun" and then the subject added a verb "to lead to" in A27 suggesting a mental shift in the represented idea. It can then be interpreted that the subject views consumerism as a product of a process of compiling values. However, the culture described by the subject here does not connote positively as it could be a repercussion of a negative process (See Excerpt 1). Thus, there could be another interpretation for the use of culture here. Thai culture connotes positively in B19 where she prided the Thainess by the justification of delicate traditional dressing style as Thai wisdom.

Culture may be used to describe the owner of this consumeristic culture which could be Western as the concept was originated in 1899 in the works of Thorstein Veblen. This concluding remarks may extend to be the thematic judgment of all episodes. Materialism is equated with ค่านิยม (khaniyom) (A25-26) or value in English. In Juno's description, materialism is fake because it comes from online communication; thus it can be dangerous (See Figure 6). It is worth to note that she later on illustrated the danger of materialism via online communication using a case of a foreign villain as an example.


Figure 6: The concept of opposite pairs of characters

Luck	
Human	Savage
Real*	Not real
With ability to think	Without ability to think
Safe*	Dangerous
Face-to-face*	Online
Handmade	Industrial

* Not explicitly mentioned by the subject in her narratives


Her characters also were described with binary concepts (See Figure 7). There are men and women, and with and without good appearance. For the Nigerian male character, he did not have a good appearance as he had "extremely black skin (A67)." Even though the evaluation was not explicit, I can infer this from the opposite binary pair of very "good-looking" woman (A61). When it comes to audiences, she contrasted animals and humans using their ability to think as a criterion. Animals are therefore savage because they cannot think. Humans should think. Without thinking, Juno portrayed the outcome in her narrative (A63).

Figure 7: Combination of three opposite pairs of characters in 'A girl from news'



Note: 1. An artificial man in a Facebook profile
 2. Nigerian man
 3. Thai woman who lost her money

Figure 8: The spectrum of nationality concept



Another group of characters in Juno's narratives is the foreigners. There seems to be a spectrum of these. Foreigners with social status such as leaders of APEC member countries and the Japanese friend were given positive connotation where an African was portrayed negatively. Caucasian, although was not mentioned explicitly, can be grouped in the foreigner category when Juno referred to "ฝรั่งหล่อๆ" (fa rang lhor lhor) in (72) or good-looking Caucasian in Thai.

Discussion

The ideational function needs interpretation with an analysis of socio-cultural context. In this study, overall binary opposition are evident throughout the selected stretches of discourse. The teacher also points out contrasts between "our" as Thai and "their" values which in this case, other values could mean materialism which seems to be something originated in Western society. This claim can be explained in two folds. First, one needs to understand that modern Thai national identity has been constructed by the ruling class or elites centralizing singular set of ideologies of the central Thai people and culture and disseminating them throughout Thailand during 1930s-1980s when Thai nationhood was concretized in various layers: governmental, cultural and local (Reynolds, 2002). Second, the contemporary Thai identity was rooted in the colonization era. This is because Thailand was destabilized by a series of boundary disputes and conflicts against Western imperialists (1867-1910); thus, generating even more territorial selfhood (Thongchai, 2000). This has been rooted in common discourse on Thainess in multiple arenas.

Understanding the relations between self and others can shed light on their meaning itself "sameness and selfhood stand in a dialectical relationship to each other" (Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. & Liebhart, K., 2009, p.14). The representation of own group and others is common in many types of discourse analysis. In narrative discourse, the narrative identity is seen as a character constituting a plot, and at the same time, "other" is always found too in the sense that there will be the narrated self which is built on internalization of social attitudes and ideologies (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Another meaning of "other" discussed in Hall (1997)'s *Representation and Media* that people tend to self-present positively and negatively other-present. Hence, more frequently social representation of self and other may be hegemonic, negotiated or oppositional.

To elaborate on this, the "us" and "them" found in the narratives may associate with right and

wrong, true and false, and real and fake. The subject linked values in Buddhism such as materialism which was represented as unreal and could corrupt people causing the problem narrated in her class. To be more specific in Buddhist script the conditioned mental state of mind, wanting materialistic objects is referred to as defilements or constructed emotions. In Buddhist philosophy, one's mental state should be free of worldly attachments or *Kleshas*. Therefore, the subject portrayed materialism in a negative light.

The opposite of materialism was not clearly introduced and only the outcome of not being able to follow the suggested value was presented. This could be interpreted as a common-sense making process where members of this community are expected to know what the opposite of materialism is. Also, I would like to point out that the lack of discussion about the pairs could be interpreted also that there is an unspoken clear concept they should already know. Nevertheless, the subject discussed how to possess the value by "thinking" juxtaposing this between human and animal capacity of thinking. This could be interpreted that being able to think as a human is civilized and not being able to follow this value could be equal to "savage" like animals. To further elaborate this, a word in Thai "khon pa khon doy" exists to describe hill-tribe people who may not yet have Thai citizenship.

Being civilized has been another concept embedded in Thainess and perhaps it is more complex than being a binary pair of savageness as Herzfeld (2002) mentioned in p. 905:

But in Thai this equivalence is not sustained, and that fact alone should alert us to a somewhat different dynamic, in which imitating the accomplishments of the West has meant having *khwaamsiwilai* ("the quality of being civilized"), whereas *watthanatham* ("culture") might actually exclude the crass materialism that some Thai critics associate with the polluting effects of Western cultural influence.

The word *siwilai* in Thai itself derived from Sanskrit which shows that the cultural pride somehow links to foreignness. In the data, foreignness was portrayed again in a binary pair: the acceptable and not acceptable. The Nigerian citizen was a representation of insincerity whereas the subject's Japanese friend, the APEC leaders and their wives are evident to justify the glory of Thainess. This can be explained by the concept Herzfeld introduced "crypto-colonialism", the concept which marks a phenomenon of a nation which claims that it has not been colonized but still is influenced by Western ideologies. In this case, the justification of acceptance seems to be from foreigners. Another evidence of crypto-colonialist ideas embedded in the data is the conclusion the subject made the conclusion about her narrative on love that at the end it all depends on luck and faith. This shows the lack of control over her own destiny which is the relationship pattern between the colonizer and the colony. However, in philosophy this could also be interpreted according to the concept of fatalism where people are surrendered to the external forces of life. This can be explained by the word โชค (*chok*) or luck mentioned in the data, or the word ชะตา (*chata*) and พรหมลิขิต (*phromlikhit*) in Thai which suggest fatalism and predestination. In พรหมลิขิต, พรหม (*phrom*) or Lord Brahman in Hinduism has a control over one's life (Vongvipanond, 1994).

Pedagogically Speaking

In the Core Curriculum of Basic Education (2008), students are expected to "have virtues, morality and desirable values, awareness of self-worth and good discipline; observe Buddhist principles or

principles of their faiths and adhere to Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy' (Office of the Basic Education Commission, Ministry of Education, 2008, p.5). Also, students should pursue to develop these following values: (a) love for Nation, Religion, and King; (b) honesty; (c) good discipline; (d) learning enthusiasm; (e) living with a sense of sufficiency; (f) devotion to work; (g) love for Thai-ness; and (h) public mind (Office of the Basic Education Commission, Ministry of Education, 2008, p. 7). According to this, the subject followed the set of values incited by the Core Curriculum. To be more specific, the Social Studies, Religion and Culture subject group emphasizes the "peaceful coexistence in Thai society and the world community; good citizenship; faith in religious teachings; appreciation of resources and the environment; and patriotism and pride in Thai-ness." (Office of the Basic Education Commission, Ministry of Education, 2008, p.10).

The discursive practices seen in her narratives also reveal that knowledge is viewed as static fact as there have been boosters to increase its certainty throughout all episodes. All in all, her rhetorical style in this episode does not include hedges. She only uses present simple tenses and may portray the whole episode as fact. Thus, only this linguistic phenomenon may not suffice to claim that the teacher views this story as fact because it could be common in Thai classroom discursive practice not to employ hedges due to the asymmetrical status of teachers and students. Taking certainty stance could reinforce the authority of teachers in classroom. More linguistic evidence must be collected to identify markedness and unmarkedness of this discursive practice. This data certainly does not suffice to generate any patterns of discourse.

As Feigenblatt et al. (2010) pointed out that education is a tool to assimilate people to one set of ideologies, it seems to be relevant to this particular case that ideologies have been constructed with discursive practices that aim at producing one set of hegemonic values mandated by the government. Moreover, to achieve the "peaceful coexistence" among people in the society, a closer look at language use of different groups of people and what ideologies embedded in their discourse could serve as a primary step in paving a way towards this perhaps rather ambitious goal.

Conclusion

By elucidating meanings embedded in the subject's discursive practices in classroom, I can understand that the truth held by the subject may come from the continuous process of nationalism building with complex ideas of us and them illustrated by Thais and foreigners, and men and women. It has become an ideology leaving limited gap in-between as it is evident in her choice of rhetorical structure: the narratives, lexical choices and styles: binary oppositions, and it has been presented as common-sense where justification and counter ideas are sometimes absent. In pedagogy, it is common that classrooms have moral judgment and portrayals of right and wrong, but I would like to point out that the use of this narrative practice as a pedagogical tool could limit participation of students and later on lead to hegemonic understanding of the world as only "black or white." The pedagogy and awareness of discursive practices should go hand-in-hand in teachers' training. Further, this study perhaps is only a trigger point to open the world to Thai classroom discourse analysis, and it, in effect, raises a question how common this discursive practice is and is it possible to find any patterns in a larger pool of data.

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Analyzing the Context of Lanna-ism

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Abstract

This paper explores about Khon Muang, referring to the multi-ethnic category of Tai ethnicity in northern Thailand, and their social movement called “Lanna-ism (*lanna niyom*)” from the viewpoint of how the public intellectual have been discoursed on the Khon Muang and Lanna, known as cultural unity in northern Thailand. By assessing historical context about identity building of Khon Muang, it can be said that they have been created own commonality stand on some intense rivalry toward Bangkok, which is the majority of every all aspect of Thai society. Furthermore, there is a gradual change about discourses on Lanna-ism started to connote not only cultural agenda, which insist importance of preserving their unique history and culture, but also political agenda, a yearning for declined decentralization, or politically lost former Prime Minister Taksin, who is borne in Chiang Mai province and tend to be looked as local hero.

Keywords: *Lanna, Khon Muang, Discourse, History, Identity*

1. Introduction

This paper discusses Khon Muang, referring to the multi-ethnic category of Tai ethnicity in northern Thailand, and their social movement called “Lanna-ism (*lanna niyom*)” from the viewpoint of how the public intellectual’s discourses on the Khon Muang and Lanna Society, known as cultural unity in northern Thailand, have been reproduced. And the impact that how discourses by public intellectuals is affecting on the current social situation surrounding them will be analyzed.

Khon Muang identity is attributed in Lanna kingdom, the ancient capital of the Northern Thailand during 13th century recently known as Chiang Mai. Kraisri Nimmanhaeminda, one of the most prominent scholars of northern Thai studies in the late 19th century, has examined identity of Khon Muang since the 1960’s. However, there is still no fixed categorization of Khon Muang. This is why public intellectuals of northern Thai tend to claim that Khon Muang identity is one commonality for mobilizing local people, despite the lack of precise conceptual definition. This movement is also different from the ordinary nationalism because historically it lacks the strong discrimination or oppression from majority. To reveal the context of Lanna-ism, this paper focuses on historical dynamics of Khon Muang-ness, and the transformation of the way of represents Khon Muang and Lanna on discourses by public intellectuals.

From the middle of 1980’s, Thailand experienced the rise of localism. It strengthened the local identity and further contributed to the sense of Lanna-ism. When the new constitution emphasizing

on decentralization established in 1997¹³¹, Khon Muang, was under the over-centralization of Thai governance, tended to be empowered. Unfortunately, such prospects came to an end several years afterward. Additionally, many works about Khon Muang were published, resulted in the revival of old local heroes (e.g. Tanet 1993a). In 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra emerged as the first Khon Muang who was nominated to be the Prime Minister of Thailand. Decentralization was a political agenda that has shaped the localism and has brought the sense of localism to ethno-nationalism. This process has reflected the phenomena of the current Lanna-ism through local history, local heroes, and local politics.

2. Khon Muang and Lanna-ism

As usual, Thailand is divided into the four regions, known as the Central, North-Eastern, North, South, and each region has been created different polity, cultural zone according geo-political conditions. In the case of Northern region, mountain lines and four rivers, Ping River, Wang River, Yom River, and Nan River ranging from north to south forms basins, then such geo-conditions make this area separated from other areas. Chiang Mai, historically central capital of Northern Thailand, is located on one of the basin of mountain basins in Northern Thailand.

Chiang Mai had been secured prosperity as the capital of traditional polity, which called Lanna kingdom, until Central Thai (Siam) gradually annexed Lanna under centralized political system in second half of the 19th century. However, territory of Lanna kingdom was always fluid. Until being reorganized as one regional area of modern Thai nation, Lanna kingdom was a political autonomy which included geographical and cultural small unit, and experienced prosperity as Tai ethnicity after the 13th century. Based on each *muang*, traditional polity among Tai ethnicity in mainland of Southeast Asia, on basins in Northern Thailand area, the territory of Lanna kingdom once had broad to Chiang Tung (currently Shan state in Myanmar), or Chiang Hung (currently Xishuangbanna in Yunnan state of China), in addition, Lanna kingdom had kept diplomatic relationship with Lane Xang kingdom in Luang Prabang, currently northern Laos.

Officially Lanna Kingdom was built by king Mangrai in 1296, prosper around Chiang Mai which royal capital and ruled through the area of whole current Northern Thailand. Though they had thrived for 200 years under the reign of Burmese kingdom from latter half of the 16th century, Lanna kingdom became independent again from latter half of the 18th century by king Kawila from Lampang. At that time, king Kawila carried out a policy that forced people in other *muang* polity to migrate to Chiang Mai, included many Tai ethnic groups for example Lue, Khun, Yong, Tai Yai. In result of king Kawila's immigration policy, Chiang Mai changed to multi-ethnic space included not only Yuan, local Tai ethnicity in there, but also migrated Tai ethnic groups [Sarassawadee 2005 (2001): 131-138,219-221]. Afterward in second half of the 19th century, Lanna kingdom started to accept gradual governance from Central Thai (Siam) due to the impact of England, which colonized Burma, seek to concession of natural resources as teak tree in territory of Lanna kingdom, and scheme to trade such resources via Siam kingdom as official diplomat level. Marriage between King Chulalongkorn and Dara Rasami, who is princess of Lanna kingdom in that time, symbolize political close relationship between Siam and

¹³¹It can be said that promulgation of new constitution in 1997 was a terminus of requiring democratization, which heightened after Bloody May (*phrwsaphaa thamin*) in 1992. There was an epoch-making project that organize assembly only for constitution via national election, totally apart from the Diet. Therefore 1997's constitution is sometimes called "civil constitution (*ratthathammanuun chabap prachaachon*)" [Suehiro 2009: 90-92].

Lanna kingdom. Lanna kingdom is not just a tributary state but also a counterpart with all due respect for Siam, because Lanna kingdom didn't rebel against Siam, and accepted rules from not England or France, but Siam [Ayabe 2014: 336-340]. Then in 1899, Lanna kingdom was totally annexed under the centralized governance of Siam state as a regional part [Sarassawadee 2005(2001): 201-213].

There is a lot of theories about origin of the word of Khon Muang. In general, Khon Muang, which tend to mean Tai ethnic people in Northern Thailand as multi-ethnic category, came up almost the same time of as Lanna kingdom started to be annexed in Thai nation from the end of 19th century. Maybe it could be said can say that category of Khon Muang is a concept which can include connote people from each ethnicity stemmed from in the past Lanna kingdom. Also, it can be the basis of ethnic identity as Lanna, which is in danger of disappearance by annexation of territory into the modern Thai state. At the time, people categorized Khon Muang tended to be called as "Lao", which was often called by groups of people not from Khon Muang the external, and it was insulting name for them.¹³²

Although both Khon Muang and Siam hold Tai ethnicity in common as a mode of expression as "brothers of tai ethnic group (pen tai phi noong kan)"¹³³. Therefore, it historically lacks historically the strong discrimination or oppression from the majority, Siam in central Thailand., and no one who call them as insulting name, Lao, it can be said that the roots of discrimination between Siam and Lanna is relatively not so deep.

Almost a half century after annexation of Lanna kingdom into Thai nation under the radical administrative reform in the end of the 19th century, public intellectuals in lowland northern Thai society started to argue discourses to enhance cultural heritage of Lanna, or to accelerate political requirement that establish a standing university in Chiang Mai up [e.g. Kraisri 1966] on media like newspaper. And it was one of the beginnings of serious of Lanna-ism, which social movement head for enhancing Lanna identity toward both cultural and political authorities of the central in Thai nation. In between 1980's to 1990's, there were many cultural discourses about Khon Muang or Lanna. For example, some emphasized the existence of Khon Muang as overt and main category in lowland northern Thai society [e.g. Tanet 1993a : 43-58], some other re-evaluated local history and tradition in the era of Lanna kingdom [e.g. Aroonrut 1991: 1-17; Sarasawadee 2005(2001); Tanet 1993a : 9-13,205-212].

Especially Tanet Charoenmuang, who is famous scholar in politics from Chiang Mai University, ran serial columns on weekly national paper specialized in politics and economy, *phuu cat kaan*, from 1989 to 1990. Then He was gradually recognized as an outstanding controversialist in public. Furthermore, Tanet took an important role on research project for local autonomy, *khroongkaan suksaa kaan pokkhroong thoong thin*, which was organized by Faculty of Politics of Chiang Mai University. And Tanet have been published books praise unique history and culture, or achievement of decentralization in lowland northern Thai society constantly. It has close relationship with real

¹³² Khon Muang at that time called *lao* by Siam, who confound Khon Muang in northern Thailand with Lao Isan in northeast Thailand, because of same peripheral population for Siam. However, Siam classified Khon Muang from Lao Isan by calling Black Belly Lao (*lao phung dam*), which indicate the custom of Khon Muang that tattooing on belly. On the other side, Lao Isan was called White Belly Lao (*lao phung khaao*), because they do not have custom of tattooing on belly [Frank(eds.,) 1964].

¹³³ About the idiom "brothers of tai ethnic group (*pen tai phi noong kan*)", some indicates inclusive Tai ethnic groups in Thai nation. On the other hand, some indicates Tai ethnic groups in from Southern China to mainland of Southeast Asia, beyond the territory of Thailand.

politics that the problems about decentralization, which Tanet debated again and again. In addition, Sarassawadee Oongsakul, who is historian specialized on in Northern Thailand history, published first edition of History of Lanna (prawattisaat lanna) in 1986, and it has been reprinted more than 10 times afterward within 30 years. Or Nithi leosriwong, also one of the most famous public intellectuals not only in Northern Thailand but also in whole Thailand, been written column on influential national newspaper in Thailand, as Mathichon or Phuu Cat Kaan, for long time in addition to mainly historical research as vocation. Moreover, many academic seminars focused on argument about history and cultural resources in Lanna society have been held on again and again for almost 30 years.

During the developing development of arguments about both historical and current lowland northern Thai society, the teaching staffs of Chiang Mai university, which is most prominent education institute in northern Thailand, took an important role in the production of discourses about Lanna-ism [e.g. Anan Kanchanaphan; Nithi leosriwong; Sarassawadee Oongsakul; Tanet Charoenmuang]. When such public intellectuals make a statement based on Lanna-ism, how the word of Lanna and Khon Muang would be represented, and what they want to accomplish by such a statement.

This paper gives roughly a rough definition of Lanna-ism as discourses which emphasize their tradition and history peculiar to the Lanna, even sometimes politicized, by public intellectuals in lowland northern Thai society like professors in Chiang Mai university. Briefly speaking, whenever understanding the reason why public intellectuals have been repeated both cultural and political discourse which based on Lanna identity, the answer cannot be concluded only in local context of Northern Thailand. Through analyzing connection between social conditions and each discourse, there were political dynamics in the aspect of developing pork barrel or confliction by enforcement of the policies from the central government. So, it is not just already a context of not ended up in a regional level, but a national level. As discussion in detail shows below, it can be said that such discourses based on Lanna-ism have been one of direct reactions to the fact that the social situation in lowland northern Thai society always have has been at the mercy of a political decision of the central government, or both capital and cultural flow from Bangkok.

3. Social Movement and Enhancement of Lanna Identity

According to government administration, Northern Thailand consist of 17 prefectures including Chiang Mai. In spite of formal administrative name as Northern Thailand, which based on Bangkok-centered geopolitics after Thai nation has been formed, why public intellectuals are cling to calling homelands as “Lanna” on discourses. As the following conclusion shows, it can be said that there is some intense rivalry toward Bangkok, which is the majority of all aspects of Thai society. Therefore, the name of Lanna, which reflects their unique history and culture of lowland northern Thai society, has established itself own meaning firmly. In other words, they have been tried to build their identity in today based on the former Lanna kingdom, which was lost by Bangkok’s annexation in midst of modernization. In the next section, it will be examined that some social events stirred up Lanna identity held by “Lanna” people.

3.1. Movement about Establishment of Chiang Mai University

It can be resulted in movement for establishment of Chiang Mai University resulted in one of prominent social phenomenon in lowland northern Thai Society during 1950’s to 60’s. Kraisri Nimmanhaeminda, one of highest local elite in at that time, took indispensable part in this

movement. Kraisri wrote details in his work, *"rao tongkaan mahaa witthayalai (prawat haeng kaan dai maa sung mahaa witthayaalai chiang mai): We Need the University (History about Establishment of Chiang Mai University)"* [Kraisri 1985a: 199-206], so this paper carries argument based on information from the above article.

Prime minister Thanom, came into being 1st January in 1958, declared a policy about national level education in 9th January in the same year. It was the plan for establishment higher education institute such universities to regional level. In that time, Bangkok was an only city where a few of university were opened in Thailand.

Date back about after WW II, American missionaries, who established educational institutes from elementary to high school already, officially petitioned the Thai government for opening American university in Thailand. Some of them entreated Nimmanhaeminda family, who have had extensive land in urban area of Chiang Mai as private estate, to donate lands for the establishment of a new university. Nimmanhaeminda family was interested in this proposal then decided to offer their lands for free, with setting 3 conditions up; 1. New university must set up the medical faculty for to solve short the lack of medical doctors in northern Thailand, 2. Research institution for tropical medicine and a large-scaled hospital also must be established with the medical faculty, 3. Offering qualified free education for talented students from Northern Thailand must be done. In the end, Nimmanhaeminda family recommended this proposal for an establishment of a new university to the government.

However, the result was that "Thai government cannot approve for establish university in a country by foreigner. Because if permit, it will be a precedent for we must allow same proposal from other large countries, for example the United Kingdom, France or China, in good diplomatic relations". Kraisri stated an opportunity for the establishment of a regional university was faded away by the government's standpoint [Kraisri 1985a: 202].

After that, a parson who interested in the establishment of a regional university in Chiang Mai appeared on the scene. The parson is Chao Kaewmongkhol Na Chiang Mai, who cognate to the royal family of Lanna kingdom. He proposed to sale a part of his land to Chulalongkorn University, which is one of the most prominent academic institutions in the country, and which sympathizes with Royal ideology, with a condition that force them to name after "University of Dara Rasami" whenever the university is set up on this land. Looking to the circumstances, there is a resident of Chao Dara Rasami, the princess of Lanna kingdom and one of the highest consorts of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) too, on the land plan to sell. And there is an intention of Chao Kaewmongkhol Na Chiang Mai that wanted them to name after the name pair of "Chulalonglorn University" having to do with the name of King Chulalonglorn. Ministry of Education approved to buy this land, but after all Chulalongkorn University don't didn't set up the university, and now it is a camp for the police force.

3.2. Launch "Khon Muang" Newspaper

Movement about setting up regional university accelerates retrospection of ethnic identity for people in lowland northern Thai society. Because it is obvious that the central government, The Ministry of Education in this context, must control excessively a new university autonomy under the power of over-centralized administration system. That is why public intellectuals started to promote discourses ethnic identity as Khon Muang, and cultural or historical uniqueness of northern Thai [Tanet 2009: 51-60]. Launching "Khon Muang" weekly newspaper, in January 1953, also can be located as one of the social trends in that time. This project had been succeeded to some extent, by high quality articles related economy, politics, and society. On one occasion, when it is failed to set

up new university by American missionaries and Chulalongkorn university, Kraisri made up his mind that “Khon Muang” paper can play a role to require demand the establishment of a university in northern Thailand for the government [Kraisri 1985: 204]. Then he published serial column in newspaper, the content was an appeal to invite gather attention to setting up a university in northern Thailand, by northern dialect of Kam Muang from cover to cover [Tanet 2009: 53].

3.3. Local Developmental and Decentralization Movement

Main social argument about lowland northern Thai society may be focused on development by central government and decentralization on the heels of this in lowland northern Thai society in 1980's to 90's. But, full-scale of regional development stemmed from a latter half of 1970's. For example, Chiang Mai airport started to go into commission international airline in service, with a plan of development Chiang Mai as not only domestic but also international town for tourist [Tanet 1993a: 163]. This took place at the same time as operation of the 4th master plan of national economy and social development (phaen phattanaa seetakit lae sangkhom haeng chaat chabap thii 4) by the government from 1977 to 1981. Following upon master plan, local central city was decided and enforced by the government [Tanet 1993a: 163-164]. In this development policy, local central city, which consists of Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, Nakhon Rachasima, Songkhla, Hat Yai, was designated as a target of intensive development following Bangkok [Tanet 1993a:164]. It resulted that Lowland northern Thai society experiences massive flowing of people, capital, substance resources from mainly Bangkok owing to rapid economic growth after 1980's. Construction of a new dam, cornering the market in lands of the propertied class, a rush of condominium building happened continuously. Then wide-ranging serious problems were caused due to the rapid growth of the area. For example, a set of problems from deforestation, and deterioration of the living environment, decline of traditional lifestyle, came up. At the same time, urban areas like Bangkok, since middle class increased rapidly by economic growth, started to become key factor of the democratization movement. Huge demands for decentralization after 1990's could be happened, is a one of direct reaction toward rapid local development by government.

3.4. Taksin Chinawtra's Appearance on the Political Scene

It can be said that Taksin Chinawtra, who is the first prime minister from Northern Thailand, have been thought as a local hero by people in Northern Thailand¹³⁴. Taksin was a former police bureaucrat, and sworn in as the 23th prime minister of Thailand in 9th February 2001. Taksin started a new career as a politician, in because of an officially appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Chuan Leekpai government in October 1994. After holding a post of vice premier, Taksin created the Thai Rak Thai Party [Suehiro 2009:142]. Then took a position as the Prime Minister, when he is 51 years old, by winning a general election in February 2001. Taksin government maintained the power until a coup in September 2006, totally for 5 years and 8 months in total [Suehiro 2009:142]. Taksin lost his position by the coup, and was being banished from both the political circles and the country. The 1997's constitution, which had been the mainspring of decentralization's promotion, was

¹³⁴ Chinawatra family including Taksin had already built up wealth, fame, social status, and be recognized one of reputable family in Chiang Mai by local people. Origin of Chinawatra family is in the oversea Hakka, an ethnic group of Chinese, who migrate from China under the king Rama V reign, from 1868 to 1910. Taksin is the fourth generation. The grandfather Chian succeeded to make wealth by river trade and tax collect, and established first modern silk factory in Thailand. The father Boonlert, Chian's third son, married with the daughter of Na Chiang Mai family, former royal family of Lanna kingdom, and experienced to manage silk shop and a bank branch, then nominated to be a member of the Diet in 1969 [Thot 2006: 81-115].

abolished at the same time. Also, a tide of decentralization based on the 1997's constitution was stagnated. In northern Thailand, it can readily be imagined that the fall of Taksin, who is local elite, and stagnation of decentralization makes Khon Muang disappointed [Tanet 2009: 227-228]. For example, Tanet (2009) supported Taksin clearly in his column:

After 10 o'clock in 28th February 2008, the one and only Khon Muang, who served as the Prime Minister in before, came back to his homeland for the first time in 537 days since September 2006. (...) When accomplished his long-cherished wish and coming back to homeland, he kneeled down and worship for mother land as he wished to do from the past. (...) There are news coverages that it was just performance, which this Khon Muang kneeled down to mother land, for image-building, some murmured he just wanted to be in front-page news, or he just pretend to love his home. (...) However, how we should think about his kneeling down on to mother land [Tanet 2009:227].

Then Tanet sympathizes Taksin's situation and assume attitude to praise Taksin as in following:

Every person can make mistake at least once, but there is no one who mistakes all the time. An elected person who the good or not must being decided by citizen, (...) however, they should think over that should not have to mobilize military instead for the citizen to occupy nation state, to control over a government, an assembly, political parties, and should not have to tear up old constitution for drawing up a new one. Such evils must be condemned under the democracy. Such ideas do not mean creation of society and pieces based on democracy, but mean creation of society by authoritarianism, violation of individual freedom, losing support of the public [Tanet 2009: 228].

Even though there are not so much many references about negative aspects of Taksin's politics, such as regulation toward media, which criticized as controls on freedom of speech, and obvious nepotism, or unusual accumulated wealth. On the contrary, a kind of ideology, which supports Taksin is a local hero without any critical analysis unconditionally, tend to be reflected on discourses.

4. Changes in the Ratio of Cultural Agenda and Political Agenda

Many previous research has been dealt with Khon Muang as a concrete ethnic group, but for Khon Muang in itself, they seem think the category of Khon Muang as the basis of localism in their subject, neither ethnic group (*klum chaatiphan*) nor ethnicity (*chaatiphan*). Discourses about Khon Muang and Lanna, which the retrospective and synchronic category, should be examined from the context of localism. After 1980's, both localism and local wisdom discourses came up rapidly. In midst of attention for local history and culture, Lanna-ism also developed by basing on such cultural agendas. Most typical one in that time was the discourse appeals for preserving their own language, *kam muang* [e.g. Tanet 1993b]. For example, Tanet (1993b) repeated an insistence of "Khon Muang must speak *kam muang*" as following:

I think absolutely it is wrong that parents do not speak *kam muang* to children. It will have negative effect on each aspect of our local society's developments in future [Tanet 1993b: 11].

A territory of Lanna had been filled with *kam muang*, which the language has beautiful

tones, once at the time. It is a symbol of vernacular culture in Lanna, which ancestors continued to keep. Why Lanna people in present don't try to keep it? Why they don't try to learn, and succeed to with peoples from the other place? It is a grief that we have to speak standard language for only two persons from Bangkok, who don't speak *kam muang*, of 8, 10, or 20 to 30 Lanna peoples in meeting. Why peoples from other places don't learn vernacular culture [Tanet 1993b: 15]?

Tanet mentions about that cultural agendas which lowland northern Thailand holds on, and are distant from a typical political ideology such as requirement for decentralization in here. It is emphasized to succeed to northern dialect, what called *kam muang*. In addition, Tanet mentions to current constitutional system which obligate to use standard Thai in every educational activity in schools, and he persuade to stop this situation that relative decline of the number of *kam muang* speaking population in new younger generations in society. There is the push backing of localism by administrative section in the context of discourses which insist preservation of cultural resources such language.

Moreover, a controversy about the name of Lanna/Lánna, which sweep the press of northern Thailand in second half of 1980's, also cannot be overlooked from the aspect of cultural agenda related to Lanna-ism¹³⁵. There were two names of Lanna, one is Lanna which has strong accent on the first middle tone and the other is Lánna, which has strong accent on the fourth high tone, co-existed in that time. In midst of rising social interest for local history, a controversy for seeking orthodoxy of the name of Lanna or Lánna overheard on northern Thailand as the central in 1987 [Lamchun 2011: 56]. It mobilizes intellectual's knowledge in northern Thailand, including linguists, then their discourses made headlines in the local newspapers or radio programs from day to day [Lamchun 2011: 56]. And national newspaper also started to take up for the debate about seeking orthodoxy of the name Lanna/ Lánna on the paper. Finally, an official view on this matter that "the name of Lánna is right" was submitted by a governmental institution in 15th June, 1987¹³⁶. After that the name of Lánna have has become the common word for ordinary people been used in general [Lamchun 2011: 59-60].

At that time, groups defense the name of Lanna, not Lánna, mainly based on Lampang. On the other hand, groups defense the name of Lánna mainly based on Chiang Mai, and there is dispute between them [Lamchun 2011: 56]. For example, some insist linguistic uniqueness of *kam muang*, which have a different linguistic system from standard Thai language, by making use of abundant data such palm leaf documents from linguistic perspective. Or the others had each expert opinion, such as comparative investigation based on linguistic difference between standard Thai and *kam muang*, semantic investigation back to the primary meaning of the word of Lanna and Lánna, and historical investigation based on documentary survey [Tanet 1993a:9-11]. Thus, history and culture in northern Thailand mainly based on once Lanna kingdom was uncovered and spread out by media. It led public interest for local history to some extent [Tanet 1993a: 9-11].

Whereas focusing on decentralization, political corruption and disorder in after 1980's led the Thai government to requirement of the democratization. In northern Thailand, enforcement of

¹³⁵ The writing of the word of Lanna is unified as Lanna, except for when author mentions about the difference between tones of Lanna and Lánna.

¹³⁶ Governmental institution in here means national institute of Thai history (*khana kammakaan chamlaprawattisaat thai*).

developmental policy by central government caused environmental problems which threaten local people's living. Then a claim of decentralization was longed for. Democracy movements including decentralization was ripened to some extent by establishment of new constitution in 1997, which declared decentralization as one of principles. However, decentralization started to get stuck after entered in 2000's, then stagnated finally. Or Taksin, who is thought as local hero in lowland northern Thai society, nominated as the prime minister in 2001, but lost his position and had to be a political refugee by a military coup in 2006. People in northern Thailand was disappointed two times by decline of decentralization and political downfall of Taksin.

Discourses based on Lanna-ism is also effected by such political tendency. Once cultural agenda, preservation of own traditional language and praise of local history, was insisted mainly, but political agenda, connoting admiration for decentralization, also came into up. The point is that change the ratio between cultural agenda of political agenda. In other words, neither culture and politics can make a distinction clearly, nor simple diagram which shift clearly from cultural agenda to political agenda, in terms of discourses on Lanna-ism, can be drawn. It can be said that basically Lanna-ism is cultural insistence, but political insistence also gradually started to go side by side with following real politics.

After entering in 2010's, which midst of high political tension between Taksin faction and anti-Taksin faction, Lanna-ism spreads out both politically and unprecedentedly. In the beginning of March 2014, a serious news covered in newspapers in overheat. It started from a news that there is a faction planning to build independent polity as "People's Democratic Republic Lanna", which consist of 8 prefectures¹³⁷ on upper northern Thailand and called as *soo poo poo lanna* (it's an acronym of *saatharanarat prachaathipatray prachaachon lanna*). For example, Khom Chat Luek newspaper made headline an article that "Accept Red Shirts! Building of *soo poo poo lanna*. Go through 6 months consultation" in 1st March 2014. In article, Phetchawat Watthanaphongsirikul, who is the key figure of famous Taksin faction group known as "Rak Chiang Mai 51", mentioned that there is more than 6monthes discussion and the outlook for independent on practice about PDR Lanna [Khom Chad Luek 2016; Akagi 2014: 25-26]. But 4th March 2014 just after it, Prachathai newspaper covered an article named "Phetchawat implies there is no idea about independent -a mistake coverage". In this article, Phechawat talked precisely that *soo poo poo lanna* don't means PDR Lanna, and have never planned independent from Thai nation, then totally denied coverage of previous Chom Chad Luek newspaper [Prachathai 2014a]. In 6th March 2014, two days after of it, Prachathai covered that *soo poo poo lanna*, which every media misunderstand as PDR Lanna, means a group of "assembly for protect democracy of Lanna (*samaccha pokpong prachaathipatray lanna*)", which do not involve in nor Phechawat and Rak Chiang Mai 51¹³⁸. To begin with, it is just a northern branch of "assembly for protect democracy (*samaccha pokpong prachaathipatray*)" from central Thailand, and mainly support for local elections. Needless to say, there is no relationship between this group and movement for independence of Lanna region. A serious of coverages overheated through misunderstanding and protest for the capital latter of *soo poo poo lanna* may seems as to be an

¹³⁷ 8 prefectures on upper northern Thailand in here consists of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Mae Hong Son, Lamphun, Lampang, Phayao, Nan, Phlue.

¹³⁸ This article covered that members of Yingluck Chinawatra, the prime minister at that time, factions who rushed to support her visiting to Chiang Mai OTOP Center in 28th February 2014 wore headband be written *soo poo poo lanna*. Yingluck is younger sister of Taksin, and nominated as the prime minister from August 2011 to May 2014. In addition, this article pointed out that all conjunctures and misunderstanding was happened from this incident, too.

absurd story at first sight. However, the fact that ideologies, which related to an extreme separatism, appeared on incoherent coverage by medias cannot be ignored.

Conclusion

Khon Muang itself have been constructive unity through its own history by experiencing massive migrate from other *muang* polity surround Lanna Kingdom, or annexation into Thai nation state. It results makes category of Khon Muang dynamic, including not only local Yuan in territory of Lanna, but also marginalized Tai ethnicity such as Lue, Khun, Yong, Tai Yai. Because definition of Khon Muang in category is always fluid, it tends to be appropriated to people's demand in modern context. Then, there is a connotational reflection of tendency that discourses on Lanna is gradually co-existing based on not only cultural agenda, for example, which insist importance of preserving their own language as *kam muang*, but also political agenda, a yearning for declined decentralization or politically lost Taksin after 2000's. Category of Khon Muang in modern context is flamed by academic definition by public intellectuals, and gradually become to be treated as foundation for not only the subject of cultural agenda but also the political insistence in real politics. Once the image of Khon Muang was built as historical Lanna kingdom retrospectively. However, the slight transition can be seen that the image of Khon Muang is increasing to be recognized as a figure related to the present politics as time goes by.

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Football and Provincial Identity in Thailand: The Construction of Chiang Rai Identity

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Abstract

Football has become one of the most popular sports in Thailand. Yet, football in Thailand should not only be treated as a sport. Since 2009, Thailand professional football league no longer serves merely as a sporting competition. It serves as a space in which the power relations among actors take place. The complex interplay of power relations among the provincial power has intensified the process of identity construction in the provincial area. The unique capability of football to institutionalize particular form of identity allows us to comprehend how the club and the fans construct their identity. Special attention is given to Chiang Rai United Football Club and its fans who located in Chiang Rai Province and Bangkok. The proposed arguments are that the construction of provincial identity is mediated by football club and provincial power; that professional football club provides a space for the fans to exercising their identity politics; and the process of identity construction is being conducted by the football club and the fans.

Keywords: Football, Provincial Identity, Identity Construction, Chiang Rai, Thailand.

Introduction

It is well-known that football has become one of the most popular sports in Thailand. Football gains its popularity through the development of the professional sporting competition, national and international sporting events, and the appropriation of the game in everyday life activities (Jonsson, 2003; 2006; Chuenchanok, 2012; Chuenchanok & Brill, 2015). Currently, Thai League is, arguably, the best sporting competition in national level. In July 2016, Thai national team also recently claimed their superiority in the regional level by winning the biennial football competition organized by ASEAN Football Federation (AFF) for two consecutive times. In the everyday life of Thai society, it is common as well for youth, adolescent, and adult to investing their leisure time by playing football. The mixture of the professional league development, accomplishment in regional level, and the adaptation of football highlight the importance of football in Thailand.

Despite of its popularity, it is difficult to deny that professional football in Thailand does not only serve as a sporting competition. Rather, it serves as a field in which the complex interplay of power relations and the dynamic circumstances of its society take place. Such condition did not occur until 2009, when the

Asian Football Confederation (AFC) declared that Thailand needs to restructure its football league by privatizing the club and the league so that Thailand-based football club is eligible in competing in annual continental football competition, such as, AFC Champions League (ACL) and AFC Cup. This circumstance led to the changing ownership of football club and the establishment of new club in provincial area of Thailand; the involvement of provincial power in the provincial-based football club; and the increasing number of spectators and fandom in the locality where the club based. Consequently, a stronger sense of competition amongst the clubs and its fans becomes galvanized throughout the following seasons.

A few numbers of scholars had been attempted to examine football issue in relatively different themes. Professional football management and branding strategies (Dissatat & Tititpong, 2014; Nathenoon & Rapeepat, 2015; Sumeth, 2015; Korbtip, 2017), football culture and the politics of localism (Chuenchanok, 2012), migration of football players (Chuenchanok, and Brill, 2015) and the use of football as modernizing tools (Jonsson, 2003; 2006; Yong, & Rookwood, 2008) are the theme that have been grasped scholar attention. Yet, judging by the popularity of football in Thailand I suggest that studies of football is still highly underrepresented in Thai academic discourse.

I attempt to fill the gap of knowledge on the study of football in Thailand by giving a special attention to the construction of provincial identity through football. To provides comprehensive view on such theme, the main focusses of the discussion will be given to the rise of provincial power and provincial identity in Thailand, the role of provincial power and the emergence of provincial football club, and the construction of Chiang Rai identity. I argue that the construction of provincial identity in football space is mediated by the football club and the provincial power. Moreover, provincial-based professional football club also provides a space for the people to exercising their identity politics. And that both of main actors in professional football, the club and the fans, are taking an active role in constructing the provincial identity.

The empirical basis of this discussion derives from part of four months of multi-sited ethnography I conducted in Chiang Rai Province and Bangkok Metropolitan Region. During this time, I spent three months and a half in Chiang Rai and two weeks in Bangkok. In Chiang Rai, the research process focused on the three main groups of Chiang Rai United (CRUTD) fans and the staffs of CRUTD. In Bangkok, I focused my research on the CRUTD fans who migrate and reside in this area. In both areas, I did not limit my research solely in the stadium where the match is held. Rather, I actively followed the fans in both inside and outside the stadium. I deployed several techniques to collecting the information, such as, semi-structured one to one interview, participant observation, documentary research, textual analysis, and internet research. Interview and observation are the main data collecting technique that being utilized, and the rests are intended to complement the former.

Identity and Football: The Two Interrelated Elements in Sport

Identity and football are two elements in sports that inseparable. Such phenomena occurred throughout the globe and have regularly being examined by scholars. The discussion of identity in sports and football which had been put under scrutiny is ranging from class, race, gender, subculture, fandom, and locality (Frey & Etizen, 1991; Hadas, 2000; King, 2000; Washington, Robert & Karen, 2001; Guilianotti, 2002; Sandvoss, 2003; Molina, 2007; Porat, 2010; Topic & Coakley, 2010; Cleland and Cashmore, 2014; Dart,

2014; Gomez-Bantel, 2015).¹³⁹ Part of this is because football has the unique capability to institutionalized particular forms of identity which allows us to study the group or individual identity within the formation of sporting competition (Molina, 2007). The fluidity characteristics of identity which enable one to adopt multiple identities or identifying themselves based on the specific context and their motivation also makes the discussion of identity becomes more intriguing to be examined (Hall, 1996; Jenkins, 1996).

The roots of the identity which embodied by the fans of football club often has its ground on a uniquely distinct history of its socio-cultural formation of its society, if it is not the football club. For instance, Glasgow Celtic and Glasgow Rangers fans who hold deep rivalry between them because of the distinct identity of the club. Celtic has strong Irish-Catholic traditions whilst Rangers have strong Protestant, Unionist and Loyalist traditions (Giulianotti & Robertson, 2007). Another example is FC Barcelona, one of the most successful club in Europe, which massively supported by the Catalan since the club serve as a symbol of their political struggle towards the Kingdom of Spain (Gomez-Bantel, 2015). Another evidence also found in other area as well, such as, *Bobotoh* the fans of Persib Bandung in Indonesia, who has strong roots on their Sundanese identity; and Israeli fans of Hapoel Tel Aviv, Maccabi Haifa, Beitar Jerusalem and Bnei Sakhnin (Porat, 2010). The distinct history of socio-cultural formation of the society enables the fans to distinguish themselves from others by reconstructing their identity through their imagination of who they are. In a way, this condition supports the argument that football club might serve as an 'extension of self' (McLuhan, 1964). It is worth to be noted that not many professional football club, or sporting club, have the prerequisite which enables them to construct their local identity. To develop and to construct the local, regional, or provincial identity, a football club and its fans must have their own uniqueness based on the socio-cultural formation which allows both actors to conjoin themselves as a unit.

The football club also plays its role in the construction of identity by representing the local-related symbol or by constructing the image of themselves in certain way which shares the similar interest of its fans. Giulianotti and Robertson (2007) show how Glasgow Rangers refused to recruit players who hold Catholic belief until the late 1980s. VfB Stuttgart, in Germany, demonstrates the identity construction by adopting the usage of local symbol. The coat of arms of the House of Wurttemberg which has three black antlers on a gold field is being adopted as the coat of arms of VfB Stuttgart (Gomez-Bantel, 2015). Moreover, various ways to construct or even retain the identity of the club can also be done by prioritizing squad with players from the club academy, the existence of politician or officials that shows support to the club and retain the regional identity, and employing directors with strong commitment to the proximity of the club (Molina, 2007; Gomez-Bantel, 2015).

I had shown how identity penetrates the dynamism of professional football club and its fans and how the club can play an active role in exploiting it by maintaining the identity which holds by the fans. However, I contend that one should not treat the club as an active actor and the fans as a passive consumer. Gomez-Bantel (2015) suggests that the club can perform as a carrier of a group identity and it provides the club with greater meaning which benefits the club in various ways. Yet, he negates the discussion on

¹³⁹ It needs to be noted that I am not suggesting that the aforementioned themes of study should be treated merely under the discussion of identity. What I am suggesting is that such themes would be beneficial in supplementing our understanding towards the notion of identity in football, or sports.

how the fans play their part in the process of identity construction. The club might reconstruct the regional identity by utilizing the image or symbol, but it is still unclear how the fans absorb the identity being presented. To this regard, I support Guschwan (2016) on his claim that the performances by the fans during the match are a process of reshaping their collective identity which they embrace outside the match. In other words, the performances of the fans resembles the culture of the society in the locality. This indicating that the fans are having an active role in the process of identity construction within football club activities. Thus, the process of constructing, reconstructing, or maintaining the local identity is occur through active participation from both ways.

In contemporary Thailand, the relation between identity and football is also apparent. However, there is a slight difference between the identity that they show compares to the football clubs outside Thailand which has been examined by scholars. Instead of embodies local or regional identity, the football club in Thailand tends to embody the notion of provincial identity. The professional football team which base outside Bangkok actively promotes their provincial identity in various ways. They promote and construct the identity of the club by exploiting the existence of socio-cultural formation which embodied by its fans and transform it to the mixture of local-provincial identity. In order to comprehend the aforementioned argument, there is a need to first understand the socio-political-economy context of Thailand in general.

The Complexity of Provincial Identity and the Rise of Provincial Power in Thailand

Provincial identity in Thailand is a relatively new term in Thai academic discourse. Yet, in Thai society, the provincial identity has been apparent for around twenty years. Nishizaki (2011) is the first scholar to introduce the notion of provincial identity in Thailand. In his assessment in Suphanburi Province, provincial identity can be understood as a form of identity which related to a positive social identity that gained by the people by series of development project in the provincial area which provides with a sense of pride towards their province where often associated with 'backward-ness'. Keyes (1967) had also analyzed similar condition through a close examination on the Isan area, northeastern region of Thailand. Keyes (1967) did not provide a specific meaning on what 'regionalism' means, however, I interpret that regionalism is a notion that related with the manifestation of Isan culture in daily life which has differences in terms of its culture, history and origins compared to the Central part of Thailand. It motivates by the idea that both Isan and Siam culture is appropriate to be used as a guidance for people social interaction. Recently, Chuenchanok (2012) introduces the term 'Localism' in the study of football and identity in Chonburi Province as a term to depict the physical and mental identification of individuals with the province of Chonburi. This is not my intention to generalize the utilization of each term and giving them the same meaning, since that provincial identity and localism are refer to a single specific area of province, and regionalism is referring to a broader area of a region. By showing the three terms, I intend to provide the reader with the general concepts that has been used to depict the idea of local, regional, or provincial identity in Thailand. For the following discussion, I prefer to adopt the term of provincial identity because it confers more specific meaning towards the identity of the people in certain locality.

The provincial identity that embodied by the people does not appear single-handedly. It is assisted by the rise of the provincial power in their provincial area. The provincial power plays his/her role in 'liberating' the people in Thailand provincial area so that the people have a more positive association of

themselves and the localities where they reside. The provincial power also does not arbitrarily arise and utilize their power in directing the development of the identity and social condition of the society. The provincial power gained their power by the influx of capital to the provincial area of Thailand and the political turmoil in the Thailand national politics. Before conducting further examination regarding the relationship between provincial identity and provincial power, it is necessary to provide a brief explanation on what provincial power is.

I adopt the term of provincial power from *Chao pho*, a term that has been often used by scholars to delineate the powerful man in the provincial area of Thailand (Ockey, 2000; Sombat, 2000; Pasuk & Baker, 2000). *Chao pho*, literally means 'godfather', often used to delineate a man in the countryside area of Thailand; who possesses the characteristics of being wealthy by doing business, either legal or illegal; has economic and political influence (*Ittiphon*); and capable in providing assistances for the people who lives in the locality under his control (Pasuk & Sungsidh, 1996). Albeit there are debates on whether the meaning of *Chao pho* derives from the word '*Nak Kleng*' or '*Ittiphon*', I support the idea that *Chao pho* is an actor who holds power, politically and economically, and have influence towards the government officials and the people of their locality (Ockey, 2000; Sombat, 2000). The term of *Chao pho* evolves to has a broader meaning after the involvement *Chao pho* in Thailand national political landscape. *Chao pho* still retains their characteristics as a person who has the power in their provincial area. Yet, their power transcends their locality after they play a significant role in national politics. The rise of *Chao pho* can be understood by comprehending the historic transformation in the Thailand political-economy context. The raise of *Chao pho* in terms of economic context can be seen after the 1957 coup. The World Bank recommendation to promotes the private-led development generated economic influx to the provincial area. *Chao pho* who has established politic and economic networks then exploits the opportunity in the development project in their locality (Ockey, 2005). Subsequently, they became richer and more powerful. Having bigger power, they then involving themselves in the local politics and received a positive portrayal from the people as *phu yai* (big man) (Pasuk & Sungsidh, 1996). In terms of the political power, the 1973 political uprising was the pivotal moment for *Chao pho*. The demand for a democratic regime opened the opportunity for *Chao pho* to penetrates the national politics. For instance, the ambitious *Chao pho* like Banharn Silpa-archa from Suphanburi Province was one of many provincial-based politicians who can be claimed as successful in the national politics by becoming a Member of Parliament (MP) and then a Prime Minister of Thailand in 1995-1996 (Nishizaki, 2011). During his regime, Banharn was well-known in allocating a huge budget to his province and conducted series of development project to develop Suphanburi area. The impact of this abuse of power has, arguably, led to intensification of the construction of provincial identity.

The transformation in the political-economy condition subsequently affects the attitude of the people in the provincial area towards the central people of Thailand. The people in the provincial area become prouder towards their locality and they feel that the derogative association, such as, 'backward people' that used to be associated to them by the central people is no longer relevant. The sense of provincial identity then arose as part of its consequence. The case of Banharn and the rise of provincial identity of the people in Suphanburi is just one example that could be utilized to delineate the social condition of the people in the provincial area. However, we need to be careful to not arbitrarily generalizing such condition in other part of Thailand. Because the study on the provincial identity and the provincial

politician is still very limited and it remains unclear on whether the people in other provinces who has Chao pho who involving themselves in the national politics have the similar feeling as what the people of Suphanburi feel.

It is debatable on whether the term of Chao pho is still relevant with the current circumstances in the discussion of Thai national socio-political condition. This is because the current situation has provided more opportunity for provincial actors to involving themselves in the national economy and politics. Furthermore, the characteristics of Chao pho that delineated by scholars is also debatable, since the power in the provincial area is more spread compared to the situation in the 1970s-1990s (Prajak, 2016). However, it is difficult to deny that the descendant and the political affiliates of the Chao pho still benefits by the economic and political power that have been accumulate by the Chao pho.

Based on the aforementioned argument, I suggest that the term of provincial power is more suitable to be utilized to depict the current condition in Thailand provincial area and to be used to delineate the provincial actor in this paper. Provincial power is an actor who holds the power, either economically or politically, in the provincial area; which the power could be inherited by the existence of Chao pho or provincial politician whom they are related or affiliated; the power that holds by the provincial power is not necessarily being used to accumulate political or economic advantage; yet, their power often be exploited by the people for their social advantage; and in turn provides the provincial power with advantages, either in terms of economic, politic or popularity. The rise of provincial power oftentimes provides the people in the locality with an incentive such as provincial identity.

The Role of Provincial Power and the Emergence of Provincial Football Club

Provincial power and the emergence of provincial football club in Thailand have a very strong tie. Even though these two elements do not necessarily relate to one and another at the beginning, it then becomes more apparent throughout the time. The involvement of the provincial power in the emergence of provincial football club, arguably, derives from the political turmoil in 2006. And the emergence of provincial football is more related with the regulation from AFC for the 2009 season of the Thai national football competition, which led to the establishment of Thai Premier League.¹⁴⁰ Yet, both events provide a perfect combination for the inception of provincial identity. I will provide more discussion on the inception of provincial identity on the next part of this paper.

The political turmoil in 2006 in Thailand was the pivotal momentum that led some of the Chao pho or provincial power to turn their agenda to football. Since the beginning of their involvement in the politics, the role of provincial based politicians was constrained by the opposition from military and Bangkok

¹⁴⁰ The football as a sport institution in today Thailand was initiated under King Rama VI (Vajiravudh) by founding Siam Football Association, or later called Football Association of Thailand, in 1925. For decades, football clubs, games and competitions in Thailand were confined within state schools, government office, state enterprises and a few number of business companies. Before the development of Thai Football semi-professional leagues in 1996, and the fully professional league since 2009, TPL, the highest football competition was Kor Royal Cup (1916-1995) which organized by TFA. The team who compete in this competition were mainly centralized near to the capital city. During 1999 until 2008 there was also one league for provincial-based football club, named Provincial League, being held by Sports Authority of Thailand (SAT) and Ministry of Tourism and Sports. The objectives were to introduce professional football and to support provincial club, in part of boosting Thailand economy and social development.

based politicians. This, then, lead to a series of coup and political crises (Baker & Pasuk, 2009). Most of the huge cases related to the political corruption scandal which involves many of the provincial based politicians. The peak was marked by the dissolution of Thai Rak Thai Party in 2007, in which 111 members of the Party, including the Prime Minister, Thaksin Sinawatra, were barred from Thai politics for a five-year period. Consequently, the provincial based politician who used to comfortable in securing their role in national politics had to lose their position. Some of the most influential provincial based politician, like Newin Chidchob, started to involving themselves in the unusual type of business, which is football. Currently, (2017 season) there are twelve from eighteen clubs which able to participate and penetrate the highest tier of the Thailand national football competition which originates from the provincial area. The interesting part is that the provincial teams which able to perform and competing well in the league are owned or chaired by the provincial power of the respective province. For instance, Buriram United from Buriram Province is owned by Newin Chidchob; Chonburi FC is chaired by Wittaya Khunpluem, the son of Somchai Khunpluem (*Kamnan Poh*); and Suphanburi FC which is chaired by Varawut Silpa-archa, the offspring of Banharn Silpa-archa. Even though the involvement of the provincial based football team tends to be late compares to the central Thai based football team, the club had done remarkably well.

In Chiang Rai Province, CRUTD, founded in 2009, is the only provincial team from the northern region that able to compete in the highest tier of professional football competition of Thailand. Likewise, CRUTD is led by a provincial power, a 31 years-old man, named Mitti Tiypairat who serves as the president and the owner of the club. He is the son of a former national politician Yongyuth Tiypairat who used to perform actively in national politics before the dissolution of his party in 2007 and barred from the involvement in the national politics. His mother, Salakjit Tiypairat, is a local politician who currently serves as the CEO of Chiang Rai Provincial Administration Organization (PAO). She also serves as the CEO of CRUTD.

Chuenchanok (2012) suggests that the involvement of the provincial based politician in the provincial based football club derives from the motivation to retain their political influence in their province. However, one needs to be carefully asses the proposed argument, since it is vague on whether their motivation is solely based on the political motives. Besides, when the provincial power, which is not necessarily a politician, involving themselves in the professional football club, it becomes trickier to asses on what their motivation is. Based on the interview which I conducted with the President of CRUTD, I perceive that the motivation to found a football club is not merely based on political reason. This is his answer when being asked on why he chose to established a football club:

“.....when I was 22, I was about to graduate from master degree. Actually, after I about to graduate from bachelor degree when I was 21. I am thinking so much to work or to study. But, if I have to work, I don't want to work in the office or in the bureaucrat system. I don't want to be the financial consultant, I don't want to be a broker, a stock broker, I don't want to be. I want to work in the thing that I like..... So, I decided to do one more year for a master degree. And I think, my parents cannot say anything about this. So, I finished master degree. When I start, about to, finish my master degree, I thinking so much about what I will work on. My family background, they are politician. But, still, I think, I am still very young to get into that kind of

field, you know. So, I have decided to do something that I like, and my parents was not one-hundred percent supported. But, okay, they wanted me to do, they want me to try [to see] if I can do it or not. So, I started to work on the professional football during that time, when I was 22.”

(Mitti, personal communication, 2017)

Mitti’s answer seems to contrasting Chuenchanok (2012) arguments. He chose to establish a football club because he did not want to be a government official or work in the office, like most of the Thai people do after they graduate from the university. Moreover, his parents who are a former politician and an active local politician shared different opinion towards his idea in establishing a football club. Even though it is unclear on to what extent that they against Mitti’s idea, his answer still could provide us with a different perspective in comprehending the basis of the establishment of provincial based football club which owned by provincial power. It also entices us to questions more on whether the motivation of the local politician in involving themselves in football club is only for political reason. Nevertheless, his answer gives us a stronger foundation in perceiving how the provincial power has a huge role in the emergence of provincial based football club in Thailand.

When questioned on why he chose Chiang Rai Province as the home base of the club, Mitti also did not showed initial intention to take any advantages on his parent position as influential person in Chiang Rai Province:

“.....Actually, I was about to take over a one club at Bangkok at that time. But, after I talked to the federation, they said “hey, you don’t have to take over. Now we have a new policy.....I was very lucky back in that time, because the President of the Thai Federation started to have regional league, which was in Thailand, back then when I was 23, around 2008, still, the league has a Thai league, Division 1 and Division 2. But, Division 2 is consist of a lot of team, but, located in a lot of areas and very hard to travel. So, in 2009, in the beginning, they start to make Division 2 to divided into five groups, five regions, which was a very good idea. Because in the North have one league, in the Northeast have a league, the South have a league, so they don’t have to travel very far. Then I started to establish this football club, back in that time. So, it was a very good construction for Thai football.”

(Mitti, 2017)

Moreover, he added that part of his intention to establish the club in Chiang rai was to develop the province by providing the Chiang Rai people with an attraction which they can enjoy as part of their leisure time and to provide a public space for them to gather and meet:

Before, back in 2007, 2008, 2009, we don’t have Central Plaza, we don’t have anything. The people don’t have anything to do in the weekend, you know. They just stay home. They are very.. We were.. we have nothing to do in the weekend. So, I just want to create, I just want to do something new, something that can make the family to have more time together, to have more people to join.

(Mitti, 2017)

It might be tempting for scholars to make a fixed claim that the emergence of the football club in the provincial area of Thailand is controlled or utilized by politician as an extension for them to gain and retain their political power. However, such claim is need to be reassessed carefully. It is not because of its tendency that can create fallacy in understanding the emergence of the football club. In some area, it is correct to make the claim. But, because of the rise of the football club sometimes is trickier than what it might be seemed. By negating the role of provincial power, which is different from the politician, one might trapped in the banal association of the tendency in the creation of provincial based football club, which often initiates by local politician. Yet, by examining the answer from Mitti Tiypairat, it clears that the establishment of football club in Thailand is having a very strong tie with the existence of provincial power in a specific locality.

Chiang Rai United and The Construction of Chiang Rai Identity

It is a challenging task to examine the identity of a group and to define what identity that they possessed, especially in the contemporary era when the individual can be easily switch their identity and associating themselves as part of many groups. Football provides a space which the fans could maintaining their identity in a relatively stable way. This is because in the football-related activities, either inside or outside the stadium, the fans can retain their identity, as the supporter of the football club which has a specific identity, through the usage of symbol, chant, and the name. In the following paragraphs, I will try to show how both the clubs and the fans actively constructing and maintaining the provincial identity which embodies in football club.

Chiang Rai United and its fans are two actors who actively constructing the provincial identity of Chiang Rai through symbolic performances and the usage of local identity which they transform into part of their provincial identity. As I mentioned earlier in the beginning of the paper, the roots of the identity derive from the unique distinct history of the socio-cultural formation of the people who reside in the locality. CRUTD and its fans are benefitted by the unique history of the northern, if it is not Lanna, culture which distinct from the other region in Thailand. The most apparent identity that retain by the club and its fans is the *Kwang song* (Hercules Beetle). Kwang song, or Kwang, is an insect that can be found throughout the northern region of Thailand (Mulla & Siriwat, 2000; Rennason, Grimaud & Cesard, 2012). What makes it special is that most of the northern people regards Kwang as part of their childhood. During rainy season, children in the northern of Thailand usually gathered Kwang and fight it with another Kwang. Even though at present time it tends to be more difficult to find Kwang, Kwang has become part of their identity. Nowadays, Kwang fight often conducted by adult for gambling.

In CRUTD, Kwang song become adopted to be the symbol and the nickname of the club. The philosophy behind the nickname is to symbolically projected the nature of Kwang who infamous for their fighting spirit. CRUTD also commodifying Kwang in several ways. Kwang adopted by the club as the mascot of the club. The crest of the club also use Kwang holding an orange flag with its horn to symbolize the heroic nature of the animal. In the front of their home stadium, Singha Stadium, CRUTD also exhibit a big statue of Kwang. The president of the club stated in the interview that he chose Kwang as their symbol and their nickname because he felt that it can represent the people in the northern part of Thailand:

“We have listed a lot of symbols in Chiang Rai. We have a fish; we have a mountain; we have a river, we have a Mekong river; we have elephant, same as a lot of teams here. But, we

researched more. When I talked to my friend who helped me to create this symbol, we thinking to represent not only [for] Chiang Rai, we want to represent the whole of the North. Lanna. Lanna area. So, the creature that have found the most in the Northern [part of the] country, is, this Kwang. And, this creature is not only a symbol. But, they [are] also very strong. They can lift [things] one hundred forty times of their body weight. So, they are very strong, you know. And they [are] also, they are a fighter. When they fight to each other. So, it is a good symbol for us.”

(Mitti, 2017)

Uniquely, Kwang is not only used by the club. The fans also adopted Kwang as their nickname. From three organized fans groups, which actively participate and give their support during the home match, two of them are adopting Kwang as their name and naming their group with Kwang as the beginning of the group name. These groups naming themselves as Kwang Lang Goal and Kwang Khong Chai. The act of naming the group with Kwang is not only occur in Chiang Rai. The fans of CRUTD who reside in Bangkok also naming their group as Kwang Krung, shortened from Kwang Krung Thep. These acts of adopting the name might not provide a strong resemblance of the argument which said that the fans are not only a passive consumer. However, I contend that this is part of their way in actively participating themselves as part of the club and to maintain their Chiang Rai identity.

The adoption of the symbol gain a positive reception from the fans of CRUTD. Every time they being asked on how they feel about the utilization of Kwang as a club symbol, the always answer enthusiastically and provide me with a positive answer, and supplement the answer with their personal story. Thana Kochpatsirichai (Lop), a 41 years old man who serves as the leader of CRUTD fan group, called Kwang Khong Chai, who originate from Chiang Rai Province highlights the aforementioned statement:

“It is suitable [symbol for the club]. Kwang is a fighter in the mountain, he won’t give up until he died..... Since I was young, I played with friends, I found Kwang on the trees. I usually was punished by teacher because I played Kwang... There were many Kwang in the mountain, Kwang will eat sweet fruits, so we can found them on trees.”

(Thana Kochpatsirichai, personal communication, 2017)

The leader of Kwang Lang Goal, 53 years old man, named Surasak Suwanphimol (Tu), who originally from Bangkok and migrated to Chiang Rai around 15-16 years ago to settle with his family, also shares similar opinion with Lop.

“Oh, [the usage of Kwang as a symbol] is good. It is Lanna symbol, there are only two provinces which have Kwang fighters, Nan and Chiang Rai. In Kwang season, boys will take Kwang to fight... I don’t know [about Kwang, before] hahaha. Because I lived in Bangkok. I just know it when I live here. People are taking Kwang to fight by take female Kwang and put it between two male Kwang.”

(Surasak Suwanphimol, personal communication, 2017)

The fans show how they construct and reconstruct their identity in more apparent way through performance inside and outside the stadium through the chant and the usage of flag. One of the chant which chanted by CRUTD fans, interestingly, does not necessarily projecting the history of their socio-cultural formation, as it shown in the usage of symbol. Rather the chant projects a sense of provincialism. This is one example of the chant that they chanting in English:

We are Chiang Rai
We Cheer Chiang Rai
We are Chiang Rai
We Cheer Chiang Rai
La La La La

Before, during, and after the match, this chant often being sung by all CRUTD fans group, both in the Chiang Rai and Bangkok, with the sound of drums accompanying it. Spectators who are not belong to the group also oftentimes enthusiastically chanting this chant throughout the match. The chanting of the chant is led by two until four persons who acts as the conductor in each group stands.

The chant indicates that the fans are supporting the club because of the shared geographical area between the club and themselves. This chant is not specifically made by CRUTD fans. It is adopted from the chant that has been used by other football clubs. Almost every group of football fans throughout Thailand chanting this chant, with a small reservation, by changing the name of the locality in which where they are belong to. It remains unclear on the origin of the chant, since it has been used massively throughout Thailand for a long time. It might be correct to argue that the chant is not necessarily depicting their support towards their province. Yet, it also could create a fallacy since, first, in other club throughout Thailand, the fans are modifying the chant by inserting the name of their locality; second, the fans have another chant that the lyrics is specifically stating their support for the club; and third, several fans stating that they sing it to show their support for their locality or province, not only for the club.

Despite of the clear indication that the chant is projecting a strong sense of provincialism and showing the active role of the fans in constructing the provincial identity, one should not negate the role of the football club in such process. Every year in CRUTD, the president of the club organized meetings with the fan groups to discuss the development of the club and the fans performances during the match. The club does not directing, nor suggesting how the performance should be addressed. Rather, they are discussing with the fans on how to sync the chants and the performance should be conducted so it will provide more hostile atmosphere. This constant interaction between the club and the fans supplement the aforementioned findings that both of the main actors in the football club are playing an active role in the process of identity construction.

These two examples clearly show how the provincial identity being actively constructed by the club and the fans inside professional football-related activities. The usage of the Kwang as a symbol and the nickname of the club and the adoption of Kwang as the name of the fan groups might not address directly how the provincial identity being constructed, because of Kwang can be found throughout northern part of Thailand. Yet, since only CRUTD which utilized Kwang and intensifying the association between Kwang and Chiang Rai people, it partly shown how the historical socio-cultural formation being

adopted as an extension of Chiang Rai identity and internalized by the fans as an association of themselves. The chant, as a second example, shows clearer depiction on how the fans construct their identity as a part of Chiang Rai by treating their support towards the club as they support the province.

Conclusion

After 2009, professional football league in Thailand faces a dramatic structural change. The instruction from AFC as football international governing body and the political disruption in Thai national politics makes professional football no longer merely a sporting competition. Numbers of provincial power got involved in football and provincial-based football club begun to proliferate. This led to the circumstance in which professional football league serves as a field where the complex interplay of power relations and dynamics social interaction takes place. One of the major consequences is that the construction of provincial identity become intensified through football-related activities in provincial area of Thailand.

Through an ethnography work that I conducted in Chiang Rai and Bangkok Metropolitan Region, I examined that football and identity are highly interrelated in Thailand professional football league. The relation between football and identity tends to share similarities in terms of how the football club can play the role as identity carrier for the fans and assisting their fans in exercising their identity politics. The differences are that the identity being constructed is a provincial identity and it is mediated through the existence of provincial power and provincial football club. The football club and the fans are also simultaneously taken active roles in the process of provincial identity construction. It occurred through the adoption of the historic socio-cultural condition of the people which used by the club and its fans. Kwang is used by CRUTD as a symbol and the nickname of the club and it is being used also by the fan groups as part of their group name. Moreover, the chant which chanted by the fans in football-related activities which shown how they are associating themselves with the locality where the football club and they belong, also shown that the identity construction is occurred through dynamics interaction inside and outside the stadium.

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An Investigation of the Genre of ‘Bot Lakhòn Nòk’ Manuscripts: A Case Study of ‘Phra Rot-Meri’

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Abstract

Despite the vast amount of research on Thai performance literature, little is known about Bot Lakhòn Nòk titled Phra Rot-Meri. The purpose of this research is to examine the version of Bot Lakhòn Nòk known under the title of Phra Rot-Meri of which ten manuscripts have been preserved in the National Library of Thailand. The study aims to analyze the invention of Bot Lakhòn Nòk titled Phra Rot-Meri in order to find out its era and its characteristics. Bot Lakhòn Nòk or the “plays of the outer theatre” belongs to the genre of ‘Thai performance literature’. According to an anthology of literature, the performance literature can be divided into different categories such as Bot Lakhòn Nai and Bot Lakhòn Nòk. The stories of Bot Lakhòn Nòk could come from any tales except Ramakien, Unarut and Inao. The stories were popular among villagers, some of which borrow the plot stories recorded in the Paññāsajātaka. Phra Rot-Meri is a well-known story that was very popular among the Thai, Lao, and even the Tai Lue of Sip-song Panna. The evidence is folktales and legends such as Nang Sipsong in Thailand and Rathasenjātaka in Lanna. Apart from this, the story of Phra Rot-Meri was also concerned with the royal ceremony from Ayutthaya. The story is also appeared in various literary genre such as ‘Kab Khab Mai’ [กาพย์ขับไม้] and Bot Lakhòn Nòk titled Phra Rot-Meri. The issue is some manuscripts of the Phra Rot-Meri play were mentioned as an Ayutthaya play, while others were mentioned as Rattanakosin. Accordingly, the era of the play is unclear. The examination of the manuscripts will provide its characteristics which should then indicate the era.

Keywords: Thai Manuscript, Phra Rot-Meri, Nang Sipsong, Bot Lakhòn Nòk, Thai Performance Literature

Introduction

Despite the vast amount of research on Thai performance literature, little is known about Bot Lakhòn Nòk ‘Phra Rot-Meri.’ The purpose of this research is to examine Bot Lakhòn Nòk known under the title of ‘Phra Rot-Meri,’ of which twelve manuscripts have been preserved in the National Library of Thailand. Bot Lakhòn Nòk or “the plays outside the royal court”, playing in ‘Lakhòn Nòk’ performance, is a genre of Thai performance literature. Lakhòn Nòk is a folk dance-drama which developed in the central part of Thailand in the seventeenth century or earlier. (Madhani Moj dara Rutnin, 2013: 11) The characteristics of Lakhòn Nòk are simple, quick, and humor. The actors or actresses should exaggerate their expressions of feelings and emotions. It is hereby popular among audiences.

From the past, Thai scholars have studied a vast amount of drama and performance literature. Prince Damrong, the pioneer in researching and compiling performance literature, wrote in *Legend of Inao or Tamnan Lakhòn Inao* (1965: 8) that Thai dramas can be divided into three categories: *Lakhòn Chatri*, *Lakhòn Nòk* and *Lakhòn Nai*. Giving birth to *Lakhòn Nòk*, *Lakhòn Chatri* is short and simple. According to *Lakhòn Chatri*, the most popular plays were *Phra Rothasen* and *Nang Manohra*, though they were performed differently. That is the protagonist of *Phra Rothasen* was male while the protagonist of *Nang Manohra* was female. Therefore, the theatres with actors who excelled at playing male parts would perform *Phra Rothasen* and the theatres with actors excelled at playing female parts would perform *Nang Manohra*.

However, in *Lakhòn Chatri*, *Nang Manohra* was much more often performed, hence *Lakhòn Chatri* is also called *Nohrachatri*. *Lakhòn Chatri* subsequently developed to *Lakhòn Nòk* by exaggerating techniques including using musical instruments and songs. (Saowalak Anantasan 1972: 9)

The stories of Bot *Lakhòn Nòk* could come from any tales except *Ramakien*, *Unarut* and *Inao* which are the plays of the court entertainment as *Khon* and *Lakhòn Nai*. Most of The Bot *Lakhòn Nòk* are adapted from 'Jātaka', particularly from *Paññāsa-Jātaka*, such as '*Manohra*' and '*Sangthong*' which are from the '*Sudhanajātaka*' and '*Suvannasangjātaka*' respectively. The *Lakhòn Nòk* stories distinctively emphasis on melodramatic and comic scenes.

Phra Rot-Meri, one of Bot *Lakhòn Nòk*, is a well-known story that was very popular among the Thai, Lao, and even the Tai Lue of Sipsong Panna. The evidence can be found in folktales and legends such as *Nang Sipsong* in Thailand and *Rathasenjātaka* in Lanna. Apart from this, the story of *Phra Rot-Meri* was also connected to royal ceremonies of Ayutthaya. For example, it was written in a Thai traditional lyrics as '*Kap Khab Mai rung Phra Rot*'. The story also appeared in various literary genres such as '*Kap Khab Mai*' '*Phra Rot Nirat*' and Bot *Lakhòn Nòk* '*Phra Rot-Meri*.' The issue is that the era of the play is unclear because some manuscripts of *Phra Rot-Meri* were categorized as an Ayutthaya play while others were categorized as a Bangkok play. The investigation of the manuscripts will shed light on its characteristics. This research aims to study and examine the handwritten manuscripts of Bot *Lakhòn Nòk* '*Phra Rot-Meri*' in order to determine the age of the documents and pass on the unpublished manuscripts to further the literature studies and the writing culture of Thai manuscripts.

'Phra Rot-Meri' in Thai Literature

Phra Rot-Meri is believed to be widely spread in Suvarnabhumi region since the ancient time as tales and local legends such as *Nang Sipsong*, *Rothasen*, *Buddhasen*, *Nang Gangrī* and *Nang Sunnatra* in both verbal and written forms. In a verbal form, the story was told as local legends namely "*Muang Phra Rot*" in Chonburi, Chachoengsao and Prachinburi province, "*Khoa Oke Meri* (the Meri's breast hill)" in Phang Ngā province, and "*Khao Meri*" in Luang Prabang in Lao. The story of *Phra Rot-Meri* was also told through lullabies and *Nōhra* performances. In a written form, "*Rathasenjātaka*" was included in the *Paññāsajātaka* (1457-1657), a Lanna literature compiled from folktales by a Lanna monk. Moreover, *Klong Nirāt Haripuñjaya* which was composed in 1637 has a verse narrating the characters *Phra Rot* and *Nang Meri*:

กังรีนราสร้าง รถเสน
หวานหวานในดินแดน ค่าน้ำ
นางยักษ์ผูกพันเวร มรโมค วันนั้น
อันพิพลัน้องข้าเร่งร้าย ระเหระหน

(Fine Arts Department, 1987: 172)

From the verse above, the *Nirāt Haripuñjaya* poet compares his sadness due to leaving from his lover with the Phra Rot leaving from Nang Meri. This verse shows that during the seventeenth century, the story of Phra Rot-Meri was known in the Lanna area and therefore was referred in other literatures. Apart from the Klong Nirāt Haripuñjaya, some scholars found the significant literature, used in the royal ceremony, is *Kap Khab Mai 'Phra Rot'* [ภาพขยับไม้เรื่องพระรถ] or the traditional Thai lyrics titled Phra Rot. The poems were sung from Ayutthaya to Bangkok period. Considering the literary style, Prince Damrong Rājānuphab assumed that these lyrics were written in Ayutthaya period. *Kap Khab Mai 'Phra Rot'*, however, has never been included in any books of history literature even though it was first published in 1912¹⁴¹. In addition, the story of Phra Rot is mentioned in the Thai textbook *Chindamani* by Phra Horadhibodi. It is believed that be written in the reign of King Narai (1656-1688 A.D) in Ayutthaya period includes the verses that scholars suspect to be an excerpt from Nang Sipsong or Phra Rot-Meri as an example of a type of verse known as 'Surāṅganāpadumachan' [สุรางคณาปทุมฉันท]

◎ โอ้ออกอุเอ๋ย เมื่อก่อนอุเคย สมบัติครามครัน
ทำบุญบ่เบื้อ เชื่อชอบทุกอัน จึงได้จอมขวัญ ลูกน้อยนงพาล
◎ ถึงบุญเราลอย สิ่งสินขยับย่อ ยากพ้นประมาณ
บาปใดมาให้ พ่อเจ้าบันดาล กำจัดสงสาร ลิบสองเสียไกล ฯ

(Chindamani, 1959: 53)

Boonteun Srivorapot (2005: 2) supposes that the line 'กำจัดสงสาร ลิบสองเสียไกล' (to banish the poor twelve sisters) was taken from the lost manuscripts of Phra Rot-Meri for it never appeared in any remaining manuscripts. The surviving manuscripts of Phra Rot-Meri are called '*Phra Rot Kham Chan*' which the Fine Arts Department emendated and published in 2005. The introduction suggests that considering the literary style, Phra Rot Kham Chan was written in the late Ayutthaya era between the reign of King Narai (1656-1688) and King Phetrājā (1688 - 1703). Moreover, Phra Rot-Meri manuscripts found in the Manuscripts and Inscriptions group at the National Library of Thailand are believed to be written before the reign of Rama II, some of which can be traced as far back as the late Ayutthaya era.

¹⁴¹ The first publish in 1912 C.E. in the ceremony of presenting robes to monk at Kruewan Temple.
[งานกฐินพระราชทาน มหาอำมาตย์โท พระยาพิเชตพิเศษพิสัยวินิจนัยโกศล ณ วัดเครือวัลย์]

Background of Bot Lakhòn Nòk 'Phra Rot-Meri'

As for the scripts or the songs used in Lakhòn Nòk, Prince Damrong (1955 : 9-10) suggests that Ayutthaya plays are similar to Lakhòn Chatri in which the poems resemble folk poetry. Originally the characters would sing the poems live (improvising) but later when Lakhòn Nòk became more popular with more Lakhòn Nòk companies, it was improved to be more fun and exotic as poets were hired to embellish the scripts. Before that the poems had had no prosody, similar to folk poems or folk songs (*Phleng Patipak*), using easy rhymes with words that end with A, I or AI sounds. (Saowalak Anantasan 1972: 178) Later, to embellish the scripts, the poems were developed into *Klon Paet* [กลอนแปด] or octameter poems with a clear beat and rhymes, the characteristics that became a model of plays in later eras.

These aforementioned characteristics of Bot Lakhòn Nòk can be found in Ayutthaya plays including Manohra and Sangthong. As Bot Lakhòn Nòk 'Phra Rot-Meri' has several manuscripts, It is proposed that some of them might be pre-Bangkok while others were written in Bangkok era.

Synopsis

The extent Bot Lakhòn Nòk entitled Phra Rot-Meri are a non-consecutive scripts. They are excerpted as episode depending on each troupes.

Phra Rot-Meri is a story of *Phra Rot* or *Rothasen*, the hero, and *Meri*. The story begins with a rich couple who prayed for themselves to having a child . Later, the wife was pregnant and gave birth to 12 daughters. The couple gave their name as *Buathong*, *Buakeaw*, *Chongkol*, *Ubon*, *Buaphan*, *Buapheun*, *Komut*, *Sribongkot*, *Buakhom*, *Pratumthong* and *Phao*. The couple, however became poor. They left them in the woods to their fate. One day, *Santra* (or '*Sunnatra*' in some manuscripts), was the queen of the realm of the ogress found them. The ogress took pity on them and brought them up.

Phra Rot or Phra Rothasen asked Meri to walk in the garden and tried to ask about names of the trees there. Meri did not realize his trick and told him about Bengal currant (or มะขามาวัว) which was the cure for the eyes of the 12 women. Once he knew the tree, he decided to ply Meri and other ogresses with liquor. When they were drunk and fell asleep, he fled the town by horse with Santra's Bengal currents.

Phra Rot's horse responded the hunched-back woman that Meri was such a shameless woman, chasing after a man. Phra Rot wanted to return to Meri, but the horse would not do so. Meri lamented over him for a while. When she realized that he would not come back for good, she told other ogres to return to the city and then held her breath to death at the hilltop. On the other hand, Phra Rot kept riding, not knowing she was dead, and missed her from time to time while appreciating the nature. Finally, he made it and met the hermit who had changed the message. When he reached his city, he returned those eyes to the 12 women and they all could see again.

Khun Kaew and *Khun Krai* searched for Phra Rot in the tunnel where the 12 women had been held and told him that Phra Rothasit, his father, would like to see him. Phra Rot went to see him as well as presented the Bengal currents. His father reprimanded him for missing for years and Phra Rot blamed Santra. She was so furious that she transformed into an ogress and tried to attack them. The hermit told a little monkey to bring a ring to Phra Rot to kill the ogress. After Santra had died, Phra Rothasit had the 12 women brought back to be his wives again.

Phra Rot saw *Dasanari* in the river with her ladies-in-waiting and he sent flowers to her by letting them flow along the stream. She picked up the flowers and told *Woradasi*, chaperone, to find out the sender. The chaperone finally found Phra Rot and he told her that he would go to Dasanari's room at night. Woradasi was so impressed by Phra Rot therefore she awaited and opened the door for him. After Dasanari had become his wife, he still stayed in her room. Woradasi asked a cook to prepare more food, claiming that Dasanari had had a nightmare and would like to offer the food to gods. The cook noticed that the food was gone everyday so he asked Woradasi. She did not dare tell a lie and revealed that there was a man staying with Dasanari.

The Manuscripts of Bot Lakhòn Nòk 'Phra Rot-Meri'

A research on Phra Rot-Meri related literature shows that the Fine Arts Department emendated and published Bot Lakhon Nok 'Phra Rot-Meri' in 2009 by including it in a book called '*A compilation of Phra Rot*' (*Prachum Rueng Phra Rot* or ประชุมเรื่องพระรถ). The 2009 emendation was conducted on only seven manuscripts (the manuscripts no. 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10) with very little information on the manuscripts, therefore the age of the documents cannot be determined. However, the 2009 emendation has helped pass on the text for some of the surviving manuscripts were severely damaged with fainting letters. Should there was no transliteration, the text of this play would have been lost.

This research will examine all twelve manuscripts of Bot Lakhòn Nòk 'Phra Rot-Meri,' ten of which are in Thai manuscripts and two are in a western book. Thai manuscripts no. 2, 4, 5 and the western book no. 1 and 2 have never been published. This examination will use a method called Documentary Edition (also known as Diplomatic Edition) which is based on a diplomatic transcript, a transcript that reports the text of a document as exactly as possible. (Kelemen, 2009: 569) The research results will shed light on the history of Bot Lakhòn Nòk 'Phra Rot-Meri' manuscripts which will help determine the age of the documents and further the study of this text in the future.

1. Manuscript no. 1

Literature section, the manuscripts and inscriptions group at the National Library, Bangkok

Title: Phra Rot-Meri, volume 1

Physical description: White chalk on black khòì paper, 68 pages

Provenance: Phrakhru Khantayakhom (Im) of Thepsirin Temple gave it to Vajirañān Library on August 7, 1908.

It begins with a list of clients and rates. The researcher assumes that this may be a list of clients and the rates the dance troupes were paid. Some lines include the name and the date such as "*Mrs. Auan on the 12th day of the waxing moon*" as shown below.





Illustration I: a list of clients and the rates

Then it describes the characters, starting with a rich man Proamchan leaving Nang Sipsong in the woods where an ogress Santra, the governor of Thantawan, later came by and found her. The ogress raised Nang Sipsong until she dreamed that she was burned to death. The researcher is intrigued by the recto of the manuscript which comes after the list of clients and rates (as shown in Illustration II) because it describes the middle of episode in which Nang Suntra (originally Nang Santra) happily adopting Nang Sipsong while the beginning of the episode is described at the end of the verso of the manuscript as shown below. (page 34)




Illustration II: Manuscript begins in the middle of the episode (page 5)

Illustration III: The beginning of the Phra Rot-Meri shown in the midst of the manuscript. (page 34)

Transliterate : ๐ เมื่อนั้น นวนนางสุนทรยักษา
ได้ฟังสิบสองกลยา ตอบมาก็มีความยินดี
จึงว่าสุริยาเกือบสว่างลับ มาเราจะกลับเข้ากรุงศรี
ว่าพลางชวนนางจรลี สิบสองมารศรีก็ตามมา

๑: ๔ คำ เจริญ

(Manuscript no.1, Literature section)

Transliterate: จัดแจงแต่งการเหมือนกล่าวมา ปรีดาชื่นชมด้วยสมฝัน
กล่อมเกลี้ยงเลี้ยงลูกผูกพัน ทั้งสิบสองนางนั้นไม่อันตราย
เจริญใจใหญ่กล้าขึ้นทุกที สิบสองกุมารงามเจิดฉาย
วรภักจิมลิมพรหมพราย จึงตั้งนามโฉมฉายสิบสองคน

The researcher assumes that there was a mistake during the compiling and labeling process, that is the recto and the verso of the manuscript were switched. Moreover, while it counts 38 poems in this episode, only 28 are found, which means there may have been more poems at the beginning of the episode but they were lost due to the damage of the manuscript.

The physical condition of Manuscript no.1 shows fainting letters in white pencil which is easily deteriorated. The play was written in meticulous handwriting with upright and organized letters. From the look of the letter, I estimate that it was probably written in Bangkok era. However, the handwritten of the list of clients which is a paratext is untidy, suggesting a different writer.

2. Manuscript no. 2

Literature section, the Manuscripts and Inscriptions group at the National Library, Bangkok

Title: Phra Rot-Meri

Physical description: White chalk on black *khòi* paper, 28 pages

Provenance: Mrs. Thongyu Chanyakul gave it to Vajirañān Library on April 13, 1925.

The manuscript no. 2 has never been transliterated. The passage starts with Phra Rot arriving in *Khamput* city, also known as *Sangkat*. Phra Rot approached Nang Worathasi, Nang Dasanari's governess, and convinced her to take him to her charge's bedchamber. The passage ends here, suggesting that the transcribing was not complete.




Illustration IV: The Manuscript No.2, The beginning of the episode, Phra Rot arrived at the Dasanari's castle.

It is notable that handwriting in the manuscript no.2 is closely similar to the handwriting in the reign of King Rama III (1824-1851) as below :




Illustration V: The manuscript no.2 (left) comparing with the manuscript in the reign of King Rama III (right)

Found at the end of the document is a list of names, wages and performance dates, starting with the Sunday 7th of the waning moon in the ninth lunar month to the Saturday 6th of the waxing moon in the tenth lunar month. Unfortunately, no year was recorded. However, the paratext at the end, “the ninth lunar month, Sunday, the 7th day of the waning moon, performed near *Bon Taphan Hok* (*Taphan Hok* gambling den)” helps estimate roughly the era of this manuscript. That is *Taphan Hok* or *Saphan Hok* (*Hok* Bridge) was built at the end of Rama IV’s reign (1851-1868) until the beginning of Rama V’s reign (1868-1890). This manuscript, therefore, must have been written during that time and were used in performances since Rama V’s reign (1868-1890).




Illustration VI: the manuscript no. 2, a list of clients, wages and performance dates

3. Manuscript no. 3

Literature section, The Manuscripts and Inscriptions group at the National Library, Bangkok


Title: Phra Rot-Meri

Physical description: White chalk on black *khòi* paper, 93 pages

Provenance: Original copy of Vajirañān Library

The manuscript no. 3 is believed to be a Bot Lakhòn Nòk written in Ayutthaya era that Prayā *Pariyattithammathada* (*Phae Talalak*) gave to Prince Damrong. It was copied from a manuscript found in Phetchaburi which was published for Songkran festival under the title “*Bot Lakhòn Chao Nòk*.” (A Compilation of Phra Rot, 2009: 87) Nevertheless, the manuscript of “*Bot Lakhòn Chao Nòk*” was never found.

The passage starts with Phra Rot and Nang Meri visiting a garden. Phra Rot pretended to ask Nang Meri about plants including Bengal currants as he collected Nang Sipsong’s eyes and the medicine for the eyes. It ends with Phra Rot fleeing the town on a horse. It is possible that the original manuscript was damaged and the ending was lost. Moreover, this document does not include a list of clients and the actors’ wages. The scribe recorded the names of the songs used in some parts of the performance. It is so-called *Phleng Na Phat* or the action tunes.



The characters conversing
(Improvisation)

‘ ‘Choet’ is a song accompanying
the performance or *Phleng Na*
Phat (literally ‘action tunes’).



Illustration VII: The manuscript
no 3. Kept in the manuscripts
and inscriptions group, National
Library of Thailand

As mentioned above, there is evidence that the manuscript no. 3 was copied in Bangkok period, but without the exact date. The characteristics of the letters are also consistent with those in the reigns of Rama IV and Rama V. As for the literary style, Prince Damrong observed that it predated Rama II's reign but was not certain if it was the style used in the reign of Rama I, Thonburi period, or late Ayutthaya period. (Legend of Inao, 1955)

4. Manuscript no. 4


Literature section, The Manuscripts and Inscriptions group at the National Library, Bangkok

Title: Phra Rot-Meri

Physical description: Yellow scribal handwriting on black *khòì* paper, 62 pages

Provenance: Original copy of Vajirañān Library

The passages starts with *Sitthikan*, Meri's officer, pursuing Phra Rot who had fled from Nang Meri. Phra Rot spread the magical powder in a river, turning the water into acid to stop Sitthikan. On arrival, Nang Meri ordered her henchmen to return home and pursued Phra Rot on her own. This manuscript has an unclear history with no transmitting date. At the end of the recto, there are two poems. The first one is a *Krattoo* poem while the other is a *Konlabot Nok Nam Foong* [กลบทก่นำฝูง] poem as shown below.



Decode : ชมกักรเมียเพื่อนัน งามจริง

ชมกักรเมียเราถึง คักได้

ชมบุตรท่านคู่อิง นารักข จริงแะ

ชมบุตรเราบ้างไซ้ คุงชาติ เชื้อถึง

Illustration VIII: *Klōngkonlabot 'Nok Nam Foong'*, added at the end of the recto

As the above illustration shows, there is no explanation on who *Khun Banburin* was. However, once examining the *Konlabot Nok Nam Foong* poem, it turns out that this poem was included in a book called "*Pathom Mala*" by *Phra Theb Molee (Pheung)* of Ratchaburana Temple, composed in Rama III's reign and was inscribed at Chetupon Temple which was also built in Rama III's reign. (Chetupon Temple's Inscription Chronicle, 2001: 571-573) This information suggests that this manuscript was written or transmitted at least in Bangkok and cannot predate Rama III's reign. However, considering the characteristics of the letters, it was assumed that they were written in the reign of Rama V.

Moreover, the accompanying songs or the action tunes (Phleng Na Phat) were inserted in some parts of the manuscript, suggesting that they were originally not a part of the play, but songs to be used in the play later.

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


Illustration IX: The example of Ms. no 4, scribe added 'Phleng Na Phat' [เพลงหน้าพาทย์], 'Choet' literally 'the fast action' (left), 'Oad' literally 'the crying action' (right)

5. Manuscript no. 5

Literature section, The Manuscripts and Inscriptions group at the National Library, Bangkok

Title: Phra Rot-Meri, episode "Phra Rot offering Bengal currants"

Physical Description: Black pencil (graphite) on white khoi paper , 93 pages

Provenance: The original copy of Vajirañān Library

The history of this manuscript is unclear as it has never been examined. A passage on the recto "Saturday, the 1st day of the waxing moon, the eleventh lunar month, the year of the monkey" is equivalent to 20 September 1884, Bangkok era 103, the year of the monkey, the sixth year of the decade, and 26 September 1908, Bangkok era 127, the year of the monkey, the tenth year of the decade, which was during Rama V's reign, suggesting that this manuscript had been copied since 1884.




Illustration X: The beginning of Ms. No 5, dated as shown above

The text in Ms. no. 5 starts with Indra coming down to help Phra Rothasen and Nang Sipsong, curing her eyes with an elixir. Phra Rothasit sent Officer to summon Phra Rot. Phra Rot battled and killed ogress Sunthara. Phra Rot asked a hermit to exorcize a demon that had possessed Phra Rothasit. Once Phra Rothasit regained consciousness, he was sent to take Nang Sipsong back to the palace. The content of

this manuscript is also found in the western book manuscripts no. 1 and 2, suggesting that Ms. no. 5 was their source.

The examination reveals that the text at the end of Ms. no. 5 in Thai manuscripts from page 76 to 93, which also appears in the western book no. 1, is the beginning of the play. The story then continues to page 3 of Ms. no. 5. Moreover, five styles of handwritings are found in Ms. no.5, some parts neatly and organized while other parts untidy, suggesting several scribes.




Illustration XI: Manuscript no. 5. Page 76-77, 4-5, 16-17 and 50-51, appearing the various handwritings.

6. Manuscript no. 6

Literature section, The Manuscripts and Inscriptions group at the National Library, Bangkok

Title: Phra Rot-Meri, episode “Phra Rot battling Nang Santra” Provenance: The original copy of Vajirañān Library

Physical Description: White chalk on black khò paper, 115 pages

While this manuscript does not have a paratext indicating the date of the writing or copy, it is notable that the last page of the recto which is damaged contains a handwritten number “2400.” However, with no passage to suggest it was a year in Buddha era, one cannot conclude this number to be the year of the transmission.




Illustration XII: Manuscript no. 6 appearing the number at the last page of the recto

Manuscript no. 6 was written in white pencil so the letters are faint, making it difficult to read and transliterate. Certain parts are copied in different handwritings, suggesting some passages were lost and later filled to complete the story as shown in the sample.

The passage in Ms. no. 6 starts with Phra Rot battling the ogress Santra. Once the ogress was dead, Phra Rot returned to Nang Meri who then died of sorrow. Phra Rot held Nang Meri's funeral and traveled to meet a hermit who guided him to Nang Dasanari in Sangkat. The story in this manuscript differs from other versions of Phra Rot, that is in one version (Ms. No.9) Nang Meri died right after Phra Rot had fled and her body turned into stone covered with a pillared hall (Mandapa).



Illustration XIII: Manuscript no.6, page 93 The various of handwriting presenting that there are much more one or two scribes (The episode where Phra Rot grieved Nang Meri's death until he fainted. Once he came to, he prayed for a golden urn to place Nang Meri's body.)

It is notable that Ms. No.6 contains a different style of poems found in other manuscripts, that is the prosody of some poems here are not in line with those in most plays while some poems are similar to those in folk songs.



Illustration XIV: Manuscript no. 6, page 9, The different verse style shown in the last three sentences

Transliterate: © เมื่อนั้น	พระรทาสิตผู้ทรงธรรม
เหลือบแลไปเห็นนางยักษ์นั้น	ระริ้วตัวสั้นเพียงขวัญหาย
ก้าวลงจากแท่นแก้วแล้ววิ่งหนี	ตกเข้า..หนีเพียงตัวตาย ฯ
Translate: Then,	Phra Rothasit, A virtuous King
Seeing the ogress,	He is startled
He steps out of the throne	and run away.

7. Manuscript no. 7

Literature section, The Manuscripts and Inscriptions group at the National Library, Bangkok

Title: Phra Rot-Meri, episode “Phra Rot fleeing Nang Meri until Phra Rot offering Bengal currants,”

Physical Description: Scribal handwriting in white chalk on black khòì paper, 111 pages Provenance: Given by Phraya Phetpani on March 12, 1907 (Bangkok era 126)

Manuscript no. 7 was given to the National Library by Phraya Phetpani whom the researcher believes to be Phraya Phetpani (Tri), the owner of the likay [ลิเก] hall in front of Ratchanatda Temple. The reason is that upon examining the manuscripts of other Bot Lakhòn Nòk plays, the researcher found 27 more plays given to the National Library by Phraya Phetpani, some of them are clearly labeled with the name ‘Tri.’ However the family name of Phraya Phetpani (Tri) is not found.

The text in Manuscript no. 7 starts with Phra Rot fleeing Nang Meri who then died of sorrow and was reborn in the Dusit level of heaven while her body turned into stone. The story ends with Phra Rot returning the eyes to Nang Sipsong and offering Bengal currants to Phra Rothasit. This manuscript does not include the date of the transcribing so its age cannot be determined. Moreover, two different autographs are found, the organized one used to record the play from start to finish, and the untidy one used to insert texts, especially on the verso where 16 verses were added.




Illustration XVI : Manuscript no. 7, page 70-71, The verse inserted in the text

8. Manuscript no. 8

Literature section, The Manuscripts and Inscriptions group at the National Library, Bangkok

Title: Phra Rot-Meri, episode “Phra Rot copulaHng with Dasanari,” Book 9

Physical Description: White chalk on black khò paper, 100 pages

Provenance: The original copy of Vajirañān Library

The handwriting in Manuscript no. 8 belongs to the scribe of Manuscript no. 6 as both stories link. The text starts with Phra Rot hiding in Nang Dasanari’s bedchamber and ends with Worathasi reporting the incident to Nang Dasanari’s father. The end of the manuscript specifies only the performance date but not the year, making it impossible to determine the time period this document was used. Moreover, the expenses and a list of names were recorded in the autograph of the scribe who inserted notes in the story, suggesting that Manuscript no. 6 and no. 8 were used as materials for Lakhòn Nòk plays.






Illustration XVII: Manuscript no. 8 page 2-3, 98-99 showing the handwriting similar to Ms. No.6 (upper), the list of names and wages (lower)

Literature section, The Manuscripts and Inscriptions group at the National Library, Bangkok

Title: Phra Rot-Meri, Volume 10

Physical Description: Scribal handwriting in white chalk on black khòì paper, 102 pages


Provenance: Phraya Phetpani gave it to the library on March 12 in Bangkok era 126 or 1907 C.E.

The handwriting in Manuscript no. 9 is similar to the handwriting in Manuscript no. 7.

On the recto there is a summary, “ @ หนังสือเรื่องพระยศ ตั้งแต่พระยศกลับไปหา ภพพานางจนท้าวประทุมราชรับลูกกระษัตริย์เข้าเมืองไหพิดาเลือกคู่ เล่ม ๑๐ ฯ” which means ‘the story of Phra Rot from Phra Rot returning to Meri, saw her dead body, until Thao Pradumaraj inviting the prince to town. It is in the same format as the recto of Manuscript no.7 as shown below.



Illustration XVIII : Mss. no. 9, page 2-3 (upper-left), 100-101 (lower-left) comparing with Mss. no. 7, page 2-3 (upper-right), page 42-43 (lower-right)



Considering the manuscript no. 9 and manuscript no. 7, the only difference is the letters on the recto of Manuscript no. 9 are smaller. However, the patterns of the alphabets are similar and certain words were spelled the same way, suggesting that Manuscript no. 9 and no. 7 were transcribed around the same time period by the same scribe.

10. Manuscript no. 10

Literature section, The Manuscripts and Inscriptions group at the National Library, Bangkok

Title: Phra Rot-Meri

Physical Description: White lines on black khoi paper, 83 pages

Provenance: Prince Wongsathirājsanit. Later Prince Rangsit gave it to the library on February 6, 1916

According to the colophon by the National Library, Manuscript no. 10 originally belonged to Prince Wongsathirājsanit, then was possibly passed on to Prince Rangsit. The first page of recto and the last page of verso of this manuscript were lost. There is no message specifying the transcribing date, the performance date or the actors' wages, making it impossible to determine whether or not this play had ever been used in a performance. The letters in this manuscript were written in white lines, possibly pearls. The handwriting differs from those found in other manuscripts, and certain alphabets such as 'ธ' was the 'ธ' that was widely used from Thonburi era until early Rama I era.




Illustration XIX: Manuscript no 10. Page 5

11. Manuscript no 1 and Manuscript no. 2 (Western Notebooks)

Literature section, The Manuscripts and Inscriptions group at the National Library, Bangkok

Title: Phra Rot, Book 1 and Book 2

Physical description: Western notebook written in black pencil or graphite. The western notebook no. 1 has 18 pages while the western notebook no. 2 has 80 pages.

Provenance: Originally belonged to His Serene Highness Prince Watcharin [หม่อมเจ้าวัชรินทร์] Later bought by Vajirañān Library in Bangkok era 131 or 1912 C.E

Both the western books do not contain the copy date, but once examined they appear to be copied from Ms no. 5 as they have the same content. The orthography in the books, however, is closer to the present-day orthography. The story events in the manuscripts are also in a correct sequence, unlike those in Ms no. 5 which are switched. In conclusion, the text shows that the western notebooks were copied from Ms no. 5 and probably written in late or after Rama V's reign.

The text starts with Indra coming down to cure Nang Sipsong's eyes with an elixir. Then ogress Sunnatra feigns ill and incites Phra Rothasit to fight with Phra Rothasen. Phra Rothasen kills Sunnatra. The story ends with Phra Rothasit inviting Nang Sipsong back to town. It is notable that in this version Indra is the one who cures Nang Sipsong's eyes, while in other versions it is Phra Rot or Phra Rothasen who does.

Moreover, the first page of both the western book was branded with the "Watcharin" crest. Once examined, His Serene Highness Prince Watcharin is most likely His Serene Highness Prince Watcharin Singhara (1850 - 3 April 1918) (His Serene Highness in Chakri Dynasty, 2004), a son of Prince Bodin Phaisansophon, the director of Printing Department [กรมอักษรพิมพการ] (Rajasakulwong, 1968: 42) who was in charge of printing houses inside the royal palace during the reigns of Rama VI and Rama V.

After investigating the manuscripts of Bot Lakhòn Nòk 'Phra Rot-Meri,' it reveals many observations.

Firstly, the types of paper used are black khò or blacken paper in nine Thai manuscripts and white khò or grayish paper in one Thai manuscript and two western notebooks manuscripts. Eight blacken manuscripts were written in white chalk, one in yellow lines. One white khò manuscript was written in graphite and another one in pearl lines (white lines). The handwritings of the scribes appear to be both elegant (scribal hand) (as shown in Ms. no.4) and untidy. Some manuscripts show five different handwritings such as Ms. no. 5, suggesting several scribes. Moreover, in Ms. No. 7, the inserted passages and poems were in a handwriting different from that of the original scribe, suggesting that the manuscript was later revised and improved for future performances.

Secondly, after examining the handwritings and the orthography, the age of the manuscripts can only be roughly determined as the scribes did not write down the dates of the transmitting. As a result, it is necessary to compare the characteristics of the alphabets to pinpoint the age of the documents. It reveals that the alphabets in Ms no. 2 resemble those in the documents written in Rama III era (1824-1851), indicating that this manuscript was transmitted during or after the reign of Rama III. Manuscripts no. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, however, contain the handwritings used in Bangkok era. Moreover, the examination of the handwritings and the orthography shows that all manuscripts are related. Ms no. 6 and no. 8 were written in the same handwriting, suggesting the same scribe. Ms no. 7 and no. 9, both originally belonged to Phraya Phetpani, should also be copied by the same scribe due to the highly similar handwritings. Aside from the same handwriting and orthography, the stories in both manuscripts can be performed in sequence.

Thirdly, in terms of the history of the manuscripts, they can be divided in three groups. The first group is the manuscripts with a vague provenance like "original copy of the library" or "original copy of Vajirañān Library" which are Ms no. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8. The second group is the manuscripts labeled as "bought by the library" which are the western books no. 1 and 2. The third group is the manuscripts with a clear provenance which are Ms no. 1 which was given by Phrakhrū Khantayakhom (Im) [พระครูขันตยาภิม (อิม)], Ms no. 2 which was given by Mrs Thongyu Chanyakul [นางทองอยู่ จรรยากุล], Ms no. 7 and 9 which originally belonged to Phraya Phetpani [พระยาเพชรปานิ], and Ms no. 10 which was given by Prince Rangsit [กรมหมื่นไชยนาถนเรนทร]. The provenances of some manuscripts indicate the age of the documents such as Ms no. 3 which has no bibliography but, according to a Compilation of Phra Rot (Fine arts Department, 2009 : 10), was copied by Phraya Pariyattithammathada [พระยาปริยัติธรรมธาดา (แพ ตาละลักษมณ์)] for the library, meaning Ms no. 3 was copied in Rama V's reign (1868-1910). The age of the text, however, might be older than the document.

Originally Ms no. 10 belonged to Prince Wongsathirājsanit [พระเจ้าบรมวงศ์เธอ กรมหลวงวงศาธิราชสนิท] (1808 - 1870) and was passed on to Prince Rangsit (1885 - 1952). Some alphabets in this manuscript can be found in documents written in Thonburi era and Rama I era. Moreover, Prince Wongsathirājsanit lived from the reigns of Rama II to Rama IV, suggesting that this manuscript could have been transcribed in or before Rama II era, but it cannot be determined if it was originated as far back as Ayutthaya era.

Fourthly, each manuscript contains different text, except for the western book manuscripts no. 1 and 2 which share the text with Ms no. 5, indicating that they were transcribed from Ms no. 5 but with the story events in a correct order. Moreover, the text in Ms no. 5 and the western book manuscripts differ from the text in other manuscripts and other versions of Phra Rot-Meri such as Phra Rot Kham Chan,

Phra Rot Klon Aan and Phra Rot Nirat. That is it is Indra instead of Phra Rot who cures Nang Sipsong's eyes. It is proposed that this version was written in a later time to differentiate it from previous versions of Phra Rot-Meri. In addition, It revealed that originally the text in Ms no. 4 was not a play but "Phra Rot Nirat" as it shares the text with Phra Rot Nirat. (Ms no. 18, Nirat Type, Literature SecHon) Ms no. 4 also contains inserted accompanying songs (Phleng Na Pat), suggesting an attempt to turn this Phra Rot Nirat into Bot Lakhòn Nòk. It is also claimed that in early Bangkok era poems were transformed into Mahori songs. For example, Chao Phraya Phrakhlāng (Hon) composed Kāki [กาگی] poems and turned them into songs to perform in Mahori performances. This type of text modification was also done to Phra Rot-Meri. Bunteun Sriworaphot (2017) suggests that Chao Phraya Phrakhlāng (Hon) turned Phra Rot Kham Chan (Ayutthaya version) into Phra Rot Nirat and later used it as the lyrics in a Mahori song. This indicates that Ms no. 4 was transcribed in Bangkok era and with the examination of the autography, it was probably transcribed during Rama V's reign (1868-1910).

Lastly, the researcher found that the examinations of certain manuscripts, the examiners might have overlooked the paratext, the messages that are not considered the text. In some manuscripts, the paratext indicates the time of the transcribing such as Ms no. 2 which contains the location of the performances, Taphan Hok casino. According to the history of Taphan Hok or Saphan Hok (Hok Bridge), the building was finished in early Rama V's reign, suggesting that this manuscript was used to perform in the same era while the document could have been transcribed earlier. However, while the dates of the performances were provided, the years were not, so the age of the manuscript cannot be specified. Moreover, the handwriting of the text in Ms no. 5 was also used to write a hidden message behind the document information label "Saturday, the 1st day of the waxing moon, the eleventh lunar month, the year of the monkey" which falls on Saturday 26 September 1908 and Saturday 20 September 1884 in Rama V era (1868-1910), suggesting that one of the dates could be the starting date of the transcribing. By examining the manuscripts in different aspects, more information about Bot Lakhòn Nòk 'Phra Rot-Meri' have been discovered and the age of the documents can be roughly determined. To specify the age of each manuscript, however, requires a close examination on both text and paratext of the manuscripts.

Conclusion

The investigation of Phra Rot-Meri manuscripts has revealed that almost all manuscripts were transcribed and written in Bangkok era except for Ms no. 10 and 3. Ms. no 10 contains the alphabets found in the documents prior to Rama I's reign but there is no evidence indicating in which era this manuscript was transcribed. Ms no. 3 contains a different type of poems written in the style found in older plays, suggesting that even though it was transcribed in Bangkok era, the text might originate in late Ayutthaya era. Ms no. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and the foreign manuscripts were all transcribed in Bangkok era. Though the copy of manuscripts was conducted in Bangkok period, the story of Phra Rot-Meri can be traced back to Ayutthaya era. The investigation of the manuscripts shows the transmission of cultures and the changes in literature genres such as the modification of Phra Rot Nirat poems into Phra Rot-Meri plays in Ms no. 4. As a result, the examination of the manuscripts is a critical tool to study literature in order to collect accurate and thorough information.

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Between Worlds: Siamese (Thai) Diaspora in the Northern Malaysia Region

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Abstract

The northern Malaysia-southern Thai border zone is a transnational zone of two overlapping worlds namely the Thai and Malay worlds. The area is also home to many Siamese (Thai)¹⁴² who live on the Malaysian side of the border. While citizenship dictates their loyalty to Malaysia, Siamese living in the upper part of northern Malaysia are 'culturally Thai'. They are mostly Thai speaking and followers of Buddhism living among neighborhoods' that are predominantly Malay and Muslim. What are the lived realities of these communities – otherwise called orang *Siam* - that reflect their identity, and sense of belonging. How do they "become" Malaysian while "being" Thai? The paper argues that cultural and national citizenships need not necessarily be exclusive and that people living in transborder zones are adaptable to the thick and thin (van Schendel, 2015) of their connectivity in relation to shifts in history.

Keywords: Siamese/Thai, north Malaysia, identity, cultural citizenship, diaspora

Introduction

As of 2007, about 70,000 Thai speaking Buddhist were estimated living in the northern states of Malaysia, mostly in the rural areas of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu (*The Star*, 25 April 2007). Kedah has the largest community of Thais (or *orang Siam*, as they are referred to locally). Thai-Malaysian settlements in Kedah are found in seven districts namely, Kubang Pasu, Pendang, Sik, Padang Terap, Kuala Muda, Baling and Kulim. Gerik in Upper Perak and Padang Besar in Perlis also have significant numbers of Thai communities.

There has been substantial research conducted on the Thai communities in the northern Malaysian states specifically Kedah and Kelantan. Most of these writings are (i) historical- providing detail history of the community spanning a time frame between 1790s and 1900s or (ii) anthropological – giving ethnographic details of Thai villages and its communities in more recent times. In most cases, these are micro studies of individual villages or communities covering a specific location and time period. A macro

¹⁴² The term Siam and Thai is used interchangeably in this paper to refer to people of Thai origins and ancestry living in north Malaysia.

study of the Thai community in Malaysia, incorporating Thais in all the four northern states providing perspectives of their cultural identities and lived realities as a diaspora community in Malaysia is somewhat lacking. While most previous studies have approached the subject of Thai community in Malaysia through archival (historical) documents and interviews with Thai villagers and community elders, this study hopes to understand Thai community through a nexus of Thai temple (*wat*), temple school (*rongrien wat*) and the Siam/Thai Malaysia Associations (*Sammakom Thai Malaysia*) located in many districts in upper northern Malaysian states. The role of monks from Thailand 'positioned' in *wats* in northern Malaysia to teach Buddhism and Thai language as well as the Siam/Thai Malaysia Associations in maintaining the cultural identity of *orang Siam* in Malaysia is examined in this paper. Data for the study was obtained chiefly through interviews with Chief monks, leaders of Thai Associations, community elders, youth leaders and visits to Thai villages.

Essentially this study explores Thai community in northern Malaysia in a hybrid space, taking into consideration the 'cultural intimacy' (Johnson 2010) between Thai/Siamese on both sides. Rather than viewing Thais living in the border region as 'trapped' (Horstmann, 2002:12), this paper examines the active agency of the Siamese in north Malaysia in maintaining their identity and managing their distinct cultural space. It attempts to present this community as a diaspora community living in Malaysia.

Siamese Community in Northern Malaysia: Background

The northern state of Kedah had political cum diplomatic relations with Siam from about the 16th century, sealed through periodic tributes from Kedah to the Siamese King. Siam had similar tributary relations with other Malay states on the northeastern part of the Peninsula including Patani, Kelantan and Terengganu, and at times with Phatthalung, on the west coast. Prior to the demarcation of the physical border between Thailand and Malaysia through the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, most of the communities- Malay, Thai, Chinese and indigenous- living in the northern most part of Peninsular Malaysia had frequent and close relations with their families and kin living on the 'other' side of the river/land. While the nation-state imposed a physical boundary, and the restrictions that came with it, communities that share history, relations, trade, cultures etc. who have long been residing in these areas continued their networks and communications.

The Population Census of Kedah and Perlis in 1911 includes Thai-speakers, and refers to Sam-Sam as a sub-classification of Malay. The distinguishing trait between the two is that Thai speakers are Buddhists, while Sam-Sam are generally viewed as Thai speaking Muslims (Kuroda, 1989). Population census in post-independence Malaya/Malaysia, however, replaced the various sub-categories. Retaining only the ethnic categories of Malay, Chinese and Indian, all other groups were collectively 'lumped' under the category of 'others'. This poses problems in determining exact numbers of 'others', including Thais. However, a study by Thamrong provides a detail list of the many Thai/Siam villages in north Malaysia, thus providing evidence for a significant presence of the Siamese in the country (Thamrong, 1976). As with most other ethnic minorities, the *orang Siam* in north Malaysia have had to deal with issues of ethnic identity and conformity to a national identity. They have persisted 'being' Thai culturally while 'becoming' Malaysian i.e. Malaysian nationality. They have come a long way from being labeled 'cattle rustlers' (Cheah, B.K, 1998: 26), poor and backward (Kuroda 2005: 65-85) to becoming an accepted part of the Malaysian cultural-scape at present.

Alexander Horstmann (2002: 12) described Siamese community in northern Malaysia as *trapped* minorities, located between a hostile host state (i.e. Malaysia) and an absent mother-nation (i.e. Thailand). Referring to the intimidating tactics of the state such as raids and beatings to prevent illegal entry of Thais into Malaysia and the norm of dual nationality among border citizens, Horstmann portrays a picture of the Thais in Malaysia as being 'neither here nor there'. This portrayal deprives the Thai diaspora in Malaysia of agency and the strategic use of flexible citizenship, a characteristic of diaspora cultures in political and cultural border zones (Ong, Aihwa, 1999: 15-16; Kuroda, 2005:73).

Thais in north Malaysia are conscious of their 'position' in the cultural-political borders of two realms and have turned their location on the margins of two cultures into a 'place' (*baan muang*), where they have sustained their distinct ways while taking on different forms of loyalty. These forms of loyalty operate within the two forms of official nationalism of the Thai and Malaysian state. Through these official nationalisms, both states tend to pursue a Thai-Buddhist (Thailand) and Malay- Islamic (Malaysia) religious hegemony respectively. The binaries operating in the Thai-Malaysia border region impact the lives of the people living in these areas, often leading to overlapping forms of loyalty, between religio-culture and state. These overlapping identities however create ambiguities in the sense of belonging, between what is manifested in the public and private spheres. In other words, a plurality of identities is displayed and shared among the Siamese in the border region where they live.

This paper discusses how the Siamese community in northern Malaysia turned a location into a *place for their community*. Borrowing from Willem van Schendel's (2015: 99) notions of place as a social concept, in particular the notion that social practices makes places and in turn places become embedded in people, the paper aims to understand the 'place' of the Siamese in Malaysia. The fluctuations between the thick and thin of places, the former enhancing a sense of meaning, connectedness and belonging (i.e. South Thailand-North Malaysia realm) while the latter, somewhat less significant, is a useful binary in trying to understand the position and identity of the Siamese diaspora community in north Malaysia. In the case of the Siamese in Malaysia, culturally they are in 'thick' connection with Thailand while in terms of land/territorial space, the intersecting zones of North Malaysia and South Thailand provide a thick connection to their identity.

Plural Identities of Borderland People

There is substantial research describing Malaysian Siamese ethnic identity based on criteria such as religion, language, or physical attributes (Yusoff 2010; Golomb 1978; Kershaw 1980). Some scholars have examined cross border networks involving monks, pilgrimage sites, to also point to a common identity of religion, ethnicity and culture (Horstmann 2002, Johnson 2012). Added to this is the local dynamics and particularisms of the place i.e. the northern Malaysian region. In particular, the agency of the 'local' people in maintaining their ethnic group identity through kinsmen/village/Buddhist associations as well as traditions and rituals distinct to this group, through the arts and festivals, that collectively turn the place of their residence into their 'home' should be noted. The synergy is further enhanced through functional relations and acceptance of Chinese Buddhists as part of the Siamese Theravada scape in Malaysia. The paper relates to this local dynamics and describes how minority groups such as the Siamese in Malaysia strategically essentialize their ethnic identity.

The majority of Siamese in northern Malaysia acknowledge themselves as people of Siamese ancestry

and actively practice Siamese culture as a reflection of their identity. The predominant Malays with whom the Siamese of northern Malaysia co-exist also recognize the Siamese as *orang Siam* (or *Siyam*), with their distinct culture. So, the identity construction of the Siamese in north Malaysia is through both self-ascription and ascription by others (Barth, 1969). The main attributes of the distinct culture of a Siamese is manifested thorough language, religion, ancestry and traditions. Johnson (2010) extends our understanding of identity making among Thais in the specific locale of the border region, where they are predominantly settled, by using the framework of cultural intimacy. Johnson explores the agency of the people (Thais in Kelantan), through temple architecture, a form of religious materiality to 'publicly' manifest their identity. Johnson provides a parallel sense of belonging between national and ethnic, both present, albeit sensitized in the border regions. He positions the two not in opposing binaries but rather juxtaposed, or as parallels between diaspora histories and state discourses. According to Johnson (2010: 253),

"Cultural intimacy in borderland regions, is reflected in the practices by which frontier and marginal communities consolidate a sense of collective personhood for themselves through juxtaposing their own autonomous histories with formal state discourses."

The concept of cultural intimacy captures the dynamics in the relationship between everyday forms of culture and practices of communities living in border regions and the strong national ideologies present and manifested there. For the Siamese in the border region of north Malaysia and south Thailand, the scenario creates plural and ambiguous identities that calls for 'strategic' means of managing and maintaining that identity. Religion and religious materiality is closely related to Siamese Malaysian identity.

In northern Malaysia, Mohamed Yusoff Ismail noted 'Theravada Buddhism underscores and defines Siamese ethnicity, in the same way Islam is to Malays' (Yusoff, 2010: 323). The central role of religion in defining Siamese ethnicity is enhanced through the prominent role of Buddhist temples and monks in the daily lives of the Buddhist in north Malaysia. The role of Buddhist monks from Thailand and the use of Thai language in the instruction of the Buddhist religion enhance further the 'thick' cultural connection to Thailand and the maintenance of the Thai/Siamese identity. Identity through religion is strongly demonstrated by the Siamese minority in the northern Malaysian region where the community lives and co-exists predominantly among Malays who also have strong religious belief and culture. Community identity of minorities through religion and cultural practices provides a strong sense of *baan muang* or belonging to their home (Interview, Nai Ai Woon, Village Headmen, Kpg. Begia, Sik, 2016). This identity of '*baan muang rao*' (our home) is essentialized as a way of dealing with the 'threat' of being undermined, absorbed or assimilated with the major groups such as the Muslim.

Role of Wat and Buddhist Monks

The temple or *wat* holds a central position in Theravada Buddhism. In northern Malaysia, Buddhist temples are predominantly located in Siamese settlements or villages. The resident monks in these temples are mostly from Thailand and, they conduct all the religious rituals, teach Buddhism as well as the Thai language. The content of rituals and teachings are similar to Thai Buddhism, resulting in

identical practices. In fact all Buddhist temples in north Malaysia are Siamese Buddhist temples. Kedah has the most number of Siamese *wats*. Some of the temples in Kedah (Wat Kpg. Begia, Sik, Wat Telok Wanjah in Alor Setar, Wat Nanai in Naka), in Perlis (Kpg. Jejawi), Penang (Wat Pinbang On, Wat Chaiyamangkalam) have resident monks from Thailand, living on the temple grounds. The state *sangha* is also dominated by Thai monks.

The Chief Thai monks in Kedah and Perlis receive their appointment from Thailand, endorsed by the Thai *sangha* and in consultation with the local council of monks (Johnson, 2012; 129). The tradition is a legacy of the close historical-political relations between Kedah, Perlis and the Thai state since the 19th century (Suwannathat-Pian, 2002: 2) However, for the state of Kelantan, the appointment of its Chief monk is endorsed by the Sultan of Kelantan (Yusoff, 2010; 326-327). This patronage and recognition accorded by the Kelantan palace to Theravada Buddhism extends support for the persistence and protection of Buddhism and its followers in that state. Indirectly, the patronage of the court entails mutual respect for the ruler and Islam and serves as a reminder that the boundaries of religious differences must be respected and adhered to.

On the Thai side, requirements by the Department of Religious Affairs, Thailand for college-educated monks from Bangkok to fulfill two years of missionary programme (*thammathud*) among Thai communities outside Bangkok has served to extend Thai Buddhism in north Malaysia. The monks teach Thai language and promote general Buddhist studies curriculum (*nak tham*) and elementary Pali (*parian*) learning in the states based on Thailand's national models (Johnson, 2010: 263). Therefore Thai Buddhist monks in Kelantan and other parts of north Malaysia were involved in both the teaching of Buddhism and Thai language as well as promoting standard practices of rituals and learning based on the Thai state model.

The close relations between Buddhism in Malaysia and the *sangha* in Thailand also provides Siamese in Malaysia access to references for religious knowledge, monastic guidelines and practices for the conduct of rites and rituals, binding both sides in a close circle of (Thai) Theravada Buddhism. The exchanges enhance border crossing networks involving monks from Thailand to Malaysia and Buddhist pilgrim networks between south Thailand-Northern Malaysia and Singapore (Horstmann, 2002: 19) In addition, Malaysian Buddhists serving as monks and novices are mostly trained in Thai Buddhist institutions, creating a strong fraternity of monk-alumnus between Thais on both sides of the border.

Other tangible forms of connection between South Thailand and North Malaysia include the prominent presence or display of the Luang Pho Thuat image or shrine. Luang Pho Thuat is a revered monk from Songkhla Thailand who is known for his spiritual prowess and power (Srijariyaporn, 2014: 52-55). He has a huge following among Buddhists in south Thailand, extending to Siamese and Buddhist populations in north Malaysia. Chinese deities such as the Kuan Yin are also prominently displayed or erected in Siamese Buddhist temples in north Malaysia. The patronage from wealthy Chinese in terms of monetary contribution help to sustain the maintenance, extension and construction of Siamese Buddhist temples in north Malaysia. In return, Siamese temples accommodate by allowing worship of Chinese deities within the temple grounds. Temple grounds also provide sites for cremation rites and space to keep urns containing remains of the dead. For city folks, as far as Singapore, who are deprived of this kind of space or avenue to conduct the proper rituals, the huge Siamese temples and the Thai monks conducting the rituals provide a viable option. It is not uncommon to see Singaporeans arriving in Kelantan to conduct

the funeral rites of their loved ones in Siamese temples there (Horstmann, 2002: 20). The role of Thai monks in conducting rituals, or the presence of monks from Thailand at religious ceremonies in Siamese temples in Malaysia provide authenticity to the form of Theravada Buddhism practiced here. Likewise, the Luang Phu Thuat network also adds to the 'authentic' image of Thai Buddhism. In northern Malaysia, the Siamese *wat* and the resident Thai monks are positioned as a medium for the reproduction and maintenance of Thai/Buddhist cultural identity through religion, language, customs, and associated rituals.

In terms of the architecture of Siamese temples in north Malaysia, Johnson observes the following:

"...religious materiality along the Thai-Malaysia border was an avenue by which identity was visually captured for all to see – including the state and its representatives. Temple architecture was, to the Kelantanese Thai villagers, a symbol of an indigenous and emotive self- recognition" (Johnson, 2010: 254).

The combination of Thai Buddhist temple architecture and Thai Theravada religious practices, Chinese patronage and deities as well as recognition from the Malay rulers in relation to the appointment of the Buddhist monks in Kelantan all lend towards a unique 'hybrid' image of the practice of Thai Theravada Buddhism in north Malaysia.

Temples and Temple Schools (Rongrien wat)

All Thai temples have a school within their compound devoted to teaching Thai language and Buddhism. The syllabus for the teaching is specifically designed and taught using books printed in Songkhla for the Siamese Malaysian students. In Kedah and Perlis, classes are conducted over the week-end, Thursday night to Saturday (Interview, Tawon Epoi, Youth leader, Pattana Rongrien Phasa Thai, Kpg. Begia, Sik, Kedah, 2016) In Kampung Jejawi, Arau, in Perlis, Thai children attend Thai language classes every day after school. They also wear uniforms that look similar to uniforms worn by Thai children in Thailand (Interview, Youth Leaders, Samakhom Siam Perlis, 2016) Thai language is emphasized as a crucial part of the Siamese Malaysian identity and to this end Thai temples play a central role through their schools and monk-teachers.

The monks teach Thai language to children and adults within the temple grounds. Rooms are partitioned into classrooms or larger halls are used to conduct the language classes. Some temples have established schools within the temple area, with funding from the Thai government (Kuroda, 2005; 62). Others receive support through foundations and NGOs in Thailand who are committed to teaching and maintaining Thai culture through Thai language. The *Mulanathi Wichianmolee* in Songkhla and volunteer groups such as the youth group comprising undergraduates from Thaksin University in Songkhla provide resources and volunteer teachers regularly to temple schools in north Malaysia (Interview, Youth Leaders, Samakhom Siam Perlis, 2016).

Thai language remains the central identity marker of Siamese in north Malaysia. According to one source who received language instruction in Siamese temple in Kelantan, "I received this legacy myself, and now I have to keep Buddhism and the Thai language alive," "If we lost those things, our Thai identity would disappear, and we'd be left with no more than our names" (*Bangkok Post* 13.9.2015).

Apart from language, the temples are also the venue for performing rituals and festivals. In fact, temple

festivals turn into social gatherings where everyone in the village turns up to meet and celebrate being 'Thai' together. More solemn events such as the *Khao Phansa* is when the village elders with the temple committee and the monks partake in Buddhist rituals and demonstrate their sense of being followers of (Thai) Theravada Buddhism. The alms giving ceremony or *takbhaat* is held at predawn hours for a seven day period where the entire community gets together to perform the ritual and listen to sermons. Most of the sermons are given by visiting monks from Thailand or special guests representing the Thai *sangha*. In this sense, rituals demonstrate Thai religious and cultural values among Siamese in northern Malaysia. The younger generation are exposed to these values and learn to appreciate being 'Thai/Siamese'. Temple events reinforce the institution of the monkhood and their revered position amongst the Siamese people. Knowledge about the culture and community wisdom is also displayed and religious events serve as opportune moment to reinforce the identity and collective memory of the Siamese community in north Malaysia. In cultural maintenance and education, the community leaders through the Village Committee and the Siamese Associations play a crucial role.

***Samakhom Siam* (Siamese Peoples' Associations): Custodians of Siamese Rights and Identity**

In each northern Malaysian state, there are Siamese Associations or *Samakhom Siam*, representing the interests of the Siamese communities in the respective states. These associations are the voice of the people, to protect the rights of Malaysian Siamese as citizens of the country as well as their cultural and religious rights as ethnic Siamese Buddhists. In other words, the associations enable Siamese to realize 'being Thai and becoming Malaysian' simultaneously defending their cultural vis-à-vis citizenship positions.

Thai Association of Kedah/Perlis was founded in 1959 by the late Phra Winaithorn Chen. Through the establishment of this association, the Siamese community was represented collectively as an ethnic minority group in northern Malaysia. The aims of the *Samakhom* Thai Kedah/Perlis include, uniting all the Siamese living in the states of Kedah/Perlis, preserving the traditions, culture and customs of Siamese community in Malaysia, developing the economic status of the Siamese community, overseeing the welfare of Siamese in Kedah and Perlis as well as maintaining good relations between the Siamese and others races in the state based on common interests (Anan, 2015).

In the years immediately after Malaysia's independence, the Association aided many Siamese thorough the citizenship process. The committee members campaigned to create both awareness on the part of the Siamese in Malaysia to register for citizenship and to ally misconceptions on the part of the state agencies and the government on the loyalties of the Siamese.

To ensure the economic wellbeing and general welfare of the community, most associations emphasize the role of education for social mobility of the Siamese community. Aid for further education, establishing libraries, distribution of books and other resources to the needy in the community are some of the projects to help the school going children and families of the Siamese community in these states. The Malaysian Siamese associations also liaise with temples, donors, NGOs in Thailand, as well as Malaysian companies and political parties for monetary and in-kind assistance. In a nut shell, these associations play a proactive role in ensuring the rights of the Siamese diaspora in Malaysia is protected at all times.

In economic affairs, the Thai association of Kedah and Perlis assist their community to be involved in

government development programs, particularly in agriculture programs focused on the rubber and rice sectors (Anad, 2015: 62-64). Periodic workshops and meeting sessions with State administrators are conducted to raise awareness and discuss issues concerning land rights of the Siamese. Of late, Siamese Associations have also focused on sports as a means for community growth and solidarity. Almost all Siamese Associations participate in Futsal tournaments organized by the State Siamese Associations. In fact, there is a hall or field devoted for Futsal training and matches in many Siamese villages in Kedah. All the activities of the association are geared towards guaranteeing the rights and well-being of the Siamese as a diaspora community in Malaysia.

There are similar associations for the Siamese in the states of Penang and Kelantan. There is also a National Siamese Association established in 1996 that operates as an umbrella body governing all Siamese in the country. Apart from aid given to needy Siamese students studying in tertiary institutions, the Association also helped in founding the Malaysian Siamese Foundation or *Yayasan Orang Siam Malaysia*, (YOSM).

The YOSM was formally established in November 2000 (Anad, 2015:71) with the aim of uplifting Siamese through education. The YOSM receives donations from well-wishers and manages the funding as well as the annual disbursement of scholarships to needy students who are enrolled in tertiary institutions. Through the financial aid to young Siamese children, the Foundation is working towards social mobility through education for its largely peasant-rural community in north Malaysia.

The agenda and activities of the Siamese Malaysian Associations were largely in response to the need for the community to maintain its cultural identity. While on the one hand, the Association endorsed and celebrated 'being culturally Thai' and simultaneously accepted Chinese patronage and elements of their cultural influence in Siamese Buddhist temples, it was also cautious of 'external' influences on its culture that may potentially blur or erode Siamese Malaysian history. The history of their migration to northern Malaya may be lost through resettlement and development agendas. The Siamese community of Pulau Tikus, in Penang who have lived there since 1840s, if not earlier, are facing the possibility of losing their Kampung Siam owing to rapid development and market forces in the property industry. The early Siamese settlers who took residence and turned Pulau Tikus into a place for their community through their social and cultural practices, will face displacement of both the community and their local history should their land be removed from them. The Siamese Associations play a proactive role in managing elements representing state nationalism on both sides, while guarding the rights and history of Siamese in Malaysia.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have tried to look at the active agency of the Siamese of Malaysia in maintaining their cultural identity as Thai and national rights as citizens of Malaysia. By looking at the active agency of the community through Siamese Associations, and the interconnecting roles of monks, temples and temple schools, the place of their residence in north Malaysia has been effectively turned into a *baan muang*, a place with a strong community sense of belonging. In this *baan muang*, albeit located 'between two cultural worlds', the Siamese are not 'trapped' but actively seek to negotiate their identity and rights through cultural avenues. Thai Theravada Buddhism, Thai monks, temple and schools fall under this cultural avenue that promotes community identity. The organization and role of the *Samakhom Siam*

provides social advancement through their focus on land, education and citizenship rights which collectively advances the place of the community as a diaspora community in Malaysia not unlike other migrant ethnic communities such as the Chinese and Indians.

Using the framework of thick and thin, the Siamese community in Malaysia have used their social-cultural practices to make their settlement into a place for the community. These practices are embedded in the collective identity and memory of the community. The history of that place has evolved through the thick and thin connections to a distant past and a close present. Some places and towns in the Siamese scape in northern Malaysia too have gone through the ebb of thick and thin, transformed from bustling border towns to quiet locales while other less known places assume greater importance. Tumpat in north Kelantan, home to the majority Siamese living in the state falls under the first category while places such as Arau in Perlis are evolving into vibrant Siamese areas. Likewise, the Siamese of northern Malaysia encounter this thick and thin in their historical connections and shifts to its 'cultural center' i.e. Thailand and political belonging i.e. Malaysia.

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Negotiating Sex, Desire and Intimacy of Lao Migrant Women in Transnational Commercial Sex in Thai-Lao Border

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Abstract

Thai-Lao border zones along the Mekong River in northeast Thailand have long been demonstrated to be places of sexual discovery and heterosexual encounters between Thai men and Lao women. This situation regards to intense and continuous flows of Lao women to commercial sex industry in Thailand. However, the previous study of Lao migrant women in prostitution in Thai context is still limited. The earlier work focuses mostly on sex trafficking in women, various types of violence in commercial sex while the issue on sexuality, emotion and intimate relations of Lao migrant women in transnational commercial sex is rarely studied.

This article studies how Lao migrant women deal with multiple forms of power relations based on gender, sexuality, racial/ethnicity, and class in commercial sex so that they could negotiate their sexual identity and intimate relations in the border space. I apply feminist perspectives and use ethnographic fieldwork collecting information from the experiences of Lao migrant women sex workers engaging in commercial sex in Thailand's northeast border, neighboring Laos, between 2014 and 2015. This contends that despite of the strict control of Thai state over commercial sex with anti-trafficking policy and politics of sexuality in cross-border commercial sex in Thailand, Lao migrant women sex workers seek strategies to negotiate their sexuality and intimacy through marketization of their body and desire. By saying this, they classify their intimate relations and create multiple identities so that they could reduce stigmatization and at the same time pursue their life goals under globalization of culture and economy.

Keywords: desire, intimacy, transnational commercial sex

I. Introduction

"It's hard to get money from them (clients). Likewise, if you go to work in a farm, if you don't use your forces, if you don't sweat, you don't get money. (...) As I do this job, if I don't work hard, I don't have money. (...) If I don't use my body in exchange of money, if I don't use my force nor sweat, if I don't do like this, I don't have money. (...) People, looking down on this job, say we get money because we sell our body for it. I'm not ashamed for being sex worker. I have money. I'm not a beggar. If I were a beggar, I would be ashamed." (Fieldnotes, 15 May 2015)

Nong, one of my key informants, answered confidently to my question about how she perceived sex work. She is a Lao girl of 19 years old and has engaged in commercial sex in karaoke bars in Thai border towns for more than 2 years. She comes from a poor family living in a rural village in Khammouane Province, Lao PDR. Her elder sister and some of her friends in the village dropped out of school to work as sex workers in Thailand and they sent a lot of money to their family. This influenced her decision on being sex worker instead of study in high school because she realized that if she continued studying in the school, she would end up with poverty and farm work due to limited access to job opportunities for rural women in Laos. She finally decided to quit school because she desired to earn money for the family as a migrant sex worker in Thailand as her sister and her friends did. Like other Lao women whom I interviewed with during my field research, Nong defines commercial sex as a kind of service job that she need to invest her energy and use her skills so as to please clients. Therefore, in this study, taking my informants' perspective, I consider commercial sex or prostitution as sex work and my research aims to focus on lived experience of Lao women in transnational commercial sex.

Some studies revealed that Lao women have engaged in cross-border prostitution in Thai-Lao border areas since 1994 due to economic, political and social changes in Laos and increasing demand for Lao women in Thai sex industry (Lyttleton and Amarapibal, 2002; Taotawin, 2006, 2008). These studies showed that as illegal migrant and sex worker, Lao women faced various forms of exploitation and violence by Thai state agents, employers and male clients in Thailand. They also risked sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDs. But, Lao women sex workers attempted to negotiate with their clients to reduce sexual violence with tactics (Taotawin, 2006). However, the preceding scholarships on Lao women and cross-border commercial sex is not emphasized on the role of sexuality as a tool of control and a source of agency in commercial sex. Thus, following Vance (1984), I will focus on the politics of sexuality in transnational commercial sex and consider sexuality of Lao migrant women as site of power control by Thai state and male clients as well as site of negotiation/resistance by Lao female sex workers. This article explores how Lao migrant women deal with multiple forms of power relations based on gender, sexuality, racial/ethnicity, and class in commercial sex so that they could negotiate their sexual identity and intimate relations in the border zone.

II. Field Research and Data Collection

In this study, I apply feminist perspectives and use ethnographic fieldwork collecting information from the experiences of Lao migrant women sex workers who aged from 18-27 years and engaged in commercial sex in northeastern Thailand's border neighboring Laos between June 2014-May 2015. They work as waitress at karaoke bars and at the same time provide clandestine sexual services to clients.

During twelve months of my field research, I have performed various roles. At first, I worked as a volunteer at a local non-government organization who provides education on reproductive health and sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and HIV/AIDs prevention for sex workers as well as assists them in having access to health care service. I also introduced myself to my informants as a Ph.D. student from Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, who conducted a research about commercial sex of Lao women in Thai border area. Moreover, at night, I became a regular client at karaoke bars in order to build trust and relationship with karaoke bar women and the owners. I usually went to Jasmine karaoke bar and Five Stars karaoke bar because the owners were women and very kind. After six months, I

decided to select my key informants at Jasmine karaoke bar because the sex workers in this bar are not involved with drug trafficking nor gambling. Jasmine karaoke bar is located out of the town, far away from a village in order that the noise of clients does not bother the villagers.

During my field research, I conducted in-depth interviews in Lao with 4 women, unstructured interview with 7 women and interview with 2 male clients. I also had conversations with Lao karaoke bar women and the owner at Jasmine karaoke bar and attended 2 birthday parties of Lao karaoke bar women. Sometimes, we went shopping together in town.

III. Thai-Lao Border: Places of Sexual Discovery

"Here is notorious for Lao women, illegal timber trade and amphetamine." (An agent from Mekong River Security Navy Unit, 25 February 2015)

Ubonratchathani Province is a border province in the Northeast of Thailand. The border length between Thailand and Laos is 361 kilometers (From Khemmarat District to Namyeun District) with Mekong River and forest as natural boundary. Since 1990s, Lao women have been crossing border to enter into commercial sex in many border towns of Ubonratchathani. Thus, these borders become sexualized due to prostitution of Lao women.

I conducted my field research on the negotiation of Lao women in cross-border commercial sex in two border towns of Ubonratchathani because they are famous for availability to Lao women's body and sexuality. There are more than 10 karaoke bars and about 200 Lao women working in the karaoke bars in these two border towns where sexual service of Lao women is provided to clients since 1994 and sex business in karaoke bars has grown up quickly for ten years. This results in the intense and continuous flows of Lao women and girls into prostitution in Thai border. The network of transnational commercial sex of Lao women and girls have expanded, and the recruitment strategies vary from persuading friends/siblings to do sex work to deceiving women and girls into sex work, through social network of Lao women or work agency (Taotawin, 2006).

Karaoke bars in these border towns are located far away from the community because it avoids causing any troubles to people in the community at night time due to loud noise. But the most important reason is that since karaoke bars provide venue for commercial sex of Lao women which is illegal, it needs to avoid surveillance of the state and people in the community. Some of karaoke bars are surrounded by forest, rice fields or cassava fields. This kind of circumstance can be a refuge for illegal migrant women from the police's raids.

IV. Politics of Transnational Sexuality

Sexuality and commercial sex or prostitution is one of significant debates in feminism. Feminism claims that sexuality is social construction, it is not 'natural' or 'biological' fact. On the one hand, it involves power relations in the society and on the other hand it is related to power of individuals to determine their sexual identity and sexual orientation. According to Vance *"Sexuality is simultaneously a domain of restriction, repression, and danger as well as a domain of exploration, pleasure, and agency"* (p.1). *"Although both gender and sexuality may be socially constructed, sexuality and gender are separate but overlapping domains or, as Gayle Rubin calls them, "vectors of oppression" (p. 9).*

To understand sexuality, it is important to *“describe and analyze how cultural connections are formed between female bodies and what comes to be understood as “women” and “female sexuality”*” (p.10). Moreover, Vance suggests that women’s experiments and analyses about sexuality from women’s experience must be center of knowledge building in feminism and feminism must insist that women are sexual subjects, sexual actors, sexual agents of their own histories (p.24).

Rubin (1984) point out that sexuality *“has its own internal politics, inequities, and modes of oppression”* (p.267) and *“is a nexus of the relationships between genders, much of the oppression of women is borne by, mediated through, and constituted within, sexuality”* (pp. 300-301). Thus, sexuality is controlled and regulated by sets of power relation through discursive practice such as medical discourse, psychological discourse, religious discourse which define what is ‘good, normal, natural, blessed’ sex and what is ‘bad, abnormal, unnatural, damned’ sex (p.281) regarding to sexual value system.

According to sexual value system, sexuality that is “good”, “normal” and “natural” should ideally be heterosexual, marital, monogamous, reproductive, and non-commercial. It should be coupled, relational, within the same generation, and occur at home. It should not involve pornography, fetish objects, sex toys of any sort, or roles other than male and female. Any sex that violates these rules is “bad”, “abnormal”, or “unnatural” (pp. 280-281). This classification of sex produces ‘the moral hierarchy of sexual activities’ (p. 280) which evaluates moral value of sexual conducts. ‘Good’ sex could be accepted by the society but ‘bad’ sex could be condemned and stigmatized. This sexual hierarchy also affects individual’s access to political, social and economic opportunities as well as legal protection. As a result, commercial sex or prostitution is considered as ‘bad sex’ in the moral sexual hierarchy and it is targeted by the state’s surveillance, control and cleaning up. “Like homosexuals, prostitutes are a criminal sexual population stigmatized on the basis of sexual activity. Prostitutes and male homosexuals are the primary prey of vice police everywhere” (p. 286).

Moreover, Satz suggests that feminism should refuse economic or material perspective of sex work, but focus on emotional aspect of sex work. Sex workers do not only sell sex but also provide sexual pleasure to customers. Therefore, body of sex workers is not only commodity but source of meaning, self-making and emotional production. They nurture their body with care and view it as valuable thing. When they provide sexual services, it seems that they use their valuable body to create sexual pleasure for others. In so doing, it becomes site of emotional and value exchange. (Satz, 1995: 63-85 in Duangwiset, 2014)

In addition, in context of international labor migration and economic and cultural globalization, feminism needs a new conceptual framework to enhance understanding about the specificities and the continuities within the globalization of sexual identities. As Grewal and Kaplan (2000) propose that concept of ‘transnational’ can address the asymmetries of globalization process and can be more useful in getting to the specifics of sexualities in postmodernity (p. 524). However, we need to identify ways in which the term ‘transnational’ is used as well as the way in which sexuality has been studied and described. Thus, Grewal and Kaplan suggest that firstly, feminism should pay attention to the intersection of sexuality with the study of race, class, nation, religion, and so on. Secondly, sexuality should not be studied as bounded unit in area studies such as in a nation or a culture but “articulation” theory and “intersectionality” approaches can help resolve this problem (p. 527). Thirdly, tradition-modernity binary reproduces the divide between “backward” or “oppressive” and “freedom” or “democratic choice” in sexuality studies. Scholarship on sexuality should focuses on the ways in which

the role of tradition and modernity is related to the production of sexual identities in globalization (p. 528). Finally, it must not emphasize global-local separation in the study of sexuality because this separation represents dominant-resistant relationship, it is to say, *“the local serves as the space of oppositional consciousness and generates practices of resistance, and the global serves as an oppressive network of dominant power structures”* (p. 528).

In this article, the concept of politics of sexuality can be applied to study commercial sex of Lao women in Thailand. Sexuality is a site of power of control of the Thai state and society over Lao women sex workers while it also becomes a site of negotiation of Lao women. Commercial sex of Lao karaoke bar women is controlled and regulated by Thai state through discursive practice, and the moral hierarchy of sexual activities is used by the society to stigmatize and marginalize Lao women sex workers. Moreover, Once Lao women sex workers crossing border to Thailand, they are not free or liberated totally from the control of Lao patriarchal culture over sexuality but eventually they are facing the power of control both from Thai society and from their own culture. Thus, using transnational framework is useful to analyze commercial sex of Lao women in transnational context. In addition, Lao women also seek or invent strategies or tactics to negotiate with power relations in commercial sex.

V. Thai State and Power of Control over Lao Women Sex Workers

Thai state is patriarchal institution and it produces discourses and representation of Lao women sex workers, as a tool, to define the meaning of these women. Firstly, discourse on sexually transmitted infections and HIV/AIDs protection is used to label the body of Lao women sex workers as “dangerous body” because it involves transmission of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), thus, the body of Lao women must be examined, controlled and educated about sexually transmitted infections. Education program on STDs and HIV/AIDs protection, condom usage as well as blood test for STDs and HIV is targeted mainly to Lao women sex workers and homosexuals in the border areas because these two groups are represented as transmitter of STDs and HIV by medical discourse due to the sexual activities. Secondly, sex in marriage and virginity of women at marriage are considered as sexual norms which are used to measure ‘good woman’ (Tannenbaum, 1999, p. 248) in Thai society. This discourse on sexual morality stigmatizes Lao women sex workers as “bad woman” because they have sex with many men for money, and they cannot maintain their virginity at marriage. Moreover, they also conducted adultery with regular clients with whom they wanted to build long-term relation so that they could have long-term support from these men. This have effects on the family relationship of Thai male clients. In so doing, their sex is viewed as “bad sex” and lower than sex without marriage by Thai sexual morality. Thus, as a woman, illegal migrant and sex worker with Lao nationality they become more marginalized than Lao men or even than other Lao women in Thai society.

Finally, according to discourse on transnational human trafficking in women and girls, Lao girls under 18 years old are considered as “victim” of cross-border sex trafficking and Thailand is a transit or destination country where Lao women and girls are taken to sex industry. Thus, Lao girls who engage in commercial sex must be rescued and sent back their home country so that they could stay with their family and community again. But in some cases, the discourse ignores realities of Lao girls who did decide to choose sex work by themselves because social and economic conditions and although these girls are sent back to Laos, they might find a way to come back again to Thailand for sex work because they need to earn a

living for their family. Like Sandy, she is 19 years old and she decided to work as a sex worker in Ayuttaya Province when she was 16 years old, thus, she did not perceive herself as a victim of human trafficking when she was rescued by the police:

“Once, I was arrested by the police. At that time, I heard someone knocked the door when I was waiting for a client in my room. I opened the door and I was taken a picture and taken to the first floor (...) I was taken to a police station (...) and interrogated. I was 16 years old and the police told me I was under 18 years old so I was not imprisoned and I was taken to a rehabilitation center for children and women. I stayed there for one year and two months until I was sent back to Laos (...) When I was asked whether I knew that I would do sex work, I answered I knew. I told him I decided to come to work on my own. I accepted guilty plea alone. No one was involved with it.” (Fieldnotes, 12 May 2015)

In this case, the discourse on human trafficking in women and girls imposes image of victim to Lao women and girls as weak, vulnerable and unable to protect themselves from traffickers. This representation ignores agency as well as reality of women and in this case the protection and the suppression from the state may not respond the need of sex workers. Here, I do not say that the protection and the suppression of sex trafficking is not needed but the implementation of human trafficking suppression policy should identify clearly who is victim of sex trafficking and who is not in order that it can provide proper assistance to women and girls.

For the reasons mentioned above, Thai state must control and suppress commercial sex of Lao migrant women so that this may bring about safety and peaceful society as well as maintain the sexual morality. Consequently, the state exercise power and use violence based on gender, sexuality, class and race/ethnicity through the state’s order on prevention and elimination of prostitution of women as well as raids of police and soldiers in karaoke bars to cope with the issue, as follows.

In June 2014, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) announced an order no. 68/2014 on temporary, urgent measures on prevention and suppression of human trafficking and on solution to illegal migrant workers¹⁴³. This order aims to regulate migrant workers by arresting illegal migrants. Thus, more than 100,000 illegal migrant workers including Lao women workers in karaoke bars in Thai borders escaped from Thailand because they feared that they would be arrested. Some of Lao illegal migrant women who insisted to work in the bar, had great anxiety and fear under this situation. When there was a police car driving to the karaoke bar, they needed to hide themselves in a safe place or a forest nearby the bar. One night, the owner of Five Star karaoke bar was informed about the police and soldier raid in the karaoke bar, Lao illegal migrants in the karaoke bar needed to escape from the bar and stay in a safe place that night. Ann, a 26-year old Lao illegal migrant sex worker told me about her concern on safety in Thailand relating to this situation, when she knew about the soldier raid in karaoke bar that night: *“I want to come back home now because Thailand is under the soldiers’ control (...) we work as sex worker, we feel unsafe, (...) if we were arrested, it would be dangerous.”* (Fieldnotes, 27 June 2014) Due to regular raids in karaoke bars to arrest illegal migrant workers, Ann, like other illegal migrant workers, decided to go back home and worked in Laos for safety until the situation in Thailand improved.

¹⁴³ See more details at <http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/588797> (in Thai language)

In August 2014, the government announced an order on special measure on registration of illegal migrant workers. All migrant workers must be registered by Department of Labor in each province so that they can work in Thailand. Thus, karaoke bar women were taken to Department of Labor in Ubonratchathani for labor registration and they had to pay the registration fee by themselves including health insurance. Moreover, they had to have blood test for pregnancy and HIV and if they found pregnant or had HIV infections, they were not allowed to receive work permit in Thailand. This process reflects the control over body of migrant women as “dangerous body”. According to Thai law, Lao migrant women are allowed legally to work as waitress in karaoke bars but as for sex work, it is still illegal. Normally, most of Lao migrant women in karaoke bars are sex workers. Thus, although they have work permit, they are still in risky situation when the government aim to prevent and suppress sex trafficking in migrant women and girls in order to improve the situation of human trafficking in migrants in Thailand.

The situation of Lao women sex workers in Thailand become worse in February 2015 after the “Red Lotus Mission” on January 27th, 2015¹⁴⁴. According to this mission, the police had raids in five entertainment establishments in Udonthani Province and arrested 32 Lao women involving in sex trafficking. This news became public interest because of such a big number of Lao women sex workers arrested. As a result, the issue on sex trafficking in migrant women has been raised in the society. In April 2015, the government announced anti-human trafficking as national agenda and gave policies on anti-human trafficking to related agencies such as Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Human Security and Social Development, DSI¹⁴⁵. According to this agenda, related officials at all levels must collaborate to tackle this problem and if government officials are involved in human trafficking such as receiving bribe from traffickers, they can be punished seriously.

The implementation of this policy in Thai border zones resulted in various forms of violence against Lao women workers in entertainment establishments and restaurants. There were police raids in karaoke bars and restaurants to arrest Lao women sex workers. Thus, Lao migrant women were not able to work in karaoke bars nor restaurants although they had work permit. They will be charged with prostitution for the only reason that they work in karaoke bar because Lao women working in karaoke bars were stereotyped by the police as sex workers. Sometimes, condom is used by the police as an evidence of commercial sex. Therefore, Lao women sex workers do not keep condoms in their hand bag because they fear that they may be charged with prostitution. In addition, resorts and motels in the areas are ordered by the police not to serve Lao women although they want to hire a room for personal accommodation since they cannot stay with the owner of karaoke bar. This shows that the police use their power to suppress commercial sex of Lao women by taking control over possible venue for commercial sex like in karaoke bars, in resorts, or in motels.

As a result, Lao women sex workers felt unsafe and feared to be arrested by the officials. They also felt that as migrant workers, they were treated unfair by the police because actually, with a work permit, they can work as a waitress in the karaoke bar. Then some Lao women sex workers went back to Laos,

¹⁴⁴ See more details at <http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/631397> (in Thai language)

¹⁴⁵ See more details at

<http://mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/14/55435-PM-declares-%E2%80%9Canti-human-trafficking%E2%80%9D-as-national-a.html>

some found a new job in other town, some hid themselves from the police's surveillance in a safe place such as in a resort whose owner is reliable, in a Thai friend's house, or in a safe house of the owner outside the karaoke bar.

To sum up, Thai state applies various forms of power to control Lao women's body and sexuality through medical discourse, moral discourse and anti-human trafficking discourse. This brings about violence and violation of human right of Lao women.

VI. Heterosexual Encounter between Thai Male Clients and Lao Karaoke Bar Women

Most of the clients are heterosexual Thai men and few clients are tom-boys. The clients have different social and economic backgrounds. Some are state authorities like soldiers, policemen, navy, village heads or sub-district heads, some are teachers, employees of a local government's office, sale agents, businessmen or farmers. Commercial sex of Lao women in border town is provided a venue for Thai men to discover sexual pleasure through buying 'foreign' body and sexuality of Lao women (Lyttleton and Amarapibal, 2002; Taotawin, 2008). As a Thai male client with 35 years old said:

"Lao women mostly are young. I feel like I have sex with young girls. It doesn't mean Thai women aren't beautiful but ... As I asked my senior supervisor: "Recently, have you eaten Thai women?". He answered me: "I haven't eaten Thai women for ten years, I have eaten only foreign girls, Lao girls because they are younger". I also feel the same." (Fieldnotes, 22 May 2015)

This instance shows that Thai male clients view Lao women as sexual, young and foreign body which respond to their sexual fantasy as well as desire for young girls. The phrase "eat foreign girls marks superiority and power of Thai men over Lao women in term of gender, sexuality and race/ethnicity because Thai men perceive themselves as predator or actor whereas Lao girls are perceived as prey or object of desire. Nagel (2003) illustrates that "Ethnicity and sexuality blend together to form sexualized perimeters around ethnic, racial, and national spaces. Ethnic and sexual boundaries converge to mark the edges of "ethnosexual frontiers" (p.1). Commercial sex of Lao migrant women becomes heterosexual encounter between Thai men and Lao women and creates "ethnosexual frontiers" where ethnicity and sexuality come together to define Thai men and Lao women, to include 'us' and exclude 'other', to form Thai men's view of sexual desire, fantasy and taste for Lao women. In so doing, Lao women as sex workers were considered as "other" in Thai society and this brings about vulnerability and exploitation of these women.

VII. Negotiation of Lao Migrant Women in Transnational Commercial Sex

Although Lao women sex workers have faced multiple forms of domination and control by Thai state and society through labeling, stigmatization and violence, they are not submissive to the power but become actor to negotiate or resist these power relations for self-making and defining identities. According to the anti-human trafficking in migrant women of Thai government, the government aims to clean up prostitution in Thailand, particularly in border areas, then the local authorities in border towns do not allow Lao migrant women to work in karaoke bars or restaurants. However, Lao women sex workers

tried to seek strategies to survive under this control through asking assistance from Thai regular clients or boyfriend(s). In order to build long-term relation and have support from the regular clients or boyfriend(s), they need to marketize their body and desire and classify the relations with clients. Moreover, they create multiple identities to reduce stigmatization.

Marketization of Body and Desire

Beauty is very important for sex workers because clients tend to like beautiful women and this influence the clients' decision on purchase of sexual service from sex workers. The dominant discourse on beauty in Thai society defines beauty as whiteness, slimness and beautiful face with big eyes, high nose bridge and long hair. Lao women also internalize this truth of beauty through media and manage their body to conform to the dominant discourse by having nose surgery or breast surgery, taking whitening supplements and /or lotion, losing weight as well as having orthodontic treatment because this may be helpful to attract Thai male clients. As Nong, 19-year old Lao sex worker mentioned below:

"When I came to work in Thailand, I saved money for nose surgery and orthodontic treatment. Working like this, beauty is needed. Before, I was very ugly because I had low nose bridge and big face. So, I intended to have nose surgery for first thing (...) When I have money, I want to make myself beautiful (...) Recently, I have just had orthodontic treatment because I was told if we want to have v shaped face, we should have orthodontic treatment." (Fieldnotes, 15 May 2015)

Moreover, most of Lao women sex worker are very concerned about cleanness because they believe that having sex with many men makes their body "dirty" as a 19-year old Lao girl said: *"Working like this, it's difficult to find a man to marry us because men think we are 'dirty'."* (Fieldnotes, 7 February 2015). Cleanness is not only related to physical appearance but to reproductive hygiene because body of sex workers is viewed as "diseased body" in medical discourse on STIs and HIV/AIDs. Lao women sex workers usually use condoms with clients and have pelvic examination as well as blood test for STIs and HIV to prevent themselves from "diseased body". As a result, Lao women sex workers attempt to present their body as a clean body in term of physical appearance and reproductive health. In addition, they need to change the way they dress in order to become sexually attractive. Knowing how to dress attractively is important for competitions in karaoke bars because dressing up can make women more beautiful and seductive. When they live with their family in Laos, they are not allowed by their parents to wear mini-shorts, mini-skirts or short dress. Normally, they wear traditional skirt and t-shirt or sometimes shorts, jeans or trousers. Every week, they go to flea market to buy fashionable clothes and sexy dress for their work. As the owner of a karaoke bar said about the importance of sex workers' appearance and dressing:

"Normally, Lao women who work in karaoke bar at the first time do not know how to dress up to attract clients. Like Lilly, first time that she came to work here, she looked like normal teenager, not very beautiful and she did not know how to dress up. So, she looked unattractive to clients. I told my daughter to accompany her to the flea market to choose some sexy clothes for her. Now, she is beautiful and attractive to clients." (Fieldnotes, 19 January 2015)

It is not only beautiful and clean appearance of Lao women sex workers but also good manners and caring which attract clients. The production of caring and affection is one of a key success to attract clients. Lao women sex workers display caring and affection by touching body of clients, hugging or kissing clients or letting clients touch their body, hug or kiss them. These physical languages show their good feeling and desire to go out with clients and this may create client's desire to buy sexual service. Furthermore, Lao women sex workers tend to display caring and affection to regular clients with whom they want to build intimate relations. This strategy is usually used by the sex workers when they want to sell sexual service to clients and have long-term relation with clients, who can provide support and protection for them while staying in Thailand.

Classification of Relations with Clients

Transnational commercial sex is a site of sexual discovery for Lao women sex workers and this provides sexual experience for them in many ways, which break sexual norms. Some of them have never had this kind of sexual experience before in their home country such as having sex without marriage, having multiple partners, because they fear to be labeled as 'bad woman' or 'promiscuous'.

According to experience of Lao women sex workers, clients are classified into 2 categories: normal client and regular clients or boyfriend. This classification has effect on negotiation for price, sexual service as well as condom use. For normal clients, there are certain rules such as fixed price, limited hour of sexual service (no longer than one hour or one night), type of sexual service (only sexual intercourse, no kiss on the lips, no nipple sucking), condom use. As for regular clients or boyfriend, no fixed rules are determined, and it depends on negotiation for price, sexual services and condom use. For instance, the price of sexual service depends on satisfaction of regular clients or boyfriends. Lao women sex workers are not concerned about the money paid for sex from regular clients or boyfriends because they may ask for money or something from regular clients or boyfriends when they need it. Regular clients or boyfriends can touch on any parts of their body and negotiate for condom use. Some regular clients or boyfriends may not use condoms when having sex. Sometimes, this results in unplanned pregnancy of Lao women sex workers or transmission of STIs. The time for sex is also flexible. Lao women sex workers feel they have more sexual pleasure when they have sex with regular clients or boyfriends as Nan told me about her sexual experience with her boyfriend who are regular client: *"With my boyfriend, I feel happy when I have sex."* (Fieldnotes, 23 May 2015)

However, the classification of relations with clients is not only for performing sexual identity, desire and pleasure of Lao women sex workers but also for seeking support and protection from regular clients and boyfriends when it is needed. For example, in case of police raid in karaoke bars, Lao women who did not have passport asked their boyfriend to help them by taking them out of the bar and finding a safe place for them. As Nong talked to me about the support she received from her Thai boyfriend:

"Sometimes, he gives me more than sexual service charge, if I need money. If he doesn't have money, he may give me 400 – 500 Baht. Once, I told him "Give me 2,000 Baht" and he gave it to me. When there was a police raid in karaoke bar, if I don't have my boyfriend to take me out of the bar, I would hide in the forest (...) It was hard if I don't have a boyfriend." (Fieldnotes, 15 May 2015)

Creation of Multiple Identities

In addition to identity of sex worker, Lao women sex workers have articulated various identities as 'good daughter' and 'moral woman' to reduce stigmatization of sex work and 'bad woman'. In Lao culture, gendered role of daughter is to take care of the parents and siblings in the family. This includes earning money for family. Thus, one major reason why most of Lao women decide to engage in commercial sex is that they are from a poor family and they need to support their family as well as to make money for better life. They know that commercial sex is stigmatized work, but they have no choice if they need to earn a lot of money. In Thai culture, daughter's responsibility to the family is very appreciated. Therefore, owners of karaoke bars as well as clients feel sympathetic to Lao women and admire their devotion for family. As a Thai male client revealed that he respects Lao women sex workers because they are responsible to their parents:

"I think Lao women sex workers who work in karaoke bar are better than Thai women. You know? Lao girls sell first sex for money and they receive 10,000 or 20,000 Baht but Thai girls have first sex for free with their boyfriend and ask for money from their parents. Lao girls come here to work. I really admire them because they earn money for their parents." (Fieldnotes, 21 May 2015)

Moreover, Lao women also perform identity of 'moral woman' who follow sexual morality of the society. They like to make merits by offering food, drinks or things to monks. As for sex work, they attempt to make a line for sexual relations. For them, sex work is only work, and they provide sexual service, but they do not want to be 'minor wife' of their clients. They have long-term relation with regular clients, but they might not make troubles to the clients' family. But in case that clients are not married, the relations will last longer. They know that they are labeled as 'bad woman' due to sex work, thus, they do not want to break more sexual moral codes as minor wife. As Lilly told me about her colleague's long-term relation with client: *"Since I worked here, I have not had long-term relation with clients. I don't want to do that. I just received money. I don't break their family. I saw my colleague, she has long-term relation with other's husband until the wife knew it and came to the bar. She scolded my colleague. As I saw her (the wife), I felt pity for her."* (Fieldnotes, 7 February 2015)

It is obvious that Lao women sex workers attempt to identify themselves as 'moral woman' although they are labeled as 'immoral woman' in term of sexual morality by the society. This reveals that Lao women sex workers perceive sex work as work and it is not involved with sexual morality. Women in sex work are not 'immoral woman' because they are also concerned about sexual moral codes.

To sum up, Lao women realize that identity of sex worker brings about stigmatization and marginalization in sexual morality. Thus, they create identity of 'good daughter' and 'moral woman' to contest meaning of sex worker which produced by sexual moral discourse as well as to reduce stigmatization of sex workers.

VIII. Conclusion

Transnational commercial sex in Thai-Lao border is constructed as 'ethno-sexual frontier' since it provides space of power relations between Lao women and Thai men, based on difference of gender, sexuality, race/ethnicity, and class. Thai male clients viewed Lao women's body as exotic and primitive. This creates sexual fantasy and desire of Thai men as well as the demand for Lao women in Thailand's sex industry. Therefore, flows of Lao women and girls cross border and engage in commercial sex in Thailand.

Thai state and society also controls and regulates sexuality of Lao women sex workers by producing different discourses to legitimize its power in order to define meanings of Lao women sex workers as 'dangerous body', 'bad woman', transmitter of STIs and HIV/AIDs, or victim of human trafficking. These dominant discourses result in stigmatization, marginalization and oppression of Lao women. Thus, the transnational commercial sex becomes site of power control of the state and of Thai male clients.

However, it also considered as site of negotiation/resistance for Lao women sex workers when they seek strategies to negotiate with various forms of power relations. In so doing, they classify their intimate relations and create multiple identities so that they could reduce stigmatization and at the same time could pursue better life and economic opportunities under globalization of culture and economy.

In addition, in transnational commercial sex, Lao women's sexuality is controlled by two sets of sexual norms: one is Lao and the other is Thai. Crossing border to Thailand does not mean that Lao women can escape from power of their own culture and find sexual liberation or freedom in Thailand because it is internalized in their mind and body. While working as sex workers in Thailand, they cannot conform themselves to Thai sexual norms and they do not have access to economic opportunities and legal protection due to their sexuality, work, nationality. Thus, they face stigmatization and violence in transnational context and they need to negotiate with both cultures so that they could contest meaning of identity of sex worker in Thai culture.

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Practical Water Pollution Management

KISS Principles to Reduce the Impact of Poor Man's Pollution In Thailand

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Abstract

Thailand has a serious, rapidly growing water pollution crisis. Large quantities of contaminants pollute public waterways and the food chain; still larger quantities lie in wait in the soil, landfills, storm drains, industrial and construction sites, housing estates and small businesses. Many believe that the best model for managing this crisis is a centralized, professional, national bureaucratic one such as the American Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In Thailand, such a model would be a costly, human resource consuming failure. It would also be inappropriate for addressing the largest, most complicated pollution threat Thailand confronts: poor man's pollution.

This paper does not address the complex, rigid, overlapping bureaucracies that share "jurisdiction" over pollution, in Thailand. Instead, it proposes a, simple, readily implemented, transparent and accountable, parallel system based on four KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid) principles: Programs must (1) have easily quantified, easily measured outcomes that are articulated and published in advance, with results published on completion (2) require only simple, mechanical activities and not depend on technology or services not available in every rural village; (3) reward initiative by those responsible, but must hold specific people personally accountable for program outcomes, irrespective of career moves; and (4) require no more than a one-time intervention that leads market incentives to cause people to act out of self-interest.

A KISS-based system will not solve Thailand's water pollution crisis, but then there are no current plans of any sort for doing so. KISS simply offers readily undertaken, practical measures that if implemented can reduce the current and future "load" of potential pollution from poor man's sources. As such, a KISS system can provide an effective means to attack a key element of the problem that is – and will remain – beyond central management for years.

Keywords: water pollution, poor man's pollution, KISS principles, waste management, pollution control, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA

Introduction

It is important to frame the discussion of complex subjects in human terms, to provide a sense of scale to which each of us can relate. This is particularly important when discussing a subject as abstract as an entire nation's water pollution problem where talk of millions of tons of pollutants in billions of cubic meters of water surpass the comprehension of even the brightest of us. Let me start my investigation into the management of water pollution in Thailand with a dip, so to speak, into the water of the Chiang Mai city, Thailand's second largest city, also known as the "pearl of the North."

The City of Chiang Mai has an extraordinary Water Department. Despite rapid growth and a surge in tourism in the past decade, it sucks in and filters the water that city residents require from the surrounding countryside. Rainy season or prolonged drought, the Water Department provides the water needed for bathing, washing, and cooking. Visit City filtration stations and you will find posted water purity data: turbidity, BOD, etc. You will not find, however, reference to any chemical pollutants, for example, the pesticides regularly used by farmers in the city's watersheds. Why not? Because Chiang Mai City, like almost all public water filtration systems in Thailand, uses sand filters that are effective against organic threats, say microbes, but cannot remove agro-chemicals.

Just north of Chiang Mai lies one of the most scenic valleys in Thailand. A small river tumbles down waterfalls shaded by forest trees. Birds sing. The air is sweet. After a short drive, you arrive at the Queen's Botanical Gardens where you can stop for a picnic or explore one of the world's greatest collections of tropical and semi-tropical flora. If you continue, you emerge into open fields intensively cultivated with strawberries and vegetables destined for the Chiang Mai market. At the very top of your drive, you come to a village that you smell before you see it. This village grows roses; roses that must be perfect – not a single insect bite – in order to sell. Growing perfect roses, like growing market-ready vegetables, requires tons of fertilizer, pesticides, fungicides and herbicides that make their way into the tumbling river that courses past the Queen's Botanical Garden and feeds the water system of Chiang Mai.

This is the problem of water pollution in Thailand.

Thailand has a serious, growing water pollution crisis. Large quantities of contaminants pollute public waterways and the food chain; still larger quantities lie in wait in soil, landfills, storm drains, sewage systems, villages, pig manure ponds and mine dumps. Thailand has a complex ministerial, legislative and regulatory system for pollution control that extends from the center to the village – and does not work. Climate change – torrential rains and floods, droughts, and devastating storms – is making a bad situation worse by over-flowing existing waste, wastewater, and sewage systems, and by exacerbating the huge problem of illegal waste disposal and the unacknowledged and undocumented problem of "poor man's pollution."

There is no silver bullet solution to Thailand's water pollution crisis; it is far too complex. This paper is limited to water pollution from "poor man's" sources – pollution from the unregulated, daily activities of common citizens: farmers' use of pesticides, car mechanics' oil and brake fluid spills, house painters' discarded paint cans, homemakers' left over cleaning chemicals. It quickly introduces the key drivers of the water pollution crisis Thailand faces, reviews Thailand's waste management system and suggests why it has failed to keep contaminants from polluting the nation's waters. It outlines the waste streams

from the country's urban and industrial centers and then turns to the problem of identifying, if not quantifying, what I consider Thailand's biggest, most threatening, but also most unmanageable water pollution threat, "poor man's pollution." This flows not from the sewers of Bangkok or the pipes of great factories, but from the fields and dumps of rural Thailand, the 55% of the country that is – and will likely remain – unserved by waste management infrastructure. I do not propose a bright, shining, super solution that arrogantly tells Thai environmental experts how to recreate the US Environmental Protection Agency or, indeed, to make any institutional changes at all. Instead, I offer a drab, bottom-up approach based on KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid) principles almost too pedestrian for such an impressive setting.

The proposed KISS approach aims not to supplant Thailand's current system of waste management for the center, but to complement it in the countryside where central authority is hard to exercise. The approach builds on four principles. All programs must (1) have clear, easily measured, published outcomes, (2) not require technical support, (3) reward initiative and enforce accountability; and (4) require minimal government intervention, depending instead on public incentives to operate. KISS reverses the existing top-down model of responsibility managed broadly and entirely by central offices and, instead, focuses on pushing increasingly narrowly defined, measurable outcomes out from the center to local authorities who are held personally accountable for their implementation.

Concerns: Descriptive, Analytical and Prescriptive

Simply writing a description of the Thai water pollution problem is virtually impossible. Statistics are hard to come by and all are suspect. The actual situation of pollution control, even the legal and regulatory status, is hard to ascertain. The government habitually publishes documents that are more aspirational than factual, and few Thai academics publish their research. See, for example, Pariyada and Pornsirir, nd) No one knows anything about critical dimensions of the pollution problem, especially so-called "poor man's pollution," and everyone is uncertain about the course of climate change and how it will exacerbate waste management problems.

It is still more difficult to imagine how to suggest better ways to manage the sources of water pollution. On the one hand, Thailand is in a time of tremendous flux. The political system is open to change, and Thais are seeking a new, authoritative voice but uncertainty prevails. On the other hand, an entrenched, cumbersome and outdated bureaucracy manages Thailand. This bureaucracy has proven resistant to change, while its inflexibility and inability to manage interagency cooperation explain much of the country's failure to implement many well-conceived pollution regulation schemes.

Dynamics

To understand Thailand's water pollution crisis, it is first necessary to understand how the dynamics of growth and climate change drive the volume and nature of potential sources of pollution.

Rising wealth, industrialization, increasing tourism and agricultural intensification all force the volume and toxicity of wastes produced in Thailand. (Chak, 2012) Thai waste generation has long tracked GDP growth (approximately 3.5% per year) and industrialization (approximately 6% per year). (www.indexmundi.com) In 2009, Thais generated 15.1 million tons of garbage; in 2015, they generated 29.6 million tons. In 2016, 32.6 million tourists visited, adding tons more garbage and medical waste to total waste production. (According to Wichan Simachaya, Director General of the Pollution Control

Department (PCD), these forces could increase waste accumulation by 600,000 tons per year into the future.) (*Bangkok Post*, 13 June 2016) Agriculture accounts for 40% of land use and contributes 25% of export value; rising demand for agricultural exports to offset lagging growth in other sectors, as well as rising domestic demand for meat are driving intensification of agrochemical use, which has quadrupled in the past decade.

Climate change – a drought-torrential rain-flood cycle plus destructive storms – increases the volume and the toxicity of pollutants released into public waters. Thailand has never successfully contained the major sources of water pollution and current efforts fall short. In Bangkok, the city water drainage system built after the 1983 floods, “was developed mainly for handling localized flooding caused by heavy rainfall, not massive run-offs from the North,” which have become the norm with climate change. (Former senior Bangkok Municipal Authority official, cited in Fernquest, 2011) Although the government estimates that the 2015 floods caused 1.44 trillion baht (\$48 billion) in damages, flood control efforts taken since did little to reduce the impact of floods in 2017 that inundated much of the southern half of the country and launched “islands” of garbage as much as a kilometer long into the Gulf of Thailand. Belatedly recognizing the likely regular repeats of such events, the government recently announced a 228.1 billion baht (\$7.1 billion) flood management scheme to build holding reservoirs upcountry and high capacity floodwater bypasses to Bangkok. (*Bangkok Post*, 18 June 2017) (The plan does nothing, however, to address two critical problems facing Bangkok. It fails to address the organizational failures that made the 2011, 2015 and 2017 floods so devastating because “confusion reigned” among the four ministries and sixteen agencies responsible for flood management. (Somsook and Archer, 2011) (A senior source at the Flood Relief Operation Command described interagency communications during the 2011 flood as “bickering,” adding “They are getting along now, but it’s a bit too late.”) (Somsook and Archer, 2011) It also fails to address all of the pollution floodwaters sweep downstream from the rural North and Northeast that largely lack sewage and waste management facilities.

Thailand’s Current Pollution Control System

Water is easy to pollute. Any potential pollutant that is not securely contained – garbage and landfill leachates, sewage, industrial waste, storm drain runoff, mine tailings, pesticides in fields – will end up in public waterways. The amount of water pollution is a function of the quality of waste management. The better the waste management relative to the amount and type of waste, the lower the water pollution – and vice versa. The size of Thailand’s water pollution crisis is *prima facie* evidence of the failure of its waste management system to cope with the size and complexity of the national waste problem. The best place to start an explanation of Thailand’s water pollution problem is with the byzantine legislative, regulatory and administrative system meant to control it.

Legislation, Administration and Organization

Broad, loosely written legislation regulates waste and waste disposal in Thailand. The legislation and its attendant regulations cover a wide range of issues and involve many ministries and agencies, as well as central, regional and local authorities. The two most important pieces of legislation, the Factory Act (FA) and the Hazardous Substances Act (HAS), supplemented by the Building Control Act, Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act, and Public Health Act, are administered by, *inter alia*,

the Ministries of Agriculture (MA), Health, Industry, Interior, and Natural Resources and Environment by way of, *inter alia*, the Departments of Industrial Works (DIW) and Public Health, the Industrial Estates Authority (IWA), the Office of Natural Resource and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONREPP), and the Wastewater Management Authority (WMA), as well as every provincial, district and sub-district government. Collectively, these laws, regulations and organizations are responsible for managing the handling, use, transportation, disposal of municipal solid waste, wastewater, industrial waste, e-waste, construction waste, thousands of specific chemicals and tens of thousands of brand name formulations that contain them. Where important substantive or jurisdictional issues arise, the government typically establishes special multi-ministry and agency task forces such as the “National E-waste Strategy Approach Committee” to prepare broad plans such as the “Toxic Industrial Waste Disposal Management Master Plan, 2015-2019.”

The waste management system is organized, as is the Thai government as a whole, with roles for central, regional and local authorities. The central government is nominally responsible for legislation, regulation, policy and standards, although it also manages most investment and implementation. Regional governments coordinate between central and local authorities, and in theory local governments are charged with implementing central government commands. In fact, local authorities are also permitted to exempt themselves from inconvenient regulations while, for example, the PCD, nominally charged with approving local authorities’ choices of waste disposal companies, generally gives this responsibility a miss.

Thailand’s large and elaborate waste management system is impressive at first glance, but on examination, it is clear that there is less here than meets the eye. Even if just skimming the surface of the evidence, it is important to review how the routine dysfunction of the waste management system contributes to the major sources of water pollution.

The Limits of the Current System – and the Major Sources of Pollution

The sweeping nature of the legislation, the complexity of the administrative structure, overlapping jurisdictions, absence of specific, enforceable regulations and lack of decentralization of authority and responsibility, as well as of accountability from one end to the other, make Thailand’s waste management system unworkable and have made water pollution control all but impossible. The extra layers of bureaucratic complexity created by the special task forces only exacerbates these problems and the difficulty of implementing the resulting plans that assign no controlling authority or accountability for the accomplishment of defined goals.

Writing for *Thai-American Business*, Audrey Hare and Daniel South point their fingers directly at the current waste management system to explain Thailand’s problems. “The major obstacles to sound waste management,” they warn, “are the overlapping jurisdictions between regulators [referred to here as “Bureaucratic gridlock], the irregular enforcement of environmental laws [referred to here as “No implementation”], and the prevalence of low-cost, illegal waste services providers. (Hare and South, 2008) They note, for example, that bureaucratic confusion often leads to “confusion about [the] proper jurisdiction” each agency commands and to agency concerns “about stepping on each other’s toes” or taking offence “if they think fellow regulators are interfering with their legal jurisdiction.” They report, too, that regulations are often not routinely enforced because there is no formal link between inspectors and

the attorney general. Finally, they observe, the ability of local authorities to override regulations often results in unqualified local favorites being awarded waste disposal contracts.

Setting Aside four Key Sources

I will make no effort to explore four critical sources of water pollution – road transportation, construction, mining and wastewater – because there is so little credible data and so many ministries are involved that each demonstrates as much the failure of interagency collaboration as anything about waste management. Thailand has a large, rapidly growing road network and truck-based national distribution system. With the exception of Bangkok, urban public transportation is underdeveloped and successive governments have sponsored car buyer promotion campaigns. Rain washes pollutants from Thai roads and vehicle particulate emissions from the air. Construction is a driver of GDP growth and generates millions of tons of waste, including hundreds of thousands of tons of asbestos, paint, formaldehyde, and other VOC emitting materials. These are recycled as fill where rain and floodwaters can reach them. Mining is not critical to the GDP, but mercury and cyanide in mine tailings are not contained and pollute downstream waters. Wastewater has long concerned the government. Repeat investments in wastewater treatment plants for large urban areas have been dogged by failure, however. In 2011, for example, the Director General of the PCD noted, “Every day, communities, factories and farms release 14.8 cubic meters of wastewater. Of that amount, only 3.2 cubic meters goes into proper treatment systems.” To deal with the problem, the PCD reported a budget for building wastewater treatment facilities, as did the WMA and ONREPP, which also reported that it would have its own facilities design committee. (*The Nation* 23 February 2017) No sewage systems exist outside of major metropolitan centers (only 21% of the country’s 67 million people have access to a sewage system) and household septic systems are unregulated. (Suwanna, 2013) During floods, rural areas contribute much of their raw sewage to downstream communities.

Simple Lack of Capacity

The Thai waste management system cannot be faulted for lack of ambition – and the gap between mission and funding (actual political commitment) is glaringly large. The FA, for example, charges the DIW to monitor the activities of 68,000 factories – with 322 inspectors. (*The Nation* 23 February 2017) As for wastewater management, as the WMA, PCD and ONREPP all struggled to build water treatment plants to meet demand, of 101 on order at one point, only 91 were technically finished. Twenty of these were not working at all and twenty-eight were discharging poorly treated water, apparently in large measure because neither the implementing agencies nor the local authorities possessed the staff to build or operate them properly. (Janjira, 2012) Similar problems bedevil the oversight of both pesticides and hazardous chemicals more generally. Thailand, for example, has the longest list of banned pesticides in Asia, but every pesticide known to man is available on store shelves in the countryside because no oversight capacity exists, while all four responsible agencies together lack the manpower to track the more than 20,000 different brand name products that contain the 265 permitted ingredients. It is understandably still more difficult to monitor the more than 2,000 chemicals listed by the HAS and the tens of thousands of products that contain them.

Bureaucratic Gridlock

Thai farmers – 40% of the population occupying 40% of the country – spray as much as 150,000 tons of pesticides on crops every year. Thailand, however, lacks “a consolidated, uniform system designed specifically for pesticide management. This deficit has weakened the enforcement of existing regulations, resulting in misuse/overuse of pesticides, and, consequently, increased environmental contamination and human exposure.” (Parinya, 2013) Why? Pesticides are regulated under the HSA through the Hazardous Substance Committee (HSC). Without staff of its own, the HSC works through the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Livestock Development and the Department of Fisheries, which in turn regulate pesticides used in household chemicals, crop production, livestock production and fish culture. These agencies battle among themselves for authority; the MA and the Department of Public Health, for example, set different standards for pesticide residues for farmers to meet. With everyone in charge, no one is in charge.

No Implementation

A critical consequence of the waste management system’s problems is that it cannot implement even when regulations exist. The examples are endless, but a few critical ones will suffice. Take the case of hazardous waste, specifically regulated under both the HSA and the FA and managed by the DIW, the Department of Pollution Control, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources and the IEA. In principle, for example, hazardous waste is supposed to be removed from factory sites by licensed, regulated haulers and disposed of at specialized landfills. The Director General of the DIW estimates, however, that just 5,300 of Thailand’s 68,000 factories disposed of their waste properly, while an environmental activist estimates that 1.9 million tons of hazardous waste “goes missing” every year after leaving factory gates. (firstpost.com, 2014) Even that waste that is, in theory, “properly disposed of” may end up just dumped. Scientists describe standard operating procedure at one of Thailand’s few, registered “sanitary landfills” as follows: “The landfill receives all types of waste materials, particularly solid and hazardous wastes. The different wastes are comingled together without proper sorting and piled on the ground for natural decomposition. Frequently the wastes are incinerated on the open ground so as to reduce their quantities.” (Upomporn, 2008)

No Regulation

No less important are the many cases where there simply is no regulation. One critical example will suffice, that of hazardous waste and hazardous e-waste disposal, which remain effectively unregulated. Here the problem is less that regulations do not exist than that (1) existing regulations are too complex to enforce while (2) many day-to-day products that contain highly toxic substances – florescent light bulbs, exterior paints, paint removers and degreasers – are unregulated and are disposed of in the general garbage. Likewise, the HSA and the FA theoretically regulate e-waste and Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of the HSA specifically identify many items that ought to be regulated. In fact, however, reported Pornpimon Chareongsong from the PCD to the 4th International E-waste Management Network (IEMN) Workshop in Hanoi, Thailand has “no specific law and regulation regarding e-wastes.” For example, although twenty two factories had been “officially permitted to accept e-waste,” there exists “no specific license for recycling e-waste, no formal recycling factory of e-waste in Thailand [and] no mechanical large-scale dismantling equipment.” Thus, he reports, “Most of e-wastes goes (sic) to informal sectors,

i.e., waste pickers, waste buyers, junk shops, waste-recyclers, and waste re-processors.” Without effective regulation, Pornpimon estimates (PCD figures 2012) that Thailand will dump some 5 million TVs, refrigerators and air conditions in 2017 and annually into the future – and with them large quantities of lead, mercury, beryllium, cadmium, other toxic metals and chemicals including PCBs. (Pornpimon, nd)

Poor Man’s Pollution

Always an issue, if seldom on the radar, poor man’s pollution is perhaps Thailand’s greatest threat and challenge. In brief, “poor man’s pollution” refers to the pollution generated by normal people that collects unnoticed in plain sight – farmers’ fertilizers and pesticides, oil, gas and hydraulic fluid dumped at garages, household cleaners, paints, building materials, batteries, electronics – plowed into fields, soaked into the ground, dumped in village dumps, burned in trash fires, etc. Thailand, for example, boasts more than 25 battery manufacturers, millions of flashlights, battery powered cellphones and laptops, small-scale solar systems with battery packs, and motorbikes, automobiles, trucks and tractors with batteries – all of which contain high levels of toxic heavy metals. A large portion of these batteries end up burned in open trash fires or dumped in open landfills that owners then burn to reduce volume before covering. More generally, while even the very best sanitary landfills leach poisonous liquids into local ground water and aquifers, open dumps and landfills leach huge quantities not just of heavy metals, but also organic and inorganic toxics. (Yousoff, 2013)

By its very nature, poor man’s pollution is impossible to estimate, but the volume is surely huge. How, for example, should we estimate the volume of fuel leaking into aquifers from underground tanks at gas stations or spilled at garages or dumped out the back by do-it-yourself mechanics? How many tons of pig shit and pig piss should we assume will escape containment after heavy rains? How much toxic fallout do old ladies’ front yard trash fires generate annually?

You see the problem.

So let me note just two important sources that are partially quantifiable.

A Problem with the Numbers: Garbage

Complicating efforts to assess the sources of water pollution in Thailand is the poor quality of the data. The difficulty is akin to the problem of the drunk looking for his lost keys under the street light – it is where he can see. In Thailand, statistics refer to waste generation, wastewater generation, and so on for municipal areas – where it is possible to measure such things, and largely ignore waste generated in rural areas where it is extremely hard to measure. Thus, for example, in 2007, a scientific survey reported 425 waste disposal sites (95 landfills, 330 open sites), in 2011 the PCD reported 127 waste disposal sites (112 landfills, 96 in operation) and in 2014 the PCD reported 2,500 waste disposal sites (500 “properly managed).” (Chiemchaisiri, 2007) While wildly different, these numbers are all nonsensical.

In rural areas without garbage collection, garbage not burned in the backyard goes to the village dump.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ In Thailand, sub-districts are generically known as “Tambons;” in practice, however, there are three forms of the sub-district: the Tambon proper, the Tessaabon and the ABT, differentiated from one another by size, authority and services provided. Tambons and Tessaabons collect garbage; ABTs do not. In fact, in rural areas, most Tessaabons

The village dump is a convenient ravine. When the ravine is full, villagers fire it to reduce the volume of the waste. When the ravine is full, they choose a new site. There are 878 districts (Ampure) in Thailand. Assuming that one quarter are rural enough to lack garbage collection (more than half are classified rural), that each district has eight sub-districts (Tessabons or ABTs) and each sub-district has eight villages, there are 14,080 village dumps in rural Thailand. In such districts, the district itself lacks a “properly managed” landfill and standard practice is to dump trash in a pile, burn it weekly and plow dirt over it. This adds 220 more dumps to bring our hypothetical total of rural dumpsites to 14,300. Because we know that 50% of the Thai population is rural, our 220 districts contain one quarter of the national population of 67 million or 16,750,000 residents. If we assume that rural people generate one-half as much garbage per day as urban residents (0.55 kg as opposed to 1.1 kg) (Chinda, 2014) then these 14,300 village dumps take in 9,212 tons per day or 3,362,380 tons per year. Rainwater carries the leachates from these thousands of ravine dumps – pesticide concentrates, paints, motor oils, heavy metals, PCBs – into local aquifers, reservoirs, streams and rivers.

Not just Dumps: Pesticides

Village dumps are an obvious source of rural water pollution but should not overshadow the most important source of poor man’s pollution: the direct, large-scale application of agro-chemicals. Forty percent of Thailand is farmland and 40% of Thais are farmers. Thailand is the 4th biggest user of pesticides in Asia and the 3rd heaviest user per crop unit. (Parinya, 2013) (Annual imports of active ingredients topped 100,000 tons for the decade prior to 2010 and today top 150,000 tons.)

These are not benign chemicals. One third of the active ingredients Thailand imports are WHO Class I or II pesticides (Extremely Hazardous or Very Hazardous), several are not even registered as appropriate for use by WHO and some are known or suspected carcinogens or endocrine disruptors. (Parinya, 2013) Moreover, pesticides are water-soluble (farmers must mix concentrates with water before spraying them) such that when it rains they migrate easily to aquifers, reservoirs, streams and rivers. Pesticides enter the food chain both through crops in the field and runoff. With climate change, the quantity of pesticides people encounter is increasing as powerful storms wash more top soil off fields and displace accumulated toxic residues in stream and riverbed sediment.

Is Poor Man’s Pollution Really a Problem?

When we think about pollution, we tend not to think about the countryside. No question about it, urban and industrial pollution is sexier than poor man’s pollution. On reflection, however, poor man’s pollution is a huge problem, sexy or not.

Consider, for a moment, poor man’s pollution in this time of climate change induced flooding, abetted by continued deforestation, agricultural intensification and the spreading blight of mountain top corn plantations. Consider what floodwaters will collect on their way south to Bangkok. Hundreds of thousands of tons of roadside litter. The accumulated excrement of twenty million people. The liquefied contents of 10,000 village dumps. The pesticide residues of ten million farmers. The oils and hydraulic fluids of thousands of garages and hundreds of thousands of motorbikes, cars, truck, farm vehicles and

collect garbage only from villagers living on main roads. Few Tessabons and no ABTs have regulated waste sites but follow the procedure described here.

tractors. The manure of millions of chickens, cows, ducks and pigs. The fallout from millions of housewives' afternoon trash fires. The casually dumped waste of thousands of local clinics and hospitals. And lots and lots more. OK, so it is not sexy, but there is a lot of it – and would you really want the mud the floodwaters leave behind in your kitchen?

You see the problem.

Sexy, Super-solutions: Inappropriate for the Task at Hand

Whatever else may be said about Thailand's current system of waste management, the most important thing to say is that it is the wrong tool to take on poor man's pollution. Despite the criticisms that I have repeated here, I believe that with some fiddling the existing system is fine for dealing with the obvious and easy part of Thailand's waste management: effluents and waste from urban centers and industrial estates. I also believe that all of the data and the very characteristics of poor man's pollution render the existing system all wrong for solving Thailand's most pressing pollution problem.

What Not To Do

Governments are seldom satisfied with partial or progressive solutions to problems. Governments, in general, like to legislate or decree immediate, comprehensive, all-in-one solutions to problems, no matter how complex.

Such approaches can work. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is a successful example. Everything about the EPA as an organization, however, explains why it is exceptional. It is a single-purpose agency created at a unique political moment specifically to regulate pollution, no matter where or what the source. It possesses administrative autonomy at all levels of government, the authority to regulate in the domains of other agencies, even states, and to bring legal action against those who violate the rules. It also possesses the deep penetrating organizational capacity and manpower to carry out its mandate down to the level of individual farms and factories.

The EPA is singular because of its legal basis, the clarity of its mission, the accountability of its director for the accomplishment of the mission articulated in measured, publicly visible outcomes. It is unique, too, in its administrative structure, authority, and organizational capacity. The EPA is the administrative and operational opposite of the Thai pollution control system.

Should Thailand build an EPA?

No.

Why not?

For all of the reasons that gave rise to the current system.

The Thai pollution control system is *not* a mistake unless one mistakes its primary purposes as combatting pollution, *which it is not*. The broad, sweeping nature of the legislation, the inclusive complexity of the overlapping ministerial jurisdictions, etc. that characterize the current pollution control system have nothing to do with how Thai environmental policy experts believe a pollution control system *ought* to be organized. Rather, the structure and weaknesses of the system are the product of political and bureaucratic bargaining in which powerful business interests, political brokers and bureaucrats jealous of their agencies' prerogatives ultimately agreed who should get what. The actual, effective control of pollution seldom, if ever, figured

importantly in the battles that shaped the system.¹⁴⁷

Any effort to create a new “super authority” to “control pollution” will be subject to intense resistance from power holders in the existing system and all of those whose interests it serves now. It will also be subject to the conflicting political and bureaucratic pressures of politics as usual, and to lobbying by those interests that might gain from any change. There is, therefore, no reason to believe that such an effort will produce a ‘better’ system than the current one. Of necessity, confronting water pollution in Thailand requires working within the current dysfunctional bureaucracy, because there is no reason to believe that a better system can be built.

Whatever else the government may implement during the next five, ten or twenty year plans, I believe that it is necessary to implement a meaningful response to the immediate threat posed by poor man’s pollution. Here, therefore, I want to outline the model of an extremely basic system for reducing water pollution in Thailand that requires an absolute minimum of legislation, regulation and administration, the implementation of which will not interfere with other government pollution control initiatives. I want to propose an approach based on the KISS principle: Keep It Simple, Stupid.

KISSing Water Pollution

Let me start by making a simple, often overlooked distinction: the larger and more concentrated a source of pollution, the easier it is to control. We all tend to fixate on big smokestacks, but factories do not go walk about; they are always right there producing the same stuff and are therefore easy to regulate. The City of Bangkok and big industrial parks may produce huge quantities of complex wastes. They are easy to identify and treat, however, especially for a government with the capacity to undertake large infrastructure projects. Furthermore, such waste streams are public knowledge, subject to discussion in the press and, more important, to international scrutiny.

If the current Thai government has proven anything, it is a capacity to make decisive commitments to large-scale, high visibility, public-infrastructure projects. There is no reason to believe that over time – and it will be in power for many years – this government will not succeed in building a waste and wastewater management infrastructure for Thailand’s large urban and industrial centers.

Conversely, far from the concentrated waste streams of Thailand’s urban and industrial centers, is the huge potential for water pollution that lies in hundreds of thousands of small, dispersed locations in the deep countryside. Politically, these are “out of sight, out of mind;” environmentally, they *are* the problem. They are also just the type of pollution threats most difficult for any central administration to meet, especially a central administration as locally dysfunctional as Thailand’s.

What to do? Design and implement a system that operates on its own.

On what principles should such a system be build and how might it work in practice?

¹⁴⁷ Lest anyone mistake this for a slight to Thailand, the story of the EPA is no different, except that the process that birthed it were different. Today, this process is clearly visible as the Trump Administration fundamentally redesigns the EPA. The President’s ideological preferences and those of his followers, as well as pressure from powerful constituent groups, are rapidly eroding the EPA’s mission, administrative autonomy and regulatory powers. The battles being fought over the mission, organization and authority of the EPA in 2017 have little to do with the environment and everything to do with power, politics and money. In bureaucratic politics, policy is not what is planned, but what happens.

The Four Principles of KISS

Principle 1.

Programs must have easily quantified, easily measured outcomes that are articulated and announced to the public in advance, with results published on completion.

- Example: Programs that promise to 'educate' people about the 3Rs (Reduce, Reuse, Recycle) are useless as there is no quantifiable, measurable relationship between education and the target outcome: reduction, reuse and/or recycling. Programs that promise to increase the recycling rate from X% to Y% by increasing the number of tons of recyclables collected from Y to Z, however, meet Principle 1.

Principle 2.

Programs must require only simple, mechanical activities and not depend on technology or technical support services not today available in every rural village.

- Example: Programs that require specialists, sending samples to special labs, or specialized technology go nowhere. Programs that require no more than matching pesticides on shelves to lists or counting pesticide containers in farmers' fields meet Principle 2.

Principle 3.

Programs must reward initiative by those responsible for actions that advance a program, but must hold specific people personally accountable for program outcomes, irrespective of career moves.¹⁴⁸

- Example: Programs that require all program directors to follow the same template, fail in most places; those where no one is accountable fail or are never implemented. Programs that tell those accountable "this is the mission, get it done," permit them to do the job their way, but make clear that they will be personally accountable for meeting the measured, publically announced results of Principle 1 meet Principle 3.

Principle 4.

Programs must require no more than a one-time intervention that leads market incentives to cause people to act as desired out of self-interest.

- Example: Programs that require complex rules, regulations, punishments and large numbers of government staff to implement are costly, cumbersome and seldom work. Programs that result in a desired behavior (e.g., safe disposal of pesticide containers) by creating a financial incentive that works autonomously through the private sector meet Principle 4.

KISS Principles in Action: Examples

KISS principles apply to a virtually limitless number and variety of distributed sources of potential water pollution. I have chosen to outline three illustrative examples here: the implantation of recycling at

¹⁴⁸ It is commonly understood in Chiang Mai, for example, that a major reason why haze suppression programs are not pursued seriously is that the governor is transferred to Bangkok before the next haze season. This eliminates his accountability for the failure of "his" haze suppression measures.

government facilities; the imposition of required recycling at all dumpsites; and the creation of a national market for recycled batteries. Feel free to develop your own example for the management of effluents from small garages and motorbike shops, safe disposal of pesticide containers, dangerous and illegal pesticides on store shelves, household cleaning agents, paints and solvents, etc.

Recycling at Government Facilities

The government's failure to practice what it preaches has left the public cynical about government policy initiatives. In the North, for example, government facilities – schools, hospitals, clinics, police stations, administrative offices – burn during the haze season. Not surprisingly, people ask: If they can burn, why can't we?" Today, the government preaches the 3Rs as its best solution to the garbage crisis – but does not recycle itself.

In rural areas, the government is often the largest modern sector employer and produces the most recyclables. With a single act, the government could order all government facilities to separate and recycle all materials for which there exists a market, and could designate each District Head accountable for executing the order.

- Principle 1: This program would have clear, easily measured outcomes. It is easy to weigh, record and value each recyclable and to compare similar facilities (within and among districts) by the composition, quantity and value of recyclables recorded. Annual collection targets for each facility can be set based on past performance and comparisons with other facilities, and published.
- Principle 2: This program requires no technical support. What the market will buy determines which recyclables employees sort into which bin. Provincial authorities can monitor performance by consulting local recyclers and publish the results.
- Principle 3: Every facility director can organize recycling at his/her facility, but each will be accountable if his/her facility fails to meet its goals. Accountability will be in the form of the director's ability to give an annual "environmental bonus" (based on the value of recyclables collected) to employees depending on whether or not the facility meets its recycling target.
- Principle 4: This program requires one government intervention: the order that government facilities recycle. As for market incentive, each facility receives 100% of the income from recycling, distributed by the director as an annual "environmental bonus" to employees. If a facility fails to meet its target, all recycling revenues go to a "waste management infrastructure fund." Employees hold the director accountable for their environmental bonus; the enthusiasm with which employees pursue recycling determines the size of their bonus.

Cleaning up Small, Illegal, Local Dump Sites

In urban areas, residents take garbage collection for granted; there is no garbage collection in rural areas. This has big implications for water pollution because of population and waste distribution. As noted above, rural Thailand is dotted with thousands of small, open dumps, all leaching toxins into the public waters directly and contributing to water pollution indirectly through toxic "fallout" from burning garbage.

A critical weakness in the current pollution control system lies in the ability of local officials to thwart central efforts to improve the quality of local waste management by contracting with unlicensed, unregulated, local trash haulers. Changing this system would be extremely difficult because of embedded local power relationships. The central government can require, however, that all local, non-urban dumps – legal or illegal – operating at the district or sub-district level have an onsite recycling sorting center to sort garbage before final disposal. Such a regulation would not require intervening in local politics – therefore generating pushback – but just the arm’s length quasi-regulation (and recognition) of current practice. This program would not eliminate all of the problems associated with open dumps; it would, however, raise recycling rates and reduce the amount of toxic smoke and fallout from burning garbage.

- Principle 1: This program would have clear, easily measured outcomes: the sorting facility itself and the streams of recyclables. Facilities are easy to photograph and record. It is easy to weigh, record and value each recyclable and to compare similar facilities (within and among districts) by the composition, quantity and value of recyclables recorded. Annual collection targets for each facility can be set based on past performance and comparisons with other facilities, and published.
- Principle 2: This program requires no technical support. Local people, likely hired by the trash collector, sort the garbage into the appropriate piles. Officials can monitor the quality of work by auditing the recycler.
- Principle 3: The designated local official may assign the work to whichever local contractor (s)he wishes and organize the recycling operation as (s)he sees fit. (S)he is accountable, however, for the recycling center’s performance. (S)he will receive a bonus of 5% of any revenue generated by the center above its annual target, but will be fined the difference between the center’s annual target and any under delivery.
- Principle 4: This program requires a single government intervention. It operates because a private contractor makes a monopoly profit from exploiting a rich waste stream and because the responsible authority faces a large fine if (s)he fails to perform.

Removing Batteries from the Waste Stream

Heavy metals are a particularly nasty pollutant because they are long lasting and easily enter the food chain. Heavy metals enter the environment many ways, I want to focus on just one: batteries. We use millions of them every year – and toss them away. In the soil, they corrode and leak heavy metals. Trash collectors burn garbage piles, destroying batteries’ outside casing and releasing heavy metals into the air (to return to earth as toxic fallout). After burning dump piles, trash collectors simply cover them with dirt. Ground and rainwater leach the heavy metals into surface wells, fishponds, rivers and aquifers.

What to do?

Regulated disposal? Special sanitary landfills?

Too much work. Never happen. Leak anyway.

The KISS solution is to make collecting and recycling batteries into a profitable business that resupplies battery manufacturers with the heavy metals for future production.

How to do this? Pass one, unencumbered law: If you manufacture or import batteries worth more than X baht per year, you are legally required to buy back any batteries – anyone's batteries of any sort – from any seller at the current market price.

- Principle 1: We know whom you are because we know what you make or import and how much money you make doing so. If you refuse offers to sell, sellers will report you. We know what the market price is.
- Principle 2: This program has no technical requirements. It assumes that improperly disposed of batteries will cause heavy metal pollution and makes no effort to measure contamination. It focuses solely on the mechanical collection of batteries. Recyclers buy products by the kilogram; the only equipment required is a scale.
- Principle 3: This program itself will not provide incentives for battery makers. The market will reward companies that are aggressive and efficient in their battery collection, and battery reselling or manufacturing operations. Battery company owners, however, will be legally accountable if their firm fails to buy offered batteries.
- Principle 4: This program requires a single regulatory action to set it in motion. Once companies have invested in battery reclamation lines, a market price for used batteries will stabilize linking battery users, collectors/recyclers and companies. This market will never be complete; it will, however, remove many batteries from the environment and reduce demand for heavy metals.

Why just KISS? Why not go all the way?

KISS solutions to big, sexy problems like a national water pollution crisis seem drab. What politician, after all, can get excited about a battery collection program when (s)he might be discussing low-temperature plasma technology for municipal solid waste vaporization and power generation?

Here is a real problem. The population of the North, Northeast and South – most of Thailand – is too poor and too low-class for political consideration, and too dispersed for sexy solutions. I will keep it simple and sidestep the critical but publically inappropriate issues aside here, to focus on the practical. The per village or per capita cost of investments in sanitary landfills and the like, to say nothing of the carbon cost of operation, rise exponentially as population density falls. But the poor man's pollution threat is real. Climate change will not slow. The drought-torrential rains-floods cycle will continue making all of these grubby little poor man's sources of pollution into big, Bangkok-sized problems. This is the law of large numbers. Thirty five million times even small messes produces one very large mess.

But the size of the final mess does not mean that a simple, sexy, super-solution will solve the problem. Each nasty little mess requires its own, appropriate and appropriately sized solution. Doctors in training are told: when you hear hoofs, think horses, not zebras. I would warn those who want to solve Thailand's water pollution problem: when you hear pollution, think KISS, not big bureaucracy.

Conclusion

This paper looks hard at water pollution in Thailand from “poor man’s sources.” It contends that the current waste management and pollution control systems cannot protect Thai citizens from the health dangers posed now and into the future by such pollution. It does not prescribe legislative, administrative, regulatory or organizational changes to the current system. Rather, it develops a parallel system for addressing the challenge of poor man’s pollution. Based on four “KISS principles,” this system focuses on readily undertaken, practical measures that if implemented will dramatically reduce the current and future “load” of potential pollution from poor man’s sources. The KISS system will not solve Thailand’s water pollution crisis, but provides an effective means to attack a key element of the problem that is – and will remain – beyond central management for years.

The KISS system proposed here is not a condemnation of the Thai government’s long standing effort to manage waste and pollution; to the contrary, it is conceivable only because Thailand has a long history of sustained effort to do so. Rather, this program simply recognizes a reality identified long ago by scholars of bureaucratic politics: big bureaucracies are not and cannot be finely tuned instruments; they mash, not slice. This said, it is important to recognize what Thailand’s large, complex waste and pollution management bureaucracy has achieved and will achieve in the future. It has mobilized huge amounts of public capital to address the large-scale issues best addressed by broad legislation, regulation and central bureaucracies. Where the issue is centralized, focused problems on the scale of the waste of Bangkok, major industrial parks in Chunburi, or wastewater runoff from the international airport, the government is on the job and doing a good job.

The most immediate water pollution problem that Thai citizens face, however, comes not from large-scale, centralized sources, but from tens of thousands of tiny sources scattered across the countryside. These are not realistically within the grasp of central authority. Small or not, collectively these sources are deadly today and will only get more so over the years that it will take for an improved national regulatory system to manage them better. In the meantime, KISS offers a way to minimize the accumulation of poor man’s waste, and the current and future load of poor man’s pollution to which citizens are exposed.

The KISS approach is not just for Thailand. Indeed, it offers even more to the great majority of developing countries that lack Thailand’s wealth, technical expertise, and waste and pollution management capacity. For many countries, KISS offers a tool for addressing waste and pollution at the source, while at the same time contributing to the global effort to reduce consumption of limited resources and the production of environmentally damaging goods.

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Representation of Ethnic Identity Thorough Spatial Conservation of the House and the Dwelling in Northern Thailand

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Abstract

Today, tourism has become an important industry, especially in developing countries, where tourism development equates to community development. In Thailand, as in other Southeast Asian countries where cultural diversity is high, the tourist industry has been operating for a long time. The tourism authority was established in 1959 in Thailand with the aim of attracting foreign investment to tourism investments. After Sukhothai and Ayutthaya were given world heritage status, domestic tourism increased considerably. Recently, a new type of tourism, ecotourism, has emerged and become popular, adding to the diversity of tourism in both purpose and content. Ecotourism is generally developed at the community level and requires a relatively small investment compared to the conventional large-scale tourism controlled mostly by outside agents.

This article examines the current situation of using traditional housing and dwelling culture to develop a tourism resource in Ban Ton Haen Noi (hereinafter THN), a Tai-Khun village of Chiang Mai. The village, established around 300 years ago by migrants from the former Burma, is enterprising small-scale tourism by providing homestay services that give tourists an experience of life in the village. After conducting intensive research using interviews, participant observations, and drawings of the houses, it was concluded that the villagers were able to preserve their culture not only for tourism purposes but also to maintain their relationship with their original lands in Burma and to promote a revival of the ethnic identity they had lost during integration to Thailand.

In such contexts, the use of the culture is an alternative method for developing the society. In addition, it gives the residents the opportunity to maintain their ethnic identity by utilizing their traditional housing and dwelling culture.

Keywords: Tai-Khun, Housing, Dwelling, Tourism

Perspective

Housing Culture in Modern Tourism

Recently, in Southeast Asian countries, in addition to conventional historical or resort tourism, there has been a significant growth in ecotourism, green tourism, and eco-museums, all of which originally emerged in Europe. (Masaka, Ishimori, Kaizu, 2011). Ecotourism has become popular quickly with many domestic cultures becoming a target for tourist development.

Usually, the main agents for tourism are international organizations, administrations, developers, tour companies, and planners. As conventional tourism is generally arranged by outside agents and requires larger investments, it contributes more to national and city economies than to that of the local community. However, eco-museums or green tourism is developed at the community level that requires relatively little capital, as its focus is on the “existing culture”; therefore, farmhouses, private homes, and local meals are used to attract tourists and local residents usually take the main role in driving the tourism and ensuring sustainability of the traditional culture in terms of the accommodations and food provided for the tourists.

In this paper, we present an account of the social activities of the villagers in THN, who are focused on developing the existing THN housing and dwelling culture to develop additional ways that the community can attract tourists to more local areas of modern Thailand. As is well known, Bangkok is a megacity with a large, growing population and recent massive urban development. Bangkok is a distinguished center for politics, economics, royalty and materiality; however, as there is a large disparity between life in Bangkok and life in other regions, our research sought to capture the new tourism occurring in rural Thailand.

Thailand has promoted tourism since the 1970's. The tourism resources at that time were historical royal sites, natural parks, food, and Buddhism (Lertcharnrit, 2013). After the integration of the ethnic minority groups in the northern mountainous area in the 1990s, the respective cultures of these groups also became a tourism resource. Even though this was promoted as cultural tourism, there was little focus on developing an administration to care for domestic cultural property (Akagawa and Tiamsoon, 2005) by the Ministry of Culture and especially the Fine Arts Department, which is responsible for administering cultural property. To preserve national identity, the main target has been the maintenance of Thai authentic culture, so the traditional culture associated with the local housing or local landscapes was not often considered. In recent years, a survey was undertaken to examine which villages had maintained their traditional lives to determine which could be culturally preserved; however, lowland rural villages such as THN have been generally ignored as tourist destinations without any assessment of their outstanding cultural qualities.

Regardless of this administrative snub, THN villagers are actively focused on maintaining and utilizing their cultural resources for tourism. Such activities could be seen as a way to revitalize their communities and give them a self-reliance independent of the state. The THN case demonstrates the future possibilities for the sustainable tourist development of Southeast Asian local communities.

Representation of Self in the Housing and Dwelling

In this article, we examine how the people themselves represent the housing and dwelling culture today and why they are trying to do it in such ways (Shimizu, 2016a–b; 2015a–d; 2014; Waterson, 1995; 1993;


1990). We examine the intentions of people who wish to represent themselves in the development of the housing and dwelling culture for tourism.

The tourism intentions are diverse in each village or each rural area. THN is a typical rural village in Thailand; it has a declining birth rate, is being affected by globalization and urbanization and is also in the midst of a nation-state process. By maintaining and conserving the original material culture including the houses, they are attempting to strengthen their bonds with their ethnic history and the origins of the land to restore and maintain their ethnic identity.

Methodology

Primary data were collected through intensive fieldwork in THN over three years; from September 22nd to October 1st, 2014; from September 16th to 21st, 2015; and from September 25th to October 1st, 2016. Field work included interviews with villagers, measuring the houses, rice granaries, the village itself, and the specific architecture related to spirit worship. The measurement survey included the plan (1/50), the sections (1/30 - 50), the house sites (1/100 - 200) and the whole village. We surveyed 20 houses in the village over the three years. Interviews were conducted with representatives of each household using a prepared questionnaire. Information was gathered on basic demographic data such as age, occupation, and the social role of each household member as well as on the households' daily activities and daily schedules. The villagers were also asked about how they planned to use the inside and outside spaces of

Figure 1: Map of THN village




the house and what remodeling and renovation plans they had. We also interviewed local carpenters about the construction methods and the skills required.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, the village and house are described with a particular focus on architecture. Then, we describe the progress that has been made to develop the traditional culture in the village and the activities undertaken to preserve the traditional housing and dwelling. After that, we examine how the housing and dwelling culture can be used as a tourism resource. Finally, we consider what the housing and dwelling represents and how it can be promoted in the context of modern Thailand.

THN as a Tai-Khun Village

Chiang Mai Province is divided into 24 districts (Ampoo), with an additional 204 sub-districts (Tambon) and 1915 villages (Mubaan); THN belongs to Tambon Thawanphraw, Ampoo Sampatong. The village has a population of 661 and has around 200 houses. The village is located 30 km south of Chiang Mai city and

Figure 2: House site (left) and house plan (right)



is along the Khan River which is a tributary of the Ping River. On the western side of the village there are lam yai and paddy fields; however, most households hire workers or rent their paddy fields to others, rather than farming themselves. Dong Chai temple is in the northwest of the village center. In the central village square, there are shrines for the village guardian spirit, Sua Baan.

The Khun migrated from Kengtung in Shan State in the former Burma to northern Thailand more than 300 years ago. Their language is similar to the Tai-Lue or the Lao dialect and they have their own spiritual faith in addition to the Buddhism. Today, thousands of Khun reside near THN.

In THN, there are many activities to encourage the villagers to preserve their traditional culture. As part of village social activities, village revitalization is being conducted in many villages in Thailand; however, such activities have not often led to tangible results. On the other hand, in THN, cultural activities are being developed to distinguish THN from the other villages in the area, which are examined in the later section.

House of THN

House Form

The house sites vary in size and form, but are commonly surrounded by fences and hedges. In addition to the main house, there is a rice storage hut, a toilet, and a garage. Banana and papaya trees are grown throughout the village. As the Khun have been engaging in agriculture, the rice granary is considered a village treasure, so even though there is less agriculture today, a lot of the rice granaries have been preserved in the village. The granaries have several arrangements and orientations; however, most are arranged facing east as this is considered a sacred and auspicious direction. In the corner of the house

site is a shrine dedicated to the land owner spirit, Chao Tii, who is the guardian spirit of the site.

Traditional houses (heuan) are built of bamboo and timber and are on high stilts, with the main living platform far above the ground as protection against floods and to keep livestock under the floor. The houses have a front space (huck lum), a living room (huck bon), a main sleeping room for the eldest person and their spouse (nai heuan luang), a sleeping room (nai heuan noi), a corridor (hoom lin), a kitchen (heuan fai), and a bathroom which has a toilet and shower (suam). Up the main stairs and through the main door is the huck lum, which normally has a water bottle for drinking and hand washing and a chair or sofa for guests. There is a step of about 20 to 30 cm from the huck lum to huck bon, which is the largest space in the house and is often located on the east side, in which there are desks, chairs, TVs, refrigerators, and display shelves for silver products, portraits, and lacquerware. In addition to being used as a meals and relaxation space, huck bon can also be used for unexpected guests as an extra sleeping room by enclosing one corner. Wedding ceremonies, funerals, and religious ceremonies are also held in this room for members of the household, relatives, and villagers. When monks are invited, they occupy the most sacred places in the space which are usually near the Buddhist altar. Although the huck bon is in a private detached house, it has public space characteristics.


On the contrary, as the sleeping rooms are the most private spaces, there are walls separating them from the main house to prevent people other than household members entering. As even opening the door and looking inside is prohibited, the doors are locked during the day. Usually, the main sleeping room is placed on the east side and is occupied by the oldest household couple or individual, while the sleeping room on the west side across the corridor is used by younger household members. At the end of the corridor at the back of the house, there is a kitchen. Previously, a hearth was used for cooking, but now there is more commonly a propane gas stove. The underfloor area is used for various activities such as sleeping, watching TV, entertaining guests and even having meals.

House Structure

Table 1: House ages in THN

No	Year of construction	Age	No	Year of construction	Age
No.1	1937	79	No.11	1957	59
No.2	1954	62	No.12	1957	59
No.3	1938	78	No.13	1940	76
No.4	1931	85	No.14	1980	36
No.5	1949	67	No.15	2011	5
No.6	1952	64	No.16	1962	54
No.7	1953	63	No.17	1967	49
No.8	1966	50	No.18	1962	54
No.9	1938	78	No.19	1956	60
No.10	1953	63	No.20	2016	1

Figure 3: Section of the house



Most THN houses were built 60 to 80 years ago. The Khun house is similar in structure to the traditional Northern Thai house. The main structure is composed of posts and beams with each post standing on a foundation base, which used to be natural stone, but is now more commonly made of concrete. The roof has a hip-and-gable design and at the intersection of the eaves, there is a drain that takes the rainwater away from the roof. Traditionally, the roofing materials were soil pounded tiles, which were laid over bamboo rafters; however, as there are no longer any artisans in the village who can make these tiles, industrial materials such as slate and corrugated iron sheet are now more common. When constructing a house in THN, there are strict rules that must be followed; for example, the number and length of the posts and beams must be auspicious as the size and layout of the rooms are determined by these decisions. The THN carpenters have a manual that clearly describes the correct methods for building these traditional houses.

There is also an established rule about stairs; when installing stairs, the person going up the stairs should not at any time face east and if there are two staircases, they should not to face to each other. Therefore, none of the houses surveyed had stairs going from the west to the east; of the 36 staircases in the 20 houses, 24 were built in an east to west direction, 9 were built from north to south, and 3 were built from south to north. Of the 17 houses that had two sets of stairs, none were facing each other; however, there were 11 houses with the stairs facing in the same direction, of which 9 were from the east to west and 2 were from north to the south. When there are two sets of stairs, they are generally built facing the same direction.

Activities on Traditional Culture

Village Committee



Plate 1: Construction manual

The THN village committee, Khana Kammakaan Mubaan, which was established by villagers with knowledge of the village history and the local spiritual or Buddhist ceremonies, is responsible for maintaining and developing the village and encouraging cultural conservation. The committee was originally set up to organize the Buddhist related events and it was officially approved by the local administration about 10 years ago. There are 29 committee members and the roles are divided into

several sectors such as agriculture, culture, and health. In THN, these committee members drive the awareness and development of cultural conservation.

25 houses were selected by the committee to be kept in a traditional form to showcase the traditional village life. The criterion for the selection was that the house had to be made of wood, had to have a traditional roof and spatial organization, and had to be stilts or a raised floor with a stone foundation on which the posts were erected. Besides these 25 houses, many villagers are still living in traditional houses, so the village landscape still has a traditional appearance.

Private Museum

There is a private museum which displays agricultural tools, bamboo and wooden crafts, and daily necessities. The owner, who has a role in the village committee, renovated his rice granaries, and uses these as the display space.



Plate 2: Inside the museum

The museum has a one-story and a two-story hut. The one-story hut is used to exhibit various fishing tools, tools for rice planting, harvesting, threshing, and carpentry tools. Daily necessities from the past to the present are displayed on the first floor of the two-story hut and the Khun ethnic calendar, lacquerware, and traditional costumes are displayed on the second floor. There is also a small room that replicates a traditional sleeping room on the second floor.

Compiling and Publishing the Booklet on Tai-Khun



Plate 3: Booklet entitled: Culture of Tai-Khun of THN

With grants from the local government, in 2011, the village committee published a 62-page booklet entitled the “Culture of Tai-Khun of THN”, which introduced the traditional Khun culture in THN, information for which was provided by the committee members. The booklet describes the traditional culture and ethnography of the village; the history of THN, clothing, language, herbal medicines, local food, and the current efforts to preserve these traditional cultures.

Moreover, the owners and locations of the 25 traditional houses, of which we surveyed 20, are listed on a map.

The booklet has five chapters. In the first chapter, the history and ethnic origins in former Burma, the migration from Shan State, and the history of the Don Chai temple are described. In chapter 2, life, traditional clothing, housing, medical care, and faith are described. Chapter 3 examines inherited culture such as textiles and traditional lacquerware and also describes the museum. Chapter 4 introduces the specific villagers who are active in developing the culture and in chapter 5, various annual cultural activities and events are introduced.

Homestay Project

A homestay project was recently planned by the villagers, for which several houses were remodeled. For example, the surface of the old wall was scraped off and the wax painted at one house in 2016 and a section under the floor was renovated to accommodate guests.



Plate 4: House renovated for the homestay project

Several villagers have been working together on this project since 2015 and they hope that the project will be approved by the local administration in the future. The committee recruited volunteers from the owners of the traditional houses and registered their houses as accommodation so that tourists can stay several nights and participate in study tours.

This project's goals are to introduce Khun culture and improve the economic situation in the village. By the summer of 2016, six houses had been registered. Because of the lack of any foreign language ability, the villagers mainly accommodate Thai tourists, but in some

cases foreigners are also accepted. The accommodation costs around 400 to 500 Baht a day which includes Khun style meals. Guests sleep with the host families, experience traditional food in the morning and evening, and participate in study tours in conjunction with another Khun village around THN.

In connection with this project, the committee plans to resurrect traditional crafts such as fabric making and lacquerware; these had been made previously in THN, but there are now no skilled artisans left in the village. They are also planning to sell local products such as dried fermented beans or traditionally patterned foot mats. They also plan to expand the tourist experiences further by offering agricultural visits and boat trips to neighboring Khun villages located along the river. However, if tourism expands rapidly in THN, it could have a significant influence on the lives of the villagers; therefore, there is a common understanding of the villagers that tourism activities should be conducted carefully and with considerable caution. In the 2016 survey, we interviewed villagers about whether they agreed with the development of tourism in the village and found that it was viewed favorably.

Various traditional cultural activities are being conducted every day in the village, which demonstrates the overall village enthusiasm for tourism development. In the following description, we describe the housing and dwelling in this context.

Village Spatial Characteristics

In this section, THN's spatial features are described in terms of the spatial organization of the village, the facilities, and the spaces set aside for the indigenous faith. As shown in the village map, a relatively large street (Soi 1) runs alongside the Khan River and there are several alleys (Soi 2 to 15) branching off from Soi 1. The area between Soi 2 to 8 is the southern part of the village and from Soi 9 to 15 is the northern part.

There is a crematorium in the southwest of the village and a former elementary school in the northwest, and Dong Chai temple at the northwest end. In the village center, as mentioned, there is the shrine of Sua Baan and in the northern part, there is a shrine for the guardian spirit of the northern part. Next to the shrine, there is a public area which has a children's playground and an area for relaxation for the old. There are also several shrines for the ancestors of the family that established the village, called Phi Puu Yaa.

Dong Chai Temple



Plate 5: Dong chai temple

Dong Chai Temple, which is an important place for Buddhist prayer, was built about 200 years ago. According to the villagers, there were no temples when the ancestors of the current villagers arrived 300 years ago and at that time, the villagers went to a temple in another village. Before public education was introduced in the village, the temple was used to educate children. THN holds several annual Buddhist rituals in the temples, most of which are also national annual events. Participating in these rituals is an indispensable part of daily life, reinforces the Buddhist faith, and promotes community

participation. The environment surrounding the temple is also maintained with great care. As the forest that extends from the temple to the front of the elementary school is owned by the temple, it is forbidden to entrust it to others; therefore, the vegetation is in a near natural state, adding significantly to the village environment.

Ancestral Shrine, Phi Puu Yaa

There are several shrines for the first ancestors of specific families called Phi Puu Yaa. As Khun society has a maternal aspect of inheritance, assets are traced back along the female genealogical line. Although there are no definite rules for residence after marriage, many husbands choose to take up residence in their wife's house. There are almost mythical anecdotes about the creation of THN; however, the most common is that a group of families arrived in the area and settled. At that time, even though it was the male head that decided to emigrate, it was the spouse that was enshrined as the ancestor. The present THN villagers are conceptually descendants of these ancestors, including some who live outside the village; therefore, in that sense, they form a clan with the ancestor at the top of the genealogy. The Shrine is located where the founder lived and is so simple that it looks like a stilt storage hut. In May, descendants from inside and outside the village hold the rite, "Lieng Phi Puu Yaa" to honor their ancestors. It is also customary to visit the shrine when getting married, building a new house, and making other important household decisions.

Sua Baan, the Guardian Spirit of the Entire Village

In the center square of the village, there is a shrine for Sua Baan that guards the entire village. There are in fact two shrines that have been built in parallel at which spiritual offerings to the guardian spirits are given twice a year; a ritual called Son Baan in April, the purpose of which is to drive away the evil spirits

that have entered the village during the past year, and the other a dedication ceremony, "Lien Sua Baan" to the guardian spirit, which is held in June.



Plate 6: Sua Baan

Gifts are placed in front at each shrine, inside of which there is a pillow and a cushion for the guardian spirit. When the ancestors opened up the forest to establish the new village, they first ritualized the spirit who has been the Lord of the land and asked for permission to live in this place. By doing so, the Lord of the land became the guardian spirit of the newly created THN.

By performing rituals and giving offerings, it is believed that the guardian spirits bring peace and prosperity to the village. The villagers also seek the permission from Sua Baan when building a new house and when a person outside the village wishes to do something in THN.




Figure 4: Inside the Sua Baan

Sua Baan's location in the center of village indicates the shrine's importance. There is also a shared warehouse in the open space in which the tools used for the rituals for the entire village are stored. It also serves as a stage for various events.

Sua Baan represents Khun traditions and also clearly distinguishes THN from other Tai speaking villages. The ancestor shrine and the shrine of the guardian spirit are closely related to Khun history and ethnic identity. These places and buildings serve as expressions of THN's uniqueness to people from outside the village.

How the Spaces are Organized and Used

In the following, more detail is given about the use of the various spaces in the traditional house. In particular, we focus on sleeping, rituals, and ceremonial occasions.

Paired Posts

In Khun houses, there are two specific posts in the main sleeping room called Sao Prayaa- male post and Sao Nang-female post which are in pairs. The male post is sometimes called Sao Kwan, the post of the soul, or Sao Eek, important post. Sao Prayaa is the first post erected when a new house is being built. In the house warming ceremony, the owner attaches gifts to the post to ask for luck from the supernatural existence in the house. Once Sao Prayaa has been erected, leaves from plants such as jack fruit, banana, sugarcane, or coconut, flower decoration called Dokkeo, glutinous rice sweets, and the owner's clothes are attached or put on the post. After that, they begin building the house.

Sao Prayaa is positioned near the head of the sleeping person and Sao Nang is positioned toward their feet. For the Khun, as it is better to face east when sleeping, Sao Prayaa is most commonly positioned on the northeast side and Sao Nang on the southwest side. Regardless of the position of the foundations, these directions appear to be strictly followed in all traditional houses.

Sleeping Room

The sleeping room arrangement is common not only in THN and Khun houses but also in each Tai speaking group as family relationships are represented there. There are common rules for the orientation of the head and the male / female arrangements in the sleeping room. As mentioned, it is preferred that the head of each sleeping person faces east or the south; of the 20 houses surveyed, this arrangement was seen in all houses and there were no examples of heads facing north or west. Males usually sleep on the right and the females on the left.

Of the 13 couples asked about their sleeping position arrangements, 5 pairs said that the male slept on the right and 6 were sleeping separately; however, no couples slept with the man on the left.




Figure 5: Sleeping arrangement

Worship Altars

Chao Tii

Chao Tii, the male or female supernatural being that protects the house site, is enshrined in a small hut placed in a corner of the house site. The household offers food and water almost every day and also on Buddhist festivals such as the new year and on special occasions such as wedding ceremonies and house construction. There are various Chao Tii forms, ready-made shrines sold in the market, small huts, and simple platforms supported with a stick. The goods that are placed there also depend on the household. We mainly saw artificial flowers, statues of Buddha, monks, goddesses, and horses as well as incense sticks, candles, rice, and water.



Plate 7:Chao Tii

In all cases, the Chao Tii was located in a northerly or easterly direction on the site, which was consistent with a villager's explanation that the Chao Tii must be arranged in a northeast direction. As with the position of the sleeping room and the direction of the head in the room, the east is considered a sacred direction because it is where the sun rises.

Buddhist Altar, Hing Pra

The Hing Pra is a Buddhist altar on which statues of Buddha and offerings are placed. As household members make offerings every day, the altar is normally placed in a corner of the huck bon. On special occasions, offering rituals are also held there. The form of the altar varies, with the most common being a board attached to a high position on the wall; however, shelves and desks are also used. A Buddha statue, artificial flowers, incense sticks, candles, rice, and water are the most common objects placed on the altar. Apart from these, many households decorate the altar with paintings, pendants, and statues of monks. As with the Chao Tii, the altar is placed in either a northerly or easterly direction.

Hing Thevadaa Baan



Plate 8: Hing Pra


Thevadaa is also a supernatural being that protects the house and household members and is worshiped in main sleeping room. Thevadaa is enshrined in an altar called the Hing Thevadaa Baan (hereinafter, denoted as Thevadaa), at which prayers are given every day or only at special events, depending on the household; however, the custom of reporting to Thevadaa when visiting the house is commonly observed. In fact, there appears to be no fixed definition as what Thevadaa represents; we were told that it was “a god of houses or a spirit that

protects the house” and “a guardian that protects us so that nothing wrong is done.” Some villagers also suggested that Thevadaa was recognized not only as an animistic being but also as a being related to Buddhism. In THN, all households had Thevadaa and its forms on a plate attached to a high position on the wall on which there were Buddha statues, incense sticks, candles, and containers made of banana leaves. Compared with the Hing Pra and Chao Tii, there were only a small number of items. Thevadaa is normally placed near the male post, Sao Prayaa, in the main sleeping room; that is, on the eastern side of the room. As the space in the house is arranged according to religious hierarchy, Sao Prayaa is located in the highest place.

Ceremonial, or Ritual Occasions

For ceremonies and ritual occasions, the usage of the space is different from everyday life and the invisible relationships are represented. Religious ceremonies, for which monks are invited to the house, are basically conducted in the huck bon. The Suep Jata is a rite that is held to prolong life when a household member is suffering from illness or injury. The chief monk prays for longevity and applies holy water to the infirm and their family, and other monks may twist a white thread around the wrists of participants. In the huck bon, the monks sit in front of the Hing Pra and then the male and female members of the household sit in order; the hierarchy is therefore highest closest to the Buddhist altar.

Figure 6: Order for the Suep Jata



This type of spatial order is also seen at wedding ceremonies. In traditional wedding ceremonies, the bridegroom sits on the right and the bride sits on the left, as the sleeping arrangements in the main sleeping room. In the following, a traditional wedding ceremony is described as told to us in the interviews with the villagers.

On the day of the wedding, the bridegroom accompanied by four male relatives walks to the bride's house carrying a sword to protect them from evil spirits. The first person in attendance carries a red bag containing four pieces of sway dok, the leaf of the betel-nut palm, and a Palm-leaf in a bamboo basket, on which the groom's birth date is written. The second attendant carries a lacquer container in which the groom's clothes are kept. The third member carries a lacquer container in which there is betel-nut and lime. The fourth person has nothing; however, if the road is long or if the other

attendants become tired, the fourth person is responsible for carrying the baggage.




Figure 7: Order in a wedding ceremony

When they arrive at the front gate of the bride's house, the groom first put sway dok on the gate. They then enter the site and report their arrival to Chao Tii, after which they climb the stairs to the front door, on which they also put a sway dok. They then enter the house. The bride and groom sit side by side in the huck bon on the right side of Hing Pra. Four relatives of the bride sit opposite the groom and four relatives of the groom sit opposite the bride.

At the beginning of the wedding ceremony, they discuss the bride's price. When the price is decided, the groom's side hands the price over to the bride's parents with some candles and leaves. They then all have a celebratory meal together and after this meal is finished, the ceremony ends. After the ceremony, the bride and groom do not

immediately live together as there is a trial period of co-habitation for seven days whereby the groom stays at the bride's house during the night, but spends the daylight hours at his own home. If there are any problems during this period, the couple can divorce. Seven days after successfully completing the trial period, they conduct a ritual visit to the groom's relatives to introduce the bride.




Figure 8: Spatial concept

The relationship between religion and space can be understood from these wedding procedures. First, the groom carries a sword when walking in the village and heading to the bride's house to protect him and his attendants from evil spirits and to ward off any invisible threats outside the house. Next, the groom places sway dok at the gate and the main door of the house in honor of Chao Tii and Thevadaa, as these two points indicate the boundaries of their respective regions; that is, the area inside the gate is protected by Chao Tii and the inside of the house is protected by Thevadaa. The Buddhist space in the village is represented by the temple, from which the spiritual elements emanate from the periphery to the

center. At the center of the village, the spiritual degree is at its most powerful as it is protected by four kinds of supernatural existence; Sua Baan, the guardian spirit of the entire village, Chao Tii baan, the guardian spirit of a specific area in the village, Chao Tii, the guardian spirit of the house site, and Thevadaa, the guardian of house.

The use of the house space for sleeping and ceremonial occasion is closely related to Khun religious thought. While the Khun spatial composition is similar to other Tai groups, it is also a comprehensive visualization of Khun thoughts and traditions. Every traditional house is encoded with spiritual significance, from which Khun culture and traditions can be understood, which is why the Khun wish to positively utilize their houses as the resources for cultural tourism in the village.

Conclusion

Representations of Self

Based on the descriptions surrounding the housing and dwelling in THN, here we discuss the meanings behind the cultural representations expressed in the Khun houses and village. Why the Khun now want to preserve their traditional house and village? From the descriptions given in the paper, we wished to illuminate the importance of the invisible relationships and concepts embedded in the spaces, which encompass relationships between the ancestral founders of the village, and the guardians of the land, house site, and house as well as the relationship with Buddha.

In THN, the various faiths coexist; that is, there is a simultaneous worship of Buddha, ancestors and animist spirits, each of which has different architecture. The temple is located away from the center of the village and the ancestral worship and animist spirit shrines are located in the village center, around which the villagers' houses are located.

Buddhism is the national religion in Thailand; however, spiritual faiths, which are often the basis of village, household, and individual behaviors, vary from village to village and across ethnic groups.

Buddhist events are shared by every community in Thailand; however, spiritual village, land, and house rituals are unique to each culture and even to each village. Therefore, as integration advances and is incorporated into the nation-state and homogenized, spiritual rituals are important to the identity of each ethnic group.

Representation through Housing and Dwelling

THN was established by a legendary founder whose legacy is guaranteed by praying for the guardian. The uniqueness of the Khun culture in this village has been built on its diverse religious and spiritual concepts, which can be most clearly understood in the complex faiths represented in their houses and its surroundings.

Architectural space is like a container for memories and experiences (Sparks and Howell (ed.), 2003). Such spaces can illuminate the unique existence of the people and the important meanings attached to their way of life, which is why it is important to preserve housing and dwelling as a whole.

The homestay project implemented in THN to display authentic Khun culture allows visitors to easily understand the specific features and the historical significance of the Khun. By converting their housing and dwelling culture to a tourism resource, they are presenting the "authenticity" of the Khun culture.

These types of conversions are also important for modern Thailand. While Thailand has promoted tourism for nearly 50 years, the focus has primarily been on historical ruins, cultural icons, areas of natural beauty, food, religious festivals, and some ethnic minority cultures; therefore, many local rural areas of lowland Thailand that do not have any obvious outstanding cultural qualities have been generally neglected. Overall, rural areas are seen as places for supplying workers for the cities or producing agriculture. Under these circumstances, the THN villagers, by developing their unique housing and dwelling, are taking it into their own hands to highlight the value of their culture with the aim of revitalizing their community. Rather than expecting help from politicians and large-scale investment, they are attempting to revitalize their community through activities related specifically to their traditional culture.

The community developments in THN are extremely meaningful in this age of globalization which has brought significant changes to Thailand and resulted in currency fluctuations, a rise in materialism, and an increase in the general skills and knowledge of the Thai society. While these developments may be good for the Thai economy, many ethnic minorities such as the Khun can foresee their ethnic identity being lost under the pressure of the dominant culture.

Projects like those in THN could also motivate other ethnic minority villages to develop and maintain their own unique cultures. However, these attempts may not last if young people are not involved or do not take the initiative. Further, to ensure that these projects come to fruition, the villages need to import or develop the knowledge to maintain, preserve, and revitalize the houses and surroundings.

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Collaborating Micro-level Stakeholders to Child-centered Climate Change Adaptation: A Pathway to Climate Change Governance in Northern Thailand

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Abstract

Children become one of the most vulnerable group to climate change disasters. Although many stakeholders at national, regional and local scales have already attempted in physical and non-physical terms to deal with climate change and variability to marginalized people including children, it is still skeptical whether or not children enable to participate in climate change adaptation. This study, thus, explored several mechanisms among related stakeholders in the application of knowledge and attitude transfer among children, teachers, villagers and local authorities in building child-centered climate change adaptation in practice under different socio-spatial contexts of four villages in upper northern Thailand (Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai Provinces). It was obviously discovered that micro-level stakeholders in the community (parents, teachers, and local headmen) are certainly influential in directing children's practice to climate change adaptation because of legitimacy of authority and intimate social bonds, despite the fact that those people (especially parents and local headmen) could only partially communicate effective knowledge and appropriate attitudes for adaptation among children. Besides, the antagonism between mainstream scientific knowledge and local ethnic beliefs was surveyed in children's mindset while they tend to rely on the mainstream with a little application to take action in local situations. Although all stakeholders informed that the promotion of climate change knowledge to the children was significant and child's knowledge and mindset was practicable, child-centered climate change adaptation was not encouraged properly due to poor horizontal and vertical communication and collaboration across stakeholders, as well as the lacking presence of self-organizing capacity. It is therefore a vantage point to establish and liberate more platforms for micro-level stakeholder to reconcile and work with children, which might be leading to long-term adaptation with governance from below.

Keywords: adaptation, climate change, child, governance, Northern Thailand

Introduction

Many extreme events in relation to weather and climate variability from local to global scale, together with the exposure and vulnerability of physical characteristics and social units are fundamental causes to more frequent and intense disaster risks. Adaptation with structural changes to all stakeholders tends to be an effective solution to prevent and mitigate future risks due to climate change (Pelling, 2011). However, vulnerability to climate change has a close linkage to poverty, inequality, and socio-cultural barriers (Kelly and Adger, 2000) which interrupt adaptive capacity. One of the most vulnerable group is the children because they are likely to receive several damages from climate change disasters more than other groups including malnutrition, water and food security for children, physical and mental illnesses mortality during disaster events, discontinuity in schooling, spatial fragmentation with a household, and child trafficking (International Save the Children Alliance, 2008; Venemam, 2007). These problems are able to reduce adaptive capacity and limit the level of human resources capacity in enhancing national development in the future.

Anticipatory or planned adaptation by community-based approach and collective action is one of sustainable solutions in eliminating risk and vulnerability which is dynamical. This action can be proceeded by technological, behavioral and managerial planning in an expected social unit. By the way, the pathway for autonomous adaptation to climate change and disasters, particularly in many local communities of Southeast Asia, has been obstructed by insufficient knowledge, communication and exchange in selecting better alternatives for adaptation, as well as lack of technological supports (Francisco, 2008; Vogel et al., 2007). Meanwhile, the recognition to multi-scale adaptation and participation to climate change is quite blurred.

Although a particular research needs to focus in an adaptation to a particular scale or unit, it is difficult to refuse that a social unit in an adaptation process is able to be classified to various scales – international, national, regional, sub-regional, local community, household, and individual. Whilst individuals might consider hazards and disaster risks regarding the perception, ways, the action to deal with, and the expectation to future needs by interpreting natural events in various directions (Burton et al., 1978; Meze-Hausken, 2008), their alternatives cannot solely run without institutional integration from other stakeholders in different scales, and vice versa (Adger et al., 2005; Smit and Wandel, 2006). Besides, successful adaptation across scales, which is a part of building climate change governance, composes of effectiveness in decreasing impacts and protecting security with robustness, efficiency in cost estimation by strong communication and awareness in social learning process, as well as equity and legitimacy in adaptation through shared benefits and accountability among individuals with social agreements (Adger et.al., 2005; McNamara, 2013; Plummer and Armitage, 2010). However, lack of effective collaboration and communication from micro-level stakeholders becomes a main barrier of adaptation across scales (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010; Osberghaus et al., 2010).

Even though the children in a local community are usually classified as a major vulnerable sector in an adaptation field, building climate change adaptation policy without concerning the capacity of adapting themselves is not appropriate for building micro-level and sustainable adaptation to climate change. By the way, it is still skeptical whether or not children in local community enable to participate and account for climate change adaptation. This article, thus, provide a baseline survey to explore several

mechanisms in the interaction of knowledge, attitude and practice (K-A-P) promotion and exchange among children (who aged 11-23 years old), teachers, villagers and local authorities in building child-centered climate change adaptation in practice under different socio-spatial contexts of four villages in upper northern Thailand, along with the investigation in the level of children active participation in climate change adaptation. The results from this article targets at empowering better and suitable pathways in mitigating with climate variability and profiling climate change governance in the Northern Thailand in the future as well.

Children in a Participation to Climate Change Adaptation and Governance: A Review of Theories and Literatures

Climate change has a strong potential to disaster risk particularly in more frequent and severe flood, storm and drought. It is a manifestation by socio-ecological interactions that cause unsustainable development to the mankind and their economy. Subsequent damages from climate change is able to manipulate more negative effects to an exposed system both in social and physical terms – inefficient and shortage of behavioral and structural capacity to cope with risk. (McBean and Rodgers, 2010; Cardona et al., 2012).

Vulnerability is a term which can describe those effects mentioned above. According to this, a particular social unit hardly enable their capacity to deal with risk and sensitivity from climate change. (Daze et.al., 2009). Social and economic inequalities, poverty, lack of technological support, as well as ineffective risk communication due to gaps of scientific knowledge and policy implementation among stakeholders – academic sectors, practitioners, and local communities – are factors influencing vulnerability to several exposed groups (Olmos, 2001; Kelly and Adger, 2000; Vogel et.al., 2009). In terms of risk communication, academic sectors and practitioners are familiar with wide-ranging risk management and come up with formal communication. Meanwhile, knowledge of local community and individuals in dealing with risk is quite different because it is usually constructed by beliefs and narratives, perception and experiences which is informal and be difficult to explain in reality (Burton et al., 1978; Meze-Hausken, 2008). Understanding roles of each organization and institution in different scales, therefore, is very important to reduce losses and launch opportunities to climate change adaptation and governance.

Adaptation is a necessary action to reduce risk and vulnerability which is operated either in short or long run, and concerns the manipulation of physical and anthropogenic perturbations (Smithers and Smit, 1997). Adaptation is also the pathways of affected people in adjusting with damages and surviving better in the same environment compared with the past. Whether or not adaptation is effective enough in reducing vulnerability is upon constructing adaptive capacity through access and control over natural, human, social, physical, and financial resources (Brooks et al., 2005). Although most people need to adapt with their perceived risks from climate change, it is still difficult because of lack of general, simplified, and reliable communication of climate information, as well as social norm that obstruct behavioral changes (Osberghaus et al., 2010). In order to solve these structural and behavioral pitfalls in adaptation, local community and other related stakeholders should drive three appropriate solutions (based on community-based climate change adaptation principle) including the creation of future scenario for predicting risk in household and community levels, the discussion for strategic planning

between stakeholders for local safety and the implementation of planning along with infrastructural investment. These mentioned outcomes should be varied by historical, socio-economic, spatial and temporal contexts of each community (Francisco, 2008). Besides, adaptation should be exacerbated the use of social capital by institutional and community mechanisms. Moreover, barriers of adaptation tend to be surmounted by collaboration among stakeholders, creative management, imagination transformation, prioritization, and resources allocation (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010). In addressing several underlying causes of vulnerability as a process of adaptation, furthermore, national and local organizations should target to empower women and other marginalized voices at a household level and enable them to participate in a strategic planning and access the information for vulnerability reduction (Daze et al., 2005).

According to the mentioned conditions, collaborative action for climate change adaptation should always be constructed by multi-scale stakeholders' participation because global and local environmental phenomena are thus able to understand back and forth in several functions. Individual behaviors and collective action in a micro-scale level in responding to environmental changes, in addition, are controlled by institutional decision-making either national or international levels. Meanwhile, several policies and regulations in adaptation to climate change, which are actualized by both public and private sectors, will be promulgated to serve different needs within the umbrella of reducing sensitivity, altering exposure of a social unit, and increasing resilience in coping with and recover promptly when encountering unexpected stresses in various socio-ecological settings. (Burton et al. 1978, Adger et al., 2005; Smit and Wandel, 2006). Thereby, multi-scale analysis in climate change should account for climate factors, impacts, and responses by understanding place-specific characteristics. It is also crucial to recognize different scales of local agency (regional scale/city or sub-regional/people and organization), promote bottom-up paradigm to meet top-down midway, provide financial and technical resources to link global and local, and build a system for long-term global-local monitoring systems (Wilbanks and Kates, 1999).

Effective practice in community-based adaptation will be initiated by allowing community to define their adaptation itself to promote the involvement of stakeholders, legitimacy, information collection and integration, and engagement of decision-makers. However, inconsistency over adaptation to climate change is a general consequence due to socio-ecological complexity of risk among scales. Effectiveness in decreasing impacts and protecting security with robustness, efficiency in cost estimation by strong communication and awareness in social learning process, as well as equity and legitimacy in adaptation through shared benefits and accountability among individuals with social agreements extremely advocate successful adaptation across scales (Adger et al., 2005).

Governance in climate change adaptation is another mechanism that stakeholders should promote through the idea of cross-scale environmental governance. Lemos and Agrawal (2006) describe that it allows public-private networks to issue their interests in environmental solution, and originate both formal and informal social learning to motivate decision making in various participants with better transparency and stronger voice in a public forum. Unfortunately, command-and-control approach by powerful actors is popularly practiced for decades to deal with environmental problems at any scale (Plummer and Armitage, 2010) and hinder social learning opportunities. Low level of integration and collaboration between organizations is thus appeared leading to its inefficiency in the implementation

(McBean and Rodgers, 2010). In other words, vulnerability in accordance with gaps of scientific knowledge and policy implementation among stakeholders – academic sectors, practitioners, and local communities – which are mentioned earlier in several paragraphs can be alleviated by multi-level system of governance and knowledge production so-called “more democratic model of communication” (Vogel et al, 2007). Scientific knowledge in larger scale from academic sectors must be downscaled by realizing spatial and temporal differences and variance of effects and knowledge to adjust more general communication patterns. Practitioners should focus more on in-depth scientific and local information to be a fundamental for policy planning. Newcomers – experts in various disciplines, people facing with risks, and local communities – must also negotiate their knowledge to the mainstream with concerns in spatial and temporal dynamics with learning scientific knowledge to interact with authorities.

Children in developing countries, especially children in a poor family, are usually concerned as one of the most vulnerable and marginalized sector in adaptation to climate change (Back and Cameron, 2008; Gautam and Oswald, 2008). Many damages from climate change – physical and mental illness, water sanitation, food security, discontinuity in schooling, spatial fragmentation with a household, and child trafficking – occurs among them (International Save the Children Alliance, 2008; Venemam, 2007). Even though it has a great capacity to obstruct and reduce the success of millennium development goals (MDGs) among children, they should not be stereotype as disaster victims as such.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) stated that children possesses absolute rights to live in suitable environments, study, have a good health and well-being, and spend their life in a safe place. Therefore, children are necessary to participate as a center in decision-making to resolve and alleviate damages affecting themselves (Article 12) including climate change consequences. It can transform their status as a practitioner rather than being only a victim in disaster risks. Building some concerns to the children that climate change is a major threat in our environment, based on spatial and temporal contexts of each community, is excessively needed (Back and Cameron, 2008).

Promotion through environmental conservation programs, local resources management, cause-effect building and recognition in water degradation and deforestation, and other activities from surroundings are a key to motivation self-esteem and drive children as a potential actor in climate change adaptation (UNICEF, 2007). Besides, local community and government, NGOs, and other international alliances should consider to their health and well-being, knowledge and experiences with climate change among children and their family members, as well as respect to children’s capacity in participation for adaptation (Bartlett, 2008).

Case studies in empowering child-centered climate change adaptation in Thailand (UNISDR, 2012) and Nepal (Gautam and Oswald, 2008) illustrated and confirmed that children required their rights in knowledge and perception enquiry about climate change, as well as dissemination a good practice in adaptation for local community to prevent and mitigate themselves, family members and local citizens from climate-related risks. However, the survey of knowledge, attitude and practice (K-A-P) among stakeholders (such as general citizens, farmers, local organizations, child, student, teacher, etc.) which can influence to child-centered climate change adaptation in many countries including Jamaica (Caribbean Institute of Media and Communication, 2012), Cambodia (Cambodian Ministry of Environment, 2011), Montenegro (UNICEF, 2011), India (Sah et al., 2015), Canada (Baker and Loxton, 2013), Australia (WIDCROP, 2008), and Tanzania (Lyimo, 2015) indicated in a similar point that most of

them have recognized climate change effects (particularly in water and temperature changes) rather than its causes, mitigation and adaptation. Thus, climate change policy in the exchange of climate change knowledge, attitude and practice, together with effective risk communication through various media among stakeholders based on socio-economic differences are very significant.

Research Methodology

This research was conducted under the sponsorship of PLAN foundation as a baseline survey to establish significant indicators in building adaptive capacity to four local communities which are located remotely from Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai cities between February to April, 2016. Two communities (Terd Thai and Mae Salong Nai) in Mae Fah Luang District, Chiang Rai Province are in the mountainous area and mostly consist of various ethnic minorities (Tai, Chinese Yunnan, Lahu, Akha, Lisu, Hmong, and Lua). Farmers, hired labor, and self-employed local industry are their major occupations. On the other hand, two communities (Mon Pin in Fang District and Ban Luang in Mae Ai District) in Chiang Mai Province consist of both Thai and ethnic minorities with no citizenship in some groups and most of them are farmers. In order to define indicators for adaptive capacity, the survey of knowledge, attitude and practice (K-A-P) to climate change in four major groups in each community including children who aged 11-23 years old, teachers in primary and secondary schools, community members both male and female, as well as community leaders with different methodologies.

- Focus group interview and brainstorming: this method is used with children in each community (maximum 15 people per time) to understand the influence and linkages of surrounding stakeholders (teacher, community members and community leaders) to children's knowledge, attitude and practice to climate change adaptation. Children were also separated by their age and education level to four sub-groups (11-12 years old, 13-15 years old, 16-18 years old, and 19-23 years old) during conducting focus group interview and brainstorming. This method was conducted to 67 children in four communities.
- In-depth interview: this method is applied for teacher and community leaders of local organizations in each community. Issues in teacher's interviewing cover fundamental knowledge in climate change, information sources and transfer to students, recognition and attitude towards K-A-P promotion to students, partnership with related stakeholders, and analysis of K-A-P gaps among teachers. On the other hand, data from community leaders relate to four dimensions including the influences of climate change to local risk and vulnerability, risk reduction, vulnerability reduction, and adaptation promotion. All dimensions are linked with K-A-P in climate change. This method was conducted to 21 teachers and 67 community leaders in four communities.
- Questionnaire: this method is suitable for community members in each community. In this stage, data were collected from 94 respondents in four communities that were randomized without the exclusion of age and gender. All questions consist of 4 parts – general information, knowledge, attitude, and practice in everyday life to climate change.

Information from three major sample groups was processed by both qualitative and quantitative methods. In terms of qualitative analysis, the answers from in-depth and focus group interview were compared and triangulated each other and also with secondary information (state planning and documents of non-governmental research), then categorized into three groups (knowledge, attitude and practice: K-A-P) – and classifying into five types (cause, effect, mitigation/coping strategies, responsible stakeholders in climate change and disasters, and future adaptation strategies). This categorization was also applied in quantitative analysis by descriptive and analytical statistics (frequency, weight score analysis, and correlations) to prove relationship between K-A-P factors. All of results from analysis were transformed to define gaps of K-A-P among four stakeholders in each community and understand the status of micro-level stakeholders' collaboration in empowering children's participation in child-centered climate change adaptation. In addition, this research also suggested a future mechanism in promoting child-centered climate change adaptation based on collaboration gaps of stakeholders with prioritization to each local community.

Results

1. Climate Change Adaptation: Children in Participation from Multi-stakeholder Viewpoints

This sector provides basic understanding and knowledge, attitude and practice in everyday life to climate change of four stakeholders – children, community leaders and local organizations, teacher, and community members.

Age is a primary factor to diversify the level of knowledge and recognition to causes and effects of climate change. Basically, children who aged 19-23 years old (late teenagers) came up with better understanding to causes and effects of climate change than the other groups. Their understanding was attached to local disasters occurred in each community (extreme weather events, forest fire, fluctuated rainfall, and landfall). In terms of climate change causes, children usually defined that anthropogenic actions (such as deforestation, shifting cultivation, burning, chemical use in agriculture, etc.) become main reasons inducing climate change and disasters in their communities nowadays. By the way, only few numbers of children indicated that climate change is exerted by physical action such as ENSO oscillation. In terms of climate change consequences, most of children, particularly late teenagers, concerned that it would affect to individual, community, and society including health problems, water deficit for consumption and agricultural production, agricultural failure, losses of life and assets, lack of income in general and adverse effects to tourism industry. Meanwhile, children mostly encountered with passive adaptation and recovery (such as drilling, using mask and spraying to reduce haze impacts, etc.) rather than proactive prevention and mitigation to disasters which is impacted by climate change (such as building firebreaks and check dam, knowledge exchange, dissemination and public relations, etc.).

However, age is just a basic option to indicate the level of knowledge and perception in climate change adaptation. Knowledge, attitude and practice in everyday life to climate change adaptation of children in four communities was rather differentiated by roles of various stakeholders – teacher, community leaders and local organizations, and community members – in each community including:

Teacher

Teacher is the most influential stakeholder, according to the evaluation of children, in climate change

adaptation particularly in providing cause-effect knowledge, mitigation/coping strategies, responsible stakeholders in climate change and disasters, and future adaptation strategies based on theory in learning materials and various offline and online media sources. However, children's attitudes and practice toward the teacher's knowledge can be described in two sides. On the one hand, children trusted in teacher's knowledge because of rationality and be practical in real situation. Another group of children stated that teacher's knowledge was inapplicable and difficult to practice in some time.

The relationship between children's opinion towards teachers mentioned earlier was totally clarified by teachers' interview. A lot of teacher mostly understand and emphasize climate change and disaster consequences by using books, other media sources containing mainstream climate change knowledge as main materials. Meanwhile, teachers have encouraged learning activities by real case studies in a community with in-class student participation, as well as promote community environmental conservation programs for students in order to construct good attitude to protect and prevent losses from climate change and disasters. However, a practical session about exercise for climate change and disaster preparedness (such as drill and tabletop) would be the responsibility of external authorities.

This situation mentioned earlier covered only three communities except Ban Luang community. In this community, risk communication between teachers and children is quite problematic. In teachers' side, they were quite familiar with one-way knowledge communication based on theory with less participation in any activity. Moreover, they thought that future adaptation strategies are not important at this moment because it does not much relate to their everyday life. In the meantime, many children in a selected village of Ban Luang community do not attend to the school. Thus, the connection between two groups was missing and disappear. This phenomenon exerted major challenges in rights of adaptation strategies among children in this community to climate change disasters.

Community Leaders and Local Organizations

According to children's attitudes in all communities, community leaders and local organizations tend to support mitigation/coping strategies and future adaptation strategies to local community according to their responsibility. However, knowledge transfer methodologies among community leaders and local organizations were different and influence to children's attitude towards these stakeholders. On the one hand, community leaders attempted to encourage adaptive capacity both short and long run to community members and children in dealing with climate change and its consequences. On the other hand, local state organizations (such as forest department, armed forces, and health station) were just command and control ways of mitigation and practice through regulations without shared opinion's expression and participation (particularly in Ban Luang Community). Although children's attitudes towards community leaders were similar to teacher, their positive attitudes towards local state organization were very low. Nevertheless, children somewhat followed the pathways of adaptation to climate change from these two stakeholders because of their authority in command and control children's practices. By the way, knowledge about cause-effect relationship in climate change and responsible stakeholders in climate change and disasters were not much shared and forwarded to the children (Table 1).

These contexts were also analyzed and emphasized by shared opinions among community leaders and local organizations. Although many representatives of local community and state organizations have

understood disaster contexts in particular with their community, risk communication to community members and children encountered with several obstacles because these organizations hardly accessed climate change information to predict and formulate possible adaptive strategies for disasters in the community. Mostly, community leaders have just received day-by-day or very short-term weather information and announcement of disaster warning from the upper authorities through LINE group and cell phone without any seasonal and yearly monitoring and forecasting. Some community leaders in Fang and Mae Salong Nai district, which is located in a remote area, thus, attempted to adapt local knowledge for determining community adaptation directions. However, it was still not efficient enough to communicate and negotiate with authorities, teacher and children to build mitigation and adaptation strategies because of different sets of knowledge among those groups and lack of knowledge integration.

Community leaders and local organizations, in addition, have rather concerned children as a vulnerable group in climate change and attempted to reduce their risks by providing more knowledge and recognition through public relations and education, but they cannot fully support a floor for children's participation in vulnerability reduction and adaptation planning at this time. Major reasons compose of lacking of self-organizational management to mobilize resources and budget in dealing with local problems, low collaboration between communities, and discontinuous adaptation promotion to the community. On the other hand, some community leaders thought that it is a direct responsibility of family members to advocate and encourage disaster risk reduction for their children.

Family Members

Family members (especially father, mother, and older relatives) are the most familiar stakeholder to children in a household unit. However, those people, as community members, represented less responsibility to provide knowledge, encourage good attitudes and practices in climate change adaptation. Children have received only basic knowledge of cause-effect and mitigation strategies from their parents and family members (Table 1). Two-thirds of children in all community, however, did not much believe and trust in the knowledge of family members because of irrationality based on supernatural faith and beliefs leading to fear without reasons, as well as no education background to support and describe as a formal knowledge. Nonetheless, half of all children in total followed practices in adapting to climate change and disaster from family members thanks to intimate social bonds and the sense of powerless among children when they are in the family. The level of trust for practice, besides, was at the same level compared to the teacher. Thus, family members become an influential actor to control children's practice in adaptation to climate change and disaster. By the way, the antagonism between mainstream scientific knowledge and local ethnic beliefs was surveyed in children's mindset while they tend to rely on the mainstream with a little application to take action in local situations.

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Table 1: Mode of K-A-P communication in relation to climate change from related stakeholders to children (sorted by the frequency of communication)

Communities Stakeholders		Terd Thai (Mae Fah Luang, Chiang Rai)	Mae Salong Nai (Mae Fah Luang, Chiang Rai)	Mon Pin (Fang, Chiang Mai)	Ban Luang (Mae Ai, Chiang Mai)
Teacher		Provide theoretical knowledge with promote recognition through activities and alternative media, but lack of practical session in mitigating to climate change and disaster consequences.			One-way communication based on theory without proactive adaptation
Community and Organizations	Leaders Local	Support mitigation and future adaptation strategies, but lack of cause-effect knowledge	Support mitigation and future adaptation strategies, but lack of cause-effect knowledge, information access and collaboration in community level	Support mitigation and future adaptation strategies, but lack of cause-effect knowledge	Focus on command-and-control strategies, unequal recognition among organizations, and lack of cause-effect knowledge and information access
Community (as Family Members)	Members	Provide very basic cause-effect knowledge for children from family members, relatives, neighbors, elderly people, and community leaders with less provision of mitigation and future adaptation strategies			
Other sources (internet, media, experts)	information (internet, media, experts)	<u>Expert:</u> No access <u>Internet and Media:</u> Totally cover but too broad to apply		<u>Expert:</u> Totally cover but intermittent <u>Internet and Media:</u> Totally cover but too broad to apply	<u>Expert:</u> Totally cover but intermittent <u>Internet and Media:</u> No access

Community Members

Approximately 71.28 percent of community members (average age is 38.81 years old) in all communities obtained basic knowledge and recognition in cause-effect relationship of climate change mainly from formal channels (news from television program/radio/newspaper and announcement from village headman and local organizations). By the way, causes of climate change consequences were quite limited and attached to their everyday life. For instance, deforestation and burning in the planting field are major factors of drought (27.24 percent), extreme weather events (26.01 percent) and forest fire (16.02 percent). These characteristics lead to crop failure (90.32 percent), lower income (87.10 percent) and damaged planning field (86.02 percent)

Community members also stated their attitudes from rating scales that the most two important things that they must concern are to endorse the most significant role in dealing with climate change consequences to community leaders (4.13 out of 5) and to provide climate change knowledge to their children (4.10 out of 5). However, they still do not much concern the anomaly of climate change (2.87 out of 5) and be confident in the capacity of household and community (3.12 and 3.18 out of 5). After analyzing the relationship of lower-score attitudes to sources of knowledge in climate change adaptation by Pearson correlation, results indicated that family members, relatives, and the elderly must build a confidence in the readiness of climate change adaptation and mitigation at a household level (sig. = .01), the elderly is also important for building adaptive capacity to the community (sig. = .05), and village headman and local organizations should encourage the recognition of community members in the anomaly of climate change at this moment (sig. = .05) (Table 2). These relationships represented the needs of collaboration among three stakeholders to encourage positive attitudes in changing adaptive behaviors among community members.

Table 2: Relationships between attitudes to sources of knowledge in climate change adaptation by Pearson correlation

Attitudes \ Stakeholders	Family members and relatives	Elderly persons	Village headman and local organizations	Average Score (out of 5)
Climate change is not a normal situation			-.225*	2.87
Your family is ready to mitigate and adapt to climate change	-.307**	-.327**		3.12
Your community is ready to mitigate and adapt to climate change		-.233*		3.18

Note: ** is significant at 0.01, * is significant at 0.05

Moreover, the practice in climate change adaptation is quite passive. Only one issue that community members often practice is to follow news and announcement from community leaders and other media (3.31 and 3.95 out of 5). Whilst the application of knowledge in practice including exchanging mitigation and adaptation practices to the others, participating in climate change planning at the local level and promoting sufficient knowledge to children in a household are in the low level (all are below 3 out of 5). According to correlation analysis with sources of knowledge and lower-score

practices in climate change adaptation, results also indicated that:

- 1) District and provincial organizations must promote community members in the participation of climate change mitigation planning with other communities (sig. = .05), while neighbors should motivate their community members in participating of community planning (sig. = .01).
- 2) Neighbors, family members and relatives should attend the training about cause and effects in climate change, educate mitigation strategies, and exchange with the others (sig. = .01) by promoting experts to provide essential knowledge in practice to climate change adaptation (sig. = .01).
- 3) Family members and relatives are main actors to encourage more education about climate change to the children (sig. = .01). (Table 3)

Table 3: Relationships between practices to sources of knowledge in climate change adaptation by Pearson correlation

Practices \ Stakeholders	Family members and relatives	Neighbors	District and provincial organizations	Experts	Average Score (out of 5)
Attend training about causes and effects in climate change	-.343**	-.363**			2.11
Exchange knowledge in mitigation to disaster and climate change risk reduction with the others	-.424**	-.480**		-.347**	2.18
Participate in planning for disaster and climate change mitigation with your community		-.286**			2.65
Participate in planning for disaster and climate change mitigation with other communities			-.235*		1.72
Encourage more education about climate change to the children	-.383**	-.354**			2.93

Note: ** is significant at 0.01, * is significant at 0.05

In conclusion, the encouragement of climate change adaptation from family members (as a part of community members) to the children may not be efficient enough at the current situation. It is impossible to launch this way if community and family members still lack of confidence in the readiness of household and community adaptation from a shortage in proactive sets of adaptation practices (such as participation in training and planning to climate change and disaster risk reduction) although their intention in raising child-centered climate change adaptation was

acceptable respectively. Results also illustrated that climate change adaptation strategies among family and community members need to be empowered by either internal or external stakeholders. This mechanism would be one of key points for successful child-centered climate change adaptation.

2. Micro-level Participation: Future Mechanism for Child-centered Climate Change Adaptation

Results in the first section clearly demonstrated that many stakeholders in the community have played their roles in building different perspectives of knowledge, attitudes, and practices to the children. In a holistic view, this research concerned that all stakeholders understand children as a vulnerable group and attempt to protect them from damages due to climate change and disasters. Besides, basic understanding of children's knowledge and mindset was acceptable because most of them realized fundamental causes, effects, and mitigation strategies to deal with climate change particularly in late teenager (19-23 years old). However, roles of children in active participation to vulnerability reduction and adaptation were scarcely seen and not much encouraged in practice by related stakeholders. There is two major issues which all stakeholders should consider to improve child-centered climate change adaptation including:

Horizontal and Vertical Communication and Collaboration across Stakeholders

Several problems of horizontal and vertical communication and collaboration among stakeholders were found and totally affect to child-centered climate change adaptation. It is noticeable that community members, as family members, become the most important actor to induce practices among children in the adaptation so that the main focus should be targeted to understand why community members were not well-functioning.

The core reason of this phenomenon was that the interaction among community members about knowledge inquiry and exchange, as well as participation in planning for disaster and climate change mitigation was inadequate and rarely discovered from various situations. Firstly, it might be caused by state organizations, experts, and academic in the upper level provided insufficient information without long-term climate monitoring to community leaders and their members to climate change disasters. Community planning, thereby, cannot launch and enforce suitable practices, project to future scenarios for the prevention and mitigation, as well as contribute to the attitude of risk awareness among community members about climate change efficiently. Secondly, some local organizations use the model of legitimate domination to command and control daily life practices of community members (which sometimes manipulate and accelerate climate change, disasters and environmental degradation) without any declaration in effects to their society and environment, as well as collaboration for problem solutions with community members. Afterwards, these groups perceived a sense of marginalization from the mainstream and attempted to oppose and negotiate indirectly with the authorities by continuing negative actions leading to environmental problems. It will also be cultivated in children's attitudes and become negative practices in the future. This circumstance was clearly observed in Ban Luang Community of Chiang Mai Province.

Horizontal networks in risk communication among communities in a certain area, thirdly, was not promoted properly because the communication process is usually centralized by the information of authorities with less opportunity to establish bottom-up risk communication. Besides, teacher's roles, as another influential actor to exert vertical communication for children in making decisions to adapt with their family members, were constrained only in the school due to the legitimacy to integrate themselves with local authorities in a formal collaboration. Above of inattentive attitudes

among some teachers in promoting climate change adaptation, a lot of teacher's knowledge is conducted by core national curriculum, which is controlled by scientific paradigm with less application to local situations. The collaboration with external experts in climate change adaptation, which is one of the most reliable source in children's attitudes, was rarely presented and intermittent.

Self-organizing Capacity

Another important issue that obstruct child-centered climate change adaptation related to the incapability of self-organization. Although local organizations and community in Mon Pin sub-district together with the promotion of NGOs attempted to launch climatic awareness and receive feedbacks about vulnerability reduction among children through community youth council, the organization still had no exact planning in driving children as an active agent in adaptation. In other words, the collaboration of local community with non-governmental organizations and experts to encourage climate change adaptation was not established and recognized as regular in all communities. In other communities, the initiation of climate change awareness and communication among children in terms of forum and council was not found at all.

Secondly, there is no powerful stakeholder to recognize social learning process and stimulate the importance of local knowledge application for climate change adaptation among community members. It might be stated that local organizations and communities normally operate their responsibilities in accordance with vertical official administration. One of the most problematic issues that local organizations extremely highlighted is that each organization tended to fix their roles due to the regulation. Exercising other assignments out of their major roles and plans may have some conflicts. Besides, the mobilization of resources and financial capitals, which should be fully allocated for climate change adaptation, were not flexible according to the situation. Other issues of self-organizing incapability are the diversity of ethnic groups and lack of citizenship which create some difficulties in the communication and mitigation, no equipment for early warning, and lack of personnel in disaster management.

Overall, those manifestations totally influenced children's knowledge, attitudes and practices to climate change adaptation as the diagram below (Figure 1). Three major actors affecting children's K-A-P at each corner of the triangle compose of community leaders and organizations, teacher and family members as community members. Children cannot communicate well with the community because the community also lacked of effective planning and adequate sources of information. Besides, the collaboration among community, teacher and family was difficult because all mentioned stakeholders were controlled and centralized directly or indirectly to mainstream passive and authoritative knowledge and mitigation strategies with very few opportunities to integrate local knowledge for adaptation in the community level. Thus, the obscurity of children's K-A-P to climate change adaptation was apparent and combined by inadequate information for adaptation, formal knowledge with less application to local contexts, and belief and bias to the authority without adjusting to the mainstream rationality. Child-centered climate change adaptation, thus, cannot initiated as this model is still succeeded.




Figure 1: Current influence of stakeholders towards children's knowledge, attitudes and practices to climate change adaptation

Micro-level Participation: Adaptive Governance in Child-centered Climate Change Adaptation

According to various contexts in each community, this article needs to suggest and promote 3-year initiative model of child-centered climate change adaptation thanks to the conceptual model of UNDP (2010) with the application of multi-scale analysis and governance in climate change adaptation. This model is designed based on the emphasis on micro-level participation for better collaboration with the upper scale and construct stronger bond of bottom-up action among children, community, teacher and family members to adjust authoritative adaptation – micro-level collaboration model (Figure 2). To accomplish this goal, this model must encourage all communities to run in six stages with different time duration including:

- 1) Defining problems in the community from climate change
- 2) Defining causes of climate change
- 3) Designing appropriate planning with clear methodologies and pathways based on the collaboration of micro-level and macro-level stakeholders in responding to climate change
- 4) Prioritizing a plan and obstacles in climate change adaptation promotion
- 5) Adjusting a plan to activities and defining goals, facilitators, target groups and expected outcomes, as well as mobilizing knowledge sources, personnel and budget
- 6) Monitoring and assessing activities in a plan based on flexibility (activities will be added or prolonged)




Figure 2: Micro-level collaboration model for child-centered climate change adaptation

In a holistic point of view, this model wishes to recommended several strategies in K-A-P promotion among all stakeholders at first. In terms of knowledge, the support of cause-effect knowledge about climate change should be promoted to children who aged below 19. Several methodology to reach this target is to link climate change consequences with disaster events that affect to the livelihood of their households. This method should be operated in couple with other family members in a household level in order to create positive behaviors for their children. District/provincial organizations and experts become major unit to empower this. Afterwards, children should learn larger-scale mechanisms in accelerating climate change and follow up current news about climate and weather from online media and alternative sources because children still have strong potential in understanding modern knowledge of climate change. Then, school curriculum should be reorganized in a form of local curriculum and associated with the participation of local knowledge and experience recovery towards climate and weather. This process may be able to reduce knowledge gaps between scientific matter and local wisdom, articulate more understanding to all stakeholders, as well as make a sense of belonging in knowledge construction and exchange by community members. Teacher, thus, should play a leading role in this stage, with the collaboration to experts and leading organizations in climate and disasters, community leaders, elderly persons and community members.

To encourage preferable attitudes to climate change adaptation, community leaders must evaluate community leaders, including children, who has a leadership and obtain trust from all community members to be a pilot group. This team is a core unit in changing attitudes with recognizing the most problematic issue among community members at first (collaboration in and between the community) before prioritizing activities in attitude transformation. Secondly, powerful authorities must adjust their images and reliability in working with the community. Decreasing command-and-control action together with constructing intimacy and participation from below, and leaving a room for sharing voices among community leaders, family members and children may be more effective in building attitudes to climate change adaptation. Besides, training programs from either public or private organizations for advocating recognition and awareness among teachers are


very important as a teacher is one of the most influential actor to children in their adaptation to climate change. Meanwhile, upper-level authorities (related ministries and departments) should reorganize their policies, motivate the significance of adaptation to climate change and disasters, as well as allocate more self-organizing capacity through the mobilization of resources and community relation activities in terms of environmental conservation and disaster prevention and mitigation (such as drill and tabletop exercise).

Finally, the promotion good practices in child-centered climate change adaptation at the beginning should be a responsibility of disaster-related organizations in initiating a floor for understanding and exchange experiences and lessons learned in adaptation of each local community. Then, local organization and teacher must be core actors to run this mechanism, with indirect assessment and monitoring from disaster-related organizations. Besides, activity-based learning is required, while teacher, local organizations, and external organizations represent themselves as facilitator to motivate the communication between children and other stakeholders in the community as a part of knowledge acquisition. In case that local organizations cannot launch and deploy climate change adaptation planning at this moment, this model suggested to utilize previous forums/councils as a center for K-A-P exchange in order to begin bottom-up and horizontal social learning. However, this stage will take long time and need the assistance of experts to commence. Whilst this forum is strong and powerful enough, children should be a part of core actors in networking with external communities. If a particular community accomplishes goals and expected outcomes in child-centered climate change adaptation due to this model, the extension to other communities and wider civil society should be strongly implemented with the concern of heterogeneity among local communities.

The model is actualized in accordance with the readiness about knowledge, attitude and practice of children and other stakeholders in the community. Firstly, Mon Pin community in Chiang Mai province and Terd Thai community in Chiang Rai province illustrated enough capacity to participate and drive child-centered climate change adaptation because of stronger children's knowledge and attitudes and enthusiasm of local organizations and teachers in motivating children. However, community members still lack of preferable attitudes and practices in adaptation to climate change. Above of children, community members must be encouraged in the participation since the stage of 1) the promotion of cause-effect understanding (with the emphasis on physical-natural mechanisms leading to climate change); 2) the articulation of formal scientific and local knowledge; 3) the planning and implementation of vulnerability reduction and adaptation to practice by local participation; 4) the establishment and networking of children council in climate change adaptation; and 5) the assessment with all stakeholders in the community (Table 4).

Stages mentioned earlier may be applicable to operate in Mae Salong Nai community in Chiang Rai province. However, community members still need stronger foundation of cause-effect understanding of climate change and the recovery of local weather and climate-related knowledge. Thus, a plan would spend longer duration in the first and second stage. Then, later stages will follow as normal. However, the process in this model for Ban Luang community is quite different from those three villages because trust among stakeholders in working together must be alleviated at first. The fundamental stage before starting this model should be deployed by image transformation of the authorities and the discussion of current action in community and its consequences to the environment and climate. Then, other defined stages will operate as follow.

Table 4: Initiative Operational Plan in Child-centered Climate Change Adaptation

Year	Year 1		Year 2		Year 3	
Community						
Mon Pin	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Terd Thai						
Mae Salong Nai	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Ban Luang	Fundamental	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	

Discussion

Article 12 of The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) stated that children possesses absolute rights to live in suitable environments and safe place with well-being so that they should participate as a center in decision-making to resolve and alleviate damages affecting themselves including climate change consequences (Back and Cameron, 2008). However, this study reflected explicitly that children become more passive and their rights in the participation to vulnerability reduction and adaptation was limited.

It is very noticeable that the collaboration and integration of climate change adaptation has a strong influence to attitudes and practices. Inefficiency of the implementation of climate change adaptation with child-centered approach was reflected through insufficient integration and collaboration between stakeholders (McBean and Rodgers, 2010). Knowledge gaps among stakeholders and lack of reliable communication of climate information influence vulnerability in practices to adapt themselves. This finding is concurrent with the study of Osberghaus et al. (2010) which indicated that most people have already perceived their climate risk but it is difficult to adapt because of efficient communicable information deficit. Another major problem that obstructed governance in this case is partly caused by command-and-control approach by powerful actors that hinders learning opportunities to share powerless voices – community members – which is coincident with the idea of Plummer and Armitage (2010). As community members (or family members) are one of the most influential unit to children and marginalized by various powerful actors, it may affect and increase vulnerability among children in adaptation to climate change. To compare with worldwide case studies in K-A-P survey about climate change adaptation in Jamaica (Caribbean Institute of Media and Communication, 2012), Cambodia (Cambodian Ministry of Environment, 2011), Montenegro (UNICEF, 2011), India (Sah et al., 2015), Canada (Baker and Loxton, 2013), Australia (WIDCROP, 2008), and Tanzania (Lyimo, 2015), results from survey were quite similar to previous studies that the recognition of causes, mitigation and adaptation in all stakeholders, including children, was not much concerned.

Although adaptation should operate both short and long term with the concentration physical-anthropogenic interactions impacting to social units (Smithers and Smit, 1997), most communities emphasized only short-term mitigation. This is an opportunity to promote collaboration among stakeholders, creative management, imagination transformation, prioritization,

and resources allocation by the use of social capital and institutional arrangement (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010) along with cause-effect recognition program (UNICEF, 2007) and empower marginalized voices at a household level to participate in a strategic planning and access the information for vulnerability reduction (Daze et al., 2005) based on historical, socio-economic, spatial and temporal contexts of each community (Francisco, 2008). Multi-scale adaptation, particularly in the encouragement of local units, need to support various resources and monitoring systems to meet top-down action (Wilbanks and Kates, 1999). However, this article prefers to highlight the empowerment of bottom-up adaptation to adjust the former structure that governed and controlled children's knowledge, attitudes and practices to climate change adaptation.

One of mechanisms in building preferable practices in community-based adaptation among stakeholder in this study is to promote effectiveness through robustness of the partnership among community leaders, teachers and family members for child-centered climate change adaptation. Besides, this model pay an attention to advocate efficiency in communication and awareness by social learning, as well as equity and legitimacy by constructing participation and accountability across scales according to the suggestion of successful adaptation across scales (Adger et al., 2005). More democratic model of communication (Vogel et al, 2007) was applied for designing micro-level collaboration model for child-centered climate change adaptation to reduce gaps of scientific knowledge and policy implementation among stakeholders. Community leaders and authoritative units should downscale themselves to understand spatio-temporal variances, while teachers as practitioners should understand in both sides (scientific formal and local knowledge) to link with the newcomers (community members).

Summary

Knowledge, attitudes and practices of four major stakeholders – children, teacher, community leaders and local organizations, and community members (as family members) – in four communities in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai Province were observed and used for designing micro-level collaboration model for child-centered climate change adaptation. At first, the center of survey and analysis targeted at the children to understand the influence from surrounding actors. Family members, teachers and community leaders were able to direct knowledge, attitudes and practices among children in adaptation to climate change. Although the status of children's knowledge received mainly by teachers was mostly acceptable, they still encountered the dissonance of attitude and practice with other related stakeholders (especially family members) leading to the fundamental cause of risk communication problems in the community. Whilst knowledge among community members and local state organizations could only partially communicate effective knowledge and appropriate attitudes for adaptation among children, children's practice mostly followed because of intimate social bonds and legitimacy of authority. These mentioned issues can describe as the antagonism between mainstream scientific knowledge and local ethnic beliefs in children's perception. Lack of effective horizontal and vertical communication and collaboration across stakeholders, as well as the incapability of self-organizing in adaptation become root causes of this state. Micro-level collaboration model for child-centered climate change adaptation, based on the principle of multi-scale analysis and governance in climate change adaptation, was deployed and implemented through initiative operational plan with the concerns of heterogeneity in knowledge, attitudes and practices of all stakeholders among local

communities. This model composes of five major stages to cover cause-effect understanding, local knowledge articulation, planning and implementation of vulnerability reduction and adaptation to practice by local participation, the establishment and networking of children council, and community assessment, as well as another fundamental stage in a particular community for the reconciliation of previous conflicts among participants.

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Life and Networks of Veteran Vintage Clothing Dealers in Jatujak Market, Bangkok, Thailand

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Abstract

Prominent in hundreds of flea market across Thailand, second-hand clothing is now a mainstay of fashion choice both among Thais and foreigners. While a conventional wisdom may be that second-hand clothing is consumed among those with low income, enthusiasm in vintage clothes from mid-to-high-income urban patrons indicates that forces of political economy and global trends play a crucial role in shaping domestic fashion preferences. But Thais are not the only consumers of thrift. Foreigners are also avid shoppers and find Jatujak to be their paradise destination. The market is flooded with those with good taste who are after good fashion thrill, ranging from Americans to Europeans and Japanese, who travel from afar to pursue rare vintage clothing of high quality. Using Jatujak Market, the most well-known weekend market in Asia, as a location of study, this paper seeks to provide explanation for the recent popularization of vintage clothes in Jatujak market as a cultural phenomenon situated at the nexus between changing landscape of foreign consumer choice, transnational flows of commodities and emergent global aesthetic sensibilities. Attending to the role of merchant networks in mediating consumer needs around the world, this paper aims to understand how vintage clothing traders came to build their network and acquire expert knowledge as well as their utility through a participant-observation account of market in action, in addition to in-depth and informal interviews of merchants and both domestic and foreign consumers.

Keywords: second-hand clothing, Jatujak Market, vintage clothing, market culture, transnational consumption

Introduction

This paper was inspired by my personal shopping experience. When I was in the United States, I needed to find a good winter coat to survive the brutal winds of Madison, Wisconsin. My uncle recommended that I look for a Barbour coat, which uses a specific type of waxed-cotton. He had one during his time in England, and it worked well with the wet, cold weather. I looked the jacket up online, and the price of a brand new Barbour jacket was almost \$500. As a poor graduate student, the cost was way beyond my budget. Therefore, I decided to look for one secondhand. Ebay was the first option that came to my mind, and I found one in my size for \$149. As I was asking questions with the seller, I was surprised to know that I was ordering this jacket from a guy who was based in Bangkok, Thailand. I kept chatting with him, and he revealed that he had a secondhand clothing

store in Jatujak market. In addition to the jacket, he recommended many other secondhand items, which meant he might have a large stock. I continued searching for similar items, and I was amazed to know that many leather, denim, and waxed-cotton jackets were being sold out of Thailand. This recurring pattern puzzled me. This is how I became interested and dug into the secrets of the secondhand clothing trade, especially in the Jatujak weekend market. The market clearly occupies a special place in worldwide sales of secondhand clothing. Thus, I would like to learn the conditions that have made Thailand, and especially Jatujak Market, a fertile, active source of trade in second hand clothing, bags and shoes.

In Thailand, there are many secondhand vintage clothing markets. Domestic markets such as Rong Khrua Market¹⁴⁹, Khlong Ngae Market¹⁵⁰ (both based near the border of Thailand), yet Jatujak market is still considered to be the top market by foreign shoppers who treasure for vintage clothing. The question that I had is what makes Jatujak market to be an oasis for the vintage clothing for forging entrepreneurs could be many reasons. After, I have done my fieldwork and observed the market for at least 2 years, I would argue that the dealers are one of the most important human mechanism to contribute to this phenomenon. Focusing on Jatujak Market, Bangkok, I argue that vintage dealers are significant actors in the worldwide circulation of secondhand clothing, and, through their own capabilities, they act as bridges to bring global shoppers to the market. Their experiences and skills in adapting themselves to the changes of the global market and the needs of consumers have equipped them with the ability, network, knowledge and experience to react to the demands of foreign buyers and local consumers alike.

Characteristics of Secondhand and Vintage Clothing, and Its Re-Valuing

In order to discuss about the role of vintage dealers in this paper, I need to differentiate between vintage clothing and secondhand clothing because they have different values. The word “vintage”¹⁵¹ was originally used in the wine makers’ vocabulary to year’s wine harvest. Nonetheless, in the meantime the word vintage has been adopted by fashion world where it is used to define “a rare and authentic piece that represents the style of a particular couturier or era” (Gerval, 2008) Vintage items should be manufactured between the 1920s and the 1980s, thus clothing, which is originated before 1920s are classified as antiques, while clothing produced after 1980s are considered modern or contemporary.

The term second-hand categorizes any piece of clothing which has been used before, regardless the age of the clothes. Whether secondhand clothing is considered vintage is determined by the age of the cloth, and not the fact that it has been used (Mortara and Ironico, 2011) As mentioned previously, vintage pieces are not necessarily pieces which have been used. This consumption mode is often confused with second-hand consumption due to overlap which exists: vintage pieces might be second-hand and second-hand pieces might be vintage, but not all vintage pieces are used and not all second-hand pieces are old. Definition of second-hand buying is very clear: “the acquisition of use objects through often specific modes are places of exchange” (Roux and Guiot’s 2008, 66).

¹⁴⁹ Located in the province of Sa Kaeo, situated near the Thai-Cambodia border.

¹⁵⁰ Located near Hat Yai, in Songkhla

¹⁵¹ The term vintage does not only use in fashion industry, in fact the term has become so popular that it is now used to define in an elegant way any “old” goods from jewels to cars to fridges (Secundus.dk, 2011).

In order to distinguish between second hand and vintage clothing requires knowledge and experience. Second hand clothing is just clothing that was used before, and the value may best serve to people who can afford them. However, some of second hand pieces could increase in value if they were realized their true significance. It was addressed by Cervellon, Carey and Harns (2012, 969) that the profile and motives of the consumer and vintage fashion are unique and very different from that of second hand consumption. The most salient characteristic of the vintage fashion consumer is education. The purchase intention of vintage pieces is higher level of education and income. Furthermore, appreciation of vintage fashion requires a level of connoisseurship, which is based on historic and artistic backgrounds. As mentioned by Jens (2005, 182), "the knowledge of the relevant fashion history as well as the knowledge of good sauces for obtaining original artifacts is important component of their (sub) cultural capital."

The commodity chain of this business is started from disposals from people who rid of their old belonging from closets. So basically, this chain starts from "rubbish". If one pays close attention to this business network, one could realize that the most important mechanism of this chain and increase the value from second hand clothing to vintage is the dealers because they are the ones who could turn meaningless objects to meaningful pieces and become wanted by consumers.

As Michael Thompson addressed "rubbish theory is based on the principle that for objects to move from the passing category of declining value to the durable category of accumulating value, they must pass through the convert category to enable their value to be radically reassigned. The meanings of commodities are not fixed and new meaning are assigned relative to the consumer, not inherent in the process of production, (Thomson, 1979). Most literatures on turning value of second hand clothing have mentioned about consumers are presented as having an active role and give second life to second hand clothing. For example, in the case of Karren's "The Second Hand Clothing Trade in Zambia", she addressed that buying and wearing second hand successfully means having what Hansen refers to as "clothing competence" or the knowledge to put different items together with confidence. She points out how women in Zambia gain "competence", necessary in any fashion context, through their consumption of used, not new clothes. Most of literatures on transformation of meaning and value of second hand clothing, mention local buyers are the main consume of second hand clothing and they can get close to be "modern" like what happen in Zambia, Philippines, Hong Kong and India (Hansen, Milgram, Clark and Norris).

Nevertheless, in the case of Jatujak market, actors who shift meanings of second hand clothing may not be consumers who could connect their experience with objects, but the dealers who exercise their "education", which consists of knowledge and experience to distinguish between secondhand and vintage clothes.

Most of overseas consumers are entrepreneurs from Europe, American, Australia and other Asian countries like Japanese, Chinese, Taiwan and Koreans. These foreign entrepreneurs aim to resale these vintage clothing again back in their countries both in shops or online. For these buyers, they are not looking to find meanings for themselves, but searching for vintage clothing that would share meaningful stories with future buyers and make profits. Since, they are not in the area, and live far away from the source. They need to establish relationship with dealers who they could trust to minimize risk for their investments. Therefore, Thai dealers are expected by overseas purchasers to be the ones to screen for pieces that have high potential for future sale. Experiences with vintage clothing and networks of Thai dealers can help to bring vitality back to the vintage pieces. Their

knowledge manifests in this business in order to ensure trust from distant buyers. So the transformation in Jatujak market is different from elsewhere. If we gaze closer at the commodity chain, it is even more bizarre, how this clothing is produced in the East (made in China, etc.) or in the West (made in U.S.A, U.K., etc.) sold and used in the West, sent to the East (SEA) as donations, and sold back to West and East as 'vintage' clothing. *State early on who the consumers are, clarify this relationship.*

How it began: The Vintage Fashion in Thailand and Its Space.

Sanam Luang¹⁵² was the birthplace of the vintage dealers in Jatujak market. Secondhand clothing trading in Thailand started in the form of recycling, small business trade around 60s-70s. During the Vietnam war, there were 6 major American Air Force bases, Don Muang, Korat, Nakorn Phanom, Takhil, U-Tapao, Ubon and Udon. American fashion became popular among Thai consumers. At that time, many parts of Thailand were utilized as US military bases. Thus, Thais became familiar with many aspects of American culture, especially music and fashion. The American presence resulted in a large volume of army surplus goods which leaked out and poured into Thai markets, such as sea bags, backpacks, sunglasses, watches, compasses and etc. Thai consumers, especially, college students would search for army bags to carry to school. As one of informants shared a story of the past.

"At that time, some of students from Silpakorn University, Pohchang Academy of Arts and Thammasat University, if they want to look different and standout or even feel proud to have US made stuff, they would go to Sanam Luang to find that particular bag to carry. Later on, we started to wear Lee Cooper bootcut flared wide bottom, and everybody wanted a pair to feel fit in at that time, and the best place to find them is at Sanam Luang."¹⁵³

US Army surplus was used by young Thais to cultivate a "look" that came with increased social status, and associated with American culture. As a result, more and more people seek to find clothing which was considered "modern".

In term of being "modern" at that time, the very first clothing that Thai people had and felt close to American culture was jeans. Teenagers felt in love with denim due to many reasons. During Vietnam war, many progressive Thai students were influenced by the Hippie movement which protested Vietnam War. At the same time, some of Thai students disliked what American government was undertaking in Southeast Asia. Thus, those students dressed themselves up like the Hippies in the States, shirts and flare jeans (Lee Cooper and Levi's) to show signs of American resistance. Moreover, Woodstock concert was a big hit. Many Thai musicians who played music for the GIs at the bases dressed up like famous rock singers like Jimi Hendrix, Mick Jagger, Jim Morrison, Bob Dylan and etc. The locals also responded to the needs of GIs, many Thai bands were formed to serve such needs for the GIs, for example, V.I.P. (วีไอพี), The Fox (เดอะ ฟอกซ์), Kaleidoscope (คาไลโดสโคป) and

¹⁵² Jatujak Market has been established since 1942. In 1948, when Prime Minister Por Pibulsongkram had a policy in which every province was required to have their own market. Bangkok chose Sanam Luang to be held as the market. In 1978, the government used Sanam Luang as a recreational area, so the State Rail Road of Thailand (SRT) donated the land on the south side of Chatuchak Park to establish as a market. By 1983, all of the merchants had moved to Chatuchak. At that time the market was called Phahonyothin Market. In 1987, its name was changed to Jatujak Market.

¹⁵³ Interviewed Yub, at Jatujak market on November, 19th, 2016

etc. were famous at that time. Most of them were metal bands. These local rock stars picked up American fashion like denim jackets, American Indian and Cowboys, so denim jeans were seen as fashionable and common for the period. Men enjoyed jeans first, then girls soon followed this trend. Not just the musicians, movies also had strong influence, like cowboy movies which were influenced by cowboy and American Indians fashion. Since then on American fashion was sought by young Thais and also adults.

Before its relocation to the current market space, Jatujak market, Sanam Luang market was the place for vendors to display surplus army goods and secondhand clothing to shoppers to seek to be part of the fashion trend. This market was not only introduced Thais surplus army goods, it also offered consumers a steady supply in a reliable location. Students in that area and era enjoyed surplus items and secondhand clothing from GIs. Vendors also began to exhibit secondhand clothing in the market, which was from domestics and overseas. At the beginning, The majority of merchandises came from Bobae market¹⁵⁴. The vendors would go there to handpick good quality and brand name pieces. Arrow, Manhattan, Van Heusen, Kenington shirts and others were imported clothing made in the United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada and were popular among the locals. Besides going to Bobae market seeking for merchandises, some of dealers found an interesting way to acquire their merchandises by hire rent wives to steal or ask US. Made objects from the GIs as well.

Consumers, then, started to regale each other with stories of their fashion and how they found their proud pieces with good price. In turn, listeners would relate their own versions of these accounts. Increasing demand for American fashion was, however, met with limited supplies. Dealers would try their luck by going to people's residents applying a barter trading system by offering food for old clothes. Usually, egg and canned fish were common means to trade for undesirable garments.

When secondhand clothing and vintage fashion became popular, more secondhand clothing was introduced in the market by another group of agents who came from Southern Thailand, especially from the provinces near the Malaysian border, for example Yala, Pattani and Songkla. In the 1970s, large amount of clothing donations through international organizations were imported to Malaysia. Thus there were open up exchange space for secondhand clothing. This group of people found an opportunity to get their hands on secondhand Western merchandise, and brought them to Sanam Luang market to hawk. Demand was highest for items like jeans such as Levis, Lee Cooper, denim jackets, western style cowboy clothing and military wear. When the market was relocated to its current location, this group of dealers relocated themselves following the market, and many of them have continued their business to this day.

At the early stage of this business, when dealers did not know much about their merchandises due to a lack of information regarding Western fashion products. They would sell at a price which they found pleasing. Over time, the demand for secondhand clothing increased. In the secondhand clothing market, there were tons of clothing for sellers to buy and invest. Thus, it was imperative that they equip themselves with vintage clothing knowledge in order to minimize the risks and increase revenue. They needed to familiarize themselves with brands, models, year made, zippers, buttons, and so on. Merchandise details and quality began to dictate profit margins.

The turning point that the vintage market shifted target group from local shoppers toward foreign

¹⁵⁴ Bobae Market in Bangkok is a 30 years old market located not too far from MBK. Bobae (pronounced Bo Bay) is famous for fashion wholesale and is now very popular with exporters from around the world.

purchasers happened in the early 90s. The very first group of foreign buyers was the Japanese. Many informants shared the same story that there was a number of Japanese buyers walking around in the market and looking for rare vintage denim jeans, leather jacket and period military uniforms. These Japanese buyers were considered “easy consumers” because they were willing to pay at high prices. This event had stimulated dealers in the market to prepare their stocks in order to show to the new group of consumers. Moreover, not only the good profits that Japanese buyers provided to Thai dealer, but they also taught Thai dealers the knowledge on global fashion trend, brands, and how to distinguish the qualities, among others. Soon, more overseas buyers came to the market to look for merchandises as well.

One of the informants, Chaowalit¹⁵⁵, shared his story with me that his brother was in this business for 30 years, and was part of Japanese phenomenon era. Chaowalit did not want to join his brother because he holds a law degree, and he was working in a law firm. After a few years, he realized he did not like working in the office, so he left and joined his brother. At the beginning of vintage clothing career, it was hard for him to learn about information and details of the merchandises. His brother could give so much knowledge, but it wasn't enough. So, he started to buy vintage fashion magazines and study by himself about the origin and value of brands. Moreover, he also learned a lot from his customers. Each time, when he met foreign buyers, both from the East and West, he learned from them all.

“I did not know much about the clothing. I have no interests on them because I am not into fashion. I can wear simply cloth. Moreover, they are old, and some are almost in rotten condition, so they are smelly and dirty. When I saw my brother working on them like sorting, fixing them, I just could not imagine how he did it. Regardless of the negatives, this business does make large profit, and you are free to work whenever you want. So I decided to join my brother. Like I said, I did not know much about vintage brands and fashion. When you want to sell well, you need to be able to recognize each brand, periods, materials and stories behind them. It is crucial. This is how we make money. You must have eyes to distinguish diamonds in piles of junks. So, I learned by myself, got few magazines, books and spent times with them. Moreover, the demands changed over time, so I need to learn and observe the fashion trends from my customers.”

The Commodity Chain of Vintage Fashion

The accessibility of second hand clothing from countries in Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan began to flourish in many part of Southeast Asia, generally, with increase in development aid following the end of the Second World War. In Africa, the boom in the second hand clothing export market to these regions occurred in the early 1990s and was fueled by large surplus of usable clothing in the West and the economic liberation of many “developing” countries, which enabled increasing numbers of people to enter the market as consumers of Western imports

155 A male dealer who has been in this business for over 20 years. He is specialized in vintage leather jackets. He came from the Southern part of Thailand.

(Hanson 2005, 347). Therefore, countries like Philippines, Cambodia, and Malaysia became the recipients of this western export trade. However, Thailand has little engagement in this portion of the commodity chain.

Second hand clothing is now shipped to Thailand from many different origin countries in containers. When they arrive at the port, there are retailers who organize second hand clothing into categories such as demin jeans, leather jackets, military uniforms, bags, shoes, belts and so on. Once sorted, retailers package merchandise into bales containing one garment type only. Each bale can weigh between about 50 to 100 kilograms depending on retailers. The prices of each bale depend on the type and quality of the second hand clothing. The best quality of secondhand clothing is called "Nam Raek" (first water), and this is the most expensive because the clothing is in high quality, in fashion trend, collectable, and most wanted by collectors. Nam Raek can give hope to dealers on potential sale and promise for high profits. Dealers who can afford Nam Raek quality would invest in this type of quality. Once bales are open and gone through, the Nam Raek would be picked out. The second grade merchandise is called "Nam Song" (second water), which is less expensive and has less potentials when comparing to the Nam Raek. The third grade is called "Nam Saam" (third water), which is the lowest grade. The dealers who have the capital to purchase and invest thus have a better chance to obtain better quality, and reduce the risk of getting poorer quality.

The dealers understand and accept the price of bales, but the great challenge is getting bad quality stock. Second hand clothing is variable in quality, and the quality of the bale is determined by the relationship and buying power of the dealers. The Jatujak dealers only know what category of clothing they are purchasing and are not allowed to examine the contents of clothing bales prior to buying them. The dealers can be lucky and get many rare pieces in good condition and of the right size, or they could also be unfortunate and open a bale to find items that are in bad conditions, too large, or out of fashion. A good bale can be very profitable and can double or triple investment, whereas a bad quality bale can significantly erode their capital. Thus, the dealers have to buy in large amount of stocks to make sure that the suppliers would reward them with rare, good condition pieces.

The main veins of vintage clothing flow from Pakistan and Cambodia to Thai market. In Thailand, it is common understanding that the main source of second hand clothing comes from Cambodia, especially the market on the border Thai-Cambodia, which is known as Rong Kluea Market in the Aranyaprathet District, Sa Kaeo Province. Also known as Ban Khlong Luek Border Market, it is said to be one of Thailand's most frequented border markets. This is true in term of lower grade vintage clothing. The dealers in Jatujak have been dealing with Rong Kluea market for almost 20 years, and some of dealers even settled their posts in Rong Kluea market to get their hands first on pieces when containers arrive. One of my informants revealed that when the stuff arrived on the border, people in Rong Kluea markets would separate best quality (Nam Raek) for dealers in Jatujak and ship over to Bangkok and display Nam Song and Nam Saam quality at their shops for ordinary customers.

In addition, dealers who specialized in vintage clothing prefer Pakistani suppliers. The Pakistanis arrived in Thailand at Jatujak market about 10 years ago. They approached dealers directly and offered what they had in stock over in Pakistan. In the early stage of interaction, Pakistani dealers did not know much about brands, fashion trends, or the details of the pieces. However, after conducting business with Thai dealers for a certain period of time since the 90s, they began to learn and realized the hidden value of unwanted items. Again, the knowledge was transformed back to

the suppliers.

Jatujak dealers believe that Pakistanis have established a relationship with the oversea organizations in the port areas which receive clothing donations from North America and Europe. Because they have first access to incoming donation shipments, they are able to cherry-pick the best quality pieces. There is also much speculation that Pakistanis may donate large sums of money to have such privilege.

Some of Thai dealers I interviewed actually went to Pakistan to look for merchandise. However, it was not easy for them to go due to barriers such as language, culture, and safety. After trading with Thai dealers for a while, some Pakistani dealers saw opportunity to expand this trade into Thailand. They married Thai women and decided to set up warehouses in Thailand. Nowadays, there are a number of second hand clothing warehouses run by Pakistanis in Bangkok, the biggest of which is in Ladpharo area.

One of my informants went to Pakistan to seek for stocks. This dealer wanted to look for leather and military jackets. When he was there, his transaction went smooth with the local suppliers. However, he noticed waxed cotton jackets laying outside on a floor outside a warehouse and soon realized that those jackets were Barbour jackets. He knew right away that this brand is a classic brand with long history from England and is expensive. Nonetheless, Pakistani dealers did not seem to know about the brand. They were annoyed because these jackets were heavy and gave out bad odor. Thus they were delighted that these jackets were of interest to Thai customers. At the end of this trip, this Thai dealer ended up with 2 full containers of Barbour jackets and made about 4 million bath alone from selling these unwanted smelly jackets. This situation reflects ability and knowledge of an experienced dealers in the market. After, this trip, the Pakistani suppliers realized how valuable Barbour jackets, and the price was never the same as before

The Expertise of Veteran Vintage Dealers

The vintage dealers in the market are mostly male, between the ages or early 20s to late 50s. Many of them are from the Southern part of Thailand we can notice when they speak Malay among each other, and majority religion is Islam. The root of their business can traced back to Sanam Luang market. Most of my informants have linked with the previous market. They are veteran and extending and passed on their knowledge and networks for new dealers who are part of family or friends. Most of vintage dealers can communicate in English.

Most of informants are specializing in different areas of vintage clothing, depending on their experience and network. Some are experts in like leather jackets, t-shirts, demin jeans, American Indian apparels and military wears. For example, one of them is an expert in jackets because his father was selling jackets before. Thus his shop only displays various kinds of jacket, for example, pilot jackets, bomber jackets, biker jackets, coats and etc.

However, dealers also realized they need to open their eyes for merchandises for local buyers as well. The number of Thai middle class consumers who buy and wear secondhand clothing has been increasing. Many people claim that secondhand clothing is of better quality than the current clothing found in malls. For this particular motive, secondhand clothing, such as shirts, T-shirt, jeans, hats, bags, shoes are purchased. Moreover, by wearing used well-known brand name items make them viewed by others with class and taste, which shows the sign of success. These types of consumers know what particular brands are well made, and which have good reputations for both look and

style. There are also other second hand shops, which provide merchandises that are suitable for Thai weather conditions, and local shoppers can enjoy. These shoppers may not be vintage collectors; they buy second hand fashion goods because they can not afford brand news. For example, second hand bags, most of the bags derive from Hong Kong and Japan. Brands like Superdry, Porter, North Face, Freitag and etc.

People who wants to look different and search for their identities through fashion would enjoy second hand clothing. They are influenced by American subcultures, anti-fashion. From 1990s, some of teenagers followed Kurt Cobain's style included uncoordinated and non-brand-name items of clothing that created the look of a carelessly cool grunge rock star. Entering the 2000s, this anti-fashion look is associated with musical scenes including indie rock and emo gradually spreading to the hipster movement. The hipster movement is popular among people in their 20s and 30s whose style attempts to reject mainstream trends. The hipster movement embraced second hand cloth because of the love for vintage items, especially clothing. Moreover, teens or young adults who follow this tread, embrace nostalgia and irony by combining vintage pieces like old trucker-caps and vintage bowling, brand t-shirts with worn luxury goods like jump suit, leather jackets, old military.

Excitement and adventure usually come with vintage clothing shopping experience. The consumers will not find what they want easily. The shops in Jatujak market usually have a warehouse feel and are crowded with clothing, accessories and garments hung on racks and walls loosely classified by type. vintage clothing shopping offers the thrill of the chase, the bargain, and the pleasure of making a find or discovery. Shoppers have to go through hundreds of store with thousands of items—a range of clothing of diverse quality and no guarantee of supply size. The uncertainty of searching requires consumers to use their “searching skills” to discover potential treasure among treasures. Mastering the skill-set of a vintage buyer takes time and experience. Many vintage lovers view a successful shopping trip as an accomplished mission that is performed in the interactive process of shopping by means of their acquired skills. Thus, when they find what they are looking for, they feel a sense of pride and mastery. Moreover, finding a vintage in the ocean of the second-hand clothing does not easily happen due to the competition between shoppers, and uncertainties of the of merchandise stock.

Being a veteran vintage clothing dealers in Jatujak Market requires knowing the nature of customers. Dealers aim to encounter with customers who appreciate value of vintage clothing. To understand dealers' methods, one should have enough knowledge to recognize meaning behind the pieces and the ways the shops are exhibited. The dealers always pay attention to their customers who come to their shops carefully. When customers enter stores and go straight to high value piece, which are buried and hidden among regular pieces, it shows that customers have the ability and knowledge to detect unlike those customers who walk in and complain about the prices.

Once dealers find out about customer's levels of knowledge and realize that they can increase their chance to sell or even to establish relationship, they would approach them differently. Potential customers would share information on what they collect or even put in orders, and the dealers also show abilities and skills of how they can seek or obtain rare or in-demand items.

Many big dealers tend to pay more attention to wholesale transaction since this type of sale would help them turn over the stocks and maximize profits. However, there will be some that are not included with big sale. These good quality, in trend or rare leftovers would be displayed in the shop with low quality piece and wait to be picked up by the right owners.

"No rush, every piece has its owner, you have to wait for its destined owner of that particular to take it home," one of the dealers shared with me a tip of being a successful dealer. In this business, dealers believe that every vintage piece has its story and that particular piece might share experience with a customer. The specific meaning of this consumption depends on context of their interaction with the buyers. Consumer is presented as having an active role and giver of second life to vintage pieces. For example, one dealer was telling me that he has an old red furlong coat hung on his shop's wall for 9 years, and one day a girl from Ireland saw it and said that the coat reminded of her mother. So she tried it on, and it fitted. She brought it.

While many Thais visit the vintage section in Jatujak market, the trade still relies heavily on foreign buyers; especially those who come from countries where people need winter gear to keep warm such as leather jackets, wax-cotton jacket and coats. The dealers even noticed different seasons from different countries to prepare their winter gears for customers. For example, dealers would prepare winter wears for Australians buyers right after Christmas because in Australia, Autumn starts around March and that is when Australian entrepreneurs come to shop in the market. The high season for vintage clothing is between September and March, which are the autumn and winter months in the cold countries. The vintage shops start to prepare merchandises for their loyal customers early in advance. Before making buying trip to Thailand, foreign buyers often contact the shops to reserve specific items, such as particular brands and models. The relationship between vendors and customers is considered very important, not for just reservation of the merchandise, but also as the crucial chance to retain high quality items. Jatujak vendors usually hide their best merchandises for their special customers to select first. Once the items are viewed and purchased, the remaining pieces will be displayed. This practice shows that this particular part of market greatly depends on foreign capital.

The transactions usually are sold in wholesale price for regular customers. The foreign customers, most of them are male, aged between 25 to 50 years old. Like I mentioned before, they usually buy a whole lot when items are in good quality and affordable. The purchased items normally will be sold again in Europe, North America, and Japan through various channels in their home countries. For instance, Rob has a vintage store in London with his brother. Rob comes to Thailand every 4-5 months to buy vintage clothing items, mostly jackets such as Belstaff, Barbour, and other high value items. He carries his bags filled with vintage items back home. However, if Rob is lucky and finds more than he can carry, he will ship them back home via Thai Post Office, which is located in Jatujak market. Besides reselling these items in the shops, Rob also posts these vintage items on Ebay. "I come to Thailand mainly to buy from my friends in the market, and these guys do not disappoint me." Rob kept saying, "I prefer coming to Thailand because I like the weather, right after the business, I will go straight to the beaches for a few days."¹⁵⁶

As one of the best vintage markets in Southeast Asia, competition at Jatujak for high-quality items is fierce. Travelling to Thailand is an expensive investment for international vintage dealers, thus having good relationship is an advantage to save time and cost.

Besides being the best vintage market in Thailand, Jatujak market is also a place where vintage items can be reconstructed and repaired. This is crucial for the business. There are two unforeseen issues from opening a bale, which are: what items you are getting and their conditions. Dealers indeed hope to get good items for their customers in good condition. However, they all realize that after all

¹⁵⁶ Rob interviewed on November 26th, 2016 at Jatujak Market

they are dealing with used clothes, thus many pieces from bales would have defects like rips, holes and missing pieces. Dealers who are associated with Japanese and Western buyers usually have their tailors to restore the life of these pieces. Nonetheless, dealers with experiences would be the ones who check and see what needs to be fixed and changed. This process requires dealers who have deep knowledge of these clothes because different brands, countries, zippers, buttons, pockets and other parts are not the same. It is not easy for tailors to detect such details. Tom is the second generation of secondhand vintage clothing business family. His family is from Nakhon Si Thammarat. Even though Tom has an art degree, he prefers this business due to profits and flexibility. He mentioned that when he opened bales of clothing, he had to screen potential pieces out from the low quality ones. Once he separated them, he had to inspect them carefully looking for defects, rips and holes.

“Once we open bales to see the merchandise for the first time, I need to pick good ones with good condition first, then from the good piles, we have to look for brands, year made and flaws. Each time when I look at these things, I feel like these vintage jackets used to have lives before, and now I am a doctor, I have to slowly check their symptoms of these pieces. Is it the zips, rips or holes? Once the symptoms are recognized; I will send them to my tailors to finish up the work. Then these vintage stuff will look great and ready to be picked up, enjoyed and lived again.”

Each dealer has his secret tailors, which they refuse to reveal. And for repair parts, like zips, buttons are ordered from overseas. These services can make shopping in Jatujak market stress-free for foreign dealers. This capability helps dealers to make more profits over low potential pieces. A Japanese shopper explained that “Jatujak market can answer my demand, since most of the leather jackets from the west are so large, and for most of my clients in Japan, the jackets need to be altered. A leather jacket is very hard to work with. If I have this done in Japan, the cost will be so high, and I won’t make anything. These guys can fix the jacket into nice shape like magic.”¹⁵⁷

The nature of finding vintage clothing is depending on luck. One cannot simply get what he/she desires for. Even dealers, they cannot guarantee what they are going to catch. However, the veteran vintage dealers can bend that rule. The veteran vintage who are in this business for a long time have a capital to invest into their stocks to ensure their sale possibilities. The fashion trends change fast in the global scale; the dealers have to enlarge this opportunity. Thus, veteran dealers would have large stocks with various kinds of vintage clothing.

I once visited a warehouse of a dealer. He has a three-story house, but the whole house was filled with all kinds of vintage clothing. He said that he doesn’t know what will be on the fashion trend or popular, so he just keeps everything until the right time comes for a particular kind of vintage fashion. He even said that “whatever my customers need, I can find it somewhere in my warehouse.” This statement shows how confident he is when it comes to his stocks for his customers.

Conclusion

It has been agreed by many that Jatujak market is the best place to look for vintage clothing in Bangkok. The market has shown the importance of the global trade; which vintage commodity is a good example. Most of the clothing comes from North America, Europe and Japan, travelling a long distance to Jatujak market. These items have been revalued from unwanted items from developed

¹⁵⁷ Interviewed on December 3rd, 2016

countries, and become precious in developing countries, which generates incomes for both parties. The dealers are important actors trading, and they are the bridges to bring global shoppers to the market by their capabilities. Their experiences and skills to adopt themselves to the changes of the global market have equipped them with abilities to react to the demands of the foreign buyers and local consumers.

Secondhand clothing become vintage clothing, and increase in values is depending upon the skills, network and knowledge of veteran dealers who have been doing this business for many decades. It is the dealers' agenda to revalue, reconstitute, enliven and reinvigorate old clothes for the market. Although the dealers' intention is to make maximize profits, dealers' ability to continue to sell vintage pieces to oversea or local customers is absolutely dependent on the ability to satisfy their buyers.

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Medicinal Plants & Traditional Knowledge of Adi and Khamti Tribe of Arunachal Pradesh

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Abstract

In rural world, medicinal plants play an integral source of easily available remedy in healthcare system. The different tribal communities of Arunachal Pradesh use different herbal plant parts for the treatment of diseases. This study was conducted to the Adi and Khamti communities of Arunachal Pradesh and their traditional knowledge on herbal plants. The personal interviews with the villagers and medicine men and assistance of local information (villages like Manhofai, Nongtaw of Namsai District, Lohitpur, Khoreliang of Tezu, Ngopok, Pasighat, in East Siang District of Arunachal Pradesh, India) were extensively done. We recorded the traditional use of no of medicinal plants species belonging to different taxonomic plant families used for different diseases/ailments. It was further tried to understand chemical features of those herbal plants. It was found that local people of different communities tend to agree more with each other in terms of the plants used to treat malaria, jaundice, urological problems, dermatological disorders, pain, respiratory disorder and gastro-intestinal disorders. The highest number of medicinal plants was reported from the Adi community and followed by Khampti community.

Keywords: Medicinal Plants, Traditional Plants, Adi Tribe, Khampti Tribe, Arunachal Pradesh


1. Introduction

Ethnic and tribal communities have vast knowledge on different medicinal plants and their uses. According to WHO, herbal medicines serve the health requirements for the millions of people in the rural areas of developing countries, which is about 80% of the world's population [1].

Having only 2.4% of the total land mass of the earth, India is one of the 12th mega biodiversity countries. India has contributed at least 167 plants to global agriculture and is the home to two of the world's 25 hotspots – Western Ghats and the Eastern Himalayans [2].

Arunachal Pradesh a land of rich biodiversity is found to have 28 major different ethnic groups residing in different areas and they have diverse native, original knowledge on medicinal plants and have developed different methods for using the available nature's resources [3][4]. Their knowledge in knowing these assets is distinguishingly different from tribe to tribe. With the use of these plants for the medicinal purpose their belief in their native folklore medicine for remedies have grown. The knowledge and belief was transmitted verbally from one generation to another. Now, due to

modernization the traditional knowledge is vanishing with time. Though, some workers have reported much utilization of medicinal plants by the indigenous tribes, still there is the need of doing much work in the field of ethno-medico-botany of Arunachal Pradesh.



The purpose of this study was to explore the relative information and conventional uses of medicinal plants by the two tribes (Khampti and Adi) of Arunachal Pradesh.

Figure 1: District wise distribution of 1. Adi Tribes (East Siang, Upper Siang, West Siang, Lower Dibang Valley and Lohit) and 2. Khampti Tribes (Namsai district and Changlang district) in Arunachal Pradesh.

2. Methodology

2.1 Description of the Study Area

Arunachal Pradesh (Land of Dawn lit Mountain) is the Orchid state of India and is always regarded as paradise for the botanist. Geographically it is the largest among the North-east Indian States commonly known as “the eight Sister state”. Arunachal Pradesh is located between 26.28°N and 29.30°Latitude and 91.20°E and 97.30°E longitude and has 83,743 sq km area. Most of the Arunachal Pradesh is covered by the mighty Himalaya. Arunachal Pradesh borders the state of Assam, Nagaland to the south and shares international border with Bhutan in the west, Myanmar in the east and China in the north.

The land Arunachal Pradesh is mainly mountainous with the Himalayas ranges running north south. These divide the state into five river valleys: The Kameng, the Subansiri, the Siang, the Lohit and the Tirap. All these are fed by snow from the Himalayas and countless rivers and rivulets. It receives heavy rainfall of 2,000 – 4,100 millimeters annually, most of it between May and September. The climate of Arunachal Pradesh varies with elevation of area. The average recorded in Arunachal Pradesh is 3000 millimeters.

The present study was done taking two tribes of Arunachal Pradesh namely Adi tribe and Khampti tribes too learnt about their knowledge of medicinal plants. The literal meaning of Adi is ‘hill’ or

‘mountain top’ and the present habitat of the Adi people is heavily influenced by the historic location of the ancient Lhoyu. The Adi tribe is found have rich knowledge on medicinal plants. While the Khampti tribe is mainly found in Namsai district, Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh.

2.2 Sampling Informants

At random a total of 165 informants were selected for the survey and the survey was conducted by visiting house-to-house represented mostly by villagers and 30 respondents (21 males and 9 females) constitute traditional health practitioner (THP), who had traditional knowledge on the medicinal use of the plants and have a tradition of healing in their families (Fig. 2). The Wage, class and educational background were taken into consideration; 55 were from 20 to 40 years of age, 60 were from 40–60 years of age, 50 were from 60 to 80 years of age, 56 were females and 109 were males. In this study, 70 respondents constituted having educational background up to class VIII standard and the majority of the informants were illiterate.




Figure 2: Field Study participants interviewed

2.3 Ethno-botanical Data Collection and Ethical Considerations

Objective of the study was clearly explained to each participant of this study, before getting the answer to the queries, and their verbal consent was taken. This study was conducted between November 2016 and April 2017.

The second author, who is being local and could speak the local languages and also knows some of the traditional plants used by the local tribal people of the region, collected the data. A semi-structured questionnaire [4] was used to interview the participants. During the period of the study from November 2016 and April 2017, each survey took 3-4 days and a total of 15 field visits were conducted before compiling the report.

The questionnaire used had three aspects, 1) It dealt with demographic information such as age, sex, religion, nationality and educational background of the participant. 2) Questions on professional experience on the treatment of diseases (diseases treated, frequency of treatment, use of herbal therapy alone or otherwise, duration of treatment, accompanied side effects, accompanied verbal instructions, plant part(s) frequently used, availability of plants/plant part(s) and knowledge of treatment). 3) Description of plants and recipes used in the treatment of common diseases, herbal

preparation, arrangement of plant part(s) ingredient, traditional solvent of choice, traditional extraction methods/method of preparation and method of administration were considered.

However, the author stressed on the collection of information such as local names of the plants, plant parts used, method of preparation and associations with other plants along with age and educational background of the participants.

Followed by the sample were extracted at lab and common phytochemicals were tallied with the reported results.

Preparation of Plant Extracts (For *Paederia foetida*)

The fresh leaves of *Paederia foetida* were washed with tap water immediately after collection and air dried for 4 – 5 days at RT. The collected leaves were chopped into small pieces and ground into coarse powder with a mechanical grinder (Usha, Lexus, India) and stored in an airtight container. Dried 20 g powder was taken in a thimble and run in soxhlet apparatus with the solvent hexane, chloroform, acetone and methanol respectively. All the extracted samples were dried under vacuum using rotary evaporator. Same process was repeated for both the samples.

Phytochemical Analysis

Phytochemical tests were conducted using the standard protocols [4]

Determination of Total Phenolic Content

The total phenolic contents of the plant *Paederia foetida* L. of both the varieties were determined with some modification as described by standard protocols [5]. Extracted samples of both the varieties (100µl) was mixed with 750µl of Folin Ciocalteu reagent (10 fold dilution with distilled water) and incubated at 25°C for 5 min. Then 750µl of sodium carbonate (60 g/L) solution was added to the mixture. Following 90 min incubation at 25°C, absorbance was measured at 725 nm using UV-visible spectrophotometer. The total phenolic content was measured using a standard curve of gallic acid at 0.02 – 0.1 mg/mL concentrations. Total phenolic content was calculated for each sample and expressed as milligrams of gallic acid equivalent per 100 mL of sample.

Determination of Flavonoid Content

The total flavonoid contents of the plant *Paederia foetida* L. of both the varieties were determined with some modification as per standard protocols [5] One ml of 2% aluminium chloride was mixed with the same volume of sample at different doses and absorbance was measured at 430 nm after 10 min of incubation. The total flavonoid content was determined using a standard curve of quercetin at 20 – 100 µg/mL. Total flavonoid content was calculated for each sample and expressed as milligrams of quercetin equivalent per 100 mL of sample.

Table 1:

a) Comparative phytochemical analysis of *Artemesia nilagirica*:

Phytochemical compounds	Fresh leaves	Hexane extract	Chloroform extract	Acetone extract	Methanol extract
	W	W	W	W	W
Alkaloid	+	-	+	+	+
Flavonoid	-	-	-	-	-
Anthraquinone	-	-	-	-	-
Saponin	-	-	-	+	+
Terpenoids	+	-	+	+	+
Cardiac glycoside	-	-	-	-	-
Tannin	+	-	+	+	+
Phlobatannin	-	-	-	-	-
Starch	-	-	-	-	-

W-Wild, (-) - Absent, (+) – Present

b) Comparative phytochemical analysis of *Cassia alata*:

Phytochemical compounds	Fresh leaves	Hexane extract	Chloroform extract	Acetone extract	Methanol extract
	W	W	W	W	W
Alkaloid	-	-	+	-	+
Flavonoid	+	-	-	-	-
Anthraquinone	-	-	-	-	-
Saponin	-	-	-	+	+
Terpenoids	+	-	+	+	+
Cardiac glycoside	-	-	-	-	-
Tannin	+	-	+	+	+
Phlobatannin	-	-	-	+	+
Starch	-	-	-	-	-

W-Wild, (-) - Absent, (+) – Present

2.4 Statistical Analysis

To summaries, the data were tabulated on excel sheet and hence various properties like plant families, habit, ethno medicinal uses, plant parts used as medicine and phytochemicals reported to be present.

Table 2: Plants used in the traditional healthcare as medicine in the state Arunachal Pradesh, India

S I N o	Scientific name of the Plant	Family	Local name of plant	Habit	Ethno-med. uses	Plant parts used	Phytochemicals reported
1	<i>Artemesia nilagirica</i> ⁵	Asteraceae	Tipintarin	Shrub	In headache and stomach pain, used as vegetable, to get relief from asthma	Leaves	Glycosides, tannins, phenols, terpenoides, saponins, amino acids, alkaloids, essential oil
2	<i>Cassia alata</i> ⁵	Fabaceae	Kra-pat	Shrub	Leaf juice is applied in eczema and itching	Leaves and roots	Alkaloids, tannins, anthraquinone, cardiacglycoside, phenols, diterpene, flavonoides
3	<i>Centella asiatica</i> ⁵	Apiaceae	Barang	herb	Fresh plant juice with honey is given in stomach ulcer, leprosy	Whole plant	Pentacyclitriterpen oids, asiaticoside, brahmoside, Asiatic acid, brahmic acid etc.
4	<i>Clerodend ronglandu losum</i> ⁵	Lamiaceae	Pattoi	Shrub	For treatment of high blood pressure and bowel troubles, obesity	Fruits and leaves	Ascorbic acid, polyphenols, steroids, saponin, flavonoids, etc.
5	<i>Colocasia esculenta</i> ⁵	Araceae	Yaksar	aquat ic tropic al Plant	Fever and cough, petiole juice is used as styptic and stimulant	Leaves, stem and rhizome	Apigenin, luteolin, anthocyanin, minerals, steroids, sitosterol, starch
6	<i>Dillenia indica</i> ⁵	Dilliniaceae	Ahutenga	large shrub /medi um tree	Fruit decoction is applied to Scalp for curing dandruff, wound healing, bone fracture, Anti diarrhea	Fruit pulp and leaves	Diterpene namely dipoloicacid, kaempferol, quercetin, betulin, betulinic acid, mallicacid, free amino acid
7	<i>Moringa oleifera</i> ⁵	Moringaceae	Sajana	Tree	In liver disorder, water purification etc.	Pods,	Catechol tannins, gallic tannin
8	<i>Musa sapientu m</i> ⁵	Musaceae	Nyoro- kopa	flowe ring plant with herba cious growt h	Boiled unripe fruits are given during dysentery, diabetes, in anemia	Fruits and leaves	Saponins, potassium, protein, calcium, sodium, iron etc.
9	<i>Piper betel</i> ⁵	Piperaceae	Ritik-rhinik	vine (Cree per)	Leaf after rubbing with mustard oil and warming over burning charcoal is applied to belly during stomach ache of children	Leaf	Nicotinic acid, thiamine, starch, eugenol, eugenylacetate, camphene, cineole, caryophyllene, D-limonene,

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							terpinen-4-ol
1 0	<i>Solanum khasianum</i> ⁵	Solanaceae	Thitbya-ke	shrub	Root decoction is used to treat malaria, antifertility property, anti-inflammatory	Seeds, berries and roots	Glyco-alkaloid, solasodine, anitrogen analogue of diosgenin
1 1	<i>Spilanthes sacmella</i> ⁵	Asteraceae	Mershang	herb	Antimalarial, antipyretic, analgesic, flowers are chewed during toothache	Flower bud, stem, roots, leaves	Spilanthol, stigmasteryl-3-O-6-D-glycopyranoside, N-isobutylamidemo eity
1 2	<i>Terminalia myriocarpa</i> ⁵	Combretaceae	Hilika	Tree	Bark extract is given in chest pain and as cardiac stimulant	Fruit, leaves, bark	Methyl-flavogallonate, gallic acid, methyl gallate, ethyl gallate, vitexin, isovitexin, orientine, rutin, ellagic acid, flavogallonic acid
1 3	<i>Zanthoxylum armatum</i> ⁵	Rutaceae	Honyur	tree	Seed and bark are used as Tonic during fever and cholera, stomach disorder	Fruit, seed, bark	Aliphatic and aromatic amides, alkaloids like benzophenanthridines, furoquinolines (dictamine), carbazoles, berberine, acridones, lignansesamin
1 4	<i>Tacca integrifolia</i> ^{11,6}	Dioscoraceae	Tagoon	herb	Skin disease, leprosy, wound healing, stomach pain, dysentery	Rhizomes, tubers	Diosgenin, costanogenin, taccalin, betulinic acid, n-triacontanol, amino acids like valine, leucine
1 5	<i>Solanum nigrum</i> ^{11,6}	Solanaceae	Byako	weed	Vomiting, diarrhea, also used to cure tuberculosis, reduce mild abdominal pain	Berries,	Pinoresinol, syringaresinol, medioresinol, scopoletin, tetracosanoic acid and β -
1 6	<i>Erigeron bonariensis</i> ^{11,6}	Asteraceae	Daglentao	herb	Vapour of leaves is inhaled in sinus problem	Leaves	Stigmasterol, freideline, quercitrin, caffeic acid, the aromatic glycoside called
1 7	<i>Chromolaena odorata</i> ^{11,6}	Asteraceae	Telimbabo	shrub	Wound healing, skin diseases, diuretic, analgesic, anti-microbial, relieve pain	Roots	α -pinene, β -pinene, geijerone, cubebol, epicubebol, camphor, limonene,

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1 8	<i>Artemisia indica</i> ^{11,6}	Asteraceae	Laglin	herb	For skin allergy, believe to be effective in breast cancer	Leaves,	Sesquiterpenes, β -pinene (15%), β -elemente,
1 9	<i>Cyclosorus parasiticus</i> ⁶	Thelypteridaceae	Rukdik	fern	Gout and rheumatism, anthelmintic, antifungal and antibacterial	Leaves, rhizome	Chalcone derivatives called parasitins, flavonoids, saponin, tannins, alkaloid, terpenoids
2 0	<i>Piper longum</i> ⁶	Piperaceae	Saturikki	climber	Treat joints pain, gout, paralysis, improve immune and digestive system, arthritis	Leaves, stem.	Piperene 3%, rutin 4%, sabinene, β -caryophyllene, chavicol, phellandrene, piperamine, piperoleins, β -bisabolene
2 1	<i>Gerbera piloselloides</i> ⁶	Compositae	Pangnesir	Small flowering plant	Treat cold, fever, acute conjunctivitis, rheumatic pain	Leaves and rhizomes	Dicoumarin like dibothrioclinins I, dibothrioclinins II,
2 2	<i>Oxyspora paniculata</i> ⁶	Melastomataceae	Porkijale	shrub	Treatment of various liver disorder, stomachic, antidote against snake poisoning.	Leave, whole plant	Andrographolide, 14-deoxyandrographolide, neoandrographolide, andrographiside, 14-deoxyandrographiside.
2 3	<i>Perilla ocymoides</i> ^{11,6}	Lamiaceae	Namdung	herb	Locally used as spices or as a curry, in treatment of asthma, also used for nausea, sunstroke, reduce muscle spasms.	Seeds, leaves	Perillaldehyde (50-60%), farnesene, perilla oil is a rich source of omega-3-fatty acid
2 4	<i>Plantago erosa</i> ^{11,6}	Plantaginaceae	Donihana-kang	herb/subshrubs	Constipation, improves digestion, astringent, demulcent, diuretic, expectorant, anti-inflammatory	Seeds, leaves	Flavonoids, alkaloids, steroids which causes anti-inflammatory, tannins etc.
2 5	<i>Clerodendrum serratum</i> ³	Lamiaceae	Bortapipik	herb	Diabetes, obesity, hypertension, locally it is also used as a vegetable.	Whole plant	D-mannitol, hispidulin, apigenin, serratagenic acid, acteoside, oleanolic acid, cholestanol, clerosterol, campesterol, 24-ethyl cholesterol

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26	<i>Gynocardia odorata</i> ³	Achariaceae	Teeksin	tree	In treatment of leprosy, toothache, lupus, scrofula and many skin diseases.	Seeds and fruits	Flavonoides, protein, fixed oil, tannins, alkaloids, glycosides, carbohydrate, triterpenoides, saponins
27	<i>Alnus nepalensis</i> ³	Betulaceae	Taram sin	tree	Disinfectant, diuretic reduce swelling, prevent excessive sweating, also used for carpentry.	Branches, bark, leaves	Bark is reported to contain 7% tannin
28	<i>Alpinia nigra</i> ³	Zingiberaceae	Bugbii-talli	herb	Analgesic, appetizer, antifungal, jaundice, gastric ulcer, diuretic, expectorant, anti-inflammatory, flavoring agent, leaves are used in beer preparation	Rhizome, fruits and leaves	Caryophyllene oxide (23%), geraniol (19.9%), eudesmol (19.4%), citronellyl (16.5%), 1,8-cineol, α -pinene, β -pinene, etc.
29	<i>Bauhinia variegata</i> ^{1,6}	Fabaceae	Pacham	tree	Asthma, ulcer, digestive problem anti-oxidant locally also used as spices	Flowers, leaves, root and buds	Quercetin derivatives, saponin, phenanthraquinone, triterpene, kaempferol, flavonoides
30	<i>Citrus medica</i> ^{11,6}	Rutaceae	Jipin	tree	Treatment of scurvy intestinal ailments, antidote anti-cancer, weak eyesight, vomiting, skin diseases, hemorrhoids.	Leaves and fruit	Limonene, geraniol, neral, P-coumaric acid, nomiline, sabinene, myrcene, 1,8-cineole
31	<i>Crassocephalum crepidioides</i> ^{11,6}	Asteraceae	Hogegain	herb	Anti-malarial, analgesic, epileptic, wound bleeding, headache	Whole plant	Caryophyllene, cubebene, farnesene, thymol, tannin, dihydroisocoumarins, monoterpenes, jacoline.
32	<i>Debregeasia longifolia</i> ^{1,6}	Urticaceae	Jirepole	shrub	Anti-tumors, rheumatism, juice is applied to the areas of the skin affected by scabies.	Fruits, leaves	Flavonoids, palmitic acid, hemicosanoic acid, betulinic acid, hederagenin, ponolic acid, catechin, monogynol A, β -danos-sterol, β -sitosterol.
33	<i>Gerbera piloselloides</i> ^{11,6}	Asteraceae	Pangnesir	herb	Treat cold, fever and acute conjunctivitis in	Whole plant	Dibothrioclinis I and II, n-hexadecanoic acid, neryl-2-

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					rheumatic pain.		methylbutanoate etc.
3 4	<i>Litsea cubeba</i> ^{11,6}	Lauraceae	Tayer	tree or shrub	Astringent, antiseptic, worm infection, blood dysentary, stimulant, anti-inflammatory, hypotensive, insecticide, in bone fracture, headache	Whole plant	Citral B, β -phellandrene, β -terpinene, D-limonene, monoterpene, geranial, cubebanone, sabinene, myrcene, citronellal.
3 5	<i>Macaranga adenticulata</i> ^{11,6}	Euphorbiaceae	Yaduk	tree	Skin damage, anti-bacterial, antityrosinase, fungal infection wound healing, stomach pain	Whole plant	High phenolic contents, triterpene like 3-epitaraxerol, teraxerone, β -sitosterol, flavonoids
3 6	<i>Musa acuminata</i> ^{11,6}	Musaceae	Kulu	herb	In anaemia, diarrhea, constipation, ulcer, for menstrual cramps	Whole plant	Campesterol, stigmasterol, β -sitosterol, linoleic acid, α -linolenic acid, carbendazim, serotonin, thiabendazole
3 7	<i>Mussaenda roxburghii</i> ^{11,6}	Rubiaceae	Tangmeng	Shrub	Detoxify mushroom poison, anti-pyretic, treat blemishes, on tongue, acute gastro-enteritis.	Whole plant	Iridoids, mussaenoside, shanzhiside methyl ester, mussaenin, quercetin, rutin, hyperin, ferulic acid, sinapic acid.
3 8	<i>Coptis thetha</i> ^{11,6}	Ranunculaceae	Rinko, idu-aro	herb	Fever, headache, gastric trouble, dysentery, ulcer, insomnia, vomiting, stimulant to heart, anti-bacterial.	Roots	Berberin, coptisine, epiberberine, berberrubine, palmeatin, columbamine, ferulic acid, worenine, magnoflorine, obakumone, obakulactone.
3 9	<i>Acorus calamus</i> ^{22,7}	Acoraceae	Wok-kak-hing	Semi aquatic creeper	Sedative, laxative, carminative, stroke, insecticidal activities, also in making perfume.	Leaves, stems and roots	α -asarone, β -asarone, eugenol, triploid and tetraploid A.
4 0	<i>Euphorbia ligularis</i> ^{22,7}	Euphorbiaceae	Thamran-hingme	tree	Bone fracture, arrow poisoning, anti-arthritis, purgative, anti-asthma, expectorant.	Stem, root, latex and leaves	Alkaloids, cyanogenic, glucoside, glucosinolates, triterpenoids, alcohol, anthraquinones.
4	<i>Phlogacanth</i>	Acanthaceae	Ran-hing	shrub	Expectorant,	Leaves and	Lupeol, betulin,

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1	<i>nthusthyr siflorus</i> ²²	ae			asthma, stomach, problems, fever.	fruit	vasicine, β-sitosterol, pyrroloquinazoline alkaloid.
4 2	<i>Syzygium umini</i> ^{24,8}	Myrtaceae	Jamun	tree	Astringent, carminative, anti-diabetic, stomach disorder, diarrhea and dysentery	Fruit and bark	Resin, albumin, jambosine-3, gallic acid, ellagic acid, corilagin, tannin, steroid, zinc, sodium, potassium.
4 3	<i>Aesculus ssamica</i> ²⁴	Hippocasta na-ceae	Ozonsak	tree	Skin infection, reduces backache, in the treatment of hemorrhoids.	Seed, roots and flowers	Triterpenesaponin called escin, assamicin and isoescin
4 4	<i>Bidenspil sa</i> ²⁴	Asteraceae	Hou-bak	herb	Wound healing, ulcer, ear, eye problem, influenza, hepatitis, urinary tract infection, anti-malaria, anti-pathogenic.	Whole plant	Friedelin, n-tridecane, friedelinol, β-sitosterol, lupeol, eleosanol acid, friedelin-3-β-ol-27-o ic acid, 21-a-hydroxyfriedel an-3-one, polyacetylenes.
4 5	<i>Cannabis sativum</i> ²⁴	Cannabace ae	Bang	herb	Stomach disorder, hypnotic, sedative, anti-inflammatory, analgesic, nausea, vomiting, hallucinogenic.	Stem, seed, leaves, flower	Cannabidiol, myrcene, linalool, α-pinene, α-terpinolene, α-humulene, caryophyllene oxide, tetrahydrocannabin ol.
4 6	<i>Costusspe ciosus</i> ²⁴	Costaceae	Jam-lakhm ti	herb	Respiratory problem, astringent, stimulant, anti-helminthic, liver cirrhosis, aphrodisiac, urinary problem.	Roots and stem	Diosgenin, cycloartenol, 25-en-cycloartenol, prosapogenin B, diosgenone, octacosanoic acid, gracillin, ligogenin, methyl proto dioscin
4 7	<i>Emplicaof ficinalis</i> ²⁴	Euphorbiac eae	Amloki	herb	Liver tonic, anti-diabetic, asthma, pepticulcer, analgesic, heart problems, jaundice.	Fruits, seed	Phyllembin, tannin (5%), fixed oil, vitamin C, pectin, iron, calcium,
4 8	<i>Houttuyni acordata</i> ²⁴	Saururacea e	Nekir name	Herb	Measles, gonorrhoea, skin troubles, anti-tumor, anti-cancer, pneumonia, bronchitis, stomach ulcer.	Shoots, leaves, stem	Houttuynoside A(1) and A(2), quercitrin, kaempferal, esters, quercetin, nonanol, bornyl acetate, lauraldehyde.

49	<i>Paedaria foetida</i> ²⁴	Rubiaceae	Phodoaslo d	herb	Rheumatism and gout, emetic, astringent, gastritis, body pain, for active digestion.	Leaf, root, bark, fruit	Iridoid glycoside, asperuloside, scandoside, paederoside, linalool, ceryl alcohol, benzo-furan, campesterol, epifriedelinol.
50	<i>Dioscorea floribunda</i> ²⁴	Dioscoreaceae	Khamalu	climber	Intestine diverticupsis, gall Bladder pain, for increasing energy, rheumatoid arthritis.	Roots	Diosgenin, steroidal saponins like floribundasaponins A and B.
51	<i>Gmelina arborea</i> ²⁴	Lamiaceae	Gamari	tree	Purify blood, stomach trouble, leprosy, diuretic, anaemia, snake bite and scorpion sting, ulcers.	Whole plant	Arborea, paulownin, gmelinol, endermin, β -sitosterol, 6-bromo-isoarboreal, 4- hydroxysesamin, umbelliferone, gmelanone.

3. Results

3.1 Report from the Informants on Medicinal Plants and their Uses

A total of 165 informants, a total of 51 medicinal plant species were reported that are distributed across no. of families and genera were used by the local people in traditional health care system to cure at least 20 different diseases/ailments (Table 2). Of the total species 51, 52% were herbs, 20% were tree, 18% were shrubs, 4% climber/vine, 3% weed, 2% creeper and 1% fern (Fig. 3).




Figure 3: Category wise application of Plants Habitant in Medicine

The different parts of these plants are used as a medicine. The use of above ground plant parts (81%) is higher than the below ground plant parts (19%). Of the above ground plant parts (Fig. 4), leaf is used in the majority of the cases (30.39%) followed by roots (8.82%), whole plants (10.78%) fruit (12.75%) Stem 7.84%, seed (7.84%), rhizome 4.90%, bark 4.90%, flower 3.92%, shoots (1.96%) and branches, buds, dried leaves, dried plants, flower buds (1.96%), flower pulp, pods (0.98%), tubers, young seedlings, young shoots less than 1% respectively and about 16% from whole plant.




Figure 4: Percentage wise utility of various parts of Medicinal Plants

3.2 Modes of Remedy Preparation, Routes administration and dosage

The method of preparation was mostly a paste (31 Species) or juice form (25 species), decoction (19 species)) and raw (19 species) and vegetable (7 species), eaten raw (7 species) (Fig. 5). Doses were mainly taken twice a day and the dosage depends on the age and physical appearance of the individual and children are given less than adults which approximate to 100–150 ml twice daily depending on the type of illness and treatment.




Figure 5: Commonly found Phytochemicals

4. Discussion

The present study showed high diversity of plant used by the ethnic communities of Arunachal Pradesh in treating different types of ailments. This can be an indication of the significant role of phytotherapy based traditional medicine in meeting the basic healthcare needs of the people. The frequent use of herbaceous species among the tribal communities could be a result of their relative abundance as compared to trees and shrubs as also witnessed by investigators of this study. The study area experiences tropical, sub-tropical and temperate humidity for most months of the year creating favorable condition for the growth of herbs. The fact that medicinal plants are used for the

same purpose by more than one community might indicate their pharmacological effectiveness. Literature survey on pharmacological properties of medicinal plants revealed the presence of bioactive compounds in many species having high fidelity level reported in this study, which could be attributed to harmacological effectiveness of plants used by the tribal community for treating various ailments or disease disorders.

The majority of the informants reported that they keep their medicinal plant knowledge secret and that transfer of the knowledge has mainly been taking place vertically from father/mother to child mainly a son. The present ethno-pharmacological survey work reported 101 species of plant for the first time for the treatment of various diseases and the herbal medicines has become integral component of traditional healthcare system among the tribal communities of Arunachal Pradesh. The highest informants' consensus for malarial fever, jaundice and urological problems indicated moderate consistency of informant knowledge and could be related to the high prevalence of these disorders in the study area. The efficacy and safety of all the claimed medicinal plants need to be evaluated through pharmaco-chemical studies.

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Running Hot: Humanitarian Histories and Critical Subject in Ambulance Work

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Abstract

Thailand has been facing a deepening human rights crisis since the coup d'état in May, 2014. The authorities had made little progress in ensuring accountability for the many deaths and injuries from political conflict in 2010. The article analyzes the social-spatial knowledge practices that have emerged in the controversy over medical mission in Thailand. I examine the impact of primary emergency medical services (EMS) in Thai society during the current phase of authoritarianism by the Military regime. I also examine four domains in particular: medical relief, psychosocial humanitarianism, gender-bases intervention and security sector support. I draw on interviews emergency aid workers as well as participant observation regarding emergency medical missions, to critique these trends. The data analyzed derives from an on-going ethnographic study begun in Bangkok from 2014-2016. More specifically, my data suggests that a potential politicization of morality inherent to both organization and volunteer level of a short-term emergency medical missions. The main purpose of this research is revealed the linkages between these fours domains and how EMS volunteers maintain contemporary emergency care worker subjectivity under humanitarian governance and security management In turn, this article illustrates that understanding contemporary regimes of urban governance necessitates attending to the entangled relationship between militarization, securitization, and humanitarianism. This study will contribute to knowledge for those who are interested in medical humanitarianism, conflict and violence studies and urban development policy.

Keyword: ambulance ethnography, medical humanitarianism, subjectivity, EMS Volunteers

1. Introduction: Emergency Lives and Extreme Work

"Bang Preak, 102, Wor. 4, 12 volunteers"

The sound of siren heralded at around 8.30 pm. "Go! Go! Get in", shouted Jim (pseudonym) loudly. After hearing Jim's, I jumped into a white rescue car and grabbed the car's edge with my right hand. I needed to rearrange myself quickly. In the rescue car, there were an oxygen tank and a blood pressure monitor attached to the vehicle wall with a stretcher leaning at the center. Defibrillator and first-aid supplies were also placed orderly. Nom (pseudonym), a volunteering paramedic aged 25, jumped after and pulled the door while shouting out against the wind toward me, "*There is an accident under Rama III bridge*". While the rescue car ran a red light, turning a bend, making me lose my balance, Nom pushed my back against him. The car moved slowly on Sathu Pradit Road. I

squinted my eyes from the light that reflected against the skyscraper's windows caused by the vehicle's that passed from the opposite direction. Five minutes later, I saw volunteers in blue uniforms waving hands in front of 3-4 ambulances. At the back of the rescue car, there were medical appliances such as defibrillator, vacuum splint and a stretcher. I hastened and passed the rescue cars that arrived at the accident scene one after another like a second layer encircled the rescue pickups as an egg yolk while encircling the victims lying on the road. Nui (pseudonym), a small young man from North East, kneeled and reached his hand toward a young girl's right knee, bruised and bleeding in a red circle. He carefully investigated until he found that she could not move her leg. Nui signaled the team member to bring a vacuum splint to wrap her broken leg. The two of them laid her down on a red Chinese plastic stretcher and delivered to the back of the rescue car.

Ked, Nui's girlfriend, witnessed last year's explosion at Erawan Shrine. She was talking to relatives of the two victims from the hit-and-run accident. They were driving a motorcycle and was hit by a car, whose driver fled the accident scene. I quickly wiped the sweat away seeing what was happening in front of my eyes. The volunteering team carefully moved and hastily helped those who were in need. Although it was so muggy that the sweat went thoroughly over the back, the scene was normal from the eyes of the EMS volunteers who got used to the regulations and procedures that were issued by the government. "You must arrive at the accident scene in eight minutes", Pook announced. *"Before anything else, the situation must be evaluated. First aid is required according to the safety regulations. Every time, you must report to Narenthorn EMS Center as soon as you receive a case, drive to the accident scene, arrive at the accident scene, assess the victim, move him from the accident scene, arrive at the hospital until you return to the rescue center"*, said Pook clearly in accordance with Emergency Medical Operation Programme by the National Institute for Emergency Medicine.

2. Objective of Research

The politic of life grows particularly acute from the perspective of crisis a perceived state of rupture that invites response. Oversea Chinese Philanthropy in Thailand is an organization implicitly to mediate crisis in terms of basic human health. With the intermittent rhythm imposed by volunteers labor, Health Care and the Charitable Spirit I have followed Poh teck tung Foundation for the two years, as an object of ethnographic study in the largest methodologies sense of term. In addition to interviewing present and former members of volunteer group and visiting several of its section headquarters and field missions, I have also examined its material cultures and sifted through the vast array of documents that circulate through and beyond its different forums of representation.

My goals in this articles are threefold. The first is to suggest that rupture is more central to modern order than we frequently choose to remember. The essential ethical tension of the present, in the others words, derives less from exceptional failures of normative moral codes in setting where good professional behavior provides little absolution. My second goal is to imply that the sort of medical action pursued by volunteers group reveals ethical complications within this field of political crisis, including dilemmas of place and capacity in emergency state, as well as the political limits of a medical sensibility. A humanitarian response to human suffering, after all, cannot escape either the historical context of conditions to which it responds or its own categorical rejection of any justification for the sacrifice of human lives. My third goal, following the work of Deleuze and Guattari was related recent writing in anthropology on the topic "subjectivity" is to underline key

intersections connecting social field, especially in addressing the intersubjectivity of volunteers that arises in encounters with difference during emergency event, its historic operating space in the shadow of disaster, and its self-proclaimed “ethic of engaged refusal.” volunteers defines itself around a concern for life in crisis on a political scale, in which survival in perceived settings of social rupture or political failure is put in question. Yet the volunteer’s action is not simply an analog to that of a state agency in so far as it avoids wider governance and its inherent mobility produces only partial and limited effects of sovereignty and citizenship.

My basic argument has two parts. The first is to claim that volunteers’ activities around the globe collectively register a minimal line of biopolitics in world affairs, The second part of my argument explores the ‘powers of non-localization’ in social field that necessary to this collaborative production of knowledge and immanent production of new subjectivities I use these terms to identify an inherent tension within politic climate the value of “life” that humanitarians seek to defend, between the maintenance of physical existence, on the one hand, and the defense of human dignity. I suggest that the significance of Deleuze and Guattari is not the presumed unity of a pinnacle of the laboring form, but rather an open social field. The Desire has multiple sites of irruption. This becomes a radical democratization of the experience, expression and possibility for a political engagement, one that neither excludes organization against particular forms of labor, nor subordinates other struggles to them.

The ambition of this work is not simply to produce a general critique of humanitarian action or an elaboration of its political limitations. Although there is certainly much to be said on that score from academic, humanitarian, and journalistic perspectives (e.g., Fassin and Pandolfi, Das, 2007; Kleinman, 2008; Kleinman et al., 1997; Biehl and Petryna, 2013). Along with much recent anthropological writing on topics like torture and human rights (e.g., Asad 2003; Wilson 1997), running throughout the emerging field of medical humanitarian studies are analyses of the subjectivity of medical humanitarians themselves e their motives, their inner experiences of joy, fear or pain, their experiences of attempting to organize services or provide care in settings of enormous scarcity or in settings of violence, the development of strategies for dealing with ethical conflicts in these local moral worlds of scarcity, and the conflicts they experience between personal moral or political values and the institutional norms within which they work.

I wish to move away from treating humanitarianism as an absolute value by approaching it as an array of particular embodied, situated practices emanating from the humanitarian desire to alleviate the suffering of others. In so doing, I hope to reintroduce a measure of anthropological distance to a familiar set of contemporary phenomena, while complex understandings of the subjectivity, voices and motives of humanitarian workers are as important as those of local peoples. Much of the work of medical humanitarianism, whether clinical or other, consists of acts of caregiving, Moral complexity is central to this work e and should be as central to critical studies of medical humanitarianism as it is to practitioners.

3. Conceptualizing Medical Humanitarian

In the past two decades, ‘medical humanitarianism’ has come to constitute not only an increasingly powerful set of organizations and interventions, but a significant topic of scholarly research. Medical humanitarianism e the delivery of health-related services in settings of crisis e has a prominent international presence in contexts of violence, famine, natural disasters, as well as conditions of

extreme poverty, deprivation, and structural violence. The definition of what constitutes 'humanitarianism' and a 'humanitarian crisis' has of course evolved historically in close parallel with changed forms of humanitarian responses (Calhoun, 2010; Fassin and Pandolfi, 2010a; Allen and Schomerus, 2012).

Subjectivity of Medical Humanitarians

Gordon (2014) provides a nuanced discussion of the experience of British military physicians, who have served in Afghanistan. These physicians reject the simple dichotomy between humanitarian and military practice. They point to their role in providing care for civilians and local combatants, while acknowledging the priority given to serving their own troops. Some describe the great difficulties they face in being forced to refer civilians or local service members they have treated and stabilized to deeply inadequate medical services, while members of their own services are quickly stabilized and referred to the highest quality of care. These are of course not so different from the experiences of physicians working in the NGO world. Gordon argues that the emergence of multiple civilian 'humanitarianisms' has created spaces for military physicians to develop self-identity as humanitarians while still recognizing their institutional constraints.

There are similarities here with the findings of Ager and Iacovou (2014), who analyzed web-based narratives of MSF humanitarian workers. Focusing on what they describe as the 'co-construction' of personal and organizational frames of these narratives, they provide insight not only into the motives of these workers but how they make meaning of the limitations of what they are able to do. Barriers are represented as surmountable, while the national relations of team members and the resilience of local communities are all stressed as means for maintaining positive valuation of humanitarian work. Humanitarian workers ultimately view their activities as 'making a difference.' A desire to make a difference (as opposed to 'doing good') is one central motivational structure that gives shape to personal narratives and motivations in the fields of medicine and global health (Good and Good, 2012).

These two papers, as well as the papers by Footer et al. (2014) and Rutayisire and Richters (2014), tell us important things about the experiences of humanitarian workers. The study of violence against health workers in eastern Burma (Footer et al., discussed above), and steps taken to circumvent violence while attempting to provide services, is a reminder that these are not experiences of foreign humanitarians alone but particularly acute experiences of local health workers in settings of conflict. And some of the subtle but powerful expressions of subjectivity come through in the voices of the authors of articles who are local researchers involved in humanitarian work in settings with histories of massive violence, such as that of Rutayisire and Richters (2014). It remains critical to listen to the voices often haunted and haunting of those who work in the field, whether decision-makers or local health workers, as well as to the voices of authors who themselves have been deeply affected by those persons and communities about whom they write.

Subjectivity in Spinoza Concept: Deleuze Spinoza's Desiring-production

In 1968, Deleuze published his major and minor thesis, *Difference and Repetition* (1994) and *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1990). Arguably a difficult text, *Expressionism* is a work in which Deleuze 'sets out to think Spinoza, or rather think "in" Spinoza dynamically producing rather than reproducing the intellectual movement through which this philosophy has become what it is discover[ing] that which in [Spinoza's] thought causes a problem' (Macherey, 1998: 120¹). This

problem, that of expressionism, the 'dynamic movement of conceptualization' (1998: 122), is what Deleuze first engages in *Difference and Repetition*, the first work where he attempts to 'do' philosophy. In these works what is interesting is both what Deleuze retains from Spinoza but also what marks his distance. The transition that Spinoza charts from the inadequate idea to the common notion is reshaped in Deleuze's own framework in *Difference and Repetition*, in Deleuze's exploration of the moment of genesis of thought which moves beyond recognition to the production of something new. What Deleuze retains of Spinoza, if we can think of it as a retention, is the sense that thought and error have a materiality, and that true revolutions in thought are accompanied by joy; but this is arguably a joy which does not take the form of beatitude but a different conception of eternity Dionysian moments of laughter that celebrate the eternal return the creativity of becoming. I turn interested in the ways Spinoza has animated their thinking about the social field, especially in addressing the discomfort that arises in encounters with difference. As Spinoza suggest that sad passions are 'equally deserving of our investigation' and it is the destabilizing moment of the encounter, which might be joy or sorrow, which 'perplexes' of soul, 'forces it to pose a problem' (Deleuze, 1994: 139-40). If we attempt to think the modalities that might shape a new political subject.

Spinoza suggest becoming active is: a state of becoming, not being; a social act, a co-production; ethical rather than moral. Our knowledge is of the wave and ourselves producing a 'common notion' and a new social body from this interaction, which in itself contributes to active joy. Most important, this second kind of knowledge, this common notion, is not an abstract or mathematical kind of knowledge, but rather concretely related to its context. In this case it is knowledge through the body, a kind of *savoir faire* (Deleuze, 1978).

However, that becoming reasonable is inextricably bound up with a deeper investigation of all the passions, rather than a simple move from sadness to joy: 'we should pay particular attention to getting to know each emotion as far as possible clearly and distinctly, so that the mind may thus be determined from the emotion to think those things that it clearly and distinctly perceives' (Spinoza, 2000, P4). He continues, moreover, to suggest that we 'think often on and meditate on the common injuries of human beings' (Spinoza, 2000,p.10). Here pathos is not curtailed and contained but rather excavated and explored; our understanding of pathos is enhanced through logos. These divergent strategies avoidance or exploration have consequences for our larger politics.

4. Methodology: Ambulance Ethnography

This study will be conducted anthropological fieldwork in the urban area of Central Bangkok, during fifteen months between 2015 and 2016. I apply method to Ambulance ethnographies by Metz 1992, Mannon 1992 in the book title *Running Hot: Structure and Stress in Ambulance Work* and *Emergency Encounters: EMTs and Their Work*. Focus on extreme work or edge work involves boundary negotiation along an edge separating order and disorder. The ambulance work is field hospital as well as field hospital on the road to understand the nature of ambulance work culture in the context of Thai society at large. Life and work in the ambulance work result in a culture that is simultaneously created by its inhabitants and the conditions in which they are situated. The study shows that biomedicine is a product of particular social conditions and that the ambulance work reflects features of its society. Behind the injuries and broken limbs in the crisis time are stories of political violence, crime, and intolerance occurring in a society where masses of people fight over

limited resources. In the emergency people interact in an extremely hierarchical manner.

Life histories (16 volunteers) will be gathered through repeat biographical interviews 3 generations[6] with five senior volunteers born in the 1960/70s, who started their becoming volunteer lives before military government came to power; six female and four male both are young volunteers, born in the 1980/90s, who developed their skill and experience during military's regime. Interviews will focus on embedded experience (emotional, capacity, professional) sexuality, social class and emergency events and practices. Participant observation in the social field and private career will allow me to 'situate' the data collected through the above methods, and to gather first-hand information on the actual practices and social interactions (with doctors, ER nurses, paramedic, epidemiologist, leader of Poh teck tung Foundation etc.) during emergency events. I aim to be involved in 10 such real time events included political violence in 2010.

5. Globalization of Healthcare on the Ground

Thailand remained under the authority of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), a group of military authorities which have held power since a 2014 coup. The August referendum approved a draft Constitution that would allow the army to retain considerable power. Elections were set to follow in late 2017 at the earliest. The prosecution of former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra for alleged criminal negligence in the management of a government rice subsidy scheme continued. In October, the government ordered her to pay a 35.7 billion baht (US\$1 billion) fine over the government losses from the scheme.

In this era, it could be regarded as the period of the struggle to strive for the definitions of "medical ethics" and "local morals", which the original meanings were influenced by the explanation for medical standard. Emergency Medical Service Organization and volunteers overcame important social and political phenomena, which fought their way in terms of politics and social movement in order to redefine the meanings of "medical ethics" and "public morals" based on the concept of "risk patterns" and "extreme work" from older definitions and work capacity. To redefine volunteering ethics based on the approach to merit and Buddhist Theravada, Emergency Medical Service Organization attempted to enhance the capacity, which was the identity of social movement and politics.

The primary reason why the movement integration of several types or groups of volunteers in this era was made possible was that their overall quality of life was much better than that of whom in the previous era whether it be social status, education, profession and income as the result of better opportunity in education and socio-economic conditions. Although modern Thai government utilized tactful power strategies in governing and investigating the life of volunteers, the movement of Emergency Medical Service Organization could insist on its power against the government.

The central turning point was when emergency medicine turned its focus from charity to humanitarian medicine after Tsunami incident took place in 2004, causing the deaths of many Thais and foreigners. A research from Sweden Institute (Anders et al., 2005) illustrated that the status of emergency medicine at that time underperformed as a national collaboration in terms of insufficiency of emergency medicine centers both locally and nationally, necessity for one emergency number as communication channel and its popularity to public, lack of skills and unprepared performance of paramedics, lack of measure for the approval of training standard and lack of resources, especially transportation both in the air and by water and the readiness of

accident and emergency department. In the meantime, there was a constant Thai-Sweden collaboration to improve the system of emergency medicine in Thailand, thus enhancing the service system in various parts.

The focal point for the development of emergency medical station was the volunteering paramedics as the first barrier. They would confront with the patients at the accident scene as Basic Life Support and manage the circumstances to be saved and risk-free. The volunteering paramedics underwent emergency paramedical course and would help at the highest level of emergency cases in Emergency Medical System (EMS). They could perform Advance Life Support (ALS) with pre-hospital care in assisting the patients both on the rescue car and at the accident scenes. They were trained how to provide saline solution, give muscle injection or intravenous injection, know the procedures for resuscitation, use electrocardiogram, transfer patients by aircraft, handle mass casualty and take care of injured patients from accident. Above all, those functions were conducted under the supervision of the medical director.

"The service based on emergency humanitarian medicine" was regarded as a vital obligation of the National Institute for Emergency Medicine (NIEMS) since public health is regarded as human rights (WHO) and it is fundamental rights of every person regardless of racial discrimination, religion, gender or any other social condition. Therefore, everyone deserved to have good health condition no matter in normal or critical circumstances, which depended on numerous factors, including healthcare service that was provided to public in normal circumstance. Taking care of a person's health was of primary issue in normal circumstance; however, being taken care in a critical circumstance was of necessary because a person could be at a higher health risk. Consequently, emergency medicine played a key role to help and to carry out remedy for the victims at fast pace and to meet the standards over the critical situation.

5.1 Humanitarian Space "Other Questions of Living"

Broader socio-cultural trends filter into the everyday conduct of organizations and occupations—and if 'storytelling is the preferred sense-making currency of human relationships'. While a culture contains elements such as observed language, customs and traditions, group norms, Espoused values, formal philosophy, and implicit rules for getting along in the organization, unique paradigms, shared meanings and symbols. The documentation of one ambulance service's culture is near completion. The language of an Ambulance Service is an interesting means to communicate amongst each other. It can also be a means to exclude others that are not part of the group. Kits, trucks, crib, siren light, camel lift, first aid kit box, Oxygen viva, defibrillator, radio community, traffic barrier, wheel chair not to forgetting what our equipment is called and how to use it! While some of our language and practices are shared with our volunteer colleagues, it can still be quite excluding even to our clients.

"Nu" or "Chananan" participated as a volunteer of Poh teck tung Foundation since she was less than 15 years old when she studied accounting for evening classes. While studying, she worked in order to lighten her family's load like most daughters of Chinese families. Nu joined this emergency aid circle due to her friend's suggestion. On her first day, she encountered an accident case - a crash caused by a bus and a motorcycle. The motorcyclist was reported to be dead on the road. By confronting with unusual circumstances that she did not brace up to, Nu came to test her own willingness: considering the excitement as a EMS volunteer at a first glimpse to the big accident. Becoming a volunteer enabled Nu to help people who were injured and widen a new horizon for her.

EMS Volunteering training: volunteers were under the supervision of the chief and the deputy chief at Bang Preak Center because these seniors would act as "coach", teaching first aid and recommending sentinel spots along one-way road. As a volunteers, the relationship to the police officers at Bang Preak Station was rather loose. "Extreme" volunteer in terms of rumor and news depicted the negative image of the volunteers such as stealing goods from disaster victims' houses, being a spy for drug dealers and driving illegally. The Poh Teck Tung Foundation uniform that the volunteers wore identified that they passed basic first-aid training. Being permitted to wear the uniform by the chief meant that they should have good conduct. While the volunteer team took care and issued an internal regulation, the National Institute for Emergency Medicine (NIEM) would take part in the training for nursing and medical appliance standard.

The pride to be a EMS volunteer: it was the first cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) case that volunteering team learned by themselves since there was no training available from the NIEM at that time. Our team was noticed from the radio that there was a patient losing consciousness. We needed to forget our fear of making mistakes because CPR is an important procedure and we needed to use our force with a constant rhythm in accordance with the patient's conditions. Death or alive: Nu decided to perform the CPR until the ambulance arrived and transferred the patient to the hospital. Nu was proud of herself to overcome her fear and decided to help the patient. *"Imagine, if that patient was one of our relatives and a person came to rescue", said Nu.*

Everything depended on experiences and some experiences frightened us.

When the opportunity arose, I dutifully conveyed the gist of these concerns to volunteer group involved in administration. It was not clear to me, however, how much they could respond without altering the scope of the time crisis. Like with the patient groups, the larger questions of continuing care extended beyond a mobile organization's reach. To meet them would require even greater transformations. volunteer group would likely need to select a smaller number of project sites and settle into the practice of community development in the mode of less mobile NGOs. Alternatively it moving into a donor role to fund the work of others. Or it could throw itself fully into advocacy, agitating for structural changes in humanitarian space. Even if successful, however, results on that front followed a timeline measured in protocols and treaties, as well as the budgets and elections behind them. A long-term crisis had no immediate solution. Was temporary treatment better than none at all? To what extent should it rely on partner organizations and alter fundraising, and advocacy? What were the risks of increasing ambulance work, and how to ensure medical supplies? In short, given a chronic problem, where to find a responsible limit?

5.2 Connections: The Secular Sense of Disaster

Around the kits, Volunteer group also developed its own mobile infrastructure. Once senior volunteers took over logistics for the group's operations in 2002, he realized that humanitarian space had been a relatively easy environment in which to operate. There the team had been able to acquire vehicles and drugs locally, and the phone system worked. however, proved a different story, as its crisis zones generally lacked phone service, transport, and even basic drugs. Seniors volunteers has associates created a radio communications network, standardized kits lists, and a vehicle pool. Both of these units also offer products to other organizations in the humanitarian market. Conversely, young volunteers has gone a more decentralized route; instead of sponsoring a proprietary logistics center, its procurement department relies on agreements with established

outside suppliers. Nonetheless, the core logic of approach remains the same. All seek to ensure the availability of standardized materials on a flexible, rapid-response basis.

A similar logic extends beyond logistics to medical action. National Institute Emergency Medicine in Thailand [NIEMS] not only established its own training programs and guideline series, but also produced publications for a broader professional audience, such as a guide to basic life aid among public space and volunteers group. The goal was both to generate applicable knowledge and to foster a culture of exchange, transmitting technical innovations and standards across far-flung missions. The need was real. Describing. The group's kit assemblage reflects the increasingly technical orientation of the world. Partly derived from military and health planning, as well as the artifacts of other organizations, NIEMS's logistics system has in turn influenced the operation of the larger humanitarian enterprise. In 2009 the World Health Organization endorsed NIEMS's classic kit by adopting it as the "new emergency health kit."

Since NIEMS was running emergency programs and had encountered higher rates of car accident than expected in its own epidemiological studies, the group emphasized treatment of acute cases and included more intravenous treatments relative to oral ones. Early editions of NIEMS's guidelines invited users to copy them; consequently, borrowed elements circulated widely. NIEMS tacitly approved "borrowing" in general, favoring wider circulation over copyright protection. Some NIEMS guidelines even eventually appeared as part of WHO's growing repertoire. However unorthodox its initial approach may have been, NIEMS's journey to professional respectability now appeared complete.

5.3 Discovering a Secular Humanitarianism and Sacred Life

To further clarify the point, let me return to the ethnographic example from my introduction.

What, then, distinguishes this secular humanitarian concern for life? In comparison with Dunant's ministrations to wounded soldiers, EMS expends relatively little attention on the needs of the dead and dying or the larger social world they represent moral economy of medical service access such as EMS's conversion to patient treatment went hand in glove with a more general reorientation to issues of medical service access. In this respect the patient emergency program again proved emblematic. By approaching its work epidemiologically and treating key diseases over time, the group began to recognize recurring patterns of failure associated with Emergency Medical Triage Protocol and Criteria Based Dispatch in its mission sites, and the importance of affecting official protocols. At the same time its essential Health insurance card proved increasingly uncertain. Within some quarters of the organization, concern was rising over the perennial problem of unequal access to medicines, as well as a general lack of drugs to combat unprofitable conditions.

At the same time NIEMS remains a deeply realist organization, fully committed to responding to the shortcomings of an actually existing world. The point in "saving" life thus lies not in denying death per se, but rather in opposing *preventable* deaths, the view that "people shouldn't die of stupid things." This list of stupid things has grown varied and long, ranging from political conflict and disaster to a range of diseases that might be averted with sufficient political will. Common to all of these is the prospect that with modest medical action, they need not prove so lethal.

In its secular medical version, then, humanitarianism has increasingly concentrated on a distinctly material project of salvation. In addition to being a biological matter of existence and a political object of concern, life emerges as a key moral value. The life at the center of humanitarian concern appears as a common quality, shared by all humans. However, it is also non-fungible and so eludes

exchange; one life cannot substitute for another, any more than could an immortal soul. In this sense it is sacred, not as a substitution for the soul in Buddha theology, but perhaps as a secular “reoccupation” of its significance. Focus rests on actions to maintain existence and enhance prospects for survival. As a matter of practical morality, then, the worth of this form of life derives precisely from saving it.

5.4 Battlefield Passion, Mobile Medical Mission

What then to say about EMS ’s logistical creation relative to its ethic of valuing life? First and foremost, the kit system represents a self-consciously Security system, in the sense of being mobile and adaptable worldwide as well as volunteer group of Poh teck tung Foundation. While flexible in application, the result is not at all fluid in terms of community involvement. Indeed, the kit system is the exact opposite of local knowledge in the traditional sense of geographic and cultural specificity in place. Rather, it represents a mobile, transitional variety of limited intervention, modifying and partially reconstructing a local environment around specific artifacts and a set script. In practice it may require considerable negotiation to implement, necessitating the cajoling of both patients and instruments to perform their proper roles. But its very concept strives to streamline that potential negotiation through provisions that reconstitute a minimal operating environment. The kit system extends the operating environment of biomedicine into a landscape of need. To insure reliability and quality, EMS is willing to ship almost anything anywhere during an emergency.

Deeply invested in a practical logic of standards, the kit system reflects something of Bruno Latour’s analysis of circulating inscriptions as “immutable mobiles.” EMS ’s constellation of guidelines and toolkits collects and distills specific clinical knowledge into a portable map of frontline medicine. Developed and refined through practice, its many elements connect one outbreak or crisis to another. In this sense the emergency epidemic in Thailand and big floods in 2011. Together, in a vast chain, the assembled kits standardize disaster by responding to it. Such a characterization reveals the degree to which biomedical knowledge and practice depend on infrastructure and the background work necessary to translate treatment into a new setting. Volunteer’s classic emergency formation generated a “culture of standardization” (as one logistician proudly put it to me) in which speed and control were paramount. Beyond obvious incompatibilities, local concerns could emerge later. During the emergency they would be held at arm’s length or by passed to the degree possible. The kit system of Volunteer did not stem from corporate or state need but rather from moral imperative coupled with medical judgment. To be sure, standardization has a long history in military and business settings. Here the critical rationale, however, derives from valuing human life over profit or political strategy. The kits respond to emergency settings: conditions of apparent rupture in which the instrumental goal is temporary stabilization. Standardization is thus never an end unto itself, nor part of a conscious effort to reshape or capture economic terrain. Humanitarian planning of this sort remains attenuated by its very mobility. Beyond emergency settings, Advance Life Support missions reenter a larger world of exchange and circulation.

Once there, the regime of standardization melts away. At times the kit can appear as a constraint, the organization’s self-created barrier to creativity. A humanitarian affairs officer Poh teck tung Foundation with described the general dilemma this way to me in 2010: “The kit made us good specialists in political violence between Red shirt and Government. We just don’t seem to know what to do with open settings. Whether conflict zone, when we have low density and widely dispersed populations we have more problems. What I see is commander of military order to EMS

and volunteer group don't setting near the conflict zone. We're used to thinking we have to have a kit to act. A pointed information posting for volunteers in conflict space related a caustic from field experience in which are haunted nowadays. Authorities used to guns, tear gas and hastily delivered solider on the ground. Members of the military continued to torture civilian individuals suspected of links political and security detainees elsewhere, facilitated by laws and orders allowing soldiers to detain individuals in unofficial places of detention without judicial oversight for up to seven days. The emergency volunteer who unpacked it found themselves mystified by the language of its instructions and determined that its contents conformed to outdated protocols. The NIENS queried the bureaucratizing force of what he termed "kit culture," noting that "in Thai as well as many other places, the kit has become more than a tool, it is increasingly the embodiment of the humanitarian gesture itself, as if dropping a kit constitutes the *raison passion* of humanitarian interventions." NIEMS agencies, he added meaningfully in conclusion, were hardly alone in this regard.

Discussing volunteer 's kit system with me in 2016, Jim, who is young volunteer described it as "a logic for action." since the 2010 military coup created an environment in which few dared to criticize the authorities publicly violations continue: is a "temporary situation" becoming chronic. The former secretariat of NIEMS a degree of strategic coherence to the organization's material engagement, however contingent its origins and practice in order Military regime. For this end the kit system has proved an admirable asset, at least for certain conditions. Yet how does this small action, not to mention the broader "kit culture" of humanitarianism, fit into a larger ethical and political calculus?

Over the final decades of the twentieth century, humanitarian operations became a normative part of international affairs. At the same time, personnel involved in aid projects professionalized, following career trajectories spanning multiple agencies as well as formal degree programs at universities and specialized institutes. With the circulation of personnel and ideas, practices and technologies standardized. The result was a limited and temporary infrastructure, highly mobile and concentrated on immediate needs. Amid the debris of decolonization and superpower struggles, humanitarians devised a means for crisis response, one that proved simultaneously effective and ephemeral. The essence of modular mobility, the kit is ultimately an open container for a closed world. Like humanitarianism itself, it remains available for appropriation into a wide range of projects related to health and issues well beyond.

The establishment of a fast and efficient logistics system for humanitarian action changed everything and nothing at all. Particular lives can now be spared, at least in the short run, from certain forms of distress. The situations that imperil them, however, too often find return rather than resolution. Given the degree to which the demographics of suffering usually outweigh any response, it would be a gross misnomer to call the greater humanitarian apparatus anything like a "solution" emergency state. NIEMS 's assemblage of tools register human agony by trying to alleviate it. In this sense humanitarian kit culture represents nothing more—or less—than a "Value of Life" for a suffering planet.

5.5 The Presentation of Rupture from Self Thought

I apply the term *crisis* to a general sense of rupture that demands a decisive response, as most dramatically exemplified by the convergence of media coverage around episodes of conflict and disaster, political violence, accidents and calamities such as earthquakes (once ascribed to "acts of god" but now designated as "natural") are thereby given narrative turning points, organizing the prose of everyday existence into more poetic, if only partly analytic, chapters. These moments fill

the contemporary international media landscape, equipped with soundtracks and titles, and the size, length, and duration of these moments as media events reflect their relative rank within an order of official valuation. For example, ethics are clearest in relation to crisis.

Memorable incidence: Nu was a volunteer who was responsible for preparing the tents and taking care of injured victims from April 10th incidence at Victory Monument because there were helicopters dropping down the tear gas into the crowd of people who assembled. The volunteers and nurses were willing to assist those victims from the beginning of the violence to the blowing of the gun when the situation unraveled. The following utterances was taken from Nu herself, talking about that incidence where her memories never faded for the rest of her life.

We were sitting by Henri Dunant Junction under the sky train. Having heard on the radio that there were victims at the lawn in front of Lumpini Park, we, volunteers, rushed to Lumpini Park where the accident took place. There was no confrontation at the time we arrived. Then, there was a man lighting a sky rocket. Suddenly thereafter, the sound like a gun was so loud that everyone who was there crouched on the ground. Some of them even kneeled. I hid under the platform of King Rama VI statue at first, then I moved on to the other tent. In a flash, I saw the other volunteer girl on my right side who was only two meters away was unfortunately shot at the head. *"Someone has been shot"*, I shouted at other fellow volunteers and I ran to grasp absorbent cottons as many as I could find and plastered in order to stop the bleeding. At that moment, her eyes were still open and she had only light breath. I tried to tell her *"Don't sleep. You have to fight. I will take you to the hospital."* Nearby, there was someone shouting out that a person had been shot. If I was not mistaken, he was shot at the hand - the one who laid down in the picture. For the person who was shot at the head, she was carried out from the accident scene and taken to the Police General Hospital. After that incidence, I found in the newspaper that she could not make it. In fact, Several people were shot and injured during this incident, several protesters, including to volunteers who try to help deaths and injuries people during this incident (Pachathai memorial report: 3 years after death 'mama Poh teck tung' victim from May 2010).

Today, Nu is 28 years old and works as a financial officer at an asset corporation around Ploenchit. Volunteering group has still been her closer friends than those whom she works with. Nu is like a center for first aid of her team. She always sits aside a first-aid kit. Her competence includes the experiences from resuscitation - a critical path for her, construction buildings, confrontation at local fair, political violence and the surface of the road, where she gazed at like a person whose eyes were trained. I remembered when I took long steps as I followed her to rescue two stubborn boys with their modified motorcycle who were in a crash with a pickup. Not knowing who was more unfortunate, I saw her touched the boy's wrecked knee before asking Nott to bring a stretcher. Her left hand lifted a flashlight and shone the light at the face of the boy who was in pain. She glanced at his wound and opened the first-aid kit. She took cottons and pulled out an alcohol bottle with her right hand, washed the wound followed by scrubbing with betadine. Her little fingers pushed the wound at its length.

Not too hard, not too light, but this was enough to clean the long-broken wound. Betadine was absorbed at the outer eyes - as wry as a painful feeling could be captured.

However, Volunteers must factor two additional component dilemmas into its ethical calculus: the issue of geographical location, on the one hand, and that of capacity, on the other. Volunteers framed itself in reaction to failings of the state-structured EMS, To work "without" borders confronts

the basic territorial logic of the nation state; however, it also recalls the Place and identity of origin are, therefore, not neutral characteristics; a borderless world retains the ruins of earlier frontiers, across which some people move far more easily than others.

In abstract terms, humanitarian space is a space of life. Within it all other considerations take a secondary role, suspended for the duration of extreme need. It is a conceptual, floating Ambulance of sorts, an update on the emergency aid worker of standing secular humanitarian or global humanitarian protection of the wounded. However concrete and tied to specific conditions NIEMS might seek to be, humanitarian space nevertheless displays inflationary pressures. One could always spare more, extend greater mercy, and further expand the scope of aid. To illustrate this deep tension within volunteer's work, I turn to a theme introduced by one of its members, namely that humanitarianism works "against" sacrifice. The EMS commander immediate concern was the cynical willingness of the national political order to accept that certain populations may die. The expansive terms through which he made his case, however, prove particularly revealing. Thus I take this claim quite seriously while extending its logic.

5.6 Becoming Active in Emergence Live

The ethical stances Volunteer most frequently maintains are neither naive nor optimistic. Because their focus rests on present suffering and the indignation it can inspire (see Boltanski 1999:182), members cannot resort to the more abstract comforts of the past (in juridical proceedings to redress injustice) or the future (in development projects to build later "capacity"). Essentially realist and skeptically minded, EMS is wary of involvements that would position its work as a substitution for what they see as responsibilities of states. For example, the same former secretariat for NIEMS who was quoted earlier observed to me, *"Why you don't ask me to Paramedic who are deserved compensation in theirs ambulance work, Why you ask me to volunteers who are dead people in political conflict 2010."* His point was not that the work there was not valuable, but rather that it did not fall into the scope of NIEMS's mission and would only result in a situation of long-term dependency.

Ambulance Service's also places boundaries in terms of practice in the form of treatment protocols or guidelines. So too, they have various Codes of Conduct which outlines appropriate behaviors for employees. Finally, there are two important sociological points to emphasize about this particular humanitarian body. The first is that EMS is a collectivity of doctors. Rather, it has grown into a federated movement of loosely connected, argumentative national groups, coordinating the efforts of a circulating international assembly of personnel. On the other hand, volunteers group are fully "operational" in directing independent missions, whereas the rest largely assist with the provision of personnel and material support for the Poh teck tung Foundation with which they are affiliated. With some 2,000 volunteer, physicians, surgeons, nurses, logistics experts, and engineers, as well as 500 locally hired staff spread in country, Poh teck tung Foundation is now a highly dispersed and mobile national entity. Beyond doctors and support personnel, it provides aid through an assortment of nonhuman equipment: ambulance car, preassembled kits to control an outbreak of disease, satellite uplinks, and generator-driven that can deliver basic life aid to any corner on the road. Key here is Deleuze's sustained fascination with the specific material conditions of necessity, rather than mere possibility, of becoming active under constraint, such as the struggle to speech of the stutterer, the writing of a major language in a minor tongue, the emergence of a minor science under constraints of a major one.

6. Conclusion

In this article, I have written as if from outside and beyond the field of crisis surrounding EMS. Yet it presents anthropology with an uncomfortably familiar figure, reflecting alternative responses to shared conditions and overlapping fields of value. NIEMS embodies a particular form of thoughtful action, one built around a centrally significant moral claim to combat human suffering distilled in the familiar call to arms: “but people are dying!” The defense of life is a fluid and rhetorically dominant value amid contemporary secular ethics, now publicly claimed by agents of war as well as those of peace and framed by a similar justification through crisis.

In denouncing the distortions introduced by such claims, humanitarians can only reaffirm their continued allegiance to the relief of suffering. Even critics of humanitarianism rarely embrace openly anti humanitarian alternatives, such as the conscious sacrifice of individuals or populations for material or political gain. Cost-benefit analyses in public health generally factor survival outcomes as well as cost, and progressive calls for social change now largely expect it to unfold without recourse to a guillotine. At this historical moment, then, it is not easy to stand completely outside the humanitarian frame of value, even amid graphic evidence of its widespread and cynical violation. When writing about humanitarian organization, both hagiography and critique grow too comfortable.

Anthropologists, at least those of the cultural variety, emphasize dignity more often than survival and even more precisely a collective right to define differing forms of dignity. Ethnographers, disciplinarily predisposed to longer-term presence and the significance of language, predictably challenge biomedical assumptions of universality and humanitarian claims to neutrality, stressing local knowledge, on the one hand, and larger patterns of political economy, on the other hand. Even the work of Paul Farmer and his associates in Partners in Health— probably the closest corollary to EMS familiar to many anthropologists—differs strategically and ideologically in its continuing investment in place and overt attachment to ideals of social justice (see Farmer 1999, 2003; also Butt 2002; and response by Irwin et al. 2002, as well as Nguyen and Peschard, 2003). Anthropologists confront a similar problem: measuring moral failure in physical destruction and death, worrying about survival, and finding resiliency from disaster. The identification of crisis evokes an acute desire for action inside as well as outside the academy. And in professing such a desire for action, anthropologists might do well also to examine actual practices of intervention and advocacy, together with their potential.

Recent studies of social movements, transnational activism, and NGOs readily illustrate that action comes in a variety of forms and has varying effects, sometimes even within the same context. The greater industry of transnational virtue, however, involves not just humanitarians, human rights activists, states, and corporations, but also anthropologists, who have long trafficked in the moral representation of difference. Acknowledging a condition of implication and recognizing shared constructions of value cannot match the seductive clarity of denunciation. Such an approach yields less masterful truth claims, necessarily incomplete by virtue of subject and analysis (Rabinow 2003; Riles 2000). In recompense, however, it constitutes the ground for a form of reflexivity that opens outward into practice, finding concrete conditions for discussions of ethics, politics, and action amid the imperative present, and recognizing the involving stakes of life and care within it.

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Lanna Textiles: Historical and Cultural Ties: Past and Present

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Abstract

In the 19th century Chiang Mai was a key center of trade in the Lanna region and participated in maritime trade with the western world. As a center for collecting, exporting and importing goods, trade brought with it new and influential commodities and cultures. Lanna wealth was displayed in the attire of aristocrats and the ruling class indicated taste and status by demonstrating an appreciation of luxurious materials, fine cutting and sewing and impressive decorative skills of master craftspeople. The exquisite style and design of Lanna textiles and clothing was influenced by neighboring royal courts and by trade, diplomatic relations and intermarriage. Traditional Lanna textiles are still worn in Northern Thailand. Lanna girls wear traditional tube skirts (phasin) when they go to the temple and for important ceremonial occasions. Lanna textile shops, retail outlets and gallery spaces sell various types of Lanna textiles, both cotton and silk. These exist in the Mueang district of Chiang Mai, in Waroros Market, Tha Phae Road, on Nimmanhaemin Road, Charoenrat Road, Watgate and in a Lanna boutique in Robinson Department Store. There are other outlets in Mae Cham, San Kamphang and Chom Thong, famous weaving areas for at least one hundred years. Textile shops and factories in San Kamphang and Chom Thong district also sell Lanna cottons and silks by the yard. This is evidence of a vibrant trade in Lanna textiles serving the local market and the tourist trade. Chiang Mai also has an active textile culture centered around museums. The most well-known are the Bank of Thailand Textile Museum, the Lanna Folklife Museum, Ban Rai Pai Ngarm Cotton Studio and the Hilltribes Museum. Private studios and galleries contribute to the overall success of this trade.

Keywords: Lanna dress, Lanna textiles, commercial outlets in Chiang Mai

Introduction

The kingdom of Lanna, being an old kingdom founded in 1296 with Chiang Mai as the center, was acclaimed for its prosperity and richness of natural resources. Lanna shared its borders with Burma, Laos and Yunnan. Its topography of wide plains and river basins endowed it with good agricultural areas abounding with such natural resources as minerals and plants as well as animals. From the upper part, the Salween and the Mae Kong rivers flow as well as the Kok, Ing, Ping, Wang, Yom, Nan and other smaller rivers. Therefore, the people were blessed with several travel routes by land and water for trade and exchange of goods in and outside the kingdom. This made Lanna suitable as a major center for trade in the region.

In the 19th century, Chiang Mai was seen as an important center of trade in Southeast Asia since it opened overseas trade with the West after the Industrial Revolution, which was led by England. This was a turning point in the structure of trade and economic systems in Southeast Asia. Trade with the West replaced the previous trade with China and India, through several city ports. This trade brought new commodities and cultures through Chiang Mai as it was a center for collecting, exporting and importing goods.

The aristocracy and ruling class monopolized the economic system of Lanna. They owned all the resources and products from the land throughout the kingdom. Taxes and tribute were collected from the commoners for such things as farm products, crops, handicrafts, minerals and forest products. Representatives at the town and village levels were designated to collect tribute to be sent to Chiang Mai. The ruling class also monopolized the export of goods such as forest products including lac, deer hides, animal horns, wood, bee's wax and minerals, as well as textiles and fabrics. Furthermore, they controlled the import of raw materials for textile making. It can be said that the aristocracy and kings were responsible for trade growth. Besides their ability to collect and control the resources of the kingdom, they created a demand for resources and luxurious commodities from overseas as well.

The major trade network in Lanna went in all directions with central cities for communication like Chiang Mai, Chiang Saen, Chiang Rai, Nan, Phayao and Hot connecting with other towns in Lanna such as Phrao, Chiang Dao, Fang, Wiang Phangkham (Mae Sai), Doi Saket, Phayao, Sering (Thoeng), Chiang Khong, Chiang Muan, Pua, Wang Nuea, Wang Chin and Thoen. Some of these places were able to trade outside Lanna, such as Sukhothai, Ayutthaya, Chiang Rung, Yunnan, Chiang Tung, Luang Phrabang and Siam.

This resulted in product circulation in several large and small town markets in the kingdom, mostly for locally produced items. At the same time, the major city markets served as places for exchanging and collecting important products that brought a huge income like valuable metals or other items including silk, glass, salt and precious stones as well as forest products like deer hide, lac, *rak* resin, benzoin, etc. Land trade involved transportation employing elephants, horses, oxen, buffalos and mules as beasts of burden that endured the rugged terrain on the plains and steep hills. Oxen were used mostly for carrying goods and drawing carts. River transportation to various cities and towns to the south, was by *mae pa* boats or scorpion-tail boats until trains began to run to and from Chiang Mai in 1921.

Being the center for trade in the region made Lanna progress in all aspects. Its wealth was clearly reflected through the luxurious beauty in the attire of the aristocrats and ruling class in the royal court especially. They were the well-to-do group who could afford imported textiles and woven products. Thus the trade for yarns and textiles gives us a good idea of the prosperity of Lanna during the 19th century.

Textiles and clothing were not only basic needs, but they also indicated the owner's taste and status, especially among the high class group who had to be selective in the materials and textiles of good quality, elaborate cutting and sewing and impressive decoration by master-crafts people in the royal court. These were fantastic in style and design, combining the clothing styles of the royal courts of the Tai Yuan, Tai Lue, Tai Lao, Tai Khoen and Tai Yai since there was trade, diplomatic relations and intermarriage between them.

Royal court textiles used gold and silver threads that were expensive and luxurious to match the wearer's status. These products were imported through city ports to Lanna via trader caravans of oxen and horses using several trade routes and networks, which can be classified in 2 ways: outside trade routes and internal Lanna trade routes.

Since the beginning of its establishment, Lanna had trade relationships with several large and small towns outside the kingdom. A record in 1811 gives the account of trade between Ayutthaya and Chiang Mai, Lan Xang and the Mon, with Chiang Mai being sited as important for textiles (Fine Art Department 1990). Documents and records in Thailand and those of foreigners who came to Lanna in the 19th century show that there were 5 important routes between Lanna and the neighboring states. These were Lanna-Yunnan, Lanna-Shan State, Lanna- Moulmein, Lanna- Luang Phrabang and Lanna-Siam.

In 1912, it was estimated that commodity transport boats between Chiang Mai and Bangkok (Siam) were 1,000 vessels per year; each had the capacity to carry 2.5 tons of goods although there were some problems due to the shallow rivers in the dry season and sometimes they had to dredge sand to allow the boats to go through certain parts of the rivers (Bock 1985). Goods from Bangkok to Chiang Mai were worth 839,000 baht and those shipped from Chiang Mai to Bangkok were only 286,750 baht (Chusit, 1980, 58). Major products from Lanna were cotton fabrics, sappan wood, lac, benzoin, ivory, animal horns, wax, deer hides and teak. In 1855, records show that textiles from Bangkok were linen, wool, thread, imported fabrics and ready-made clothes (Hallet 1988). After Princess Dararasami of Chiang Mai, the daughter of Chao Intha Withchayanon (the 7th king of Chiang Mai), became the royal consort of King Rama V of Siam in 1886, more traditional woven cotton, especially tube skirts were sent for sale in the Siam royal household.

Toward the end of the 19th century, trade with provincial towns in the upper parts of Lanna lost significance due to the annexation to Siam when trade focused more and more on the south via the waterways and later trains and roads that were increasingly developed. Almost all of the commodities were from Bangkok with the growing town of Paknam Pho being an important trade center.

Lanna aristocrats and members of the royal families could afford luxurious imported goods since they owned the boats and pack animals used in the transportation as well as monopolizing several kinds of concession rights to reap huge benefits and wealth. Most of the luxurious products sought after by the elite were clothing, fabrics and accessories rather than furniture or glassware. Only a few of the latter items were bought to have the court craftsmen imitate them. The kinds of textiles they preferred were silk and silver or gold thread.

It can be seen that the trade between Lanna and other areas in the north like Yunnan, Shan State, Burma and Luang Phrabang was in the hands of the Yunnanese and Tai Yai as they were skillful in organizing and managing transportation as well as controlling a large size of trade caravans on the main routes from Kunming to Moulmein. Cotton fabrics from England, velvet and clothing from Manchester brought via Moulmein were not sold successfully to the common people who preferred simple and inexpensive cotton clothes and so the market for silk and silver and gold thread was limited to the wealthy and members of the royal family. For this reason local textiles and woven cloth from Lanna could be considered a large and expanding business within the region.

Markets for Textiles and Woven Materials in Lanna

Before the establishment of the Lanna kingdom, the towns in the region that had the most distinctive roles were Chiang Saen on the Kok River and Haripunchai on the Ping River. Chiang Mai was still under construction at that time and had not yet developed as a trade center. When the city was fully established, Chiang Mai became a large and diverse market town for textiles as it was conveniently situated and was the center of the kingdom in terms of political administration and commerce. During the 19th century the markets in Chiang Mai provided embroidered cloth, cotton fabrics from England, good quality wool, velvet, satin, silk, muslin, Chinese silk, jackets, woolen cloth, dyes from Germany, stitching needles and silk fabrics. Lampang was the second largest market town dealing with raw or unbleached silk and silk fabrics as well as printed cloth, whereas in the Nan valley area a small market supplied such items as thread and cotton fabrics only. Other major towns in Lanna like Lamphun, Phrae, Chiang Saen and Chiang Rai had some markets whose names appear on the major trade routes, especially the route from Tali to Chiang Mai that was recognized as the most economically prosperous route at that time, which won it the name of the "Golden Road" (Sarasawatdi, 2009: 521).

Textile trade and woven materials in Lanna before the Bowring Treaty in 1855 involved such imported goods as quality cloth from India, China and Java (Rangram, 1971: 113) coming through various ports. These were of a better quality than those from England, which did not last very long and the color tended to fade after washing a few times (F 069/27/20 March 1862). However, after the development of sea transportation and production techniques of textiles along with tax reduction measures for goods from England as a result of the Bowring Treaty, textile goods from England were able to compete with those from India, China and South Java. A report of the British Consulate in the same year (1855) stated that even though cotton from England was not as durable as the cotton fabrics produced locally, the price was much lower (Ingram, 1971: 115). After the Bowring Treaty, other currencies were used for trading throughout Lanna such as the Indian Rupee, the Baht, cowrie and Tog money, for example, besides the kinds of money already used in Chiang Mai like the Chiang, Phakchi, Samphao (Chinese) and Hoi money (Lan Xang). The Rupee was the most important currency for selling, buying and exchanging business in Lanna (Anan, 1985).

Local markets in Lanna dealt in such items as forest products, unbleached cotton, indigo (*mo hom*) cloth, locally woven cloth, pottery, basketry and other handicrafts. Lanna women also came to buy and barter among the villagers and visit the neighboring villages where flea markets or village bazaars sold such items as homespun thread or yarn and hand woven cloth. They also sold their products to the vendors and merchants who had booths in the local markets. Important markets of this kind were Lichiangphra or Klangwiang markets extending from the front of Phra Singha temple to the Bodhi tree at Klangwiang area (the front of the present day Provincial Police Station of Mueang District, Chiang Mai) and the market on Thapae Road (Suraswadi, 2009: 520).

In the past, the economic system of Lanna was self-sustaining. People did their own weaving and grew rice for home consumption. Almost every house had a loom to weave cotton and silk for family members (Bock, 1884: 324). In the dry season, after the harvest, the men being free from work turned into merchants on pack-ox caravans taking goods from their villages to sell to other towns with 50-60 beasts of burden in each caravan. They brought back commodities that were not available in their own villages to sell also. These were such goods as lac, salt, tobacco and fermented tea leaves (*miang*) (Chusit, 1977). These Lanna merchants were not as successful as the Yunnanese,

Burmese and Shan merchants because they only conducted trade for supplementary incomes at certain times of the year. Many people were recruited to do labor work for the aristocrats or engaged in farm work to send products as tribute to the state.

Many documents stated that cotton growing abounded in Lanna and cotton became a significant export from the region. A record by Richardson gave an account that the Yunnanese merchants who traded with Chiang Mai returned with mainly cotton products. A report by the British Consulate officials stated that raw cotton was most demanded by the Yunnanese merchants (Richardson Mss: 27). The best area for cotton growing was on the high plateau whereas the lower plains were good for rice growing. Although people in the low plains could not grow cotton successfully, they still did cotton spinning and weaving for household use. As a result, several levels of bartering and goods exchange developed to obtain the raw cotton. Some groups had to travel 2-3 days to buy or barter their goods for raw cotton; for example, clay pots, fish, salt, chili peppers, tobacco, fermented tea leaves, betel nuts and betel leaves were exchanged. Raw cotton could be also be exchanged for dyed cotton thread or spun yarn as well as other kinds of woven cloth. Labor work could also be exchanged. For instance, people in the low plains took raw cotton to spin and weave and paid for the raw cotton with half of the woven fabric they had made. Raw cotton could be the medium of exchange for other kinds of commodities they needed. Thus trade and bartering was conducted directly or indirectly because in some areas woven textiles were hard to find. Some villagers would beg or steal woven textiles while others did labor work or sold things to get the money to buy the cloth they needed (Bowie, 1993: 165).

Cotton cloth was used in the people's daily life while silk was popular among the high class groups, mostly woven by the court servants or sometimes the mistresses did the weaving themselves with assistance from the servants. Some records tell that the princesses or queens of some Chiang Mai kings stayed in large teak houses and spent time doing silk weaving while the servants did the spinning of the yarn and so on (Bock, 1884: 322). Besides being for royal household use, silk was exported and brought profit to the masters. This was said to be a major source of income for some aristocrats in Chiang Mai, according to a foreigner's record that part of their income came from selling clothing products woven by the masters' servants (Hildebrand, 1875: 16).

Apart from silk fabric woven in Chiang Mai, there were outside sources as well. There are many records of imported silk fabric coming into Chiang Mai, as it was the center for imported textiles, in particular silk products from China brought by the Chinese Ho pack-ox merchants. There were items such as raw silk, silk shirts and blouses, wool cloth, silk trousers, hats and woolen rugs. Thin cotton fabrics were imported from England. Several shops along Thapae Road are mentioned as being "small shops facing the road carrying mainly printed fabrics and cheap cotton products" (Satow Mss: 56). There were over 100 of these shops in Chiang Mai in 1874 (Ingram, 1971: 116).

The Role of Aristocrats in Lanna Textile Trade

The trade of textiles with other towns outside the kingdom was monopolized by the aristocrats who took the role of bosses or owners of trade caravans who had servants to produce as well as take the products for sale in different places. A major income came from the sales of woven fabric that was produced by the skill of hundreds of the masters' servants. The aristocrats had the advantages of the labor from their servants as well as being owners of the valuable resources. Furthermore, they had the contacts through close relationships with other towns due to intermarriage among their family

members. These contacts increased the trade and the variety of goods involved. For example, the marriage of Princess Tipawan Na Lampang to Chaofa Phromlue Na Chiang Tung or that of Princess Dararasami, the daughter of the 7th king of Chiang Mai, who became the royal consort of King Rama V of Siam resulted in the expansion of the exchange of textiles and woven products to a broader circle.

An important person who had a significant role in Lanna textiles during that period was Princess Ubonwanna, daughter of King Kawilorot Suriyawong and a sister of Queen Thipkeson, the wife of King Inthawichayanon. The princess was very intelligent, charming, witty and eloquent. She was considered an influential business woman of the time. She conducted some large businesses in Lanna being the owner of teak timber concessions, gave huge loans to the Burmese and Shan merchants, engaged in the timber business, owned a woodcarving factory, a lacquer-ware factory, a liquor distillery, a railway concession, a tube-skirt factory, an imported fabric shop and several shops in the Chiang Mai market. She also had a small outlet near her royal residence selling textiles and imported fabrics such as muslin, thick cotton cloth, high quality woolen cloth, silk, velvet, buttons, stitching needles, thread of all kinds as well as silver ornaments (Bowie, 1993).

Another royal figure who played an important role in reviving and promoting the weaving business and textiles was Princess Dararasami. She brought together several weaving experts in twill and satin (*yok dok*) weaving and weavers of tube-skirts with discontinuous supplementary weft hems (*pha sin tin chok*). She arranged for the training of weavers and built a weaving workshop behind her residence with approximately 20 looms. She especially promoted twill and satin weaving, which has been handed down until today. She also led the dressing style by combining the Burmese *luntaya achieq* with the Lanna royal court style of hem piece (*tin chok*), which went well with the lace blouse with ham sleeves that was popular at the time. After 1897 when the King Chulalongkorn, Rama V came back from Europe trip. The British Queen Victoria reign outfit took influence in Siam court and Lanna. Luntaya achieq is still popular among present day Lanna people for special occasions.

The Conversion of Clothing

The Lanna style of dress in the first era; Mangrai dynasty (1296-1558) has just been found the evidence from sculptures of Deva around the chetiya pagoda in Jed Yod temple in Chiangmai. It has been showing the dress of aristocracy in modern world which is topless but there are a lot of jewelry like bracelets, necklaces, earrings and wearing a Crown. The male clothes are folded and stacked in the front and pulled up the pleats. Rustle release both sides that is a pattern which has been influenced by the Langa or India. It reflects the diverse cultural richness and prosperity at that time. The dress of commoners cannot determine conclusively because the evidence does not appear.

From the wealth in Lanna economy, the trading congestion from a variety of ethnic groups reveals the influence of artworks, culture, tradition and costume that is beautifully blended. During the 19th century, women of the royal courts of Chiangmai, Lampang, Lamphun and Phrae would wear striped silk tube-skirts with the hem pieces that are made from the silver and gold threads. The blouses had round collars over which shoulder cloths were worn diagonally across the chest. These went well with silver and gold ornaments. Silk thread for weaving was imported from China and Laos. (Dodd, 1923: 200). Women in the royal courts of Nan, Phayao and Chiang Rai wore either silk or cotton striped tube skirts decorated in various techniques such as discontinuous supplementary weft (*chok*), tapestry (*koh luang*), weft ikat (*mat mi* known locally as *mat kan*). Those with silver threads

or silver paper wrapped around thread were referred to as *sin kham khoep*. The blouse was called *suea pat* or *suea pai*, which fastened down the side and was made of cotton, silk or Chinese satin embroidered with gold or silver thread. Silver ornaments were preferred.

The reign of the Rama VII of Siam, King Prajadhipok correspond to the range of Art Deco era in Europe, which is popular with simplicity and minimalist. During those days, the young western woman began cutting bob hair as short as their ear or popular to curling their hair like waves. Not much Chiangmai women agree to cut their hair, most of them popular to wear hair in the bun and put hairpiece near their cheek look like bob. They wore a loose hip-length blouse with tube skirt but shifted to a higher level as the shin and white pair of stocking and shoes to match the clothes are pastel. Style tube skirt was reduced. The only remaining striped skirt ledge or foot only. And a simple sarong color without any pattern.

Later in the 1957 with a striped skirt in bright colors such as lime green, bright pink, blue, yellow, called Pha Sin San kamphaeng, became a popular fashion throughout the country. Popular to wear with long sleeve blouse that the same color as Pha Sin. After this period costumes Lanna also underwent modifications. Women began to wear the skirt and costume in Europe style.

Today Lanna textiles are still worn in Northern Thailand. Lanna girls wear traditional tube skirts (*phasin*) when they go to the temple and for important occasions. Lanna textile shops retail and gallery spaces sell various textile both cotton and silk are centered around Mueang district of Chiang Mai such as Waroros Market, Tha Pae Road Nimmanhaemin Road, Charoenrat Road, Watgate and Robinson department store and many shop in another district like Mae Cham, San Kampan, Chom Thong. There are many textile shops and factories in San Kampan and Chom Thong district sell cotton and silk fabric by the yard. This is the evidence to show that textile trading in Chiang Mai is flourishing. Chiang Mai also has a vibrant textile culture centered around more than 4 museums and galleries such as Bank of Thailand Textile Museum, Lanna Folklife Museum, Ban Rai Pai Ngarm Cotton Studio and Textile Museum, Hilltribe Museum, Studio Naenna and etc.

To sum up, the attire in Lanna for commoners was made from cotton while that of the high class was made from luxurious materials such as silk, which reflected their social and economic status. It also showed their advantages in terms of labor and trade privileges. Besides providing their own cotton and silk, Lanna people also imported other raw materials for textile production, dyes from Germany, silk thread from China, silver and gold thread as well as factory woven fabrics from India and England, which were shipped and went through several city ports like Moulmein, Luang Phrabang, Yunnan, Shan State and Siam by land and water. Such luxurious commodities reflected the ability of Lanna society and culture to expand and become a city with a regional level trade network during the 19th century. It is obvious that Chiang Mai was not just a city with a sustainable production system, but an independent society that played a role in the economic system of the region and the continent as a center for trade, and a was large market place for product exchange as well.

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Multifarious Functions of the Influence of the Others: Reversed Gender Roles in *Suratnari*

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Abstract

During the interwar years in the twentieth century, the identity of the Thais was very much affected by the political cataclysm both internally and externally. Ideologies and values that are transculturated into the society alter the way the Thais perceive themselves and the Others. This ongoing research paper sets out to examine one particular novel from the Seventies written by M.L. Boonlua Debyasuvarn titled *Suratnari* (1972). Because of the crucial temporality of the time, “[h]istory books do not tell us what people’s emotions were—that is the work of novels” (Kepner, 2013, p. xix). *Suratnari* depicts the reversal of the gender roles in the imagined country, Surat, especially for women to no longer have “designated agency” (McClintock, 1997, p. 98), but rather as hybrid and transcultural subjects who embody the traditional and modern values. *Suratnari*, I argue, reverberates the social reality of the Seventies and it is pivotal because we can see the multiplicity of functions of colonial thoughts that are being manipulated in this novel. The analysis of the novel then resonates and points out the “semi-colonial, crypto colonial or in part auto-colonial” (Thongchai, 2014, p. xvi) nature of Siam/Thailand. *Suratnari* discloses the functions of colonial thoughts and values in Surat where the inexorable presence and imagined Others are always brought into consideration. Altogether, *Suratnari* as a utopian novel manifests women as the spectacle of the nation (McClintock, 1997) where they both: (1) sacrifice for “the larger social struggle” (Sinnott, 2016, p. 15) and (2) embody “nationalism as fetish spectacle” (McClintock, 1997, p. 101). The analysis of *Suratnari* echoes the empowerment of women’s role and the reversed gender normativity and shows that women are militant and impassioned agency—an antithesis to the belligerent political structure at the time—who work towards the better good of the nation.

Keywords: role reversal, multiplicity of functions, embodied femininity, nationalism

Introduction

Incidents of the interwar years in the twentieth century have affected Thai people immensely. One critical result after the ending of the absolutism era in 1932 was the emergence of a constitutional government. This allowed Thais to enjoy their freedom, particularly the freedom of the press. Yet, this freedom was short lived: the government was immediately taken over by Field Marshal Phibun’s premiership. This was followed by the World War II, the “American Era” in the Indochina, and the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT)’s ousting of the military regime. I argue that, amid the

socio-political derangement, women play a significant part in contributing to the national progress and development that is contrary to “the bourgeois order” (Foucault, 1990, p. 5). This is consisted of the state-constituted values, the concept of idealized “female-assigned” (Haritaworn, 2012, p. 143) body and Thai femininity. Women’s roles reach far beyond “*designated agency*” (McClintock, 1997, p. 98). Women in this selected literature play a *raison d’être* of militancy. They are pioneers of the country, the powerful dominants in the social ladder and the hope of the nation whereas men unseemly exploit the power in times of national change.

The Author and Cultural Revolution

It should be emphasized here that women are intermeshed in the relations between politics, culture and normative gender relations. There is no gain in claiming the separation between the domestic and the public spheres in the Seventies. Kepner (2013) writes:

In order to understand Boonlua’s life story, it is necessary to understand some basic facts about the absolute monarchy before the overthrow, about the rise of guided democracy under military rule during the 1930s, and about Thailand’s experience of world war II, during which the nation was allied with the Japanese and bombed by the Britain and the Americans. It is also important to understand Thailand’s position in the Indochina War of 1954-75. When the nation allied itself with the United States and became a base of operations for air attacks on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and to understand as well the triumph and eventual defeat of a student-led revolution that brought down the military dictatorship in 1973, only to be crushed in 1976. (p. xix)

There is a strong sense of transnationalism that makes up M.L. Boonlua’s ideological construction. M.L. Boonlua was born on December 13th 1911 to Chao Phraya Thewet and Mom Nuan. Her father was a high official in Royal Siamese court who was profoundly close to King Rama V. She was sent abroad for education, similar to any other high rank officials’ descendants of the twentieth century. Due to her father’s pride and apprehension towards Western imperialism, he sent his children abroad to learn from the West. These cultural responses show the ambivalent attitudes Thai people held towards the West at the time.

The Thais have always had an appropriated appreciation for the West. Especially King Rama V’s modernization plan through which he looked to Westernization as the paragon of modernization. As part of this modernization, concerns regarding women did not go unnoticed. In the early twentieth century, Thai women were advised to fill the roles of motherhood and wives but some scholars write that it was not until King Rama VI’s reign that the women’s development reached its peak (Kopkitsuksakul, 1993). But, the progress decreed during this period was for Western eyes to see. A few decades later, the growing dissatisfactions towards the King’s favoritism, the growing number of the middle class, the demand for democracy, the principle of the Western ideology (Kepner, 2013, pp. 62-63), and the Great Depression drove the Promoters to stage a revolution that eventually ended the absolutist regime in 1932. Undeniably, Western influence, ideas, and values had been selectively adapted in almost all social and cultural spheres of the Thais’ lives.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁸ Benedict and Ruchira (1985) write about the “new generation of Thai intellectuals” (p. 28) reaction towards “American Era” that its principal drive was in fact influenced by Western (American) values: “dramatic

M.L. Boonlua as a civil servant played a notable part in the discursive practice of Thainess herself. According to Kepner (2013), the Promoters' actions "changed the future of the entire nation, but for Boonlua, the results of political change were quite personally significant" (p. 61). She had a position on the national committee for women's garments.¹⁵⁹ The task was challenging for her and she looked to her two close sisters, Buppha and Chalaem who were the "ultimate 'palace lad[ies]'" (qtd. in Kepner, 2013, p. 15) and Phraya Thewet, her brother, for advice. My question is: was this task solely chosen for her because she is a noble woman and a civil servant?

Representation and restoration of Thai culture and Thai civilization have always been part of the circulating rhetoric in Thai society. I argue that, M.L. Boonlua's task was heavily a part of said discourse in Field Marshal Phibun's administration. I want to point out that the power relations in this case were a state-led policy. The "[n]ational cultural program" (p. 150) was a crucial part of M.L. Boonlua's career. It was a campaign designed to "define, interpret, and regulate Thainess" (p. 150). A policy M.L. Boonlua expressed her dissatisfaction to. She has always considered Thai society to be multi-cultural and multi-ethnic. It is reified here that the Others' presence (whether physically or ideologically) is indispensable. Whether to define ourselves or to *re-define* the declining authentic constitution of us, the Other is who we project such representation for. M.L. Boonlua's *Suratnari* is a contributing work that reflects her thoughts, values, and the society at the time.¹⁶⁰

Most notably, *Suratnari* depicts the participation of women in national development discourse. The novel portrays a "vision of the ideal bureaucracy" (p. 187) amid the military regimes dating from Field Marshal Phibun to the last military regime, Field Marshal Thanom in 1973. 1973 was the same year the students and professors were able to remove "the three tyrants" (p. 290) from office due to their demonstrations of "pro-democracy, pro-civil rights, anti dictatorship, and anti military activists" (p. 289). This all took place just one year after *Suratnari* was compiled in 1972.

Synopsis of *Suratnari* (1972)

Suratnari (1972) depicts lives of Thai Surat in the land of *Suwan Ratthana Thaweeep*. Mick, the narrator, guides us through his experience of fascination, wonderment, and admiration of Surathians. The incident after their shipwreck in Indian Ocean brings Mick, Khun Luang¹⁶¹ Praphap, Chris, and Wang to embark into the land of Surat. The locals who happen to be their "Tai brothers and sisters" (Reynolds, 2002, p. 314) treat them with hospitality. For the few months that Mick and Khun Luang reside in Surat, the readers are made aware that the roles of man and woman here are in stark contrast to Thai Siam.

Empowered women in Surat are described as many things: unfeminine, outspoken, and sometimes

rebellion against the conventional pieties of their country's political leadership, social mores, and cultural values "Americanization" at this juncture of American history had a powerful double impact on many of these young Thai" (p. 29). Ironically, socio-cultural impacts induced the disgruntlement with the way the leaders ran the country at the time.

¹⁵⁹ A position she was appointed to during Field Marshal Phibun's regime (1948-57). Under his administration, the rhetoric that was nationalist centered focused mainly on the restoration of Thainess.

¹⁶⁰ Benedict (1985) writes that the stories he selected in his book ranged between the years 1967-79 "American Era". The years that "in many ways form a distinct epoch in Thai cultural life. For, as we have seen, Sarit had lovely succeeded—by repression, censorship, and (paradoxically) an enormous extension of education—in cutting off the younger generation from its immediate intellectual ancestors" (pp. 40-41).

¹⁶¹ Title conferred by the King.

gender neutral. Vishu, Napasmanee, and Atikan are significant characters who prove that we are all flexible and the societal meanings attached to ourselves change over time. The case of Surat, in particular, changes because of the encounter with the Western imperial Other. I should emphasize that the cultural and ideological contact affects the Suratians (of different sexes) differently. Surat itself is divided into two; the North welcomes change and the South, clings to the “matrilineal spirit” (Pongsapich, 1997, p. 17)¹⁶² that is the traditional convention of Surat. *Suratnari* shows the importance of synthetic Thainess, which is the hybridity of tradition and the Other combined.

Transnational encounters affect and consequently alter the way we perceive normative gender relations. The reversed gender roles delineated in the novel clearly position women as the breadwinners, the majority members of the governmental cabinet, the matrilineal inheritors of land properties and the dominants in the society. The latter characteristic results in a lack of women’s movements or organizations in the novel. Rather, Suratian men are fighting to change the tradition and form a male assembly in the novel.

It is crucial that we understand M.L. Boonlua’s history and her thoughts on the synthetic characteristics that make up Thai society. I argue that the deviation from normative gender relations that are promoted by the institution is M.L. Boonlua’s reflection of the society.¹⁶³ The Seventies was also the period when “[t]he women’s liberation in Thailand directly [was] influenced by the West¹⁶⁴, where discrimination against the female sex and male dominance in society [were] the main factors. As mentioned earlier, in Thai society women [had] greater authority and power in practice than is legally prescribed” (Mattani, 1988, p. 120). True to her thoughts, *Suratnari* enhances the empowered women, especially the hybrid outcome that is a mixture between the tradition and the modern. Her depiction changes our perception towards gender relations quite effectively.

As I have argued earlier; in time of political upheaval and limitations being enforced upon social lives of the people, woman writers like M.L. Boonlua envisioned the empowerment of women by the women. First, the power relations in the novel defy that of male-dominated social reality. And second, there is new reconsideration of the social meaning concerning the essentialist notion of what woman and man are.

Reversed Gender Roles

Luang Praphap dissolves the notion of gender normativity in many of his dialogues. For example, this shrewd character gives an example of a seahorse and its reproducing ability to show how gender can

¹⁶² Pongsapich (1997) writes that “[t]here is no need to belabour the fact that bilateral kindred with matrilineal-bias is indeed an overt pattern of kinship in Thai rural society. It is important, to emphasise that the role of kinship and kin relations is closely connected with land inheritance is a very important aspect of kin relations” (p. 11).

¹⁶³ Unavoidably, “the central theme for this generation of writers was the Great Transformation of their country under their very eyes—a transformation engendered by the spread of modern capitalism and the remorseless expansion of the state” (Anderson & Mandiones, 1985, p. 43).

¹⁶⁴ Darunee and Shashi (1996) write about the development plan in the Seventies that: the often—and over—cited study Boserup, *Women’s Role in Economic Development*, published in 1970 demonstrating that development processes have been strongly male biased and bypassed women, led the international aid community to attempt to integrate women into the production (market) system so that the economy could grow more vigorously. Women’s specific needs and capacities, let alone the specificity of the society and culture, were not considered. In fact, this emphasis on economic integration in many cases further increased their exploitation (p. 81).

be fluid:

Khun Mick, things in this world are all supposition. In our life cycle, the thing that we call female, it becomes impregnated and gives birth. However, this is never transcendental and it's uncertain. Take a look at the seahorse, the males are the ones who give birth. (Debyasuvarn, 1972, p. 26)¹⁶⁵

The agency of the author can be found here. As an attempt to educate Mick, Luang Praphap, is an unconscious voice of the author herself i.e., an experienced adult who has seen the world and is adaptable to changes. Mick questions the strange Suratian culture regarding sexuality and expresses his essentialist view of the ideal Thai femininity. He heedlessly compares American women to the Thai when he encounters them at the American club and describes them as having "bold mannerisms, callous etiquette ... especially the women coming out of the swimming pool with their soggy hair and water dripping from their faces. They would slovenly take off their swim caps and whisk their hair sloppily" (pp. 73-74). This is because he is accustomed to Thai culture where Thai women are to a certain extent, equal to men, but can still perform as hind legs to their men, according to Mick (p. 77).

Mick's thoughts delineate the oppression and stability of gender normativity. In particular, Thai Siamese women are the absolute antithesis to Western women (and possibly some Suratian women). The other male character, Watcharen, shares the same speculation concerning the role division between that of male and female. His and Mick's concepts are in trajectory because they rest on the biological determination. He believes that "women have the inherent task to reproduce, breastfeed, care for the household, and nurture children" (p. 118). On the contrary, men hold the belief that they are naturally stronger than women and are wiser and more intellectual. Why then must they care for the upbringing of their children; it is not men's business" (p. 118). Surat's unusual gender convention is deemed unnatural according to Watcharen and Mick at the early stages of the novel. Furthermore, these two characters always perceive the Suratian norms in contrast to the Others. What the others practice, especially the West, should be taken as a role model; ideal gender relations that Suratian should adopt.

But, clear separation of gender roles is neither the case in Surat nor the case in Thailand in the Seventies. Vishu explains that in Surat, men are refined and polished (*khat klao*) and that naturally, mothers care for their children more than men do. The children are mothers' children, but fathers need to nurture and cultivate in them the love for their fathers (p. 629). The normativity of gender roles can be cultivated (*oprom*) and performed. As a result, we see the process of *oprom* takes place in Surat and there is more understanding towards gender roles by the end of the novel. Mick himself later realizes the biological characters that he takes for granted. How one should perform their gender is always fluid, resulting in social practices by men and women that are ambiguous or reversed compared to the expected sanctioned roles. How the Others take into account the notion of gender is something externally influenced yet Surat should not revolve around this Otherness (pp. 799-800).

The way in which M.L. Boonlua depicts the utopian society of Surat resembles a matrilineal society.¹⁶⁶ Specifically, Mattani (1988) writes "Boonlua based [Suratian] social structure on a matriarchal society in the Shan state which is inhabited by a group of Thai people" (p. 120). Varunee

¹⁶⁵ All translated dialogues from the novel are transcribed into English by the author.

¹⁶⁶ See Mattani (1988) chapter 4, "The change in the role of women in contemporary Thai literature" pp. 111-121, Pongsapich (1997) pp. 3-51 and Purisinsit (2015) in "Women in Village Society" pp. 131-163.

Purinsit's (2015) *Women in Village Society* also writes that in the current time "Thai women have good social position" (p. 131). Nevertheless, this was before the influence of the rapid growth of the market economy that accelerated in the latter half of the twentieth century. Prior to the changes in the economic situation (p. 146), Thai women in this distinct social setting could inherit land properties (p. 133-134) and could manage economical productions. Although Varunee states that the labor division is of a flexible nature, the power to make decisions (p. 141) lies heavily in the women. Regardless of the matrilineal nature of the society that M.L. Boonlua elaborates in her novel, the Suratian women and their gender roles go far beyond the social position of Thai women in reality.¹⁶⁷

In the novel, women's roles are reversed and they have power monetarily and politically. Suratian men start to criticize the norm that is practiced in Surat. The way Suratian gender norm works in the textual reality resembles Althusser's work on ideology. Ideology is a matter of reproduction and it functions as long as it is practiced.¹⁶⁸ Precisely because the gender role is practiced and maintained as a tradition and is conserved within Surat, this makes Suratian men form a movement equivalent to that of the feminist movement influenced by the West. Watcharen is the vice president of *Puritsapha*, the men's assembly, that demands equal rights and radically concentrates to transform Suratian tradition where women in power perpetuate the status quo. The men's assembly considers the West as its model, claiming that the West provides equal rights and men can therefore exercise their rights freely. Suratian conventions and norms are criticized by the Americans as "unnatural" (Debyasuvarn, 1972, p. 553). Many of the women characters in *Suratnari* or the men's *saami*¹⁶⁹ take this matter lightly and some question why Surat has to follow the same trajectory of those of other societies? (p. 95).

Indeed, we need to ponder upon the dialogues concerning the Other. Can Thai Surat—as a reflection of Thai Siam—exist without the influence of the Other? Can it proceed with national progress on its own and without the help of women? Is national progress solely the work of men—gendered progress? Influences of the Other will be explored in the next section.

Colonialism: Multiplicity of Functions

It should be emphasized that Thailand is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country (Kepner, 2013). *Suratnari* portrays the effects and the constructive nature of the colonized country. This narration represents what Kepner (2013) explains as "war in fictions" (p. 213) written by M.L. Boonlua. The 'war' largely comprises of how colonial rule can either be gainful or futile. Underlying the dialogues, the readers can locate the hybrid nature of Thai Suratian culture. As I have argued earlier, M.L. Boonlua's writing is an insightful reflection of Thai society in the Seventies. How the Western ideas, practices, and values function in Suratian society (as an echoed Thai society going through the decades of development epoch) will subsequently be explored.

¹⁶⁷ See further in Tantiwiranond (2007).

¹⁶⁸ See further in Blunden, Andy. *Louis Althusser 1970 ideology and ideological state apparatuses*. Marxists.org., <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm>.

¹⁶⁹ Language that is used in the novel regarding genders are as follows: *saami* means wife (whereas the Thai language's literal meaning refers to husband); *priyaa* means the beloved one or darling (usually followed by the husband's name e.g. Watcharen *priyaa* would refer to Sorawan); *sri* is used to refer to both sir and madam (Mr./Ms./Mrs.); *suay* is a compliment for both sexes meaning beautiful and/or handsome; *chan* refers to the subject "I" for both sexes; and *ther* is a pronoun for both him and her.

Surat was under British colonialism for twenty years. In the novel, Luang Praphap tells his Tai brothers that Thai Siam, too, fell under colonization during the reign of King Rama VI.¹⁷⁰ The conversation during the welcome reception at Vishu's grandfather's is about how and in what way(s) the colonial rule has become beneficial to them. Being subjugated under colonialism is both advantageous and disadvantageous for Surat. Yet, to simply discuss the colonial rule in this way seems oversimplified and discredits the discourse of colonialism and its manifold functions.

Colonialism's first function is pragmatic. It creates an administrative system which supports the principle of democracy, economic interests, and ultimately, certain language skills—English. But, from the perspectives of Suratian women, Western values would only espouse men to demand equal rights similar to the West. Furthermore, it urges men's repudiation of the Suratian tradition¹⁷¹ as "regarding the rights that men have less than women here in Surat, the Americans perceive this matter as unnatural" (Debyasuvarn, 1972, p. 553). Undeniably, the claim that Siam has never been a colony subtly indicates the situation both in the text and social reality. Surat accepts this on the pragmatic level and that alone.

Mattani (1988) divides the external influence of Westernization on the grounds of "pragmatic reasons" (p. 6). The way in which Thai people accept and adopt Western values and practices is conditioned in the sense that it does not mar the socialization process, culture, and way of life of the locals as follows:

Westernization has to make its way through the Thai people themselves on their own terms and not to be forced upon them by foreigners. Through their wise and subtle synchronization and assimilation which is often called the "Siamese or the Thai way," Eastern and Western cultures became Siamized. (p. 6)

Similarly, the criterion that decides what can be appropriated and adapted is ambivalent and dependent on the institution. This statement is justified both in the social reality of Thailand and textual reality in *Suratnari*. While Surat accepts its situation with pride and discusses about the pros and cons of being a colonized state in the past, it implicitly asks us to reconsider the semi-colonial status of Siam/Thailand. The notion of uniqueness is brought up again especially when the Suratian host states: "we do not mind the West. We do not expect the West to understand us" (Debyasuvarn, 1972, p. 52). Putting the Other at a distance is by no means making it a stranger to the social reality of Thailand. To put in Reynolds' (2002) words that, as a matter of fact "[w]e might better understand Thai identity as primarily a negative force, the name for that which resists the pressures and intrusiveness of what is foreign and alien. The power of Thai identity lies in its imagined capacity to differentiate inside from outside and in the process of doing so to hold the subversive Other at arm's length" (p. 27).

On the ideological level, the way in which colonialism functions within the novel differs between

¹⁷⁰ Luang Praphap mentions that certainly Siam was colonized by the British. The government at the time tried to appeal the status by approaching Lanka country. They wanted to sign peace treaty to show that it was not Siam that fell under colonial rule (Debyasuvarn, 1972, p. 19). But, this did not succeed.

¹⁷¹ Early on in the novel, Mick explains that the Suratian Queen's younger brother discreetly signed a contract with the British in hope that the Western power would bring change to Suratian culture and the potent role of women in their socialization process. However, contrary to his wish, the clause in the contract that will make him become the governor was never carried out. As a result, the Queen had to endure the status of a colonial country (pp. 20-21). Her Majesty, though, was never forced to pay respect to the British King (p. 21).

Suratian women and men. The latter advocates for equal rights. The way in which M.L. Boonlua narrates *Suratnari*'s tradition shows that Western influence collaboratively¹⁷² empowers Suratian women to become more militant, outspoken, shrewd, and strong willed. This manifests in their ancestors encouraging the children to educate in the West and return to contribute to the country's progress and development. Female descendants are advised to take professions that are in the field of "administration or bureaucracy" whereas men are persuaded to advance in the field of academia (Debyasuvarn, 1972, p. 610).

M.L. Boonlua also stressed the education of most of the female characters in the novel. Undeniably, as a remnant of colonial power, the Western values and ideologies such that of democracy, freedom, or capitalism comprise a considerable amount in *Suratnari* and in turn empower Suratian women such as Vishu, Atikan, Napasmanee, and so on to be dominant both in the private and public spheres.

On the contrary, the discursive practice of colonialism functions in a complicit manner in regards to Suratian men. Watcharen, for instance, demands equal rights for men by revering the patriarchal ideology of the West. The male assembly, *Puritsapha*, asserts that Western values that favor men should be practiced within Surat. Suratian matrilineal socialization which honors women is completely unnatural and should be debunked (p. 553). Suratian men who have returned from Europe or America question the traditional values and demand changes—a perspective that indisputably resonate with the reversed social condition in the Seventies.¹⁷³ As Mattani (1988) writes, "the so-called leftist intellectuals" that question the "privileged" led to the uprising in 1973 which "was inspired by the Marxist social and cultural revolution" (p. 13). The way in which Western values function complicitly for Suratian men who demand patriarchy underpinning the society shows that the Other that Surat keeps at a distance has a "polymorphous injunction" (Foucault, 1990, p. 32) of functions.

Therefore, women are empowered and dominant in the land of Surat. At the same time, Western patriarchal values are manipulated as the male assembly legitimizes their premise in order to stage a cultural transformation. Foucault wrote:

[t]here is no binary division to be made between what one says and what one does not say; we must try to determine the different ways of not saying such things, how those who can and those who cannot speak of them are distributed, which type of discourse is authorized, or which form of discretion is required in either case. There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses. (p. 27)

Thus:

we are dealing less with a discourse on sex than with a multiplicity of discourses produced by a whole series of mechanisms operating in different institutions ... it is not simply in terms of a continual extension that we must speak of this discursive growth; it should be seen rather as a dispersion of centers from which discourses emanated, a diversification of their forms, and the complex deployment of the network connecting them (pp. 33-34)

¹⁷² I am grateful to Professor Takashi Aso for the suggestion on the colonialism's multiple functions.

¹⁷³ In the same manner, Gail Omvedt (1986) writes about the social movements in the latter half of the twentieth century Thailand that "[w]omen were also militant participants in peasants' and workers' agitations ... but leadership remained in the hands of men" (p. 240).

Colonized Surat echoes the social reality of Thailand as “semi-colonial, crypto colonial or in part auto-colonial. As a consequence, Thailand often finds itself at a crossroads between Western and local influences” (Winichakul, 2014, p. xvi).

The same way that Foucault delineated the “polymorphous injunction” of discourses or the “multiplicity of discourses” on sexuality, I suggest that we should pay attention to the way the discourse can be employed and maneuvered. And “what is peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not that they consigned sex to a shadow existence, but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it *ad infinitum*, while exploiting the secret” (Foucault, 1990, p. 35). The manner in which Suratians take into account the advantage and disadvantage of colonial thoughts and values disclose the social reality of synthetic Thais that M.L. Boonlua advocated (Kepner 2012; 2013). M.L. Boonlua portrayed how the Other can be permeated as an ambivalent element that constructs Thai social meaning. Her comprehension of Thainess is that it is heterogeneous. The characteristic of a semi-colonial Thai (or colonized Surat) exhibits “the strategy of hybridizing, supplementing, abbreviating and amalgamating” (Harrison, 2014, p. 14) the Western Other. The multifarious ways that the Western values function as a result of colonialism has made it “impossible to isolate ‘the West’ from constructions of Thai cultural identities” or as Thongchai states “in Thailand ‘the West’ is always in some sense a Thai-ized West” (qtd. in Harrison, 2014, p. 28).

Orachun—the Spectacle of the Nation

The Seventies’ political upheaval motivated a number of Thais (especially students in the NSCT) to voice their opinions regarding the “military – dominated government” (Keppner, 2013, p. 283). The group consisted of those who were “politically liberal and progressive” (p. 290) and most significantly, there was a call for “pro-democracy, pro-civil rights, anti dictatorship, and anti military activists” (p. 289). The aforementioned statement prompts me to question what was the role of women at the time?

Megan Sinnott (2004) writes in *The Libidinal Power* that certainly, women participated in the revolution, but there was certain significance on sexual repression that promoted the national progress over individual desires. Sinnott writes that the “leftist movements of the twentieth century have simultaneously promoted sexual conservatism, such as heterosexual monogamy, marital fidelity and even abstinence, while still inspiring passionate commitment to progressive social transformation” (p. 5). Vishu’s sexuality is a case in point. It is narrated in such a way that shows “a central mechanism for the structuring of political orders” (p. 12). Hence, Mick’s romantic feelings are not reciprocated. Vishu sacrifices her love for Mick for the development of the nation.

Sinnott further delineates the “[d]iscourse of sexual morality” (p. 13) which shows the necessity to reconsider liberal sexuality. She explains that when there are no restraints on sexuality, it can lead to gender oppression, “[t]he liberation of women was linked to the suppression of supposed licentious sexual desires and acts” (p. 13). Vishu’s sexuality fits perfectly with the previous statement. Her love and sexual desire are suppressed for the greater social and national struggle of Surat in political and economical terrains.

Aside from women’s role as a martyr for the nation, their sexuality, and women’s bodies in particular, are closely intertwined with the notion of national progress. As far as the historicity of

Thailand goes, I argue that M.L. Boonlua could have anticipated the important political change due to the nature of the military government. As Kepner (2013) explains:

Thais accept the fact that there are two categories of people: the powerful and the powerless, the important and the unimportant, the older and the younger ... The Thai social system has managed to survive by relying on this principle of inequality. Thai's deep understanding of the truth about power relations and their lack of national ideology contribute to a flexible value system, features of which can easily be adopted to the changing environment and made relevant to where the power is located or who possesses it. (p. 286)

Due to political upheaval, we see a complete reversal of power relations rather than a mere oscillation of power in the novel. The asymmetrical characteristic of power relations, however, is still employed. The deployment of power and the understanding of how Thai social system operates led M.L. Boonlua to depict this inequality between men and women and people in different social classes. One year after *Suratnari* was published,¹⁷⁴ "the three tyrants" (p. 290) were ousted, resulting in open political activities for several years. As an antithesis to what was happening in the Seventies in Thailand, women in matrilineal socialization rule Surat. The textual reality resonates what Baker and Phasuk (2014) write that "[a]s is well known, females have traditionally maintained a relatively powerful social position in Thailand Tai societies, as best symbolized by bilateral kinship patterns that give relatively equal weight to male and female lines of descent" (p. 209). Matrilineal nature was present "as early as [the] fifteenth century" (p. 197).

Anne McClintock (1997) writes in *No Longer in Future Heaven* that men "represent the progressive agent of national modernity ... embodying nationalism's progressive, or revolutionary, principle of discontinuity. Nationalism's anomalous relation to the time is thus managed as a natural relation to gender" (p. 92). The statement automatically alludes to the notion that women represent something stagnate, retrograde, or an inherent body of tradition i.e., intrinsic and natural to that of the nation. However, women characters in *Suratnari* are deemed otherwise—unnatural to the eyes of the Thai Siam and the West. Power relations and gender roles are reversed and performed differently from the social reality.

In the novel, the conception that the nation is directly implicated onto women's bodies is depicted. In fact, Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (1989) write that one of the women's role and their relation to nationalism¹⁷⁵ is as "participants in national, economic, political and military struggle" (p. 10). Certainly, the role of biological reproducers is revered throughout the novel, but I would like to emphasize the aforementioned relation between women and the state because women characters in *Suratnari* are audacious, sharp, and outspoken on the nation's progressivity. Vishu, Atikan, Napasmanee are all bold characters that extoll the country's development so much so that they are deemed as power hungry and are willing to make sacrifices for their nation. I believe that this is M.L. Boonlua's perspective on the country's advancement, especially the development and modernization plans implemented during Field Marshal Sarit's rule: "Sarit's implementation of *kan-phatthana*, his counter-insurgency strategic plan and his encouragement of foreign investment

¹⁷⁴ It was published in two serialized books: *Suratnari 1* (1972) and *Suratnari 2* (1972).

¹⁷⁵ See further in *Woman-Nation-State* (1989).

and privatization of government enterprises into national policies ‘accelerated social and economic changes’” (Feangfu, 2014, p. 112). And it did accelerate the social cultural meanings attached to gender roles and the national progress.

In other words, “the roles that women play are not merely imposed upon them. Women actively participate in the process of reproducing and modifying their roles as well as being actively involved in controlling other women” (Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989, p. 11). I argue that M.L. Boonlua remarkably separates the role of men and women in *Suratnari* which fits McClintock’s statement: “nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned institutionalization of gender *difference*. No nation in the world grants women and men the same access to the rights and resources of the nation state” (p. 89).

Roles and responsibilities are in such stark opposition between the main characters Vishu and Mick. I want to emphasize again how the discourse of colonialism is employed by Surathians collaboratively and complicitly. The latter strengthens the appropriation strategy by men which resurfaces again when Vishu counters Mick and his keen interests in the Other’s affairs. Mick replies that “you cannot live in Thai Siam. ... The Thai Siamese people pay attention to the Other’s disparagement. And that is the only way the people want to get up and better anything” (Debyasuvarn, 1972, p. 190). Although Mick represents what M.L. Boonlua describes as “indifferent to worldly matters” (p. 14), Luang Praphap gives voice to the writer’s shrewd and experienced worldview regarding the influence of the Other:

I think Asian countries are impassionately finding funds from abroad to develop the countries. I suppose development is necessary but knowing how to utilize the money is also crucial. Most importantly, people should use the things made in their countries. Use them efficiently and only what they have ... there is no need to acquire monetary sustenance and accelerate material growth. (p. 475)

Vishu, who embodies the drive of the nation, replies, “modernization [and its effects] will travel to those who are less knowledgeable. They will have to toil to become like the people in the city [who are modern]”¹⁷⁶ and “how can people live with the old and adjust to the new?” (p. 476).

Mattani (1988) writes that “[t]he women’s liberation in Thailand is directly influenced by the West, where discrimination against the female sex and male dominance in society are the main factors” (p. 120). During the military premiership from Field Marshal Sarit, Thanom, and Prapas, “Sarit’s implementation of *kan-phattana*” (Feangfu, 2011, p. 42) urged M.L. Boonlua to express her concern about the social reality of Thailand. Napas (2001) describes the main premise underlying women’s development during the decade of women (1975-85) as “the change and reform concerning the already [existing] policies and rules [have] pushed and extolled by the United Nations and the world meetings that had been held since the International Women year [1975-85]” (pp. 78-79).

As a result of the strengthened American support during Sarit’s premiership, the economic development that dominated the Seventies was seen as a “widening gap between rural and urban earnings attracted migration and transformed the face of the city, the heartland of development itself, into an impersonal, profit-driven metropolis, albeit one endowed with wealth and

¹⁷⁶ Janit (2014) writes extensively concerning the divide between Bangkok and the outskirts that shows the stark opposition between the modernization and the tradition (his notion of tradition within the country during Field Marshal Sarit’s rule is dubbed as “*Orientalisation from Within*” (p. 116).

opportunities" (Feangfu, 2011, p. 42). M.L. Boonlua had "condescending admiration" (Kepner, 2013, p. 191) for Sarit, but her apprehension regarding the nation's development is expressed throughout the novel. I argue, at least through the agencies of Vishu and Khun Luang Praphap. That it is safe to say that "'fiction' and 'reality' run into each other in the popular imagination" (Hamilton, 2002, p. 284).

Women characters are not only martyrs, driving forces for the national progress, they are also no longer considered, to use McClintock's term, designated agencies (1997, p. 98). Vishu herself is closely related to nation building and modernization. Literally so, Vishu as a civil engineer devotes herself to a road construction project where she believes "that women and men should work for the country as much as they can ... Hence, we [Sorawan and Vishu] must sacrifice" (Debyasuvarn, 1972, p. 621) and the "sake of the populace precedes anything" (p. 703). Surat's main problem concerns the economic advancement and how to justly find foreign investors to help develop the country. The time Vishu invests in road construction shows that her endeavors, actions, energy, and her body are all one with the nation.

The narrative of women in *Suratnari* shows that women are no longer tokens for immobilized nationalism, nor are they deemed as being "backward in *racial* and *gender* time" (McClintock, 1997, p. 101), I am indebted to this splendid conceptualization of the spectacle. The analysis of the novel provides another view or resistance towards the gendered, invented, and masculine (McClintock, 1997) form of nationalism. When Vishu finishes her speech,¹⁷⁷ the people shout that she is an *orachun*¹⁷⁸ as their heroine. Later, Lambert and Mick also refer to Vishu as one great heroine. Vishu is able to acquire political agency. She delivers tranquility to the crowd, gathers collective unity, and speaks earnestly regarding the Surat as a nation and the people's wellbeing from her position as a civil servant. This symbolization-token-of collectivism is agreed upon by the masses is deemed as a spectacle by the Suratians. McClintock cleverly delineates that "more often than not, nationalism takes shape through the visible, ritual organization of fetish objects ... as well as through the organization of collective fetish spectacle ... Far from being purely phallic icons, fetishes embody crises in social value, which are projected onto, and embodied in, what can be called impassioned

¹⁷⁷ At the gathering in Praseen city Vishu gives a speech as follows:

Truly, Surat is not like any other country in the world, but I would like to inform my brothers and sisters that in other countries and other continents that are not *Rattana Thawee*, they have things that we do not have. You will find that in Europe and modernized Asian countries, women are hospitalized because of hemorrhage and the number of the patients admitted is up to 30-40 people monthly. These women are nearly dead. And why is that? Because those women carry human beings inside them. In the more modernized places, when women give birth, their children need fathers to not be socially shamed. Men in those countries are irresponsible because they do not take responsibility with the women. Women are deemed indecent and wrong yet not the men. (*Crowd buzzed*) In those countries, women can nurture the children if they are married traditionally. Men do not need to because it is not significant for them to do so. In Surat, men and women nurture children together and equally. The children love their parents equally. They have their brevity and genteel manners just like any child's nature. Suratian women do not need abortions and risk losing their lives at the hospital and alone. ... I am not a politician. I am merely a Suratian. I support anyone who can escalate the well beings of Suratians. But, I don't want anyone telling us, Suratians, that we cannot compete with Others only because we practice different traditions. ... We do not want power. We do not want to be like other countries, we only want happiness. (Debyasuvarn, 1972, pp. 173-176)

¹⁷⁸ Mick explains that *Orachun* is the husband of Krisana, which means that Vishu is neither a woman nor a man. In fact, he states that Vishu's sexual identity does not matter, but he sees her as one splendid human being (p. 485).

objects" (p. 102). Like the way Vishu symbolizes and signifies the body of the nation, I suggest that *Suratnari* is an echo of our society. M.L. Boonlua envisioned the construction of new social meanings¹⁷⁹ when women were no longer mere instruments that represent the nation to the world stage. Instead they are active agencies, the spectacles that embody modernization, critique and narrate the discursive practice of nation building.

Conclusion

In order to analyze the development of women in the Seventies, I agree with Kepner that novels are the way to perceive the intuition of social reality. More importantly, "[t]he introduction of fiction through popular narratives ... inevitably remoulded the imagined relation between self, society, and the world of Others" (Hamilton, 2002, p. 281). Women are no longer the instruments that constitute the self-representation of the country. In fact, they work in a synthetic manner with the Other to intermesh traditional and modern elements as they see fit. Yet we must not limit the forms that transcultural encounters can take. The discourse of the Other's impact is manifold in its deployment both collaboratively and complicitly. More significantly, "internal heterogeneity" (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 41) exists within and among us.

M.L. Boonlua's *Suratnari* reveals the ideological constructedness of "the invention of the 'good' Thai women [that] runs parallel to the ability to imagine the geo-body of the Thai nation. As part of this process, woman and nation become inextricably intertwined. Authentic Thainess became associated with politeness (*khwaam-suphap*) and correct behavior (*khwaam-riaproi*), especially on the part of women" (Harrison, 2014, p. 18).¹⁸⁰ The novel is a laudable source as Harrison puts it "to unsettle and disrupt the status quo ... to disturb convention" (p. 23). *Suratnari* certainly is a cultural text that depicts empowered women. They are martyrs for the nation, devoted, and signifiers of the collective populace. The spectacle of woman's agency gives hope for the new social meaning concerning gender relations.

"[T]he act of appropriation" (p. 23) that the Thais always find a way to localize or naturalize values and ideas of the Other is more or less the heart of the novel. Consequently, women, in this novel and M.L. Boonlua herself are no longer mere tokens of the state. They can be read as spectacles of their nation (McClintock, 1997, p. 102), Surat, who envision advancement for the country both in the textual reality and social reality, similar to M.L. Boonlua who "was born to serve her family and the kingdom" (Kepner, 2013, p. xvi). Women in *Suratnari* are empowered and have their own agencies. They change with time and this reifies that their assigned bodies also alter temporally. The sacrifices and the driving forces embodied by women are inevitable given the characteristics of the national and international politics, ideologies, and values that influence and alter the way people perceive the status quo. In other words, "if women have come to do men's work, men have not come to

¹⁷⁹ Another point that M.L. Boonlua wrote in the novel concerned the "balance of power" (p. 263) where she provided three households. They are Napasmanee, Jantharikawan, and Watcharen families. They try to dominate the society especially in politics. The way in which there is no single powerful household evinces her criticism on the social reality at the time.

¹⁸⁰ See Phaka (2014) pp. 169-91. She writes that "in the invention of the 'body' of the nation came the movement to raise 'consciousness' (*jit-samneuk*) of that body, one in which the notion of 'woman' (*phuying*) was gradually related to 'nation' (*chat*), as mediated by various social and political provisos" (p. 181). The notion of the nation's body and the body of a woman that is pure, virginal, and never been colonized are constructed and elaborated further in *Disturbing Conventions* (2014).

share women's work nowhere has feminism in its own right been allowed to be more than the maid servant to nationalism" (McClintock, 1997, p. 110). The future portrayed by M.L. Boonlua reverberates the social reality that she has experienced and lived through. It is a future that involves much more participation by women with the certainty that the ideology and values of the Other inevitably take part in the narrative of women and the nation.

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Politics of "Page-Nongng", Politics of Nonsense: De-formalisation, Subaltern Space, Collective Identity

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Abstract

"Nongng" (literally meaning 'the younger'), a well-known Facebook page among over 223,842 likers, particularly Thai teenagers and young adults, is more and more fashionably mentioned and referred. What lie behind this page, however, are not just nonsense, vulgarity, or simply comicality as it is (re)presented.

This study, therefore, aim to uncover what lie behind its representation of nonsense, a use of vulgar language, "*Pasa-Tip*", literally meaning 'divine language', primarily derived from "*Pasa Skoy*" (a sub-culturalized young women), which is an intentional Thai typo, and caricatures as well as clips videos with politically incorrect captions. I will reflect this page in three dimensions: firstly, collective identity, so-called "*Satsana-Nongng*" (Nongng's religion), shared among page members, so-called "*Nongngians*"; secondly, subaltern space, where those who are not included in the mainstream political platform and dominant culture come to share their voices; and thirdly, process of de-formalisation, contesting the academics of writing, framing, and representing.

Taking this page into account would bring about understanding another space where Thai politics and debates over current issues have been silently (but piquantly) (re-)produced in a form of transgression between academics and nonsense. Once nonsense becomes sensible, while voices of the unheard can be heard, the missing piece of knowledge jigsaw can eventually be discovered.

Keywords: Academics, Knowledge, Nonsense, Page-Nongng, Subaltern

"*Nee Nongng Ngai*" (This Is Nongng): Introduction to "*Page-Nongng*"

Feminist scholars and activists have long been challenging the way knowledge is (re)produced, and by whom as well as for whom this knowledge is (re)produced (Haraway 1988; Mohanty 1988; Harding 1991; Wickramasinghe 2010; Grasswick 2011). In feminists' eyes, the way knowledge is (re)produced has always been associated with the generation of power by and for certain groups of people. The knowledge producers, so-called the academics, as an institution – will never be 'non-gendered' (Bar On 1993; Evans 1996; Stanley 1996; Wise 1996), while knowledge production – as a process – will never be free from being political in this sense. 'What can be counted as

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knowledge and by whom?’ will always be one of the greatest challenges among feminist movements.

Beyond a mere online social network, Facebook gain more and more recognition among scholars, particularly feminists who see Facebook as another source of research data that could be collected and analyzed (McIntosh and Cuklanz 2014), or another political tool for feminists to eradicate gender oppression and promote gender equality (Alexander and Sapra 2013) or another space where conflicts and compromises among women and girls can be found (Brandes and Levin 2014). However, not everything on Facebook would be included in the realm of academic knowledge. The boundary between knowledge and non-knowledge still exists.

*“Nongng”*¹⁸² (literally meaning ‘the younger’), a well-known Facebook page among over 223,842 likers¹⁸³, particularly Thai teenagers and young adults, is more and more fashionably mentioned and referred. Full of politically-incorrect caricatures, jokes and memes and misspelled typing, this page is seen as an absurd/nonsense Facebook page. What lie behind this page, however, are not just nonsense, vulgarity, or simply comicality as it is (re)presented. Such boundary could eventually be contested and even broken through with this Facebook page.

This study, therefore, aims to uncover what lies behind its nonsense, a use of vulgar language, *“Pasa-Tip”*, literally meaning ‘divine language’, primarily derived from *“Pasa Skoy”*, or the language of *Skoy* (a socio-cultural category of culturally marginalized young women), which is a deliberately misspelled orthographic production of typing, and caricatures as well as clips videos with politically incorrect captions. Instead, this page can be alternatively understood in three possible ways. Firstly, it can be understood as a collective identity, so-called *“Satsana-Nongng”* (Religion of *“Nongng”*), shared among page members, so-called *“Nongians”*. Its three main cultural characteristics will be investigated, including Satsana-Nongng and its characters, gay gaze and *“Phua-Page”* (the Page’s husbands), the understandability of *“Pasa-Tip”* and its newly created terminologies, to see how they reflect a social reality in the Thai society. Secondly, it could be a perceived as a subaltern space, where those who are not included in the mainstream political platform and dominant culture come to share their voices, thoughts and, at the same time, create and maintain particular subject. Their marginality and their politics against the dominant culture of the Thai society shall be investigated to see how they are excluded from the realm of knowledge. Last but not least, most importantly, it is a process of de-formalisation of the academics in terms of writing, framing, and representing. It aims to challenge the rigidity of the academic rationality in social sciences. Overlooking the politics of Page-Nongng and politics within Page-Nongng, feminist scholars, in particular, might not fully challenge the positivist’s claim on the epistemic realm of objectivity and contest the taken-for-granted epistemic violence, regularly caused by the colonial discourse of knowledge. Once nonsense becomes sensible, while voices of the unheard can be heard, the missing piece of knowledge jigsaw can eventually be discovered.

¹⁸² The name of this page was *“Nong”* [น้อง], but after being reported on 20 September 2016, it came back with another ‘-ng’ letter in Thai – *“Nongng”* [น้องง]. Therefore, spelling this page name in English is adjusted to be in accordance with its deliberated orthographical error.

¹⁸³ As of 19 February 2017.

“Satsana-Nongng”: Collective Identity of “Nongians”

Page-Nongng is not only a space where people join their ‘likes’ and exchange their thoughts and feeling in ‘comments’ like any other Facebook pages, but this page also goes much further by creating a communality via a constitution of the “Satsana-Nongng” as a collective identity. This collective identity is constructed on a basis of a recognition of commonness and shared characteristics on the one hand, and an ability “to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’, *abjected*” (Hall 1996, 5). In other words, this collective identity is created and maintained by a contradiction between inclusion and exclusion. Those who internalize this ambiguity of the loosely-structured essence and elements of Satsana-Nongng and pretend to fully understand it might fully be recognized by other page members and even might call themselves as “Nongians”, or the people of Page-Nongng, while leaving out other Facebook users who inadequately demonstrate this recognizability from their shared imagined community, as Hall (1996) claims that, “*Every identity has at its margin, an excess, something more. The unity, the internal homogeneity, which the term identity treats as foundational is not natural, but a constructed form of closure...*” (Hall 1996, 5). In order to understand its collective identity and the way in which it is created, the collective identity of Page-Nongng should be investigated in this part via its three main cultural characteristics, including Satsana-Nongng and its characters, gay gaze and “Phua-Page” (the Page’s husbands), and the understandability of Pasa-Tip and the emergence of Nongng’s terminologies, to see how they reflect a certain kind of (unseen) social reality in the Thai society.

“Satsana-Nongng” and Its Characters

In the Satsana-Nongng, the administrators of this page (so-called “Admin”¹⁸⁴ in Thai transliteration), including Nongng-Bangkhae and Nongng-Ladprao¹⁸⁵, characterize those characters in early posts (in a form of clip videos and pictures with a funny caption) of this page and institutionalize those characteristics in the Satsana-Nongng. Page-Nongng made itself up as a religion (Satsana) because it aims to parody many emerging cults in the current Thai society, particularly Yore/Jorei cult, Luang Por Dhammajayo’s Dhammakaya temple¹⁸⁶, Ajarn Ubon’s Baan Suan Pyramid¹⁸⁷, Maechee Tossaporn’s Karma-correction ritual¹⁸⁸, Kuanaim Lanlanphak (sarcastically so-called “Mae She Lhee Kio Huad”)¹⁸⁹, etc.

¹⁸⁴ There were three administrators of this page, including Nongng-Bangkhae, Nongng-Ladprao and Nongng-Sathorn, but due to a personal conflict within administrators, there are nowadays only two administrators left in this page.

¹⁸⁵ Named by themselves after their address.

¹⁸⁶ Presented in Figure 1.1 in the left frame, Luang Por Dhammajayo is in brown robe.

¹⁸⁷ Presented in Figure 1.1 in the left frame, Ajarn Ubon wears a dark pink robe, standing between Luang Por Dhammajayo and Maechee Tossaporn.

¹⁸⁸ Presented in Figure 1.1 in the left frame, Maechee Tossaporn is in white robe.

¹⁸⁹ Presented in Figure 1.1 in the middle frame, Kuanaim Lanlanphak is the one who dresses a white robe and sits on a lotus.



Figure 1.1: Universe of “Satsana-Nongng” (Nongng, n. d.)

In Satsana-Nongng, the Nyhbew Planet and the Roseway Galaxy are both frequently mentioned as a main part of this cult. As it aims to parody many emerging cults in the current Thai society, Satsana-Nongng also set up a storyline, ontological realm as well as including those characters from many cults in itself as shown in Figure 1.2. Satsana-Nongng parodically claims that only those who convert into Satsana-Nongng could survive from the Last Judgment and transferred through the Roseway Galaxy to the Nyhbew Planet where “Than” (literally means you or Sir), unidentifiable God of Satsana-Nongng and “Chaya Ong-Elf”, Than’s wife, whose form is shown as an online game character, reside. Another important character is “Deegalata”¹⁹⁰, communicator between Chaya Ong-Elf and Nongians on earth. His name, Deegalata, was created after the song in a clip video, showing his joyous dance in an unidentifiable song. He was taken from that clip video and has been parodied by the administrators of this page and Nongians as well as being once commoditized as shown in a T-Shirt collection.




Figure 1.2: Nyhbew Planet and Roseway Galaxy (Nongng, n. d.)

¹⁹⁰ Presented in Figure 1.1 in the middle frame under Kuanaim Lanlanphak, Dhee-Galatah is a little boy dressing in light brown Kandura.

“Phua-Page”: The Victory of Gay Gaze

Focusing on Nongians in particular, there are some real (male) persons who are recognized by most of Nongians and are counted as a crucial part of the Satsana-Nongng, which is the Phua-Page (the Page’s husbands). Shown in their good-looking or muscular profile pictures, they are easily recognized and become popular within this page. Page-Nongng also put its spotlight on this particular group of good-looking male Nongians and be more interactive with them.

As many Nongians in the category of Phua-Page gain more interests from other Nongians, it reflects that the way in which most gay male Nongians express their gale male desire over Phua-Page’s (sexualized) masculine bodies. According to Wood (2004), gay men, compared to lesbians and straight women, supported by a claim of Beren et al. (1996) and Silberstein et al. (1989), tend to focus more on their body image as a primary source of attraction and a central part of their personal and cultural life (46). However, on the contrary to Wood who portrays gay male people as powerless and non-agency subject to the homonormative masculine bodies, Nongians can be differently understood as their desire toward those (sexualized) masculine bodies of Phua-Page is, in fact, reflecting two contradictory ways of both subjugation to the “hegemonic masculinity”, which is a concept demonstrating that not only women but also men suffer from normativity of masculinity in different levels (Connell 1987), on the one hand, and the agency of objectification of Phua-Page, on the other.

This relationship between Phua-Page and Nongians can be understood from the term “Nongians”. The term “-ngian” at the end or a suffix demonstrating a group of person associated with the noun of “Nongng”, which literally means the people of Page-Nongng, in fact, is also a tricky homophone of “ngian”, which literally means ‘being sexually aroused’ in Thai informal language for obscene purpose. This hidden obscene meaning is always associated with a call of this group of page member when they show their common interest in Phua-Page.

The use of this term, Nongians, is, therefore, reflecting two possibilities altogether, including naming

of a group who share the same doctrine and story, and naming a group of those who express their sexual desire in words or in a caricature with a caption towards Phua-Page. The use of this term, “Nongians”, is, per se, reflecting the internalization and institutionalization of gay male gaze among members of this page.



Figure 1.3: “Phua-Page” Meeting (Nongng, n.d.)

Understandability of “Pasa-Tip” and Emergence of Nongng’s Terminologies

The derivation of Pasa-Tip was the deliberately misspelled orthographic production of typing, the so-called “Pasa-Skoy”. The term, “Sakoy”, according to the Thai Royal Institute (2010), literally refers to “teenage girls who sit behind the Waen’s on his motorcycle, cuddling him up and dressing very short jeans” (70), while “Waen” refers to “teenage boys who loves to noisily rev up his motorcycle, making

brum-brum [waen-waen, in Thai] noise" (Ibid.). Skoy is portrayed as those young girls who "wear a very tight T-shirt or a lady singlet, a lady vest, a strapless, with falling-down pants and flip-flops, putting on make-up to be much whitened and bonding their hair in double topknots, or slightly layered hair, coloring in golden or light brown, while incarnadining their lips with a lip tint or "Utaitip" tint" (Chawitra 2013, 123). Newly created around 2550s BE (around 2007-2016), Skoy might be portrayed as the marginalized and sub-culturalized minorities even in academic space as there is still barely no literature directly discussing or mainly focusing on their subculture and identity. Chawitra (2013)'s study on Pasa Skoy (or Skoy language) might, therefore, be claimed as a pioneer of this unpaved track. She argues that, behind unrealistic spelling and intentional orthographical error, cultural resistance is possible to be found as Skoy language, produced by a Facebook page called "Samakom Niyom Skoy" (Pro-Skoy Association), is intentionally misspelled. Using particularly some rare consonants in Thai language and making it more complicated with 'shift' and 'caps lock' buttons on a computer keyboard, this kind of typing possesses specific orthographical rule and is inherited among only certain groups of people (Ibid., 129).

Even Chawitra (2013) leaves a question on how and why this subculturalized language is associated with Skoy mistily unanswered, her contribution could be at least applied to compare with Nongians and Pasa-Tip. Compared to the limited usage among a certain community of Skoy language, Pasa-Tip is more broadened and less grammaticized. While Pasa-Tip expands more broadly due to the number of page members and the way it is (re)produced on the one hand, Pasa-Tip has no orthographical rule and dynamically (re)produced among Nongians, both in and outside of the page on the other hand, as two administrators of this page gave an interview that, "Pasa-Tip is a language used within Page-Nongng, ordinary people outside could also understand it, depending on how he/she has a typing skill... it is, in fact, only a typo because he/she has too big fingers, typing on a wrong letter... So, how it is pronounced depends on how the voice in your head tells you" (Prism Digital Magazine 2017). Lacking of orthographical rule, Nongians highly interact to each other to (re)produce, co-produce, (de)cypher the text as well as emphasize the dynamics of orthography of Pasa-Tip. Due to this, Pasa-Tip is both a cause and a result of collective identity among Nongians, which plays a crucial role in sustaining the collective identity of Page-Nongng.

Moreover, unlike Pasa Skoy, which is only limited to the orthographical mystery, Pasa-Tip contains another interesting characteristics. The emergence of a number of newly invented vocabularies and terminologies in Page-Nongng is another important part that contributes to this page to gain more and more popularity from Nongians and other non-Nongians. Its terminologies are not only used within this page but also widely used in the Thai society nowadays, both in social media and everyday life conversation. Some examples of terminologies of Page-Nongng can be found below:

- "Sathu-Boon-Yore" gives the same sense of "Amen!" in a Christian way. "Sathu" is normally used in a Buddhist way to signal a recognition to the state of being. However, this term in Page-Nongng is used in a different way as "Yore" derived from a cult named "Jorei", which was believed to derive from Japan and exist in Thailand for decades.¹⁹¹ Recently, it was widely criticized in Thai social media for its commerciality and its absurdity against the (imagined) mainstream Theravada Buddhism in Thailand altogether with the emergence of critiques against any other cults presented in Figure 1.1. Its name was used by Page-Nongng

¹⁹¹ The specific time period and its detailed information has never been academically investigated before.

as a parody against a newly emerging cult. The signified of “*Sathu*” remained the same as it was in a Buddhist way, but its signifier has changed as it also contains the essence of sarcasm against the perceived absurdity.

- “*In-Lhor*” or “*Kanomjeen*” is literally translated as “*Are you into this!?*” This term derives from a music video, “*I Can’t*”, of a singer named “*Kanomjeen*” from Kamikaze Record in 2013.¹⁹² “*In-Lhor*” is widely used in this page to halt a tendency to be criticized or attacked in a conversation while making fun of the interlocutor at the same time. “*In-Lhor*” might be replaced sometimes by another term, “*Kanomjeen*”, with a caricature from that music video as shown in Figure 1.4.



Figure 1.4: Caricature of “*In-Lhor*” in *Kanomjeen’s* Music Video, “*I Can’t*” (2013) (Nongng, n.d.)

- “*Raew-Ngai-Krai-Care*” literally means “*Who cares!?*” This term is normally used to reject or ignore any critiques or objections in a conversation.
- “*Kor-Por-Tor*” implicitly stands for “*Kuan-Pai-Tai!*” literally means “*Should go to hell!*” This mysterious three-letter acronym was once highly popular among Nongians and non-Nongians as its meaning has never been officially clarified. Many possibilities were produced to explain this term. This term is treated as one of the most popular blaspheming among Nongians.
- “*Ew-Es*” refers to an action of striking a post by distort a body and a hip to make a beautiful and unnatural curve for making a photo. This word can also refers to an action or a moment to do such action for expressing fabulousness.
- “*(Na)Wongwaan*” is intentionally misspelling of “*(Na)Songsaan*”, meaning “*pity(ing)*” in English.
- “*Chuay-Nong-Duay-Naka*” literally means ‘Please help Nong!’ It was highly used by many people on Facebook and Twitter in 20 September 2016, when the first version of the “*Page-Nong (without another -ng)*” was reported. It was used as a campaign to bring this page back and demand for justice for Nongians, claimed by administrators of this page.

Therefore, Satsana-Nongng can simply be perceived as a pop culture as Dittmer (2010) claims that it is a culture that aims to shift cultural authority away from those who control and monopolize the limited access to culture in their own way (24). Pop culture, therefore, contains resistance in some

¹⁹² This term is presented in this music video when the protagonist and the antagonist of the storyline asked each other if each of them were into their role of losing their beloved man.

senses but also carries ubiquity as it is popular among masses. So does Page-Nongng's culture. The emergence of Nongians and their culture can be analogically understood the same way as it was constituted against the Thai dominant culture but later become popular as it gains more membership from those who stay outside and inside the dominant culture.

While Adorno and Horkheimer (1979) suggest that the pop culture is a consequence of culture industry, functioning itself as a concealment of mass awareness of the economic alienation and subordination, which was under elites' control (Dittmer 2010, 28), the pop culture in this case, Page-Nongng in particular, demonstrates itself contrarily to this notion of pop culture as a domination that aims to disperse masses' agency and resistance. Instead, Page-Nongng as a pop culture energizes and provokes Nongians to resist and wield their agency against the Thai dominant culture where they have never been included.

Moreover, Page-Nongng can also be seen as a space for digital leisure where Nongians can share their interests and preferences as the digital leisure provides *"both a communicatively rational way of interacting, and a space for the instrumentalization of such institutions"* (Spracklen 2015, 94). Facebook, particularly Page-Nongng, can be seen as a collective identity shared among members of this page because of this.

As Pasa-Tip can be explained as a cultural resistance like Pasa Skoy too, it is necessary to investigate not only Nongians' identity and cultural exchange among themselves but also the external interaction with Thai dominant culture which constitutes the marginality to Nongians and silences their voices and their existence in Thai dominant discourses. This shall be investigated in detail in the following part of this article.

"Page-Nongng" as Subaltern Space

Apart of being a place people share their comments, thoughts and lifestyles together, Page-Nongng can also be understood in another dimension. It is an imaginary space where those who are not usually included in the mainstream political platform and dominant culture come to share their voices, thoughts and, at the same time, create and maintain particular subject which is no more 'objectified subject' as they used to always be portrayed and understood by the dominant culture of Thai society.

As claimed by this article, Page-Nongng can alternatively be understood as a subaltern space, this proposition shall be investigated through the relations of Nongians and the Thai dominant culture to understand how Nongians' socio-cultural life looks like and how the politics within Page-Nongng could contest against the dominant culture of Thai society.

Marginality of Nongians

First and foremost, Nongians can be seen as the subaltern to the Thai dominant culture. Their socio-cultural life is a production of the exclusion of the Thai dominant culture. The term, the subaltern, defined by Guha (1983), primarily derived from Antonio Gramsci, is *"a name for the general attribute of subordination... whether this is expressed in term of class, caste, age, gender and office or in any other ways"* (35). Guha criticizes both the Imperialist explanation on peasantry in India and the nationalist explanation on heroic portray of peasant rebellions against the Empire for sharing the same assumption: the unilinear historiography (Sarkar 2000, 302). Studying the oppressed subject does not truly fit how the subaltern is represented or subalternized. According to

Beverley (1999), subaltern studies or the study of subaltern subject should, in fact, offer *“a conceptual instrument for retrieving and registering the presence of the subaltern both historically and in contemporary societies. The breakdown of certain forms of thought associated with the idea of modernity – so the argument might go – has to with their inability to represent adequately the subaltern...”* (31)

As the subaltern studies’ axial concept has transformed from class-based politico-cultural domination and class-based politico-economic exploitation, which are both popular among those cultural Marxists, into marginality (Chibber 2013, 8), the subaltern studies of the poststructuralist study of subalternity in this article is mainly focusing on how this marginality has been ‘represented’ and ‘re-presented’ by various agents and actors through certain uses of languages, significances and meanings.

Even subalterns share the same basis of the general attribute of subordination as Guha suggests, they, Nongians in particular, are not merely ‘the oppressed’ but ‘the subaltern’ because of two reasons. First, Nongians have been mentioned or explained in any descriptions of Thai society before. Most of Thai literatures focusing on the so-called framework of social problems have never been seriously focusing on these people. One might argue that this is because they have just recently emerged. But if we link the analogy of Pasa Skoy and Pasa-Tip with Skoy and Nongians, we might at least say that both Sakoy and Nongians are interrelated. Both Skoy and Nongians are not even oppressed or underprivileged by the Thai dominant culture (or by the Thai dominant academics), both of them are instead unseen, unheard, and unperceived. They are usually mentioned as something ‘incorrect’ to the whole society in some way without any explanation nor serious exploration. It is likely that they are forgotten to even be oppressed.

Secondly, they have no presence elsewhere but within this page only. If they seek to exist outside this page, they are no more seen as Nongians as Hall (1996) suggests that *“identities are constructed through, not outside, difference. This entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the other...”* (4). Once they speak out elsewhere, they become something else (e.g. ordinary rogue Facebook users). Analogically, it is as if they were the same group of the subaltern as Spivak suggested that the subaltern can only speak when they are no more subalternised (Spivak 1994; Spivak 1999; Spivak 2000; Morton 2007). Therefore, Page-Nongng is paradoxically preserved and left out.

Nongians vs. Thai Dominant Culture

The politics within Page-Nongng space, in the second part, is the politics of subaltern, which is the politics of speaking and identity. The way the subaltern is spoken for has widely been problematized by many postcolonial thinkers in different ways. The (Western) colonial discourse of knowledge production should be closely investigated to understand how the marginalized or subculturalized people as well as the subaltern in Thai society, such as Nongians, are likely to be (re)presented and spoken for by the Thai academy in which the Western knowledge (re)production is embedded and intensified as much as many places in the world.

As Harding criticizes that *“Western science, which is simply ‘science’ for Eurocentrists, is conceptualized as fundamentally pure ideas, not as the culturally determinate institutions and practices that historians, sociologists and anthropologists report”* (Harding 1992, 312 in Go 2016, 145), Western knowledge, so-called ‘science’, is treated as if it naturally existed, waiting for human beings, particularly Western scholars, to discover and collect them in a backpack of Enlightenment

logics in which Western wisdoms are. This over-claimed superiority and taken-for-granted centrality of Western knowledge should be rejected, particularly when we aim to understand the subalternised subject outside the limited representation and strict explanation of the colonizing Western knowledge.

Spivak (1994) contributes so much to understand how (Western) colonial discourses and (Western) colonial knowledge interact with cultures across the globe. Spivak notes that Eurocentric knowledge (re)production exaggerates itself as an elixir to understand the whole world in the name of theorization. The (Western) theory assumes that Western intellectuals and their intellectuality know 'the Other' and those who are subordinated to the Western-centric realm of knowledge production, as Spivak metaphorically criticizes that "[t]hat radiating point, animating an effectively heliocentric discourse, fills the empty place of the agent with the historical sun of theory, the Subject of Europe" (274). The epistemic boundary created in such a way brings about an act of epistemic violence (Spivak (1994, 271), as Maggio (2007) criticizes that "*the essentialization of the Other is always the reinforcement of the menace of empire*" (420). The intellectual elite or those who have power and control over the knowledge production in the Western academy de-link themselves from the colonialism and the colonization of knowledge, pretending that the colonial project has long ended along with the end of the colonial era (Maggio 2007, 420). The (Western) academy and its epistemology, in Spivak's account, seem part of the problem and should not be wholeheartedly admitted as the absolute way to perceive and understand the world. The unadjustable 'mold' will never be fully matched with the world where subaltern live their lives.

However, it would be much wrong to rush to conclusions that Spivak is urging us all to shut the door on the face of the Western academy and bringing in the separation of the two (uncommunicable) worlds – the West vs. the East, or the North vs. the South. Spivak, instead, warns us to deconstruct colonial discourses of knowledge without falling into traps of cultural relativists who brings in a strong fortress dividing the world into two realms. Cultural relativists' claim should be well-aware and contested in two ways as follows.

First and foremost, instead of recognizing the Western academy as being incontestable, the (Western) academy and its epistemology can be, at least, contested, confronted and even adjusted to become not only part of the problem but also part of the solution. In other words, while the Western knowledge is broadly applied to understand the world in educational spaces across the globe in schools, universities, and so on, as if it were a Universalist project of neo-colonization, the way it is differently applied to each site of the world, the way it is differently interpreted, and the way it is differently hybridized with local cultures and local realities across the globe from time to time can lead itself into the contestation of the rigidity of the Western knowledge. The incontestability is now contestable in this sense.

Secondly, the separation of the two (uncommunicable) worlds would eventually bring about the over-glorification of the Orientalism against the West as most cultural relativists urge us, scholars, to fall down into their trap (O'Hanlon and Washbrook 1992; Moscovici 2002; Guhin and Wyrzten 2016). While the West becomes inferior by any means, the East is redefined and presented in a form of the one and only authentic and culturally rich source of human civilization. However, the Western superiority cannot be undermined by simply inversing the essentialism of the West and the East. The way we, scholars, perceive the Western knowledge and its epistemology as being static and rigidly unchangeable should be adjusted so that the Western superiority, colonial discourses and its

epistemic violence can eventually be undermined. At the same time, the over-glorification of the East and Orientalism should also be tackled as it maintains the sense of superiority of the West in a form of the East.

A concept of hybridity should be brought in for this reason. According to Maggio (2007) the separation and difference between the self and the Other is *"tied up in the tension between 'speaking' and 'being heard'"* (430). That is to say, to expose one's own identity and the self, the definition of the Other is always created, either intentionally or unintentionally. Once the hybridity theory – which has long been using for de-essentializing the notion of complete separation of globality, locality, races, and ethnicities – is introduced in the relations between these two entities, there will be *"no clear-cut distinction between the isolated 'speaker' and 'listener'. There is always a conflict, an inherent tension, between the 'speaking subject' and the 'hearing subject'"* (Maggio 2007, 430). Once the West, which has long been the speaking subject, and the East, which has long been portrayed as the hearing subject, can be alternatively understood by using this concept, there will be no more the separation of the two (uncommunicable) worlds.

As Spivak (1994) criticizes Marx's historiographical way of representing the subaltern's struggle and politics, she emphasizes that, *"The small peasant proprietors 'are therefore incapable of making their class interest valid in their proper name [im eigenen Namen], whether through a parliament or through a convention'"* (Spivak 1994, 278). Analogically, the subaltern in Page-Nongng and their politics – so called the politics of nonsense – can be understood the same way as their politics cannot make their interest valid in their 'proper name' whether through institutionalist political approach or through constructivist one. By unfolding the subaltern life and their politics outside those two conventionalist approaches, Page-Nongng can reflect the way in which it contests against the Thai dominant culture in two ways.

First, as mentioned earlier, their collective identity under the same umbrella of Satsana-Nongng is political per se because it aims to undermine the hegemonic popularity of the mass culture, long monopolized by the Thai dominant groups. Their intentional orthographical production of typing, their caricatures, their vocabularies, their jokes, and even their products for sale (e.g. shirts) become more and more popular and appear in the mainstream media in many ways. In other words, Satsana-Nongng is widely and quickly expanded in the Thai society. On the other hand, the mainstream media puts the spotlight on this page's culture so much, particularly its vocabularies and its incomprehensible Gwen-style dialogues in its Facebook posts and in some interviews on the mainstream media.

Secondly, on the contrary to the first point above, as Page-Nongng gains more popularity, not only from its collective identity, including their Pasa-Tip, and topics of discussion, but also their non-PC sarcasms in many ways (e.g. sexism in Figure 2.1, ageism, racism, etc.)¹⁹³, many Facebook pages are opposed to Page-Nongng and Nongians, claiming in the name of preserving the linguistic convention and political correctness. A non-PC sarcasm, in particular, as shown in Figure 2.2, is, in fact, a result of interaction between conventional knowledge (Slavoj Zizek's name and the use of his claim on non-PC culture deeply embedded in the caption) and non-knowledge (self-defense in an act of discrimination and abusiveness as well as its contradiction with Slavoj Zizek's name). The fisticuffs between Page-Nongng and other Facebook pages can be found regularly, while social earthquakes

¹⁹³ Its actions frequently became talk of the town about its abusiveness and discrimination in a sense of 'insult in/against insult.' Please see Kritdikorn (2017) and Prachatai (2017) for further detail on this issue.

caused by Page-Nongng and elements of their collective identity are not beyond imagination.




Figure 2.1: Page-Nongng's Sexism against 'Gay Bottom', Mentioning "Being 'handsome but bottom' is as discontented as having a Red-Shirt husband while we are Suthep's daughter [PDRC supporters]!" (Nongng, n.d.)



Figure 2.2: Page-Nongng and Its Parody on Slavoj Zizek's Non-PC, Mentioning "Being abusive but always claiming Zizek as a reference." (Nongng, n.d.)

These two processes, 'pulling Nongng in' and 'pushing Nongng out', could basically provide an alternative explanation of the paradox relationship between Nongians and the Thai dominant culture nowadays.

De-formalizing the Academics

Closely linked to the previous section of this article, this part shall explore how the academics has been challenged by the alternative way to study the subaltern as it proposes another possibility to/ against the (Western) colonial discourse and its epistemic violence disguising in the Thai academics.

Page-Nongng, first and foremost, can be alternatively perceived and understood as another possibility of resistance in an epistemological level as it goes, either consciously or not, against the way knowledge, particularly that in social sciences, is (re)produced.

According to Maggio (2007), the best way to understand the subaltern in the non-Western culture is to 'translate' their actions, which are full of meaning and offering a communicative role, in their own ways (435-436). Once the more open-ended view of discourse and communication is adopted, cross-culture understanding is possible for those who seek for a possibility to hear when the subaltern speaks. Therefore, to understand the subalternity of the Page-Nongng, where subaltern people reconfigure their subalternity beyond the boundary of nonexistence, we, scholars, should also imply the way these people communicate and its implicit meaning behind those acts as Maggio suggests. At this point, the subaltern voice can be heard.

Analogically, once Nongians' actions are no more seen as nonsense or meaningless but are considered as full of meaning as well as offering a communicative role, the untranslatability of the collective identity of Page-Nongng will eventually be overcome as Maggio suggested. The subaltern voice within this page will eventually be heard.

A study of the subaltern is per se political per se, as Beverley (1999) claims, *"Subaltern studies is not only a new form of academic knowledge production, then; it must also be a way of intervening politically in that production on the side of the subaltern"* (28). Therefore, studying Page-Nongng as a subaltern space in the second section of this article might be driven by politics. It is the politics of knowledge that aims to criticize 'who takes control over knowledge production over whom and how?' And as mentioned above in the previous section, the ways in which Page-Nongng contests against the Thai dominant culture by widely and regularly creating social earthquakes as a cultural resistance to the hegemonic popularity of the mass culture, long monopolized by the Thai dominant groups, can also be understood as an epistemic retaliation against the Thai dominant culture and its hegemonic power in the (Western-influenced) Thai academics. Therefore, this section will investigate how Page-Nongng could alternatively understood as the third possibility, which is the process of deformatization of the Thai academics.

Many posts in this page are in a form of clip videos and pictures with a funny and taunting captions that reflect nonsense, vulgarity, or simply comicality. However, the meaning behind these clip videos and pictures can be alternatively understood as a way to contest the rigidity of the academics. Most of the time, Page-Nongng posts political criticisms and parodies on their page. It might be seen as politically active because of this, but they have never been counted in the realm of academics. Therefore, this characteristics of Page-Nongng should be differently seen more than just nonsense or vulgar actions.

As it suddenly becomes the talk of the town, instead of subjugating itself under the conventional way, by allowing only Thai scholars to analyze the Page-Nongng phenomenon and speak for Nongians, Page-Nongng transgresses into the Thai academics, either intentionally or unintentionally, by producing interviews and giving special talks in websites, events and television shows. As Spivak (1994) expresses her concern toward Foucault's analysis of real politics, claiming that *"the substantive concern for the politics of the oppressed which often accounts for Foucault's appeal can hide a privileging of the intellectual..."* (292), making themselves regularly appear in the public space can be interpreted that Page-Nongng does not allow the academics to monopolize the privilege of speaking as they have always been.

Therefore, the emergence of Page-Nongng and their collective identity, particularly their sarcasms used for criticizing politics and the use of memes as caricaturing, can be ‘translated’, as Maggio suggests, as a challenge to the formality of the Thai academics, which could be understood in two interrelated ways.

First, they talk about the same topic as intellectuals but they do it in a different manner. Most of the time, Page-Nongng posts Thai political issues or talk of the town on its timeline. Nongians always reciprocally react in a sarcastic manner and altogether humorize these posts. As shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, when current Thai political topics were mentioned in Page-Nongng, they would always be interacted by many comments from Nongians even without providing detailed information or background of each issue. Sometimes, their interacting comments would also carry the sense of Nongians in their text (for example, the use of Pasa-Tip or the intertextuality between a political issue and another or between a political issue and some irrelevant topics as shown in Figure 3.3, which Page-Nongng links the emptiness of the Parliament to a Japanese cartoon character). This shows how Page-Nongng could challenge scholars’ monopolization of knowledge production. The institutionalized power of knowledge/ knowledge of power is contestable in this sense.




Figure 3.1: Page-Nongng’s Parody on Prawit Wongsuwan’s Dissipation for His Hawaii Trip, mentioning “Hawaii Trip would worthwhile if the plane crashes.” (Nongng, n.d.)




Figure 3.2: Page-Nongng’s Parody on Orapim Raksapon (Best), Famous Hyper-Royalist Speaker, Mentioning “Being blacklisted in Credit Bureau, but will go to talk about ‘sufficiency economy’.” (Nongng, n.d.)



Figure 3.3: Page-Nongng's Parody on the Parliamentary Emptiness, Mentioning "Seeable but Unseenable, It Is Friendship, by Katsuya Jōnouchi"¹⁹⁴ (Nongng, n.d.)

Secondly, they sometimes parody intellectuals and their academic propositions by using memes as caricaturing within the semi-academic realm. In other words, they mention of intellectual names or contents with non-academic manner for an academic purpose. This shows how the Thai academics, either in a form of person or in a form of institution, can be contested by something existing outside its realm, which is the so-called nonsense. On one hand, this could be seen as a way to discredit scholars and their academic entities, but on the other hand, it could be alternatively understood as a way in which nonsense and non-knowledge both try to blur the rigid boundary between knowledge/ non-knowledge and nonsense/ sensibility.

These two manners of deformatization of the Thai academics reflect that Page-Nongng is not something uneducated or purposeless, they are intrinsically purposeful. Due to this, Page-Nongng, where young likers share their memes and jokes in comments, can be alternatively understood beyond the mainstream theory in social sciences, particularly politics, which only sees it as merely a space where there are only nonsense, vulgarity and comicality, which are all excluded outside the realm of the mainstream political studies and at the outskirts of the social and sociological studies.

The way in which Page-Nongng try to blur the rigid boundary between knowledge/ non-knowledge is the process of de-formalisation of the academic knowledge as well as its institutions, the academics, where knowledge is produced. Challenging the formality and substance of knowledge per se, Page-Nongng is attempting to invite us to take the limited boundary of knowledge and non-knowledge into account as well as persuade us to reject the notion of separability of knowledge/ non-knowledge spaces. Figure 3.6 should be the best example to see how Page-Nongng interrelates these two separated entities in the same box. This shows how Page-Nongng is trying to paradoxically imitate and reconfigure the knowledge production process beyond academic spaces. As mentioned earlier that Facebook is more and more recognized as another space where

¹⁹⁴ The name of a protagonist cartoon character in Yu-Gi-Oh! Page-Nongng also parodied a cartoon character as well as its dialogue as shown in this case.

knowledge is discoverable, only some spaces and some characteristics can be counted as knowledge. Page-Nongng is trying to invite the academics to rethink about what they likely to see as merely nonsense or something to overlook.



Figure 3.4: Page-Nongng's Sexist Parody on Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpon, Mentioning "When two scholars talk about the same thing, one is interesting, another is annoying." (Nongng, n.d.)



Figure 3.5: Page-Nongng's Parody on Dr. Somsak Leamteerasakul's Comments on the Nongng's Culture of 'Insult in Insult', Mentioning "The Refuging One, the Roaming One. Ajarn White-Headed. Satsana-Nong Is Not Unreal or Nonsense, It Is Generally Reco(ck)gnised by Scholars." (Nongng, n.d.)




Figure 3.6 Page-Nongng's Critique on Sexism, Demonstrating the Inseparability of Knowledge/Non-Knowledge, Mentioning "Being curious for long time, why trans and gay Nongians would feel these that terms, like "fag", "gold mining", "destroying mashed pumpkin", "anally thrilling", are de-humanizing. On the contrary, when we call women "Chanee (chicks)", why could we? If "fag" shouldn't be used, "Chanee" is even more unusable? Too confused... Just joking about shit below, but suddenly talk as if a scholar... Oh! Confused... (Sexually)..." (Nongng, n.d.)

Conclusion: Nonsense Is Sensible

As this article is only to primarily point out the existence of Page-Nongng and Nongians, this article rejects itself to claim on producing an absolute truth for Page-Nongng and its subalternity as well as its political goal. What this article urges to see the most are including three possibilities as follows: First and foremost, this article urges to see more and more literatures on Nongians or even Page-Nongng's culture per se. The (de)linkage between Nongians and other marginalized groups of people in the Thai society (for instance, Skoy, Punk and K-Pop devotees, etc.) should be more and more explored to uncover the overlooked space of Thai socio-political spaces. Secondly, instead of being treated and considered as merely social problems as other group of marginalized people encountered before, this article urges to see how Nongians could be differently conceptualized and theorized apart from the subaltern framework or even be differently explained and concluded within the same framework of study, compared to this article. Last but not least, as Spivak encourages us, scholars, to unlearn our own privilege when we study subalterns, and as she promotes the autobiography research among subalterns to get rid of the misrepresentation and the state of 'speaking-for', it is highly ideal to see Nongian studies produced by Nongians per se to see how they interact with their own subalternity, resistance and contradictory harmonizing relations within themselves and with the Thai dominant culture. This article, however, does not aim to reject the (Western) colonial discourse and preserve something 'new' or 'particular' produced within Page-Nongng or even over-glorify the particularity of Page-Nongng by calling us all for turning our back to the Western knowledge and de-link both realms of knowledge. Instead, this article aims to challenge the cultural particularism as well as

cultural relativism as mentioned in the second section of this article.

Western knowledge associated with discourses of development and (socio-economic) superiority like post-development thinkers and their stance on anti-development, for instance, Escobar (1995)'s argument for *"not in development alternatives but alternatives to development, that is, the rejection of the entire paradigm altogether"* (215), Spivak suggests us all to negotiate from within instead (Kapoor 2004, 640) by *"persistently transforming conditions of impossibility into possibility"* (Spivak 1988, 201). Therefore, Spivak suggests us to become *"vigilant about our own practice and use it as much as we can rather than make the totally counter-productive gesture of repudiating it"* (Spivak 1990, 11) and calls for 'acknowledging complicity'. As she suggests that we are all subject-effects (1988, 204), which means that we are positioned in discourses unavoidably, we should acknowledge our own contamination, rejecting the notion of purity of self, to undermine Imperialist claim on superiority of (Western) colonial knowledge and make the subaltern voice possible to be heard (Kapoor 2004, 641). As Spivak suggests, we, therefore, need to unlearn our privileges, systems of knowledge and representation, while rejecting the preconceived the notion of 'the Third World in trouble' to stop imposing the Imperialist knowledge to colonize the Other. She does not, however, persuade all of us to ignore what happens in the Third World, but she wants us to unlearn our own taken-for-granted thoughts and beliefs, which simply means *"stopping oneself from always wanting to correct, teach, theorize, develop, colonize, appropriate, use, record, inscribe, enlighten..."* (Kapoor 2004, 642).

Against Escobar and his anti-development critics, Spivak suggests that if we insist to turn our back on development and seek for alternatives to development, we would be much risky to 'romanticize acts of resistance' (Abu-Lughod 1990) without realizing that it is highly problematic to overlook privileges of those who could lead their roles in resisting and leaving others who do not possess the same ability and privileges behind. The romanticization of resistance share the same analogy with the over-glorification of the East as both put the spotlight on the inferior and over-claim their agency, while overlooking subalterns whose voice cannot really be heard or even show their power in 'heroic' characteristics to 'actively' resist domination and oppression.

Moreover, the romanticization and over-glorification of cultural particularism of Page-Nongng might also be dangerous as it aims to completely divide knowledge/ non-knowledge realms and perpetuate this separation. Instead, this article aims to point out that, in fact, this notion should be contested by the way in which Page-Nongng interacts its nonsense of the so-called non-knowledge with the sensibility of traditionally academic knowledge. The paradoxicality between knowledge/ non-knowledge and nonsense/ sensibility happens here: as non-knowledge is nonsense and knowledge is sensible, knowledge might be nonsense while non-knowledge might be sensible. Once either non-knowledge or nonsense is no more rejected, nonsense might likely become sensible among the Thai academics and the Thai society in general. The muted voice of those who speak so loud would eventually be heard and included as a long lost piece of knowledge jigsaw to fulfill the whole picture of the Thai politics and society.

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More than a Medium: Construction of Faculty of Engineering, Prince of Songkla University

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Abstract

Construction is generally seen as a labor-intensive activity, more associated with practical, rather than theoretical, aspects of building. This paper, however, argues that not only can intellectual dimensions of an architectural work be drawn from the construction process, but constructional 'theory' can also be developed. In the context of setting up a new university in southern Thailand, later named as Prince of Songkla University, this paper looks at the construction of its first major building, the Faculty of Engineering [FE] - completed in 1971 and designed by a non-licensed architect, Amorn Sriwong, and an independent engineer, Rachot Kanjanavanit. The requirement for a space large enough to contain engineering teaching facilities, and its positioning in rural Thailand, where any access to advanced building technology remained limited, resulted in the development of a particular type of construction. The use of precast concrete elements onsite made the structure of the FE technically and economically possible. This paper focuses both on the daring aspect of the structure: the system of modular concrete domes covering the entire lot of 24,000 square meters; and on a simplified method of onsite concrete casting. The method of using a bamboo mattress and earthen mould to facilitate the casting process was designed not only to suit local conditions, but also to offer complete flexibility in operation at a relatively low cost, unhampered by the restraints of factory-based mass production. This ongoing research explores how, in the context of 1960s southern Thailand, a seemingly 'modern' system of construction was modified to synchronize with traditional modes of building. The findings will contribute to a better understanding of the discourse on Thai modern architecture.

Keywords: construction, Faculty of Engineering, Prince of Songkla University, Thai architecture

The Faculty of Engineering, Prince of Songkla University is known for its modern, futuristic design, little is known however how it was executed. Its building history can be traced back to as early as 1965 when the Southern University Establishment Committee was set up to carry out a task of setting up a new university in southern region of Thailand, which would be the third university outside Bangkok following Chiangmai University in the north and Khonkhen University in the northeast of Thailand.

Early Establishment of the Southern University

Originally the new Southern University was planned to locate in a seashore area at Tambol Rusamilae, Pattani province. The reasons why it was chosen to be the site of the new university were as follows. First, historically, Pattani was used to be center of Montol Pattani, but had relatively been under developed compared to neighboring provinces like Songkla and Yala. If the new university was established in Pattani, it would help the province to grow substantially as educational hub. Secondly, for geography and transportation reasons, the new university should be established in the area of four southernmost provinces of Thailand, at the center of which were Pattani. Thirdly, Pattani peoples were very enthusiastic about the University; many of them donated lands and money for building of the new University. (Thanat Khoman, 1965) It is recorded that the land donated to the new University met conditions for its construction, enabling the construction of university buildings to begin. (Pradit Cheuychit, 1971a, p. 107) Moreover, in established the new Southern university, it is understood that it would be operated, not as a single-campus, but as a multiple-campus university that has several campuses located in different locations, making it possible for future expansion. This idea of multiple-campus University –was well accepted, as several provinces wanted it to be located in their territories. (Pradit Cheuychit, 1971a, p. 107)

The construction of Pattani Campus began in 1966. The University's new buildings including lecture buildings, workshop, water tower and water filtration plant, worker row houses, instructor accommodations, meeting room and administration building, in total of eleven buildings, were all designed by Department of Public and Municipal Works. (Pradit Cheuychit, 1971a, p. 107) This first phase of construction was expected to be completed in December 1966, so as the first academic year could begin right after. At the first stage, only the courses of engineering opened for electrical and mechanical fields and, then, in the next year expanded to factory-mechanical and building fields. After the first two years, these vocational trainings would thereafter be upgraded into university level as Faculty of Engineering in 1969, while other courses prepared to be opened in the next stage included medical science, commerce, and political science. (Anon, 1966, Sep 2) However, between December 1966 and early January 1967, while the construction of the Southern University in Pattani had been underway, the whole campus was affected by flooding, causing a delay in construction project and severe road damage. (The Southern University Establishment Committee, 1967) It was during this time that Stang Mongkolsuk, the then Dean Faculty of Medical Science, was appointed as a member of the Southern University Establishment Committee, and it was him who brought impetus to the setting up of the Southern University, later named as Prince of Songkla University.


Stang Mongkolsuk's Role

In June 1967, after appointed as a committee of the Southern University Establishment, Stang with other committees took the newly recruited teaching staffs on an on-site inspection at Rusamilae campus. However, they found both the site and the building of Faculty of Engineering unsatisfactory. The remote location of Pattani province was considered as at a disadvantage in recruiting able instructors from

abroad and Bangkok, and the design of building as incompatible with engineering teaching facilities. (Nipon Masawisut, 1971, p.46) Pradit Cheuychit recounted the building visit as follows:

[...] although the building was quite well-executed, the design and master planning were unsuited to be Faculty of Engineering, since the building was built upon wetlands nearby the sea [...]. This constraint imposed by the sea causes no space for expansion. As the building was designed without concern for engineering equipment to be used in the building, some equipment was unable to be installed as it was too large. And if in case of heavy machinery which causes excessive vibration when working, it is uncertain whether the building can withstand that vibration. (1971b, p.115-116)

As a result, it was concluded that the Pattani campus was geologically unsuitable for Faculties of Science and Engineering for technical reasons. Pattani Campus was then adapted into the center of educational fields where Faculties of Education and Arts would be based instead, while Faculties related to technical fields like Science, Engineering and Medicine needed a new campus.



Stang Mongkolsuk and his team, inspecting the construction of the Faculty of Engineering, Prince of Songkla University

Note: From Prince of Songkla University, 6 July 1971 (p.122), by Prince of Songkla et al, 1971, Phranakorn: Krung Siam Kan Pim.

Since then, Stang had sought a new site, and soon found rubber plantation at Tambon Kor Hong in Hat Yai, owned by Lady Long Atthakraweesunthorn, satisfied the needs for establishing the new campus. He then approached the owner, proposing in the manner of almost like cadging, to buy the whole site. She responded with great generosity by not selling, but donating 280 acres of land to be used as a site for the

University's second campus, later named Atthakraweesunthorn Campus in honor of her charity. (Sansuk Chalermkunthorn, 1971, p.17-18)

Stang's success in dealing with the donated land gave him authority to propose the Southern University Implementation Plan to the Southern Development Committee. In July 1967, he suggested that the university could now have two main campuses. The first campus is at Rusamilae in Pattani province 'where Faculty of Education and Faculty of Arts, including Demonstration School will be located here.' (Stang Mongkolsuk, 1967) The second campus at Hat Yai district, Songkla province, 'will be the main location for the field of technical science like Faculty of Science, Faculty of Engineering and Faculty of Medicine.' (Stang Mongkolsuk, 1967) His choice for Hat Yai as the location for the main campus reserved for technical science field was justified as follows:

The recruitment of instructors in the field of technical science appears to be most difficult. Thus the location of university campus is one of the most important factors in recruiting instructors who have high degrees in education to agree to work for Southern University. Another reason is that Hat Yai district is located quite far away from the sea, so the proper care and maintenance of lab equipment at Hat Yai Campus can be done with more ease than at Rusamilae. But the most important of all is that as Hat Yai is a real center of the southern Thailand, the task of university development is much easier there. (Stang Mongkolsuk, 1967)

Stang's idea of two-campus University led the budget for university development of each campus to be planned separately. From 1969 onwards, each campus received its own annual budget from the government. Stang was thus appointed as a chairman responsible for directing the construction of necessary facilities and administering the new Hat Yai campus.

This responsibility gave Stang an incredible amount of control and power over the building work including his choice of architect. Previously, especially since 1961 onwards, the design of university buildings would customarily be responsible by architects from Department of Public and Municipal Work, or from Department of Fine Arts, or from government offices related to building, except that they were unable to carry out a work on time. (Anon, 1962, July 12) The problem was that by relying on those government architects with whom Stang had to communicate through bureaucratic system, he would therefore have less control over the building work. (Pradit Cheuychit, 1971b, p.122) Moreover, he had learned from his earlier experience in setting up Chiangmai University that making use of so many architects, each one had his or her own way of approaching design, proved difficulty in keeping a consistent unity throughout the whole campus. A particular telling illustration of Stang's concern over the overall appearance of Hat Yai Campus was given by his colleague Pradit Cheuychit as follows:

A lot of universities consists of buildings inharmonious to one another, differing both in terms of periods and of styles. It is impossible to tell where a true characteristic of a university lies [...] for each architect has his own design pattern thus using many architects to design and build in the area of one university is like handwriting on a single page of paper by many peoples, each of whom has his own individual handwriting style. Although each handwriting shall be neat and beautiful, but to

keep all in harmony like the art of poetry is extremely difficult. (1971b, p.124)

With this in mind, Stang insisted to appoint only one architect team to design Hat Yai Campus, as he could be more certain about its overall appearance of the built environment, although this later caused severe criticism against him and his architect. (Prince of Songkla University Archives, 2014, p.57)

But there is more to it than that. In post-war period up until that time the creation of 'Thainess' in architecture was still a dominant trend. To a certain extent, it became a state policy to design important public buildings with national character. At Chiangmai University, for example, the Ministry of Education specified that the architecture of its main university building, housing the offices of University Rector as well as University Council's meeting hall, must be functional for its purposes in the interior, and 'Thai in character' in the exterior. In 1962, accordingly, Prince Samaichalerm Kridagara, the then Dean of Faculty of Decorative Arts, Silpakorn University, and Mom Rachawongse Mitrarun Kasemsri, an architect in Department of Fine Arts, both of whom had previously co-designed Bhuping Palace, a royal residence in Doi Buak Ha, Chiangmai, were requested by the Ministry to design the University's main building, using Thai traditional style as primary source of references. (Anon, 1962, July 24, 30) This creation of 'Thainess' in architecture was also true for early buildings at Pattani Campus as its site engineer Chinda Kulwattho recalled that the main principle in designing the university building was to create a building in Southern style in general, except for the Administrative Building and Auditorium which were to be in 'Thai' Style. (1971, p.38) At Hat Yai Campus, however, rather than using architects expert on Thai traditional building, Stang now turned to a modernist architect and an independent engineer whose knowledge of modern architecture and construction was made use of by him to create a unified modern characteristic for the Hat Yai Campus. In this regard, Stang's persistence in his choice of architect is indicative of his attempt to intervene to public building work.

The Architect

Of all architects in post-war Thailand who had worked under Stang's leadership, Amorn Sriwong was his favorite. Although best known for his Lecture Building of Faculty of Science, Mahidol University, Amorn is less known as a building designer than he deserves to be. His modernist buildings, mostly designed between late 1950s and 1970s, largely passed architects by, while it is a little known fact that Thai historian Nidhi Eoseewong was his younger brother. According to Nidhi Eoseewong (Interview, 30 May 2017), Amorn seemed to have been interested in building from an early age. However, as a child born into a Chinese family in Bangkok, he was more encouraged by his father to continue family's wholesale business than to pursue architecture as his career. Unlike his older brother, who agreed to help his father in running family's business, Amorn rejected it – a fact that upset his father – and decided to go his own way. With his mother's support, he was trained outside architectural school by being apprenticed to a site Engineer Weekorn Weeranuwat with whom Amorn initially applied for laborer job, and it was the engineer who first taught Amorn about building lesson that he saw important for him to be a building designer. So far, little is known about how he developed his career as architect, nor is it clear how he became acquainted with Stang, who from late 1950s until his death in 1971, had commissioned him to design a number of buildings in every new universities Stang actively involved in

their early establishments; for instance, Mahidol University, Chiangmai University, Khonkhen University, and Prince of Songkla University. In Stang's obituary written by Amorn, it is suggestive that their architect-commissioner relationship had started as early as in 1958, if not earlier, as Amorn was commissioned by Stang to design the Faculty of Medical Science, University of Medical Science which later became Mahidol University (Bangkok). (1971, p.48) But the building that perhaps made Amorn first known to the architect's circle was Lecture Building of the Faculty of Science, Mahidol University, designed in 1964 and completed in 1968, whose circular plan and remarkable concrete structure was well-received. It was around this time that Amorn and an independent engineer Rachot Kanjanavanit were commissioned to design Prince of Songkla University's master plan and its several new buildings, including the Faculty of Engineering, the first faculty building of Hat Yai Campus, designed in 1968 and finished in 1971.

It should be noted that up until 1969, Amorn and Rachot had obtained work by the tender competition system prevalent in Thailand at that time, whereby the requirements and the design of a proposed building prepared by architects and engineers are published and the contract awarded to the company that submits the lowest price to build it. Under this system, the architect and the engineer of the proposed project obtained their fees from the winning general contractor, not the client, of about 4 to 5 percent of the construction cost. Prince of Songkla University was the first project that Amorn and Rachot were formally appointed as architect and engineer by the University itself, which now became the one who paid their fees of 4 per cent; the first 2 percent for design fees and another 2 percent for supervision fees. (Manoon Borisut, 1968, Aug 19)

Faculty of Engineering, Prince of Songkla University


Situated on a sloping terrain of Nang Hong Hill, the Faculty of Engineering is consisted of three main edifices designed within the periphery of 150 meters in width by 150 meters in length. The first edifice is the 2-storey Podium, housing workshops, laboratories, faculty library and museum, class rooms, faculty office, drafting room, service yard, and locker room. The Podium is pieced by two courtyards: one courtyard is on its lower floor; another is on its upper floor, so although large in floor areas, all the workshops and laboratories have windows on different sides of the room, creating cross ventilation with ease. On the front façade, the main entrance to the podium is elegant with ramps leading up from lower floor to the upper floor above. Once you are on the upper level, the lower courtyard is on your left, while the corridor in front of you leads you all the way to upper courtyard, at the center of which stands the second edifice: the 4-storey Lecture Building.

Positioned almost at the center of the Podium, the 4-storey Lecture building, 20 meters wide and 30 meters long, is surrounded by four small gardens; one of which is half-garden, half-artificial pond. It is from this artificial pond that the water flows from the upper level to lower level, linking the spaces between two internal courtyards by water curtain fountain. On the first floor of the Lecture Building, a number of lockers are provided for students to store personal possessions. The second and third floors are devoted to small class rooms and large lecture rooms. The lecture room is not only larger in size, almost three times the size of the classroom, but it also has a pitched floor, so that student in the rear,

sitting higher than those at the front, see a lecturer and the board with ease.



4-storey Lecture building; Note: From the author.



Radio Station Tower, rising above the Podium Building

*Note: From Prince of Songkla University, 6 July 197 (p.123), by Prince of Songkla et al,
1971, Phranakorn: Krung Siam Kan Pim*

If the first and second edifice are all designed for teaching purposes and supporting facilities, the third edifice: the Radio Station Tower, was useful beyond the Faculty of Engineers, as it housed equipment necessary to carry on communication via radio waves within the Hat Yai Campus. Rising over the roof of

the podium, the radio station tower is graceful and striking in its shape and form. The core of the tower is in cylinder shape of 4 meters in diameter, within which a well-designed spiral staircase is to lead up to the balcony level and the station floor at the top level. The structure of the tower is no less than striking. At the level 50 centimeters above the roof of the podium building, the ring beam surrounds the tower as a base from which a total of twelve buttresses project to support both the floors and the roof. The buttresses, as they rise upwards diagonally further away from the center, blend the balcony floor and the station floor at their outer edge; the higher the buttresses, the thinner but deeper their section becomes until they reach the station floor. From this point onwards, each buttress transform itself into V-shape beam acting itself structurally as abutment. Between every two abutments, a parabolic vault springs off, from one abutment to the other, over the area equal to one-twelfth sector of the station floor, designed in ring-shaped plan surrounding the spiral staircase. This unusual and complicated arrangement of the structure, in which the heavy parts on the top are rested on the relatively smaller core, was surely the architect's and engineer's ideas so as to fulfill the demand for optimum space of Radio Station Tower with the minimum obstruction to the podium.

If the structure of the Radio Station Tower is ingenious structural design, the structure of the Podium building is a result of creative thinking, both in terms of structural solution and construction method. Seen from the ground level, the building of the Faculty of Engineering is unmistakably a piece of engineering, where every building element is in perfect accord with the laws of physic, and none is styled up for no sensible reason. As might be expected of a man who was trained by an engineer, Amorn see the business of architecture in his own time as that of choosing and building the 'right' structure.

One aspect of his principle, as exemplified at the Faculty of Engineering, lay in reducing the variety of building elements and therefore building trade required for making them to just four elements: column, space frame, valley gutter, and roof dome. With these only four building elements, Amorn created the structure that is both light and strong to cover enormous area with minimum supports, while letting each of the elements represents its own process of production.

Unlike the previous building initially built at Pattani Campus, converted into the Faculty of Education later, the Faculty of Engineering here is designed to have a flexible interior layout. The aim is to achieve a design that could accommodate present and future requirements, as the faculty would expand itself to include other branches of engineering as the Faculty grows, so that the building does not become inconvenient as a result of the changing functional requirements. To achieve this flexibility, the building is supported on concrete columns, positioned 10 by 10 meters apart.

The reinforced concrete column is in twisted form, with a square of 40 centimeters by 40 centimeters at the bottom, whose section is positioned parallel to the building perimeter. As the column rise upwards, its section twist while at the same time its shafts taper inward. At the top of the column, the column sections become a square of 20 centimeters by 20 centimeters, half a size of its base, as a result. The shape of the column shaft is formed by linking between the column corners at the base and those at the top with eight straight lines, creating a total of 8 triangular surfaces round the column.

The building is consisted of 225 columns. From the top of each column, an inverted pyramid of double-layer space frame springs to support the roof. Compared to the concrete columns, the space frame members, made of steel tube, are relatively thin, 5-inch diameter at the lower level of space frame

and 3-inch diameter at the top level of space frame. Most of Amorn's earlier buildings had been in reinforced concrete, but here he realized that a concrete roof structure would be slow to build. The major advantage of steel space frame construction in the situation Amorn was facing was that as individual members are light, they are easily connected together onsite by welding – as this was a common method of steel fabrication at the time.

*The concrete posts are set 10x10 m.
apart to create flexibility in the
interior*

Note: From the author.



The schedule for building the Faculty of Engineering of 31,800 square meters allowed only 550 days. This limit of time forced the architect and engineer to adopt some form of prefabrication with high speed of construction necessary for the Faculty of Engineering, evidencing in the modules of gutter and of concrete dome. The question is how these seemingly prefabricated building elements were produced, given fact that the architect of this building was constrained to work with limited local means, in such a remote place where factory mode of production proved difficult to acquire. Although the modular design of the gutter and the concrete dome is ideally suited to factory production, this is not a case of factory mode of production, although the systematic design of these prefabricated components might lead us to believe that it were. The photographs of the Faculty of Engineering under construction illustrate particularly well the ways in which the prefabricated elements were being made with some local building means.

Onsite Prefabricated Elements



The roof structure of the Faculty of Engineering, under construction

Note:: From Prince of Songkla University Archive.



Roof concrete domes; each dome has a square base of 2.5 x 2.5 m. – the size that can readily be controlled by human hands.

Note: From the author.

If the concrete domes at the Faculty of Engineering were all handmade using the technique of earth forming, a closer investigation to the underside of the dome reveal the usage of local bamboo mattress called lamphaen mat to facilitate the casting processes. After the earth was formed in desirable shape, water was used to bond the earthen mould, helping to distribute earth particles into compact arrangement which held for moulding process. But earth mould suffered from the drawback that there was considerable adhesion between the mould and the concrete which was cast upon. Thus before each

concreting operation, the mould were treated with bamboo mattress to facilitate the casting processes. Once concrete was poured onto the woven surface, the excess water quickly seeped through the surface and then into the pores of the mould. This in turn helped stiffening the concrete by draining the water excess, while the excess water aided the temporary earth-mould constitution. Moreover, traces of this woven texture for the concrete dome, removed after the concrete was settled, are left visible. The texture left on the underside surfaces of the concrete dome is apparently appealing, giving an 'archaic' appearance to the 'modern' material. What is so fascinating about the construction of concrete dome at the Faculty of Engineering is the contrast between the structural daring of the work, resulted from the sophistication of the structure engineering, and the primitivism of the execution.



The underside surface of the concrete domes, while painted white, still allows the mark of bamboo-mattress to be partially visible

Note: From the author.

To return to our original question as to what does the construction of the Faculty of Engineering tell us about historiography of modern architecture, it is something of a surprise to find the answer to this question embedded in the concrete. Normally, what is usually regarded as modern architecture has something to do with 'modern' material and 'advanced' building technologies. But what comes out of our discussion of one particular building furnishes an example of how modern architecture in Thailand differs significantly from the orthodoxy of Modern Architecture. The evidence of the Faculty of

Engineering, which so futuristic in its forms, but largely built with means that might have been used in the most primitive buildings, illustrates the fact that new systems of construction will not always replace established ones, but rather there is a process of assimilation and appropriation, as a new system of construction is adapted to an existing building tradition, or grafted on to it. What is remarkable about the Faculty of Engineering is that it allows us to see modern architecture in Thailand as both progressive, while also connecting with its earlier tradition.

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The Emerging Local Museum and Its Meaning through Local People

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Abstract

This article presents the interpretation of how emerging local museum settings in Thailand have been formed by the local people on the context of globalization (B.E.2530 - present). The keywords of "Stakeholder", "Place" and "Things" were identified to support the interpretation. Thailand's local museum management of the documentaries and literature of local museums were collected from the Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn Anthropology Centre (Public Organization) database which have correspondingly been analyzed into descriptions. The result of the study indicated that the ideas of building local museums were influenced by trends of globalization. Throughout 30 years, local museums in Thailand have been affected by six major factors including 1) city transformation, 2) local community impact, 3) object discovery in local areas, 4) community icons, 5) local community intrarelationship, and 6) values of antiques found in the local area. These factors led to the local awareness needed to preserve local identity, and to use the local museum as a symbolic tool to interpret their sense of belonging and pride to both the local people and the visitors. Moreover, the early development of local private museums had single individuals or a small number of "stakeholders" in the local museum. "Place" is identified by building or location of building. "Things" denote the collection of museum objects. Since then, local museums have been more identified and participated in from various Stakeholders in the community. "Stakeholder" will be responsible for participatory management of the locals, "Place" will be representing the local area and "Things" will be given its importance to the ways of life, society, culture, local wisdom, environment, etc.

Keywords: local museum, local identity, Emerging Local Museum, Local awareness

1. Introduction

“For many decades, globalization as a process of exchanging world views, products, ideas, and other aspects of culture between people from different countries which is often seen as an epoch. This process has direct effects on culture, economic development and prosperity, and on human physical well-being in communities around the world. For many, globalization has been benefitting and allowing countries to develop livelihood of the people, not to mention how globalization gradually unites all communities around the world into one. While adversaries of globalization often claim that the globalization trend has gradually been diminishing social identities and social strength of local communities in various countries. With the support from the local community to resist globalization trend, the “localization” term is coined. Local communities begin to be aware of how they should be creating their own cultural identity, protecting their culture and being dependable on themselves.” [1]. In Thailand, many local people try to find their way back to their own origins giving importance to their own communities using museum as a tool for reminding them of who they are, how important their community is and showing outsiders their true cultural identities. In fact, they are also aware of the differences between other cultural identities and respect them as much as they respect themselves.

Based on awareness of the local people toward the museum, this research is particularly interested in the emerging local museum and how the locals interpret the meaning of museum and this could lead to find out on how local museums are created and, in some way, would be able to seek ways to protect and preserve local museum for the future generations. In this article, sources as Thailand’s local museum management of community documentaries, and related literatures on local museums were collected from the Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn Anthropology Centre (Public Organization) database which have correspondingly been analyzed into descriptions.

This article will begin presenting the interpretation and key concepts of how emerging local museum settings in Thailand has been formed by the local people on the context of globalization (B.E.2530 - present). The interpretation of what local is meant and how local museums are originated will be discussed along with main factors affecting museum changes and how they are turned out to be at present.

2. The Overall Picture of Museum

To understand one’s country context better, the integration of the inherited and evolving mix of economic, political, and social variables including culture, traditions, way of living as well as education and technological advancement should be taken into account. These factors, consequently, influence the stakeholder to identify and interpret the meaning of the word “museum” from the meaningful combination between “place” and “thing”. The meaning of the museum itself reflects the interests and concerns of the stakeholder and also to who is intended for and for what reasons.




Figure 1: The overall picture of Thailand and foreign museums

2.1 Influence of Country's Context Changes on "Museum" Interpretation

Inheriting and evolving mix of economic, political, and social variables including culture, traditions, way of living as well as education and technological advancement immensely effect on country's context changes and "the stakeholder" and their perspectives on museum interpretations. Interpretation of museum, therefore, not only can rely on one specific variable but also depending on all variables including people's attitudes and values of museum at that particular point of time.

2.2 Stakeholders

Types of museum stakeholders or caretakers have been categorized by the nature of their interests and their social classes that they belong to. From an early stage of museum history, stakeholders of the museum were either kings or nobles before they lost their power into the hands of government officials who overthrown them but again the generation changes and evolves, social, economics, and politics take its part, museum becomes the properties of the common people. The process of transferring authority from one types of stakeholder to the other has been becoming one of the very most important roles in museum transformation and therefore local people in a modern heritage context have better chances of

building their own museum to serve, protect and preserve their local communities, their people, and their identities.

Interpretation of “Place” and its importance

“Place” has been interpreted by the stakeholder’s belief. Back in the old days, people believe that “area” itself is a sacred place where goddesses with knowledge deities are living but for right now those beliefs have completely been changed into the place where scholars come to educate themselves.

But time changes so as the people, the righteous stakeholder authority of the museum have been shifting from scholars to kings or hermits. Kings tended to place museums inside their palaces, whereas hermits fostered their museums inside churches and temples. As we can see museums could be referring to places where artifacts are kept and if those artifacts get bigger and bigger, eventually a larger place would be built for them. In fact, museums had also once interpreted by the kings as a symbol of their authority and power.

Time passes so with power and authority of the holders, though, as the administration fell into the hands of government officials who seized the power from the king, museums were still situated in the palaces, temples, or even newly built official buildings.

Again, with another shift of authority, museums were finally administrated by commoners of the country. The common people have more rights to build more museums which were account for their own properties as homes.

Since then, museums have been managed by the people in their own communities and from there the interpretation of “place” have been changed yet again. As we could see, at first, “place” fell into the category of belongings for just a few groups of people as houses, palaces, or temples but then the “place” has extended its interpretation into the belongings of communities and its people.

Interpretation of “Things” and its Importance

The interpretation of “things” to the researcher would refer to items of artistic, cultural, or scientific importance for public education, nonetheless for “things” to stakeholder’s interpretation would be depending on stakeholder’s point of views.

The word, “things” during the ...era objects were seen as display items. Stakeholder at the time sees “things” as objects.

Later on, stakeholders began giving their importance to those objects by adding values as background knowledge for the audience by activities as exhibitions.

The word, ‘things’ in the modern era, could be seen as display items with knowledge attached to them but further interpretation of “things” has unlimitedly been extended to wisdom, folklores, natural surroundings, cultural heritage, traditions, etc. depending on who the stakeholders want to communicate to and what interpretation they want to convey through museum.

2.3 Museum as a Tool for Interpretation

“Museum” according to the interpretation of the stakeholder is a tool for conveying the message through objects with meanings and purposes. Whereas, “Stakeholder” is considered to be of those who try to get his/her message across in a form of museum. “Stakeholder” has invented different tools in

different eras to interpret and convey meanings of museum. At the beginning, museum was only used for display items, no *educational* and scholarly purposes were given interest. Due to institutional supports and technological advancement, interests in local museum began to take its place among the people who have more chances to get closer to museum and be aware of importance and true values of museum.

2.4 The Audience

Audiences of the museum are expected to be reached and got message delivered according to stakeholder's nature of interests.

3. The Origin of Thailand's Local Museum During Globalization Era (1987 to Present)

At present, community management using museum as a tool for interpretation is created from grouping of local people in the community. Local museum management has been attracting interests from many local communities as we can see from the survey of Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn Anthropology Centre. "Where 87 local museums are managed by local communities while 384 local museums are run by the collaborations between temples and local people in the community." [2] Based from the data given, there are 471 local museums to some extent administered by the locals which is much higher than the numbers of museums managed by government sources and private sectors as well as other types of museums and thus, numbers of local museums are considered to be highest when comparing to any other types of museums. Before getting in depth into why local communities want to have their own museum, why using museum as a tool for interpretation, and what is the meaning of the local museum, there should be something that we must discuss. Understanding and defining the word, 'local' and how 'local is related to area and in what way are questions that will be answered initially.

3.1 The Localization

According to Srisak Walipodom [3] "local is defined as something that is related to area that is good enough for human to settle down which may include mountain region, river side region, and seaside region. The area is spacious enough for people to create a community or communities or an area where it belongs not to only to a particular community but also as a public area such as forests, rivers and ponds, as well as lowlands and fields. It can also be referring to Ecological Niche or Ecological Niche, a place where humans, animals, and plants coexist together adaptably and harmoniously.

This public area might not belong to any single one of the community but it belongs to every communities. The area is fostered and protected, shared and benefitted, to all the communities. Rules and regulations are set among them to protect the area from the intruders and among themselves.

The environmental adaptability of the people and sharing the area among them create a form of living together. This type of form is called "local culture" that reflects the true nature of local traditions, rituals, and customs.

People from different local communities in some ways share a page of history which create their sense of solidarity belonging to the same community.

Each local community has different social and culture sizes and complexities depending on the

development of that particular society. Some communities may compose of few villages situated in suburban area but many of them are larger in size comprising of villages and towns.”




Figure 2: A local map comprising of communities and natural resources as mountains, swamps, rivers, forest, etc. Source: Adapted from Srisak Walipodom (2008) [4]

To understand changes of geoculture, environment in the past should be uncovered and studied. In fact, current changes of environmental conditions are in line with local culture of people in different social dimensions and that creates in depth understanding of history, culture, as well as environmental conditions.

”For human basis of social structure, there are three fundamental components of social relationship relating to people

1. Relationship between people and people
2. Relationship between people and nature
3. Relationship between people and supernatural phenomena

That create a sense of unity among those who share same culture area.” [3]

It could be concluded that local refers to a geographical area where conditions are suitable enough for humans to settle down comprising of local communities who share the same social norms and a place where humans, animals, and plants coexist together adaptably and harmoniously.

3.2 The Origins of Thai Local Museum

There are 3 main factors influencing the transformation of Thai local museum

3.2.1 The factors influencing transformation in creating museums found by the researcher are social changes, community changes, antique discovery in the local community, good attitudes towards important figure head in the community, relationships between people the community, and item collections.

3.2.2 Cooperation between local people and researchers

The research of this article will mention about those researchers who took their parts in helping the local people create and build museums.

3.2.3 The attitude of governmental officials towards locality – the officials gave their importance by imposing laws for the rights and freedom of Thai people in order for them to preserve their culture, traditions, and intellects as well as natural resources belonging to the people inside their own community.

From these three factors mentioned above, the local communities have been given more chances to preserve and protect their own cultural heritage.

3.2.1 The Factors Influencing Changes in Building Museums

3.2.1.1 Social changes within the Country Context

At present, there are three major factors affecting social changes within the local community which are attitudes, technological advancement, and population size of the community. Capitalism becomes part of people of every day's life forcing those people who live in the rural area to abandon their family and their communities and heading into to the urban areas. The attitudes towards their own communities are rather negative believing urban area tends to give them more opportunities in life and comfort. The more they have this attitude, the more chance of them to abandon their communities and deteriorate the local people's identity. When attempting to observe social changes within different local communities from the past until now, changes have occurred dramatically. For instance, a Thai local water market community situating in the canal area, in the past, people were very rich due to the fact that they were able to transport and trade well. However, due to transportation factors, people tend to use roads as a mean of transportation which cause less importance to the water transportation and of course deterioration of the community identity. People don't use water as a mean of transportation anymore, the water market began to disappear.

From the case mentioned above, social changes within the country context causes many communities to lose their cultural identity and waiting for the day to disappear. However, there are some communities that are able to preserve and protect themselves for those social changes by using museum as a tool to promote their own identities. The identities have been reflecting through their museums where they show who they really are and where they are from helping them to promote the importance of their own identities as in Kao Hong Market museum, Ban Ja Lae Hilltribe Life and Culture Center, Eastern Community Cultural and Way of Life Learning Centre, Nong Poog Tao Community and Chantaboon Community Learning house.

3.2.1.2 The Changes within Place of Local Community

Natural and demographic changes within local community are factors influencing changes within the local community dramatically. Demographics will affect the community context directly in terms of community settlement and migration. Whilst, socioeconomics will indirectly influence the community context change. Therefore, factors affecting changes within the community can be divided into two categories, natural phenomenon and area encroachment.

1. Environment affecting the community

From several natural phenomena as climate changes could eventually affect directly on many local communities. One example of natural factor that affect the community is water. Water can cause soil deterioration within the community creating land loss and not to mention how water level in the sea flood into the community. Some people in the community have to move away from the area and that causes changes the people way of living as in Khun samut Chin museum and Bang Sadet Court doll Centre.

2. Factors of Land Encroachment

With the rise of population within community, needs of land for country development is important. Land expropriation for public utility as MRT subway station and building dams are needed. With these reasons, the communities living in those areas have been affected as those who live near the dam area when the gate of the dam is closed, fish can't lay their eggs, no fish grows and the people have no fish to eat. Land encroachment may also result from the land investors who want to invest on the locals' land for hotel construction, shopping malls, or even opening private businesses around the area which will directly affect the local people. It could be said that locals will have to move somewhere else if their lands are seized from one way or the other, many locals will have to work for those investors and some of those business owned by the outsiders could eventually ruined the natural environment of the community. Nevertheless, these negative factors gradually affect local people's livelihood. In relations to these factors, many Thai local communities have been moving away, facing unsolvable problems. Nevertheless, there are some communities who decided to change their perceptions by finding ways to resolve these problems creating a sense of their community identity. They have tried to be optimistic trying to find how those problems could be used to help facilitate the community in the future, to help younger generations learn the impacts of those problems and create the understanding of how community should be preserved and protect for both its identity and the people. In fact, it is also their tasks to help the outsiders to appreciate of who they really are and to make government officials see their values as what Local museum of Thai Bueng Bann Khoksalung, Historic Hut Charoen Chai community, Baan Khun Chumnongjeenarak museum, Pak Mun Local Museum and Amphawa Floating Market were trying to do.

3.2.1.3 Antique Discovery within the Community

Thailand has been populated ever since the dawn of civilization in South East Asian region. With sophisticated and altered cultures scattering to various parts, traces of past cultures were still there to be noticed. Antiques and antiquities have left to be seen as the evidences of evolution and changes in Thai communities. In the past, collections of artifacts were left to be the burden of Thai government officials as those from Fine Arts Department and other different regional antiquities centers. However, current laws support Thai locals to collect those historical artifacts and keep them in their communities. From there, communities in different regions of Thailand are able to keep the artifacts inside their local museums to represent their identity and pride of the people within the community. Besides, it is also a great chance for the people to introduce and explain how their communities are developed, evolved and

changed into what they are now and to let their younger generation within the community understand the true identity of their community.

Another benefit for the community is the values of economics within the community. They would have been able to use their sophisticated and beautiful culture to attract tourists and that in one way is to support financially to the people in the community and for them it could also help protect and preserve their priceless artifacts from the poachers as you can see in Baan Wanghad Museum, Nakorn Chum Cultural Center, Baan Kho Yisan local museum, Khun Samut Chin museum, Doi Viang - Doi vong Community Museum, Baan Rai Museum and Bai Sema Baan Kut Ngong.

3.2.1.4 People's History Museum

The long history of Thailand's community development have been very interesting, some of them has been taking for centuries to truly show their distinct identities. This social system connects people from generations to generations, numbers of people have been involved, and so this social system create good relationships between the people within the community. With the reason, the community has been a vital role to create good people with good deeds where integrity, honesty, sacrifice, and nobility are always there with the people.

Therefore, to honor these people for their merits, museums were built to exhibit their good deeds. Most museums will be exhibited where these people live, it can either be their houses or in the community where they live. It could be understood that good things connect people with their history and help keep alive traditions and beliefs in those younger generations who can appreciate of what these people have done for the community that lead them to follow the good example. In fact, the community could benefit from these people by building a museum that could eventually attract tourists from different places. The examples of this type of museum are the hometown of the venerable P. A. Payutto Museum, Pracha Suksan Arts and Crafts Centre and Phra Sumetha Thibodi's biography Museum, Baan khun chumnongjeenarak museum, Phuphayak Memorial, Northern Thailand Nationalist Chinese Army Regiment Memorial Museum, Luang Ta Bua Thammachedee Museum.

3.2.1.5 The Assemble of old and young generations within the community contexts

With the current trends in capitalism where focuses of the people are based on finding money, people to move one place to another where money could be found. People tend to move into the urban area and leave their communities behind. The relationship of people in the community are left stranded, lesser and lesser sense of identity has been gradually relinquished.

Museum as a vital role to create closer relationship between the people and the community has been taken into account. The museum help creates sense of identity, lessen the space of relationship and help build good relationships between old generations and the new ones through the process of creating traditional intellects as traditional toys and collections as in Baan Padad Toy Museum and Local Museum of Thai Bueng Baan KhokSalung.

3.2.1.6 Museum Collection Types

Museum collections could be divided into 3 types according to this research writer: The inheritance, the donated, and antiques' collection.

The “inheritance” meaning collections that have been passed on from one generation to another and mostly found inside the museum within the temple area. Abbots of the temple from generation to another will be responsible for taking care of the community. For the local people, collections in the family also have been passing on from the ancestors to descendants but the process usually starts with collections for pleasure or for pride of the family.

The “donated” collection is a term coined originally from traditional museums where collections were limited or none exhibited inside the museums. In fact, museums have been asking donations from the people in the community for collections that people use in their daily life as old televisions, teapots, tools for wood cutting, baskets, utensils, and old typewriters, etc.

The “Antiques” collection in the community were apparently found within the area and were valued as historical heritage. When the antiques were found, people in the communities would let the researchers conduct research on them and brought into the local museum for exhibitions. The example of those antiques are holy books, artifacts, etc. It could be assumed that having “collections” the people in the community seems to appreciate having museum as a place to keep those collections.

3.2.2 Movement of the Local Museum and the Supporters

“Around 1987, trends of globalization have been influencing changes in local museum movement mostly from private sectors as scholars, elites, Mr. Srisak Walipodom and his colleagues, and Prapai Wiriyapun foundation. These people came in and help the local people set up local museums and support the locals to be proud of their own identities. Local museum does not only concern with buildings, places, and collections but it also has to be related to the history of culture, society and its people within the same community. This awareness is to bring the community’s culture and its historical identity back which is apparently an anti-globalization movement. Globalization tries to connect people together into one global community whether it is economics, politics, and culture but the idea of local museum is one of the many parts of movement that tries to bring back the community and the locals’ identity. In fact, the locals and the supporters are willing to support to bring back community identity.” [5]

The role and the importance of local museum tends to be vital to the identity of the community and its people and how they adapt to rapid social changes. In fact, they also help preserve natural heritage, culture, traditions, and educating their own people whether they are elders or young to truly understand their true identity and creating good relationship between the people and its community that could link to *happiness* and vibrant communities.

3.2.3 The Importance of Public Administration in Local Community

Nowadays, local communities tend to have much more awareness on local museum supports due to the fact that “constitution of The Kingdom of Thailand which was enacted on the 11th Day of October B.E.2540. CHAPTER III Rights and Liberties of the Thai People. Section 46. Persons assembling as to be a traditional community shall have the right to conserve or restore their customs, local knowledge, arts or good culture of their community and of the nation and participate in the management, maintenance, preservation and exploitation of natural resources and the environment in a balanced fashion and persistently as provided by law. Local museum has, therefore, gradually changes according to the social conditions and social context.” [6] Likewise, there is also another constitution article supporting the local

community which has been enacted on the 24th Day of August B.E. 2550. Part 12 Community Rights. Section 66. Persons assembling as a community, local community or traditional local community shall have the right to preserve or restore their customs, local wisdom, arts or good culture of their community and of the nation and participate in the management, maintenance and exploitation of natural resources, the environment and biological diversity in a balanced and sustainable fashion.” [7]
Having their own local museums to preserve their true cultural identities and to raise awareness has been increasing and becoming a trend. Potentially, more museums have been established more than ever while the awareness of cultural preservation and community identity have been raised to attract tourism industry.

3.3 Changes of the Local Museum

3.3.1 Museums Made by the Locals

Stage 1 It could be seen that local museum is usually created individually or a single group of people in their community as a monk, a teacher, or a small group of people not from a large one.




Figure 3: The people who create local museums

It could also be seen from this phase that “the area” for museum to be exhibited in a small room or limited spaces within building.

The main museum stakeholder is an abbot

The appearance of the temple seem to be influenced by the traditional museum where building and collections are emphasized on.




Figure 4: Museum is exhibited within the temple area

Concerning with the exhibition, collections will be exhibited within the temple area while the financial support will be based on the locals and the museum attendees.

Most of the temple museum have their distinct identities where the exhibited collections are preserved from one generation to the other. Collections that have been collected by the late abbots will be exhibited in the museum supported by the current abbot so people can come and learn inside the temple. In fact, the temple museum can also be collaborating with the local community schools to exhibit those collections somewhere else outside the temple.

The temple museums usually focus its exhibition on the history of the temple, biography of well-respected Buddhist monks, temple's collections as well as traditional housewares supported by the locals.

Teacher as a Museum Stakeholder

Museum created inside the school begins with teacher seeing the values of cultural heritage. Some of them have opportunities to see other local museums where they realize the importance of local museum and since then they create the museum as a center of historical education for young children and adolescence to admire and learn from the “things” that are exhibited inside the museum. Besides, collections are also donated by the people in that particular community. When collections are large enough, teachers will ask school directors for permission to exhibit those collections inside the museum usually in a school room.



Figure 5: School map where the exhibition area is limited inside one of the school room

When looking on how teachers manage their museums, it could be noticed that the concept of preserving cultural heritage is a base but the importance of thing and area are limited in a particular area. Whereas, collections are mostly donated from the people in the community to kick start the museum by teachers in school.

Individual as a Museum Stakeholder

This type of museum organized by individual living in the community who has been trying to respond to the needs of cultural values of the locals by contributing his/her personal inherited belongings to the museum while some of the collections are also donated by the outsiders who also realize the importance of this personal museum. The community museum also reflects the value of the past generation for their efforts to preserve their community identity. This museum is managed by an individual in the community. There is not any contributions or helps from other community members. The museum is located inside a house exhibiting collections in a room or sometimes in a personal compartment as found in Baan Ja Thawee Museum.




Figure 6: House uses as a museum

Figure 7: Museum and its territory

Museum and Community Management

The establishment of museum has been started by the idea of raising awareness of the locals for its community importance using museum as a center for cultural and social development and activity. An individual and a small group of locals are responsible for jump starts. It could be seen from the initial stage of museum development that people tended to see museum as a place to collect and exhibit antiques and collections whether they are excavated from archeological site or donated from the locals. Besides, museum development has also been contributed by community in terms of their participation on museum construction and its activities. In the later stages of museum development, appointed or elected board of community members originated from the locals have been responsible for administrating the museum.

From Figure 8 it could be assumed that each house in the community has their own traditional household skills, some of them have similar skills, and some of them don't. In fact, these houses tend to own both traditional skills and collections passing from their ancestors. To them, interpretation of "museum" seem to be a reminder of what the older generations have done for them and the values of things in the community.




Figure 8 shows different homes with different types of traditional household skills

Museum at first according to the local's interpretation refers to just a building where the collections are kept. Those collections may be discovered as antiques in the community or contributed from the locals. Museum, therefore, to the locals doesn't include all the territories around it but rather just a place for keeping collections.

Stage 2

Later on, nevertheless, the meaning of museum have not only been seen as buildings but also the territory around the museum including the locals who have been living there, sharing memories and fostering the community. More importantly, they are all there to protect their community and preserve natural surroundings, cultural heritage, and nurture their community for the next generation.



Figure 9: The collaboration among the locals in the community

4. Conclusion the Origin and Transformation of Thailand's Local Museum




Figure 10: The origin and transformation of Thailand's local museum

Due to the tidal wave of globalization causing changes in Thailand's social and economic context, Thailand local community have also been implicitly affected whether from losing its local identity, community identity, homes, natural resources, etc. Discovery of antiques, memorialization of good people, and building good relations between the young and the elders are parts of how they attempt to revive their distinctive identity back to their community and therefore, museum is built as a tool for interpretation and for community cultural revitalization. Recalling the history of the locals, their ways of living and local intellects is part of the social awareness within the community.

Realizing the needs of protecting and preserving Thailand's local museums from globalization, researchers attempt to reach out and help locals create and build museums by collecting useful information based on the origin of the community, studying the collected antiques found in the community area, and organizing museum exhibitions and in fact, these researchers are very competent in terms of their archeological knowledge, museum design, exhibition expertise, and community development. Concerning with government supports on preserving, protecting and serving local communities, useful laws and regulations were imposed in Thailand's constitution section.




Figure 11: The development of local museum used as a tool for interpretation

At the early stage of museum transformation, individual or a single group of people in a particular community had interpreted museum as a place that help preserve and exhibit collections in a single building. The purposes of building a museum is to let people in the community embrace values of the local community, develop the sense of pride and help outsiders understand the true nature of each community identity. In fact, these purposes would gradually attract the attentions of the government to support financially and museum management. Besides, giving education on display items and exhibition management to the local are also responsible by the government officials. In order to create and build museum, therefore, different experts from different fields should be taking their parts, not to mention of those who are specialists in archeology, professional museum designers, and exhibition experts must also be involved.

Nonetheless, some of the local communities have not been supported by the government organizations even without any volunteering researchers, and consequently, no educational supports for local communities are available. Unfortunately, some of the local museums had been closed, neither the locals themselves nor outside spectators are interested in the museums. Museums are kept as just old storages, some of the display items are scattered, even some of the items are just *unrecognizable* piles of debris and no locals in the community has any knowledge related to those *items*.

As mentioned, local community seemed to interpret museum as just a building where collections are kept and available for exhibition inside museums at first but soon after the locals are more self-reliant, they realize the interpretation of museum as a representative for local intellects, culture, traditions, folk plays, folksongs and the true identity of the locals in the community.




Figure 12: The development of local museum used as a tool for interpretation

In order to make local museum more sustainable, perceptions of stakeholder from museum as just buildings and place to keep objects should also be embracing the community's natural surroundings, educating locals with available resources as their people, homes within the community and so forth could lead to the cooperation among the local people in the community. Thus, yellow area referring to those locals who decide to contribute and help develop their local community will use museum as a tool to attract those locals who haven't given any contributions to the community. From figure 12, not all locals have got involved with supporting the community as you can see from the gray areas. It could be assumed that current situation of local museum development is at this stage.



Figure 13: The development of local museum used as a tool for interpretation

The hope of local museum to be alive in the future rest upon the contributions of the local community and its people and how they interpret museum is likewise very significant. Contributions of the locals in terms of protecting their natural resources, embracing their cultural heritage, traditions, their ways of life, integrating social, economics, and community together could eventually develop all aspects of basic needs for the community to survive and realize their true identity and subsequently could lead to people to see the importance of building local museum to reflect their true local identity and benefits all locals in that particular community.

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The Existence of Local Museum in Thailand: A Case Study of 14 Local Museums in Central Region

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Thailand

Abstract

A local museum serves the role of creating a sense of consciousness, a sense of pride and a sense of belonging to locals that could be the main component of strengthening a sense of community. Nevertheless, the situation of local museums in Thailand have suffered due to the lack of attention and preservation by the locals. Based on these situations, this research proposes to study the current situation of local museums in Thailand, focusing on museum management. The researcher explored all related documentaries of museums in Thailand taken from the databases of the Princess Maha- Chakri Sirindhorn Anthropology Centre (Public Organization), along with surveys of 14 museums hosted by the local communities. Observation and interviews were used in data collection methods and a conceptual management is used as data analysis technique. The result revealed that the presence of the 14 surveyed local museums depend in their management upon; local participation, continuing activities and events of museum operation, and a cooperative working network, requiring various supports ranging from education, budgets from government sectors, etc. Educational activities based on the local museums were planned to raise awareness of the locals and the interest of visitors, in order to create their sense of belonging to the community and the museum. For the interpretation of meaning and content of the museum, accurate information, a sequence of exhibition as well as a presentation technique should be able to understand easily and benefit to others.

Keyword: local museum, interpretation, awareness, museum management

1. Introduction

Local museum has been considered to be one of the key roles to raise awareness and conscious of local people on their community's values, pride and the sense of belonging which eventually become a main factor for community strength. Unfortunately, at present, most of these local museums have been in very bad conditions with insufficient social supports. From the awareness of this situation, the researcher has aimed to analyze and study the current situation of local museums in Thailand both for their management and interpretation. The researcher has based and collected its research information from Thailand's local museum management of community documentaries where related literatures on 14 local museums were elicited from the Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn Anthropology Centre (Public Organization) database and field surveys on those museums were also conducted additionally. Concerning the filed surveys, interviews and observation were conducted **on the locals in the community** from March 2015 to July 2015. Whereas, conceptual framework of museum interpretation of the researcher has been based on Dean, D., & Edson, G.'s Interpretation loop. [1] This research has primarily emphasized its study on SENDER, MESSAGE CHANNEL, and RECEIVER accordingly. [1] Regarding to the local museum's context, **"sender"** refers to an individual, group of individuals or organizations who has/have aimed to develop and use museum as a place for educating people on local community's ways of living, their local intellects, local heritage, and local history and more importantly, participation. [2] Whereas, best practice of museum administration has been comprised of 9 basic elements including physical conditions, purposes, principles, activities, management, service, and networks as well as locals' participation, financial supports and assessment. [3] **"Message"** refers to stories or things that local museum curators intend to make interpretation of. After the researcher had been conducting field work surveys on designated local museums, meaning of the word "message" were interpreted differently according the museum curators' beliefs and how they would convey those interpretations into message. **"Channel"** refers to a mean of conveying what the museum intend to interpret within the museum area including exhibitions of display collections, a center of educational institute and engaging activities that reflects the traditional culture of the locals. The word, **"receiver"** refers to locals and visitors who have been participating in any museum activities that the museum has organized.

This research article will be starting off by giving the information on the conditions of 14 museums situated in the central region of Thailand followed by the museum management, their physical appearances, the interpretation of museum, and cooperating activities between locals and the museums as well as problems that were found in the museum. Besides, field work survey results as well as factors and how those factors affects the existence of local museums in Thailand will also be discussed.

2. Findings of 14 Museum's Field Survey

2.1 Baan Wanghad Museum in Sukhothai Province

The Baan Wang Had archeological site museum was established in 1991 [4] by Mr. Singha Wutthichompoo, a man who keeps trying to preserve and protect the place where civilization remains are saved for future generations. This museum is also devoted as a *source* of intellectual stimulation and entertainment to develop and strengthen the knowledge of students, university students, and

researchers. Antiques and collectables excavated in the community have also been kept in this museum.

2.1.1 Museum Management

The management of The Baan Wang Had archeological site museum is performed by the local community. Originally, this community meant to make this museum archeological site museum as place to preserve and protect their cultural heritage, to foster the sense of belongings, and to help understand the values of their cultural inheritance. Right now, unfortunately, Baan Wang Had museum is lack of curatorship, the place is left abandoned. No maintenance is managed and priceless objects were stolen from the museum.

This museum has been taken care of by locals of the community whose responsibility is to just open and closed the museum. No one in the community has any background knowledge of excavated objects whatsoever but the place has been kept open for exhibition.

Nowadays, there are still excavations in the area and still those antiques are still stolen from time to time. From the interviews, many antiques were found accidentally but gold is what the locals are looking for not the antiques. [5]

2.1.2 Museum Appearances

This museum is located inside Wat Jomsrirattanamonkol temple in Taling Chan sub-district of Baan Dan Lan Hoi district, Sukhothai province. Within the temple, there are 3 monks staying. The architectural appearance of the museum is rather new. The purposes of constructing this museum was to yield direct benefits to all the local people managed by the community itself. The place where museum was established is an archeological site.



Figure 1 shows locations and architectural appearances and archeological sites of the museum in Baan Wang Had community

2.1.3 Interpretation of the Museum

Exhibition inside the Museum

The exhibition of museum displays antiques and items from the architectural site inside glass cabinets with tags on them.

Activities, museum, and community

The researcher has found that there have been no activities organized by the community for the museum. Few or no community locals pay any attention to the display items inside the museum additionally.




Figure 2: Relationship between museum and community

From figure 2, it could be concluded that the relationship between museum and community is rather low. People in the community paid very much of their attention to their agricultural ways of living, not the museum. People are lack of fostering the sense of belongings, and understanding the values of their cultural inheritance. There have been no activities to relate the local community with the museum. Museum was abandoned by the locals while temple itself did not organize any activities during festive seasons or Buddhist religious days.

2.1.4 Problems Found

Baan Wang Had museum, currently, does not have a clear picture who the real stakeholder of the museum is. The founder of the museum has already left the community and ordained as a monk somewhere else. Time for opening and closing museum is to be unsettling. The museum will only be opened during the visiting time of the tourists. The conditions of the museum are dirty and bad, some of the antiques have been disappearing from the museums.

Unfortunately, it could be observed that the museum looks like just an old storage. There seems to be no importance given either to its history or its maintenance and use. In the researcher's opinion, extended knowledge from experts should be involved to help the locals recognize, understand, and explain about excavated objects when visitors attend the museum. Right now, no one in the community has an idea what those antiques and collectibles are.

2.2 Huai Nam Sai "Hmong" Museum in Phitsanulok Province

"Huai Nam Sai "Hmong" Museum has been founded since 1995 by Hill Tribes Development Center. Later on, the center has been moved away and since then the museum has been steered by the village chief and his community moving and exhibiting their antiques and collectables at Hill Tribes Development Center building" [6]

2.2.1 Museum Management

The management of Huai Nam Sai "Hmong" Museum have managed by the local community. The community has got absolute title to land and the museum at Huai Nam Sai Community, however, the museum is currently closed for renovation.

2.2.2 Museum Appearances

The Ban Huai Nam Sai “Hmong” museum is located at Noen Phoem sub-district, Nakhon Thai District, Phitsanulok Province. The architectural design of the museum is rather new where the museum appears not to have any traditional “Hmong” architectural designs, in fact, this museum is comprised of several buildings. From interviews, “it was found that some of the buildings are left as a storage.” [7] This community appears to be located in the past Hmong ethnic area but unfortunately characteristics of Hmong’s culture as traditional house designs and other traditions cannot be noticed any longer.



Figure 3 shows museum location and its nearby area.

2.2.3 Interpretation of the Museum

Currently, display object are still exhibited and no further collectables are added to museum’s showcases. The display object are arranged side by side as if they were kept in a storage. This particular feature illustrates that none of the community members have collections management skills and interpretation of what the items are made for and how it was originated. It could be assumed that the reason why they organize the exhibition because they want to do it.

Activities, museum, and community

Recently, there have been no activities organized by the community for the museum. Museum has been keeping display items and collectables for exhibition. Children in the community and adolescences came to the museum once in a while. Most of the time, museum is closed and will only be opened when tourists come. Unfortunately, only few tourists and people outside the community made rare visits. From an interview, there was one visit from representatives of a university but again it was one year ago. Activities in the community will be based on “Hmong” traditions and customs organized in every December. Consequently, there are no other activities organized yet again. Back in the old days, the Hmongs had their own traditional costumes but presently, not anymore.



Figure 4: Relationship between museum and community

2.2.4 Problems Found

From the current influence of globalization, culture, traditions, and a custom as Hmong traditional costumes have gradually been disappearing. The relationship between the local community and the museum is rather low. Museum was only used for keeping antiques while the community had no intension of being an important part of developing the museum. Community and the museum had no mutual benefits and therefore museum is left to be alone and is not considered to be a vital stimulation for outside classroom learning for the community.

2.3 Nakorn Chum Cultural Center, Kamphaeng Phet Province

“Nakorn Chum Cultural Center was founded in 2003 which lie in the will of Phra Khun Phrasri Watchira Bhorn, the Abbot of Wat Phra Barom That royal temple. The abbot himself has aimed to provide education and create awareness in order to promote restoration and preservation of antiques and collectables for future generations. Phra Khun Phrasri Watchira Bhorn collected those antiques found in the temple area while some of the collections were bequeathed by the people and from there, the idea of building a local museum has been created. This museum aims to collect donated traditional crafts used in everyday life of Nakorn Chum community and it could be found that numerous crafts have been donated to the temple.” [8]

2.3.1 Museum Management

The management of Nakorn Chum Cultural Center have been undertaken by a temple, whereas this Wat Phra Barom That royal temple has got their absolute title to land where Nakorn Chum Cultural Center is located. At the moment, there are monks from Wat Phra Barom That temple staying and taking care of the museum. Long time ago, however, with the lack of curators around the museum, some of the objects have been stolen and thus, right now, the temple attempts to manage the temple by assigning monks. [9]

2.3.2 Museum Appearances

Currently, the museum is located inside Wat Phraborommathat royal temple, Nakorn Chum subdistrict, Muang, Kampangetch province. The appearance of architectural building design is similar to that of nearby archaeological Community Excavation.



Figure 5 shows museum location and its nearby area.

2.3.3 Interpretation of the Museum

The museum interprets and exhibits historical information of Kampangetch province and local

community where the museum is situated. The exhibition of the museum will display basic hand *tools* to perform *everyday* work tasks and housewares as baskets, handy tools, type-writers, etc. The founding collections and other priceless items as holy books are exhibited inside the museum.

The exhibition of museum is organized by arranging display items according to their categories whether they are housewares or antiques. Moreover, some of the items are tagged with short descriptions but some no tags are available and that is why people do not know what the item is and how it was used as well as its historical background. Besides, museum has also arranged educating activities around the area for youths and students.

2.3.4 Activities, Museum, and Community

After interviewing monks who have been taking care of museum, local community did not take their part with the museum and there are only few activities available for students to work on. When children come to do their activities at the museum, no interesting works were done, just few photos were taken as their assignment.

Concerning school activities related to the museum, students are assigned to be guide lecturers for the museum usually on Saturdays and Sundays. Students from junior high school has participated on the museum but currently fewer students have decided to volunteer. [9]




Figure 6: Relationship between museum and community

2.4 Kao Hong Market Museum, Suphanburi Province

Kao Hong Market museum located in Suphanburi province has been established in 2005 [10] originated from an ancient house where its founders were Kao Hong Market development committees. Kao hong Market museum offers exhibition of community's donate items as old photos and other community belongings.

2.4.1 Museum Management

The management of Kao Hong Market museum have been managed by the local community, whereas the museum's properties are possessed by a private owner. Right now, however, museum and its properties are rented by the locals with an intention to exhibit display collections in the community.

2.4.2 Museum Appearances

Presently, it has been found that Kao Hong Market museum located at Bang Prama District, Suphan Buri

province were constructed, decorated and designed with traditional architectural style built which is one ancient wooden house.

2.4.3 Interpretation of the museum

The interpretation of the museum can be divided into two categories: exhibition within the museum and in local community. Museum exhibition will be hosted on the first and the second floor of the building. On the first floor, traditional household items as baskets, wicker baskets, and old televisions will be exhibited. In fact, some of the paintings crafted by Suphanburi College of Fine Arts have also been displayed. Some of the items are exhibited in rows with name tags on them. In case of televisions, they are stacked on top of each other with also name tags on them but unfortunately no historical descriptions as how it was acquired, how it was used are written on the tags. The second category of museum interpretation is exhibition in nearby local community. The exhibition was organized through the process of using maps and signs to educate people and locate the archeological site within the community area. Highlights of exhibition are guard towers where people can go inside and observe the construction. Besides, sacred shrine worshipped by the locals and an ancient house with its long history related to the community are also considered interesting.



Figure 7 shows Hong Market museum, its display items, and its community

2.4.4 Problems Found

After investigating problems occurring in the museum of Kao Hong Market, it could be assumed that both community and their museum are closely related in terms of how they integrate and promote exhibitions not only inside the museum but also outside in the community. Spectators and visitors are attracted to the continuous stories related from one place to another while museum is the central of interest. Nevertheless, there are still problems occurring due to the fact that those who open and close museum are not punctual, too many display items are over stacked inside the museum, and too little written information of each item and the people in the community are described. Most of the display items are quite timeworn as well as the museum itself, in fact, maintenance of the museum and its items are required.

2.5 The Hometown of the Venerable P. A. Payutto Museum, Suphan Buri Province

The Hometown of the Venerable P. A. Payutto Museum was established in 2006 with financial supports from Sri Prajun people and families of Phra Phrom Kunaporn (P. A. Payutto). These people have been contributing their money to help construct a two-room wooden museum located in the middle of Sri

Prajun market or the place where Phra Phrom Kunaporn (P. A. Payutto) was born. [11]

2.5.1 Museum Management

Currently, the Hometown of the Venerable P. A. Payutto Museum is administered by the P. A. Payutto Foundation having locals as board committee members while volunteering locals will be responsible for helping open and close the museum as well as cleaning and guiding visitors around the place.

2.5.2 Museum Appearances

The museum is located within the Sri Prajun local market area in Suphan Buri province. The architectural design of the museum has been reflecting the traditional culture of the locals while the community where the museum situated is in the heart of old market area.



Figure 8 shows the architectural designs within the community area and inside the museum

2.5.3 The Interpretation of the Museum

The exhibition features the history of the museum and the biography of Phra Phrom Kunaporn. The interpretation of the museum has been divided into two parts: exhibition inside the museum and *exhibitions* developed by *museums* in *community* venues.

Exhibition of the museum features the biography of the Venerable P. A. Payutto, his birthplace and his old family's business. [11] Besides, the museum was also once opened as the first High school in Sri Prajan district. [11]

Museum also exhibits various types of models such as kitchen model, a textile shop model which was a very old family business as well as the model of first Sri Prajun's high school. In the school's classrooms, blackboards and desks are demonstrated. In addition to the models' exhibition, there are display items featured in the showcase.

Furthermore, local people focus on participating activities with the museum. Natthakarn Sarakarndee, who is villager, said that "Every year on the twelfth of January, activities will be organized by the foundation to commemorate the establishment of the hometown of the venerable P. A. Payutto Museum. Those activities are essay contests which are usually hosted in the government offices. Besides activities like certificate ceremony and donations of Dharma book event for both the locals and visitors are also hosted at museum." [12]

2.5.4 Problems Found

Concerning the museum's exhibitions, full-time guide lecturers should be provided since temporary volunteering guides are unavailable sometimes. The opening and closing time is set officially but not opened or closed punctually.

2.6 Bann Khun Chumnong Gienarak Museum, Suphanburi Province

Khun Chumnong Gienarak's House Museum in the Samchuk Market community was established in 2002. The existence of Khun Chumnong Gienarak's House Museum is a result from a collaboration between the locals using the museum as a tool to reflect true values of their community history and identity as well as to revive the livelihoods of the Samchuk market yet again. This museum also received a support from the Lek-Prapai Viriyapant Foundation through the establishment of the Khun Chumnong Gienarak's House Museum. [13]

2.6.1 Museum Management

Concerning management of Khun Chumnong Gienarak's House museum, the place itself has been administered by the locals in the community while the museum and its area have been land owned by heirs of Khun Chumnong Gienarak, which granted board committees of the Samchuk Market to rent the properties.

2.6.2 Museum Appearances

The museum of Khun Chumnong Gienarak's House is currently located in Samchuk market, Suphanburi province. An ancient 3-storey wooden house where its design and construction influenced by traditional life style of Samchuk locals was then developed into museum.



Figure 9: Bann khun chumnongjeenarak museum

2.6.3 The Interpretation of the Museum

The exhibitions displayed, are distributed into two portions, in Khun Chumnong Gienarak's House Museum and the local historic market as the living museum. In the Khun Chumnong Gienarak's House Museum exhibits biography of Khun Chumnong Gienarak himself and his families and the origin of his house. Whereas, the display of the house includes bedroom, hallway, living room, etc. On the first floor of the house, the model of Samchuk market location and its historic stores are displayed. Explanations are presented in the form of charts and drawings as part of the exhibition.

In the local historic market as "living museum", traditions of the market could be observed by glancing through sellers and their goods, visitors can experience firsthand atmosphere of the past, however, new Samchuk market sellers were also seen there. From the observation, interestingly, more people tended to be interested in the market rather than Khun Chumnong Gienarak's House Museum.

2.6.4 Problems Found

After observing museum and its surroundings, it could be assumed that the exhibition of the museum's house and its owner are quite interesting and attention-grabbing but the museum area is a bit limited. Written descriptions of the display items are insufficient and no guide lecturers were provided. Volunteers, who take care of this museum, have been provided from the local community even some of the volunteers sold their products as well. The relationship between the locals in the community and the visitors are tightly bound when comparing to other mentioned communities in this research paper.

2.7 Amphawa Chaipattananurak, Samut Songkhram Province

Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn instructed the Chai Pattana Foundation to develop Amphawa Community in Samut Songkhram province land as an educational center, or the Amphawa Chai Pattana Nurak Conservation Project which was initiated in 2008. Khun Prayong Nakhawarung had offered a piece of land to this Project. [14]

2.7.1 The Museum Management

The development of Amphawa Chaipattana Nurak Project would be to the benefit of the Amphawa residents because one of its objectives is the conservation of Amphawa's cultural heritage and riparian community as well as promotion of community economic development. [15]

2.7.2 Museum Appearance

Museum of the Amphawa ChaipattanaNurak Conservation Project located in the Amphawa community, where its architectural design reflects the traditional identity of the locals and their modern ways of life. Community. Museum itself is located within the water market area belonging to the old market community. Currently, most local shops did not belong to the locals due to the fact that house rental fees are too expensive causing them to move away from the community.



Figure 10: Amphawa Chaipattananurak

2.7.3 Interpretation of the Museum

The museum of Amphawa ChaipattanaNurak Conservation Project is comprised of cultural exhibition hall, community shops, the coffee shop or “Chan Chala” and agricultural demonstration field [14]

The interpretation of Amphawa community database is to give information to the tourists about Amphawa at the administrative office. Whereas, exhibiting and vending history have been reflecting the Amphawa community's traditional ways of life. The exhibition itself has not been well-demonstrated and

display items are left-stranded. Many of them are put together in a pile and no one are interested in the items. In temporary exhibition room, many artworks, is reflected Amphawa community's traditional ways of life, displays by freelance artists. In addition, the local's demonstration of handicraft weaving with coconut leaves is also available for Thai and foreign tourists.

2.8 Ban Pak Mab Miniature Dock Museum



Figure 11 illustrates current conditions of Ban Pak Mab Miniature Dock Museum

This miniature dock museum was built in 1996. [16] The boat miniature manufacturing household business under the management of the Women and Youth Fishing Co-operative Group of Bang Jakreng Bangkeo (Miniature Dock) have already been closed due to the fact that the head of the craftsmen group already quit the job and found the new one somewhere else. No one wants to continue making the traditional miniature boats and sadly, now, there is no existence of exhibition to any further extent. [17]

2.9 Baan Khao Yisan Local Museum, Samut Songkram Province

The museum was established in 1996 by a group of local villagers who supported and helped collect antiques by themselves or by asking their community members to donate those antiques that they own and keep them at the temple for public exhibition. In fact, the ground floor of the temple hall was used for the exhibition permitted by the abbot. [18]

2.9.1 Museum Management

The community is current responsible for overseeing the Baan Khao Yisan Local Museum. Land and properties of the museum are land owned by the temple. The exhibition is organized both in the museum and in the community. The representatives from the community are curators of the museum while exhibition in the community will be hosted and guided by the local guide lecturers but prior contact to the museum should be arranged.

2.9.2 Museum Appearances

The museum of Ban Khao Yisan is currently located in Wat Khao Yi San, Yisan sub-district, Amphawa district, Samut Songkhram province. The architectural design of the museum is similar to that of the traditional one belonged to the temple. The exhibition is hosted to tell stories of the unique livelihood of Yisan people through both archeological and daily items and also the history of temple.



Figure 12 shows the architectural design of Ban Khao Yisan Local Museum

2.9.3 The Interpretation of the Museum

The interpretation of museum has been exhibited on the first and the second floor of the museum where the historic events of the community were told. On the first floor, the focus of exhibition will be based on the identity of how Yisarn people live. The display items exhibit on this floor are mostly donated by the people in the community while items are employed with name tags and their written descriptions. Besides the diorama of traditional charcoal kilns and community houses were also exhibited. On the second floor, geographical environment, historic events, and beliefs on “The Por Pu Sriracha guardian spirit of Yisarn community that have determined and influenced their way of life are also introduced. Local antiques and relics of Buddhism excavated in the area are exhibited either.

Historical temple, ways of life, traditions and surroundings of the community have also been exhibited as another part of museum interpretation.

2.9.4 Problems Found

From a survey, it could be said that the exhibitions inside the museum seemed to be very interesting, explanations on most display items are clear-cut but some of them are still ambiguous and complex and thus, guide lecturers should be provided. Most items on the second floor are excavated antiques, and historic collections belonged to the temple. Exhibiting mostly on the history of the community, the theme seems to be less exciting. “Concerning relationship between museum and the community, people seem to be uninterested with the museum and its exhibition. There are no activities involving the community with the museum. Occasionally, members of the museum board will meet up and discuss about museum’s problem and solutions.” [19]

2.10 Thai Courtesans Dolls Producing Centre, Ang Thong Province

The history of Thai Courtesans Dolls Producing Centre in Ang Thong province started by the people of Ban Bang Sadej who earned their living by growing rice and making bricks and joss-sticks. For so many years, they had to go through the floods which shattered their paddy field. After, H.M. the Queen had visited Ban Bang Sadej seeing that the river bank earth had made up of mixture of fat clay, she asked Fine Arts College instructors to try use those clay to hand make small dolls – small like courtesan dolls. The result was that a group of doll makers was formed, and skilled instructors were sent to Ban Bang Sadej to teach and train the people. That is how at the old sermon hall of Wat Ta Suthavas was born the occupation of Ban Bang Sadej courtesan dolls household industry. [20]

2.10.1 Museum Management

Financially supported mainly by the Governor's Office, and some other government bureaus as Office of

the National Economics and Social Development Board, this museum's properties, the Thai Courtesans Dolls Producing Centre, and the temple have been owned and administered by Ban Bang Sadej people. [21]

2.10.2 Museum Appearance

The architectural design of the museum is a modern one characterized by its 2-story Thai-style house built meant to use as a museum. "The community where the museum is situated has inherited traditional ways of agriculture as fish breeding, growing rice, making bricks and joss-sticks from their ancestors. Another way of making their livings is how locals learn to make courtesan dolls. Several families in the community produce different types of courtesans such as dolls, fruits, or even boats. After finish producing these courtesans, dolls will be sold to Thai Courtesans Dolls Producing Centre for further sales and distribution." [21]



Figure 13 shows the architectural building designs of both inside and Outside Thai Courtesans Dolls Producing Centre

2.10.3 The Interpretation of the Museum

Thai Courtesans Dolls Producing Centre conveys Thai traditional ways of culture and livings dated back in the past.

The ground floor is the working area of the doll makers, where signs telling visitors how a courtesan doll made is noticeable. Besides, demonstration and training of Courtesans Dolls making will be available for those visitors who are interested in the activities and Courtesans Dolls are also sold.

The second floor is the exhibition place divided into two zones, one is for exhibiting and telling the stories of how Thai people in the past have come to be engaged in the pottery business, and how they Traditional Thai Army using models as storytellers. The models are placed on showcases but without any descriptive museum labels. The second zone is a room where model of dolls made by her Royal *Highness Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn and Princess Bajrakitiyabha have been exhibited.*

2.11 Khun Samut Chin Museum Samut Prakan Province.

Khun Samut Chin museum has been established in 2007 by the supports of the local people in terms of how they excavated and donated those antiques such as dishes and plates, earthenwares, kitchen wares, remains of kiln, as well as jewelry, and ancient Thai coins, etc. The purpose for the locals to establish this museum was to construct a place to help educate the people and a place where nature is preserved sustainably. In fact, before the existence of this museum, the community had also organized a debate on its establishment. [22]

2.11.1 The Museum Management

The museum has been run by the community while its ownership rights on its land and properties also fall into the hand of the people in the community. When asking for the inheritor of the museum, no one claims to be one of them. [23]

2.11.2 Museum Appearance

The Khun Samut Chin museum is situated on the village chief's land in Samut Prakarn province. The building architectural design is considered to be of modern and the construction of the building is intended for using it as a museum. The community around the museum seems to look traditional. The area where excavated antiques were found are facing environmental problems in terms of deteriorating land by seawater around the coastal area. This phenomenon has caused the people to lose their homes, schools, temples, and their agricultural area and that is why many locals in the area have to move away to somewhere else time and time again. [23]



Figure 14: Khun Samut Chin museum

2.11.3 The Museum Interpretation

The museum has displayed the history of Khun Samut traditions and antiques that were found in the area. The interpretation of the museum has been divided into two areas: the museum itself and in the community. Before visiting the museum, the chief village will be explaining the community's historical interests as well as its antiques found in the area, and the establishment of the museum. The place where the chief introduced his stories was his house. The way he explained his points was by using pictures and objects as well as telling his own personal experience and referring from his research studies.

In the museum, display items excavated from the area and those that were donated from locals have been exhibited in the museum's showcase cabinets according to the item's names alphabetically. However, small descriptions are unclearly provided on the label while those written messages are sometimes too small to see. Some of the display items as baskets are stacked on top of each other without any labels provided and therefore, those items are unknown from their background history. Besides having antiques, the museum also displays agricultural tools and equipment that belong to the people in the community.

In the community, not only museum exhibits excavated items but also the way of traditional life of the people are presented. Young guide lecturers will be helping explain the background history of the community. These middle school young guides have been trained by school teachers. They will be describing and explaining about important places and educating activities as mangrove forestation and shell gathering.

2.12 Pracha Suksan Arts and Crafts Centre and Phra Sumetha Thibodi's biography Museum, Lopburi Province

"Somdej Phra Maha Sumethathibodi or Samdech Chuon Nath had established Pracha Suksan Arts and Crafts Centre in 1992 with the purpose of helping the poor or unemployed people get a permanent career. In the center, there are a convention hall, a training facility, and a residence for dharma meditation including A Tai Puan club of Ban Mee." [24] At the time of Somdej Phra Maha Sumethathibodi's management there were many local people participating and helping organize textile crafting activities for the benefits of the community. Unfortunately, however, after Somdej Phra Maha Sumethathibodi passed away, less and less locals have presented disinterests in the activity. At the moment, only 3 to 4 people are still continuing the textile crafting and their works are kept in the storage room inside the center. [25]

2.12.1 Museum Management

Presently, ownership of land and buildings of Pracha Suksan Arts and Crafts Centre and Phra Sumetha Thibodi's biography Museum has been obtained by the descendants of Somdej Phra Maha Sumethathibodi who have been managing and financially supporting the center. [25]

2.12.2 Museum Appearance

Within the area of Pracha Suksan Arts and Crafts Centre and Phra Sumetha Thibodi's biography Museum, its area has been separated into two parts: Pracha Suksan Park which is a residential area and camping grounds while another area is where the Pracha Suksan building is situated. On the ground floor of this building, there are only 3 to 4 locals crafting the textiles and selling them. Besides, Thai Puan exhibition, monument, and Phra Sumetha Thibodi's biography Museum have not yet to be opened for Somdej Phra Maha Sumethathibodi's item displays.



Figure 15: Pracha Suksan Arts and Crafts Centre and Phra Sumetha Thibodi's biography Museum

2.12.4 Interpretation of Museum

The interpretation of museum gives its importance to the biography of Somdej Phra Maha Sumethathibodi and Thai locals called 'Puan' but not the importance of the local community learning. Museum interpretation outlines the importance of important persons, traditional ways of life, intellects, and display item presentation. Item collections are exhibited imitating real life experience as well as displaying in showcase cabinets.

2.13 Local Museum of Thai Bueng Baan KhokSalung, Lopburi Province

Thai Bueng Khok Salung Folk Museum was officially established in 2000 due to the fact that Thai Bueng community living around Pasak Jolasid Dam area was affected by the dam construction causing Thai

Bueng people to leave their houses and move away from the area. Having fear of losing their traditions and traditional means of livelihood, after a public debate in 1998, local people decided to establish the Thai Bueng Khok Salung Folk Museum in an attempt to preserve their own identities and cultural heritage for the future generation. The concept of managing this museum can be concluded that if museum is where items are exhibited, people go there and leave, this means the museum is considered to be dead. The purpose of running this museum according to the museum's leading group, is to give more opportunities to the people to participate in museum's activities so the museum will always be alive and this could eventually attract people to come. [26]

2.13.1 Museum Management

Presently, ownership of land and building of Thai Bueng Khok Salung Folk Museum has been obtained by the local community while museum management team are from the local people. [27] The management team has been giving their importance to reviving their traditions and traditional intellects through the process of educating not only to the locals but also to children in local schools to be aware of values of their local identity. In fact, educational activities as culture, traditions, and ways of living are also introduced to the visitors of Thai Bueng Khok Salung Folk Museum.

2.13.2 Museum Appearance

The newly built Thai Bueng Khok Salung Folk Museum located in Ban Kuai sub-district, Ban Mi district, Lop Buri province, has been imitating its architectural design from traditional local houses' design as well as other traditional traces. Museum facilities has been divided into two buildings: one for local shopping stores and the other for educating, training, and organizing activities for the local people. In fact, the place is also arranged for the homestay. The museum also organizes annual activities during special occasions for the locals. The community has inherited its culture from the Thai Bueng ethnic groups whereas the people tend to use their community as a place for educating visitors.



Figure 16 shows the architectural building designs of Thai Bueng Khok Salung Folk Museum and museum's activities

2.13.3 The Interpretation of Museum

The interpretation of the museum has been conveyed through facts and information from researchers and older generations on history, culture, tradition and local intellects of Thai Bueng Khok Salung people. The museum interpretation can be divided into two areas: The first area is located in the local museum which has imitated its architectural design from traditional Thai Bueng house called "Ruen Fa Koh". The house represents the past existence of the Thai Bueng people, unfortunately, there are no Thai Bueng living in the community any longer. Museum exhibition has been displayed on two floors. On the first floor, exhibition of Culture, traditions, and ways of living of Thai Bueng Khok Salung people are described

on large museum labels with pictures and written descriptions on them. Also on this first floor, exhibition grounds have also been used for demonstration of textile weaving using ancient looms, making of Thai traditional crispy pancake, Thai traditional hanging mobile called, “Puang Mahot”, etc. On the second floor, the “Fah Koh” Thai Bueng house has been displayed on its exterior and interior designs including its balcony, bedroom, and its well-organized kitchen. Display antiques of the locals as rifles, potteries, and other types of utensils have also been exhibited since the very first start of the museum.

The second area of exhibition is displayed in the community where visitors can experience the locals’ way of living and their history as well as various types of Thai Bueng intellects such as knife-making, traditional mat weaving, traditional toy making and basket weaving. In fact, demonstration of making prophesy, singing folk songs are exhibited in different parts of the community.

The collaboration between local schools in Khok Salung community and museum have immensely been supporting and promoting students to experience and learn Thai traditional cooking inside the classroom.




Figure 17: Relationship between museum and community

2.13.4 Problems Found

After field research survey in in Khok Salung community, it could be found that the relationship between the museum and the locals are being made. Visitors who come to see the museum can join the house of the intellect masters who are still working and ready for their work demonstration. However, there are some concerns involving community management, community feelings, and the presentation of facts based on exhibition to the visitors.

2.14 Historic House Charoen Chai Community, Bangkok Province

The Historic House Charoen Chai Community museum was officially opened in September 2011. It can be said that the museum was originated from the feeling of uncertainty experienced by the people in the neighborhood, due to the presence of the MRT underground station scheduled to be constructed in this area and to make way for the project, a number of houses in the community will be removed. At the same time, the landlord who later established the Chumbhot-Pantip Foundation and owned a house No.

32, had decided to develop the area into a learning center that emphasizes Chinese people' way of life in Charoen Chai Community, as well as preserves the value of this community's traditions, life styles, businesses, culture and architecture. [28]

2.14.1 Museum Management

The Historic House Charoen Chai Community museum is currently managed by the community while the museum's land and property ownership rights belong to the Chumbhot-Pantip Foundation

2.14.2 Museum Appearance

The museum's architectural design is considered to be of traditional imitating its artistry from the local houses in the community. The community around the museum offers uniqueness of Chinese traditional livelihoods within the old market called "Talad Bok" where many Chinese are living and carrying out their works. Unfortunately, at the moment, the impact of MRT subway construction are still critical to the community.



Figure 18 shows the pictures of The Historic House Charoen Chai Community museum

2.14.3 The Museum Interpretation

Regarding interpretation of a 2-story one the Historic House Charoen Chai Community museum, the building has been divided into two zones. The first floor is considered to be used as a reception zone while the second floor is for exhibition. In the past, the second story was being used as residential place for a group of Chinese opera. Fortunately, clothing's are still kept there for display. In the reception zone, there are some old-time things given by fellow residents while on the walls, some photos of the Charoen Chai community in the past are exhibited. On those pictures, there are descriptive labels explaining in detail.

2.14.4 Problems Found

From field survey, it could be said that the museum exhibition is spectacular both for its interesting story telling and exhibitions. Due to the small exhibition area, however, picture and posters are used for displaying instead of display items and collections. After looking at those pictures, interests of the researcher was provoked. Nevertheless, from prior information gathering, the museum was told to be more like a traditional community museum but in reality, the community was more like a place for trading and no one wanted to give any information relating to the museum. The management of museum was left unclear of who is responsible for running the museum while officially open and closed

time of the museum was ambiguous. For the maintenance of the museum, locals who lived and sold their things in the area were mostly too busy to help and support the museum. From the researcher's perspective, there are signs of museum's degradation both physically and psychologically.

3. Conclusion: The Existence of 14 Local Museums Located in the Central Region of Thailand

From field surveys, it was found that the establishments of these local museums were based on social and political as well as environmental and geographical factors. Some of these museums had also been established related to the concepts of exhibiting life histories of the honorable famous people, displaying of antiquities and excavated collections within the community area and helping support the locals financially.

3.1 Museum Management

During the initial stage of local museum establishment, the supports of the locals have been primarily staged in terms of their item contributions and museum construction. However, again from field surveys, it was also found that, at present, there are four types of groups that take their part in administrating the museums: community, temple, foundation, and individuals.

3.2 Museum Appearance

3.2.1 The Architectural Designs of the Museum Buildings have been Divided into 5 Types:

1) preservation of traditional architectural designs of community local house by designating them as museums 2) newly built museums with contemporary designs 3) newly build museums imitating traditional architectural designs from the community 4) the community temple as museum exhibiting community stories 5) traditional houses and newly built houses as museums to reflect integration of modern and traditional architecture

3.2.2 The community of local museums are characterized into 3 different types:

ethnic village, old market community, and community as archeological site

3.2.3 Two types of museum importance are given:

3.2.3.1 The importance is given to only just its building constructions and area located within the community

3.2.3.2 The importance is given to the museum buildings, area, and community where it is located. The benefits of giving this importance is to help educating the community about their local culture and traditions.

3.3 The Interpretation of the Local Museum

3.3.1 Content

The Information of display collections exhibited inside the museums has been collected from the field survey of the researchers in collaboration of the local community. When categorizing bits and pieces of information, it could be assumed that each different community has its own unique identity as in

geography, social environment, ways of living and intellects, culture and traditions, dressing, people, spoken language, job and working tools, cultural heritage, ritual, supernatural belief, traditional food, folk plays, history and legends, etc. However, contents in the museum are well-interpreted or not depending on how much information is being researched and studied.

3.3.2 Ways of Interpretation and how Museums Exhibit them

From the field survey information, it could be found that exhibitions have been displayed both inside and outside the museums, whereas, guides of the museums are locals. There were annual festivals and special occasions hosted by the local communities including educational activities based on their traditional intellects were being presented to other communities such as handicraft works.

Local museums have made their interpretation of local community's importance for younger generations, locals, visitors, government sectors, and private sectors. This will help educate and raise the people awareness of community's solidarity and unity while government and private sectors will be encouraged and responding back to support the museums financially.

3.4 Problems Found Affecting the Existence of Local Museum

After conducting field surveys on 14 museums located in the central area of Thailand, there were two problems found. Apparently, being unable to have good planning for museum is one of the significant problem. Planning on finding museum curators went missing, no systematic plan for museum administration was being established, and no financial funds for the museum's activities as well as museum's specialists and designers were being supported either from the government sectors or private sectors, not to mention how museum's administration and maintenance were lack. The opening and closing time of museum is yet to be another problem.

Interpretation planning is considered be a second problem. Without good interpretation planning, activities inside the museums were not performed continuously and docent were not sufficient enough to help interpret the local community's interesting features as well as the contents of the museums were harder to understand while the exhibitions were presented uninterestingly.

3.5 Suggestions on the Sustainability Strategies of Local Museum Existence

The sustainability strategies of the 14 local museum existence are depending on two factors. The management of the museum should be involved by the locals while continuous improvement plan should be applied to museum's management strategies including finding curators and promoting activities. Besides, collaboration between government sectors and private sectors to help support the museum educationally and financially should be established. Moreover, planning to help educate the locals and visitors also needed to be promoted to raise the awareness of the locals and their love towards the community as well as to make rules and regulations among the locals. The second factor is interpretation. Content and information should be reliable while sequencing of the content and presentation should be easy to follow and able to apply those knowledge for future use effectively.

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The Return of the Oppressed: Rethinking and Retracing the Queer Power of Ween in Thai College Communities

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Abstract

In every state of life, one requires to identify him/herself as an individual or a group member to express the identity and existence in certain community and society. At Chiang Mai University, there is Ween, an independent student association that recruits male college students who regard themselves as the transgender (Kra Tei) to conduct activities, including welcoming ceremony, Queen beauty pageant, and Ween Show. All of these are the quest and the rite of passage of transgender students to become the real Ween who can openly dress in female school uniform despite the normative heterosocial discourses in Thai society in which Ween is regarded as marginalized body; their oppressed queerness has undergone the lack of agency. However, a question has been raised whether voicing Ween's agency become another dominant group of surveillance system among their peers and other college communities while hazing is ritualized and performed to create sisterhood and friendship. To explain this phenomenon, hermeneutic approach has been employed to interpret and unfold their performances and gendered performativity. Therefore, this research will investigate the concept of power construction and the crash and repetition of queer oppression among Thai college students. When Ween members transfer the oppression to the new group members (freshmen), the desire of power is repeatedly replaced by another (new) form of dominance to maintain their seniority system structure.

Keywords: Queer, Power, Thai College

“The **oppressed**, instead of striving for liberation, tend themselves to **become oppressors**.” Freire (1972)

Mapping the “Power”

Most often, oppression is defined as a set of policies, practices, traditions, norms, definition, and explanations (discourse) which functions systematically exploit one social group to benefit of another social group. It is almost inevitable to discuss the concept of oppression without investigating the idea of power structure and its construction and, indeed, the hegemony and discourse of power that circulate the cycle of oppressive hierarchical system in human paradigm of being in the actuality of society. Social classes, religious classification, gender categorization -- these are all the products of societal mystification; where power has been constituted to control, survey, and tame its members to not to “stray from the path.” Once the power is exercised in the wrong turn, there will be the oppressors and the oppressed coexisting the communal space.

Exploring cultural geography of Thailand, people all around the world might have an image of the country of smiles in which people are very gentle and friendly towards each other and “the others”. There are beliefs, values, practices and so on that construct the idea of “Thai-ness” in various dimensions such as seniority, communality and the sense of kinship (sisterhood/brotherhood) in Thai communal society. Traditionally, we are taught to pay respect to the elders; for example, we have to bow down our heads when we walk pass them, we have to put *ka* and *krab* in the end of the sentence for the sake of “Thai” politeness and most importantly we greet each other with *wai* (a gesture of putting two hands together to pay respect). These practices have not only play essential role in macro society but also the exercise the values upon the micro communities as well – the college communities of Chiang Mai University.

Sattayanurak (2008) comments on the “Thainess” especially the looking at the post-modern Thai society, the knowledge or discourse on “Thainess” as established by government-supported intellectuals and propagated through the media and government-regulated school system remains highly influential, and is “highly respected” by teachers and students. This structure embraces the so-called rituals in the school. For decades, students of Chiang Mai University have tremendous traditions that have been passed on from one generation to another. We have a well-known initial rite of (*kuen doy*) where the freshmen have to walk up to Suthep Mountain in order to become the real CMU students or (*look chang*). By encoding the signifier of being a student, the first-year students are asked to wear school uniforms in order to remain “legitimate” and “polite” during school time.

Historically, from pre-modern Siam’s royal elites react to the gender construction by using state instrumentalities to modernize the look of genderscape. Jackson (2009) refers this biopower regime included the regendering of men’s and women’s dress codes, speech forms, and personal names. In responding to Western critiques of “semi-barbarous” androgyny, the Siamese state drew on new forms of power to institute a regime of European-styled masculine-feminine gender differentiation. That is the forms of power that Foucault identified as the source of the homosexual/heterosexual divide in Europe were adapted in Siam to institute a masculine/feminine gender binary across cultural fields that

previously had not been strongly marked by gender difference.

Since it is crucially related to the genderscape of Thailand, one notion of Thai culturescape is almost regarded as a taboo in our society – gender(s) and sexuality(ies). According to conventional Thai normative paradigm, desire is something that should not be critically criticized and discussed in public. It is almost impossible not to mention about power relations constituted and (still) constituting hierarchical system, not only in terms of age and social classes but also gender construction, among Thai citizens – we are now landed in the land of “(gendered) seniority system”. From the Foucault’s point of view, in his late life, he is more focusing on the personal space rather than his public space. He is pointed out on the counter power of self as written in his work “The History of Sexuality Vol I: An Introduction (1976) as the way sexuality is structuralized from the public versus personal point of view. He stated that gender is not naturalized but rather is a foster of social structure for example in the 17th - 18th century where Christianity are governing the pure gender. Foucault argued that individuality are self-constructed and where most of us can totally control our representation. He also said that self is an invention where we invent one’s self of our own.

Seen (and oppressed by) from the normative notion of heterosexuality that genders and sexes should exist in only two spheres -- male and female according the biological features, queer movement has emerged in order to subvert this hierarchical mentality on gender and sexuality. Most importantly, one of the groups usually seen being oppressed is queer, from the study (Mason & Barr, 2006). For this reason, is it possible to conclude that those with negative attitudes towards the excluded gender are more likely to be religious, politically conservative, and less well educated, and to have authoritarian personalities and traditional gender role beliefs?

In Thai, *kathoe*y is a general term encompassing all third gender categories, theoretically referencing all non-normative gender presentations and sexualities beyond heterosexual male and female. However, in practice, *kathoe*y seldom refers to female-bodies individuals, regardless of their gender expression. Retracing the historical record, Jackson found that the modernizing Thai state had enforced a restructuring of normative gender culture that largely ignored homosexuality and transgenderism until the 1970s and 1980s (Jackson, 2003). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Foucauldian forms of biopower had indeed been instituted in Thailand via the reformation of laws, education, and other domains. However, the aim of these reforms was to refashion heteronormative male and female genderings as “civilized” and “modern” rather than to establish normative patterns of sexual behavior.

Conducting this research, the terms “political correctness” is truly crucial, especially the positionality of the “speaker” having either etic or emic point of view or even employing “appropriate” analysis of gendered subject. In this research, the question about queer power of college community in Chiang Mai will be explored in three dimensions: what are the doings (the acts), who are the doers (the subjects in queer community) and why and how they have been done (the acts and subjects). The researchers aim to explore queer power in Thai college community in Chiang Mai through multi-dimensional lens of gender studies in order to demystify the power relation of the Oppressor and the Oppressed in Ween community embodied with the oppressing discourse of gender struggle in Chiang Mai University so that the “agency” and “voices” of the students who regard themselves as queer, trans, bi or even the

individuals without any gender classification can be genuinely created providing spaces and including people with differences in this diverse community.

Ween Performativity and the Performances

Ween is a group by students in the university club that is queer-male only. In Ween community whose oppression resulted by traditional societal practices and a cliché stereotype of *kathoey* should be someone creative, funny and loudly expressive. For many Ween students in Chiang Mai University, there are subgroups of Ween communities which are be divided briefly as the Big Ween (วินใหญ่), the circle that recruits all Ween members from every faculty in Chiang Mai University; and the Small Ween (วินเล็ก), the Ween group from each faculty which is claimed to be “more friendly and funnier than the big one”. Beginning since the freshman year when entering the university the all male students are grouped together by the sophomore to do the activities, then the Ween sophomore will select the freshmen from the male group and put them in Ween initial rite process. One important notion that should be discussed here is the concept of performativity through the perspective of J.L. Austin, a language philosopher, who introduced the term “performativity” as a part of speech act theory and Judith Butler in “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory”, a gender theorist. Austin explained that in communication and speech act, there are terms: “performative sentence” or “performative utterance”. In short, “a performative” means speech and utterance can perform an action. He wrote, “the name is derived, of course, from ‘perform’, the usual verb with the noun ‘action’: it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something” (Austin, 1962).

From the notion of J.L. Austin on *performativity* that action itself will not be initiated or, sometimes, legitimated until it is uttered from the authorized individual, one process of Ween group that echoes the idea of Austin’s performativity is “naming” the group members after the selection process. At the very first stage of entering Ween, the process of coming out by letting the students to close their eyes and literally coming out of their male peers. They also provide the Ween shirt when the Ween members pass their one-year task. After they have been selected to be the “participants” the freshmen have to perform something in front of everyone and let the senior members decide what they should call the young ones according to their performances (the names can be very creative, funny or even arbitrary).

Starting with their new nicknames, they become their “names” written on the name tags (instead of their real names) the freshmen would wear with their school uniform in order to identify who they are among the crowd. In the same token, this is also the *Rite of Passage*[1] of the newcomers as well. Ween hold strong belief in the idea of coming out and going in. The whole process of Ween initial rite takes a whole year before new Ween members will be accepted by the seniors as known as the Sisters, the ritual of transmitting sisterhood. After being hazed and scolded to form and establish the unity of the group, the newcomers will be granted permission to dress as women and titled as the real Ween at the end of the whole ritualistic process.

In addition, there are many other events that are organized by Ween members. Many Ween students participate in almost every school activities such as being the hosts of the special events, holding a fun

and very creative initial rite for the freshmen, organizing colorful events. One of the well-known events, from the Ween, is their pageant competition, the students were using the stage to perform their pageantry -- beauty or funny or power statement to the public mostly to their peers. From observation at the event, we can see most of the ween club are gather to the catwalk that announce the power of the oppressed. After the show, the winner received the titled will be holding the crown for years. There is also another important event that Ween perform annually since 2010 -- Ween show. The performance was originated by Ween Club organized by Ween students in the university to portray the performance in various aspects for example variety shows, skits, and dances. Most of the students are included in the stage management from front to back stage. The collections of the show are mostly about the theme that is all about the forbidden love of the queer group. The storylines are ended with tragedy, funny, and some are taking part in social satire.



A Scene from Ween Show

Together with Butler's explanation on gender performativity, she proposed the idea of performativity as it is the acts of an individual that constructs his/her gendered body instead of the physical and biological gender that attached with the person since s/he was born.

To do, to dramatize, to reproduce, these seem to be some of the elementary structures of embodiment. This doing of gender is not merely a way in which embodied agents are exterior, surfaced, open to the perception of others. Embodiment clearly manifests a set of strategies or what Sartre would perhaps have called a style of being or Foucault, 'a stylistics of existence'...

Consider gender, for instance, as a corporeal style, an ‘act,’ as it were, which is both intentional and performative, where ‘performative’ itself carries the double-meaning of ‘dramatic’ and ‘non-referential’ (Butler, 1988).

From this notion, before being allowed to express their gender identity as in either female or male appearance through wearing school uniform according to their gender performativity, the students require to cross the threshold of this gender ritual annually. After the freshmen receive their title, they will be the sophomores (Big Sisters) initiating the ritual in the following year – producing the cycle of queer group formation and passing it on to the next generation. How Butler coined the term “performativity” with the explanation of **what we do constitutes and defines who or what we are** reflects why the students need ritual and performances in Ween community in order to form and perform their gender identity. From this point, the new names become the signifiers of their new identity as Ween; verbal performativity of the Ween power here, thus, constructs the space of queer power and the identity as an individual who truly embrace who s/he really is (coming out) and as one (going in) of the Ween sisters.



Miss Queen MassComm 2016 - Ween Beauty Pageant

One example that echoes Ween performativity is when one question has been asked to a contestant in Miss Queen Mass Comm 2016 that “to be born as a woman being loved and to be born as a *kathoey* but never received love from the others, what would you choose?” and the answer is that she chose to be a *kathoey* as she is proud to be who she actually is. Her answer illustrates a genuine perspective on how

many kathoeys embrace femininity embedded in their manner and physical appearance, but they do not claim that they are women (however many of *kathoeys* in Thailand claim themselves as woman inwardly and outwardly). From this, the actions (of their choices) manifest their performative body of Ween (and queer). Joining Ween activities, Miss Queen Mass Comm for instance, their participation and commitment enables them to create and exercise their agency and gender identity through the rite of passage of Ween group.

Queering Ween Power

Being called *Khun Mae* (คุณแม่ or ขุ่่นแม่), the notion of “being the Mother as in *kathoeys* community” also reflects the structure of Ween group as Mother Clanship established among the members functions as **authoritative figure** taking care the young ones. Suesat and Buddharaksa wrote in their research on “Mother Clanship” in Thai-kathoeys *Mor Lam* community that building unity and creating network among *kathoeys* are very crucial for their communities in order to maintain their existence in Thai society. Nonetheless, this patronage system does not only convey the strong bond of Ween sisterhood, but also unveils the power relation of the oppressors towards the oppressed.

This queer power can be analyzed through the concept of “Panopticon” according to Foucault’s critique:

In Bentham’s schema, the Panopticon represented a central tower, surrounded by a circular building comprising cells, each containing an individual inmate and open to view by a single overseer located in the tower. This was not only efficient in that one person could oversee a large number of inmates. It was also effective in the sense that, according to Bentham, the simple fact that inmates knew that they might be watched at any moment was sufficient to modify and control their behavior. Vision, here in the form of the overseers gaze operated at the distance as a mode of power (Gunn, 2006).

Foucault talks about how power can be a surveillance system, this group is the 21st-century Panopticon where system is not built as a constructed buildings but power portrays itself and projects itself as an invisible institution (Foucault,1980) where the oppressors are able to suppress the oppressed. Revisiting Ween process of the initial rite, there are certain rules for the newcomers to follow them very strictly, for instance, the freshmen cannot wear makeup at anytime; their hair (both long and short hair) must be tied up and neatly pinned with bobby pins; they cannot engage any relationship with another man; they cannot take female hormone pills; and most importantly they cannot absolutely discuss Ween process with the outsiders at any circumstances. All of these restrictions for Ween participants are likely to be the surveillant eyes of the seniors whose monitoring system is applied to the freshmen throughout the initial process. Some of them will be verbally abused during the nights of Ween gathering; some even endured with physical abused when they do not pay respect to the seniors or secretly do something behind their back.

During daytime, the Panopticon mode of “moral conduct” will be activated to monitor the members, and in the night time, for those who do not obey the rules will be punished according to their “wrong” deeds. The circle of sisterhood gathering, at this point, becomes a secret dungeon where Ween power and

violence are exercised to forcefully “encourage” the newcomers to help one another to survive their tasks each night until they are tamed and behaved in certain ways Ween should be and they will be liberated from the ritualistic conducts eventually. These methods which is claimed to “unite” them as a group, Ween group itself is designed to “take care” of their own kind but in the same token it is designed to keep an eye on their kind as well which is similar to the concept of Panopticon -- the oppressing gaze of surveillance system towards Ween members.

Retracing the Oppressing Return - Beyond the Border of Gender Boundaries

During the interview with Ween (both Big and Small Ween) students, one of the answer we have is the physical contact during Ween gathering is required, because all young Weens used to be the top (ตัวแม่/ตัวท็อป) of the school (in terms of how they express themselves as kathoey). They have to reduce their ego and help each other to survive from the tasks. Referring back to Thai genderscape, gendered positionality seems to be more recognized and acceptable. However, what tends to be only the tip of the iceberg of gender and sexuality oppression in Thailand is that this paradigm of homosexuality is sexualized and objectified through several Thai media as we can see from TV. The projection of gender expression, here, is genuinely stereotypical and repeated over and over. Comparing with the image of Ween as seen through their stories from Ween Show, all of them end up with death or tragic love, and most importantly kathoeys are the ones who always make people laugh from their comical and farcical manner. Even worse, heterosexual male actors in Ween Show are merely well-rounded characters, but only the toys for Ween actors, especially the seniors, to play with. These are the reflection of the stereotypical queer in Thai college communities which is not always legitimate and even worsens the situation of queer movement in Thailand in larger image.

One of our students told us about how he has to hide his sexual and gender identity whenever he goes back home to rural area. He said, “people would not line up with you if they know that you are not a ‘man’.” This, we argue, is the mentality of Thai middle-class towards the non-binaries which is still very conventional and biased. According to Freud’s “The Return of the Repressed”, it is a process of repressing one’s trauma as a defense mechanism, but this repression will return and distort its form to hunt and haunt that particular person. Coining this notion with the situation and actuality of Thai queer movement, what seems to be the biggest eye of the surveillance is not the Ween seniors who have been constructing their gender and identity discourse, but they actually are the “product” of the most oppressing Panopticon mode is Thai paradigm of gender binary of femininity and masculinity, as Megan Sinnott wrote in her work “the more traditional understanding of what is now called ‘homosexuality’ in Thailand relies on the primacy of gender (visible markers of masculinity or femininity) rather than sexual behavior per se” (Sinnott 2002). Instead of breaking through this constructed gender mystification, Ween communities, at this point, are unable to cross this threshold and fall back to the regime of their “queer” dictatorship. Further, their mentality of the oppressed and practices of the oppressors always circulate and pass on from generation to the next. Ween power itself becomes only a reaction towards gender inequality, not a reflection of power misconceptualization. As Simon Gunn claims “furthermore, how are yourself what's not to be regarded solely as an instrument of repression or domination but as

the circulating omnipresent force, neither good nor evil. Consequently, resistance - the talisman of radical politics and history -- was not the opposite of power but its corollary" (Gunn, 2006).

We, as the researchers and their teachers, realized that we saw that seniority system can only extend its virtue and righteousness when it is recognized not by force but with understanding and empathy that makes human humane. What we actually notice from this phenomenon is a gender violence and violation that has been passed its value to the younger ones for years. Diversity of gender performativity is needed in college communities and also should be embraced and exercised for the marginalized and absolutely for everyone in the society. If the term "queer" make themselves queer and alienated from the normative life, the sense of inclusiveness for every kind of queer is needed for our society as Judith Butler provides her suggestion:

To be a participant in politics, to become part of concerted and collective action, one need not only make the claim for equality, but one needs to act and petition within the terms of equality. The "I" is thus at once a "we", without being fused into an impossible unity. To be a political actor is a function, a feature of acting on terms of equality with other humans. Equality is a condition and character of political action itself at the same time that it is its goal (Butler, 2009).

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[1] Victor Turner, a cultural anthropologist who had been working symbols in the stages of rituals, uses the term the Rite of Passage to illustrate the functions and stages of rituals. Initially, a French ethnographer and folklorist Arnold van Gennep coined the term the *Rites of Passage* (Les Rites de Passage) to explain rites and rituals that construct position, definition and status of an individual, especially the growing up process of a person. In this sense the rites of passage the transitional phrase between childhood and adulthood. (Turner 1995, 79).

Deviation in Language Use and the Misperception of Minorities: A Case Study on the Use of Thai Final Particles by Shan People

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Abstract

Shan people are one of the minority groups in Thailand who are often downtrodden by Thai people. Shans are often deprived of their rights and social welfare benefits. Moreover, through the use of Thai language, mainstream media often portray them as uneducated and associate them to violence. Many studies on language and minorities focus on how Thai people use their own language to create a negative perception of the minorities and how the power of Thai people is maintained through such language use. However, based on our survey, the language used by minorities could be a factor causing them to be misperceived since language use and politeness are key criteria for differentiating whether an individual is Thai or non-Thai or educated or uneducated. Therefore, in this study we investigate the issue of language and minorities from a different perspective. That is, we investigate the use of Thai final particles, the units of language that convey politeness, by Shans. Since most Shans learn Thai after their critical period and from an informal learning situation (e.g., from daily routines), it is hypothesized that the Shans might not be able to use final particles in a native-like way. We discuss how such deviation in language use makes utterances of Shan appear impolite, and thus, creates a misperception of them. The expected contribution of this study is to promote better understanding of Shan people, which in turn might promote their standard of living in the future.

Keyword: minority; Shan; Thai; language use; final particles

Introduction

Most Shan people live in Shan State, Burma, but for decades these groups of people have poured into Thailand to flee political persecution or to seek better job opportunities. However, their lives in Thailand are not a bed of roses as their wages are often lower than the minimum rate stated by law. Moreover, not all Shans get social welfare benefits, and even if they do, there are still some benefits, such as unemployment insurance and pension that they lack as these are restricted only to Thai citizens (see Boonlert, 2009; Senanimit & Ekiem, 2014, and references therein for related discussion). Besides,

although by Thai law education is one of the basic rights that Shans should have access to, in reality they rarely receive a proper education (see Senanimit & Ekiem, 2014, for related discussion). Apart from being deprived of rights, the Thai media often portray the Shan in a negative light. Based on an informal survey of 20 native Thai speakers, it was found that 45% of the respondents know about Shan people mainly from the news and perceive them to be uneducated, violent and often associated with crime. Such perception, in turn, provokes racial discrimination. In order to help Thai people have a better understanding of Shan people, which in turn will help tackle the racial discrimination problem, causes of misperception have to be identified first.

Based on the results of the informal survey mentioned above, 95% of native Thai speakers use deviation of language use as a main criterion to differentiate Thais from non-Thais, and 70% of the respondents believe that politeness is a key characteristic of educated or having high social status. Such results imply that language use might be one of the causes of misperception, making people wrongly believe that an individual is uneducated or impolite. To illustrate, since some Shans who work in Thailand started learning Thai after the age of puberty, it might be hard for them to acquire and use Thai in a native-like way (see Lenneberg, 1967, 1969; Johnson & Newport, 1989; Hakuta, Bialystok, & Willey, 2003, for related discussion on the *critical period hypothesis*). Moreover, since they learn Thai in mostly informal situations (versus being formally instructed), they might be unaware of some linguistic aspects of language; and therefore, their language use may deviate from standard Thai. Such deviation of Thai language could cause Thais to misunderstand them, making them think that they are uneducated, although some of them are reported to be educated as they had enrolled in Burmese schools before migrating to Thailand.

According to Cai and Wang (2013), second language learners, even advanced learners, often fail to acquire pragmatic knowledge (i.e., the appropriate use of language in relation to context) of the target language, and native speakers of the target language often consider utterances with pragmatic mistakes more unacceptable than any kind of mistake. Seeing that pragmatic knowledge of the target language plays an important role in language use, this study focuses on the acquisition of Thai final particles, the use of which requires pragmatic knowledge. In particular, the study focuses on the use of the final particles *ná?* and *sì?* as these two particles are associated with politeness (Iwasaki & Ingkaphirom, 2009), a feature that the respondents of the informal survey used for judging the education and social status of individuals.

In this study, we investigate how the Shans use *ná?* and *sì?* and how such use is different from the use of *ná?* and *sì?* by native Thai speakers. We then, discuss how deviation of the use of *ná?* and *sì?* can cause Thai people to perceive Shans as uneducated and impolite. For the presentation of this article, first we will review the knowledge about Thai final particles with a focus on *ná?* and *sì?*. Next, we will review the use of Thai final particles by native Thai speakers. After that, we will report the data collected from the Shan people. These data are divided into two parts, including role-plays aiming to elicit the use of *ná?* and *sì?*, and a multiple-choice test aiming to investigate the overall ability to use Thai final particles. Lastly, we will discuss the use of Thai final particles by the Shan people as compared to the use by native Thai speakers showing the possibility of how such use can create a misperception of the Shan people.

Thai Final Particles

According to Prasithrathsint (2010), final particles are words that appear at the end of utterances and have no syntactic relationship with other words in utterances. Although final particles are not important in terms of syntax, they are important in terms of pragmatics as they are used for expressing a speakers' status or mood (Maklai, 2015). The presence of a final particle is optional (Bhamoraput, 1972), and there can be more than one final particles in an utterance (Maklai, 2015). The meaning of a final particle depends on the context in which it appears (Maklai, 2015).

In Thai, there are more than 20 final particles (Piyasantiwong, 1981). However, the two particles that are most well-known both by Thais and foreigners as particles for politeness are *khà?* and *kháp*. These particles are used to politely end affirmative utterances or are used in conjunction with other particles to form polite questions. The difference between the two particles is that normally, *khà?* is used by women and *kháp* is used by men. However, these two particles are not of interest to this study because all Thai learners who learn Thai either formally or informally are made aware of their usage.

The Thai language has two other final particles, namely *ná?* and *sì?*, that according to Iwasaki and Ingkaphirom (2009) can convey a sense of politeness. The use of these two final particles is of interest to this study as the authors assumed that unless Thais and learners of Thai are formally instructed, both Thais and learners of Thai might be unaware of their effects on the politeness of utterances. For native Thai speakers, such unawareness does not affect the language they produce. However, if Thai learners are unaware of the politeness effects, their use of such particles might be different from that of native speakers, making their utterances sound impolite. Below we review the functions of *ná?* and *sì?* that are related to politeness (see Maklai, 2015, for more details on the functions of *ná?* and *sì?*).

According to Maklai (2015), *ná?* functions to soften utterances. When a speaker wants to give a suggestion, make a request, seek agreement, or make an objection, *ná?* is added to the end of an utterance. When such a particle is missing, the utterance sounds harsher and a listener might feel that his or her face is being threatened (see Brown & Levinson, 1987, for discussion on face threatening acts). Examples which are from Maklai (2015) are given in (1) to (4).

(1) Giving a suggestion

rāw wā: cǎj khūən phítcā:rǎ?nā: tūə?ē:ŋ dō:j dùən ná?
I think Juey should consider one's self by immediately **FP**¹⁹⁵
"I think Juey should reconsider herself immediately."

(2) Making a request

nō:n phák ná?
sleep rest **FP**
"Get some rest."

(3) Seeking agreement

¹⁹⁵ Abbreviations used in the gloss in this article are AS = aspect, CL = classifier, COMP= complementizer, COMPA = comparative, CONJ = conjunction, FI = pause filler, FP = final particle, MOD = modal, NEG = negation, PAR = particle, PREP = preposition, PRO = pronoun, RCM = relative-clause marker

dū:thâ: fǒn cà? tòk ná?
 look-like rain MOD fall **FP**
 "It looks like it is going to rain."

(4) Making an objection

phô: jāŋ mâj sǎ ná?
 Father yet NEG die **FP**
 "Father is still alive."

In examples (1) and (2), asking or suggesting someone to do something can threaten the listener's face. By adding the final particle *ná?*, these utterances are softened, thus not making the listener feel like he or she is forced to do something. For (3), by adding *ná?*, the speaker leaves room for the listener to share his or her opinion, and by doing so, the conversation can flow smoothly. On the other hand, if the particle is missing, the listener might feel that he or she is being forced to converse. In (4), when the speaker would like to correct the received information, *ná?* is added so that his or her utterance will sound less aggressive or will not hurt the feeling of the one who is giving wrong information (see Takahachi & Beebe, 1993, for related discussion).

While the presence of *ná?* makes utterances sound more polite, the functions of *sǐ?* in relation to politeness go into the opposite direction. That is, the presence of *sǐ?* can make the tone of an utterance sound stronger, and possibly threaten a listener's face. The first function of *sǐ?* related to politeness is to make utterances sound more powerful. According to Maklai (2015), speakers will use *sǐ?* to give a command when they perceive they have the right to do so and believe listeners should obey them. Maklai (2015) also noted that the use of *sǐ?* in this function often occurs either when speakers have a higher social status or are older than the listener is, or when a speaker and a listener have a very close relationship. The use of *sǐ?* to make an utterance sound more powerful is exemplified in (5).

(5) A boy told his younger brother to let go of the pen in his hand.

plǎj
 let go
 "Let go."
 However, the younger brother did not obey him, so the boy repeated his command.
 plǎj sǐ?
 let go **FP**
 "Let go."

In (5), the boy gave his younger brother a second command, adding *sǐ?* at the end to make the command more powerful.

The second function of *sǐ?* related to politeness is to make utterances firmer. From Maklai (2015), speakers will use *sǐ?* to show and emphasize that they know what the listener is thinking. For example, in (6), the listener desires to play a trick on the speaker and thinks that the speaker does not know the listener's intention. The speaker, on the other hand, would like to express that he or she does know, so

the speaker adds *sì?* as in (6) below.

- (6) ník wâ: chán cà? lǒŋ kōn thē: ɲán sì?
think that I MOD be-deceived trick you FP **FP**
“You think that I will be fooled easily.”

(adapted from Maklai, 2015)

In (6), by using *sì?*, the speaker is communicating what he or she knows confidently. This kind of utterance can threaten the listener’s face. If the speaker wants his or her utterance to sound less face-threatening, the particle *rǎ:* should be used instead of *sì?*.

Speakers will also use *sì?* to make utterances firmer when they want to argue against a listener and emphasize their opinion at the same time as in (7) below.

- (7) phô: jāŋ mâj sǎ sì?
Father yet NEG die **FP**
“Father is still alive!”

In (7), the utterance is adapted from (4) where a speaker would like to re-correct what was said. When the final particle is changed from *ná?* in (4) to *sì?* in (7), the utterance sounds more aggressive. Re-correcting information by using *sì?* as in (7) is known to be an act that may threaten the listeners’ face (Maklai, 2015).

Another function of *sì?* is to mark a speaker’s disapproval when bring up a topic of discussion (Maklai, 2015). The tone of an utterance with *sì?* used as a forceful topic marker is known to be aggressive. For example, if a speaker has a problem with her boyfriend and her friend suggests that she should apologize to him, the speaker might show her disapproval by mentioning her boyfriend together with the particle *sì?* (see (8) for example). This implies that the speaker thinks it is not her but her boyfriend who needs to say sorry. As is the case in (7), the presence of *sì?* in (8) also threatens the listener’s face.

- (8) khǎw sì? tōŋ mā: khǎ:thō:t chǎn
he **FP** must come apologize me
“It is him who must apologize to me.”

From Maklai (2015), it can be seen that the presence of *ná?* makes utterances sound more friendly or more polite. On the other hand, the presence of *sì?* makes the tone of utterances more aggressive, and such an aggressive tone might threaten a listener’s face. The most extreme prediction on the use of *ná?* and *sì?* by Shan people is that the Shan will use *ná?* less frequently than native Thai speakers do but will use *sì?* more frequently. Therefore, based on the language they use, Thais might judge Shans as being impolite.

The Use of *ná?* and *sì?* Particles by Native Thai Speakers

Maklai (2015) conducted a study investigating the acquisition of Thai final particles, specifically the final particles *ná?* and *sì?*. Two groups were investigated – native Japanese speakers whose language also exhibits the use of final particles and native English speakers whose language does not make use of final particles. In order to investigate whether the two groups of learners acquire and use final particles as native Thai speakers do, Maklai (2015) also collected data from 20 native Thai speakers between the ages of 18 – 22 years. This section only reviews the use of the two final particles in politeness function by native Thai speakers.

In the study, three of the native Thai speakers were male and 17 were female. For the first task, the Thai participants were asked to pair up and to do role-plays based on the nine situations given to them. After completing the role-play task, each pair of participants was given a pair discussion task. In this task, participants had to hold a discussion on certain topics. For example, they were asked which objects they would take with them if they were trapped on a desert island for a month. Participants needed to provide reasons why they choose or do not choose each object. The discussions were recorded. The role-play and pair discussion tasks were aimed to elicit the use of *ná?* and *sì?* particles.

From the role-play and pair discussion tasks, it was found that there were 8,422 utterances produced by Thai participants. The mean percentage for the use of *ná?* per utterance was 0.84%. On the other hand, the mean percentage for the use of *sì?* per utterance was 0.25%.

With the focus on the role-play task, it was found that Thai participants used the final particle *ná?* related to politeness more than the final particle *sì?* related to politeness. For the particle *ná?*, all participants used it to soften an utterance when they wanted to give a suggestion. For example, in (9), when the first Thai participant (i.e., T1) and the second Thai participant (i.e., T2) were discussing the country they should travel to together. T1 used *ná?* to soften her suggestion in order to convince T2 to go to Russia.

(9) rátsīā kô: nâ:sǒncāj **ná?**
Russia COMP interesting **FP**
“Russia is interesting.”

However, the Thai participants did not soften their utterances in other situations. It might be the case that *ná?* was absent because participants were close friends; therefore, there was no need to use the polite particle.

As for the use of *sì?* in the function related to politeness, it was found that 45% of the participants used this particle to make utterances sound more powerful and to make utterances firmer. However, none of the participants exhibited the use of *sì?* as a forceful topic marker. The example (10) illustrates the use of *sì?* as a tool to make a powerful utterance.

(10) T2: kē: jà: wâ: rāw **sì?**
You do-not blame I **FP**
“Don’t blame me!”

In (10), T2 asked T1 to teach her how to drive, but T1 thought that T2 did not listen to what she was teaching. Thus, T1 was angry and yelling at T2. On the other hand, T2 did not really understand what T1 was teaching, and she did not like the way T1 was blaming her. T2 used *sì?* to make T1 stop blaming her. This function of *sì?* was to make T2's utterance sound more powerful.

The use of *sì?* as a tool to make an utterance firmer is exemplified in (11). In (11), T9 broke a promise, not going to see a movie with T10 because T9's boss asked her to do an urgent assignment. T10 was angry with T9 and blamed T9. T9 was trying to make T10 understand her but T10 argued against T9 and emphasized that the T10 was more important than the assignment.

(11)T10: kē: phĕn mĕn tŏŋ sĕmkhĕn kwà: ŋā:n sì?
you friend it MOD important COMPA assignment FP
"You know, 'friend' has to be more important than an assignment."

Apart from the role-play and the pair discussion tasks, the participants were also asked to complete a multiple-choice test that aimed to measure how much they know about the use of *ná?* and *sì?*, as well as other Thai final particles. It was found that the accuracy in answering the questions was over 98%. This suggests that, in general, all participants know how to use Thai final particles. If the accuracy was restricted to either the use of *ná?* or the use of *sì?*, all participants attained 100% accuracy. This implies that all participants know when and how to use *ná?* and *sì?* appropriately, both in regard to the functions that are related to politeness and in other functions. The results from the multiple-choice test which indicate that Thai participants know how to use Thai final particles help confirm that the absence of *ná?* and *sì?* in some of the situations in the role-play task was occurred by intention, not by the lack of knowledge about Thai final particles.

The Use of *ná?* and *sì?* Particles by Native Shan Speakers

Methodology

Participants

Six native Shan speakers volunteered to participate in the study. One of the participants was male and the other five were female. The age of participants ranged from 29 to 42 years old. All participants migrated to Thailand after the age of 15 (i.e., after puberty). One participant reported starting to use Thai before migrating to Thailand as her hometown was in a Thai-Burmese border area. Other participants reported using Thai after moving to Thailand. None of the participants had gone to Thai school or had taken a formal Thai lesson. All participants were employed doing house cleaning or gardening in Chiang Mai. None of them was close friend.

Stimuli

There were two tasks for participants to do. The first task was a role-play task. It was used to investigate the use of *ná?* and *sì?* particles in the functions related to politeness. The task comprised of eight role-play situations, including giving information, teasing or making a joke on the listener, correcting information, asking an inappropriate question, giving suggestions, attacking or threatening the listener,

asking for help and making an argument. All the situations were from Maklai (2015) and all scenarios were constructed based on the functions and speech acts of *náʔ* and *sìʔ* found in the Thai National Corpus (TNC: Aroonmanakun, Tansiri, & Nittayanuparp, 2009; see Maklai, 2015 for more details on the design of the role-play task). Each situation included two scenarios, so each pair of participants had to do 16 scenarios in total. An example of a scenario is given in (12).

(12) Speaker B has just gotten a new job and speaker A wants to know about speaker B's salary.

Speaker A

Topic: Asking about salary

Place: Bakery shop

Situation: You are talking to your close friend about his/her new job and you want to know his/her salary.

Instruction: Ask your friend about his/her salary.

Speaker B

Topic: Asking about salary

Place: Bakery shop

Situation: You are talking to your close friend about your new job. Your friend asks you about your salary but you do not want to tell him/her because your salary is small.

Instruction: Try to avoid answering your friend's question.

The second task was a multiple-choice test from Maklai (2015). It was used to measure participants' knowledge of Thai final particles. In the test, there were 26 items testing the use of *náʔ*. However, only ten out of the 26 items tested the use of *náʔ* in the function related to politeness. A set of ten items testing the use of *sìʔ* was also included in the test. For these ten items, eight were used for testing the use of *sìʔ* in the function related to politeness. The proportion of the items testing the use of *náʔ* and *sìʔ* was calculated from the functions of the two particles found in the TNC (Aroonmanakun, Tansiri, & Nittayanuparp, 2009; see Maklai, 2015 for more details about the design of the multiple-choice test). Apart from the items testing the use of *náʔ* and *sìʔ*, another set of 32 items which asked questions about the use of other final particles were also added. These items were included to measure participants' general knowledge about other final particles and to conceal the objective of the study. Table 1 illustrates the number of test items in the multiple-choice test.

Table 1: Categorization of items used in the multiple-choice test

Types of items	Function	Number of items	Total
<i>náʔ</i>	Related to politeness	8	26
	Other	18	
<i>sìʔ</i>	Related to politeness	8	10
	Other	2	
Other final particles	Other	32	32
Total			68

In the test, each item comprised of four alternatives. The wording in all alternatives was the same, except the final particles. An example of the test item is given in (13).

(13) Your boyfriend/girlfriend and you are watching the sunset together. You want your boyfriend/girlfriend to agree with you that the sunset is beautiful. What would you like to say to him/her?

- | | | | | |
|----|---------------------------------------|-----|----------------|------|
| a. | phráʔa:thít | tòk | nī: sǔəj | thəʔ |
| | sun | set | this beautiful | FP |
| | “The sunset is beautiful, isn’t it?” | | | |
| b. | phráʔa:thít | tòk | nī: sǔəj | nəj |
| | sun | set | this beautiful | FP |
| | “The sunset is beautiful, isn’t it?” | | | |
| c. | phráʔa:thít | tòk | nī: sǔəj | náʔ |
| | sun | set | this beautiful | FP |
| | “The sunset is beautiful, isn’t it?” | | | |
| d. | phráʔa:thít | tòk | nī: sǔəj | thī: |
| | sun | set | this beautiful | FP |
| | *“The sunset is beautiful, isn’t it?” | | | |

Apart from the test items, there were three filler questions that asked about other things unrelated to final particle. These fillers were used to distract participants’ attention away from the objective of the test, and also included to determine if the participants were paying attention to the multiple-choice test.

Procedure

Participants paired up and were instructed to do role-plays for all 16 scenarios. Since they could not read Thai, the researchers read the instructions to them and made sure that they fully understood what they had to do before letting them do the role-plays by themselves. Participants’ conversations during the task were recorded. The task took about 10 – 15 minutes.

After the role-play task, multiple-choice tests were distributed to participants. For the test, Sixty-eight test items were interspersed with three fillers. The items were given to participants in random order. Participants listened to the questions and the alternatives from a recording spoken by a native Thai speaker. At this point, they were allowed to listen to the questions and the alternatives as many times as they wanted. As they listened, participants chose the most appropriate alternative as their answer. For example, in (13), the speaker desires to seek agreement from the listener about the beautiful sunset. The final particle *thī:* is not an appropriate answer as it never occurs in this context. For the rest of the three final particles, namely *thəʔ*, *nəj* and *náʔ*, the final particle *náʔ* in alternative ‘c’ is the most appropriate answer because it functions as a softener. That is, because the speaker desires to seek agreement from the listener, he or she should try to make his or her utterance polite. When *náʔ* is added at the end of the utterance, the listener will not feel like he or she is forced to admit that the sunset is beautiful. Unlike *náʔ*, the use of *thəʔ* in alternative ‘a’ will definitely make the listener feel uncomfortable, as the presence of such a particle forces him or her to agree with the speaker. The use of

nəj in alternative ‘b’ might create a sense of force, or it might suggest that such an utterance is nothing but a declarative sentence. Therefore, the use of *thə?* and *nəj* will not allow the speaker to achieve his or her goal and has the potential to threaten the listener’s face.

It should be noted that unlike in Maklai’s study (2015), a pair discussion was not conducted. This is because all participants were available only at lunchtime, which lasted around thirty to sixty minutes. Since the scenarios presented in the pair discussion task were not designed to elicit the use of *ná?* and *sì?* particles in every function, the pair discussion task was dropped so that the amount of time spent in doing the experiment would fit participants’ time constraints.

Analyses

For the role-play task, the conversations from each pair of participants were transcribed by a native Thai speaker and then cross-checked by another native Thai speaker. Utterances produced were counted. Each instance of *ná?* and *sì?* that occurred as a sole particle in each utterance was marked and its functions were analyzed by using Maklai’s (2015) framework. Utterances in which two or more final particles co-occurred were not marked and analyzed because according to Maklai (2015), it is hard to pinpoint the exact function of each particle in those utterances. Utterances containing *ná?* and *sì?* were also analyzed in conjunction with the number of utterances Shan participants produced to investigate how frequent the *ná?* and *sì?* particles related to politeness were used. In this study, only instances of which the functions of *ná?* and *sì?* were related to politeness were reported and discussed in detail.

For the multiple-choice test, all participants gave correct answers to the three fillers questions. This suggests that they were paying attention to the test. Therefore, none of the participants were excluded from the analysis. To analyze the data, each correct answer was counted as one point. The percentages of correct usage were then reported.

Results

Role-play Task

From the role-play task, 154 utterances were produced. The mean percentage for the use of *ná?* per utterance was 3.04%. On the other hand, the mean percentage for the use of *sì?* per utterance was 1.99%.

With a focus on politeness functions, it was found that 66.67% of Shan participants used *ná?* to soften utterances in the situations in which they needed to make a suggestion or make an argument. Examples are given in (14) and (15) respectively.

- (14) S3: *rāw* *pāj* *thīəw* *thá?lē:* *kān* *máj*
 we go travel sea together FP
 “Why don’t we go to the sea.”
S3 *sà?nùk* ***ná?***
 fun **FP**
 “‘It’ll be fun.”

S4: pāj thiəw nāj hā:ŋ kô:dâ:j
 go travel in mall also
 “We could go to the mall.”

In (14), the third Shan participant (i.e., S3) and the fourth Shan participant (i.e., S4) were discussing about where they wanted to travel together. S3 used *ná?* to soften her suggestion in order to convince S4 that they should go to the sea together.

(15) S5: măn klāj cīŋ cīŋ
 it far really really
 “It’s really far.”
 S6: măn māj klāj **ná?**
 it NEG close **FP**
 “It’s not close. It’s far.”
 S6: măn klāj bô:k lě:w
 it far tell AS
 “I told you.”

In (15), S6 told S5 that Bangkok was far away from Chiang Mai but S5 did not believe it. After having travelling to Chiang Mai from Bangkok, S5 admitted that she was wrong. S6 used the final particle *ná?* to soften his argument in this conversation.

Shan participants also demonstrated the use of *ná?* when making a request (e.g., borrowing something from a friend). However, the particle *ná?* co-occurred with the particle *nəj*, and therefore, such an instance was not further analyzed.

As for the use of *sì?* particles, none of Shan participants used *sì?* to make utterance firmer or to be a forceful topic marker. However, 33.33% of the Shan participants used *sì?* to make their utterance sound more powerful when making a request. For example, in (16), S5 wanted S6 to sit on the chair that had the fake lizard on it. S5 used *sì?* at the end of her utterance to increase an authority.

(16) S5: mā: nāŋ trōŋ ní: **sì?**
 come sit at here **FP**
 “Come and sit here.”

Multiple-choice Test

Percentages of the correct answers were provided in Table 2. In the table, the overall correct usage of Thai final particles was reported first, followed by the use of *ná?* and *sì?* respectively, with the overall correct usage of *ná?* and *sì?* followed by the correct usage of each function.

Table 2: Percentages of correct answers from the multiple-choice test

Particle	Function	Correct answers (%)
Overall	-	69.36%
<i>náʔ</i>	Overall	72.44%
	Softening utterances	81.25%
<i>sìʔ</i>	Overall	55%
	Making utterances sound more powerful	75%
	Making utterances firmer	33.33%
	Being a forceful topic marker	50%

From Table 2, it can be seen that for all particles tested, the correct usage was above chance level (see the first row, 69.36%). Shan participants did well on the use of the *náʔ* particle. However, Shan participants seemed to have a slight problem with the use of the *sìʔ* particle, specifically on the *Making utterances firmer* function (33.33%) and *Being a forceful topic marker* function (50%) which are politeness-related functions.

Comparison of the Use of *náʔ* and *sìʔ* between Shan People and Native Thai Speakers

Role-play Task

The use of *náʔ* and *sìʔ* by native Shan speakers were compared to that of native Thai speakers which was reported in Maklai (2015). As reported above, the mean frequency of *náʔ* and *sìʔ* from Shan was 3.04% and 1.99% respectively, whereas those by native Thai speakers were 0.84% and 0.25% respectively. It can be seen that the mean frequency of *náʔ* and *sìʔ* from Shan were slightly higher than those from the native Thai speakers.

The use of *náʔ* and *sìʔ* in the function related to politeness by native Shan speakers and native Thai speakers were further compared. The comparison reveals that there were both similarity and differences in the use of *náʔ* and *sìʔ* between the two groups. As for the similarity, it can be seen that both Shan learners of Thai and native Thai speakers used *náʔ* to soften utterances or to make utterances sound more polite when they wanted to suggest something to the listener. Such use of *náʔ* by native Thai speakers and Shan learners of Thai can be found in (9) and (14) which are replicated here as (17) and (18) respectively.

(17) T1: rátsīə kô: nâ:sǝncāj **náʔ**
Russia COMP interesting **FP**
"Russia is interesting."

(18) S3: rāw pāj thīəw tháʔlē: kān māj
we go travel sea together FP
"Why don't we go to the sea."

S3: sàʔnùk **náʔ**
fun **FP**

"It'll be fun."

S4: pāj thîəw nāj hâ:ŋ kô:dâ:j
 go travel in mall also
 "We could go to the mall."

As for the differences, the first difference was found in the situation in which a speaker argued with a listener. In the scenario where one participant wanted to admit that she was wrong for not believing what she was told by her partner, this Shan demonstrated the use of *ná?* to soften her argument (see (15) which is replicated here as (19) for example). However, none of the native Thai speakers used *ná?* to soften his or her argument. It is possible that when there was an argument, Shan used *ná?* to avoid conflict because none of the Shan participants was close friend. However, for Thai participants, they were close friend; therefore, politeness might not be necessary.

(19) S5: măn klāj cīŋ cīŋ
 it far really really
 "It's really far."

S6: măn māj klāj **ná?**
 it NEG close **FP**
 "It's not close. It's far."

S6: măn klāj bô:k lé:w
 it far tell AS
 "I told you."

Another difference was found in the situation in which a speaker wanted a listener to do something. In this situation, 33.33% of Shan learners of Thai used *sì?* to make their utterance more powerful (see (16) replicated here as (20) for example). On the other hand, only 5% of native Thai speakers used *sì?* make an utterance sound more powerful in this situation.

(20) S5: mā: nāj trōŋ ní: **sì?**
 come sit at here **FP**
 "Come and sit here."

Although it can be seen that native Shan speakers demonstrated the use of *ná?* to soften utterances or to avoid conflict, it can also be seen that the Shan used *sì?* to make utterances sound more powerful more often than native Thai speakers. Such a difference in the use of *sì?* might be a source of misperception causing native Thai speakers to believe that the Shan are impolite. However, it should be noted that the Shan data were collected from only six individuals. Due to the limited amount of data, statistical analyses and a firm conclusion cannot be drawn. Further studies are needed to investigate whether the trends found in this study can be statistically verified.

The similarities and differences discussed above deal only with utterances in which *ná?* and *sì?* occurred. However, another point worth mentioning is that in some of the utterances made by native Shan

speakers, there were instances that Shans did not use any final particle. However, if native Thai speakers were to say the same utterance, *náʔ* might be added to soften the utterance. For example, in (21), this Shan intended to make a request but the particle *náʔ* was missing.

- (21) S4: jà:k hâj dè:m
 want give drink
 "I want you to have a drink."

The same is true for the utterance in (22) where a Shan refused to eat anything at that moment. To soften the negation, the particle *náʔ* should have been added.

- (22) S3: jāŋ mâj jà:k kīn
 yet NEG want eat
 "I don't feel like eating right now."

In (23), although the Shan would like to persuade her friend to go somewhere, the absence of *náʔ* makes her utterance sounds more like a command.

- (23) S5: pāj kān
 go together
 "Let's go."

From this comparison, it can be seen that native Shan speakers are not able to use *náʔ* and *sìʔ* particles in the politeness functions in a native-like way. The absence of *náʔ* when requesting, persuading or rejecting something or someone, and the presence *sìʔ* which was more frequent than with native Thai speakers' utterances, might threaten a listener's face, making the listener believe that Shan people are impolite, uneducated, or even aggressive.

Multiple-choice Test

It might be the case that the deviation in the use of *náʔ* and *sìʔ* particles by native Shan speakers arises from the fact that they have not fully acquired the use of Thai final particles, not because of them being impolite or aggressive. Therefore, the results from the multiple-choice test, which aimed to measure the knowledge of Thai final particles, by Shan learners of Thai and those by native Thai speakers reported in Maklai (2015) were compared to examine whether the level of final-particle knowledge of Shans and that of native Thai speakers are different.

The comparison reveals that, in general (i.e., for all particles tested), the use of Thai final particles by the Shan is different from that of native Thai speakers ($t(5) = 3.84, p = .012$) such that the Shan made more mistakes in the test than did native Thai speakers. This indicates that the Shan had not fully acquired Thai final particles.

When the comparison is restricted to only the use of *náʔ*, it was found that the score of the Shan was significantly lower than those of native Thai speakers ($t(5) = 2.94, p = .032$). However, this difference was not due to the use of *náʔ* in the politeness function (softening-utterance function: $p > .10$). This implies that the Shan know how to use *náʔ* to soften utterances and can account for the similarity in the use of

náʔ to soften utterances by the Shan and native Thai speakers as exemplified in (17) and (18). However, the absence of *náʔ* in some circumstances (e.g., (21) – (23)) might have resulted from other factors, and thus, further studies are needed to explain why this was so.

As for the knowledge of *sìʔ*, the comparison reveals that the Shan scored significantly lower than native Thai speakers did ($t(5) = 6.26, p = .002$). When restricted only to the use of *sìʔ* in the politeness functions, it was found that there was a marginal difference in the use of *sìʔ* to make utterances sound more powerful ($t(5) = 2.24, p = .076$) such that the score of the Shan was lower than that of native Thai speakers. For the use of *sìʔ* to make utterances firmer and to be a forceful topic marker, Shan scored significantly lower than native Thai speakers did (making utterances firmer: $t(5) = 8, p < .001$; being a forceful topic maker: $t(5) = 2.74, p = .041$). Taken together, these results indicate that the Shan had not fully acquired the use of *sìʔ* in the function related to politeness. The marginal difference in the use of *sìʔ* to make utterance sound more powerful can account for the results showing that the Shan could use *sìʔ* in this function but they used it more often than native Thai speakers did. Moreover, since the Shan did not acquire *sìʔ* in the *Making utterance firmer* and *Being a forceful topic marker* functions, the lack of knowledge in these functions might be one of the reasons why the Shan did not produce *sìʔ* in these functions. Altogether, the Shan's lack of knowledge in the use of *sìʔ* could be one of reasons why the Shan could not use *sìʔ* in a native-like way.

General Discussion and Conclusion

The study investigated how native Shan speakers used the Thai final particles *náʔ* and *sìʔ* in the functions related to politeness, and how such use deviated from the norm. It was found that there was deviation in the use of *náʔ* and *sìʔ* by native Shan speakers. That is, although the Shan know how to use *náʔ* to soften utterances and could sometimes demonstrate the use of *náʔ* in a native-like way, *náʔ* was absent from some of the utterances in a situation in which native Thai speakers would judge the presence of *náʔ* to be more appropriate. As for the use of *sìʔ*, it was found that the Shan tended to use *sìʔ* more often than native Thai speakers did but the only function of *sìʔ* that they used was to make utterance sound more powerful.

It should be noted that results of this study are based only on six native Shan speakers, and some parts of the results have not yet been statistically tested. Therefore, further studies are needed before a solid conclusion can be drawn.

From this study, the point worth noting is that since the absence or presence of *náʔ* and *sìʔ* can affect politeness, the absence of *náʔ* in some circumstances and the frequent use of *sìʔ* in utterances by Shan might threaten the face of Thai people who hear such utterances. Thus, such deviation in language use might be one of the factors that causes Thai people to believe that Shan people are impolite, uneducated or aggressive. However, as can be seen from the results of the multiple-choice test, native Shan speakers had not fully acquired the use of Thai final particles. Thus, their lack of knowledge could be a cause of the deviation. Instead of judging Shan people to be impolite, uneducated, or aggressive, Thai people should pay attention to the fact that language errors are a natural, common occurrence in language learning, especially for groups like Shan people or other minorities who are trying to acquire a language

after puberty, and who have not been formally instructed. That the speech of a minority group sounds impolite should not be used as a reason for judging a group as aggressive or uneducated.

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Rediscovering the Past from the Future of the Community: The Creation of a Youth Guide Club and the Revival of Local History in Baan Bor Luang, Bor Kluea, Nan Province

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Abstract

Baan Bor Luang is an old community with a history of producing rock salt for over 700 years. Located in the northern frontier province of Nan with two mountain ranges of Luang Phra Bang and Phee Pan Nam, Bor Luang Village was difficult to access by land-based transportation in the past; therefore, it has been neglected by the government and was a stronghold of communist insurgents in the mid-70s. However, with the expansion of transportation networks into the area with a rich history of salt production and mountainous rainforests, Baan Bor Luang has experienced a growth in the number of visitors and tourism-related businesses that could eradicate historic remnants of this village. This paper presents the collaborative work of the university researchers (KMUTT) in the region aiming to stimulate local community members to realize their area's historical significance by organizing a local history youth group. This research began with the establishment of a network of local scholars, followed by the identification of children and young students with talent and interest in local history. These youth were trained as history researchers in the village and guided in their media production of exhibits about the village story for visitors. As a result of this project, today there is an enthusiastic group of youth who can present the history of the village and who have produced a collection of local narratives. The group also generated significant revenue from tour guide services and raised awareness of Baan Bor Luang's cultural heritage within the community. The young guides of Baan Bor Luang represent the hope for cultural heritage preservation movements in the future. However, there is the question of how the community can cope with the rising number of tourism businesses and the conflicts among members in the community as a consequence of booming tourism business.

Keywords: Local History, Baan Bor Luang, Rock Salt, Bor Kluea, Cultural Heritage

Introduction

Nan today is one of the northern provinces of Thailand. In the past, Nan was an independent state comprised of local people who had settled along the Nan River valley. Nan civilization was established around the same time as the Sukhothai Kingdom (1238) and possesses unique Buddhist architecture reflecting its cultural and political connection with Sukhothai, Lanna, Lan Xang and Pagan civilization. Moreover, with a cool climate year-round, Nan possesses natural resources including unique forests, mountains and a river valley landscape. From Department of Tourism data, in 2515 Nan hosted around 732,446 tourists and generated revenue of 1,956,020,000 Thai Baht.¹⁹⁶ Bor Kluea District is one of the popular districts in the province for tourists. The name Bor Kluea refers to the location of historic salt pits that are concentrated in the area of Baan Bor Luang village.

Bor Kluea District is located in the northeastern part of Nan Province bordering the People Democratic Republic of Laos in the east. The district is comprised of 4 sub-districts with 39 villages. Baan Bor Luang is the village in Nan possessing the salt pits and their history of sending salt to the ruler of Nan as annual tribute. The salt production here is associated with the history of Nan and its relationship with the Lanna Kingdom centered at Chiang Mai, since one of the motivations of King Tilokarat of Chiang Mai's attack on Nan was to acquire this area as part of his Lanna Kingdom. As mentioned previously, Baan Bor Luang village has long been historically important for Nan Province. However, the younger generations do not know their own local history, and their parents' generation can remember very little about the history of the salt pit.

Therefore, the research team from KMUTT initiated the project to study the local history of Baan Bor Luang led by a youth group from Baan Bor Luang School. The main objective of the project was to educate the young generation of Baan Bor Luang to learn the local history of their village which possesses cultural heritage of historic salt pits and the livelihood patterns of villages in the past. Moreover, the students who participated in the project became tour guides who can inform tourists about Baan Bor Luang's local history. The project also cultivated a sense of local pride and made the younger generation realize the value of their unique history and local culture. As a result, they were inspired to preserve, and revive their community's cultural heritage.

Research Methodology

KMUTT framed key principles of studying and writing history in modern time (Collingwood, 1994) as followed. First, historians must be conscious to validate any accuracy of evidence. Second, study process in history that is scientific method is questioning information. Third, writing history must be derived from evaluation of all ideas, information and conclusion. Forth, studying process in history requires analysis and investigation of information to obtain solution. The process in studying history can provide children guideline to study in other fields in the future. For methodology in researching and presenting history of Baan Bor Luang local minority community, the team operated by conducting oral history, interviews of ordinary people, workshop, mapping method, and public exhibition. The revived local history provided

¹⁹⁶ Internal Tourism by Region in 2015, Department of Tourism, Ministry of Tourism and Sports

the community sense of belonging (Hayden, 1997).

The researchers started the project by establishing the “Youth tour guide of Baan Bor Luang” by brainstorming with the group of local teachers and students who previously had done volunteer activities with the research team. The group of 31 students from local schools in the vicinity of Baan Bor Luang enrolled in the project. The implementation of this research project can be separated into two phases. The first phase was about collecting local information and historical evidence. Students and children of Baan Bor Luang conducted a survey for general information of the area, the history of the village, and culture and traditions of processing salt from saline water in a salt pit. The second phase was about training students and children to operate as tour guides so that they could use their data and knowledge in communicating the local history of Baan Bor Luang village more effectively. During the training program, students learned the importance of local tourist destinations in conjunction with local art, culture and traditions. Moreover, students learned the importance of preservation of both natural and cultural tourism resources. The training program also provided them with the principles of the tour guide profession, such as how to host visitors and improve personality and develop communication and preparation of destinations for visitors. The Baan Bor Luang Youth Tour Guide Group was founded in February of 2015. Among 31 members, they are 4 boys and 27 girls representing roughly half of the children in the village. Twenty one of them are primary school children from Baan Bor Luang School and Baan Bor Yuak School. The group worked on both phases at the same study period.

The students started the first phase of learning the history of Baan Bor Luang by brainstorming, thinking and questioning how to acquire more information about the story of places, events, rituals and traditions in their community. From the brainstorming session, they put together list of information including parts that they already knew and parts they needed to research further. Furthermore, they planned to conduct the research by interviewing elderly members in the villages, inviting Nan’s local scholars to lecture, and researching secondary sources from the Internet and the library. The data they collected was diverse and needed references. KMUTT researchers assisted the children in drawing conclusions and creating connections between information from interviews and data from academic papers as well as conducting fieldwork. Some members of the group discovered old artifacts, textiles, written materials, and historical images from interviews with the elderly. After consulting with the researchers, students concluded again with their own writing and developed storyboards. They reviewed their findings with researchers and trainers again before finalizing the story. From the collection of data the students had surveyed and analyzed with KMUTT researchers, the book “History of Baan Bor Luang” was composed for the Baan Bor Luang tour guides to use as their handbook and some were distributed to visitors. The book is comprised of 5 major stories:

1) The history of the village settlement; 2) The process of making rock salt from saline water in the pit; 3) Rituals and beliefs about making salt; 4) History of salt trade in the north; and 5) History of local Buddhist temples in Baan Bor Luang Community.

The second phase was about developing skills in storytelling. The main activities were a training program for coaching children and youth to be tour guides and field trips to cultural sites and historic places in the city of Nan. For the tour guide training program, children and youth were trained for 60 hours by instructors from the community college of Nan. The field trip to visit other cultural sites and historic

places in Nan province facilitated them to exchange knowledge and experiences with other youth guide groups. They learned new ideas and understood the role of story tellers in the community. The children and youths of Baan Bor Luang today are not only tour guides telling the history of the village to visitors but are also representatives of the community, organizing exhibitions, contributing to TV programs, magazines and other medias, and selling the village history books. These activities encouraged them and boost their confidence to continue more volunteer work with their community.

Historical information from Field Research

Historic Places and Artifacts

Regarding research on important historic places in community, the team of children and youths conducted field surveys and interviewed the elderly in the village. The research team found that there was a total of ten salt pits. Seven salt pits are still in use while the other three were abandoned. Only two of them are popular tourist destinations. The previous research and written information was not clear about the number of salt pits. Some indicated that there were only six salt pits with unclear locations. For instance, research indicated that there was a salt pit called Bor Khae in Baan Nam Khae village, but from the survey, Bor Khae is in the Baan Bor Yuak village while the Bor Yuak salt pit was abandoned. The salt pit at Baan Bor Yuak was actually called Bo Tong since there was a pipeline made of metal. The research team also found evidence of 16 historic Buddhist temples¹⁹⁷ in the village of Baan Bor Luang and its vicinity, while today there is only one left which is Baan Bor Luang temple. The evidence of temples also signified the long history of political involvement with the salt trade and tribute as the new rulers of northern principalities built temples to mark their possession of new territory.

Origin of Baan Bor Luang Village

The stories about the origins of the salt pit (bor kleua in Thai) and ancestors of Baan Bor Luang Community are very diverse. The minority Lua told the story of Lua old lady whose body generated salt. Some elderly told the research team that their ancestors came from Mongolia to the city of Chiang Saen in the Lanna Kingdom and moved to Bor Kluea because of their knowledge of boiling salt. However, according to Walailak (1991), the ancestors of Baan Bor Luang community could be the Tai Lue from Sipsong Panna in Yunnan Province of China, since they shared similar beliefs, rituals and traditions with the community in Baan Bor Luang. They have similar rituals of worshipping the village house spirit and establishing a city pillar or “Sao Jai Mueang” for the village. Moreover, some Tai Lue produced salt in Bor Hae which is in the south part of Sipsong Panna using a similar process to the practice of making salt at Baan Bor Luang.

Rituals and Traditions in the Past

People of Bor Kluea had four major ceremonies in the past. First, the biggest event in Baan Bor Luang is “Ngan Gaem” or the annual village guardian spirit worshipping ritual. In the past, the ritual to worship

¹⁹⁷ These temple are Wat Prasat, Wat Na Mueang, Wat Na Bong, Wat Mon Koo, Wat Ton Tong, Wat Tarn Chum, Wat Ta Pong, Wat Piang Kuk, Wat Ton Mueang, Wat Hang, Wat Ton Kwan, Wat Chom Chaeng, Wat Ton Moon, Wat Phrathat Nong Kaew, Wat Na Kam, and Wat Baan Bor Luang.

guardian spirits of the village was a grand event of the year, and village members organized festivities for 7 days. The present generation of villagers still continue this event, but at the present time, the village reduced the rituals and festivities to only three days. The younger generation of youth in the village did not participate as much as before. This research project made them realize the origin of it and understand the practice.

Secondly, another important event related to the salt pits is “Phithi khor Sai nam Kluea,” or the ritual for requesting saline water streams, which is organized every three years. However, the young generation rarely participates in this ritual. Third is the ritual of change, the city pillar which was called “Plean Sao Jai Mueang” or “Plean Sao Lak Mueang.” This ritual is unknown for the young generation of children and youth since it would take place rarely, only when the pillar was critically damaged.

Finally, the most important event of the Bor Kluea community in the past was “Song Suay Kluea” or sending salt as tribute to the Lord of Nan at the city of Nan. The tribute was abolished after the coup in 1932 that ended the absolute monarchy and the central government administration centralized at Bangkok became fully functioning. The Lord of Nan’s position came to an end in 1931 with the last lord of Nan, named Chao Mahaphrumsurathada. In the pre-modern era, the community of Bor Kluea prepared 7,395 kilograms of salt and delivered it to the Lord of Nan every year in 220 oxcarts. Since the community of Bor Kluea Tai was the one who boiled the salt water and made salt, the task to deliver salt belonged to the Lua community of Bor Kluea Nuea. Nan city needed to cultivate rice to feed Bor Kluea delivery carriers. These rice fields are today the Nan International Airport. The practice no longer exists, and without studying the history of Bor Kluea, the younger generation of children would not know this important event in the past.

Process of Making Salt in the Past

From research about the history of the village and local knowledge in this area, we found that the process of making salt from saline water had changed significantly. For instance, in the past, most of the equipment was made from bamboo. Large bamboo was used to deliver saline water and store it until salt settled at the bottom but today villagers use PVC pipe to drain salt water to settle in cement tanks. In the past, circular weaving bamboo plates or “Por” were used to store salt but now wooden boxes are used. The pots for boiling saline water used to be clay but now are metal. The pots and pans were bought from the Chinese of Sipsong Panna and they were much smaller than what we have today. Moreover, villagers used to put an ivy called “Khrua Thao Poon” to boil with saline water for whiter and cleaner salt but now no one used it.

Contested History

The village history that the youth research team discovered challenged some of their parent generation’s normative beliefs and the youths also questioned the role of adults in development of the village that destroyed historic sites. For instance, the youth estimated the age of the salt pit at approximately 700 years. According to the legend of Bor Kluea, that salt pit was found during the reign of the first lord of Nan, Phraya Phukha in 13th century. Nevertheless, most of adults in the village had informed visitors that salt pit was found around 800 years ago. Moreover, this was written on the information board at the salt pit. Therefore, there were some villagers and local officials who pressured the children and youths to

change this part in the History of Baan Bor Luang book. However, the youth team insisted on using their data and challenged adults to find more evidence to prove their claim.

Some adult criticized the details of the salt trade in the past, such as the claim that salt was exchanged for fish sauce on the ground that fish sauce is a similar product to salt. The children and youth also indicated that the story was from the compilation of interviews with the village elderly and their information should be valued. Although some adult villagers disagreed with the historical facts that the young research team found, most of the parents of the children in the youth guide group supported the new history book. The activities of the youth guide group became famous and generated significant supplementary income for the children's families during the tourist season period, so a majority of villagers supported the children's claim.

The children and youth also found the location of historic but deserted temples of Wat Tontong and Wat Tan Chum which possessed historic evidence and Buddhist artifacts as well as stone inscriptions. However, the site of the two temples together became the new hospital of Bor Kluea, burying 400 years of old historic evidence of the Baan Bor Luang community. Moreover, they found old images of the shrine of Wat Baan Bor Luang that was constructed in the traditional Tai Lue style. The temple was heavily damaged by rocket grenades during the fight between Thai army and communist insurgents in the 1980s and was reconstructed in 2003 in the standard Central Thai style. The bridge crossing Mang River was a bamboo bridge and was traditionally reconstructed every year before the rainy season but later was constructed as a permanent structure in concrete. However, the concrete bridge was prone to collapse during heavy rainstorms. The young researchers also questioned why those promoting new development disregarded their cultural and historical heritage of the village. The young generation expressed their wish to preserve historic elements of their village as much as possible in the future. For instance, local materials of bamboo and wood should be used for construction instead of concrete structures.

Conclusion

Through this community learning process and research into local history, youths in the project were reintroduced to the history of their village and contributed to strengthening the reputation of the Baan Bor Luang community. The local history project ignited children and youth passion for the past, and inspired them to pay attention to the village's decision-making process with regards to historical and cultural heritage. Instead of being passive listeners in society, children became the ones who offered new details about the community's history. Moreover, there were some unclear details about the history that prompted further investigation and study by a new generation of youth who sought opportunities to collaborate with villagers and local scholars. In addition, the youth acquired various lessons and skills as follows:

1. Understanding their background and history of Baan Bor Luang village thus realizing the importance of history for their local identity.
2. Developing learning skills from critical thinking, analyzing data and solving problems using systematic methods.

3. Developing skills in public presentation and story telling.
4. Developing roles and duties of youth in community tourism development.
5. Reviving the relationship between young generation and elderly generation through the village survey and interviewing with elderly.

From the community learning process to the youth tour guide training program, children gained significantly subsidiary income for their family and became famous during the high tourist season. As a consequence, the villagers also gain more revenue from tourism activities. This research concludes that the community should continue to support the project with children and youth as follows:

1. The community should realize the importance of learning activities for children and youth and support children activities.
2. The community should participate in the learning process and activities with children and youth in the village.
3. Learning activities for children and youth should conform with the contexts and local wisdom of the community.
4. Learning activities should be compatible with the current problems and needs of the community.

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**Cross-Cultural Networks and the Rise of Intermarriage:
A Case Study of Pa Pae Laveue Village, Mae Sariang District,
Mae Hong Son Province, Thailand**

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Abstract

Interethnic and Interreligious marriages are commonplace, but they are actually complex and require the contextual approach to understanding. This paper proposes to study intermarriage phenomena as a relation and cross-cultural space to understand how ethnic identity and religious identity are selected to fulfill and maintain relationships in family and community. High rates of intermarriage between Laveue (Lua) people with Catholic Sgaw Karen and with Buddhist Northern Thai (Tai Yuan) people are observed in Pa Pae village by utilizing anthropological kinship survey and interviewing intermarriage typical cases. By developing an analysis beyond the historical closeness and ethnic intimacy, this paper suggests that religious identity has become a cross-cultural network which is relevant to the process of ethnic identification through cultural resource managing in everyday practices rather than ethnic origin.

Keywords: cross-cultural network, intermarriage, ethnic identity, religious identity

Introduction

Intermarriage happens in every corner of the world. Inter (-) is a prefix which can be used with or without a hyphen to attribute a quality of between or among to the word behind. Intermarriage, in this study, means a marriage between two different persons. The differences are varied as many as people in a given society identify themselves and being identified by others. In Thai language, we often say *kan taeng ngan kham klum* for intermarriage which literally means cross group marriage. By group, various kinds of affiliation can be applied e.g. ethnicity, religion, and so on. However, as titling the paper with cross-cultural networks, I am not implying to study transnational relationship or intermarriage between “Thai” and westerner. But, I would like to study intra-“Thai” which actually are culturally diverse populations at least in terms of regions. In this study, I focus on intra-“Thai” relations among three following ethnic groups in northern Thailand: Laveue, Sgaw Karen, and Tai Yuan. The peoples are known and locally called in northern Thai language as *Lua*, *Yang*, and *Khon muang* respectively.

The reason why I study these three ethnic groups is not randomly. I started my research with eagerness

to learn about Lua people and their culture. After I had reviewed the previous and existing literature and started conducting a Laveue village study at Pa Pae village where the villagers call themselves as Laveue, I prefer to use the identified term Laveue than Lua in my study. Laveue are different from village to village. Not just the term they use to identify themselves, but also each Laveue village's ethnic and religious neighbors. In case of Pa Pae village, it is encompassed with Sgaw Karen villages and many Pa Pae villagers go to more distance for study and work in lowland Mae Sariang and Chiang Mai among Tai Yuan and other ethnic groups. Based on my household survey (last updated in 2016), the data clearly shows that there are many married-in Karen while there are many married-out Laveue to Tai Yuan in lowland areas. Later I will present the numerical data of intermarriage in Pa Pae village which I highlight as the study's circumstance.

Laveue people of Pa Pae Village are not all "animists" (folk religion) like they used to be in the past. The villagers who neither convert to Protestantism nor Catholicism persist in practicing animistic rituals and have integrated to Buddhism since not more than thirty years ago. Buddhism is compatible with Laveue animism in Pa Pae Village. However, no village claims to be an exclusive animist or a specialized Buddhist, even the traditional leader and the ritual leaders. Rather, the juxtaposition is of non-Christian and Christian. In other words, a non-Christian family is thus animist-Buddhist family supposedly. Among the village's 94 households, there is approximately forty-six percent of animist-Buddhist, thirty percent of Catholic, and twenty-four percent of Christian.

I agree that historical closeness and ethnic intimacy among Lua—Karen—Tai¹⁹⁸ are important references for intermarriage studies. Regarding the territorial migration, Lua people are respected to be the original inhabitants of lowland center (Chiang Mai) before they moved to settle in highland areas of Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Son Province. Tai people replaced the occupancy of Chiang Mai. Some Sgaw Karen afterward migrated across western state border of Thailand (or Siam-Burma border in the past) to settle nearby Lua in highland areas of Mae Sariang. Politically, Lua has lost their power to Tai. Yet, Lua has been regarded in myths and worshiped as local guardian spirits by Lua and Tai in Chiang Mai. In this middle-range mountain, Lua kept relationships to Tai as the intermediate agent to collect tributes from highland ethnic groups (esp. Sgaw Karen) and sent to Tai kings in Chiang Mai. Due to the end of Tai's Lanna Kingdom in the eighteenth century, the ethnic relations were reevaluated. Again, Lua lost their designated power. Lua and Karen have been close neighbors and were generalized together as mountain peoples. Tai people have been townspeople; since some decades ago Lua and Karen also incline to leave their natal villages to dwell in urban towns whereas some of them return to the villages and sometimes marry in Karen and Tai who first met in towns.

However, I argue that despite significant historical closeness and ethnic intimacy among Lua—Karen—Tai, it does not mean that ethnic assimilations always go to the same absorbing direction. I support Marlowe's idea of "People of One Place" (1979: 191) that the exercises of the hierarchy are about period (*when*) and local context (*where*) rather than to ethnicity (*who*). In the contemporary context, as I propose, intermarriage phenomena are spaces of cross-cultural relations which ethnic identity and

¹⁹⁸ I sometimes use the interchangeable terms as follows: Lua to Laveue, Karen to Sgaw Karen, and Tai or Khon muang to Tai Yuan in order to give more general and simply ethnic names.

religious identity are brought to negotiations. I intend to utilize the term cross-culture to suggest that ethnicity and religion is not an independent unit but rather each is a layer of one another under the broad sphere of a locality.

Beyond the dichotomy of majority and minority or Buddhism and Christianity, this study supposes that there is no single unity in each realm. It is always many unities that combine within a realm. I found that most Karen who married Laveue of Pa Pae village are already a Catholic or likely convert to be Catholic as their Laveue spouses. Catholicism crosses Laveue—Karen ethnic boundary. Both regard themselves to the same religious category as Catholics. Oppositely, Tai Yuan who married non-Christian Laveue of Pa Pae village are predominantly animist-Buddhists. To some extent, Laveue—Tai Yuan share common folklore. They are likely not to convert to be Christian as their Laveue spouse since most of the married couples reside new locally in Chiang Mai. In sum, ethnicity and religion should be seen in both hierarchical and horizontal, and more importantly in diagonal directions or crossways in cross-cultural aspect because ethnicity always links to religions and in the same time religion always links to ethnicities in intermarriage context.

Methodology

This paper relies on my ethnographic fieldwork for my doctoral dissertation on Laveue marriage ceremony and kinship practices. I have been conducting a village study in Pa Pae Village, which is a Laveue ethnic village in Mae Sariang District of Mae Hong Son Province, since 2015. I first surveyed Mae Sariang District in March 2015 and subsequently entered Pa Pae Village in September 2015. I owe my host family for accommodation and warm-heartedness since I have always stayed at their house every time I visited the village. In September and October 2015, I conducted a preliminary survey of the village and the households. I draw each household's kinship chart up to three generations of living members in order to know the current situations of a population and village-city migration. The majority of the village is Laveue, however, there is one household that the household head is currently a Karen widower who married to a Lua family's adopted Karen daughter. The family is Catholic and his (Laveue) children married Karen wives and husbands into the village. Other than that the inherited Laveue is the head of the household.

Based on the primary fieldwork, I become interested in studying Laveue family and kinship systems. I returned to the village in February 2016 to participate and observe a marriage ceremony. It was the first Laveue wedding case during my fieldwork. The bride and the groom have different ethnicity and religion and they remain their different religious affiliations after marriage. I also joined their wedding held at the groom's house in Chiang Dao District of Chiang Mai Province. Since then, I have turned my study focus into interethnic and Interreligious marriage phenomena of Laveue—Karen and Laveue—Tai Yuan, whose close proximity and relationships were mentioned in northern Thai chronicles.

The main fieldwork was conducted during August 2016 to mid-January 2017. From August to early October, the villagers were free from agricultural activities, but most of working villagers went to work for wage outside the village. I interviewed elderly villagers and mostly housewives who stayed at the house and also conducted interviews in the evening after the villagers were home. I observed the

communal events including the propitiation of the village spirits and the celebrations of Christmas in December, as the transition from the year end to the New Year for animist-Buddhist villagers and Christian villagers respectively. Three weddings took place in December 2017 which none of them was in full traditional version. The current version of the marriage ceremony is described through my observations during 2016 fieldwork and the past versions are acquired from interviews to local informants and the past wedding photos.

Intermarriage: Ethnic Identity and Religious Identity

In this paper, “Thai” are people of Thailand and I concern all ethnic groups of Thailand who might have distinctive speaking language as “Thai”. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss nationality or citizenship. This paper deals with interethnic marriages within “Thai” people in perspective of culture, specifically between Laveue—Karen and Laveue—Tai Yuan. For the most part, Kunstadter (1967a, 1967b, 1968, 1978, 1979, 1983 and 1984) has studied Laveue—Karen relations in Mae Sariang area in aspects of subsistence, population, migration, religion, and cultural identity. However, there is no specific study on the relations of Laveue in Mae Sariang and Tai Yuan.

In Thailand, as far as I read through, interethnic marriages are discussed by Conrad (1987), Toyota (1998), Bao (2001), and Hayami (2004). Each study provides useful viewpoints to my study. Conrad and Toyota study ethnic groups who speak Lolo-Burmese or Tibeto-Burman language: Lisu and Akha, respectively. Bao focuses the study on the first generation “Chinese” and the second generation “Thai Chinese” whose ethnic origin is Chinese. More closely to my study subject, Hayami studies about Karen people who also speak Karenic or Tibeto-Burman language. Meanwhile, Laveue people that I study speak Palaungic branch of Mon-Khmer language which is a different language family to Sino-Tibetan of Karen and Tai-Kadai of Tai Yuan.

Conrad reports intermarriages between Lisu with Chinese descendants like Chinese-Lisu (*haw*), Lahu, and Akha in the provinces of northern Thailand, by contrast to no intermarriages were reported despite geographical proximity between Lisu with Hmong, Mien, Karen, and in addition with Northern Thai. Contradictorily, Conrad (1987: 199) points out that “The (six) groups encompassed in the category *chao khao* (literally mountain people, p.198) are called ‘hill tribes’ to differentiate them from other ‘minorities’ or ‘ethnic groups’ such as Chinese or Shan, who also live in the hills”. These six major groups include Karen, Hmong, Mien, Lisu, Lahu, and Akha. From Conrad’s point, intermarriage does not depend on the common social category of being ‘hill tribes’. Rather, he emphasizes the importance of kinship and affinal ties in Lisu society and the point of his study that “for the (Lisu) people concerned, to be ‘Lisu’ is a matter of lifestyle, not of ancestral origins” (Conrad, 1987: 214). That is why intermarriages are found between Lisu—*Haw*, Lisu—Lahu, and Lisu—Akha, who define themselves related in terms of kinship management than ethnic origin.

Toyota concerns not only ethnic identity but also religious identity in the matters of intermarriage. She depicts four following informant cases of Akha identities in Chiang Mai: (1) Christian identity, (2) Tai identity, (3) Chinese identity, and (4) Akha identity. She argues in the case of Christian identity that religious identity is always changed actively and diversely based on an Akha’s life experiences. While Tai

identity facilitates an Akha to adjust one's life in Chiang Mai, Chinese identity eases an Akha to associate to Chinese origin and dissociate to other Akha category in Thailand. This kind of association renders transnational marriage and in doing so "Interethnic marriages indeed strengthen cross-border social networks". Last, in the case of Akha identity, Akha marriage ceremony is utilized as a representational space to validate an Akha's identity to observers. In sum, cross-cultural networks are generated across ethnicity and religion to reaffirm one's ethnic identification both at the marriage ceremony and couple life after marriage.

Bao discussed how alternative identities of Thai Chinese in contemporary Thailand are (in his term) "reworked" in middle and upper-class Sino-Thai weddings in Bangkok. He redefines the term "Sino-Thai" in his study as "Chinese immigrants with their descendants embodying a synthesis of both Thai Buddhist and Chinese Confucian ethics" (2001: 279). He illustrates Sino-Thai wedding ritual configurations to show how Chinese identity and Thai identity are chosen to represent their identities in gender hierarchical order on the wedding day. He suggests that class cut across Sino-Thai ethnic boundaries and at this intersection Western culture situate between class and ethnicity. In Bao's study, ethnic morality is emphasized rather than religious identity as an instrument of Sino-Thai's ethnic identification.

Hayami observes intermarriages between Karen and Tai Yuan (or Khon muang in Hayami's text). Concerning to ecological and agricultural changes, local inhabitants relocate and enter their neighbors' territory. She explains why Karen intermarry Khon muang that "In fact, because of their (Karen and Khon muang) long history as neighbors, various prejudices, and mutual fears, for example, the attribution of magical powers to the other, have also developed" (Hayami, 2004: 80). It is contrary to Hmong people who are in *Khae* (ethnic Chinese) category. "There is a tendency to look down on the *khae*, and villagers consider marriage with these groups distasteful, if not unthinkable" (Hayami, 2004: 79-80). All in all, she adds interethnic marriageable category can be defined differently in an urban setting.

I would like to conclude some critical points from the four studies above. The territorial proximity does not determine the intermarriage inclination among ethnic or religious groups who live close to each other; however, it is likely to open cultural familiarities and results acculturation. In Conrad's work, interethnic marriage depends on cultural compatibilities between two ethnic groups. In contrary, cultural incompatibilities are often accompanied with awareness and attitudes towards particular ethnic groups. However, it is not clearly evident that the common feature of patrilineal descent system and social categorization accelerate the intermarriage tendency. Hayami's work, in the same way as Conrad, suggests that intermarriage is encouraged by mutual categorization which she further argues that this categorization is contextually reconsidered.

For both intra-ethnic group and interethnic groups, religion becomes another crucial factor in the marriage context. Toyota shows how each individual Akha selects and switches their ethnic identity and religious identity to represent oneself to different concerned peoples. By becoming a Christian, she asserts that "Identities are not always passively influenced by the situations but different individuals respond differently towards the same circumstances" (Toyota, 1998: 215). Social class plays an important role to capitalize on Sino-Thai intermarriage in Bao's work. In the process of interethnic marriage, Bao demonstrates that Chinese ethics and Thai ethics are selected to identify their Thai-Chinese ethnicity in Thailand. All of the above descriptions show how the complexities of ethnic

identity and religious identity in intermarriage phenomena have been studies in Thai society. Next, I will present my fieldwork data in details and finally affirm the argument of this paper.

The Rise of Intermarriage

In the respect of ethnic neighborhood, a considerable number of Laveue villagers of Pa Pae village have been intermarrying to their Karen ethnic neighbors. Pa Pae village is located among Karen villages in this middle mountain range area of Mae Sariang. In Pa Pae Sub-district, there are twelve administrative villages which nine are Karen villages. More precisely, there are totally twenty-three domain and satellite villages of Karen and seven of Laveue. The domain Laveue village in this sub-district are Chang Mo (village no.4), Om Phai (village no.11), and Pa Pae (village no.3), sorted by more to less population size respectively. According to Pa Pae Sub-district Administrative Organization's document that I received in September 2016, in Pa Pae village there are 449 villagers in 107 households. It is the only administrative village in this sub-district area that has no satellite or sub-village.

By investigating traditional marriage and kinship patterns, along with the spread of Christianity and Buddhism and the development projects to the village, I concern ethnicity and religion as the determinants of Laveue marriage changes in Pa Pae village. Protestantism was spread to Pa Pae village in the 1960s by American missionaries from New Tribes Mission and later by a well-known Protestant missionary among Laveue people: Donald Schlatter. The village's first Protestant Church had been built near the first converted family before the new Protestant Church was built on a hill facing west due to the rise of Protestant villagers replaced the old one. In the 1970s, Catholic missionaries who have propagated in Mae Sariang area, especially among Karen, introduced Catholicism to Laveue people of Pa Pae village. In the 1980s, a forest monk initiated propagating Buddhism to Pa Pae villagers and the village's monk monastery was built. Unlike a traditional Laveue village in Mae La Noi which has been influenced by the *Thammacharik* Buddhist missionary state-sponsored project and the villagers consists of animists, Buddhists, Protestants, and without Catholics, I have never known of neither Pa Pae household that is exclusively animist nor absolutely Buddhist.

Regarding my field survey in Pa Pae village during 2015 to 2016, I tabulate ethnicity and religion to assume different frequencies of being within (intra-) and between (inter-) these two elements (see Table 1 below). There are totally 222 married couples included those couples who are living inside and outside the village. By interviewing every household in the village, I further asked about each household's members' marriage from the household's informant. I have to note that I do not distinguish between animism and Buddhism, but I distinguish Christian denominations between Catholicism and Protestantism. In my doctoral dissertation, I abbreviate animist-Buddhism to AB, Catholicism to C, and Protestantism to P. In the following parts, these abbreviations will be shown in the conversion directions (\leftarrow or \rightarrow) and in no conversions of intra-religion (+) or interfaith (=) which a husband is always on left side and a wife is always on the right side. Superficially, we can see that neither same nor different ethnicity is the indicators of religion differences in married couples and we might suppose that interethnic marriage is often consistent with Interreligious marriage because the frequency is double to intra-ethnic but Interreligious marriage.

Table 1: The Relationship Between Ethnicity and Religion

<div style="text-align: center;">Ethnicity Religion</div>	Intra-ethnic	Interethnic	Total (%)
Intra-religion	71	72	143 (64%)
Inter-religion	26	53	79 (36%)
Total	97	125	222
(%)	(44%)	(56%)	(100%)

Is ethnicity not a factor in the case of intra-religious marriage? The numbers of intra-ethnic and interethnic marriages are almost equal to intra-religious marriage, regardless the residence of the couples. Within 222 married couples, there are 118 couples living in Pa Pae village while 104 couples living outside Pa Pae village (see Table 2 below). In Pa Pae village, 67% (79 couples) are Laveue couples while 33% (39 couples) are other ethnic marrying-in with Laveue of Pa Pae. Most intra-religious couples are AB+AB. This means to the married couples who do not convert to Christianity both in the unit of family and couple.

Table 2: The Correlation Among Ethnicity, Religion, and Residence

<div style="text-align: center;">Couple Residence</div>	Religion	Ethnicity		Total (%)
		Intra-ethnic	Interethnic	
Pa Pae village	Family conversion	17	0*	17
	Intra-religion	43	23	66
	Couple conversion	18	11	29
	Interfaith	1	5	6
Sum		79	39	118
Outside	Family conversion	0*	0*	0
	Intra-religion	11	49	60
	Couple conversion	7	17	24
	Interfaith	0	20	20
Sum		18	86	104
Total		97 (44%)	125 (56%)	222 (100%)

I refer family conversion to the couples who got married when they were then animists and later on converted to be Christians after Christianity had spread to the village. There are family conversions to Protestantism (P<<AB) and Catholicism (C<<AB), however, I do not count family conversions to Buddhism (B<<AB) since Buddhism is an extension of animism in Pa Pae village. Most of them are the old generation whose marriage ceremony was in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. I put zero marked with a star on the table to indicate the limitation of my study survey. In contrast to family conversion, I refer couple

conversion to the married couples which the husband and the wife come from different religions and the religious conversion is made as a result of marriage.

In Pa Pae Village, 38 out of 43 are AB+AB intra-Laveue married couples. Conversions among intra-Laveue married couples from Catholicism to animist-Buddhism ($AB \leftarrow C$) and vice versa ($C \leftarrow AB$) are more than conversions from Protestantism to Catholicism or animist-Buddhism ($C \leftarrow P$ or $AB \leftarrow P$). However, animist-Buddhists and Catholics are not different to convert to Protestantism ($P \leftarrow AB$ and $P \leftarrow C$). Five of Protestant couples (2 P+P, 1 $P \leftarrow AB$, 2 $P \leftarrow C$) are living outside the village, whereas none of the Catholic couples and only one animist-Buddhist couple ($AB \leftarrow C$) are away from the village. There is only one exceptional case of the interfaith couple ($AB = C$) among intra-Laveue married couples living in Pa Pae Village. While Laveue—Karen couples are 7 C+C, 5 AB+AB, and 3 P+P, other 7 Karen also converted to Catholicism (4 $C \leftarrow AB$, 2 $AB \rightarrow C$, and 1 $P \rightarrow C$) to follow their Laveue spouses. There are no Tai Yuan who married into Pa Pae and convert to Christianity. All of them remain animist-Buddhists ($P = AB$).

In Table 2 outside residence are Laveue villages, Karen villages, or other ethnic villages, and towns where neither husband's nor wife's natal house is located. Due to the scope of this study, I have no chance to observe the married couples who are presently living outside Pa Pae village. So, it is important to note that the figures of outside married couples were informed by their households' informants and it is a relatively arguable presumption. Nevertheless, I would like to provide these data as a comparison and to underscore the significance of village-city connection in my study. In inter-village Laveue marriages, Pa Pae wives moved out to their husbands' villages, and most of them are animist-Buddhist couples (AB+AB, 5) and Protestant couples (P+P, 4) but no Catholic couples (C+C).

In interethnic marriages, 31 out of 49 are AB+AB. The most prominent numbers in each intra-religious interethnic marriage are AB Tai Yuan—AB Laveue (15), C Karen—C Laveue (3), and P Laveue—P Karen (5). The couple conversions are 9 to Protestantism, 6 to Catholicism, and 2 to animist-Buddhism. On the contrary to customarily converting to husbands' religions, there are also cases that husbands convert to Christianity as their wives outside the village. Interfaith couples consist of $C = AB$, $AB = C$, $P = AB$, and $AB = P$ between Laveue—Tai Yuan and Laveue—other ethnic groups, whereas there is no Laveue—Karen interfaith couple.

It is evident in Table 2 that ethnicity is the factor that diverges intra-religious marriage. AB+AB intra-Laveue marriage is dominant inside the village, while the interethnic marriage of AB+AB Laveue—Tai Yuan are outstanding outside the village. Holding the same religious belief is important to both intra-ethnic and interethnic married couple, especially the married couples who are going to live either in husband's or wife's natal house, because religious affiliation is one of the important approvals of the family to other fellow villagers. At the marriage, the bride moves to live with her husband's family and converts to have his family's religion accordingly. I have not found the household where the residing members are mixed of non-Christian and Christian, except for the only interfaith couple ($AB = C$).

According to Pa Pae village informants, none of Laveue married out to live in Karen villages in this area. Unless the Karen spouse moves into Pa Pae village, the married couple moves to the third place in lowland areas. As they know, both cases of a Laveue groom and a Laveue bride is always going to make a marriage proposal to his and her spouse-to-be Karen. Any bride price is required to pay at the proposal. Laveue villagers who are the proposal maker usually bring rice liquor and two chickens along to Karen

village and after that, the marriage ceremony is prepared and hosted in Laveue village. Based on Table 2, 25 out of 39 are Laveue—Karen interethnic couple. Ten Karen wives and fifteen Karen husbands intermarry to Pa Pae village. Regarding the couple's religion, Catholicism is more than animist-Buddhism and Protestantism as follows: 14, 6, 4, and plus one interfaith couple which Karen husband is Seventh-day Adventist and Laveue wife is Catholic. Half of Karen spouse are Catholic and another half converted to be Catholic at the marriage ceremony in Pa Pae village. So far, I give the explanation about the rise of intermarriage in Pa Pae village. Continued to the section below, I am going to utilize a conceptual framework to conclude the ideas discussed through this paper.

Networks across Ethnicity and Religion

By a general image, most of "Thai" citizens are Buddhist because Buddhism is the national and official religion of the Kingdom of Thailand. For the mainstream, being an educated and modern "Thai" is to speak central Thai language (without regional dialects and provincial accents) and to be Buddhist. Compared with Bangkok as the capital of Thailand, Chiang Mai is the regional capital of northern Thailand. "Thai" from all regions leave their home in the countryside to pursue higher education and job opportunities in Bangkok.¹⁹⁹ In the same way, in Chiang Mai especially since the urbanization in 1980s many "Thai" regardless of ethnicity and religion from surrounding provinces come to stay for a short and long term.

The ethnic diversity is understated as the dichotomy between majority and minority. But actually, the issue is more complex and always renders to other arguments. Because of a small number of minorities and Christians compared to majority "Thai" and Buddhists, interethnic and Interreligious marriage are not really paid attention. Through this paper, I draw attention to intermarriage phenomena as a concrete field to discuss the relationship between ethnicity and religion in Thailand.

In this section, I would like to refer Hammond and Warner's work (1993) as the guideline to my argument. I do not set this point in order to compare my case study to or with American case because both are essentially different, but rather I am interested in Hammond and Warner's systematic and logical explanations. Intermarriage has been an ongoing issue in American society, the country which apparently accommodates multicultural states and intercultural citizens. Intermarriages both interethnic and Interreligious are on the rise. It is often the issue of interracial marriage between Native Americans and immigrants from another part of the world such as Africans and Asians. Moreover, intermarriage is accompanying with the controversial matter of miscegenation laws in the United States, whereas there are no laws on intermarriages in Thailand or in Buddhist restrictions.

Hammond and Warner (1993: 56) presume that ethnic assimilation and religious secularization in the respect that "both ethnicity and religion are vulnerable to forces that diminish their social importance". They further point out the three common features of ethnicity and religion. The first feature is the increasing individual freedom to choose one's ethnicity and one's religion and the second feature is the declining inheritability of ethnicity and notably religion. I would like to make the third feature as a

¹⁹⁹ Boccuzzi (2012) writes a very good book titled "Bangkok bound" by contrasting city and rural reality. Yet, she portrays the local trains as the connection back and forth between two destinations of Thai individuals' life.

significant point to study intermarriage by the quotation below.

A third feature common to ethnicity and religion is the role played by intermarriage in the processes of assimilation and secularization. Just as marriage across ethnic boundaries need not weaken the ethnic identity of either partner but often does, so may marriage occur across religious lines without weakening religious identity. But religious intermarriage is often discouraged for fear of just such loss because that loss, like lost ethnic identity, frequently occurs (Hammond and Warner, 1993: 57).

In my case study, interethnic marriages neither weaken ethnic identity nor religious identity. But more or less, it strengthens Laveue—Karen Catholic affiliation and Laveue—Tai Yuan animist-Buddhism compatibility. In opposition to Hammond and Warner, I see that Laveue—Karen interethnic marriage bolsters religious assimilation rather than ethnic assimilation because both are freely to express their own ethnic characteristics. Yet, religious conversion is customarily undertaken and it is more rigid for the married couples living inside the village than the couples who live outside the village. As Kunstadter (1983: 151) stated that “Clearly they (Laveue people of Pa Pae village) are not becoming Northern Thai Buddhists, but neither are they becoming Karen. They are becoming something new, that is, Catholic ‘hill tribe’”. Still, this stage is lack of the empirical data and further intensive fieldwork is needed to be done in order to discuss ethnic and religious assimilation of Laveue—Tai Yuan married couples. Nevertheless, I suppose that Laveue—Tai Yuan interreligious marriage might weaken both parts’ religious identity due to religious compatibility. But, it might help strengthen “Buddhist” practices in some extent.

Moreover, Hammond and Warner (1993: 59) conclude three relationship patterns between ethnicity and religion following Abramson’s statement (1980) as follows: (1) ethnicity corresponds to religion—“ethnic fusion”, (2) religion is one of the ethnicity bases—or “ethnic religion”, and (3) an ethnic group among other ethnic groups is connected to a common religious tradition—or “religious ethnicity”. They create the terms “ethnic religion” and “religious ethnicity” to emphasize the two following identifications. The former is the ethnic identification and the latter is religious identification which each of them can be asserted by the absence of one another. Furthermore, they assess the second pattern that “ethnicity helps to uphold religion” and conversely “religion helps to uphold ethnicity” in the third pattern.

Among Laveue—Tai Yuan—Karen, Laveue is believed to be the ethnic group that propitiates greater spirits than Tai Yuan and Karen. Laveue, therefore, has more complicated traditions than other two groups.²⁰⁰ Animism is the common characteristic of these three indigenous ethnic groups of northern Thailand. Laveue and Karen are hill animists whereas Tai Yuan are plain animists. To different degree and content, each ethnic group has been influenced by Christianity (chiefly Protestantism and Catholicism),

²⁰⁰ Similar to Laveue (Lua)’s myth of carrying all spirits return to the village with “a tightly-woven and covered basket” and so Laveue (Lua) regard themselves as “a spirit-burdened people” compared to Tai Yuan and Karen (Kunstadter, 1983: 151), Kammerer (1990: 280) noted Akha’s myth of carrying “customs” (zah^v) returned home with “a tightly woven sack” and thus Akha concern their customs (zah^v) to be “numerous and difficult” compared to Shan, Thai, Chinese, and Lahu people.

Thammacharik Buddhism and Lanna Buddhism. In order to preserve their ethnic identity that is associated with animism, animistic practices are continuing but also being modified.

In Pa Pae village, neither a strong impact of Thammacharik Buddhism nor Lanna Buddhism can be seen. But, the villagers have been encouraged by “practical wandering monks and nuns”. They are not institutional missionaries, but they are likely the pilgrim devotees. No cutting off animism and any rite of passage are necessary to be done to abandon animism. Animism is still important with the addition of Buddhism. As I already mentioned elsewhere, the villagers who do not convert to Christianity adjust their lives as animist-Buddhists. Back to two decades before the spread of Buddhism into the village, Protestant and Catholic missionaries had made conversions to a significant number of Pa Pae families and intra-ethnic/interethnic married couples. Thus, it is incorrect to see Laveue ethnicity as the static ideal of being outstanding animists without respecting to their actual religious practices of animist-Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism.

Regarding Hammond and Warner, the relationship between ethnicity and religion of Laveue has changed from the first pattern (ethnic fusion) to the second pattern (ethnic religion) since the spread of the world religions to the village in the 1960s. Inter-Laveue village relations are invigorated through intra-religion marriages which mostly among animist-Buddhist Laveue and Protestant Laveue. Therefore, religion should be perceived as one of Laveue identity accompanying with other identities. Christian Laveue can claim their Laveue ethnic identity by speaking Laveue language, wearing Laveue costumes, and following other Laveue ways of life, without claiming of Laveue spirits’ veneration as animist-Buddhists.

Paralleling to agricultural activities, scheduled religious activities are followed by Pa Pae villagers. Animist-Buddhists usually give alms to Buddhist monks and participate in Buddhist activities inside the village’s monk monastery area. However, non-Christian families continue making an offering to their household spirits periodically and to the village spirits annually. Animistic beliefs are still essential to Laveue communal life as a continuity of Laveue culture. There are also some (animist)-Buddhist non-villager Karen, married-in Tai Yuan or Tai Yuan officials, and Thai adherents who take part in Buddhist activities with Pa Pae villagers.

For Catholic and Protestant congregations, they have stable churches and the group’s weekly, monthly, and yearly praying activities. Karen and Tai Yuan Catholic priests are often invited to visit the village to perform Catholic rituals. On the contrary, Protestant pastors are usually Laveue who are also Pa Pae villagers or Laveue from nearby villages. Laveue and Catholic Karen from neighboring villages also come to join Sunday Mass and other religious activities on the important Christian days in Pa Pae village. In turn, Pa Pae Christians go to join other villages’ activities. To conclude, the religious diversity has been sustaining and vitalizing in Pa Pae village.

Ethnic religion (the second pattern) is relevant to religious ethnicity (the third pattern). In religious ethnicity, interethnic relations are formed. Religion is a channel to connect two or more ethnic groups. In Mae Sariang area, Laveue—Karen relations are generated in terms of neighborhood, marital alliance, and Catholic. On the other hand, there are many Laveue—Tai Yuan interethnic married couples whose animist-Buddhist beliefs and practices are compatible with each other. In conclusion, common religious identity plays a more important part in contemporary context across ethnicity.

Conclusion

This paper attempts to draw attention to intermarriage phenomena among intra-“Thai”. I refer to the previous discussion related to ethnic identity and religious identity in the context of intermarriage in order to examine my study case. I base my field research in Pa Pae village which is a Laveue ethnic village in Mae Sariang District, Mae Hong Son Province and by investigating through family and kinship I extend to analyze intermarriages between Laveue—Sgaw Karen and Laveue—Tai Yuan. Even though these three ethnic groups’ languages belong to different language family as follows Mon-Khmer, Sino-Tibetan, and Tai-Kadai, their relationships are obvious in respect of historical closeness and ethnic intimacy.

Nevertheless, I argue that intermarriage phenomena should not be generalized because the interdependence between ethnicity and religion are dissimilar in each village. In northern Thailand, Tai Yuan are mostly animist-Buddhists whereas remarkable numbers of highlanders including Laveue and Karen are Christian. There are two denominations of Christianity spread in Pa Pae village. Firstly, Protestantism is embedded in Laveue villages of this mountain. Secondly, Catholicism is introduced to Laveue via Karen and it becomes a religious identity of Laveue—Karen married couples. Likewise, we should not underestimate a great number of Laveue—Tai Yuan married couples who generally are animist-Buddhists and tend not to remain different religion in the case of Interreligious marriage. Unfortunately, I did not conduct intensive fieldwork among these Laveue—Tai Yuan married couples who are away from the village to live in the urban areas.

To summarize, this study proposes that religious identity is a kind of cross-cultural network that is consistent to Hammond and Warner’s “religious ethnicity”. Religious identity is primarily influenced by the spread of world religions to a local context, but gradually it is promoted along with the rise of intermarriages. Religion identification is claimed while ethnic identification is also concerned. What we had better keep in mind about studying intermarriage in contemporary Thai society is about ethnic and religious diversity. Especially as this study proves, religious identity is bringing people of different ethnic groups together.

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Tracing the Blame: The Shift in Focus from State Accountability to Community Morality in the Practices of Isan Development Monks

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Abstract

The 'development monk' movement began in the 1960s as individual monks contesting state development practices in favor of those that adhere more closely to Buddhist teachings. Throughout the 1980s and 90s, development monks began forming networks and collaborating with neolocalist NGOs and activists in an effort to assert local autonomy and identity in the face of state development policy. However, since the creation of the "People's Constitution" and the passage of the National Decentralization Act in the late 1990s, which led to the Thai government adopting the language and symbols of localism in its development strategies, there has been a large-scale withdrawal of NGO support from monastic development practice and an increase in monastic collaboration with government entities. There has been a corresponding shift in the practices of development monks from those that target economic and environmental policies to those that attempt to rein in 'vice,' such as drinking and gambling. With the recent coup, this trend has only accelerated as exemplified by the nation-wide "Villagers who Adhere to the Five Buddhist Precepts" project. This project is headed by the National Office of Buddhism under the jurisdiction of the NCPO in collaboration with development monks, and works to solve national economic and environmental problems by correcting 'immoral' behavior at the village community level.

I argue that this collaborative shift from working with neolocalist NGOs to almost exclusively working alongside government entities has resulted in a drastic shift in focus from the systematic moral failings of development practices, policies, and ideology to the creation of 'moral communities' from which material development will naturally spring. This, in turn, portrays the failure to develop with moral failings at the village level while ignoring the larger system-level problems of which these 'moral failings' may be more symptom than cause.

Keywords: Development monks, Buddhism, Community Development

Introduction

Phra Nak Phatthana or ‘development monk’ is a term refers to Thai monks who engage in various forms of social activism. In the years since the movement’s inception (usually placed in the early 1960s), this label has come to be applied to monks working in a number of different arenas and on a vast array of activist endeavors - from forest preservation to local business cooperatives to meditation workshops. I follow Lapthananon’s definition of development monk as a monk who “regularly engages in development²⁰¹ activity with villagers or the community in a way that affects their living conditions or way of life” (2012a, p. 7, translation mine). I exclude from this definition, as Lapthananon does, activities that are of a purely religious nature, such as temple expansion and the organization of religious ceremonies. This being said, the activist practices of development monks can hardly be called secular. These monks see the root cause of socioeconomic problems as the failure to adhere to Buddhist precepts and seek to address those issues through the application of religious teachings.

The past two decades have seen a marked shift in monastic development activity, in terms of both practice and ideology. Once a movement active in contesting the centralized development practices of the state, it is now characterized by collaboration with state entities on projects aimed at implementing local development projects. While the movement was once primarily concerned with system-level economic and political reform, in recent decades, it has become increasingly focused on projects aimed at eradicating what its practitioners see as harmful behavior at the village, household, and individual levels. This paper examines how these changes have affected the moral dimension of monastic development activism, specifically what I am calling the ‘locus of liability’ for socioeconomic problems in the villages. Due to Buddhism’s emphasis on personal responsibility, ‘liability’ here refers to both faulty action (Feinberg, 1968) and the responsibility to make corrective changes. I use ‘locus’ to mean the scale (individual, local, state, etc.) and actor or actors at/to which liability is ascribed. I argue that the shift from collaboration with neolocalist NGOs to working almost exclusively alongside government entities has resulted in a similar shift in the locus of moral liability that drives monastic development work. Previous generations of development monks located this liability with national and global political and economic systems, citing the moral failings of national and international development ideology, practices, and policies. By contrast, the current generation of development monks work mainly to create “moral communities” from which (it is assumed), sustainable material development will naturally to spring. The failure to develop is, in turn, portrayed as originating from moral failings at the individual and village level while larger system-level problems (of which these perceived “moral failings” may be more symptom than cause) are largely ignored. I outline this trend in the following sections, looking specifically at the recent focus in monastic development practice on the elimination of vice and the driving economic philosophy of Sufficiency Economy.

²⁰¹ The word “development” (*phatthana*) in Thai is used to describe a much wider range of activities than it typically is in English. Because of this, the word, “social activism” may be a more accurate than “development activity” to represent development monks’ practices. However, because the word is so central to the subject and because it is the term used both by my informants and in the academic literature on the topic, I use it here as well.

Morality in Buddhist Development

The development monks with whom I worked often explained the nature of their activities in terms of ethics (*chariatham*) or morality (*Sinlatham*, *khunnatham*). Although, for the most part, these monks initially became involved in development work out of the desire to improve material conditions in their villages and to strengthen community ties, they tend to see the causes of development-related problems as being rooted firmly in a failure to adhere to Buddhist teachings. Many of their activities, thus, are concentrated on eliminating behavior such as materialism, greed, and addiction, which conflict with Buddhist doctrine and which these practitioners see as being a hindrance to development.

The ascription of moral causes to development problems is unsurprising given the naturalistic way in which morality is widely understood in the context of Theravada Buddhism. Charles Goodman (2009) has argued that Theravada Buddhists adhere to an ethical philosophy similar to that of rule consequentialism in the Western tradition, which proposes a universal set of rules, the adherence to which is justified by the consequences. One is not, he says, obligated to follow moral rules as a matter of virtue. However,

life without the rules is still subject to the Law of Karma, and the grim consequences of performing the actions that would be forbidden by the rules can give people prudential reasons to choose to accept the rules as binding on them (p. 55).

Development monks with whom I worked described social, economic, and environmental problems in the community as the natural consequences of the failure to adhere to Buddhist precepts. A comparison often presented to me was that between Buddhist morality and natural science, as both are governed by sets of natural laws (as opposed to a dogmatic moral code enforced from on high through the dispensing of reward and punishment). As Phrakhru Phothiwirakhun (a development monk in Roi Et province with whom I have been closely involved for several years) phrased it, “Buddhism holds that the *dhamma* [*thamma*] is nature [*thammachat*] ... We not believe in a god, but in principles to guide our own actions ... There is only nature and the consequences [of our actions] are natural” (Personal Communication, 29 May, 2016). Failing to act in accordance with Buddhist virtues, thus, represents a fundamental lack of understanding regarding the nature of cause and effect. Correction of these misguided actions and ways of understanding the world is the most direct way to solve social and material problems. The goal of monastic development is to reconfigure the context in which development takes place so as to base it on Buddhist virtues. This takes the forms of both advocating for “moral” development practices and the development of “morals” within the community in order to encourage material (economic, environmental, etc.) development. However, as I argue below, the landscape of monastic development has, in recent years, shifted drastically from the former to the latter.

Neolocalism and System-Level Development Reform

In the first decades of the monastic development movement, its emphasis was primarily on the creation of a moral/ethical economic system based on Buddhist values. The movement first arose when a number of monks began to actively oppose the top-down state-centered development model proposed by the

Thai government in its First National Economic and Social Development Plan (Nishikawa & Noda, 2001). These monks were outspoken against what they saw as an overemphasis on greed and materialism that had accompanied Thailand's move toward increasingly urban-centered and neoliberal economic policies. They understood these policies as being inherently contrary to Buddhist teachings - specifically, those of *Pratītyasamutpāda* (Dependant Arising), *Mettā* (Loving-Kindness toward sentient beings), and satisfaction through the elimination of desire. It was this failure to adhere to a development model compatible with Buddhist teachings that was causing the economic and environmental problems they were seeing at the village level, such as rampant deforestation, villagers' increasing debt, and growing income inequality (Swearer, 1997, King, 2009).

Emblematic of this ideology is the outspoken academic monk, Prayudh Payutto (Phra Bhramagunabhorn, formerly Dhammapitaka), who published a booklet in 1988 entitled *Buddhist Economics* (*Sethasat Naeo Phut*, 2005[1988]).²⁰² In this work (as well as in subsequent lectures and a second edition published in 2005), he argued that a lack of "ethical" (*chariyatham*) consideration in the dominant economic model was a major cause of modern social and environmental problems. He, thus, advocated for a new economic model that did not valorize excess and overconsumption and instead encouraged people to act in accordance with Buddhist teachings (Payutto, 2005). In a 1993 speech at the Parliament of World's Religions in Chicago, he listed three faulty perceptions underlying "modern human civilization" that have precipitated many of the economic, environmental, and social problems of the past decades. These are the beliefs that 1) mankind is separate from nature and should attempt to "conquer" it, 2) that we fail to see other human beings as such, treating them instead as rivals or commodities, and 3) that happiness is "dependent on an abundance of material possessions" (Payutto 1993, p. 3).

This ideological framework, which sees an increasingly commodified and centralized development model as a primary cause of local hardship, is the basis for what Parnwell describes as "neolocalism." Neolocalism refers to the localist ideology prominent among development monks and other localist activists in the in the 1980s and 90s that attempts to locate solutions to local development problems in "situations, practices, and moral codes that prevailed (sometimes more imagined than real) in the past, which both local and external activists are seeking to rekindle and remodel" (Parnwell 2007, p. 998). In previous decades, collaboration among development monks and neolocalist NGOs and activists was common, leading to them often taking similar approaches to development practice. These ideological inclinations were eventually codified as the Community Culture [*watthanatham chumchon*] movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Community Culture was, at its heart, a refutation the large-scale ideological paradigms that had been adopted by the state and other actors and institutions whom its adherents saw as being disconnected from local concerns and conditions (Nartsupha, 2001; Thongyou, 2004). They were attempting to find a path toward rectifying what they perceived to be immorality inherent in those paradigms by referring to a kind of local idyll, firmly rooted in notions of culture, history, and tradition. It is a view that suggests that the only path out of the disembedded economy (cf.

²⁰² The term "Buddhist Economics" originally coined by E. F. Schumacher in the 1950s as an attempt to reconcile the field of economics with the metaphysical worldview of Buddhist countries (Zsolnai, 2011). See (Schumacher, 1993)

Polanyi, 2001) and its accompanying social and environmental problems is to go back to the way it was before. As Phongpaichit (2005) writes, “[T]he main proposition was that, to resist the destructive forces of globalization and outward oriented development, communities needed to look inwards and strengthen their own foundations of resources and culture” (p. 167). In other words, the problems that have accompanied globalization and neoliberalism are making their way into localities via outside actors implementing non-local development policies and strategies. Thus, the reaction becomes an attempt to “claw back” (Parnwell, 2005) local control over development by appealing to a remembered way of life and working to stave off the modernist forces attempting to push their way into local communities. Phra S (one of the few neolocalist development monks I encountered who were still active), for example, makes a qualitative distinction between environmental problems that originate from within the village and those that come from non-local sources.

There are many ways we can talk about pollution (*singwedlom pen phit*).²⁰³ It comes from every place, every direction. *Phit*²⁰⁴ can come from a single speck of dust...Pesticides are also *phit*. The chemicals that come from fertilizer are *phit*. Biological fertilizers are also *phit*. These are the *phit* that come from the community, from the villagers. However, all of this *phit* is not able to harm humans. But some kinds of *phit* does not come from the community, but from somewhere else. They are brought into the village so that someone can make a profit ... These harmful chemicals, which are actually international [from international sources] create *phit* that is hazardous...They may come from a factory that does something wrong - for example if there is a leak or a seepage or a break, then they flow out. These come in and do harm to the community. These poisons come from the hands of people who come in search of a profit (personal communication, September 12, 2013).

He went on to describe villagers in past decades as having lived blissful, if physically exhausting lives. However, as a result of the externally driven material development that had since come to characterize contemporary life in the region, the villagers were in debt, they were no longer self-sufficient, and the forests around them were being destroyed as investors increasingly came to buy up the land and exploit its resources.

In the past, they [the government] evicted people from the forests and forbade them from living there. They thought the villagers were destroying the forests, so they kicked them out. But the

²⁰³ *Singwedlom pen phit*, a Thai word for pollution can be literally translated as “the environment is toxic”.

²⁰⁴ *Phit* can mean “toxic” or “impure,” and also “dangerous” or “harmful.” Although the Thai word is a noun and can be translated into English as an adjective or noun depending on the context. It can, thus, refer to the nominal forms of these concepts as well (toxicity, impurity, etc.). A common practice among the monks with whom I spoke was to demonstrate the relatedness among concepts through the multiple connotations of a word or phrase. For example, when asked about the connection between Buddhism and environmental conservation, several development monks, including Phra S., responded that the word *thammachat* [nature] comes from the word *thamma* [dharma]. Interestingly, this comparison was also used when talking about Buddhist precepts as description of natural laws, rather than moralistic regulations, as *thammachat* (as is the case in English) can be used to refer to “nature,” both in sense of the natural environment and natural laws.

forests were still being destroyed. In fact, they were being destroyed to a greater extent than before. This is because the *nai thun* [capitalists]²⁰⁵ have machinery and can chop down many trees per day. The villagers only had axes and saws...They had to know then where the damage was coming from. It came from the *nai thun*...[Similarly], we have had gold, steel and minerals...since ancient times. But in this era, people's greed has increased. People's desire has increased. So they do more, dig more, use more resources, take more resources, and there is more damage done to nature. This damages the community. It makes the community change (ibid).

For many neolocalist development monks, development-related problems in local communities result from the encroachment from non-local and modernizing forces, who have little-or-no stake in quality of life at the village level. These entities are driven by values that conflict with those of community, history, and identity, which these practitioners understand as being central to traditional village life.

In past decades, development monks' practices were informed, to a large extent, by these ideals and focused on the refutation of centralized/non-local control of local resources and development strategies. There were several monks, for example, involved in the creation of local currencies in order to bolster the local economy and reduce reliance on non-local sources of income, goods, and services. Phrakhru Suphacharawat, a prominent development monk in the 1990s and the abbot of *Wat Ban Thalad* (a temple in Yasothon province) for example, partnered with localist NGOs in order to create a "community currency system" (*bia gud chumchon*) with the temple as the center of operations (Sarakhan et al., 2011). According to Parnwell (2005), the abbot supported the project because it "symbolize[d] important Buddhist principles of sufficiency, moderation and non-attachment" (p. 16).²⁰⁶ In addition to this, he worked to relocalize agricultural practices in his village after seeing the environmental damage and increase in villager debt that resulted from the government's push to switch from subsistence agriculture to the growing of cash crops for urban consumption (Rungwichton & Udomittipong, 2001). The creation of community rice and buffalo banks has also been a popular practice among development monks as attempts to re-localize the means of production (and consumption) and bypass the national/international economic systems that they see as having failed the villagers (Suksamran, 1988; Hoffman, 2000; Sivaraksa, 2000). Another well-documented practice in which development monks have traditionally engaged to assert local autonomy with regard to resource management is the tree/forest ordination ceremony [*buad pa*], in which a forest is symbolically ordained by wrapping a tree in the saffron robes of a monk (Rungwichton & Udomittipong, 2001; Delcore, 2004; Darlington, 2012).²⁰⁷ With all of these kinds of practices, the focus was on reforming the moral failings in the economic/political

²⁰⁵ Although *nai thun* directly translates as capitalist, it does not necessarily mean one who adheres to the ideology of capitalism (as opposed to communist). I have also often heard it used to refer to anyone embarking on a project with the primary goal of making money (e.g., investors and entrepreneurs).

²⁰⁶ This currency was subsequently abandoned after it was declared illegal by the Bank of Thailand and the villagers involved were accused of trying to form a "free state" (*rat issara*). For more information (in Thai) see: http://www.appropriate-economics.org/asia/thailand/bangrajan_kudchum.html

²⁰⁷ However, some researchers (myself included) have argued that this particular practice has since been co-opted by the state in a way that re-enforces a nationalist narrative and top-down hierarchical power structure (Tannenbaum, 2000; Isager & Ivarsson, 2002; Southard, 2016).

system, and the locus of liability was, thus, with state and other non-local actors who had (in the minds of development monks) eschewed Buddhist values in their development practices and policies.

Networked Localism and Village-level Reform

In the late 1990s, however, Thailand faced political upheaval and a large-scale economic crisis, which resulted in a new constitution, government restructuring and a dramatic shift in national development strategy. In the years leading up to this shift, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)-issued five-year development plans had already been trending toward more localist rhetoric and an ostensibly more decentralized and participatory development model, partially in answer to the pushback from neolocalist activists (Kelly et al., 2012). This new focus on state localism was codified with the creation of the Tambon Administration Organizations (TAO) (subdistrict-level government agencies in charge of development administration in their communities) in 1996, the drafting of the so-called “People’s Constitution” in 1997 (McCargo, 2004), and the National Decentralization Act in 1999 (Lao-Araya, 2002, Suwanmala & Weist, 2009). As Shigetomi (2004) notes, during this time, NGOs and activists that had been part of the Community Culture movement found themselves participating to a greater extent in the formation and implementation of government development policy, including finding their way into drafting process of the 1997 constitution, and occupying various government positions. They were seen as representatives of the localist movement and “indispensable actors in the new system of governance” (p. 54).

This ‘absorption’ of localist NGOs into state-led development in combination with the crowding out of others through increased government involvement in subdistrict and village-level development projects led to a decrease in collaboration between development monks and neolocalist NGOs and activists. Instead, development monks began collaborating to a greater extent with government agencies and so-called “government NGOs” in the planning and implementation of their development projects (Southard, 2016). This has coincided with an ideological shift among the recent generation of localist development monks. I have categorized this as a shift from the anti-modernization “back to the future” (Parnwell 2005, p. 1007) approach of neolocalism to that of “networked localism,” which is characterized by its attempt to re-appropriate the symbols, technologies, and conveniences of modernization and globalization in order to reassert the role of locality within a new context (Southard 2014). These networked localists are much more active in collaborating with state entities on local development projects than were their ideological predecessors. Subsequently, the strategies they employ in community development have changed, along with the locus of moral liability implied therein. There has been a focal shift from projects that attempt to address system-level “moral” problems and their repercussions to practices that place responsibility at the level of the village, household, and individual. Networked localism is rooted in active collaboration with extralocal networks and entities and its practitioners have, for the most part, exhibited markedly less distrust for the state in the management of local development. This increased collaboration with government organizations has led to large-scale changes in terms of both the concrete goals of individual projects and the explicit ideological underpinnings of these projects. Monastic development projects are now more often than not focused

on eliminating on *abayamuk* - vices such as drinking and gambling - as a way to solve social and economic problems in the village. Development monks have also, in large part, adopted state-espoused ideologies, such as “sufficiency economy” and *mu ban raksa sin ha* (Villages Adhering to the Five Moral Precepts), as philosophical guidelines for their practices. All of these place the onus for social and economic hardship on the need for villager - rather than system - reform and relocate moral liability as being with the villagers, themselves. In the following sections, I examine the relatively recent proliferation of monastic development projects focused on combating vice, as well as the state-led development philosophy of Sufficiency Economy, which has been heavily incorporated into monastic development practice.

Village Vice

As development monks’ support from neolocalist NGOs began to dwindle and government-led organizations were actively pursuing monastic collaboration, many development monks began relying on government actors and institutions for support. Phrakhru Phothiwirakhun, a highly active development monk in Roi Et province phrased it thus:

Currently, I feel like there is a lot of cooperation between development monks and politics [the government]. This is because if politicians come in and support us it allows us to do development work longer...there must be organizations that come in and help. But if no politicians help us, the temples have to fund themselves, which we can do, but not perpetually (personal communication, February 15, 2014).

This means that development monks often end up choosing to engage in projects for which they are able to gain government support, in essence limiting the scope of their activities to those that support the social and economic narrative that the state is currently attempting to invoke. In 2003, for example, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra announced the Thai government’s controversial²⁰⁸ “war on drugs.” During this time, development monks were, as Lapthananon writes, “strongly encouraged to contribute their efforts to the rehabilitation campaign” (2012b, p. 178) and were given resources to do so. Consequently, many development monks began to re-focus their development activity on eliminating illegal substance abuse in their villages. Development monks now often find themselves collaborating heavily with government-funded NGOs and other public organizations, such as the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (*Samnakgnan Kongthun Sanapsanun Kan Sangsoem Sukhaphap*, THPF), and the Stop Drink Network (*Samnakgnan Khruakhai Ongkrong Gnot Lao*) in campaigns against alcohol, smoking, and gambling. In fact, the vast majority of active development monks whom I encountered in the field were now primarily involved in these projects combatting what they refer to as *abayamuk* (vice, as espoused by Buddhist doctrine) in their villages. This shift in focus to state-supported development projects is evident in the activities being emphasized by both the Phaendin Dhamma-Phaendin Thong Development Sangha Networks Organization (*Ongkan Khruakhai Sankha Phatthana Phaendin Tham*

²⁰⁸ See Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2008

Phaendin Thong, PDSNO) and Development Monks for Society (*Phra Nak Phatthana Phuea Sangkhom*), which are, respectively, the largest development monk networks in the northeast and the nation as a whole. While the core members of these networks had long been involved wide range of social and economic development activities, many have either narrowed their focus to state-initiated campaigns aimed at convincing villagers to refrain from *abayamuk*, or have made these kinds of activities their top priority at the expense of the projects for which they were originally known. Phrakhru Samuhan Panyatro in Surin province, for example, is a development monk who is famous for having turned his temple into a sanctuary for elephants and for advocating for their humane treatment. However, when I visited his office in 2013, it was littered with banners and other promotional materials advocating for abstinence from alcohol. He told me that he had recently become less involved in his elephant-related activism, and had shifted his focus to working with regional development monk networks (which are funded in part by government entities like the THPF) on these kinds of anti-alcohol projects. Satawaphet Suwanprapha, the coordinator of the *Khon Hen Khon* project (a series of seminars aimed at local activists in which development monks often participate), also emphasized the role of networks in facilitating monks' involvement in these kinds of government projects. As he put it:

These monks are interested in doing everything [a wide variety of different projects]. But the THPF is involved in [curbing] *abayamuk*, so they have these monks do it. So these groups of monks [the networks funded by the THPF] have to get involved in projects related to *abayamuk*. However, individually they can do anything they want (personal communication, November 6, 2015).

This is not to say that the development monks working on these kinds of projects felt as if they were acting against their ideological inclinations or even necessarily working on these kinds of projects at the expense of others. Although some of the monks with whom I spoke expressed disappointment with this reduction in scope, most were enthusiastic about receiving government assistance for projects they saw as addressing fundamental concerns in their villages. It stands, however, that there are certain kinds of projects being emphasized - through promotion, support, and active recruitment - while others are either being abandoned or becoming secondary considerations. Furthermore, these projects all implicitly present a specific narrative regarding moral liability in development activity and the appropriate targets for reform. Although they are still based in promoting development rooted in adherence to Buddhist virtues, they are much less concerned with the moral liability of those engaged in development work and crafting development policy than they are that of the villagers facing social and economic hardships.

These kinds of projects depict villagers as living in poverty due to lifestyle choices, such as alcohol abuse, while potentially ignoring the socioeconomic factors that may lead to these kinds of problems. A popular television advertisement by the THPF and the Stop Drink Network (and one that is often referred to by development monks working in this arena) serves to illustrate this point. It begins with a depiction of a rural family dressed in rags and sitting in a dingy room with an earthen floor. The man, shirtless, drinks from a beer bottle, shouting, "*Jon khriad!*" ("I'm stressed because I'm poor!") between swigs as his family watches on, exasperated. Suddenly he freezes, looks at the bottle, and says, "I'm quitting drinking." It cuts to a montage, which begins with him working in an empty field, and progresses to shots

of him working in an increasingly lush rice paddy, interspersed with scenes of him receiving money, paying his debts, and saving. It culminates with a series of scenes that depict the man going to school, lecturing a group of rural farmers, and standing at a podium giving a presentation with a sign behind him that reads "Training for taking action: the level of local wisdom toward sustainability." These scenes are punctuated with shots of him and his family, now dressed in a style popular with the Thai middle class, hugging, laughing, exercising, etc. The commercial ends with a low angle shot of the man looking off into the distance against a clear blue-sky with the voiceover, "Who knows how far the nation will progress if you just stop drinking?" The title of the commercial and tagline for the accompanying campaign was "*loek lao loek jon*" (Stop drinking, stop being poor; Thai Health Promotion Foundation, 2005). This advertisement is reflective of the overarching development narrative put forth by government organizations such as the THPF and the Stop Drink Network as well as the development monks with whom they work. It is one of a vicious cycle in which lifestyle choices on the part of the villagers are the primary causes of their development-related woes, which further tempt the villagers into continued engagement in those activities.

Advocates of this approach often portrayed it as emphasizing self-reliance and as an attempt to find local bottom-up solutions to development problems. However, it ignores a competing narrative that understands problems such as substance abuse, not as causes, as symptoms of large-scale systematic failings. An account given by one activist with whom I worked (I will call him P) of the drug problem in S village illustrates this contrast. P is an independent activist in his 50s who has spent several decades collaborating with development monks, NGOs, and other independent activists on a wide range of localist development projects. He is still highly active, and frequently works with academics and former heads of neolocalist NGOs arranging activities, such as village protests, to assert local rights in the face of what he sees as corporate and state incursion. P told me that in recent years, S village had come to have a severe methamphetamine problem and a large portion of the men in the village were using these drugs regularly. According to P, the problem began when the men in the village started working on rubber plantations in addition to their regular farming. Workers on the plantations began taking amphetamines in order to stay awake through the night harvesting rubber and still work their farms in the morning. He attributed the need to earn this supplementary rubber income to the debts the villagers had incurred buying chemicals, machinery, etc. when they shifted their agricultural practices from self-sufficient polyculture farms to monoculture plantations with the goal of selling the products on the market. He blamed this shift, in turn, on the government's development campaigns and incentive policies, as well as the involvement of outside corporate interests in local farming. In addition, he said that the reason villagers had access to these drugs in the first place was because corrupt police officers from a nearby city were coming into the village and selling drugs they had confiscated. As I could not find any villagers who were willing to talk about this, I cannot attest to the veracity of this account and understand that it may strike some as facile or perhaps even conspiratorial. However, what is important here is not that this is the kind of narrative commonly put forth by neolocalist NGOs and activists to explain troubles in the villages. In the example above, P implicates state development policy, which encouraged villagers to switch to monoculture plantations, corporations encouraging the leasing of expensive farming equipment, and police corruption leading to the availability of drugs as primary causes

for the village's amphetamine problem. Rather than casting problems such as drug and alcohol abuse as the causes of social and economic strife, according to this view they are symptomatic of larger systemic issues in development policy and ideology.

These examples highlight the contrast between the narratives put forth by the kinds of neolocalist activists with whom development monks had worked in the past, and those offered by government organizations such as the THPF, which currently hold significant influence over the kinds of projects in which development monk networks choose to engage. These current projects tend to treat problems such as substance abuse in the village as "vice" or moral failings and as the source rather than the result of villagers social and economic hardships. While these kinds of problems are bound to negatively affect the lives of the villagers, the recent campaigns against *abayamuk* (vice) locate liability with the villagers themselves and away from the larger institutions in Thai society and their contribution to local development woes.

These kinds of issues have recently been the focus of a large-scale nationwide project in which development monks are highly active, called "*Muban Raksa Sin Ha*" (Villages Adhering to the Five Moral Precepts). Most other vice-related projects in which the development monks with whom I worked participated tended to be headed by village monks/monastic networks receiving support from government organizations such as the THPF. This project, however, takes a more top-down centralized approach to the problem of vice. It is headed by the National Office of Buddhism under the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO - the junta that has been in power since 2014) and works with monks to solve what it sees as national problems by correcting "immoral" behavior at the level of the village community.

The program encourages villagers to adhere to the five Buddhist moral precepts to be obeyed by the laity. These consist of prohibitions against killing, stealing, adultery, lying, and taking intoxicating substances (it is this last precept that tends to receive the most attention). Monks are tasked with holding events in their villages in which they teach about the five moral precepts and distribute "contracts" for the villagers to sign whereby they agree to abide by these rules. The impetus for the project comes from a lecture given by the supreme patriarch (the monk at the head of the Thai Sangha), Somdet Phra Maharatchamongkhalachan, in which he stated,

The five precepts are important for human beings. When all people follow the five precepts together, the people in society will live peacefully and happily. When it is possible, please let villages like that be known as "villages that adhere to the five moral precepts" (National Office of Buddhism [NOB] 2014, p. 5, translation mine).

The ideology driving the program attributes many of society's woes to people's lack of adherence to these precepts. A booklet distributed by the National Office of Buddhism details the goals and methods of implementation for the project. In laying out the reasons for the project's necessity, the connection between morality in the community and larger social and environmental problems is clearly stated:

Thailand has had many problems including ... crime, the destruction of natural resources, environmental problems, the spread of drugs and vice, conflicting ways of thought, people looking to benefit themselves rather than the group, and the intrusion and desecration of the institutions central to the nation, which are problems that come from a lack of consciousness about morals and ethics (ibid, translation mine).

It is important to note that, like the title of the project, language throughout the document and subsequent campaigns explicitly identify villages (*muban*) and communities (*chumchon*) as the targets of reform, both words that invoke rural villagers (as opposed to the urban middle class or political elites).²⁰⁹ This is not surprising, as it has been primarily rural villagers who have been most vociferous in their opposition to the junta and its policies. According to this philosophy, the failure of the villagers to act in accordance with Buddhist morality is seen as the cause of problems not only in the village (as is the case with the campaigns headed by the THPF), but also of the nation as a whole, including the political turmoil that led up to the 2014 coup. This turns the narrative of the neolocalists, in which national policy and ideology were responsible for village problems, on its head. Where they saw moral failings in the national system as the source of development-related problems in rural areas, this program places the locus of liability for national turmoil in village communities and the households therein.

Sufficiency Economy

In terms of explicit philosophy, there has been none so influential on monks' economic development activities as that of *sethakhit pho phiang*, or 'Sufficiency Economy.' The origin of the Sufficiency Economy ideology is most often traced back to a speech made by King Bhumibol in response to the 1997 financial crisis in which he called for local communities to become more self-sufficient and practice economic moderation while refraining from overconsumption.²¹⁰ This has since been widely adopted by government and non-government development organizations and is a central tenant of the 8th - 11th National Economic and Social Development Plans. In my interviews with development monks it was by far the most common referent they used to describe their economic philosophies. One of the primary stated goals of the PDSNO (the development monk network mentioned above), for example, is "to introduce the philosophy of sufficiency economy as a driving force toward concrete results in all areas around the country."²¹¹ Even Phra S, who has adopted a decidedly neolocalist development philosophy, references the concept. However, he employs it as a way of criticizing the corporate ideology that he sees as leading to the deleterious effects on local well-being, saying:

²⁰⁹ Though the word "*chumchon*" can technically refer to any group of people living together in one place, urban or rural, it is rarely used to refer to people in an urban setting and in conversation is often used interchangeably with "village."


²¹⁰ Full English transcript available at <http://kanchanapisek.or.th/speeches/1997/1204.en.html>

²¹¹ From a 2007 PowerPoint presentation on Phaendin Tham Phaendin Thong ideology given to me by Phrakhru Phothisirakun, the group's secretary (Translation mine).

Corporations do not have words like *phaen din tham phaen din thong* [Land of Dhamma, Land of Gold] or Sufficiency Economy in their hearts at all. Companies have a lot of capital in order to get more profit. This is because they only exist for profit, to make as much of it as possible. This is not compatible with Sufficiency Economy (personal communication, September 12, 2013).

It is, thus, clear that the idea of Sufficiency Economy has come to form the basis a variety of (sometimes contradictory) views regarding local development. In fact, part of what has made this such an attractive referent for various actors is its malleability. The philosophy as espoused by King Bhumibol, however, did not contain any specific guidelines for its implementation, leading to a wide range of applications and interpretations. As Kevin Hewison writes, “SE is so broadly defined that it really is whatever one wants it to be” (2008, p. 214) and government actors and agencies subsequently began appropriating the term in order to legitimate their own political practices and policies (Intravisit, 2005). The philosophy was given center stage after the 2006 coup, where it was held up as a refutation of so-called ‘Thaksinomics’ - the range of rural subsidies and populist economic policies that had characterized the recently ousted regime - and used as a referent to give the junta further moral legitimacy through association with the monarchy (Ivarsson & Isager, 2010). The problem with the previous regime was that it was investing in large-scale top-down subsidy and micro-financing programs rather than promoting economic moderation at the grass-roots level. Sufficiency Economy-based programs are billed as attempts to address that problem by offering solutions to the grass-roots causes of poverty and underdevelopment. A booklet published by the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) describes the three main characteristics of Sufficiency Economy as being - 1) moderation – living within one’s means, 2) reason – acting in accordance with the law, morals ethics and culture, and 3) immunity – being prepared to adapt to socioeconomic changes (by saving money, etc.). It goes on to detail three equally ambiguous conditions that must be met in order for Sufficiency Economy to exist. These are 1) morals – for citizens to act morally and without greed, 2) knowledge – to exercise knowledge and caution when applying theory to practice, and 3) life – to base one’s life on restraint, diligence, morality, and wisdom (NESDB, 2007).

The philosophy is touted as being applicable at both an individual and system-wide level. In practice, however, these conditions tend to translate into projects aimed at promoting lifestyle changes in individuals/villages, such as the campaigns against *abayamuk* described above. In fact, vices such as drinking and gambling are often cited by development monks and other proponents of Sufficiency Economy as go-to examples of villagers’ lack of economic restraint causing financial hardship. As Canyapate and Bamford write, “Rather than trying to achieve a balanced, sustainable economy by means of societal measures such as progressive taxation, laws banning usury, or limits on the exploitation of natural resources, SE looks to individuals to police their own economic activity” (2009, p. 147).



Cartoons excerpted from NESD's booklet on Sufficiency Economy depicting vice [left] and overspending [right] as causes of economic hardship (NESD, 2007).

This is in keeping with a Buddhist understanding of economic liability in that it proposes a “middle path” (Ivarsson & Isager, 2010) approach to economic development that emphasizes moderation and discourages greed and overconsumption. Proponents of Sufficiency Economy explicitly describe these aspects as being based on Buddhist principles. However, the philosophy clearly emphasizes different targets for moral reform from those of development monks in previous decades. Compare this to the philosophy that guided the community currency attempt at economic moderation mentioned briefly above. Although these approaches stem from a similar ideological appeal to financial restraint and a de-emphasis on rampant materialism/consumerism, in the case of Sufficiency Economy, the locus of liability is at the local/individual level. The assumption behind the push for community currency was that local problems stemming from greed and materialism could be solved if economic activity was localized and shielded from the system that valorizes these ideals. The modern sufficiency economy movement, however, cites irresponsible economic behavior on the part of the villagers as the focus of reform and largely ignores more systematic concerns.

Conclusion

In recent years, the ideologies and practices that define the development monk movement (and Thai localism, in general) have been characterized by a move toward more extensive networking and greater mobilization of extralocal resources. This movement, which I refer to as ‘networked localism,’ attempts to adopt the symbols, tools, and conveniences typically associated with supermodernity (Augé, 1995) and employ them in the pursuit of genuine grass-roots local development. There has also been an active push by these networked localist toward greater collaboration among a wide range of actors and institutions in localist development work. Meanwhile, the state’s development initiatives and the rhetoric employed therein have taken on a decidedly more localist tone, emphasizing grass-roots solutions to national problems. The resulting collaborative endeavors among state entities and development monks have turned to local communities for both the causes of and solutions development’s discontents. While these are purported to be examples of true bottom-up development,

the standards of proper village culture and conduct are approved - if not created - at the extralocal level. Furthermore, for development monks, this means that the moral focus of Buddhist development activism is on the villagers, themselves, and much less attention is paid to state and non-local actors' roles in village-level problems. Although factors such as alcohol abuse, smoking, gambling, and overspending no doubt play a part in villagers' medical and financial woes, these have become the primary focus of many monastic development groups, while systematic 'moral failings' such as those inherent in state-level economic policy and ideology remain largely unaddressed.

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Land Encroachment at the Borderland of Surin Province

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Abstract

This study shows that historically the Chongjom borderland was primarily used by military authorities to secure the Thai- Cambodian border. There are three public land areas included in this study; first, the public land that was used primarily for assisting Thai citizen affected by communist terrorists and foreign coups, forming villages of self-defense along the Thai-Cambodia border. There are currently land plots near the district office of Kabchoeng which have no legal land ownership documents issued but the renters, who instead received an official contract designating land tenure, issued by the Kabchoeng sheriff between 1984-1995. Secondly, public land under the Agricultural Land Reform Project is managed by the Surin Provincial Land Reform Office. Finally, state land is controlled by the Surin Treasury Office.

In Chongjom, there is both direct and indirect public land encroachment. The encroachment process that occurred in the Chongjom borderland illustrates reciprocally beneficial relationships and networks among private companies, government agencies, local politicians and local leaders who directed the Chongjom border development. State land direct encroachment along the Chongjom border market results from the use of Cambodian traders to extend plots of trading space into unlicensed areas. Then they are created into a full border market development plan, which includes the encroached area. It is then submitted to the Treasury Office for leasing after it has been approved. But before the plan is approved, the hundred new 2-story concrete building shops have already been advertised and sold to interested Cambodian and Thai traders. This indirect land encroachment process is seen mainly through the illegal transfer of rented plots and land into private ownership. The agricultural land assigned to farmers who were originally entitled to use the land intended for farming was illegally sold and used.

Keywords: land encroachment, border, Chongjom

1. Introduction

Robinson (2004) states that encroachment is a highly complex phenomenon. It is illegal occupation and cultivation of common land at the boundaries of common and private land, for instance, farmers with private land adjacent to the common land encroach by gradually moving the boundary marker, incorporating the common land into their own holdings, and farming it as their own to the exclusion of others.

Policies and laws regarding for use and management of land often reflect political agenda and rarely reflect what is happening on-the-ground, or at the local level in particular for public land (Makarabhirom, 1999). This particular case is found in Chongjom at the borderland of Surin Province of Thailand. Chongjom border in the north eastern part of Thailand is located at Ban Dan Sub-district, Kabchoeng district with a distance of 69 Km. from Surin municipality and 13 Km. from Kabchoeng district office. The neighboring Cambodian community next to the Chongjom border is O'Smach village, Samrong district, Odormeanchay province. Chongjom border area was part of the Huay Thaptan and Huay Samran national reserve forest and has been used as a temporary cross border trading site between locals Thais and Cambodian. It has been upgraded to an international border checkpoint from September 1, 2002 onward. An average of trading value from 2009-2014 between the two countries through Chongjom checkpoint is 1,105 Million Baht per year (33.5 Million USD). Majority of exporting goods from Thailand are fuel, beer, whiskey, cement, LPG gas and importing goods from Cambodia are cassava, used bicycles, used clothes, and lumbers (Surin Custom Office, 2014).

Since 2011, a 214 road from Chongjom border market to the border checkpoint infrastructure project on improvement and 4 lanes expansion has been implemented in order to connect with 68 road in O'Smach to Siemreap province to supports ASEAN infrastructure network and help building ASEAN economic and communities. In addition, Surin and Odormeanchay agreed to co-sign sister city project to create mutual cooperation and development among the two neighboring cities. Surin is also part of the Emerald Triangle plan on tourism cooperation between Thailand, Lao PDR and Cambodia.

The main trading area between the two countries in Surin province is Chongjom border market. Pattana Chuenyong asserts that it has been built in 2002 by the Surin Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO), who rents a plot of land around 20 Rai (3 Hectares) from the Surin Provincial Treasury Office to build a 60 room-building. Then the building and market space was assigned to a private Company to rent the rooms out to locals and Cambodian traders (personal communication, June 6, 2014). The majority of traders in Chongjom border market are Cambodian traders. According to the PAO's information, there are 830 rooms for shop renting in the market with a total of 764 tenants, of which 733 people are from Cambodia and 31 are from Thailand. Therefore, Thai traders occupy less than 4% of shops in the market. Borderlands between Thailand and Cambodia in Neo-liberalism concepts is clearly seen from free enterprise, free competition, reducing government's role and regulation and focus more on individual responsibility to find solutions to their problems (Martinez and Garcia, 2015). One of the key features of the cross-border economics is characterized by income differentials between Thailand and Cambodia. When accompanied by high rates of joblessness, income disparities between countries frequently result in migratory outflows from low earnings regions to higher income markets (Borjas, 1994).

Border and borderland complexity lies mainly on human cultural, political, economic activities and security challenges. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly (2005) distinguished four important analytical lenses on border studies: "(1) market forces and trade flows, (2) policy activities of multiple levels of governments on adjacent borders, (3) the particular political clout of borderland communities, and (4) the specific culture of borderland communities." He also identified two fundamental elements that define border and borderland: human activities and broader social processes including market forces, law, regulations, policies, regional cultures and politics (Brunet-Jailly, 2007).

Market system plays a vital role on Chongjom border development direction. There are various condition changes in order to facilitate accessibility of resources, funding, labor and market in the area.

Border becomes a space for competing, negotiating, and benefit reciprocal between local residents, local politicians, government offices, investors and transborder traders.

2. Methodology

This study purports to investigate public land encroachment at Chongjom border. Data was collected by interviewing Cambodian and Thai traders in Chongjom border market, villagers in Kabchoeng and Dan sub-districts, Kabchoeng district, Surin province and local authorities. The research also complementarily collected conversations from group interviewing among villagers and involved authorities.

3. Results

The study illustrated when Chongjom border area has economically developed, it has gradually changed the villagers' ways of life from farmers to traders and from land titling holders to landless farmers. In terms of land use, there are more land plots being transformed to serve business sector. For instance, farm land plots are shifted to trading areas, shops, small markets, apartments, or other business involved. Ownership has been changed from one to another. Some land plots issued by the Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO) were sold to both insiders and outsiders. Land plots and buildings are being managed for rent. Agricultural land allotted from ALRO is for distribution to landless and poor farmers, they have received so-called 'Sor Por Kor 4-01' deeds, which gave them possession of the land, but did not allow them to transfer their ownership rights to any outsiders (Wipatayotin, 2011).

The areas covered in this study include 3 areas, Kabchoeng market which is the area without legal ownership, the land assigned to farmers by the ALRO which locate opposite to Kabchoeng market, and the market area at Chongjom border market which is rented by the Treasury Department.

Historically, Chongjom border management was primarily used by military authority in order to secure Thai- Cambodia border. The land was used mainly for assisting Thai citizen affected communist terrorists and foreign coups. Furthermore, the area was used to solve asylum seekers' problems occurred in the bordering area. There was an attempt to strengthen the border community with well-protected and good economy so that border people were secured. More importantly, the utmost goal was to convince people to live but not to leave the border villages. Maintaining the communities in Chongjom was also a strategy to buffer any invaders by which the communities themselves obstructed the invaders from using this border land. Assigned by the Office of National Security Council, Royal Thai Army Forces, Chongjom people were also strengthened so that they could be summoned and back up the military force when it was needed. However, Chongjom border land use today has been transforming from being used for military defensive purpose to business activities.

3.1. Kabchoeng Market Area

In 1984 the land near the district office of Kabchoeng was divided into 50 square meters. There were total amount of 297 plots. These plots were sub-divided in order to appeal Thai people to live in the

area. The divided plots were released with cheap rental, for instance, 2 Thai Baht for each square two meters, according to the district office's land use regulations. There was no land ownership document issued but the renters received an official contract of land hire issued by the Kabchoeng sheriff during 1984-1995.

Nevertheless, there was no lease extension issued afterward. Thus the tenures have kept the issued contract and rental receipts to affirm that they are legalized to use the leased plot. In the present, there has been no process to legally issued ownership to the tenures. Although there was an endeavor to include the land into the ALRO's policy, the attempt was failed. As a result, selling or changing ownership of the leased plots was virtually meant to be 'sub-release.' As we could see, today rental rate has been considered expensive.

In details, the lease identifies the tenures have to pay the annual rent in advance at Kabchoeng district office. They are required to pay property tax and local land development tax as well as other relevant fees to the lessor. The tenures are required to build their lodging within the first year of contract.

Any land reforms, for example, digging a ditch, canal, pond or earth dam, and building or reconstructing the building must be licensed from the lessor. The tenures are not allowed to sub lease the leased plots. They are required to pay the rent by the specified date, if not they will be fined at 1.5% of the unpaid rental.

The tenures could terminate the contract in the following cases; the tenures want return the leased land plots to Thai state or the lessor to use. The cancellation can be processed by proposing the cancellation letter to the district office 30 days in advance. In case the tenures have gone bankrupt or cannot follow the contract or violate any regulations identified by the contract, the tenures are required to demolish their buildings and clear the land plot into the same conditions or allow the lessor to demolish the building and pay for dismantling cost or consign the building to the lessor. Before changing the land plot conditions such as land reclamation, the possible changes need to be informed the municipality of Kabchoeng. For instance, to build a house, the tenures are supposed to submit a house plan and request to build the house.

3.2. The Area Opposite to Chongjom Border Market

This area is part of the National Conserved Forest-Huay Thabthan- Huay Samran. The Department of Forestry has licensed many governmental organizations and private business persons to use the land, for example, the Self Defense Villages along Thailand-Cambodia Border Project, Huay Thapthan Forest Development Plot o3 Project (Forest Villages), Citizen Access to the National Conserved Forest, Citizen Access to Wildlife Conserved Forest and the ALRO. This area was formerly belonging to the National Conserved Department of Forestry. There were rice farmers used this land and later capitalists bought the land from the farmers who occupied plots of land. Most land plots have been occupied by the capitalists and some of them occupied more than 40 Rai.

In 1989 military divided the land and selected some citizens within the Self Defense Villages along Thailand-Cambodia Border Project to receive the land. There were 3 land division processes, the first and second time of division allowed 8 Rai for each licensees and the third time allocated 4 Rai. Most capitalists allowed their occupied land to be allotted to the villagers. The licensees are then required to

live and farm in the allotted land. Some government services support seeds by which the farmers could borrow the seeds to plant in their farming plots and return the seeds after their harvest. This management sometimes caused conflicts between the former farmers who occupied the land before the new licensees who are assigned by the military. To manage the conflict, most newly assignees through the aforementioned project would not live and use the allotted land. Other than farmers using the land, there are a self-settlement, royal projects and local authorities using this land. The Department of Forestry mainly watches and manages the conserved forest area.

Until 2003, The Surin provincial Land Reform Office came to implement the Agricultural Land Reform Project in the area, consequently, some land plots which the project assigned to the villagers were returned to the Treasury Department. On September 12, 2005 Surin provincial treasury office leased 54 Rai of the governmental land plot SR.1534 to 18 people in order to help with farming land access. The 18 tenures submitted their request to the Surin provincial treasury office for changing their land use from farming to living area on the ground that the land plots are now not suitable for farming. Furthermore, the area has been economically developing. Significantly, the area is also affected from the economic development of Chongjom border. Nevertheless, their request was failed. The villagers are not allowed to adapt the use of the land plots. However, the Surin provincial treasury office leases some plots of the land to Surin Provincial Administrative Office (PAO) for building an OTOP (One Tambon One Product) center. This lease meant to affect in cancelling some land plots which formerly assigned to the some of the villagers. Thus the lease later brought about conflicts between the affected villagers and the Surin PAO.

This fact coincides with reports by the Land Institute Foundation which revealed that losing of forest area and forest occupied area was partly a consequence of laws and regulations ambiguity on natural resource management, lack of uniqueness on policy making and coordinating process, and reflects of poverty and injustice in the society (2002). In addition, the land plots assigned by the ALRO opposite to Chongjom border market have been changed the occupiers especially the plots locating by the main road. Some plots were sold to different people while some plots still belong to the same licensees. Most plots are adjusted to be shops, rooms for rent, parking lot for rent, and some plots are reformed as trading booths to be leased as for selling fruits, consumption goods. Some plots are built as are modern shops such as seven-eleven convenient stores.

3.3. The Chongjom Border Market

The Surin PAO rents 3 plots from the Surin provincial treasury office. There are the plots number 904, 909, and 1534. In 2002, the Surin PAO was officially allowed to use one of those plots, around 20 Rai, to build a 60 room-building. The building was assigned to a private company to rent the rooms out to local traders.

In 2012, the Surin PAO's annual fiscal minute reports that the PAO generated 2,442,100 Thai Baht from the private company who earns income from tenures who rent the rooms and space in the market. The PAO then paid 63,864 Thai Baht as the rent of the leased plot number 904 and other fees to the Surin Treasury office. Interviews with traders in Chongjom border market result that the private company administrating the market earned from daily, monthly rentals, annual fee, electricity, hygienic

management, leasing change fee, and other fees around 31 million Thai Baht each year. Thus the rental income of PAO is counted 7.87 per cents of the administrative company. That means the treasury office's rental income is counted 0.20 per cent of the administrative company and it is calculated 2.61 per cent of the PAO's rental benefit.

In terms of renting this marketing plot, there is invasion of land use. Some tenure used more space than it was licensed. In October 3, 2008, it was officially reported that invasion of using the 904 plot where it used to be Ban Dan School. The Surin PAO invaded to use this area as the waste storage. In comparison with aerial photographs over Chongjom market. The land at the back has been invaded. There are many buildings built in unlicensed area.

After the invasion, January 20, 2010 the Surin Treasury Office investigated that the Surin PAO used more space than the lease defined. Thus the office requested the PAO to follow the contract of land hire by demolishing the buildings located outside the rental area within 30 days. However, the request has not been accepted and processed up to the present. The Surin Treasury Office's reports (September 23, 2010) reveal that the Surin PAO built 350-400 temporary 4 square meters rooms for rent. The PAO's document also reports that there are 830 rooms from 45 allotted locks. The number of the tenures is less than the rooms as some tenure rent more than 1 room.



Figure 2: Chongjom Border market in 2003; Source: Google earth



Figure 3: Chongjom Border market in 2014; Source: Google earth

Surin PAO used more space than it was licensed. Historically, in October 3, 2008, it was officially reported that invasion of using the 904 plot as the waste storage where it used to be under possession of Ban Dan School and caused disputation between the two organizations. Later, the 904 plot was issued to the Treasury Department, and then rented out to the PAO for approximately 20 Rai (20 Rai 2 Ngarn 56 Tarangwa). In comparison with aerial photographs over Chongjom market, the land at the back has been encroached. There are many buildings built in unlicensed area. (See figure 3 and 4)

The encroachment process occurred in Chongjom border market where the Surin PAO rents the land from the Surin provincial Treasury Office illustrates beneficial relationships among local politicians who direct the Chongjom border market development. The sub-processes are treated through Cambodian traders who came to rent the shops and the extension of trading space into the unlicensed area. By doing so, the Cambodian interviewees reported that the market administrative staff would ask them whether they want to rent more shops and identified the extending trading space to the licensed tenure. The tenure built up the trading buildings and allotted the shops and paid the monthly and annual rental defined by the market administration.

When the local politicians came to power, they oriented the market development policy by spending 500 million Baht budget. An amount of 495 was spent to extend the shops (92-3-48 Rai) and 5 million Baht to build a solid waste incineration plant. The PAO proposed this additional development plan and requested to rent the whole lot of the 904 land plot from the Surin Treasury Office. They created a full border market development plan including the encroached area and submitted to the Treasury Office for leasing, the 100 new 2 stories concrete building shops have already been advertised and sold to the interested Cambodian and Thai traders long before the approved process done. Indirect land encroachment process is seen mainly through illegal transfer of rented plots and land reform to private ownership. The agricultural land assigned to farmers who were originally entitled to use the land intended for farming, was being sold and misused.




Figure 3: Chongjom Border market rental space from the Treasury department shows in Number 1 and 2
Source: Surin Provincial Administrative Office (PAO)

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


Figure 4: Chongjom Border market encroachment area; Source: Surin Provincial Administrative Office (PAO)




Figure 5: Surin PAO Chongjom Border market additional development plan and requested to rent the whole lot of the 904 land plot; Source: Surin Provincial Administrative Office (PAO)

There are several forms of sub-leasing occurred in Chongjom market. Firstly, the traders came to book the trading space when the market was newly opened and the administration processed the booking without fee. The traders then built wooden structures, decorated the floor and the shops by themselves and then rented the trading room to Thais or Cambodians. At the beginning, the sub-leasing costs approximately 5,000-6,000 Baht each room. Before the fire incident, the cost increased to 20,000 Baht. In the present, the cost is 200,000-300,000 Baht, varied by the size of rooms. For new traders, they rent from the Thai or Cambodian traders. This group of traders will have to pay double. The 2,000 Baht is paid to the official licensee and another 2,000 Baht to the market administration. In some cases, they earn enough and buy the room from the official licensees. Another form is to derive the leasing right from their family. For example, Mr. Lalit came to help his mother to sell goods. Formerly his mother occupied 2 rooms. Later she allotted 1 room to her son. Some traders receive the trading space from their sister who came to trade before and once the sister estimated a good business opportunity then she gave a shop to her brother. Another trader is an ante. When she wanted to go back to live in her hometown, then she gave her shop to her niece. There are several shops that belong to one extended family. The extended shops of the Cambodian traders are one of factors contributed to public land encroachment in Chongjom border market.

The land management and ownership change in Chongjom Border has changed over time, from Thai-Cambodia security buffer zone to become a contemporary market. As the military buffer zone, Chongjom was managed by the Thai military convinced the villagers to live in the area. At that time, it was acceptable even they lived without the official land licenses. Nevertheless, when the war zone became the market, the land value increased from 8,000 Baht to one million. It is 125 times higher than its original value within 25-40 years. The land ownership is then seriously problematic and concerned by the stake holders.

4. Conclusion and Discussion

Chongjom border market represents benefits and power relations mainly from political and other means of power to clearly facilitate a group of people on policy determination, border trade expansion and development including interest negotiation. Politics of border trading benefits contestation is seen through direct political power implication, the patron-client system, and an attempt to enter and inherit political position in order to preserve their interests on border market trading.

Local politician plays a vital role on negotiation and contesting for border trading interests with both direct and indirect power implementation, while some local leaders and officials involve in a role of mediator to serve politician's interests. Groups of local politicians, investors and transborder traders gain most of direct economy benefits from Chongjom border market. Langculanon (2009) asserts in his study on The Development and Political Role of Political Business Group in Thailand that the role of Political Business Group has caused a political impact in both positive and negative. If political business group take a political role in the sense that their status is politicians to use their knowledgeable and experience to offer ideas or policies that benefits to developing the country's economic. It would be benefit. But they use the role or power to search the prosperity without taking into account the public interests. It

would be a major cause significant damage to the nation.

For administrative implications, the study could suggest that the rental rates should be defined according to types of rent, for example, residential rent, business rent, or government or local authority rent who aim to sub-lease to other private personals. Advance rate of the rent could be used so that the rent is calculated on basis of the sub-leased tenure's income. Another rate calculation could be process by percentage of the net income of the tenures. Thus the State could make the best benefit from the land. Moreover, the villagers in Kabchoeng market still have not acquired official land ownership so the local authorities should legalize the land plot to them. This might be processed though the ALRO issuing living and business purposes or licensing a community land title. Consequently, the villagers can use the land on the basis of their need.

The area opposite the Chongjom market, the Agricultural Land Reform license should be made available to villagers to change the land use purposes form farming to living and business. Also, the authorities should survey the licensed right, investigating whether the assigned plots of land is still hold by the original licensee or not. In case the land plot has been sold to others, the ALRO should put punishment according to its regulations. Last but not least, development planning should be systematically processed in order to reduce environmental problems and community conflicts.

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Shared-Cultural Heritage in Ritual-Performances: A comparative Study between Southern Thai Nora and Malay Mak Yong

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Abstract

This paper is an analysis of the well-known ritual-performances, the Southern Thai Nora and Malay Mak Yong, which function as a 'folk theater' for entertaining and as a 'ritual' for healing an unknown illness which called '*Nora-Roong-Khruu*' and '*Main Puteri angin Mak Yong*'.

By conducting the research, the performance's elements which included myth's of origin, story, dance movements, characters, and costume are focused. Researcher found that even though the Southern Thai Nora is shaped by the concept of 'Thai-ness' that intertwined between Central Thai and Southern-Thai identity while Malay Mak Yong represents the 'Malay-ness' that implanted among Kelantanese, Central Malay and the Islamic influence. The analysis of these both performances exposes 'the shared-cultural heritages' that intertwined among Southern Thai, Siam and Malay cultures before the influences of Buddhism and Islam had spread. Likewise, this interaction occurred naturally before the boundary of state was emerged.

To elaborate this study, Dance Anthropology, Performing arts theories and Folklore studies together with the participatory fieldworks in Southern Thai and Kelantan state of Malaysia are applied.

Keywords: shared-cultural heritage, myth of origin, dance movements, ritual-performance

Introduction

Southern Thai Nora is a traditional performance combining singing, dancing and reciting verses, together with ritual. It has survived among Southern Thai community from ancient times until now. By using the Southern-Thai dialogue, Nora is appraised as a representative of 'Southern Thai identity'. Nora is not just only 'dance.' It also represents the remnants of the clan system in primitive society. To be accepted as a 'Master of Nora' or to be 'in' the Nora clan, that person must devote themselves to following a Nora way of life until the 'rite of passage' is passed. With status as being a Nora graduate, that person will be

respected among Southern Thai communities.

Mak Yong is a Malay dance-drama which is also known in the three southern Thai border provinces, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, the northern-west states of Malaysia, Kelantan and Terengganu, and Riau Island, Indonesia. Various opinions are discussed about the origin of Mak Yong. Some believe that Mak Yong originated as a royal court dance in the Patani kingdom in the reign of a princess named Raya Hijau. It developed and spread as folk theater among Malay communities after that time. Some histories state that it was derived from the ritual of worshipping the 'rice soul' or 'semangat padi', which is entitled 'Mak Hiang' in Malay belief. Another historical source said that Mak Yong was created unexpectedly by couple of farmers for the purpose of soothing a newborn baby. Even though we cannot make conclusions about the origins of Mak Yong, nowadays it is performed as an entertainment at particular events. It also plays a crucial part as a 'ritual-performance' for healing unidentified illnesses, or 'Main Puteri angin Mak Yong'. From 2005, Mak Yong has been proclaimed as an element of 'Malaysian Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity,' inscribed by UNESCO as representative of 'Malay-ness'. It has become the region's politico-socio-historical emblem through the elements of performance: dance movements, plots and stories, style of performance, songs and musical instruments, even costumes.

Focusing on the Malay Peninsula, which includes Southern Thai and Malaysia, the researcher found evidence of interaction among people through trade routes both on land and sea, trade centers and migration. As Paul Dowsey-Magog states, the Malay Peninsula was a melting-pot where cultures met and interacted. (Dowsey-Magog, 2002, p. 2) An article entitled 'Historical Perceptions of Local Identity in the Upper Peninsula' by Chuleeporn Virunha (2008), mentions the history of exchange between what are nowadays called Northern Malaysia and Southern Thailand. She points out that this area was a meeting place of people for trading before the emergence of the modern nation-states, Thailand and Malaysia. Not just only products were exchanged or shared, but also cultures. People of different religions met, interacted or dialogued during those time. Although the crucial impact that divides this area into two is the spread of Theravada Buddhism and Islam, people among these communities still share the common natural resources and an economic life oriented around both agriculture and trade. (Chuleeporn Virunha, 2008, p. 39) Besides, both still share a common belief which was originally 'Animism', and both are shaped by the same cultural landscape. Passed down from generation to generation are social activities, dances, rituals and with them, myths. From this point of great interest, I intend to study the shared cultural heritage in these two ritual-performances. Both were redefined with the coming of Thai and Malay identity. The origins of myths, dance movements and ritual-performance in Southern Thai Nora and Malay Mak Yong will be analyzed.

Analysis of Myths in Origins of Southern Thai Nora and 'Dewa Muda' in Malay Mak Yong

I start with the shared cultural roots and heritage of myths of origin because without these stories, the Nora and Mak Yong dances and ritual performances would never have existed. To elaborate on this topic, I choose to compare the myth of Nora with the story of 'Dewa Muda', the epic from the Mak Yong ritual performance. For analyzing and categorizing the elements of the origins of the myths, I apply the Motif Index from Stith Thompson (Thompson, 1947). The stories of Nora and Mak Yong are as below:

The origin of the myth of Nora as transmitted by Khun Uppatham Narakorn, the Master of Nora (1976) starts with 'Nang Nuan-Thong-Samli', the beautiful princess of the king named 'Phraya Sai-Faa-Faad' and his consort 'Nang Sri Mala'. One night when she was sleeping, she miraculously dreamt about the dance with the 12 beautiful movements from the angel, with rhythmic music. Once she woke up, she was willing to create the performance. She orders her servants, both male and female, to make musical instruments and taught them to dance by imitating the movements that she memorized.

The practice was very joyful until one day, Nang-Nuan-Thong-Samli was willing to eat pollen from the lotus she asks her servants to harvest. After consuming it, she became coincidentally pregnant. Without her condition being noticed, she continued to practice dancing until one day her father, Phraya Sai-Faa-Faad', asked her to dance and saw immediately that his daughter was pregnant. He asked who was the father of her baby. No matter how many times he kept asking, Nang-Nuan-Thong-Samli kept answering that she didn't have an affair with any man. She repeated that she became pregnant because of eating the lotus pollen. With that unreasonable and unacceptable answer from her, Phraya Sai-Faa-Faad' grew angry and banished her and her servants by making them take a raft away from his kingdom. With the help of 'Dewa', her raft was finally reached Ka-Chang Island. There she delivers her son and names him 'Gu-Maan Noi' which means 'Little Prince'. She teaches him to dance by looking at the reflection from the river, until her son is very skillful. Once he reaches 10 years old, he asks his mom about her story. After listen from Nang-Nuan-Thong-Samli, he is willing to go back to his grandfather's land. She grants permission and Gu-Maan Noirafts travels to the land of Phraya Sai-Faa-Faad' and performs the dance taught to him by his mother.

Word of his dance skills spreads to Phraya Sai-Faa-Faad' and Gu-Maan Noi is called to perform at his palace. When Phraya Sai-Faa-Faad sees the dancing, he feels familiarity with the performer. Talking to Gu-Maan Noi, the king realizes that the boy is his grandson. He gives his king's attire to Gu-Maan Noi as a costume for this performance and names him 'Khun Sri-Sattha'. The king orders his servants to bring Nang-Nuan-Thong-Samli back to his palace. Even though she at first refuses to return, the servants insist. They bind her hands and bring her back to the palace. Phraya Sai-Faa-Faad asks her for forgiveness. After his mother and his grandfather make their peace, Gu-Maan Noi continues to perform the dance and it has been called 'Nora' since then.

The story of Nora's origins have several key points including:

- a. Nang-Nuan-Thong-Samli dreams about the 12 dance movements performed by an angel.
- b. Nang-Nuan-Thong-Samli teaches the movements to her servants and son until it was called 'Nora' after that time.
- c. Nang-Nuan-Thong-Samli consumes the lotus's pollen then gets pregnant.
- d. Nang-Nuan-Thong-Samli gives birth and her son was named 'Gu-Mann Moi' who became 'Khun Sri-Sattha', the first of the Nora lineage in southern Thailand.
- e. Phraya Sai-Faa-Faad gives the king's attire to Gu-Mann Moi and these attire became part of Southern Thai Nora costume until today.

From these points, I will elaborate by comparing further with the Mak Yong story.

Focusing on Mak Yong, there are various versions but the plots remain similar. For this study, I have chosen the story from a Ph.D. dissertation entitled *The Kelantan Mak Yong Dance Structure: A Study on Performance Structure* by Ghulam-Sarwar Yousof (1979) because it was transmitted in Kelantan. The story begins with 'Dewa Muda' (the young prince), he dreamt about a white deer, which has a golden horn. Once he awakens, he and his servants go to the forest for hunting. Suddenly he finds the beautiful golden deer, he follows this deer until he becomes lost. During that time he tries to find a forest pond. Eventually he comes upon the water. Once he cleanses his body, he finds the petal of a flower upon which a message has been written. "If you get this message, please come to the sky," it reads. Suddenly he falls in love and becomes willing to meet the author, a sky princess named 'Puteri Ratna Mas'. With help from his sibling, he reaches the sky by borrowing a magic kite (Wau Bulan) from his mother. The sky princess and the young prince fall in love. The princess decides to keep him secretly inside her room. By using magical knowledge, she turns Dewa Muda into a white flower, wears the flower on her headdress, and brings him secretly to her room. They spend day and night together happily. One day, one of her servant wonders about her mistress's behavior, she keeps an eye on the princess until she finds Dewa Muda in the princess's room. With no hesitation, the servant kills Dewa Muda by firing an arrow from a bow. He suddenly loses all consciousness. The body of the young prince is brought down to the earth for cremation. While the funeral is prepared, the princess comes to him and revives him with her magic. Finally they both return to the sky and live together forever.

The story of Dewa Muda has key elements including:

- a. The prince found the message from princess written on the petal of a flower.
- b. He climbs up to the sky using a magic kite, his mother's possession.
- c. Dewa Muda and Puteri Ratna Mas fall in love.
- d. Puteri Ratna Mas invites Dewa Muda to her private place.
- e. Puteri Ratna Mas uses magical knowledge disguise Dewa Muda as a white flower.
- f. Her servant kills Dewa Muda.
- g. The princess comes to earth to heal and revive her love using her magical knowledge.
- h. After the tragedy is redeemed, they both return to the sky and live together forever.

From these two myths of origin as related above, I found that the myth of origin of Nora and the story of Dewa Muda from Mak Yong have some similarities in terms of plot, sub-plot and climax point, as well as in their key characters. The meaningful motifs I have found are 'Female Creator', 'Magic Object received from Mother' and 'Women gain special knowledge and mystical power' and 'sexual intercourse'.

About the motif of 'Female creator', it can be said that the stories of Nora and Mak Yong are being told because of the actions from 'Nang Nuan Thong Samli' and 'Puteri Ratna Mas' - the two princesses who create 'herstories'. Without these women, the story of Nora and Dewa Muda could not exist. The motif of 'Magic Object received from Mother' and 'Women gain special knowledge and mystical power' emphasizes the role and status of women and might also symbolize the remnant from primitive society, which is matrilineal. In Southern Thai Nora, Nang Nuan Thong Samli owns the knowledge about dance while in the Dewa Muda story, Dewa Muda's mother owns the magic kite as a heritage from her family.

and Puteri Ratna Mas gains special knowledge to disguise, heal and revive Dewa Muda from death. The actions from these two stories reveal the status of women, the owner of these stories before the mode of production was changed later, with the shifting of power to male dominance, supported by the arrival of Buddhism and Islam.

Focusing on the motif of 'sexual intercourse' I found that Dewa Muda story speaks for 'the sexuality of relations' required by woman (Puteri Ratna Mas) that cannot be accepted in Malay societies. From this point, I assumed that the Dewa Muda story was intended as escapism from the real world while in Nora, Nang Nuan Thong Samli was banished because she was pregnant. It showed a power relationship in which woman was suppressed by man, especially by the father in a patriarchal society.

Shared-Cultural-Heritage in Dance - The Decoding of Dance Movements and Gestures in Southern Thai Nora and Mak Yong

With the similarity of the geographic and cultural landscapes between Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia, dance movements, the story in performance and even music are interacted and exchanged. Focusing on my aim of studying the Malay Mak Yong and Southern Thai Nora, the decoding of dance movements leads us to understand the shared cultural heritage, transmitted through 'body language' in terms of dance and movements. From this point of study, Southern Thai Nora dance movements and Malay Mengadap Rebab are thoroughly analyzed.

Before starting this chapter, I need to mention the importance of dance as a 'creativity product' that expresses the thoughts of humankind. To interpret the meaning of dance we have to understand it as a part of culture, it has its own meaning coded by their community and was created by interaction among the politico-socio-cultural contexts, both in Southern Thai Nora and Malay Mengadap Rebab. To analyze these dances, I started my research by reviewing the related literatures together with conducting the participatory fieldwork as a 'dance practitioner' in Southern Thai and Kelantan, the northern-east state of Malaysia.

Dance Movements and Gestures in Southern Thai Nora

Nora is the Southern-Thai traditional ritual performance which combines singing, reciting verses, dancing, role-playing and healing illness with a magical spell. It has been understood as representative of the Southern-Thai identity by presenting the characteristics of Southerners, which is soft and delicate but also strong and quick. The practitioners who are willing to be 'Master of Nora' have to learn how to perform by relating their bodies to their in-depth souls through the smoothness and rhythm of their gestures. As a consequence, the dancer must relate thought and soul together with body movement. Moreover, people who devote themselves to be a Master of Nora must engage with the ritual of Nora, which is called Nora Roong Khruu.

In the process of learning the dance, the basic movements called 'the 12 gestures' were learned as well as some other basics such as 'Bot Khruu-Sorn' and 'Bot-Sorn-Ram'. Nora practitioners have to learn these and to be absorbed into the aesthetic of Nora until the performers can move smoothly with the music. I started training in Nora in 2011 and realized that the charm of Nora dance does not come only from the beauty of the Central-Thai or Siam Court dance perspective, but the 'liveliness' when the Nora

performers, musicians and onlookers interact. Because the movements of Nora dance closely connect with traditional ways of Southern-Thai life, Nora is appreciated and very well-known in Southern-Thai communities.

Focusing on the dance movements and gestures in Nora, I categorized the basic gestures and movements of Nora into two groups as follows:

a. Dance movements and the imitation of natural phenomenon

Among the Nora dance movements and gestures, it can be said that the most influence that shapes the Nora movements comes from the natural phenomenon that surrounding Southern-Thai landscape. Movements such as the cycle of lotus flower from young bloom to old age, the buffalo horn, the spider spinning its web, the lunar eclipse, a bunch of flowers created.

b. Dance movements and the religious concepts and cultural Interaction

Base on the influence of Hindu-Brahman and later Theravada Buddhism through Southern-Thai communities, new dance movements including Thep Panom, Phrom Dewa, Phrom-Sii-Na, Lord Buddha in gesture of forbidding, and King Rama crosses the ocean were created.

From findings in the Southern Thai Nora dance that show the relationship between dance movements and nature, a comparison to find the shared cultural heritage with Malay Mak Yong will be applied.

*Figure 1: The movement of
'Thep Panom', Southern Thai
Nora
[Kanit Sripaoraya ©2015]*



*Figure 2: The movement of bunch of flowers, Southern
Thai Nora
[Kanit Sripaoraya ©, 2015]*



Dance Movements and Gestures in Malay Mengadap Rebab

During fieldwork in Kelantan, Malaysia, I learned *Malay Mengadap Rebab* from *Puan Ruhani Binti Mohd Zin* at the National Department for Culture and Arts, Kelantan (*Jabatan Kebudayaan dan Kesenian Kelantan*), and a second chance came with *Prof. Farok Bin Zakaria* and *Puan Noor Hayati Binti Zakaria* from the *Bunga Emas Sri Panggung* troupe, Universiti Malaysia Kelantan (UMK). Movements and gestures they all taught me were transmitted from '*Khatijah Awang*', the well-known Prima-donna Mak Yong in Malaysia. As a Mak Yong practitioner, the most important part that I had to understand was the rhythm of 'Gong'. It leads all cues for performers to move smoothly, delicately and rhythmically to its beating. During this practical time I noticed that the body for Malay dance is loosened and naturally sways like ocean waves. Although the movements are soft, Malay performers have to control their bodies and mind under the concept of 'balancing' which is of great significance in the Ancient Malay philosophy. This concept is emphasized and expressed through the balancing of physical movements which start from the right to left, fast and slow, soft and strong, move and rest, and so on.

Focusing on the study of *Malay Mengadap Rebab*, which is crucial in the Malay Mak Yong ritual performance, I have found a previous study which is crucial and meaningful -- a dissertation entitled **The Story of the Wind: The Role of Mak Yong in Shamanistic Healing in Kelantan, Malaysia** by Patricia Ann Hardwick (2009). The highlight of her study is the interpretation of Mengadap Rebab movements. She collected the *Mengadap Rebab* dance gestures and movements and elaborated its meaning by relating it to the influences of ancient Malay philosophy, belief system and Islam. Besides, I found that the dance gestures and movements she collected since 2009 and the movements I have practiced from the *JKKN Kelantan* and *Bunga Emas Seri Temenggong* troupes are almost same. I categorized the movements by their meanings into four groups as follows:

a. Dance movements and life cycle of being

The movements in this category are '*bersedia*' and '*ikan seluang beranak*'. '*Bersedia*' means preparation position is the first position when all Mak Yong performers enter onstage. Pak Yong will sit in the front row followed by Mak Yong, the queen or princess, and the others. In this position, the dancers will sit in a cross-legged position while awaiting the cue from the counting of the gong. When the beating is cued, Pak Yong starts reciting the verse about his status, his royal attire, '*keris*' (Malay dagger) and his authority to rule his country.

Hardwick analyzed this scene by relating it to the cycle of human life when the fetus inside mother's womb is waiting for delivery. The scene when Pak Yong recited the verse refers to the growth of muscles, and body's skin that slowly covers this fetus until a human being is complete.

Another movement that represents the cycle of life is '*ikan seluang beranak*,' meaning the minnow delivers her babies. To perform this, both hands mimic a minnow and her babies. Swaying hands show the moment when the little fishes are delivered beneath the river waters.

b. Dance movements and religious concepts

The movements in this category include *Titik bermula*, *Empat* and *Mesti Satu*. In Hardwick's study, she explained the meaning of *Titik bermula* as 'Point of Beginning' and '*Mesti Satu*' as 'the Oneness,' both

referring to 'Allah' the greatest God who creates everything in the world in Islam. There is also the *empat's* gesture that literally means number four in Malay language. It also refers to the four elements: earth, water, fire and wind. As well as it can combine as a part of the five times daily prayer and the five pillars of Islam.

c. Dance movements and the imitation of natural phenomenon

In this category, natural phenomenon, animal behavior and its characteristics, come the beauty of natural movements which surrounded Malay communities. These are imitated and created as part of *Malay Mengadap Rebab* movements. The movements in this category include:

- *Renyut* movements or 'sway the torso'. To perform this, the dancers will sway their torsos from right to left smoothly. De Danaan explained that this movement imitates the movement of nature when playing with the wind or the swaying of large animals when walking or moving. (Llyn De Danaan, 2014).
- *Dunia kita selalu berpusing* or 'the world is still turning' represents the truth of nature, that all lives are eternally moving as the world is still turning.
- *Dage Membue* or the coconut blossom is falling down
- *Sulur memainkan angin* or the baby shoot is playing with the wind
- *Sawo kami meggarak linkare* or the python uncoiling itself
- *Gajah kami lambagn belalai* or elephant lifting its trunk
- *Ikan Seluang beranak* or the minnow delivers her babies
- *Susun sireh* or the arrangement of betel leaves

d. Dance movements and the influences from cultural Interaction

In this category, I analyze movements by comparison with another dance in Asia, especially in the hand movements and gestures. 'Mudra' gestures come in 'Bharata Nattayam', the well-known Indian dance. From my study I found that there is some similarity of hand movements, perhaps most strongly influenced by mudra. For instance, '*Sembah*' means paying respect to the Sultan, the royal family or a greeting for the audience in a Malay context and is probably derived from the Indian Mudra called '*Anjali*'. '*Empat*' or the Number Four gesture that applies from '*Pataka*', '*Titik bermula*' is similar to '*Hamsaasya*', and the '*mesti satu*' refers to '*suci*' in Bharata Nattayam. Moreover some of the dance movements in Malay Mak Yong and Southern Thai Nora have similarities which can be depicted as a 'shared cultural root' in terms of gesture and movement patterns. According to my findings, the shared movements between Southern Thai Nora and Malay Mok Yong are as follows:



Figure 3: The movement of 'Sod-soi Mala' in Southern Thai Nora (left) and 'Susun sireh' in Malay Mak Yong (right). In Southern Thai Nora, this movement was named and called by the influence from Siam court dance which mean making the flower garland while in Malay Mak Yong means the arrangement of betel leave. Source: Southern Thai Nora – Kanit Sripaoraya©2017



Malay Mak Yong – the performance from group named 'Bunga Mas Seri Temenggong', Malaysia in 'Mak Yong Spiritual Dance Heritage: Seminar and workshop', held by SEAMEO SPAFA at Thammasat University (2011)



Figure 4 : The walking movement in Southern Thai Nora (left) and 'Jalan Sri Rama' in Malay Mak Yong (right)

Source: Southern Thai Nora – Kanit Sripaoraya©2017

Malay Mak Yong – the performance from group named 'Istana Budaya', Malaysia in 'Mak Yong Spiritual Dance Heritage: Seminar and workshop' by SEAMEO SPAFA at Thammasat University (2011)



Figure 5: The movement of 'Buffalo horn' in Southern Thai Nora (left) and 'Tanduk Kerbau' in Malay dance (right)

Source: Southern Thai Nora – Kanit Sripaoraya©2017

Malay Dance – from book entitled Tarian Melayu by Mohd. Ghouse Nasuruddin (1994, p. 20)



Figure 6: Position of 'Bird flies' in Southern Thai Nora (left) and 'Burung Terbang' in Malay dance (right), Source: Southern Thai Nora – Kanit Sripaoraya©2017

Malay Dance – from book entitled Tarian Melayu by Mohd. Ghouse Nasuruddin (1994, p. 20)




Figure 7: Movement of 'fanning fingers' in Southern Thai Nora [Kanit Sripaoraya ©2017]




Figure 8: The movement of 'Sulur memain angin' or the baby shoot is playing with the wind in Malay Mak Yong [Kanit Sripaoraya ©2017]

By observing and participating in the fieldwork of dance in Southern Thai Nora and Malay Mak Yong, I conclude that these two dances have similarities initially inspired and influenced by the natural environment, geography, and the characteristics of flora and fauna within the cultural landscape. For example, the movement of fanning fingers was interpreted as the coconut palms in the wind in Malay Mak Yong or as a bird fluffing its wing in Southern Thai Nora. The movements of 'elephant lifts its trunk' and 'Buffalo horn', as well as the movement of 'bird flies' are common.

Moreover, the dance movements have shown the origins created among 'agriculture communities'. Some dance movement reflects the mode of production in the harvesting process, such as '*Padd-Tarn*' or cut the sea-coconut from its tree. Or the movement of 'fanning fingers,' as Thianchai Isaradej (2003) related to the Southern-Thai traditional sickle. Indigenous cultures interacted with each other, including Siam, Malay, Indian and even Chinese. Dance movements were 're-shaped'. Besides, when the

influences of Hindu, Buddhism and Islam also became implanted, the concept and structure of performances were reshaped, including Southern Thai and Malay Mak Yong. From the arrival of religious influences the shared cultural roots and heritage were re-formed and reshaped.

The Shared Cultural Heritage of 'Nora-Rong-Khruu' and Main Puteri Angin Mak Yong'

From analysis of myths of origin and of dance movements, in this part I will examine the structure of these two ritual-performances. By conducting my fieldwork as a 'participant' since 2014, I have found some similarities which can be said to be 'shared cultural heritage' through the ritual-performance structures. These include not only the elements of performance itself, but also the ritual objects and its function.

Ritual-Performance as 'clan heritage'

Firstly I need to highlight one of the significant functions of these two ritual-performances, 'clan heritage,' because it was used to pay homage to the ancestral spirits of 'animistic belief'. In Southern Thai Nora, the southerners believe in Nora spirits known as '*Khruu-Moe Nora*' or '*Taa-yaii Nora*' as well as holding a belief in ancestor spirits called '*Taa-yai*'. These spirits can either give rewards or punish descendants if they broke promises. To avoid disturbance and to fulfill obligations, a descendant who has 'Nora lineage' or 'Nora clan' must conduct the ritual of Nora or '*Nora Rong Khruu*' to appease the spirits. And the performance itself functions as a ritual space for the Nora practitioner who is willing to be the Master of Nora by passing the 'rite of passage,' beginning with the cutting topknot ritual and completed in the crowning ceremony.

Remnants of indigenous beliefs are also reveals in the ritual of Mak Yong. I participated in one ritual that was held for healing an illness. I was informed that one of the elders fell sick because a clan declined to set the ritual for worship the Mak Yong spirits or '*Khruu-Hmor Mak Yong*' of their lineage. After the ritual to appease the Mak Yong spirits, the illness soon passed.

The belief of the spirits still strong in Malay communities especially in rural areas and it was 're-interpreted' in another two meanings. *Khruu-Hmor Mak Yong* in Thai-Malay society was interpreted as 'angin' which means the 'desire' of that person needed to release, or the 'wind,' one of the four elements of the human body, needed 're-balance'.

From the analysis of plot and character in the story of '*Dewa Muda*,' together with participating in rituals in the three Southern Thai border provinces and Kelantan state, Malaysia, I found that apart from worship of spirits in animistic practice, '*Dewa Muda*' releases desire or repressed passion. In 'Pak Yong' or 'the young prince' or '*Dewa Muda*', the desire to be young, smart and attractive as *Dewa Muda* is fulfilled. The role of '*Mak Yong*' or '*Puteri Ratna Mas*' or 'the sky princess', releases the desire to be gorgeous, and charming. Besides, the ritual of Mak Yong aims not just to heal the ill person, but also affects the actress in the role of 'Pak Yong'. To be in the 'Pak Yong' character is a 'transformation process' that illustrates women (through the Pak Yong performer) can achieve the same 'rights' as a man. It can be said that, in the Dewa Muda Story, the role of Pak Yong reverses the roles of men and women in real life.

From the findings above, I determined that these two ritual-performances reflect 'animism,' especially in ancestor worship. Indigenous beliefs along these lines were strong before the influences of Hindu-Brahman, Buddhism and Islam re-interpreted the meaning and function of the performance to suit religion.

Ritual-Performance as 'remnant of matrilineal society'

Symbols in these ritual-performances demonstrating the remnant of women's status in primitive society include ritual objects includes three coconut shells and a woven basket full of uncooked rice. According to Southern Thai connections with Malay traditional medicine, these ritual objects represent the role of midwife or '*bidan*' and more deeply mean the rebirth of new life after passing this ritual. In Nora, the Nora practitioner will gain new status as 'Master Nora'. In Mak Yong the patient will gain the new life after a performance.

Ritual-Performance as a 'connection between nature-human-spiritual world'

Apart from the function of these ritual-performances as worshipping ancestral spirits, both also present a connection between nature, to human and spiritual worlds.

In relation to the connection to nature, belief in a soul or the spirit of some nature things are used. 'The rice soul' or '*semangat padi*' especially was used to protect ritual space. According to my participation and observation in Nora ritual, the uncooked rice is scattered over the ritual space while in Mak Yong ritual, the popped rice is replaced. Besides, I have found offerings for appeasing the rice soul, including make-up such as powder, mirrors and combs in Mak Yong. From this point I assumed that even though the ritual is conducted to fulfill the wishes of ancestor sprits, it cannot be completed if there is a lack of ritual objects from nature. Performances reflect the primitive belief that humans interrelated with nature and the spiritual world before the emergence of religions. As well, woman is projected as the 'great giver'. I conclude that the Southern Thai Nora and Malay Mak Yong have a shared cultural heritage that relates to women's roles and their status in primitive society. It also shows animistic belief, especially in ancestral spirits and nature's spirit, that still influences human life.

Conclusion

In modern society and in the present times, a woman's life in Southern Thai and Malay societies is suppressed by patriarchy society because males dominate discourse in both Islam and Buddhism. In Buddhism, women are judged to be 'unpurified' and thus unable to seek ordination as Buddhist monks. Women are not permitted to be the Nora ritual-performer. In Islam plus with the Malay customs and traditions, women are expected to be 'ideological women' who have to be humble, polite, graceful, educate children, take care of housework and be a good follower to her husband. The role and status of women in these two ritual-performances is subordinate. But women still take a role as 'spirit medium' in Southern Thai Nora or 'Pak Yong' in Malay Mak Yong to resist, negotiate, and compromise with men. Even though Southern Thai Nora and Malay Mak Yong are dominated by men, women's status working harmoniously with nature is showcased in the Southern Thai Nora and Malay Mak Yong that survives in a

rich, functioning shared cultural heritage today.

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The Perception and Place of Crime in Chiang Mai

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Abstract

Security is one of basic needs that promote quality of city-life while crime has taken parts of insecurity. Feelings of insecurity restrict people movement and/or barrier activities that lead to reduce their well-being. A great number of cases are increasing its seriousness at a conservation area of Chiang Mai. Although it is not occurred in all places of the city but the criminal cases tend to present repeatedly at the same places. Public perception in crime is one range of crime control strategy that policy-makers, urban planners and urban designer take into account. However, there would be a disjunction between how people perceive the risk of crime and actual incident that occurs in the community. Therefore, the study aims to match the perception of crime spaces between the spaces that frequent insist crime and spaces of crime in perception of residents in order to understand characteristics of cognitive spaces and evidential spaces in crime for being benefits to every levels of city planning.

This study is scoped of crime at public space; violence, assaults, property damage and thefts. Data is collected from criminal documents and questionnaires. Stratification sampling is taken to city-residents who lived inside a city more than 5 years. Relationship of reasons of fear is examined by correlation statistics. Afterward, places of crimes and cognitive places are overlaid for summarizing how the spaces play role to the fear of crime.

The result shown that each type of crimes prefers its own specific places differently. Thieves' offenses are usually occurred in an isolated area while cases of snatching crimes are operated in public spaces. The urban spaces that hold potential of crime occurrence are mainly resulted from physical setting and social characteristics of place. Lastly, the perception of Chiang Mai's residents is based on actual occurrences.

Keywords: Fear of crime, Perception of Crime, Place of Crime, Chiang Mai

Introduction

Urban by definition means places where congregate people from many places to live and do business together at the same places. All of people are shared spaces, experiences and participate in urban activities together. Among of crowd in an urban, urban area is contained both of good citizens and criminals at the same time. Numbers of criminals are growing in parallel with community size (Clemente

& Kleiman, 1976) (Lebowitz, 1975) due to tendency criminals need concourse for being their victims and refuge after doing crime.

Fear of crime is reflected by physical evidence such as fences, bar at openings; doors, windows, closed circuit camera and management by regularly control by guard, and policemen. However, all of protections of crimes are doing at private area mainly. It does not cover to public spaces of a city.

In the last thirty years over two hundred articles, conference papers, books have been published on some aspects of fear of crime. There are numbers of apparent in the public's concern regarding a perceived increase in crime amidst declining crime rates (Duffy, 2013 and Fleker-Kantor, Colbert, & Kandris, 2015). Even, fear of crime is a personal perception depends on sex, age, experience, etc. but it reflects an overall of secure quality of life in a city. Fear of crime usually have negative effect on quality of life by individuals to restrict their movements and/or activities that lead to reduce their physical, social and emotional well-being. (The Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 2009) Interestingly, it seems that fear of crime is more widespread than crime itself (Hale, 1996). For example women or elderly are concerning seriously in crime while appeared to have the least risk of being victimised. Kitchen & Williams (2010) revealed an avoidance behavior, risk minimization, social cohesion and community building in Saskatoon, Canada that relate to the fear of crime.

The consequences of fear of crime has particularly impact on individual life style that tend to stay at home and try to protect themselves by tools such as gun and also fragment community connection (Conklin, 1975). Moreover, if fear makes people spend more time at home and off the streets that consequent on less level of surveillance in public spaces which in turn may lead to increases in crime (Goodstein & Shotland, 1980).

Public insecurities about crime are widely claimed in devastate quality of life of individual and community connections. In the other words, feeling of insecurity keeps people off the public places and activities that barrier people to participate in public life and change forms of public environment. Consequently, for controlling crime benefits and maintains neighborhood connection, it needs an analysis that matches perception and reality. Cities that without people at public spaces are leading to a dead city. Therefore, security in individual life and public life about crime is a major subject in consideration for reaching livable city.

Review Literature

A. Fear of Crime

Maslow A.H. has studied on human motivation and proposed his theory in psychology named Maslow's hierarchy of needs in 1943. Maslow's theory has divided human basic needs into five levels; physiological needs, safety needs, needs of love, affection and belongingness, need for esteem and needs for self-actualization. Beyond these needs, the person does not feel the upper need level until the demands of his/her have been satisfied. Security of people has rank in the second order, therefore, security is foremost matter after basic needs. Lang Jon has applied Maslow's model to urban design and explained important of security needs in term of urban design as follow:

Designing for security has become important not only of individual buildings and total and all-of-a-piece

urban designs, particularly housing developments, but also in the broader public realm of urban design concern. Indeed, it remains a prerequisite for people, especially women, children and the elderly, to use spaces at all (Lang, 1994, p. 236).

The fear of crime is a rational response to the defined threat of victimization as opposed to the actual probability of being a victim of crime. Cities are places of social interaction where contingent to a feeling of security (Baumer, Testing a General Model of Fear of Crime: Data from a National Sample, 1985) that underpins a sense of place attachment and the social cohesion of its residents (Warr, 2000) Breetzke & Pearson (2014) have classified factors that affecting the fear of crime at two levels.

1. Individual level that contain factor of age, race and gender. Wyant (2008) has mentioned that fear is reaching to the greatest when individual perceive themselves to be at a physical disadvantage against potential attacks or when individuals believe that they are particularly vulnerable to being victims of crime (Breetzke & Pearson, 2014). The fear of crime at individual level is the psychology of risk perception (Jackson, Revisiting Risk Sentivity in the Fear of Crime, 2011) including sensitivities to issues to the impact of victimization (Lee, 2001) (Zedner, 2003) (Furedi, 2006) and control over its occurrence (Tulloch, 2003) (Jackson, 2004). Furthermore, individuals who have had a direct experience of crime exhibit more fear (Baumer, 1978 and Skogan & Maxfield, 1981). However, Hale (1996) has noted on an indirect experience of crime, hearing about victimization of others may play a stronger role in anxieties than direct experience. Wyant (2008) found that people may take steps to avoid dangerous areas and/or people may reduce their perceived vulnerability.

Painter (1996) has cite on research of Wilson & Kelling (1982) and (Skogan W. G., 1990) that there are three cues which indicate potential risk and heighten fear for personal safety: darkness, disorder and finding oneself alone or in the presence of others who are perceived to be threatening. Moreover, crime and fear are linked to disorderly behavior in public places. Fear of crime develops when residents believe they have lost control over the environment in which they live (Tulloch, 2003)

2. Neighborhood level. In neighborhood level is operated to identify factor of social and structural composition of neighborhoods that could induce fear of crime. The chief factors is the incivilities both of social incivilities such as drunk in public, noise and physical incivilities which is disorder urban neighborhood such as trash and litter, graffiti that increase fear of crime (LaGrange, Ferraro, & Supancic, 1992). Furthermore, the levels of breakdown and disability in that neighborhood also have effected to fear of crime at neighborhood level. It means that neighborhood stability (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981, Wilson & Kelling, 1982 and neighborhood context (Wyant, 2008) (Brunton-Smith & Jackson, Urban Fear and its Roots in Place, 2012) are the main factor that influence the fear of crime.

Many researches have shown environmental cues with the fear of crime. According to the criminological literature, cues fall into two broad categories; social incivilities and physical existing. Social cues are disorderly or disreputable behavior (Biderman, Johnson, McIntyre, & Weir, 1967); noise pollution (LaGrange, Ferraro, & Supancic, 1992) ; numbers of people that are present in the area (Jacobs, 1992, Valentine, 1989 and Burgess, 1994) ; vandalism (Jones, Maclean, & Young, 1986 and Hassinger, 1985) whilst physical cues are poor lighting (Tien, O'Donnell, Barnett, & Michandani, 1979), (Hassinger, 1985, Jones, Maclean, & Young, 1986, and Pain, 1993); graffiti (Maxfield, 1987); litter (Maxfield, 1987 and

Burgess, 1994) poor state of buildings (Hassinger, 1985 and Maxfield, 1987); areas adjoining vacant areas such as car parks, parks (Van der Wurff & Stringer, 1988 and Valentine, 1989); the positioning of shrubberies (Pain, 1993); discarded needles (Burgess, 1994) and the presence of empty or abandoned streets (Lewis & Maxfield, 1980)

In summary, explanations for fear lie partly in the physical deterioration and social disorder of neighborhoods. Feeling of fear depends on two factors; an individual's perception of risk of being a victim and an assessment of how serious consequences of victimization are likely to be. Both factors are likely affected by people's feelings concerning the neighborhood where they live and sense of the presence or lack of community support. Whilst there is a general consensus that recorded crime has relevant with fear in neighborhood, there remains uncertainty in surrounding neighborhoods setting affect fear; and how the reason of feeling of fear relate to each other.

B. Crime and Built Environment

The literature on fear of crime has grown rapidly since 1960s and initial major growth areas for both academic research and policy initiatives. Researchers have launced their interest of crime that relate to built environment by book's of Jane Jacobs named "The Death and Life of Great American Cities". She claimed that frequent crime places are consequent from unwell urban planning. Jacobs drew attention to the role of good visibility combined with natural surveillance as a deterrent to crime. She focused on "eyes on the street" that would maintain social control. Her thesis was a natural surveillance by people who use the public spaces. Guarding eyes will secure spaces are needed appropriate amount of people who continuous use on the street and opening of buildings which face to the street also act as eyes on street. She suggested that less crime would be committed in areas with an abundance of potential witnesses (Jacobs, 1961).

Jacobs's work is supported by Oscar Newman who propose the area called "Defensible Space" in 1972 (Newman, 1972). By his concept, defensible space is "a residential environment whose physical characteristics – building layout and site plan – function to allow inhabitants themselves to become key agents in ensuring their security". Newman focused on social control, crime prevention and public health in relation to community design. He mentioned that crime and fear of crime are caused by a lack of informal social control by poor physical designs which afford out of sight areas and isolated community. By Newman idea, defensible space will promote the feeling of ownership and stimuli surveillance of people. He called for the creation of separation of zones from public to private that allows residents to adopt an attitude of belongingness. To achieve this attitude Newman suggests placing walls or fences at private areas, or employing symbolic devices such as different level of ground, materials, or landscaping (Newman, 1972)

Newman quoted five basic principles of designing defensible space that should have following attributes:

1. The mix of different resident groups that best to utilize and control
2. The territory of space should be subdivided in zones that reflected by residents' proprietary; public space, semi public/private space, private space
3. The natural surveillance at windows to allow resident to natural survey what is happening

4. The juxtaposition of dwellings that create residential atmosphere to impart a sense of security
5. The building forms and group should be small entities that allows people to perceive of vulnerability and isolation of a particular group of inhabitants.

The following study is prone to environmental improvement and many researches suggested to improve street lighting can significantly reduce fear (Murray (1983), Painter K. (1988), Painter K. (1989a), Painter K. (1989b), Vrij & Winkel (1991) etc.

Newman's ideas formed to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, CPTED, that defined by Crowe (2000). In brief, CPTED is centered around the Defensible Space idea. It stresses the importance of a sense of territoriality among residents, and providing natural surveillance through environmental design.

In 1975, Jay Appleton proposed the prospect-refuge theory in *The Experience of Landscape* (Appleton, 1975). The main theory states importance of see without being seen. The desires are for prospect (opportunity of seeing without obstruct) and refuge (safety by concealment). In 1992 Fisher & Nasar published a theory in a manner of add features into theory of Appleton. Fisher & Nasar updated crime prevention in their paper of Fear of crime in relation to three exterior site features: prospect, refuge and escape. They further informed that criminals are seeking for non-surveillance spaces and try to escape from guarding people. And criminals tend to like places that ease to conceal themselves and spots that victims have limit ways to escape.

The recent tool to predict criminals' preferences for committing an offense is Space Syntax. Space syntax is a theory and set of methods for analysis spatial configuration of settlements and buildings. Space Syntax was developed by Bill Hillier, Julienne Hanson and colleagues at the Bartlett School of Architecture, University College London in the 1970s (Space Syntax Limited, 2016). The method calculates the level of accessibility of street segments from all other street segments within a spatial system through two measures, known as Integration and Connectivity.

In summary, fear of crime is a state of emotion to be victimization that varies by ethnic, age, sex, experience, etc. Then, it differs from places to places. And previous studies have proved that crime would occur when both opportunities and criminals are available. Baumer (1985) notified that fear is a rational response of suppose victims. However, there are numbers of researches that revealed contrasting between reality occurrences and fear of crime. In this work, researcher attempt to understand correlation between recorded crime occurrences and cognitive places in the way that spatial setting plays on feeling of fear. The research scope in fear at neighborhood level and investigates in both physical and social cues that have related to fear of crime. The geographical focus area for this research is a historical area of Chiang Mai city in the northern part of Thailand of approximately 100,000 people.

Material and Methods

A. Data

Chiang Mai is a major northern regional city of Thailand. It is found in 1296 by King Mengrai. The city is formed in square shape at about approximately 4,000 square meters. Now an old city area is acted as a central administration, business center and tourist attraction places.

The Muang Chiangmai Police group crime committed in the city into 5 broad categories: violence; assaults; private property damage; theft; and, governmental property damage. The study is scope to crime that occurs to people at public spaces of a city. Then, governmental property damage is not included to this study.

An individual-level data is processed by questionnaire of sampling residents who live in an old city area more than 5 years. The sample size is 400 by calculating method of Yamane (1967). The questionnaire is distributed by stratified sampling according to administrative district.

From the 1960s the concepts of fear of crime has been investigate in a large number, although adequately measured the concept of crime. However, it has often proven elusive because fear of crime is a complex and multifaceted emotion. Farrall, Bannister, Ditton, & Gilchrist (1997) outlined recommendations for measuring the fear of crime with adequate answer. Moreover of social, temporal, and geographic aspects, the questions should pertain not only to understand whether an individual felt safe but why they felt unsafe. To this extent, respondents were asked to point the area of fear and give the reason of feeling of fear. After getting data of places of fear, researcher has traced follow the place that has mentioned in both recorded crime and respondents' opinion and consider their similarities. Furthermore, the reason of fear of respondents are also analysis to show their relevant.

B. Analysis

The statistical Analysis SPSS was used in these analyses. The individual data is summary by frequency (sex, age, experience, etc.). Crosstab technique is used for displaying connection between type of crime incidence and individual data. Moreover, the correlation among reason of fear from questionnaire is investigated by statistical correlation. In addition, the result is investigated the condition of place by surveying.

Results and Discussion

The results and discussion of this article is divided into 2 parts: recorded crime, places in fear of crime of residents' opinion and perceive of crime places correlation between reasons of fear which contain explanation as follow:

A. Places of Fear of Residents

Residents in a conservation area of Chiang Mai have prior experience of crime 3.3% who are all employed and married. Most of victims are in range of 41-50 years old and gain income over 20,000 baht per month (THB).

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the individual-level independent variables

	Frequency	Valid Percent	SD
Sex			.500
Female	188	47.0	
Male	212	53.0	
Age			1.523
10-20	92	23.0	
21-30	106	26.5	
31-40	41	10.3	
41-50	107	26.8	
51-60	27	6.8	
61-70	27	6.8	
Education			.939
High school	108	27.0	
Diploma	96	24.0	
Bachelor Degree	169	42.3	
Graduate Degree	27	6.8	
Income			1.457
1,000-5,000 THB ^a	53	13.3	
5,000-10,000 THB	66	16.5	
10,000-15,000 THB	41	10.3	
15,000-20,000 THB	91	22.8	
> 20,000 THB	149	37.3	
Marital Status			.482
Not Married	146	36.5	
Married	254	63.5	
Employment Status			.490
Available	241	60.3	
Employed	159	39.8	
Prior Victimization			.177
Never	387	96.8	
Used to	13	3.3	

^aTHB is an abbreviation of an unit of Thai currency Baht

The respondents informed fear of crime in places as zone or a neighborhood. The results can be ranked in 5 places; 1) Moon Muang Street (53%), 2) Katum corner (13.8%), 3) Ratchapachinai Street (13.0%), 4) Kang Ruean Jam Street (10.5%), and 5) Hua Rin corner (9.8%) respectively.



Figure 2: Places of crime in mind of respondent in a historical city of Chiang Mai.

Remarks: a) Moon Muang Street, b) Ratchapachinai Street, c) Katum corner, d) Hua Rin corner, and e) Kang Ruean Jam Street

B. Perceive of Crime Places and Correlation Between Reasons of Fear

The reason behind those fears of crime can be grouped into 5 reasons; inadequate lighting, deserted road, distrust of activity at the area, noisy, and too much alleys link to the area. Respondents are mainly state on inadequate lighting at night (32.3%), distrust activities at site (29.2%) and deserted road (23.0%) respectively.

Table 3: Percentage relation between perceptual places of crimes of respondents in a historical city of Chiang Mai

Crime places Reasons	Moon Muang St.	Katam Corner	Ratchapachi nai St.	Kang Ruean Jam	Hua Rin Corner	Total
Inadeq light	68	28	26	28	39	189
%	(11.6)	(4.8)	(4.4)	(4.8)	(6.7)	(32.3)
Empty road	40	28	0	28	39	135
%	(6.8)	(4.8)	(0.0)	(4.8)	(6.7)	(23.0)
Distrust act.	132	13	26	0	0	171
%	(22.5)	(2.2)	(4.4)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(29.2)
Noisy	26	13	13	0	0	52
%	(4.4)	(2.2)	(2.2)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(8.9)
excess alley	13	0	26	0	0	39
%	(2.2)	(0.0)	(4.4)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(6.7)
Total	279	82	91	56	78	586
%	(47.6)	(14.0)	(15.5)	(9.6)	(13.0)	(100.0)

The environment at Moon Muang street contains the most fearful of respondents in Chiang Mai city. The neighborhood of Moonmuang street is mixed with few guesthouses and related activities of guesthouses; pubs, bars, restaurants, etc. Lighting condition of the area has darkness pool in some areas due to a large distant of lamps. Furthermore, the interview revealed that they are afraid of strangers who passing by their neighborhoods. The number of newcomers create their atmosphere such as drunk, noisy, and quarrel in sometime. Such activities lead residents to protect themselves in stay mostly at home that bring to abandoned street of residents that according to Ketchen & Williams (2010). For other fear places of respondents' opinion, it shares number of reasons that difficulty in define the main motives.

However, the results shown that inadequate light at night has taken part of fear of crime in every places in mind of respondents. As light plays a primarily physiological role in our lives by influencing our visual performance; it also acts as an important factor in address crime and fear problems (Loewen, Steel&Suedfeld, 1993; Nasar, Fisher & Grannis, 1993; Painter, 1996; Nasar & Jones, 1997; John Burnett and Alex Yik-him Pang, 2004, etc.).

Furthermore, the interview outcome seems that there are some reasons related to each other. The test of relationship among reasons by the Kendall's tau_b statistic is shown that nearly all reasons are having low relationship at significant level 0.01 except a couple light and abundant alley. Among relationships, only lighting level has correlation with distrust in moderate level at significant 0.01. And there are only a couple of inadequate light and alone atmosphere and a couple of noisy and distrust activities at site are correlated in positive trend. The significant findings are enough illumination can reduce noise level and distrust activities at the area. And when the distrust activity and noisy level are increasing, it would

reduce desert atmosphere accordant with The Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (2009). It seems that level of noise and uneasy activity at neighborhood effected to illumination and continuous use on street in different ways that need to balance.

Table 4: Correlation significant level between couple reasons fear of crime of respondents

	Inadeq Light	Alone Atmos	Distrust Act	Noisy	Too many alleys
Inadequate Light Amount					
Kendall's tau b	1.000				
AsympSig(2-sides)					
Alone Atmosphere Amount	81				
Kendall's tau b	.182**				
AsympSig(2-sides)	.049				
Distrust Activity Amount	27	26			
Kendall's tau b	-.545**	-.339**			
AsympSig(2-sides)	.041	.044			
Noisy Amount	13	0	39		
Kendall's tau b	-.172**	-.276**	.252**		
AsympSig(2-sides)	.045	.022	.047		
Too many alleys Amount	13	39	0	0	
Kendall's tau b	-.092	-.235**	-.284**	-.127*	1.000
AsympSig(2-sides)	.048	.021	.024	.013	

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Those 5 reasons in fear of crime, 3 are categories into physical setting (inadequate lighting, deserted road and excess alley) and 2 are grouped into social condition (distrust activity and noisy). And the top 3 in fear of crime are noted 2 of physical setting and 1 social environment. It seems that physical of the area might have quite effect to fear of crime more than social circumstance at low level of significant level. Furthermore, residential area that changed to mix with commercial activities for newcomers and tourists has decreased relationship among residents in neighborhood and lead to unstable feeling to the residents.

Conclusion

Number of evidences related to fear crime in perceptions are growing in investigation of the local physical and social environment. The fear of crime of individual level of Chiang Mai people are related to fear of crime at neighborhood level.

The incivilities can be occurred in different places that carry inadequate illumination, discontinuous use on street and dissimilar activities of a neighborhood. The physical disadvantage of an area seems induced fear of crime slightly more than social incivilities.

Nonetheless, social environments have involved to break down on neighborhood stability of community connections and devastate public securities in a residential area. New activities has create insecurity to residents and lead to weak stability of neighborhood (Skogan&Maxfield, 1981, Wilson&Kelling, 1982 and

Wyant, 2008). Disorderly urban land use reflects mistake of zoning regulation of Chiang Mai in balancing and controlling activities to fit to an existing contexts. By the results of this study, the level of noise and doubt performances inside a neighborhood are implemented to illumination contrast with feeling of alone.

Lastly, perception of crime among residents are grounded on actual places of threat. It is interesting that city dwellers are considered threat of victimization only at their own circumstances that be a signed of fragment of stability inside a community.

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Politicization of Rice Price: Who Gain and Who Lose from the Populist Policies to Intervene Rice Price in Thailand?

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Abstract

This research aims to (1) analyze the effectiveness of populist policies, particularly the scheme of rice mortgage and the scheme of income guarantee for rice farmers, in mitigating the impact of the global market on the domestic rice price and (2) analyze the politicization of rice price with regards to the sharing within the rice-trading sector of benefits and risks arising from the fluctuation of rice price. First, the results show that adopting the populist policies is effective in mitigating the influence of the global market on the domestic rice price by about 13.33 percent. It also mitigates the influence of the export price pass-through to the paddy rice price by about 35.99 percent. Second, the benefit- and the risk-sharing structures arising from the fluctuation of rice price between the exporters, the rice millers, and the farmers are 1.8305: 0.2232: 97.9463 and 14.9140: 30.7461: 54.3399 before the adoption of the populist policies and during the adoption of the populist policies, respectively. Moreover, different populist policies also result in different benefit- and risk-sharing structures. The different structures are 9.9003: 27.15753: 62.9422, 13.5071: 6.1679: 80.3250 and 5.0864: 15.0578: 79.8558 for the first rice mortgage scheme, the income-guarantee scheme, and the second rice mortgage scheme, respectively.

Keywords: Populist Policies, Rice Price, Politicization

Significance of Rice as a Political Good

In “A Comparative Study of Food Policy in Rice Countries -- Taiwan, Thailand, and Japan” (1982), Professor Hiroshi Tsujii of Kyoto University, Japan, explains the significance of rice on the economic and the political stability in Asian countries that more than 90 percent of rice in the world (at the time) were grown and consumed in Asia, and that rice remains the food crop that the working class consumes, which makes for a relationship between the rice price and the cost of living, especially the relationship

with wages in Asian countries. Rice can, therefore, be considered as a political good, and with such economic and political sensitivity, governments in Asian countries, both developed and developing countries (Jantapong & Sirikanchanarak, 2012: 3) have attempted to prevent their rice prices from being affected by the global market. They have chosen to implement several measures, including tax measures, subsidies, and various market operations, to intervene their domestic markets (Kajisa & Akiyama, 2004: 3)

As for Thailand, rice is an important strategic good (Isawilanon, 2009: 2) as the staple food for the domestic population, and is the number-one export among agricultural produces (Jermittiparsert, Sriyakul & Pamornmast, 2012: 97) as Thai rice owns the top market share in the world's rice market since the World War II²¹² (Forssell, 2009: 7). Moreover, thanks to the signing of the Bowring Treaty, which marked the relationship between England and Siam in 1855, the country began to increasingly open for international trade. With the increasing openness, production was no longer simply for subsistence but for a commercial purpose. Production expanded both in terms of areas and product volumes (Isawilanon, 2010: 57) so as to respond to the foreign market demand (Isawilanon, 2009: 2), and rice farming became the occupation for most households in the rural area. A survey in 1954 showed that 88 percent of the working-age population was farmers (Chuchart & Tongpan, 1960: 9). Rice exports became one of the country's most important issues as the country's economic well-being depended on the rice trade. The years when rice exports did not do well, the impacts were felt on the national income and the income of the farmers; the domestic rice price fell; the farmers earned low income; and the economy and the commerce were then faced with a slowdown (Chuchart & Tongpan, 1960: 219).

The most recent census of the agricultural sector in 2013 by the National Statistics Office indicated that 3,777,470 farmers own land that cultivates rice, which can be categorized by regions as follows: 344,996 in the central region (9.1 percent), 883,635 in the northern region (23.4 percent), 2,437,146 in the northeastern region (64.5 percent) and 111,639 in the southern region (3.0 percent). When considering the household members, in 2010, the population engaging in rice-farming activities could be as high as 17 million people (Isawilanon, 2010: 1) or a quarter of the country's entire population, which makes the rice-farmers the largest voting bloc in the society (Jantapong & Sirikanchanarak, 2012: 2) and the rice policy inevitably influential to the election result (Poramacom, 2014: 201). This also explains why rice farmers strongly support the political party whose campaign involves the mortgage of every grain of rice (Ineichen, 2014: 2) and why rice can turn into a political problem that is strong enough to bring down a cabinet member or even a government (Siamwalla & Na Ranong, 1990: 1).

Politicization and Rice Price

As mentioned above, it has been more than a century that much of the Thai rice is exported (Agricultural Economics Research Bureau, Office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 1994: 104). With the increasing connectedness between Thailand and the world (Isawilanon, 2007: 8), the movement of rice price in the global market has a great influence on the movement of the paddy rice

²¹² This is in exception of 1967-1970, 1973-1976, 1978, and 1980-1981, during which Thailand was the second-ranked rice exporting country (Jantapong & Sirikanchanarak, 2012: 3).

price in Thailand via the price mechanism (Isawilanon, 2009: 37). The study on “Thailand’s Rice Market Model” (1986) by the Agricultural Economics Research Bureau posits that:

“The price of five-percent broken paddy white rice that the farmers received, the wholesale price of five-percent broken white rice in the Bangkok market, and the export price of five-percent broken white rice all trend upwards or downwards along the same line. This is because the domestic rice price, which is the price at which farmers can sell, and the wholesale price in the Bangkok market follow the export price. Rice exporters are the most powerful when it comes to determining the export price, which also moves according to the price in the global market.”

This is consistent with the explanations on the price pass-through mechanism among the exported agricultural produces by Prayong Netayarak (2007: 211-212) and on the determining factors of the price of rice used for domestic consumption by Wattana Na Ranong & Tamrong Chormaitong (1987: 18-19). Other relevant research includes “Statistical Analysis to Establish the Relationship Level among the Factors Influencing the Movement of Domestic Rice Price” (1984) by Tongsuk Tiyachaipanich, “The Study of Demand and Supply Structures of Thai Rice” (1986) by the Land Development Department, and “Power(lessness) of the State in the Globalization Era: Empirical Proposals on Determination of Domestic Paddy Price in Thailand” (2013) by Kittisak Jermsittiparsert, Thanaporn Sriyakul & Sudarat Rodboonsong, which, in addition, points to the facts that the domestic paddy rice price has no relationship with its production cost.

However, rice is the product that is closely related to politics, whereby Wanna Liaowarin (1981: 13, 15) states that the rice price and the export volume have the impacts not only on the national income and the amount of rice for domestic consumption, but they also affect the government’s stability. The government, therefore, has to implement commercial policies and measures that are consistent with the economic and political situations at the time, which makes Thailand’s rice exportation become the shared responsibility between the private sector and the government, instead of letting it be solely in the hand of the private sector as it would have been all along in the free trade regime. The purposes of the government policies are to prevent the middlemen or the rice millers from suppressing the price faced by rice farmers (Siamwalla & Puapongsakorn, 2009: 3), to enable rice to be traded at the highest possible price, to manage the rice volume so that it is adequate for domestic consumption, and to export rice as much as possible (The Land Development Department, 1986: 12). Siamwalla (1975: 233) also elaborated on this complication that because the policy-makers must be confident that the rice exports are traded at prices deemed suitable for producers, consumers, government, and foreign buyers, balancing these benefits cannot be managed with simply economic instruments but can be possible only with political instruments.

The research “The “Populism” Policy and Building/Diminishing Economic “Inequality” and “Unfairness”: Empirical Suggestion on Pork-Barrel in Thailand’s Rice Trading Business” (2012) by Kittisak Jermsittiparsert, Thanaporn Sriyakul & Chayongkan Pamornmast is the latest effort (previous effort by Nipon Puapongsakorn & Jitrakorn Jarupong, 2009) to increase understandings in the politicization of rice

prices. The paper demonstrates the shares of benefits gained by each of the involved parties, which include the rice farmers, the rice millers, and the exporters, from every one-baht change in the rice price in the global market, prior and following the adoption of populist policies, that is, the rice-mortgage scheme in early 2008 and in late 2011 as well as the income-guarantee scheme for rice farmers in late 2009, respectively.

Research Questions

Even though Jermsittiparsert, Sriyakul & Rodboonsong (2013) has pointed out that the rice price in the world market has 4.78 times more impact on the 5-percent broken paddy rice price in the domestic market than the government policy, which means that in the age of globalization, the government power does not truly exist, it must still be considered that rice is a political good that involves the country's largest voting bloc. It is, therefore, necessary for the government to intervene one way or another in order to prevent the world market from influencing the domestic rice price. This leads to the first research question with regards to the effectiveness of pertinent government policies, including the rice mortgage scheme and the income guarantee scheme for rice farmers, in mitigating the influence of the world market on the domestic rice price.

Second, this research has expanded what is achieved in Jermsittiparsert, Sriyakul & Pamornmast (2012) regarding the politicization of the rice price, particularly the benefit-sharing structure as a result of a price fluctuation between the rice exporters, the rice millers, and the rice farmers. The time period of interest was extended from originally April 2011 to April 2013 to cover the time period during which the administration of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra implemented the highly controversial rice mortgage measure, where farmers could pledge every grain of rice for a return of 15,000 baht per ton (Puapongsakorn, Puntakua, Nantajit, Arunkong & Janepuengporn, 2014: 1-1; Forssell, 2008: 35; Inoue, Okae & Akashi, 2015: 4). Additionally, a further question is posed on the benefit- and the risk-sharing structure as the rice price fluctuates in the world market, which is another important issue that the rice farmers must face and, therefore, an objective of the government's rice price intervention policy (Chawengnirun, 2554: 1-2; Jantapong & Sirikanchanarak, 2012: 7), particularly whether the different policies result in any differences in the benefit- and the risk-sharing structures within the chain of rice trading in Thailand including the rice exporters, the rice milers, and the rice farmers.

Research Objectives

The objectives of this research are (1) to analyze the effectiveness of the populist policies, particularly on the effectiveness of the rice mortgage scheme and the income guarantee scheme for rice farmers in mitigating the effect of the world market on the rice price in the domestic market and (2) to analyze the politicization of the rice price with regards to the benefit- and the risk-sharing structure within Thailand's rice-trading chain, which includes the rice exporters, the rice millers, and the rice farmers, as a result of price fluctuations.

Research Methodology

Data used in the research are time series of export rice price, domestic rice price, and domestic paddy rice price in two time periods.

(1) The monthly time series for the time period before the implementation of populist policies, encompassing the 99-month period from January 2000 to March 2008, is considered.

(2) The weekly time series for the time period during the implementation of populist policies, encompassing the 302-week period from April 2008 to April 2014, is considered. These 302 weeks can be broken down into three sub-periods according to the type of policy implemented.

(2.1) The first period of the rice mortgage scheme took place over a period of 57 weeks from April 2008 to April 2009.

(2.2) The income guarantee scheme for rice farmers took place over 110 weeks from May 2009 to July 2011.

(2.3) The second period of the rice mortgage scheme took place over 135 weeks from August 2011 to April 2013.

Data analysis involves a regression analysis with the least-square method in order to test the relationship between the export rice price, the domestic rice price, and the domestic paddy rice price. Stationarity is tested using the Dickey-Fuller unit root test (1979), which finds that the above time series are non-stationary. Series are, therefore, retested using Johansen's cointegration test (1991). In addition, with the Newey-West estimator (1987), the heteroskedasticity and the autocorrelation problems are taken into account in the computation of the standard deviations of the resulting coefficients, so that t-tests can be conducted properly on the pass-through of the changes in rice price along the rice trading chain, that is, respectively from the export price, to the domestic rice price, and to the domestic paddy rice price.

Research Results

The Effectiveness of the Populist Policies on the Mitigation of the World Market's Influence on the Domestic Rice Price

The regression analysis is conducted between the export rice price and the domestic rice price, as shown in Table 1, and between the domestic rice price and the domestic paddy rice price, as shown in Table 2, for the time period prior to the adoption of populist policies. It is found that the prices are positively correlated. Every one-baht change in the export rice price means a 0.981695-baht change in the domestic rice price in the same direction, and every one-baht change in the domestic rice price means a 0.597441-baht change in the domestic paddy rice price in the same direction.

Table 1: Regression analysis of the export rice price and the domestic rice price, prior to the adoption of populist policies

Dependent Variable: RICE		Method: Least Squares		
Sample: 1 99		Included observations: 99		
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 4.0000)				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-590.1670	259.2731	-2.276236	0.0250
EXPORT	0.981695	0.024741	39.67936	0.0000
R-squared	0.976075	Mean dependent var		9027.677
Adjusted R-squared	0.975828	S.D. dependent var		1871.105
S.E. of regression	290.9075	Akaike info criterion		14.20388
Sum squared resid	8208836.	Schwarz criterion		14.25631
Log likelihood	-701.0922	Hannan-Quinn criter.		14.22509
F-statistic	3957.269	Durbin-Watson stat		0.882387
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Table 2: Regression analysis of the domestic rice price and the domestic paddy rice price, prior to the adoption of populist policies

Dependent Variable: PADDY		Method: Least Squares		
Sample: 1 99		Included observations: 99		
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 4.0000)				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	39.32253	104.9029	0.374847	0.7086
RICE	0.597441	0.011408	52.37062	0.0000
R-squared	0.981479	Mean dependent var		5432.828
Adjusted R-squared	0.981288	S.D. dependent var		1128.373
S.E. of regression	154.3525	Akaike info criterion		12.93635
Sum squared resid	2310995.	Schwarz criterion		12.98878
Log likelihood	-638.3493	Hannan-Quinn criter.		12.95756
F-statistic	5140.265	Durbin-Watson stat		0.902043
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

For the period during which populist policies were adopted, Tables 3 and 4 show the regression results between the export rice price and the domestic rice price and between the domestic rice price and the domestic paddy rice price, respectively. The results indicate that the prices are positively correlated. Ever one-baht change in the export rice price means a 0.850860-baht change in the domestic rice price in the same direction, and every one-baht change in the domestic rice price means a 0.382423-baht in the domestic paddy rice price in the same direction. It can be said that after the adoption of the populist policies, the influence of the export rice price on the domestic rice price decreases from 0.981695 to 0.850860, or a decrease by about 13.33 percent. The influence of the domestic rice price on the domestic paddy rice price also decreases from 0.597441 to 0.382423, or a decrease by approximately 35.99 percent.

Politicization of Rice Price in the Benefit- and the Risk-sharing Structures Resulting from Price Fluctuations in Thailand's Rice-trading Chain

The politicization of rice price is considered in terms of the benefit- and the risk-sharing structures along Thailand's Rice-trading chain resulting from the rice price fluctuations, provided that milling 1.67 portions paddy rice would result in one portion of rice. The assumption of this paddy rice to rice ratio holds throughout the analysis

Table 3: Regression analysis of the export rice price and the domestic rice price, during the adoption of populist policies

Dependent Variable: RICE		Method: Least Squares		
Sample: 1 302		Included observations: 302		
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 6.0000)				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	1259.900	503.2252	2.503651	0.0128
EXPORT	0.850860	0.030286	28.09411	0.0000
R-squared	0.960657	Mean dependent var		16502.78
Adjusted R-squared	0.960526	S.D. dependent var		3137.128
S.E. of regression	623.2861	Akaike info criterion		15.71449
Sum squared resid	1.17E+08	Schwarz criterion		15.73906
Log likelihood	-2370.888	Hannan-Quinn criter.		15.72432
F-statistic	7325.283	Durbin-Watson stat		0.435574
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Table 4: Regression analysis of the domestic rice price and the domestic paddy rice price, during the adoption of populist policies

Dependent Variable: PADDY		Method: Least Squares		
Sample: 1 302		Included observations: 302		
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 6.0000)				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	3506.965	417.4315	8.401295	0.0000
RICE	0.382423	0.024725	15.46712	0.0000
R-squared	0.735617	Mean dependent var		9818.016
Adjusted R-squared	0.734736	S.D. dependent var		1398.784
S.E. of regression	720.4270	Akaike info criterion		16.00417
Sum squared resid	1.56E+08	Schwarz criterion		16.02874
Log likelihood	-2414.629	Hannan-Quinn criter.		16.01400
F-statistic	834.7182	Durbin-Watson stat		0.300292
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Prior to the adoption of the populist policies, the rice exporters' share of earnings is 1.8305 percent $((1-0.981695) \times 100)$ whereas the shares received by the rice millers and the rice farmers are 0.2232 percent $((0.981695-0.979463) \times 100)$ and 97.9493 percent $(0.981695 \times 0.597441 \times 1.67 \times 100)$, respectively (Tables 1 and 2).

During the adoption of the populist policies, the rice exporters' share of earnings is 14.9140 percent $((1-0.850860) \times 100)$ whereas the shares received by the rice millers and the rice farmers are 30.7461 percent $((0.850860-0.543399) \times 100)$ and 54.3399 percent $(0.850860 \times 0.382423 \times 1.67 \times 100)$, respectively (Tables 3 and 4).

The analysis can be further broken down into three sub-periods.

For the first period of the rice mortgage scheme, it is found that the rice exporters' share of earnings is 9.9003 percent $((1-0.900997) \times 100)$, whereas the shares received by the rice millers and the rice farmers are 27.1575 percent $((0.900997-0.629422) \times 100)$ and 62.9422 percent $(0.900997 \times 0.418314 \times 1.67 \times 100)$, respectively (Tables 5 and 6).

Table 5: Regression analysis of the export rice price and the domestic rice price during the first period of the rice mortgage scheme

Dependent Variable: RICE		Method: Least Squares		
Sample: 1 57		Included observations: 57		
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 4.0000)				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-188.6648	1155.703	-0.163247	0.8709
EXPORT	0.900997	0.053447	16.85783	0.0000
R-squared	0.913166	Mean dependent var		21093.86
Adjusted R-squared	0.911588	S.D. dependent var		3686.966
S.E. of regression	1096.291	Akaike info criterion		16.87171
Sum squared resid	66101994	Schwarz criterion		16.94340
Log likelihood	-478.8438	Hannan-Quinn criter.		16.89957
F-statistic	578.3948	Durbin-Watson stat		0.523964
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Table 6: Regression analysis of the domestic rice price and the domestic paddy rice price during the first period of the rice mortgage scheme

Dependent Variable: PADDY		Method: Least Squares		
Sample: 1 57		Included observations: 57		
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 4.0000)				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	2246.326	728.4745	3.083603	0.0032
RICE	0.418314	0.035720	11.71102	0.0000
R-squared	0.859854	Mean dependent var		11070.18
Adjusted R-squared	0.857306	S.D. dependent var		1663.255
S.E. of regression	628.2916	Akaike info criterion		15.75834
Sum squared resid	21711271	Schwarz criterion		15.83003
Log likelihood	-447.1128	Hannan-Quinn criter.		15.78620
F-statistic	337.4488	Durbin-Watson stat		1.110347
Prob (F-statistic)	0.000000			

For the income guarantee scheme for rice farmers, it is found that during its implementation, the rice exporters' share of earnings is 13.5071 percent $((1-0.864929) \times 100)$ whereas the shares received by the rice millers and the rice farmers are 6.1679 percent $((0.864929-0.803250) \times 100)$ and 80.3250 percent $(0.864929 \times 0.556101 \times 1.67 \times 100)$, respectively (Tables 7 and 8).

For the second period of the rice mortgage scheme, it is found that during its implementation, the rice exporters' share of earnings is 5.0864 percent $((1-0.949136) \times 100)$ whereas the shares received by the rice millers and the rice farmers are 15.0578 percent $((0.949136-0.798558) \times 100)$ and 79.8558 percent $(0.949136 \times 0.503804 \times 1.67 \times 100)$, respectively (Tables 9 and 10).

Table 7: Regression analysis of the export rice price and the domestic rice price during the income guarantee scheme for rice farmers

Dependent Variable: RICE		Method: Least Squares		
Sample: 1 110		Included observations: 110		
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 5.0000)				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	800.4778	376.2313	2.127622	0.0356
EXPORT	0.864929	0.022349	38.70089	0.0000
R-squared	0.958639	Mean dependent var		14955.27
Adjusted R-squared	0.958256	S.D. dependent var		1491.858
S.E. of regression	304.8065	Akaike info criterion		14.29525
Sum squared resid	10033959	Schwarz criterion		14.34435
Log likelihood	-784.2385	Hannan-Quinn criter.		14.31516
F-statistic	2503.156	Durbin-Watson stat		0.882097
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Table 8: Regression analysis of the domestic rice price and the domestic paddy rice price during the income guarantee scheme for rice farmers

Dependent Variable: PADDY			Method: Least Squares	
Sample: 1 110			Included observations: 110	
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 5.0000)				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	602.5277	456.7399	1.319192	0.1899
RICE	0.556101	0.030349	18.32329	0.0000
R-squared	0.767297	Mean dependent var		8919.170
Adjusted R-squared	0.765143	S.D. dependent var		947.1075
S.E. of regression	458.9879	Akaike info criterion		15.11394
Sum squared resid	22752348	Schwarz criterion		15.16304
Log likelihood	-829.2667	Hannan-Quinn criter.		15.13385
F-statistic	356.1118	Durbin-Watson stat		0.549374
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Table 9: Regression analysis of the export rice price and the domestic rice price, during the second period of the rice mortgage scheme

Dependent Variable: RICE			Method: Least Squares	
Sample: 1 135			Included observations: 135	
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 5.0000)				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-89.63559	424.4195	-0.211196	0.8331
EXPORT	0.949136	0.025800	36.78815	0.0000
R-squared	0.972378	Mean dependent var		15825.26
Adjusted R-squared	0.972170	S.D. dependent var		1794.742
S.E. of regression	299.4023	Akaike info criterion		14.25616
Sum squared resid	11922354	Schwarz criterion		14.29920
Log likelihood	-960.2906	Hannan-Quinn criter.		14.27365
F-statistic	4682.023	Durbin-Watson stat		0.766391
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Table 10: Regression analysis of the domestic rice price and the domestic paddy rice price, during the second period of the rice mortgage scheme

Dependent Variable: PADDY			Method: Least Squares	
Sample: 1 135			Included observations: 135	
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 5.0000)				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	2048.897	873.7336	2.344990	0.0205
RICE	0.503804	0.055800	9.028682	0.0000
R-squared	0.718872	Mean dependent var		10021.72
Adjusted R-squared	0.716758	S.D. dependent var		1066.443
S.E. of regression	567.5663	Akaike info criterion		15.53530
Sum squared resid	42843487	Schwarz criterion		15.57834
Log likelihood	-1046.632	Hannan-Quinn criter.		15.55279
F-statistic	340.0933	Durbin-Watson stat		0.169431
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Discussion and Conclusion

It can be concluded that not only does the relationship found here among the export rice price, the domestic rice price, and the domestic paddy rice price correspond with many other research works. (Chulaphan, Jatuporn, Chen & Jierwiriya (2012); John (2013); Poramacom (2014); Pitchayamahut (2015); Sahavacharin & Srinon (2016)), but the populist policies can also be proven to mitigate the influence of the world market on the domestic rice price with some effectiveness. The influence of the export rice price on the domestic rice price is reduced by approximately 13.33 percent, while the price pass-through to the paddy rice price is reduced by about 35.99 percent.

In this regard, rice can be thought of as a political good, unlike any other agricultural products. Jemsittiparsert, Sriyakul & Rodboonsong (2013) once conclude that “the government intervention in rice price is irrational because the government policy is much less influential to the domestic paddy rice price than is the influence of the rice price in the world market, despite its significant, negative relationship with the rice price in the world market, such that the government-determined price offsets 27 percent of the rice price in the world market”. However, such conclusion is drawn without considering the economic and political fragility of rice as a political good, and deserves to be reviewed and again carefully discussed now that it can be established that the populist policies adopted by the government in recent times has successfully served other purposes, including mitigating the influence of the world market and effectively protecting the domestic market.

As for the politicization of rice price, the shares of benefits or risks borne by the rice exporters, the rice millers, and the rice farmers as a result of the price fluctuation in the rice-trading industry differ across time periods. Prior to the adoption of the populist policies, the shares borne by the rice exporters, the rice millers, and the rice farmers are 1.8305: 0.2232: 97.9493, respectively. During the implementation of the populist policies, the corresponding ratio is 14.9140: 30.7461: 54.3399. Different populist policies also produce different sharing structures. Specifically, during the first period of the rice mortgage scheme, the ratio is 9.9003: 27.15753: 62.9422; during the income guarantee scheme for rice farmers, the ratio is 13.5071: 6.1679: 80.3250; during the second period of the rice mortgage scheme, the ratio is 5.0864: 15.0578: 79.8558 (Table 11).

This result is somewhat inconsistent with the work by Chawengnirun (2011: 19-20), which indicates that the government intervention in the form of rice mortgage scheme affects the rice exporters negatively, the rice millers positively and negatively, and particularly the rice farmers positively, because such scheme would raise the rice price. On the contrary, this research finds that the share of benefits borne by the rice farmers decreases during both periods of the rice mortgage scheme, that is, originally from 97.9463 percent down to 62.9422 percent and 79.8558 percent during the first and the second periods of the rice mortgage scheme, respectively. However, this research is consistent with Puapongsakorn (2008 as cited in Hongtaison & Kamnuansilp, 2013: 1306), which finds that the rice millers benefit from the scheme as their share of benefits increases from 0.2232 percent prior to the adoption of the populist policies to 27.1575 percent and 15.0578 percent during the first and the second periods of the rice mortgage scheme, respectively.

Table 11: The benefit- and the risk-sharing structure borne by players in Thailand's rice-trading sector as a result of rice price fluctuations

	Benefit- and risk-sharing in Thailand's rice-trading sector		
	Exporters	Millers	Farmers
Prior to the adoption of populist policies	1.8305	0.2232	97.9463
During the implementation of populist policies	14.9140	30.7461	54.3399
- Rice mortgage scheme, first period	9.9003	27.1575	62.9422
- Income guarantee scheme for rice farmers	13.5071	6.1679	80.3250
- Rice mortgage scheme, second period	5.0864	15.0578	79.8558

Because rice is produced seasonally, the rice price also moves according to seasons (Isawilanon, 2010: 25). When supply rises during the harvest season, the rice price falls, and when supply starts to fall as the harvest season passes, the price gradually rises (Agricultural Economics Research Bureau, Office of Agricultural Economics, 1986: 27; Chawengnirun, 2011: 14). Based on the data analysis, prior to the adoption of the populist policies, it appears that rice farmers may receive the greatest share of benefits. However, it has been a long-standing fact, for at least six decades-as far as history can be traced (Kongrit & Petcharat, 2016: 195), that farmers usually sell rice immediately after harvest. Most or all of the in-season rice are usually sold from the month of January to the month of April (Chuchart & Tongpan, 1960: 107-108), which is the reason why the government attempted several measures to address the problem. For instance, in 1955, the Public Warehouse Organization was established to purchase and gather rice from the farmers after the harvest season (Isawilanon, 2009: 50)²¹³. An implication of the seasonal factor is that even, according to the data analysis, the farmers receive the greatest share from rice sales, the share can also be presented as the risk arising from seasonal price fluctuations. Prior to the adoption of the populist policies, farmers, therefore, have to carry all such risks (97.9463 percent), especially during the period of falling rice price. Rice millers and exports, on the other hand, even though receive much smaller shares, they can sell the rice when the price already goes up.

The adoption of the populist policies to deal with rice may then be politicized as mentioned by Siamwalla (1975: 233). The policies may be employed to re-balance the unequal benefits that are originated from rice-trading. The policies are intended to re-distribute the risks from price fluctuations from originally being passed directly to the farmers²¹⁴ to being spread to the millers and the exporters in a greater

²¹³ However, the practice was not seriously implemented until 1960, which was when the government set up and tasked the Rice Reserve Committee with responsibilities to purchase paddy rice from farmers in provinces where complaints of low rice price arose. Even then, the implementation was limited in scope as the government lacked the revolving fund to operate such measure (Agricultural Business Research Unit, 2006 as cited in Isawilanon, 2009: 50).

²¹⁴ Before the populist policies are implemented, a one-baht change in the export rice price means a 0.981695-baht in the domestic rice price and a 0.597441-baht change in the domestic paddy rice price. After the populist policies are adopted, a one-baht change in the export rice price means a 0.850860-baht change in the domestic rice price (representing a decrease by 13.33 percent) and a 0.382423-baht change in the domestic paddy rice price (representing a decrease by 35.99 percent).

extent. Since the millers and the exporters can sell their stocks of rice when the price seasonally trends upwards, the shares received by the millers and the exporters should present more benefits than risks, as evidenced by the regression results that during the implementation of these policies as political instruments, the millers and the exporters see an increase in benefit shares. Specifically, the millers' share increased from 0.2232 percent to 27.1575 percent during the first period of the rice mortgage scheme, and the exporters' share from 1.8305 percent to 13.5071 percent during the income guarantee scheme for rice farmers. For this reason, although the adoption of the populist policies aimed at intervening the rice price did increase the farmers' income somewhat, farmers remain one of the poorest occupational groups, because the overall benefit distribution is not enough to help the farmers escape poverty (Jantapong & Sirikanchanarak, 2012: 8-9), and above all, still does not reduce the existing gap nor eliminate the economic inequality (Jermstittiparsert, Sriyakul & Pamornmast, 2012).

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